Southeast Asia in the 9th to 14th Centuries

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Southeast Asia in the 9th to 14th Centuries

edited by
David G. Marr and A.C. Milner
(with an introduction by Wang Gungwu)

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A ship from the carvings on the 8th century Buddhist temple at Borobodur, central Java. This is thought to represent a trading and passenger vessel utilizing the monsoon winds of the Java Sea in the period of the Javanese and Sumatran Kingdoms of 500–1000 A.D.
[The publishers gratefully acknowledge G. Adrian Horridge, **The Design of Planked Boats of the Muluccas** (London: National Maritime Museum, 1978) for the use of this illustration.]

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Preface

In May 1984, about forty historians, epigraphers, archaeologists, linguists and anthropologists convened at the Australian National University for four days to talk about early Southeast Asia. It was a refreshingly cosmopolitan encounter, at least four languages being spoken across the conference table, another six cropping up in the conference papers.

The outcome might have been a Southeast Asian tower of babel, with each specialist talking past the others. Fortunately, most participants came to Canberra eager not only to present the fruits of their most recent research, but also to evaluate the state of the field in general, and to engage in interdisciplinary and cross-regional discourse. To encourage such exchanges, conference organizers insisted that authors remain silent while their papers were introduced and reviewed by participants who were not specialists in the particular subject matter. Thus, a Javanist reviewed a paper on early Vietnam, a Malay specialist reviewed a paper on Arakan. Of course, authors took part in subsequent discussion and were permitted the final word. On the first morning some participants regarded the method with a certain trepidation, but by lunchtime it was clear we had an intellectually stimulating atmosphere in which the research materials themselves were being subordinated to the issues raised and the problems demanding further investigation. Towards the end of proceedings a number of scholars commented on how they had gained a better conceptual context for their own highly specific work.

Fortunately this spirit did not dissipate when scholars returned home, and has been captured in the revised papers published in this volume. Readers not familiar with the early history of the region will discover that Southeast Asia was a lively place in the ninth to fourteenth centuries, with extensive trade, bitter wars, kingdoms rising and falling, ethnic groups on the move, impressive monuments being constructed, and profound religious issues being debated. Readers vaguely aware of such grand Southeast Asian kingdoms as Angkor, Pagan, Majapahit, Champa or Dai Viet will see them take on colour and character. On the other hand, readers already well versed in the available literature will find that a number of contributors to this book are uncomfortable with established labels, asking

whether they oversimplify reality, or obscure important developments elsewhere in the region.

To push deeper and wider in early Southeast Asian history demands discussion of specific texts, authors, artefacts and concepts. These are the building blocks which allow analysis to reach beyond mere speculation. The editors of this volume urge readers not to be daunted by erudite passages. As students of nineteenth and twentieth century Southeast Asia, we share your difficulty. Nonetheless, amidst all the inscriptions, genealogies, poetic allusions and Old Javanese kinship terms, we are rewarded with a far better understanding of how people lived in Southeast Asia five hundred to one thousand years ago. Today's Southeast Asia cannot be comprehended without reference to those seminal developments.

This volume is directed not only at the regional specialist, however. As Wang Gungwu explains in the introduction, all of the contributors address questions which concern historians of many parts of the world. The student of history having no training in Southeast Asian studies will, we hope, find much of interest in the way the authors in this volume analyse the development and character of the early polity, the processes of culture contact, and the methodologies which might be most rewarding in the investigation of the historical records of a distant civilization.

In an endeavour of such complexity, it is impossible to name all the people who helped make it possible. Our first thanks go to the Departments of Pacific and Southeast Asian History and Far Eastern History at the Australian National University, which provided institutional support from the moment the conference idea was conceived to the day we sent off camera-ready text to the publisher. The Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU, and the ACLS/SSRC Joint Committee on Southeast Asia both responded generously to our applications for conference funding, thus enabling us to invite a number of participants from overseas. Jennifer Cushman and Jennifer Brewster helped to plan and implement the conference. Among the many other scholars who participated in the conference proceedings but are not represented in this volume, special mention and gratitude is extended to J.M. Gullick, Michael Aung Thwin, Christian Bauer, Peter Burns, E. Edward McKinnon, and Ian Proudfoot.

At the close of the conference, everyone agreed we must not allow the process of revision, editing and printing to delay dissemination of important findings for many years. Fortunately, most authors returned their revised manuscripts in reasonable time, and the editors received expert local assistance from a number of individuals. Jennifer Brewster, Ian Taylor, Claire Mandle, and Jacqui Parkinson shared copy-editing chores with us. Karen Haines devoted uncounted hours to preparation of the camera-ready text and diagrams, extracting every ounce of potential from our imperfect word-processing equipment, always trying to improve the consistency and aesthetic quality of printing and formatting. Triena Ong, Managing Editor of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, gave us valuable advice from the moment the ISEAS accepted the manuscript for publication.

David G. Marr A.C. Milner

Introduction

Wang Gungwu

For several decades non-Western history has attracted a new breed of historian, who accepts that an interdisciplinary approach is essential to the study of the past. The traditional historian, who depends primarily on archival records, has of course accepted this approach when normal sources prove inadequate to deal satisfactorily with all the complex features of the past. For most modern periods, however, an interdisciplinary approach has had little appeal to the historian already faced with a superfluity of material in large and orderly archives. Only when it comes to the non-Western past has it been conceded that interdisciplinary studies might be necessary.

Pre-colonial Asia, Africa and the Americas, sadly without archives, could not be studied by historians at all without the help of other kinds of scholars. For this reason, most of the best-trained professional historians in the West either ignored the non-Western world entirely or limited themselves to the history of Western settlement or Western imperial and colonial enterprises outside Europe. The non-Western past was impossible to study by conventional historical methods because much of that past was by definition unhistorical. It consisted largely of exotic if not esoteric materials gathered by travellers, discoverers, missionaries, colonial administrators, even merchant-adventurers, and ultimately systematically recorded and explained by professional ethnographers and, for Asia and North Africa, by orientalists.

Despite questions about their dubious origins in Western expansionist history, both ethnographers and orientalists are descended from a highly respectable group of scholars, the classicists, whose broad, almost encyclopaedic tradition of learning may be traced back to the Greeks and Romans, the Arabs and then the Renaissance Europeans. The tradition still survives in some departments of classics in modern universities. Unfortunately, in recent times it has been regarded as a revered, but not greatly relevant, holistic approach towards knowledge, which may be still useful for the study of remote antiquity, but whose capacity to say anything new about that antiquity now depends mainly on the discoveries of the archaeologists.

However useful that classical tradition may have been in the past, it is not considered of much help for scholars today. The scholarly world increasingly believes that professional skills in well-established

modern disciplines are essential at the frontiers of knowledge. This applies to the study of the past as much as to the study of contemporary problems.

Increasingly, from the achievements of a multitude of scholars who have had to master many kinds of skills to deal with the history of cultures and civilisations other than their own, evidence is gathering to show that interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approaches have advanced our knowledge of the past for areas where professional historians have been unable to work. I am not referring here to the example of the **Annales** school of history, where the use of modern disciplines, including those of the natural and biological sciences and the social sciences, has greatly enriched our understanding of the dynamics of social and cultural change. Achievements there are primarily in areas where written and archival sources are dominant, and the new disciplines have served to widen the range of questions asked of these sources. Similarly, the belated use of similar disciplines in the study of Japanese and Chinese history has not brought about real advances in methodology. There, too, documentary sources abound, and advances in knowledge have come from re-examining the sources with new sets of questions stimulated by new academic disciplines.

Far more dramatic have been the achievements of those scholars who have focused on the pre-modern history of the Americas, Africa south of the Sahara, and South and Southeast Asia. Here the shortage of written sources has pushed students of history to depend more and more on the skills of anthropologists, archaeologists, linguists and art historians. Furthermore, a distinction can be made between Africa and the Americas on the one hand and the South and Southeast Asian regions on the other. Where the former is virtually devoid of indigenous written sources, the latter does offer some documents to satisfy classically trained historians, philologists, and scholars of **belles-lettres**; the skills of these scholars can in turn attract the attention of modern social scientists who are usually more concerned with literate and developed societies and polities. In short, South Asia and Southeast Asia are ideally placed to bring the maximum variety of traditional and modern scholarly skills together. Several scholarly books and articles during the past decade or so confirm that this conscious coming together of skills has been fruitful and the results remarkably encouraging.

This volume of essays on Southeast Asia takes another step forward in efforts to elucidate the pre-modern past through the integration of various scholarly skills. While these essays do not constitute a revival of the classical skills, they do demonstrate how these fine old skills can work together successfully with technically sophisticated new skills in order for progress to be made.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the beginnings of history in Southeast Asia had to be reconstructed by using the methods of epigraphy and philology on a small number of literate sources. During the twentieth century, sustained work by archaeologists and social anthropologists has opened wide the range of reconstructions possible. It has filled in many gaps in knowledge, as well as offering more sophisticated explanations for what we do know. Since the end of World War II, there have been further improvements in the methods of studying pre-literate and barely literate societies,

and scholars have been asked to re-examine their texts afresh in the light of what is now known about the nature of pre-modern societies around the world.

These developments in the study of Southeast Asia led to a major conference in London in 1974 to evaluate the results of new research and the application of new methods. That conference produced an excellent collection of papers, **Early South East Asia**, edited by Ralph Smith and William Watson (Oxford University Press, 1979). The volume confirmed the value of combining various techniques and disciplines for building a picture of the region's ancient history, and offered stimulating new perspectives on the two millennia before the tenth century AD. In particular, it showed to what extent the discoveries of the archaeologists have challenged the picture offered by the scant written sources, and how the new reconstructions of pre-modern societies by social anthropologists have refined the questions which need to be asked of those sources. The most dramatic successes have surfaced in work on prehistoric periods, notably findings about the origins of horticulture, agriculture and bronze metallurgy in mainland Southeast Asia. However, many gaps in the story remain, and much work still has to be done.

In the meantime, a later period in pre-modern Southeast Asian history has been under investigation by several groups of historians. Not surprisingly, their findings have been influenced by the methods of the social sciences, and they too challenge many of the interpretations accepted earlier this century. Among these, perhaps the most significant effort involves re-examination of the theme of 'Indianisation', and the extent to which exaggeration of that theme led to serious errors of interpretation of earlier archaeological materials. Another area of scholarly revision relates to ancient maritime trade, where the concern is to rectify a misleading picture of the region as merely a passage-way for foreign merchants, providing stopping-places and shelters for ships sailing between India, West Asia and China. Yet another reconsideration focuses on the nature of indigenous political structures, including the difficult problem of how states came into being, and how their evolution proved to be far different from the picture derived from the records kept by Chinese mandarins from afar. There remained, however, interesting differences in interpretation between the 'ancients' (those who looked forward from the earliest beginnings and depended mainly on archaeology) and the 'moderns' (those who turned backwards and concentrated on new written sources and on what re-reading the known texts could reveal).

These differences are manifested largely in an intermediate historical zone, where written sources are thin or fragmentary and where protohistoric archaeology is constantly finding materials which do not quite fit what has been preserved in writing. Broadly speaking, this coincides with the period chosen for the 1984 conference in Canberra, from which this volume of essays derives - the period between the ninth and fourteenth centuries. This is a zone into which both the 'ancients' and 'moderns' venture and occasionally meet, but it remains difficult, partly because archaeology has not revealed enough, partly because written sources have been either inadequate or too cursorily examined so far. Over the decades, four scholars have stood out in seeking to bridge the gaps - J.G. de Casparis, Oliver Wolters, Boechari and Paul Wheatley - and their distinguished contributions have

challenged others to re-examine all that has been said, especially about these intermediate six centuries. Indeed, it was the recent bold effort by Wolters to analyse the total range of evidence for a new explanation of what happened to early Southeast Asian states and cultures (in his book **History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives**, Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1982) that led to the 1984 conference.

The organisers of the conference had begun with other plans. They were first interested in the border areas between mainland Southeast Asia and southwestern China. After reading Wolters' book, virtually as it came hot off the press from Singapore, they realised that he had taken the subject further afield and had set out some key questions about the continuities which make Southeast Asia a historical unity. Wolters not only focused on the time zone between the 'ancients' and the 'moderns', but also sought to reformulate the old image of the region as intermediate between India and China. His delineation of sub-regions was particularly helpful. Geographical zones within the region could now be discerned which were just as important as the well-known ones between Java-Sumatra and South and Southwest Asia, between the mainland valley states and India, and that with which the conference organisers started between the valley states and southern China. During the conference this fruitful approach encouraged discussion in depth of relationships among sub-regions, especially Java-Sumatra and the mainland valley states, the intermediate Malay peninsula areas, Cambodia and Champa, and between the latter two and Vietnam.

Wolters' ideas were used also to organise the conference along the themes of 'Polity', 'Localisation and Cultural Diversity' and 'Approaches'. His use of the **mandala** to characterise the nature of the region's polities provided an excellent start. The **mandala** concept questions received ideas about the 'state', about 'big men' and their kin, about what constitutes a 'dynasty'. It emphasises the precariousness and subtlety of relationships between centre and periphery, where force is inadequate, administrative structures non-existent, economic ties minimal. The first nine essays in this volume explore the many facets of this subject from different angles and at the same time demonstrate how the same questions can be usefully asked of at least four sub-regions: the three major ones of Java, Cambodia and Vietnam, plus the less familiar one at the neck of the Malay peninsula (Stargardt). Two papers emphasise factors which Wolters has always recognised but does not deal with extensively in his new book: both Vickery and Stargardt examine economic and technological factors which helped determine the nature of the polities in Cambodia and at Satingpra.

What is common to the remaining papers is particularly striking. Two points deserve attention. The first involves examination not only of changing images and perspectives through time, but also of changing structures, as, for example, in the process of state formation through local and regional phases to an 'imperial' phase (Kulke). While this is more true of the mainland valley states than elsewhere in the region, it nevertheless provides a useful test, especially as compared with the ebb and flow of power distribution in Java (Christie and de Casparis), or the spatial (maritime) mobility of the Malay world (Manguin). The second point relates to the position of Vietnam on the edge of the core areas of Southeast Asia. Bearing in mind the extent to which indigenous societies and cultures in Vietnam have, like those of Kwangsi and

Kwangtung, been submerged through the lack of interest among the compilers of Chinese historical records, three papers on Vietnam (Whitmore, Taylor and Ungar) bring out political, religious and symbolic features which should be familiar to those specialising in other parts of 'Indianised' Southeast Asia (as do the other three papers on Vietnam by Wolters, Tran Quoc Vuong and Guy).

The second major theme of the conference concerned 'localisation'. This raised the question of whether specific integrated local cultures existed prior to the coming of foreign cultural elements, and to what extent the latter were accepted, fractured and restated, or 'localised', by pre-existing local cultures. In the Southeast Asian context, where totally indigenous data have until recently been deemed non-existent for the historical periods, scholars were notorious for their readiness to consider almost anything they found in the region, including archaeological artifacts, to have come either from outside the region or to have been influenced by external cultural elements. This has been one of the great burdens which Southeast Asian historians have had to bear. Eight of the essays in this volume were written partly in response to the 'localisation' theme, and they certainly show how difficult it is, in an area of such cultural diversity, to distinguish indigenous from foreign elements in the integrated cultures which eventually emerged.

Perhaps the most probing question is that raised by Macknight, when he examines the eastern edges of the region, which have been regarded as deep in the shadows of whatever light may have come from India in the distant past. Do the cultures of the Eastern Islands constitute a dark intermediate zone between 'Southeast Asia' and the largely indigenous cultures of Oceania (especially the Pacific world of the Melanesian and Polynesian peoples)? Or does their very lack of definition constitute proof that all light emanated from India and the West, and that it was their distance from that source which left them in shadow? In sharp contrast, the two essays on Vietnamese culture and technology (Tran Quoc Vuong and Guy) show what happened when the light from China was strong and the local peoples had to struggle hard to defend their 'local genius'. In between are even more kinds of responses, all conspiring to make the question of 'localisation' too multifarious to be easily pinned down (see the sophisticated discussions by Vallibhotama, Mabbett and Fox). The process of localisation involved ecological differences, distance or proximity from a Great Tradition, elite and popular responses to spiritual needs, deeply rooted kinship structures, different uses of rituals and regalia, processes of urbanisation and, not least, technology and modes of production.

Despite all that, a sense of what the 'localisation' process meant does come through all the essays and we are left in no doubt that it is a refreshing concept helping us to re-assess the 'Indianisation' and 'Sinicisation' motifs of much early writing. And, in each of these eight essays, there are further successful challenges to the idea that everything significant in the region came from somewhere else.

The conference ended with three essays on the theme of 'Approaches'. Although this did not attract as many papers as the other two themes, the three essays, especially Wolters' own on the reading of a particular Vietnamese text, demonstrated that the time has come for historians of Southeast Asia to look at 'texts' as a means of understanding how people who lived in a particular time and place

saw the world around them and communicated their ideas to contemporaries.

This approach is not new, of course. The best traditions of philology demanded the elucidation of source materials in this way. But the present effort is informed by more sophisticated developments in linguistics. It also has the great merit for historians of challenging them to stop plundering surviving documents for facts before they know the meaning and context of the words they pick out, before they can appreciate the circumstances and environment in which the authors lived and the words were uttered. On this point, the well-known strictures of Jacques (and, earlier, of de Casparis) are underlined repeatedly. Also, with fine imagination, Worsley is able to demonstrate that 'texts' of stone (bas-reliefs, temples, even whole cities?) can be equally revealing of the kind of self-conscious localisation which we are trying to depict in words. Perhaps the most illuminating point coming out of the essays on localisation and on approaches, however, is that examples of Indian ideals being emptied of meaning and filled with Javanese experiences are restatements. This leads to the view that no monument or statue in Southeast Asia is unmistakably Indian, every one of them being restatements expressing indigenous needs.

It can now be said that Wolters' new book provided a valuable handle for a score of scholars to take another look at early Southeast Asia, to open themselves to other disciplines, to adopt a sub-regional and multi-centred view of the region instead of a holistic one and, not least, to read the 'texts' correctly and not anachronistically. Beyond that, we came to realise that our separation of 'polity' as an institution from 'localisation' as a process implies a priority historians tend to give to 'polity'. Historians are inclined to identify the institution before they analyse the process (of localisation, in this case) by which that institution was formed and, through such analysis, try to understand the processes by which the polity could thereafter induce more and greater 'localisation'. That is understandable because it is futile to speak of processes in the abstract. Nonetheless, perhaps we could be more explicit in recognising that each polity was itself the product of localisation, that in reality they are inseparable, two sides of the same thing. Several conference participants did emphasise in discussion that localisation was natural and inevitable (how quickly did the dynamic process overshadow the institution!), and that the most interesting questions were which parts of the Great Traditions were localised, and why. It is undeniable that, in most parts of the region, elements of the Great Traditions appear dominant in form. The question remains, however, why some Traditions had the capacity to transform indigenous cultural elements so that the effort to localise that Tradition simply led to the submergence of those indigenous elements, whereas other indigenous cultures were so integrated and distinct that the Great Tradition they localised survived merely superficially.

The historical process of localisation is obviously a difficult one to describe and explain. What makes it even more interesting is that it did not stop with Great Traditions, but occurred also within the region as something that might be called re-localisation. For example, Javanese and Khmer influences on Champa, reciprocal influences between the Mons and the Burmans, numerous local or localised strands that became woven into what is now Thai, all take us away from the

grand themes of 'Indianisation', and from large and often misleading categories such as 'China' and 'India' which have dominated so much of the literature on early Southeast Asia until recently.

There were suggestions at the conference that, by plotting on the map these examples of local localisations within the region, we would have a clearer picture of how each localised polity might have determined the shape and nature of another. Equally important would be a map showing how 'Indian materials', already transformed and adapted locally, might have been secondarily relayed from the point of entry to other sub-regions in Southeast Asia. Such maps might help to determine whether indigenous cultures were receptive to Indian influences or to influences within the region; the degree of receptivity could be an index of the basic unity of something described as Southeast Asian cultural foundations. On the contrary, if what was accepted in one sub-region differed markedly from that in another, that would be a useful pointer to underlying cultural differences within the region.

The question of mapping touches on the factor of geography as well as the question of boundaries. Several essays discuss matters of ecology and environment, notably Stargardt's paper on Satingpra and Manguin's paper on ships as bearers of change. They both mention mobility, in one the common phenomenon of moving capitals around at frequent intervals, and in the other the cultural traffic and the maritime trade across what Wolters calls 'the single ocean' between the Arab world and East Africa at one end, and China at the other. This raises four questions which I believe deserve further attention.

Firstly, moving capitals was common also to the ancient worlds of China, Japan and Europe. How different was it in Southeast Asia, and to what extent was its survival till so late in history a measure of strong local cultural values? There may be scope for additional studies of comparable cultural traits in the ancient history of several other parts of the world.

Secondly, apart from Manguin and Macknight, I think the essays play down the role of early maritime trade as a determinant of polity and the localisation process, especially that role which kept the region open to sustained influences from India and China. Perhaps the fact that Wolters himself, who has been a major contributor to our understanding of this topic, is quiet about it leads us to feel that enough has been said. Yet Kenneth Hall, whom we had not brought to the conference, in his latest book **Maritime Trade and State Development in Early Southeast Asia** (University of Hawaii Press, 1985), demonstrates how important this international maritime trade could be to all the issues of polity and localisation the essays focus on.

Thirdly, the cultural traffic over land clearly involved different processes of change from that by sea. Different kinds of barriers were erected, soldiers were a different breed from sailors, different items of trade influenced local cultures and, of course, those population centres which evolved deep in the interior necessarily contrasted with those at great trading ports. How different these processes were could be tested by comparing localisation in the valleys of Yunnan, in the upper reaches of the Irrawady, Salween, Mekong and even the Red River (where the Indian materials came more directly into competition with Chinese materials among people who might have been, like other Southeast Asians, more inclined to respond to the Indian), with whatever localisation there was across the seas to the Eastern islands of Indonesia, to the Philippines, New Guinea and beyond.

This leads to the fourth question, that of the boundaries of Southeast Asia. It was not long ago that what today we call Southeast Asia was either part of Eastern or Southern Asia; bits of it were lodged elsewhere, for example Burma as part of British India, Vietnam and the Philippines as parts of the Far East, and New Guinea simply forgotten. After 1945, Southeast Asia appeared like a new bright star whose time had come and, within a decade or two, we were speaking of Southeast Asia as if the name had always been there. Nevertheless, there remains the need to determine what, other than geographical tidiness and modern political realities, justifies the separate treatment of the history of the region since the work of Brian Harrison and D.G.E. Hall in the early 1950s. For the ninth to the fourteenth centuries, the boundaries are not so clearly defined. If Vietnam was less Chinese, then so also were Yunnan and parts of Kwangsi, Kueichow and Kwangtung. Where were the western borders of Burma? Should we be more open-minded about Sri Lanka and parts of the South India and Bengal coasts? And could the region be said to have possessed an eastern or northeastern boundary among the islands as early as that? I thought it useful that conference participants noted from time to time that local peoples during this period showed little consciousness of strong cultural commonalities. There was no sense of belonging to a region, and it is probably anachronistic to expect such feelings. Was that very lack of consciousness of boundaries itself a major common trait that distinguished the region from others?

Finally, the conference found so much of interest in the cultural variety of the area and the complexities of polity and localisation that it did not seem to give enough attention to the boundaries of the period of the ninth to fourteenth centuries. Why begin at the ninth and why end with the fourteenth? Several papers here are convincing in establishing that the ninth century was significant for Java, and to some extent also in pre-Angkorian Cambodia, because of the way that localisation and state formation laid the foundation for early kingdoms and for the 'imperial' kingdoms of the future. For both areas, however, Kulke suggests that the end of the tenth century and the beginnings of the eleventh might have been more important where changes to the polity were concerned; this was certainly true for Vietnam as well. At the other end of the period, Vallibhotama emphasises the fifteenth century as a period of major change for Thailand, and this would also apply to Angkor. But again, the fourteenth century might well have been the vital period for changes to the polity in the Java-Sumatra sub-regions.

Perhaps our reluctance to nail these centuries down at the conference shows that we have reached a certain stage of maturity in our study of early Southeast Asian history. We know enough to sense that these dates could not be equally relevant for every part of the region, yet not enough to determine what dates might be more significant for a region which we believe had an historical unity all its own. This new-found maturity has brought us not only to realise that interdisciplinary approaches are integral to our work and probably to all attempts to write history; it has also led us to reach deeper into some of the complexities of time and space in the non-Western past. We have travelled beyond the point where each of us believes in the possibility of writing a comprehensive history of that past.

1

The Early and the Imperial Kingdom in Southeast Asian History

Hermann Kulke

The early States of Southeast Asia were equipped by modern historiography with more or less all Weberian criteria of a modern State. Accordingly, these early States were governed by the kings through a central administrative staff which was able to uphold successfully the legitimate claim of the monopoly of physical force within a given area.[1] Successful pillages of neighbouring areas were therefore often understood as annexations and rather vague tributary relations were interpreted as an indicator of the existence of an hierarchically-structured system of provinces and districts etc.

Let me illustrate this interpretation of early Southeast Asian history by two examples selected from two certainly "unsuspicious" authors whose works are still regarded as standard works. About early Funan L.P. Briggs wrote in the year 1951: "From a little river-settlement governed by a naked girl, to an empire more than a thousand miles in extent, with boundaries perhaps as wide as those of which the proudest Khmer Emperor could later boast, in less than two centuries, is no small achievement for any people in any period."[2] Recent research however, particularly by C. Jacques, has shown that nearly none of these statements can be accepted any longer as established facts.[3] Funan's history neither began as a river settlement under the legendary naked Naga princess, nor do we have any proof that the alleged conquests of the Funanese King Fan Shi-Man led to a permanent annexation of areas far beyond the Mekong and even Menam delta.

The other example refers to the famous quotation from the New History of the T'ang about the kingdom of Holing which most probably was located in Java. The relevant passage in the **Hsin T'ang shu** is as follows: "on the borders [of Ho-ling] there are 28 small countries, all of which owe allegiance to Ho-ling. There are 32 great ministers and the Ta-tso-kan-hsiung is the chief of them."[4] Heine-Geldern, in his even more famous article on "Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia", quoted this passage to illustrate the cosmic role of kings, courts and governments in Southeast Asia. But he also inferred from this passage "that the kingdom of Java in the 9th century was divided into twenty-eight provinces, their governors together with the four ministers having numbered thirty-two high officials.(...) It is clear that in all these cases the empire was conceived as an image of the heavenly world of stars and gods".[5] We shall come back later on

to the function of these cosmological speculations. What matters here is Heine-Geldern's obvious misinterpretation of the Chinese text when speaking of twenty-eight governors of the twenty-eight provinces of the Javanese empire. None of these words is mentioned in the text. Instead, it seems to be clear from the text that the ruler of Holing was the **primus inter pares** among a large number of ministers and that his State was surrounded by twenty-eight small tributary countries. They were in all probability a permanent threat to the authority of the central ruler rather than integrated provinces of an empire.

If we look at the standard works of Southeast Asian history - and certainly also of South Asian history - we may find quite a few other examples which show that some of the early "empires" of this region might well be the products of modern historiography rather than ancient history. And we may even come to the hypothetical conclusion that modern historians fell victim to a rather "sinister conspiracy" of ancient Indian and Chinese philosophers, historians and official scribes to conceal the historical truth, because it is well known that ancient Indian thinkers and their Southeast Asian contemporaries described the **śāstric** theory of the State, whereas the court poets and authors of the inscriptions primarily aimed at a mastery of the highly-sophisticated art of poetry. None of them therefore cared for a (detailed) description of, for example, the actual structures of a state and its real borders. On the other hand, Chinese official scribes of the **Hung lu ssŭ**, the office which was responsible for "the reception arrangements for foreign envoys and also the recording of details about their countries",[6] were certainly deeply interested in the actual situation among the "barbarians of the South". But in their reports, which they prepared for their emperor and which later on became available to historians, they "translated" the information not only into their own language but also into their own officialese. Its idiom was deeply pervaded by the Chinese conception of their own centralized State. According to O.W. Wolters, Chinese writers were thus "unable to conceptualize 'Funan' as being anything other than a 'state', albeit an unstable one, and, because of this Chinese perspective, 'Funan' has become the earliest Southeast Asian example of what sociologists refer to as a 'patrimonial bureaucracy', a model that does not seem to fit the prehistoric evidence".[7]

II

Evidence provided by more recent prehistoric and proto historic archaeological research shows "that by the beginning of the Christian era a patchwork of small settlement networks of great antiquity stretched across the map of Southeast Asia".[8] It is particularly this new evidence,[9] and an increasing awareness of its relevance for an evaluation of the historical period of Southeast Asia combined with a hitherto unknown open-mindedness on the part of historians to anthropological theories, that has initiated a process of far-reaching and even radical reconsideration of the early history of Southeast Asia. Thus we are no longer able to think in terms of a "transplantation theory" which starts out from the assumption that a ready-made (Indian) concept of State and statecraft was "transplanted"[10] to the virgin soil of Southeast Asia. Instead, two problems, amongst others, have become major issues of current research. Firstly, not "indianization" but "indigenization" or "localization"[11] of foreign influences have become

key-words of research. And secondly, another major focus of research is the persistency of indigenous, prehistoric "pre-State" structures throughout history.

"Multiplicity of centres" has become another key-word and a helpful tool for analytical research on the early State in Southeast Asia. For pre-Angkorian Cambodia, for instance, O.W. Wolters noticed that the "evidence reflects the multiplicity of regional centres in the land which, for convenience, we call 'Cambodia'. And he concluded that "in this situation the term 'kingdom' [...] is an inappropriate one. Greater unities were still only the fragile consequence of the prowess of an individual leader. This kind of unity quickly dissolved when an overlord died or lost the confidence of his allies".[12] In Java, scholars like F.H. van Naerssen spoke of a "polykraton concept of the Hindu-Javanese period"[13] and inferred from epigraphical evidence that during the early Javanese period till the late 9th century A.D., "there were several independent rulers, some of them enjoying the title **mahārāja** and others without that title".[14] And Boechari even concluded that "what remained unchanged during the whole [old-Javanese] period was that there never had been a centralized government. The kingdom was divided into a number of autonomous areas, governed by **rakais** or **rakryans** [who] could act independently from the king".[15]

The concept of a "multicentred political system" is certainly a most necessary new approach which provides, perhaps for the first time in Southeast Asian historiography, a framework for an analytical study of the actual structure of the early State in Southeast Asia. It seems to be of particular relevance for a study of early historical political systems as they are known, for instance, from Chenla[16] or in Burma during the pre-Pagan period and larger parts of the pre-Singhasari history. To my knowledge this concept, however, has rarely been applied to the larger States of Southeast Asia during the 9th to 14th centuries. It was O.W. Wolters who again took the lead in this discussion. In a chapter on "Historical Patterns in Intra-regional Relations" in his recent work on "Southeast Asian Perspectives" he introduced the **maṇḍala** concept of ancient Indian political literature into the discussion about the structure of the larger States of pre-colonial Southeast Asia.

> "The map of earlier Southeast Asia which evolved from the prehistoric networks of small settlement and reveals itself in historical records was a patchwork of often overlapping **maṇḍalas**, or 'circles of kings'. In each of these **maṇḍalas**, one king, identified with divine and 'universal' authority, claimed personal hegemony over other rulers in his **maṇḍala** who in theory were his obedient allies and vassals. [...] In practice, the **maṇḍala** (Sanskrit term used in Indian manuals of government) represented a particular and often unstable political situation in a vaguely definable geographical area without fixed boundaries and where smaller centres tended to look in all directions for security. **Maṇḍalas** would expand and contract in concertina-like fashion. Each one contained several tributary rulers, some of whom would repudiate their vassal status when the opportunity arose and try to build up their own networks of vassals. Only the **maṇḍala** overlord had the prerogative of receiving tribute-bearing envoys; he himself would despatch officials who represented his superior status."[17]

Wolters explains his **maṇḍala** concept with a "glance at some of the famous **maṇḍalas** which adorn the textbooks on earlier Southeast Asian history". The Thai-kingdoms of Ayudhyā and Bangkok, the Sriwijayan **mandala** ("the notorious uncertainty about its geographical span and political identity is a striking instance of the amorphous nature of the great **maṇḍalas** in earlier Southeast Asian history", p.22), the Philippines and the Javanese **maṇḍala** of Majapahit. In all these cases the development of these famous **maṇḍalas** "depended on the waxing and waning of particular **maṇḍala** centres [...] which never led to new and more enduring political systems. [...] The single exception to an otherwise ephemeral political scene is that part of the Angkorian **maṇḍala** which comprised the Khmer-speaking people".[18]

It is this notion of a persistency of prehistoric elements as the dominant structural feature even of the larger states of early Southeast Asia which will be the focal point of the present paper. The period which covers roughly the millenium between 500 and 1500 A.D. is the period in which the results of more recent historical research differ most radically from those of the earlier or "conventional" historiography, both in India and Southeast Asia. Let me explain this by a few examples. The different interpretation of the mediaeval Indian State under the Cōḷas and the Pālas by Nilakanta Sastri and R.C. Majumdar on the one side, and by Burton Stein and R.S. Sharma on the other are as symptomatic of this controversy in the context of Indian historiography[19] as are the different interpretations of the States of Funan and Śrīvijaya by L.P. Briggs and G. Coedès on the one side and by C. Jacques and Bennet Bronson on the other in the context of Southeast Asian historiography.[20] The basic difference between the earlier and the more recent historiography is the contradictory estimation of the role and structure of the early State. These two "schools" ascribe a very different position to the early State in a continuum of governance formations from a tribal or "stateless" form of government to a unitary centralized "empire state". The conventional school places the early State in the final position of this continuum of pre-modern State formation. But its adherents never really analysed the socio-economic basis of the process which led to the emergence of the early State. They took it more or less as a given fact derived either from an earlier state or from models of theoretical **śāstra** texts. Contemporary historiography with its anthropological models on the other hand ascribes a position to the early State which is much lower down the scale than the unitary State of the conventional school. Mainly on the basis of anthropological models it is assumed that the early State developed "from below". But this development reached only a certain level which, because of inherent structural problems, the early State was unable to transcend.[21]

A third school which plays an influential role in contemporary Indian historiography is the Marxist influenced "Indian School of Feudalism".[22] According to this school, the Hindu State of early mediaeval India was the result of a continuous process of fragmentation of a former unitary State through feudalization. This fragmentation was caused "by the wide-spread practice of granting big and small territories to vassals and officials who entrenched themselves territorially and ended up as independent potentates".[23] From an analytical point of view, the anthropologically-oriented historiography and the School of Indian Feudalism come to rather similar conclusions. The main

structural feature of the early State is the above-mentioned "multiplicity of centres" which was responsible for the obviously insurmountable political stagnation. Both schools however differ completely in their explanation of the historical process out of which the early State of the whole region emerged.

As a former student of Indology I was trained to look at the early State in India and Southeast Asia from the "religious point of view" and to study the "Hindu political thought and its metaphysical foundations".[24] But the results of intensive fieldwork in the Hindu-tribal frontier in Eastern India, particularly in Orissa,[25] and later on in Java, convinced me of the inadequacy of this approach for a study of the process of state formation in India and Southeast Asia. I began to understand the early State as a result of a continuous process "from below". And I was fascinated by the "discovery" of many "pre-State" elements, because they had either been completely neglected by ancient **Dharmaśāstras** and modern textbooks alike, or discarded as mere prehistoric relics, rather than accepted as constituent structural elements of the early historical state. But in the course of my further research, and particularly through reading the relevant anthropologically-oriented historical studies,[26] I was beginning to doubt the applicability of the anthropologically-oriented models for the whole process of pre-modern State formation in India and Southeast Asia, particularly the larger States of these regions. As a consequence of these doubts I drafted a conceptual framework which tries to differentiate between several distinct phases and which reveals a decreasing applicability of these models. Although these different phases were part of an overall (though not homogeneous) process of state formation, the respective State of each of these phases faced different structural problems and developed different means to cope with them.

III

As I have shown elsewhere,[27] the process of state formation usually passed through three successive phases, i.e. the local, regional and imperial phases or levels. Very generally speaking, the first step always had to be the successful establishment and consolidation of a solid local power within a limited territory. In many cases this power might have been founded by a "big man" or "man of prowess"[28] but usually it led to the establishment of a new form of control over a clan or tribe by a privileged lineage and its "elder" or leader. Chieftaincy is usually the term which is used for this pristine level of political development. It is characterized by the absence of any sort of institutionalized bureaucracy. Yet its authority had to be based on the legitimation to extract, at least temporarily, socially-produced surpluses from the surrounding land, and to mobilize men even from outside the leader's own lineage in order to protect the land and its own position. Anthropologists have shown that nearly all tribal societies provided a legitimate societal framework for the establishment of these chieftaincies.[29] It is unnecessary to point out that it is this early period of state formation in Southeast Asia where anthropological models are most important and helpful for an analytical study. In fact, without these models historians often seem to overinterpret or even misinterpret the very few sources we possess about this early period.

The process of state formation entered the second or regional state when the leader of the "nuclear areas"[30] of local power was able to extend his authority beyond its territorial borders. This phase usually began with the military conquest of one or several neighbouring local nuclear areas. But during this period military conquest neither led to the annihilation or replacement of the existing political authorities, nor to a direct unification of these newly conquered areas with the centre. The defeated leaders were usually reinstalled as tributary chiefs. But this second step involved much more than a mere military conquest which, moreover, was usually only temporary. It required the establishment of permanent and legitimate relations with the conquered areas and their leaders.

Two inscriptions from Java and Orissa in Eastern India are particularly informative with regard to the emergence of local chieftains to early **rājās.**[31] Best known is of course King Mūlavarman through his famous Yūpa inscriptions of Kutei in East Kalimantan which are dated palaeographically to about 400 A.D. In a few lines they describe, better than any other known documents of this period, the rise of a family within three generations. The grandfather Kuṇḍuṅga, though already called "Lord-of-men" (**narendra**), still bore a purely indigenous name. It was Kuṇḍuṅga's son who assumed the name Aśvavarman and became known as the founder of the dynasty (**vaṃśa-kartṛ**). His son Mūlavarman was the first to bear the title **rājā**. He performed great sacrifices, and donated immense wealth, land and many cows to Brāhmaṇas "who had come here" (**iha-āgata**) as is explicity mentioned in one of the inscriptions. He ruled over his **kraton** (called **pura** in this Sanskrit inscription) which he illuminated magnificently. But most important for our discussion, Mūlavarman, as the son of the founder of a ruling local lineage (**vaṃśa**), initiated the second stage of early state formation. He defeated other landlords (**pārthiva**) and made them "tribute givers" (**kara-dā**). The use of the title **pārthiva** in this connection seems to be very significant. Of course, it is often translated as "prince" or even "king". But more than most other conventional royal titles, **pārthiva** has the original meaning of a landholder (**pārthiva** = earthly, coming from the earth). **Pārthiva** thus designates exactly the local landlord whom we know from Java as **raka**. Mūlavarman obviously had defeated several of them in his neighbourhood, but he confirmed them in their legitimate local rights on the condition that they "give" (**dā**) tribute (**kara**).

From the other side of the Bay of Bengal we know another interesting example of the rise of an autochthonous leader during the same period. It comes from Southern Orissa, from one of the typical riverine nuclear areas of early state formation and relates to the origin of the Śailodbhava dynasty, which once had wrongly been identified as the progenitors of the Śailendras of Java.[32] Several inscriptions of the later Śailodbhava kings relate to the story of Pulindasena, a famous man of Kaliṅga who was tired of ruling the world. On his request the Great God granted a boon to him and created a new king out of pieces of a rock (**śilā-śakala udbhedī**). Pulindasena named him Śailodbhava ("one whose origin is the mountain") and thus founded the dynasty (**parikalpita-vaṃśa**).[33] Both names, Pulindasena and Śailodbhava, point to a tribal origin of the dynasty. The Pulindas are a well-known tribe of Central India.[34] Pulindasena, who bears no royal or princely title, therefore may well have been a military

chief (**sena**) of this tribe settled near the famous Mahendragiri, which in the inscriptions is called the "Great Family Mountain" (**bṛhat-kula-giri**). Pulindasena's successor adopted a Sanskrit name and became the founder of a local dynasty after leaving his hilly homelands and settling in (or conquering?) the fertile valley of the Rishikulya.[35] The inscriptions, however, leave no doubt that it took several generations till they were able to consolidate their rule in the riverine nuclear area and to perform their first great horse sacrifice.

Traditional equalitarian chieftaincies did not usually provide a legitimation for this new type of domination. It is most likely that in exactly this situation Hinduism and the idea of the universal Hindu ruler within a very limited territory began to spread to many countries on both sides of the Bay of Bengal. The idea of Hindu kingship provided an institutional framework and a new ideological legitimation for an already existing indigenous political development. And, as we already know from the slightly earlier development in India, Hinduism at that time was perhaps the most adaptive religious and social system which was open to many aspects of "localization". But it is certainly correct to argue that legitimation was not the only attraction of Hinduism for tribal leaders. As pointed out by Wolters, Hinduism must have been particularly attractive for "men of prowess" because of its highly developed system of magical power derived from meditation (**tapas**).[36]

The early State which emerged from this struggle among several "nuclear areas" and their "men of prowess" will be called the Early Kingdom. Its leader usually acquired a new title, e.g. **Rājā** or even **Mahārāja**. But, despite the various royal paraphernalia which surrounded these new **rājās** and their courts, they remained basically a **primus inter pares** among the local leaders throughout this period. The structural weakness of this political system was the precarious position of the **rājā**. His tributary chiefs outside his own nuclear area were often of the same stock and had therefore, at least theoretically, the same chances to become a **rājā** once they were able to prove their own "prowess".

The political system of these "early kingdoms" was characterized by a "multiplicity" of local political centres and shifting loyalties of their leaders, particularly at the periphery of their system. In the context of these early kingdoms Wolters is certainly right when he states that "the king's status was unique only because it was a religious one".[37] And in the context of this early stage of development I certainly agree with B. Stein who wrote about the later Cōḷa State of South India that it was only the "ritual sovereignty which converted a congeries of local political systems into a segmentary state".[38] And, as already mentioned, it is particularly this period to which I would suggest to apply Wolters' maṇḍala concept.

IV

The numerous Early Kingdoms with their precarious balance of power, shared by the central authority of a **primus inter pares** and the centrifugal local polities, were certainly the dominant feature of the political map of Southeast Asia throughout the first millennium A.D. At the end of this period, however, a new development began which changed this political map considerably during the first centuries of

the second millennium. During this period a small number of supra-regional powers emerged which dominated the whole area. This process began in the early 9th century in Angkor which dominated larger parts of continental Southeast Asia from the 11th to the early 13th centuries. About a hundred years later this role was taken over by the Thai kingdom of Ayudhyā. From the middle of the 11th century until the end of the 13th century Pagan ruled over larger parts of western continental Southeast Asia. And after two only temporarily successful attempts in the 9th century under the Śailendras and the Mataram dynasty, and under Airlangga in the 11th century, Java joined in during the 13th century under Singhasāri and became the leading power of the islands under Majapahit in the 14th century. Only Śrīvijaya in the western "Insulinde" and Campa in the eastern part of continental Southeast Asia remained unchanged. It would certainly be interesting to know whether the complete disappearance of these two polities from the political map of Southeast Asia was at least partly caused by their unchanging structure in contrast to the new emerging powers of Pagan, Angkor, Majapahit and Vietnam. These States will be called Imperial Kingdoms.

It is of course a justifiable question whether these states were an "exception to an otherwise ephemeral political scene", as Wolters described even the case of Angkor.[39] Or to put it into other words: was the difference between the Early and the Imperial Kingdoms only a temporary and territorial expansion? Did perhaps even Angkor thus remain just an enlarged version of Chenla, and do we have to depict the State of Majapahit in equal terms with the State of Kadiri? Another possibility to explain the existence of these Imperial Kingdoms is the assumption that some structural changes took place in Southeast Asia around 1000 A.D. which enabled few imperial "men of prowess" to transcend the limitation of the Early Kingdom and to initiate a third or imperial phase of state formation in Southeast Asia. The answer to these questions depends on how much evidence can be brought forward in favour of either a basically unchanging continuity of "pre-State structures", or in favour of a structural change. In the context of this paper I shall emphasize indicators and possible reasons for this change.

The first and perhaps most obvious change was the new territorial dimension of the Imperial Kingdoms. But it was not a mere enlargement of the area of the former Early Kingdom. The significantly new feature was that the empire was based territorially on the forcible unification of two or even several core areas of former independent Early Kingdoms. And it was no longer a matter of subordination of the former "regional" leaders of these annexed areas but their complete extinction as autonomous authorities. Usually they were replaced by members of the central dynasty or by deserving persons from the administrative or military staff. Only by a considerable and permanent enlargement of the core area, to which the imperial dynasty had direct and uncontested access (in order to legitimately tap its resources), was an Imperial Kingdom of this third phase able to last longer than the lifetime of a "man of prowess".

V

This process is perhaps best discernible in the early history of Angkor[40] and in eastern Java. The history of East Java is

characterized by a sequence of several futile and very few successful attempts to unify the whole of Eastern Java under one dynasty and thus to establish an East Javanese empire. The rule of King Sindok in the early 10th century, King Airlangga in the early 11th century, and the kingdoms of Singhasari and Majapahit after 1222 A.D. are usually accepted as periods of successful unification of Eastern Java. Epigraphical evidence, however, proves that the region under the direct control of Airlangga (1016-1049) was more or less restricted to the delta region of the Brantas and Solo rivers and their adjacent areas. Though he was able to establish himself as the most powerful ruler of East Java, it was only this nuclear area of his Early Kingdom where his inscriptions have been discovered and where, most probably, his still unidentified capital Kahuripan was situated. Although he claims in an inscription in the year 1041 to have conquered the Southern region, which he contemptuously calls "utterly uncivilized" or literally "unaryanized" (**adhika-anaryya**),[41] he was never able to occupy or even annex the other two nuclear areas of Eastern Java around Kaḍiri/Blitar and Singhasāri. Hence the alleged division of the whole of Eastern Java by Airlangga into Janggala and Panjalu refers only to a division of his own Early Kingdom in the delta region, as has been proved by Boechari.[42]

The rule of Airlangga and his immediate successors was followed by a long interruption in the epigraphical evidence till the year 1117, when we come across the first inscription of a ruler of Kaḍiri. For more than a hundred years, till 1222 A.D., an uninterrupted sequence of kings is known to have ruled from Kaḍiri over the middle portion of the Brantas valley.[43] During this century East Javanese history became the history of the Early Kingdom of Kaḍiri. No other important kings are known to have ruled during this period in the upcountry around Singhasāri and in the lower delta region. But we have also no evidence that Kaḍiri tried or even succeeded in conquering these areas outside its own nuclear area.

It was only during the Singhasāri period that the foundation stone of an Imperial Kingdom was laid in Eastern Java. Founded by Ken Angrok in the year 1222, the kingdom of Singhasāri seems to have been firmly established as the foremost power of Java only under the kings Viṣṇuvardhana and Kertanagara who ruled between 1248 and 1292 A.D. Although Singhasāri defeated Kaḍiri and certainly established its power at the cost of Kaḍiri, it was obviously not able to annex Kaḍiri completely and extinguish its rulers.[44] From the **Nāgarakĕrtāgama** we know that throughout the whole Singhasāri period three Kaḍiri kings ruled as tributary kings (**sāmanta-rāja**).[45] Despite the extension of its ("ritual"?) authority over Bali and parts of Sumatra, Singhasāri thus seems to have remained an extended Early Kingdom. The precarious position of Singhasāri was dramatically highlighted when Jayakatwang, the **sāmanta-rāja** of Kaḍiri,[46] looted the capital Singhasāri and killed its king in the year 1292 A.D.

It was only under King Wijaya, a relative of King Kertanagara, that the newly-established kingdom of Majapahit was able to annex Kaḍiri completely. For the first time since King Sindok in the 10th century, the three nuclear areas of Eastern Java, Singhasāri, Kaḍiri and the delta area with Majapahit, became united under one dynasty. It extinguished all local **rājās** in this region, which became the new and considerable enlarged core area of the empire of Majapahit. The

annexation of the neighbouring areas, however, was in no way smooth sailing. During its first decades Majapahit faced a nunber of serious revolts in exactly those areas which had been annexed. These revolts are a clear indicator of a drastic change in policy of the central dynasty towards the outer areas which formerly were ruled by highly-respected tributary chiefs or **rājās**.

The **Nāgarakĕrtagama**, composed only a few decades later in the year 1356 A.D. illustrates the success of this new policy of annexation most convincingly. Already its first chapter contains a complete and "annotated" list of the **nagaras** ("towns" or capitals of formerly independent chiefs and **rājās**) which meanwhile had been completely annexed by Majapahit. They all seem to have been ruled by princes and princesses of the Majapahit dynasty. This description concludes as follows:

> All Illustrious Javanese Kings (**rāja**) and Queens, the honoured ones who equally are distinguished by their towns, each having one for his or her own, in one place, in Wilwa Tikta (Majapahit), they hold in their lap the honoured Prince-Overlord (**narendrāḍipa**)."[47]

In my opinion, this description is a clear indicator of a successful policy of annexation of an imperial kingdom.[48] This annexation was followed by a thorough "dynastification" of the areas of formerly autonomous and even independent chiefs and **rājās** which had once surrounded the nuclear area of an Early Kingdom.

In India and, to some extent, also in Southeast Asia this development is reflected by the semantic change of the word **sāmanta**. The etymological meaning of **sāmanta** is "on all sides" or "bordering". In earlier texts it means particularly "neighbour". In the early political terminology, e.g. in Asoka's inscriptions of the 3rd century B.C., it is equivalent to "(independent) neighbouring ruler". Around 500 A.D., when the early mediaeval kingdoms expanded into their areas, its meaning changed to "(defeated) neighbouring ruler" and it became synonymous with "tributary chief" or "tributary **rājā**" (**sāmanta-rāja**).[49] It was a typical attribute of the Early Kingdoms of mediaeval India to be surrounded by a "circle of tributary chiefs" (**sâmanta-cakra**).[50] Because of their importance at the royal courts, **sāmanta** soon also became a title of high officers and dignitaries at the central dynasty. This semantic change from an independent neighbour to a tributary chief and finally to a high dignitary at the central court thus is an excellent illustration of the structural changes which took place during the above-mentioned process of state formation.

In Java, too, we know several examples of a slow transformation of former independent local **rakai** chiefs to tributary princes of the Early Kingdoms, and finally to high dignitaries at the courts of the Imperial Kingdoms.[51]

The earliest inscription of East Java was issued in the year 760 A.D. by an independent prince, Gajayāna of Kañjuruhan near Singhasāri which was identified by J.G. de Casparis as the Kanuruhan of later inscriptions. A **rakai** of Kanuruhan was still acting independently in his territory in the year 881 A.D. but in the year 915 King Dakṣa issued an inscription "in favour" (**anugraha**) of the **rakai** of Kanuruhan. In the meantime, Kanuruhan had obviously been incorporated into the kingdom of Dakṣa. In later centuries the **rakai** of Kanuruhan became the highest

functionary of the central government as "chancellor".[52] A similar development might have taken place in the case of other high dignitaries of the Javanese kingdom, e.g. the three **rakais** Hino, Halu and Sirikan.[53] Although their incorporation into the central government took place in the transition period of the Early to the Imperial Kingdoms, the change of their function within the political system is symptomatic of a development which culminated in the period of Imperial Kingdoms. The process began with their subordination as tributary rulers and it was followed by their integration and incorporation into the central government. This in turn finally led to their "de-territorialization", their displacement from their former territories, which were then taken over by members of the central dynasties or officers of the court. This process increased slowly the number and importance of the "patrimonial staff" of the central dynasties at the cost of the autonomous local leadership.

VI

Undoubtedly, the State of Angkor was most advanced in the double process of transforming former autonomous local or regional centres into provinces (**viṣaya**) and in building up a centralized bureaucracy. As is well known, Chou Ta-kuan mentioned at the end of the 13th century that Cambodia was divided into about 90 provinces, each province having a fortified citadel, governed by a mandarin. But Wolters pointed out that the number of the twenty-three images of Jayabuddhamahānātha, which Jayavarman VII had distributed throughout his empire, is more likely to reflect "the number of substantial territorial units in the kingdom at that time, which included some in the Menam basin".[54] An article by S. Sahai contains a list of eighteen **pramāns** or **viṣayas** out of which ten "could be traced back to the pre-Angkorian period when they functioned as more or less independent principalities rather than actual units of provincial administration".[55] Out of those which are mentioned only in Angkorian times as new provinces, Lavo or Lopburi in Central Thailand forms an interesting example of a very quick transformation of a conquered, formerly independent principality into a province of an imperial kingdom. Till the early years of the 11th century Lavo was an independent kingdom. It was conquered by Sūryavarman I when he was still struggling for the uncontested rule of Angkor. But already in the year 1011 a **tamrvac** from the **pramān** Lavo was mentioned among this cadre of high officers who took the famous oath of allegiance to Sūryavarman. His village (**sruk**) was also situated in the **pramān** of Lavo. The question whether we may infer from this fact that this **tamrvac** originally belonged to the local elite of Lavo or whether he was posted there from outside, is difficult to decide.[56]

"Provincialization" of neighbouring principalities and early kingdoms through the expansionism of imperial kingdoms, however, usually did not erase the socio-political identity of these annexed areas. During the early years of the Mahīdharapura dynasty when Sūryavarman II perhaps had not yet been able to establish his authority in the outlying districts, Lavo sent on its own a mission to China in the year 1115 and again in 1155, after the death of the great Sūryavarman. Lavo might even have become completely independent during the following decade. But Lavo was again certainly a province when a son of Jayavarman VII

became the Lord (**īśa**) of Lavo and when Jayavarman sent one of the Jayabuddhamahānātha images to Lavo.[57]

Malyang is another example which shows that even a former principality which was near to the imperial capital does not lose its identity, even after several centuries of "provincialization". In the year 893 it was mentioned as a **pramān** and again in 1145 as a **viṣaya** of the Angkorian State. But during the chaotic years which followed the devastation of Angkor by the Cams in the year 1177, Malyang revolted against Jayavarman VII. Thus even strong imperial kingdoms like Angkor had to face revolts and wars within their own provinces. But contrary to the period of the early kingdoms they were the exception and not the rule. Therefore we should be careful not to overstress the aspect of "multiplicity of centres" in the case of these Imperial Kingdoms. Otherwise the structure of the German medieval empire, for instance even under Emperor Frederic Barbarossa, has also to be reconsidered and certainly the contemporary French and English kingdoms, too.

The case of Angkor reveals yet another aspect of change which had begun already in the period of the Early Kingdoms and which led to a substantial change in the internal development of the Imperial Kingdoms. Anthropologists agree that fission, the breaking away of one part of a social group or polity, was a major feature of chieftaincies. This fissiparous tendency still existed in the Early Kingdoms. When a tributary chief became strong enough he declared his independence and established within his own nuclear area a new polity. In course of time, it might have become the core of a new Early Kingdom. Its new **rājā** certainly tried to defeat his meanwhile weakened overlord who in turn thus fell back to the position of a tributary chief of his erstwhile "vassal". During the period of the Early Kingdoms dynastic change usually also meant a displacement of the nuclear area of the former Early Kingdom by the nuclear area of the new dynasty, which became the core of the new kingdom. This political pattern of the Early Kingdoms, which was still characterized by a tendency of fission and fusion, by the rise and fall of local and regional dynastic centres with their overlapping circles or spheres of influence and their changing loyalties, is appropriately described by the **maṇḍala** concept. But from a certain stage of development onwards, the fissiparous or centrifugal tendencies were outbalanced by, and finally given up in favour of, centripetal efforts. Jayavarman II's foundation of the Angkorian kingdom was as much based on this changing attitude as his success contributed to the change. "Local independence was no longer the acceptable objection as it had been in the eighth century. The integrity of the Angkorian kingdom was no longer in question".[58]

In this new situation the aim of ambitious governors in outlying provinces or autonomous tributary chiefs was no longer separatism but rather to gain a stronger and higher position at the centre, or to launch, in case of its weakness, a **coup d' état**. Sūryavarman I's aim was not to defeat or to destroy the Angkorian kingdom in order to build up a new great kingdom. On the contrary, he fought for years to conquer the already firmly-established centre and to become its uncontested ruler. And it was Sūryavarman who became the true founder of Imperial Angkor.[59] Again, a century later, the Mahidharapura dynasty, which had its origin most probably in the north of Angkor, did not fight for its own independence. But it began a struggle for the conquest of Angkor which lasted for several decades. It was finally won by

Sūryavarma II who then became one of Angkor's greatest imperial rulers. Had he acted during the second stage of the Early Kingdoms, he might have constructed Angkor Wat in his own nuclear area in order to demonstrate his own greatness vis-à-vis the defeated dynasty of the centre.[60] It needs no further explanation that this new centripetal force contributed a lot to the relatively high stability of the extended core areas of the Imperial Kingdoms.

Such problems as, for instance, the extension of the patrimonial staff, the provincialization of formerly autonomous tributary states, or the centripetal ambitions of the leaders of outlying provinces, show that anthropological models lose much of their relevance for a structural analysis of the Imperial Kingdoms. And, as already mentioned, even the **maṇḍala** concept as described by O.W. Wolters does not give sufficient scope to the structural changes which constitute the difference between the Early and the Imperial Kingdoms.

VII

Another major problem of the transition from the Early Kingdoms to the Imperial Kingdoms is whether or not the latter were able to establish a firm hold over the local administration of the enlarged core area and to increase their legitimate access to the local resources. It is known that the "conventional school" of historians answers this question in the affirmative. These historians argue on the basis of the existing lists of a hierarchy of officers which allegedly linked the court directly and indirectly with the provinces, districts and even villages. But on the basis of his intensive studies, B. Stein came to a very different interpretation, even in the case of the administration of the *Cōḷa* empire which usually is accepted to have been one of the most centrally-administered States of its age throughout India and Southeast Asia. "In this political order resources did not flow from the subordinate to the central domain by command of the latter. In fact, there are no reliable data on resource transfers of a political nature - cash or kind - at all".[61]

A systematic analysis of the rather meager epigraphical evidence most probably will show that this inference holds good for most or even all Early States in the whole region. It seems as if the court and its officers in all these States lived mainly from their own landed property and from benefices with a usufruct which might have been limited in time or heredity. This decentralized system of extracting socially-produced surpluses existed already in the nuclear areas of the Early Kingdoms. But the major difference between the Early and the Imperial Kingdoms in this regard was the fact that the imperial court was able to extend this system into the annexed provinces of the enlarged core area.[62] According to the growth of this core area and the centre's power of disposal, the number of courtiers and officers grew without changing the decentralized system as such. But the mere increase in the number of courtiers who obtained a living from "their" villages in the countryside increased - directly or indirectly - the impact of the centre on its hinterland. There might indeed have been only little "resource transfers of a political nature" from the more distant places of the core area to the centre. New, however, was the dense network of mutual dependency which linked the centre and its enlarged core area in a hitherto unknown degree. Whereas the court of the Early Kingdom

depended mainly on the resources of its direct hinterland, the whole enlarged core area of the Imperial Kingdom was linked with the centre by a system of decentralized collection of duties and their redistribution. In his paper on "Kingship, the Saṅgha and Society in Pagan"[63] Michael Aung Thwin has very convincingly shown how the three irrigated **kharuin** rice belts of the core area of Pagan, with their decentralized local administration, were linked with the court at Pagan through an elaborate system of redistributive economy.

VIII

Finally, another distinct feature of the Imperial Kingdoms should be mentioned: the new "ritual policy" and ideology of the imperial rulers. Religions, whether autochthonous cults, Hinduism or Buddhism, have always been an integral part of kingship and statecraft in India and Southeast Asia. The importance of the personal belief of the rulers and their priests and their magical capability is known to us already from the earliest inscriptional and literary evidence. And on special occasions there were always grand ceremonies, for example, seasonal festivities, potlatch-like "Verdienstfeste" or Vedic rituals. But in the context of statecraft, religion otherwise remained a private affair of the ruler and his court rather than a public or political affair. This role of religion and rituals however changed considerably in Southeast Asia during the last centuries of the first millennium A.D. and it changed even more drastically throughout the following centuries during the time of the Imperial Kingdoms when religion, or better, religious policy, became a major and permanent aspect of kingship.

This change is perhaps most obvious with regard to the topography of the temples. Since their first appearance in Southeast Asia there have always been temples at the political centres or capitals of the Early Kingdoms. But it seems that initially temples of major importance, both from the religious and political point of view, were more often constructed at particular holy places, for example, on the top of a mountain or on its slope (e.g. Vat Ph'u and Mahendraparvata in Cambodia or Canggal, Dieng, Borobudur and Gunung Penangungan in Java). But from a certain period onwards temples were constructed to an increasing extent near or at the political centres. Accordingly they became more and more the focal point of a magico-political "force field" emanating from the political centre of the kingdom. Krom had earlier suggested that the temple complex of the Lara Djonggrang at Prambanam depicted a replica of the whole state, the central sanctuary representing the royal court, and the different temple buildings around the sanctuary the various parts of the kingdom.[64] Later, in his detailed study of the inscriptions of Tjandi Plaosan-Lor, J.G. de Casparis was able to go even one step further. He proved that the donative inscriptions on the surrounding 174 small shrines belonged to the royal family and "higher dignitaries from all over the kingdom, so that the temple complex as a whole would more or less reflect the relations within the kingdom. [And] there may be some indications that the place in the complex occupied by their buildings corresponds to the situation of territories with which they are associated".[65] Thus, already in the transitional period between the Early and the Imperial Kingdoms the central temples had become a magical instrument[66] of obviously the greatest importance under the direct control of the king

and his priests. This function of the temple, which never existed in this explicit form in India, found its clearest expression in the royal temple pyramids of Angkor and culminated in the Bayon of Jayavarman VII. How else can one interpret the fact that the Jayavarman sent twenty-three sculptures of Jayabuddha, showing the king himself in an idealized form as the "Great Protector" (**mahānātha**) Buddha, while at the same time these provinces had to send substitutes of their own provincial deities to the capital where they were enshrined in the Bayon. This was embellished with fifty-four towers, each of which showed four faces of the deified king.

To the same extent that these new royal temples became the magico-political centre of the empire and the cosmos, the imperial kings themselves became directly associated with the divine power of these centres. Hindu kingship has always been regarded as a divine institution and Hindu kings were compared with gods. But it was only during the relatively late time which coincided with the period of the Imperial Kingdoms that even living kings "as rulers of the earth" became the representatives and part (**aṃśa**) of the divine cosmic ruler or Devarāja. On the top of the temple pyramids of Angkor the divine Devarāja and the "subtle innerself" (**sūkṣmāntarātman**) of his earthly representative met and merged in the divine **liṅgam** which bore a name combining god and king.[67] In a few cases, imperial kings might even have tried to become deified during their actual lifetime. A well-known, though still dubious, example is King Kertanagara's inscription of the year 1289 A.D. on an image of the Buddhist deity Mahākṣobhya. In this inscription he seems to have claimed that he was consecrated "in the form of Mahākṣobhya".[68]

This apotheosis of the imperial kings certainly may also be explained in religious terms. The tremendous increase in their power and the new symbols of divine kingship which surrounded them must have raised their status accordingly in the eyes of the people. But this religious change of the role of kingship implies or reflects a political change, too. An imperial king was no longer only a founder of a glorious dynasty and a destroyer of the surrounding **sāmanta-cakra**, as for instance Sañjaya of Central Java is praised in his inscription of the year 732. The imperial king unified the hitherto fragmented and chaotic world under one umbrella (**eka chattra**) and became a universal **cakravartin**. This imperial ideology of a cosmic responsibility for the whole realm finds very clear expression in the famous Sdok Kak Thom inscription of the year 1052, referring to the foundation of imperial Kambuja in the year 802. Jayavarman II invited the Brahmin Hiraṇyadāma who was well-versed in magical science (**siddhi vidyā**) "to conduct a ceremony which should prevent this land Kambuja from ever being dependent on Javā, and to bring about [instead] that there should be only one single 'Lord of the lower earth' [= king; Khmer: **kamrateṅ phdai karom**], who would be Cakravartin. This brahman [...] consecrated the 'Lord of the World', who is King [**kamrateṅ jagat ta rāja** = Skt.: **Devarāja**]".[69]

In Java, Kertanagara's rule marks the beginning of the imperial phase of the Javanese kingdom. The Sarwadharma inscription of the year 1269 describes Kertanagara as the "Illustrious Great King, being considered as the one sunshade (**eka chātra**) over all Java-land, causing the unification of the lands of Janggala and Pangjalu to return".[70] And it was "because of his unification of the domain" (**kṣityekībhāva-**

karaṇāt)[71] that twenty years later he claimed the divine status of a Mahākṣobhya.

IX

It is not only this new imperial ideology which matters in the context of this paper however. Of even greater relevance are its structural consequences. On the basis of this new ideology and, at the same time, in order to strengthen the imperial unity and their own position, the imperial kings covered their extended core areas with a close network of religious institutions which focussed directly on the capital and its religious institutions and thus, at least indirectly, on the imperial king himself. This system, linking local, provincial and a few major temples at the capital with the imperial temple of the ruling king, was perhaps most highly developed in Angkor under Jayavarman VII.[72] The economic ties which linked these temples might even partly have substituted for the "resource transfer of a political nature". And, furthermore, in the case of Angkor we have reliable and detailed data on the extent to which the large temples, which remained under direct control of the central court, influenced directly the economic development of the core area of Angkor. The core area and the provinces were linked through imperial roads. Along these roads the imperial kings constructed resthouses for pilgrims, traders, and officers, and at nodal points of this infrastructure temples functioned as royal resthouses and temporary imperial palaces. At the end of the 12th century the extended core area of Angkor might have been covered by about 3000-3500 temples, all fulfilling important ritual, economic and administrative functions.

Under the imperial kings of Majapahit the extended core area of East Java was also covered with a network of temples. These temples were certainly not as monumental as the temples of the earlier kings of Central Java or Angkor. But the intrinsic feature of the "ritual network" in East Java was perhaps even more explicit. Inscriptions and the **Nāgarakĕrtagāma** leave no doubt that these temples were directly linked with the imperial policy of unification of the extended core area. In the already-mentioned Sarwadharma inscription, King Kertanagara reconfirmed the special privileges granted to the religious domains (**dharma**) by his father Viṣṇuvardhana. These concessions were granted in order to separate "the dominions and dependencies of the honoured holy domains of the clergy of all kinds from the lands of the Royal servants, with the intention of the independence (**swatantra**) of the honoured holy domains of the clergy of all kinds, in order to render the more firm the Illustrious Great King's sitting on the jewel lion's throne, being considered as the one sunshade (**eka chātra**) of all Java-land, as the exalted deity (**uttungga dewa**) among all the honoured Prabhus (**samantaprabhu**) of the land of Janggala and Pangjalu".[73] Here we have in a nutshell the essence of the imperial ritual policy, i.e. to unite the extended core area and to strengthen the position of the ruler. This conclusion is reconfirmed by the **Nāgarakĕrtāgama** composed about a century later. In connection with the **Śraddha** ceremonies performed for the queen Rājapatnī at her funeral temple at Bayalangu, it is stated: "The reason for it to be fashioned as an eminent religious domain (**dharma**) was: in order that again the land of Java might become one, that orderly it might have one king (**rāja**), that as one country it

would be known in the world in future, not going to deviate. It was to be a token of the Illustrious Prince's being a vanquisher of all countries on the earth, being a universe-swaying Prabhu (**cakrawartti prabhū**)".[74] And the chapter of the **Nāgarakĕrtāgama** concludes: The deceased Queen "is being offered worship (**puja**) by well-born people (**amatya**), the villages (**grāma**), all of them are submissive (**bhakti**). She enjoys her heaven, having a grandson paramount in Yāwaland, a [sole] monarch (**eka nātha**)".[75] The ideological function of this grand ceremony in which the whole court of Majapahit participated is very evident: to keep the land united and the villages submissive and to ensure that Java is ruled only by one universal ruler.

But again, it is not only this imperial ideology which matters here. It is the network of royal temples covering the extended imperial core area of Majapahit which is relevant for our present deliberations. The **Nāgarakĕrtāgama** mentions that in the year 1365 A.D. there existed twenty-seven royal religious domains (**dharma haji**).[76] All these temples and their dependencies were under the guardianship of abbots (**sthāpaka**) and under the control of royal priests (**wiku-rājas**). And it is of the greatest interest that, at least according to my knowledge, all these royal domains and their temples were established during the "imperial" century of Javanese history from the middle of the 13th century to the year 1365 A.D. when the **Nāgarakĕrtāgama** was written by Prapañca. None of the earlier temples (e.g. Sanggariti or Badut) seem to have been included in the system of these royal domains.[77] These royal domains, therefore, obviously formed an integral part of the policy of the imperial kings of this period.

X

The system of royal domains in Java and of the hierarchical order of temples in Angkor and monastic institutions in Burma thus provided the imperial kings and their courts with an additional infrastructure which did not exist in the Early Kingdoms. Further research is certainly required to come to some final conclusions in these matters. But even now we may come to the hypothetical inference that this new infrastructure had an impact on the structure of the Imperial Kingdoms of Southeast Asia, too. It allowed the imperial courts, perhaps for the first time, a permanent and in some cases even direct access to the sphere of local matters even outside the limited nuclear area which was under their direct political control. Together with other spheres and mechanisms of integration, some of which have not been mentioned at all in this paper (e.g. art and architecture, literature or trade),[78] this ritual policy played an important role in a continuous process of interlocal or intraregional integration. This process of integration and structural change which radiated from the courts to the extended core areas was perhaps the most important change which took place during the short period of Imperial Kingdoms in Southeast Asia. In most cases the political framework of these core areas of integration was shattered in the following centuries. But the socio-cultural heritage of these extended core areas of the former Imperial Kingdoms again played a most important role in a more recent political process which scholars of political science refer to as a "nation-building process".

NOTES

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1. Max Weber, **Economy and Society**, ed. by G. Roth and C. Wittich, Berkeley UCP 1968, Vol. I, p.53f.

2. L.P. Briggs, **The Ancient Khmer Empire**, Philadelphia 1951, p.18.

3. C. Jacques, "'Funan', 'Zhenla'. The Reality Concealed by these Chinese Views of Indochina", in **Early South East Asia**, ed. by R.B. Smith and W. Watson, Oxford University Press 1979, pp.371-9.

4. Quoted from O.W. Wolters, **Early Indonesian Commerce. A Study of the Origins of Srivijaya**, Cornell University Press, 1967, p.216.

5. R. Heine-Geldern, "Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia", in **Far Eastern Quarterly**, 2 (1942) p.21.

6. O.W. Wolters, op.cit., p. 188.

7. O.W. Wolters, **History, Culture and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives**, Singapore 1982, p.13.

8. Ibid., p.2.

9. I.W. Mabbett, "The 'Indianization' of Southeast Asia. Reflections on the Prehistoric Sources", in **Journal of Southeast Asian Studies**, 8 (1977) pp.1-14.

10. Even G. Coedès spoke of "this Sanskrit or Indian Civilization transplanted into Southeast Asia" and again of "the Indian civilization of Southeast Asia" (**Indianized States of Southeast Asia**, Hawaii 1968, p.16).

11. O.W. Wolters, op.cit. (note 7), p.57 ff.

12. O.W. Wolters, "North-Western Cambodia in the Seventh Century", in **Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies**, 37 (1974) p.371 and 383.

13. F.H. van Naerssen, "Tribute to the God and Tribute to the King", in **Southeast Asian History and Historiography**, ed. by C.D. Cowan and O.W. Wolters, Ithaca 1976, p.298.

14. F.H. van Naerssen, op.cit., p.297 and F.H. van Naerssen and R.C. de Jong, **The Economic and Administrative History of Early Indonesia**, Leiden 1977.

15. Boechari, "A Preliminary Note on the Study of Old-Javanese Civil Administration", in **Madjalah ilmu-ilmu sastra Indonesia**, 1 (1963) pp.122-33; quoted from F.H. van Naerssen, op.cit. (note 13).

16. C. Jacques, op.cit. (fn.3).

17. O.W. Wolters, op.cit. (note 7) p.16 f.

18. Ibid., p.27.

19. K.A.N. Sastri, **The Cōḷas**, Madras 1955; B. Stein, "The Segmentary State in South Indian History", in **Realm and Region in Traditional India**, ed. by R.G. Fox, New Delhi 1977, pp.3-51; R.C. Majumdar, **The History of Bengal**, Vol. I, Patna 1971; R.S. Sharma, **Indian Feudalism**, Calcutta 1965.

20. L.P. Briggs, op.cit.; Claude Jacques, op.cit.; G. Coedès, "Le Royaume de Crivijaya", in **BEFEO**, 18 (1918) 1-36; B. Bronson, "The Archaeology of Sumatra and the Problem of Srivijaya", in R.B. Smith and W. Watson (eds), op.cit. (note 3), pp.395-405.

21. H. Kulke, "Fragmentation and Segmentation versus Integration? Reflections on the Concepts of Indian Feudalism and the Segmentary State in Indian History", in **Studies in History** (Delhi, JNU) 4,2 (1982) pp.237-63.

22. The major contribution is R.S. Sharma's work on Indian Feudalism (see note 19). For a discussion about this "School" see my above-mentioned article (note 21) and the recent contribution by B.D. Chattopadhyaya, "Political Processes and Structure of Polity in Early Medieval India: Problems of Perspective", Presidential Address, Ancient India Section, Indian History Congress, 22-24.12.1983.

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24. J. Gonda, **Ancient Indian Kingship from the Religious Point of View**, Leiden 1966; V.P. Varma, **Studies in Hindu Political Thought and its Metaphysical Foundations**, Delhi 1954.

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26. e.g.: M.H. Fried, **The Evolution of Political Society**, New York 1967; E.R. Service, **Origins of the State and Civilization. Process of Cultural Evolution**, New York 1975: H.J.M. Claessen and P. Skalnik (eds), **The Early State**, The Hague 1978; R. Cohen, "State Origins: A Reappraisal", in H.J.M. Claessen, op.cit., pp.31-76.

27. H. Kulke, "Early State Formation and Ritual Policy in East Java", unpublished paper, Eighth Conference of the International Association of Historians of Asia, Kuala Lumpur 1980.

28. O.W. Wolters, op.cit. (note 7), p.6 ff.

29. See e.g. Lance Castles, "Statelessness and Stateforming Tendencies among the Batak before Colonial Rule", in **Pre-colonial State Systems in Southeast Asia**, ed. by Anthony Reid and Lance Castles, Kuala Lumpur 1975, pp.67-76.

30. For the concept of the "nuclear area" in the context of South Indian history see B. Stein, "Integration of the Agrarian System of South India", in **Land Control and Social Structure**, ed. by R.E. Frykenberg, Wisconsin 1969, pp. 175-216.

31. For the inscriptions see B. Ch. Chhabra, **Expansion of Indo-Aryan Culture during Pallava Rule (as evidenced by inscriptions)**, Delhi 1965, Appendix, p.85 ff.

32. R.C. Majumdar, **Ancient Indian Colonies in the Far East, II: Suvarṇadvīpa**, Dacca 1937, p.225 f.

33. See e.g., "Banpur Plates of Madhyamarāja", ed. by D.C. Sircar, in **Epigraphia Indica**, XXX, pp.32-38.

34. B.C. Law, **Tribes in Ancient India**, 2nd ed., Poona 1973, p.174 f.

35. For further examples from Orissa see: H. Kulke, "Early State Formation and Royal Legitimation in Tribal Areas of Eastern India", in **Studia Ethnologica I: Aspects of Tribal Life in South Asia**, ed. by R. Moser and M.K. Gautam, Bern 1978, pp.29-37 and J.G. de Casparis, "Inscriptions and South Asian Dynastic Traditions", in **Tradition and Politics in South Asia**, ed. by R.J. Moore, New Delhi 1979, pp.103-27.

36. O.W. Wolters, "Khmer 'Hinduism'", in R.B. Smith and W. Watson (eds), op.cit. (note 3), pp. 427-42.

37. O.W. Wolters, op.cit. (note 7), p.19.

38. B. Stein, op.cit. (note 19), p.16.

39. See also in this connection K.R. Hall, "An Introductory Essay on Southeast Asian Statecraft in the Classical Period", in **Explorations in Early Southeast Asian History: The Origins of Southeast Asian Statecraft**, ed. by K.R. Hall and J.K. Whitmore, University of Michigan 1976, pp.1-24; Denys Lombard, "Le concept d'empire en Asie du Sud-Est", in **Le Concept d'Empire**, ed. by M. Duverger, Paris 1980, pp.433-41.

40. O.W. Wolters, "Jayavarman II's Military Power: The Territorial Foundation of the Angkorian Empire", in **JRAS**, 1973, pp. 21-30; C. Jacques, "Etudes d'épigraphie cambodgienne. VIII. La carrière de Jayavarman II", in **BEFEO**, 59 (1972) pp.205-20.

41. For the text of the inscription see B.R. Chatterji, **History of Indonesia, Early and Medieval**, Meerut 1967, pp.171-84.

42. Boechari, "Sri Maharaja Mapanji Garasakan, a new evidence on the problem of Airlangga's partition of his kingdom", in **Madjalah ilmu-ilmu sastra Indonesia**, 4 (1968) pp.1-25.

43. N.J. Krom, "De vorsten van Kediri, 1038-1144 (saka)", in **TBG**, 56 (1914) pp.242-52.

44. E.g., G. Coedès, however, is of the opinion that Kadiri "became an integral part of the kingdom of Tumapel" (Singhasari) already under Angrok, op.cit. (note 10), p.187. On Aŋrok see: Boechari, "Ken Aŋrok - Bastard Son of Tungul Ametun?", in **Majalah ilmu-ilmu sastra Indonesia**, 6,1 (1975) pp.15-33 and "The Inscription of Mūla Maluru . A New Evidence on the Historicity of Ken Aŋrok", in **Majalah Arkeologi**, Th. III, No.1-2 (1980) pp.55-70.

45. **Nagarakertagama (NK)**, 44,1 (translations quoted from T.G.T. Pigeaud, **Java in the 14th Century**, The Hague 1960, Vol. 3).

46. Jayakatwang's origin and his relation with the Singhasāri dynasty are still unclear. According to the newly-discovered copper-plates of Mūla-Malurun, Jayakatwang was a nephew of Kertanagara. But "according to

46. (continued)
the Kidu Harṣa Wijaya Jayakatyĕ is a great-grandson of Kṛtajaya, the last king of Kadiri who was defeated by Ken Aṅrok or Śrī Rājasa. That is why his chief minister (**patih**) instigated him to attack Kṛtanagara of Siṅhasāri, great-grandson of Ken Aṅrok, to revenge his great-grandfather's murder (H.W., II, 17-19;35)", Boechari, op.cit. (1980), p.62.

47. **NK**, 6,4.

48. For a different interpretation see O.W. Wolters, op.cit. (note 7), p.16.

49. See L.L. Gopal, "Sāmanta - Its Varying Significance in Ancient India", in **JRAS**, 1963, pp.21-37.

50. In his Canggal inscription of the year 732 A.D. Sañjaya also claims to have "overthrown many circles of sāmantas", sl.11 (H.B. Sarkar, **Corpus of the Inscriptions of Java**, Calcutta 1971, Vol. I, p.18).

51. Boechari, **Some Considerations of the Problem of the Shift of Mataram's Center of Government from Central to East Java in the 10th Century A.D.** (**Bulletin of Research Centre of Archaeology of Indonesia**, No. 10) 1976.

52. F.H. van Naerssen, op.cit. (note 14), p.53 ff.

53. Boechari, "Rakryān Mahāmantri i Hino. A Study on the Highest Court Dignitary of Ancient Java up to the 13th Century A.D.", in **Beberapa karya dalam ilmu-ilmu sastra** (Fakultas sastra Universitas Indonesia 1975-1976), pp. 61-111.

54. O.W. Wolters, op.cit. (note 12), p.369, note 102.

55. S. Sahai, "Territorial Administration in Ancient Cambodia", in **The South East Asian Review**, 2 (1977) pp.35-50, (38).

56. **IC**, III, p.210, La formule du serment, A16.

57. **IC**, II, p.176, Grande Stèle du Phimanakas, St. LVII.

58. O.W. Wolters, op.cit. (note 40), p.30.

59. M. Vickery rejects G. Coedès story of Sūryavarman I's alleged origin from the Malayan Peninsula and instead traces back his origin to an old aristocratic family of Angkor. (M. Vickery, "The Reign of Sūryavarman I and the Dynamics of Angkorean Development", unpublished paper, Eighth Conference of the International Association of Historians of Asia, Kuala Lumpur 1980.) His paper is important in another context, too, as he noticed a "rapid bureaucratic expansion" in Angkor in the 10th century which thus preceded Angkor's final "imperial breakthrough" in the 11th century.

60. At exactly the same time a very similar event took place in eastern India when Anantavarman Coḍagaṅga of southern Kaliṅga conquered Central Orissa in c.1112 A.D. He shifted his own capital to Central Orissa and constructed there, too, the greatest temple of his enlarged empire, i.e. the Jagannātha temple at Puri. See H. Kulke, op.cit. (fn. 25 and fn.67, p.40).

61. B. Stein, op.cit. (note 19), p.45.

62. J.G. de Casparis, "Pour une histoire sociale de l'ancienne Java principalement au Xème s.", in **Archipel**, 21 (1981) pp.125-51; J.

62. (continued)
Wisseman Christie, "Rāja and Rāma: The Classical State in Early Java", in **Centers, Symbols, and Hierarchies: Essays on the Classical States of Southeast Asia**, ed. by L. Gesick (Monograph Series No. 26, Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies), New Haven 1983, pp.9-44.

63. M. Aung Thwin, "Kingship, the Saṅgha, and Society in Pagan", in K.R. Hall and J.K. Whitmore (eds), op.cit. (note 39), pp.205-56.

64. N.J. Krom, **Inleiding tot de Hindoe-Javaansche Kunst**, 2nd ed., 1923, Vol. II, p.453.

65. J.G. de Casparis, **Short Inscriptions from Tjaṇḍi Plaosan-Lor**, Djakarta 1958, p.31 (**Bulletin of the Archaeological Service of the Republic of Indonesia**, No. 4).

66. J. Filliozat, "Le symbolisme du monument du Phnoṃ Bakheṅ", in **BEFEO**, 54 (1954) pp. 527-54.

67. H. Kulke, **The Devarāja Cult**, Ithaca 1978 (Data Paper, No. 108, Cornell Southeast Asia Program).

68. The Mahākṣobhya image inscription of the year 1289; see B.R. Chatterji, op.cit., p.186.

69. Sdok Kak Thoṃ inscription, C, 71-4; see H. Kulke, op.cit. (note 67), p.15.

70. Sarwadharma inscription, plate 6, recto, lines 4ff; see G.T. Pigeaud, op.cit. (note 45), p.149.

71. The Mahākṣobhya image inscription, see note 68.

72. I.W. Mabbett, "Kingship in Angkor", in **Journal of the Siam Society**, 66,2 (1978) pp.1-58; Leonid A. Sedow, "Angkor: Society and State", in **The Early State**, ed. by H.J.M. Claessen and P. Skalnik, The Hague 1978, pp.111-30; M.C. Ricklefs, "Land and the Law in Epigraphy of Tenth-Century Cambodia", in **Journal of Asian Studies**, 26 (1967) pp.411-20.

73. Sarwadharma inscription, plate 3, lines 4 ff, see Pigeaud, op.cit. (note 45), p.145.

74. **NK**, 68,5.

75. **NK**, 69,3.

76. **NK**, 74,2.

77. Not all of the 27 dharmas, however, have yet been identified.

78. J. Wisseman, "Markets and Trade in Pre-Majapahit Java", in **Economic Exchange and Social Interaction in Southeast Asia**, ed. by K.L. Hutterer, Michigan 1977, pp.197-212; K.R. Hall, "Khmer Commercial Development and Foreign Contacts under Sūryavarman I", in **Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient**, 18,3 (1975); A. Thomas Kirsch, "Kinship, Genealogical Claims, and Societal Integration in Ancient Khmer Society: An Interpretation", in C.D. Cowan and O.W. Wolters, op.cit. (note 13), pp.190-202; I.W. Mabbett, "Varṇas in Angkor and the Indian Caste System", in **Journal of Asian Studies**, 36 (1977).

2

Hydraulic Works and Southeast Asian Polities

Janice Stargardt

Introduction

Whatever the merits of "The great river valley" theory for delineating the ancient pattern of settlement in the Near East, North India and North China, it seems to have little relevance in ancient South East Asia. Although the mainland of South East Asia was in large part created by three of the world's great rivers: the Irrawaddy, the Chao Phraya and the Mekong, none of the earliest cities and states was located in their vicinity. This extraordinary fact has been noted with surprise in regard to the Mekong, in a recent study of ancient Khmer civilization.[1] In fact, it is equally true of the ancient pattern of settlement of the Pyūs in Central Burma, the Mōns in Central and Southern Thailand and the ancient inhabitants (probably Mōn) of the Trans-Bassac Plain in Southern Vietnam. The fact that early civilizations developed on the fringes of the great alluvial tracts of the Irrawaddy, Mekong and Chao Phraya rather than in their richest soils, is at first sight the more enigmatic in view of the needs of agriculture and the range of opportunities that were apparently neglected through this pattern of settlement.

Pyū sites are typically located in side valleys of the Irrawaddy, on the more limited alluvia created by perennial but highly seasonal rivers such as the Yin and Nawin. The ancient Khmers occupied a similar habitat along a series of rivers draining into Tonlé Sap or into the Mekong River from the North and the West. The Mōn sites of Central Thailand and the head of the Malay Peninsula are on the periphery of the Chao Phraya alluvium or close to much smaller rivers such as the Mae Khlong and the Khwae Noi. The ancient sites of the Trans-Bassac Plain are in fact - despite the title of the site survey - well away from the delta of the Mekong,[2] along the fringes of its alluvia or on those laid down by smaller rivers. Similar ecological conditions surround the sites belonging to the Satingpra complex in South Thailand. Excavated sites with this significant pattern of distribution can be traced from the 2nd century BC down to the 14th century AD and range from small sites like Pong Tuk to vast ones like Śrī Kṣetra and Angkor. Their total chronology is much longer than the period selected for study in the Canberra symposium, but the continuity of the settlement pattern, as well as its prevalence over such a wide area of the mainland, give it a

basic role in discussions of the emergence of enduring, larger polities in South East Asia. This paper attempts to broach the problems posed by this settlement pattern by looking in some detail at the data provided by the Satingpra complex and more briefly at the wider context revealed by the Pyū, Khmer and Mōn sites elsewhere.

Hydraulic Works and the Satingpra Settlement Pattern

The sites of the Satingpra complex discovered since 1970 are presented in Figure 1. The sites themselves, their environment and the stages of development of ancient civilization, agriculture and hydraulic works have been uncovered and studied over the past fifteen years by a joint team from Cambridge, the Fine Arts Department and the Prince of Songkhla University.[3] Although much of the Malay Peninsula at latitudes between 0° and 10° N receives a heavy rainfall distributed in two rainy seasons per annum, the Satingpra complex had its core territory in a relatively dry area. It has only one rainy season, which is poor if not inadequate for producing rain-fed rice, and the Satingpra Peninsula has produced little natural drainage or water storage. Yet in this area, a remarkable continuity in the pattern of settlement has been traced from the 2nd century AD down to the 14th century AD. Ancient villages, monasteries, workshops and towns were strung out along ancient beach ridges running parallel to the modern coastline. Similar beach ridges provide important keys to the pattern of ancient settlement in the area of Nakorn Śrī Thammarat, Sī Chon, Chaiya, Kubua, Petchburi, and across the Gulf of Siam, in the area of Oc èo. One of the remarkable environmental features of settlement on the Satingpra Peninsula, however, is that from the earliest evidence so far recovered, permanent agricultural settlements were established well away from the natural sources of surface fresh water (the lakes of the isthmus). This unusual development was made possible only by the exploitation of sub-surface fresh water by a variety of means - man-made ponds or tanks, canals and wells: that is, by hydraulic works.

The Satingpra hydraulic works, which were to become a very large and productive system with a a high measure of integration, were in origin a discontinuous set of village works of very limited extent (Figure 2). For every ancient settlement which succeeded in providing itself with water for irrigation as well as domestic needs, there were several others that achieved only a lower degree of environmental control and practised bare subsistence forms of unirrigated agriculture. Nevertheless, the technology acquired by some villages through the practice of small-scale hydraulic works was in time to become a valuable instrument in transforming the natural aquatic levels of the Satingpra Peninsula and converting low agricultural yields into substantial and reliable surpluses. The extraction of agricultural surpluses was the basis on which urbanization and the beginnings of a larger polity took place on the Satingpra Peninsula between the 5th and 6th century AD, but intermittent participation in long-distance maritime trade had been going on since the 2nd century AD and was to rise in frequency and volume after the 6th century AD, in association with the development of transport canals.

Urbanization and the Hydraulic Network

The larger hydraulic works of the Satingpra Peninsula comprised large canals constructed to navigable proportions. They were consistently constructed to one of several standard sizes - for instance, 10m wide by 3.40m deep, 10m wide by 3.65m deep, and 6m wide by 3.40m deep (**Satingpra** I, Tables 26, 27a and 27b). The standardization and the high degree of integration between the canals of the navigable kind during Phase I of Satingpra's urbanized history (Figure 3) reveal the presence of an effective co-ordinating mechanism in this polity. The extent of the large-scale, integrated canal system indicates the core territory of the Satingpra state. There were, however, unirrigated territories closely associated with it but still practising less productive forms of agriculture and less directly accessible because of the absence of transport canals. Moreover, the small-scale village irrigation works continued to exist side-by-side with the great canals. The centre of the hydraulic system was Satingpra - the type-site - situated amidst the most intensive hydraulic development of the whole area. The site contains the greatest number of monumental tumuli and the richest deposits of archaeological debris. The Satingpra urban area was defined by its hydraulic works (Figure 4), which were laid out in an approximately symmetrical way: the great lateral canal linking the Gulf of Siam to Thalé Sap (the central artery in the navigable system), bisected the urban area from East to West. It was 12m wide and 4.40m deep over most of its course. A moat surrounded the small citadel area where the central monuments, an ancient tank, dense habitation and trade debris lay. In the outer urban sectors, squarish water tanks ranging in size from 250m to 50m a side, defined the corners of the site.

In the demarcation of urban spaces by hydraulic works and the pairing of monuments with tanks, one recognizes again at Satingpra features whose significance has already been studied in Angkor's successive stages.[4] Recent research has also revealed the presence of a dense network of ancient canals and water tanks in and around each of the three vast cities of the ancient Pyū: at Beikthano, Halin and Śrī Kṣetra (or Thayekettara).[5] Differences exist between the hydraulic technology employed by the Mōns at Satingpra, the Khmers at Angkor and Sambor Prei Kuk and the Pyūs at the sites just named, which will be explored further in the following pages together with their important similarities, but the definition of urban spaces through canals, moats and tanks is an important feature common to them all.

The Satingpra hydraulic system reached its zenith during its second phase of urban civilization, from the mid-9th to the late 13th century (Figure 5). Phase I came to an end with a serious attack on the capital city in appproximately 835 AD during which one of its western gates was burnt. Phase II witnessed the repair and refoundation of the capital with the ritual burial of a cremated young elephant near the western gate. This took place in approximately 885 AD (**Carbon 14 and thermoluminescence dates for Satingpra** in **Satingpra I**, Tables 2a and 2b). During Phase II, the Satingpra complex passed under Indonesian cultural and possibly political dominance. Its navigable canals were greatly extended, especially to the West, making two almost continuous waterways across the isthmus, and to the North forming a transport route to Nakorn Śrī Thammarat and the ancient coastline at Pak Phanang

(Figure 1). In the 11th century high quality ceramic wares, especially Kendis made at Kok Moh, the kiln site in the Satingpra complex, began to be exported along the northern canal to Nakorn Śrī Thammarat, and in considerable quantities along the trans-isthmian waterways to be traded at Kota Cina in North Sumatra and Muara Jambi in South Sumatra as well as to the southern Philippines and Kedah. The kiln site where these wares were made was linked by navigable canal to the capital, Satingpra, and through it to the North, to the sea and the lakes. Maritime trade with China, which had been going on during Satingpra Phase I, rose enormously in volume during Phase II, with numerous shipments of fine quality glazed stonewares and porcelains from southern Chinese kilns being sorted in the Satingpra citadel and re-exported from there, westwards along its canals or southwards down the coast. The Satingpra citadel contains one of the densest concentrations of ceramic debris - mainly Chinese - found outside a burial site in South East Asia. It was clearly a centre for the collection and rediffusion of trade wares of many kinds, among which the ceramic debris was the most durable. Since the citadel was almost certainly the palace area, the concentration of trade debris in this place evokes an image of trade under royal supervision or, at the least, royal licence.

The burden of shipping on the central canal passing through the capital city must, by the 11th century, have been so heavy that duplicate canals were constructed immediately to the North and South of it to similar dimensions. Whereas in Phase I, between the 6th and 9th century, there were 95.7 kilometers of navigable canals operating on the Satingpra Peninsula, in Phase II this rose to 160 linear kilometers in the core hydraulic territory alone (excluding the northern and western extensions). Areas on the Satingpra Peninsula that were not previously included in the hydraulic network were now served by it and artefacts from foreign and local trade begin to appear in the archaeological records of almost all sites from this time onwards. This fact points to a much higher degree of commercial integration of all parts of the Satingpra polity during Phase II of this urban civilization. In spite of the appearance of Indonesian cultural influences which dominated the religious art, architecture and inscriptions of Satingpra's urban Phase II, its rural economy was not affected: the technology employed on the Satingpra hydraulic system remained unchanged. Field boundaries, field sizes and dyke plantings with sugar palms (**Borassus flabellifer**) preserved the same characteristics as in Phase I and no traces have so far been found of the distinctive rice-grain type developed in Central Java - **Oryza javanica.**

While the significance of the Satingpra navigable canal system, linking the South China Sea to lakes, rivers and the Indian Ocean almost continuously, is obvious in the domains of trade and administration, its impact in local agriculture was no less profound. During urban Phase I, 6th to 9th centuries, the great canals and tanks made an estimated total of 6,079,046m^3 of fresh water available for irrigation (**Satingpra I**, Table 37). In Phase II this total had risen to 7,678,160m^3 (ibid., Table 38) while during this phase the land area under irrigation trebled (ibid., Table 14). A close study of the sediments and debris occupying the beds of the Satingpra canals and tanks has, however, revealed a mixed situation composed of dynamism and decline, both of which need to be taken into account if one is to see clearly the complex relations