

ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF LANGUAGE

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Volume 29

Hans Arens

Aristotle's Theory of Language and its Tradition

**ARISTOTLE'S THEORY
OF LANGUAGE
AND ITS TRADITION
TEXTS FROM 500 TO 1750**

**Selection, translation and commentary
by
HANS ARENS**

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PREFACE

It is a very small particle of the philosophic and scientific cosmos that bears Aristotle's name, in fact, it is little more than one page of the whole corpus that I am going to consider, that one page out of 1500 where, in the frame of his logic, he formulates his general views on language. Yet, here, in the first four chapters of *Peri hermeneias*, he is not primarily interested in language, which is a natural - and therefore self-evident - instrument of expression and communication: he considers it only as the indispensable means of forming a proposition, which is part of a syllogism. The linguistic theory sketched here without any pretence to originality would not claim our serious attention and careful examination if those 48 Greek words in ch.1 had not proved of such incredibly far-reaching influence in the development of linguistic thought. This influence was rendered possible by the steady tradition of the text, and this book is intended as its documentation. As far as I know there exist no modern translations of all the old commentaries I present, and so I hope to do some pioneer work in the field. As the list in ch.1 shows, I offer only a selection: the works of eminent authors available in modern editions.

Up to Martinus de Dacia the material consists of explanations of the Philosopher's words, and it is obvious that the same words must often lead to the same explanations, the more so as the explainers did not want to criticize him, but

to prove him right. This attitude was bound to lead to many parallelisms between the different texts. I could not omit all those repetitions if I did not want to present mere fragments to the reader. Fortunately the writers are different personalities with different styles and ways of handling the matter so that the reader does not only get acquainted with the medieval ways of thinking and argumentation, but also with the different forms of that sort of literature: the commentary, the exposition, the glosses, the paraphrase, and the questions. At the same time he can follow the development of the scholastic method. And with all the burden of formalism, traditionalism, and dependence on authority which the authors carry along, they have ideas of their own - more or less, of course - and all these chapters add up to a book on linguistic logic or the logic of language, which makes an interesting section in the history of linguistics, being a museum of past views on language. And my serious advice is to wander through it and see what is there, so as to avoid presenting thoughts as new and progressive which are in fact very old - it is always a poor sight and a little ridiculous too.

I had to content myself with presenting the Greek and Latin material in English and adding my comment where I thought it necessary or at least desirable. I am not giving a philosophical exegesis, but an interpretation from the linguistic point of view. The *grammatica speculativa* and the *grammaire générale* or universal grammar could not be included, though I end with the latter (James Harris). From Aristotle on, the translation is always more or less an interpretation, sometimes not really possible, because there is no exact equivalent, for instance, of *onoma* and *rhema*. And the interpretation is a hazardous enterprise because of the distance of time (1500 years between us and our first commentator) and the lack of an elaborate terminology, which

manifests itself in the polysemy of the essential terms, especially in the Latin commentaries, for instance: forma, vox, intellectus, ratio. And, also from Aristotle on, one often cannot be sure that the text is correct or whether by an error of the author, of the scribe, of the editor or, lastly, of the printer, there is something wrong with it - sometimes the only thing one knows (or thinks one knows). For all these reasons, and because I am neither an expert medievalist nor a logician, I can, despite several revisions of my text, not guarantee that my translation is always correct.

While it is obvious that the original text must not be altered according to our critical judgement, but has to be presented in the form it showed to the first Greek commentator, this may not seem necessary for our English translation. But as it will take the place of the original for most of the readers it must narrowly follow it in its wording, otherwise it might be misleading and would render several interpretations of the commentators incomprehensible. Neither in this nor in the following translations of the medieval and later texts do I try to insinuate any modern views on language by using parts of modern terminology, because this might falsify the text; on the contrary, I always try to remain as near to it as possible and often choose the same word in its English form if it says or can say the same.

This is the real difficulty: to render the old writings understandable through themselves and to be at the same time as precise as possible without undue modernisation. During my studies I saw more and more clearly the necessity of keeping that precarious balance between a past world of thought and expression and our own in order to avoid provoking endless errors concerning antique and medieval linguistic ideas, which, in my eyes, would be worse

than innocent ignorance. If the text allowed it, I have used various expressions for the same Latin word, for instance: declarative sentence, statement, enunciation, proposition for 'enuntiatio'; κατὰ συνθήκην or θέσει, 'secundum (or ad) placitum', 'positione' have also been rendered in different ways. On the other hand, a word like vox (φωνή), which means an animal faculty, an utterance, and everything uttered, from single sound to complete sentence, had to be rendered as the context required: by 'voice', 'vocal form', 'word' etc., and 'intellectus', which also means a faculty, an act, and its result, had to be differentiated (and often with great difficulty). But one must be conscious of the fact that in the minds of the old authors these and many other words had that wide semantic range, which seems impossible to us because it prevents precision.

In order to avoid the full repetition of the same passages in every expositor's text and, at the same time, to facilitate reference, I have adopted the division into 30 lemmata used in the edition of Thomas' text; they are indicated by the figures in (). The figures in / / indicate the page of the original edition. A third reference, to the pages of the present book, would perhaps have been desirable in my commentaries, but easily confounding, too. For the same reason a reference to the pages and lines of the Aristotle edition was avoided. As I am not sure that the book will be regarded and read as a whole of 18 chapters, it may happen that I mention or explain a thing twice in different chapters. Information concerning persons named in the texts is only given if they are not contained in the list in ch.1.- Where I have omitted a part of the text I have indicated its length and its content or, at least, noted 'rep.': repetition.- LSJ means: A Greek - English Lexicon by H.G.Liddell, Robert Scott, and H.Stuart Jones. With a Supplement, ed. by E.A. Barber ... Oxford 1968.

Quotations of Priscian always refer to the *Institutiones grammaticae*, ed. Hertz.

The extraordinary fate of Peri hermeneias

It is a common-place saying that the importance of Aristotle can scarcely be exaggerated. Especially since he was, for more than two millennia, the teacher of logic for the whole Occident, the instrument being the so-called Organon, a comprehensive title of the books 1 Κατηγορίαι (Categoriae, Praedicamenta), 2 Περὶ ἑρμηνείας (De interpretatione), 3 and 4 Αναλυτικά (Priora, Posteriora Analytica), 5 τὰ τοπικά (Topica, the general principles of argument), 6 Περὶ σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων (Sophistici elenchi, Sophistical refutations). For 200 years after Aristotle's death (322 B.C.) these works were lost and unknown. Their revival that is, their real life, especially that of the first two books, began with their publication by Andronicus of Rhodes about 50 B.C. In the course of time, out of Aristotle's universal work his writings on logic come to the front, are received and promulgated, and they are the only part that, from then on, enjoys an uninterrupted tradition in text and commentary.

The small treatise, which takes the second place in the order given to the Corpus Aristotelicum by Bekker, was, according to Isaac (p.33) "écrit par Aristote à la fin de sa carrière sous la forme de simples notes" - I don't know how he knows. L.Minio-Paluello, the last editor of the first two books, states at the beginning of his preface: "The two books with the titles Categoriae and De interpretatione have held the first place among Aristotle's writings on logic, which are commonly called "Organon", for

2000 years - not only with the Greeks and those learned in Greek letters, because, with them, Romans, Armenians, and Syrians could read them in their own languages already in the fourth and fifth centuries, the Arabs in the ninth, Germans in the eleventh, others at a later date; and a lot was written in explanation of this and other books by the masters of philosophy at Athens, Alexandria, Rome, Constantinople, later at Paris, Oxford, Florence; almost in the whole world ..." J. Isaac, in his historical monograph on *Peri hermeneias*, says: "Together with the *Categories*, whose history is almost identical, it /sc. *Peri hermeneias*/ has thus had a very exceptional fate, owing chiefly to Boethius ..." (p.34).

Indeed the career of this little book of less than two dozen small pages is extraordinary: not only a great number of copies, but also of commentaries, expositions, glosses, scholia were being produced in the course of fifteen centuries. The number of copies is explained by the fact that logic was one part of the trivium and that the teachers had to provide the indispensable Aristotelian text for the students; but that was not enough because the text was so difficult (as everybody can still see who tries to get acquainted with it) that an explanation of the Philosopher's words became necessary. This explains the great number of commentaries etc., which are never restricted to the loci that really need interpretation, but retrace every word of it and are full of repetitions - out of pedagogical care for the students? One can say that for some centuries the writing of commentaries was a favourite occupation of scholars in Western Europe, just as the production of philosophical grammars in the form of *Tractatus de modis significandi*.

Some figures and names will show the extent of that copying and commenting activity. J. Isaac in his valuable monograph "*Le Peri Hermeneias en occident de Boèce à Saint*

Thomas" gives us a - necessarily still incomplete - picture of the former on the basis of the first volume of the Aristoteles latinus. As the Greek language was unknown in Europe for centuries it was Boethius' Latin version that replaced, no, that was the original text. Either this alone was copied or the whole of Boethius' First or Second commentary (Prima, Secunda editio), which contained it. Isaac, tracing the development from the 9th to the 16th century, gives the following table "Copies made of Peri hermeneias":

I. Copies of Peri hermeneias

century	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th	15th
text alone	3	7	7	9	69	40	19
Prima ed.	4	7	5	4	0	0	0
Sec. ed.	0	3	8	6	2	1	0
total	7	17	20	19	71	41	19

(One more copy of the Second edition in the 16th century). In 800 years then, 195 copies were made, as far as we know now. Astonishing as this figure is, it is still too low and only concerns Boethius, but during the 10th and 11th centuries the small work with the same title that went under the name of Apuleius was also much appreciated, as Isaac tells us (p.37).

I shall now give a list of the commentaries and the other translations, without any claim to completeness:

II. Greek commentaries to Peri hermeneias

Collection: Commentaria ad Aristotelem Graeca (CAG),

Berlin 1883 ff.

Aspasios, about 100 of the Christian era, a peripatetic, teacher of Herminos. His commentaries are lost. Herminos, 2nd cent., a peripatetic, teacher of Alexander of

Aphrodisias. Fragments of his commentary to the *Categoriae* in CAG VIII.

Alexander of Aphrodisias, about 200, Athens, a peripatetic, who wrote several commentaries to works of Aristotle (CAG I-III); the P.h.-commentary is lost.

Porphyrios, ca. 234-301/5, a disciple of Longinus and Plotinos, while his commentaries are lost his Introduction (*Isagoge*) to the *Categories* is still one of the classical philosophical texts.

Iamblichos, ca. 250-325, a Syrian disciple of Porphyrios, a neo-platonist. Not extant.

Syrianos, 5th cent., Athens, teacher of Proklos and Ammonios Hermeiu. Not extant. Commentary to the *Metaphysica* in CAG VI.

Ammonios Hermeiu (or Hermeias), before 445 until 517/26, a neo-platonist, head of the school at Alexandria. His commentaries, at least those that go under his name, in CAG IV,3-6. Among his disciples are the most important neo-platonists of the 6th cent. and through his followers Johannes Philoponos, Simplicios, Olympiodoros, Elias, David, Stephanos of Alexandria, Damaskios, his commentaries had a far-reaching influence.

Johannes Philoponos (or Grammatikos), 6th cent., a Christian philosopher, scientist, and commentator; his commentaries, without that to P.h., CAG XIII-XVI.

Olympiodoros, 2nd half of 6th cent., neo-platonist philosopher of Alexandria; his commentaries and scholia to Aristotle, without P.h., in CAG XII,1.

Elias, 6th cent., his commentary to *Categoriae* in CAG XVIII,1. Scholia to Ammonios' Commentary.

Stephanos of Alexandria, about 610. His superficial commentary to P.h. in CAG XVIII,3.

Johannes Damascenus (or: of Damaskos), ca. 650-750, the great Christian theologian. Not extant.

Michael Psellos, 1018-79 (?), the famous Byzantine polyhistor, teacher of Michael of Ephesos and Johannes Italos. His Paraphrase of P.h. was printed at Venice in 1503 together with Ammonios' Commentary and Leon Magentenios' Interpretation.

Michael of Ephesos, ca. 1050-1120, Byzantium, commentator, on the basis of Alexander of Aphrodisias, of parts of the Organon and of other Aristotelian works. CAG XX.

Johannes Italos, born ca. 1025, Byzantine philosopher, commentaries to P.h. and other Aristotelian writings on logic. MSS extant.

Neophytos, author of Epitome in quinque voces (i.e. in Porphyry's Isagoge) et in Aristotelis Organon sive libros pertinentes ad logicam.

Leon Magentenios (Leo Magentinus), 14th cent., Metropolitan of Mytilene. His Ἑξήγησις (interpretatio) was printed together with Ammonios' Ἀπόμνημα and Psellos' Παράφρασις in Venice, 1503. There also exists a Pseudo-Magentenios.

Further: Gregorius Humilis, Johannes Pediasimus, Drosus, Georgius Scholarius, and several anonymous works. Concerning them and the authors named after Olympiodoros see Adolf Busse's Supplementum praefationis, p. XXVI-LII of his Ammonios-edition.

III. Latin works of different denomination

Lohr in his alphabetical catalogue "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries" names about a hundred works that treat Perihermeneias alone or together with the other parts of the Organon, that is, the whole Logica vetus, up to 1500; most of them were written in the last 250 years. We can be sure that the list is not complete. The number appears less astounding when we consider these works as the indispensable school-books of ten centuries, logica or dialectica being

the foundation of study at the university. We may even find that number relatively small seeing that each MS existed only once and could only be copied by hand.

Beside the commentarii of Boethius (6th cent.), Abaelard's glossae (12th cent.), Alberti Magni paraphrase, Thomas' expositio, and the quaestiones of Martinus de Dacia, all of the 13th cent., and the treatise of Johannes a S.Thoma (17th cent.), which are presented here, we find works labelled exercitata, disputata, dicta, lectura, lectiones, rationes, glossulae super ..., summulae, compendium logices, tota ars vetus, and among the authors are Gerbert of Aurillac (Pope Sylvester II) in the 10th century, Robert Kilwardby, Boethius of Dacia, Petrus de Hibernia (who introduced Thomas into Aristotle's philosophy), Siger de Courtrai, John Duns Scotus (two works on Perihermeneias alone), Walter Burley, William of Ockham, Thomas von Erfurt; of the 16th century I mention Alphonsus Pratus and Jacobus de Naveros, whose books on Perihermeneias were published at Alcalá a hundred years before John's of St.Thomas great work. Only few had the honour of being printed at once when printing began, e.g. Johannes Gratiadei de Ascoli: Commentaria in totam artem veterem (Venice 1493), the Expositio aurea attributed to William of Ockham (Bologna 1496), Aegidius Columna's (a disciple of Thomas) Commentaria in Perihermeneias (Venice 1507).

IV. Arabian commentaries

by Alfarabi (ca. 870-950), Avicenna (Ibn Sina, 980-1037), Algazel (Ghasali, 1059-1111), Averroes (Ibn Roschd, 1126-1198), threefold exposition.

V. Latin translations

Marius Victorinus, middle of the 4th cent.; Boethius, beginning of 6th cent.; William of Moerbeke in his translation of Ammonios, 1268; Maître Guillaume de Lune, 1321 (according to Isaac). Further: 3 Syrian, 2 Arabian and one Ar-

menian translations. See the preface of Minio-Paluello to his edition of *Categoriae* and *De interpretatione*.

Beside this tradition of the Latin translation there went that of the Greek original: we have three manuscripts of the ninth or tenth century, a hundred of later times; and when the era of printing began, *Κατηγορίαι* and *Περὶ ἑρμηνείας* were among the first works to go to press. Minio-Paluello (p. VII) speaks of 40 or more printings of those works, mostly together with Aristotle's other works or with the other parts of the *Organon*, rarely separately. He mentions translations into 12 languages, but does not name them; he states that "eorum loci complures in commentariis prope innumeris laudantur", but does not name one of the "almost countless commentaries". The first printed edition was that of the Venetian printer and scholar Aldus Manutius in 1495, the 19 other printings in Western Europe that followed until the end of the 16th century are all based on this prototype. The first printed edition of the Latin version was published in Venice in 1481.

All this constitutes only one part of the career of that singular booklet. Beside the commentaries, expositions, paraphrases, and glosses there went the lectures in the Parisian arts faculty, the *Quaestiones disputatae*, and the compendia and summae of logic, which were in great demand. The most widely used text-book was the *Summulae logicales* by Petrus Hispanus (Pedro Juliao of Lisbon, 1210/20-77, Pope John XXI. 1276/7), of which Prantl knows 48 editions. This compendium was translated into Greek by Georgios Scholarios (1400-64) with the title *Σύνοψις εἰς τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους λογικὴν ἐπιστήμην*, but a long time regarded as a work of Michael Psellos (for instance by Prantl). Geyer (Ueberweg 2,456): "Dieses vielfach benutzte Lehrbuch, das oft kommentiert wurde und für Jahrhunderte den Logikbetrieb fixierte". Of its 7 treatises or books the first six contain the *Logica anti-*

qua, 1 De enunciatione (= Hermeneia), 2 De universalibus (= Porphyry), 3 De praedicamentis (= Categoriae), 4 De syllogismo (= Priora analytica), 1-7, 5 De locis dialecticis (= Topica), 6 De fallaciis (= Sophistici elenchi), while the last treats the modern term-logic.¹⁾ As to Michael Psellos,

1) A very successful commentator of this influential book was Johannes Versor (d. ca.1480). His expositio accompanying the text is 10 to 50 times longer and presented in the traditional form of expositio (always 4 points), argumenta (always 5 points), and solutio (always 5 points). Some of his statements are worth noting here:

(1) "It is evident then that for a significant vocal form two things are required: first that it have a significate different from itself, of which it is the sign; second that it be established (ordinare) for such significate, either by human will or by natural instinct. (p. 7A).

(2) He gives an explanation of why the signs are vocal: "The reason is that the vocal forms are in our power and that we can form them when we want to and vary them with much differentiation, but we cannot form at will the objects of the other senses, e.g. colours and tastes. Therefore the voice is more convenient for signifying mental concepts ... than the other sensibles." (p. 7A).

(3) "A non-significative vocal form is one that does not represent /I think it ought to be "present"/ something to audition which is thus understood, and represents nothing beside itself as a sign, though, of course, it represents something (per modum rei), like 'buff' and 'baff', which are not significant (quae non repraesentant). But if these vocal forms are uttered derisively or with some asperity of voice they can signify derision or another affect and could be interjections. When they are uttered without a special sign of corporal gesture or in pronunciation they are not significative ..." (p. 7B).

→

he wrote, among others, a *Synopsis organi Aristotelici*, printed in Greek and Latin at Wittenberg 1597. There were also - to mention only these three works - the *Summulae seu logicae institutiones* of Paulus Venetus (Paolo Nicoletti), first printed at Milano 1474. In 1634 there appeared *Artis logicae prima pars* of Johannes a S. Thoma. This successful book, of which I shall give some specimens, is still oriented towards Aristotle and, in the same degree, towards Thomas and shows that in the middle of the 17th century the Philosopher's authority is still unbroken.

Finally, in 1662, Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole published the classical book of logic (or book of classical logic) *La logique ou l'art de penser*, of whose four parts the second corresponds to *Peri hermeneias*.

As Aristotle's fundamental theory was or pretended to be the logical conception of language it did not compete with grammar. He never became a rival of Priscian: logic and grammar were two different fields (and the Biblical exegesis was a third). The Philosopher's determinations concerning the 'parts of speech', noun and verb, did not influence the predominant grammatical definitions (Priscianic), whereas the theory of language in general did not disagree with the grammarians' conception, if they had any

(4) Though Petrus states: "*Vox significativa ad placitum est illa quae ad voluntatem primi instituentis aliquid repraesentat*", Versor, explaining the difference between '*voluntas*' and '*placitum*' in Abaelard's sense, concludes that the word is more properly said to signify '*ad placitum*'.

(5) He states that "to the logician only that is a noun that can be the subject of an enunciation and of which something can be truly or falsely enunciated" (p.9B) and that alone the verb in the indicative of the present tense is a verb to him" (p.10B), i.e.: noun and verb are understood as subject and predicate of a proposition.

(at all times grammarians have thought they did not need any linguistic theory). But there was a certain mutual influence and interaction: according to Geyer (Ueberweg 2,456) "ist die logica moderna oder die terministische Logik aus dem Eindringen der Grammatik in die Sphäre der Logik entsprungen. Umgekehrt erwuchs aus dem Eindringen der Logik in das Gebiet der Grammatik eine weitere, für die Entwicklungsgeschichte der Logik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert interessante Erscheinung, nämlich die Sprachlogik oder die grammatica speculativa." It took the form of *Tractatus de modis significandi*, a sort of treatise that was the fashion for almost a hundred years, and their authors enjoyed a high reputation. From their standard subject they were called *Modistae*. Pinborg (1967: 309-23) enumerates 24 of them and 80 treatises or commentaries to them. (The last speculative grammar was written about 1500 by Jan von Stobniczy). This was the first flowering of Aristotle's linguistic theory. The second came in the 17th century in the form of *grammaire générale*, universal grammar, *Allgemeine Grammatik*: in 1660, two years before *La logique de Port-Royal*, Antoine Arnauld and Claude Lancelot published their *Grammaire générale et raisonnée*, a modest work, highly overvalued in our time: the genre lived for 250 years. It was the second spectacular career of Aristotle's identity doctrine. In 1751 we find in James Harris' "*Hermes, or a philosophical inquiry concerning universal grammar*" a perfect resuscitation of the Stagirite's thought. With ten editions up to 1841 it proved very successful and is a singular monument to the immortality of Aristotle.

Aristotle's text

Between the doctrine of the categories of signification and that of the syllogism Aristotle treats the proposition, and as the proposition is defined as an enunciative sentence, the sentence has got to be defined too; and as the sentence consists of noun and verb, at least, he had to determine what they were, and so he came to start with the word, i.e. with language itself, though he does not speak of it. So it is the first chapter that contains the gist of his linguistic theory, of which Karl Otto Apel says (1976: 36): "a position which has both guided and misguided all philosophical thinking up to the present day." Of course, such a theory has not been accepted for 2000 years only because the Philosopher had formulated it, but because it appeared plausible, and the plausible statement of an undoubted authority is almost immortal.

The text whose meaning and significance we are going to examine and whose tradition during 2000 years we want to show comprises the first four chapters (16,1 - 17,7), no more than 72 lines, and is presented here, principally, for reasons which will become apparent later on, in the form constituted by Theodor Waitz (1844); the deviations - all of them insignificant - of L.Minio-Paluello's edition(1949) are indicated, and words or parts of words lacking in several MSS are put between brackets. A complete apparatus criticus would have been of no avail because it would not furnish a basis for any different interpretation.

As to the title, it seems scarcely credible that anybody but Aristotle himself should have chosen it: it needed explanation, and, in the course of time, was understood differently. So, for instance, codex E adds to the title (in Greek) "or on the declarative sentence" in order to make it understandable. The Latin translation "De interpretatione" is not any clearer at first sight. The Greek word *hermēneia* means: translation, interpretation, verbal expression, style - and here it means, indeed, interpretation: the interpretation of reality by means of a judgement. That, of course, can be right or wrong, true or false, and so the expression of verity or falsity by a proposition, statement or judgement is the subject of *De interpretatione*, and everything that does not serve that expression is strictly excluded.

From the first four chapters it is already apparent that what we have before us is not the author's definitive text, but something based on his academic lectures, with lapses inevitable in notes taken during or after them. We shall indicate the points in question later on. The very beginning shows that the book on hand is not a final edition: it begins as abruptly as *Categoriae*, whereas the *Analytica* starts with the sketch of a disposition; *Categoriae*: "Homonyms are called things that have only the name in common.."; *De interpretatione*: "First we must determine what an onoma and what a rhema is ...", *Analytica*: "First we must indicate the object of our disquisition and whose business it is ...". It is impossible that a writer, at the beginning of his great work on logic, should not even give a hint at the scope of his work, its disposition, and his immediate subject. Nor is there any connection between the end of *Categoriae* and the first sentence of *De interpretatione*. What commentators have called Aristotle's proem or introduction is nothing of the kind, it is an indispensable part of a treatise on judgements or propositions; it is just the

introduction that is lacking. His "First we must determine" does not follow from the subject set for this part of his work on logic; he does not indicate it, nor does he explain the title, he only enumerates his several subjects, in the wrong order and not correctly because the sentence in general is not one of them. The beginning can be regarded as a signal of what we may have to expect in the following treatise: indeed, we shall find omission as well as repetition, misplacement, and even illogical expression - and all that in six dozen lines - for to us the text is no longer sacrosanct as Aristotle's authentic writing as it had been in the eyes of his commentators for many centuries.

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ

(16a1 - 17a7)

(1) Πρῶτον δεῖ θέσθαι τί ὄνομα καὶ τί ῥῆμα, ἔπειτα τί ἐστὶν ἀπόφασις καὶ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφανσις καὶ λόγος.

(2) Ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα, καὶ τὰ γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ. (3) καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ γράμματα πᾶσι τὰ αὐτά, οὐδὲ φωναὶ αἱ αὐταί. (4) ὧν μέντοι ταῦτα σημεῖα πρώτως¹, ταῦτα πᾶσι παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὧν ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα, πράγματα ἤδη ταῦτά. (5) περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς, ἄλλης γὰρ πραγματείας.

(6) ἐστὶ δέ, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὅτε μὲν νόημα ἄνευ τοῦ ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι, ὅτε δὲ ἤδη ᾧ ἀνάγκη τούτων ὑπάρχειν θάτερον, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ. (7) περὶ γὰρ σύνθεσιν καὶ διαίρεσιν ἐστὶ τὸ ψεῦδος τε καὶ τὸ ἀληθές. (8) τὰ μὲν οὖν ὀνόματα αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ ῥήματα ἔοικε τῷ ἄνευ συνθέσεως καὶ διαίρεσεως νοήματι, οἷον τὸ ἄνθρωπος ἢ τὸ λευκόν, ὅταν μὴ προστεθῇ τι. οὔτε γὰρ ψεῦδος οὔτε ἀληθές πω. (9) σημεῖον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦδε· καὶ γὰρ ὁ τραγέλαφος σημαίνει μὲν τι, οὕπω δὲ ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι προστεθῇ, ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ κατὰ χρόνον.

(10) ὄνομα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην ἄνευ χρόνου, ἥς μὴδὲν μέρος ἐστὶ σημαντικὸν κεχωρισμένον. (11) ἐν γὰρ τῷ Κάλλιππος τὸ ἵππος οὐδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ σημαίνει, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ καλὸς ἵππος. (12) οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀπλοῖς ὀνόμασιν, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐν τοῖς πεπλεγμένοις· ἐν ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέρος οὐδαμῶς

σημαντικόν, ἐν δὲ τούτοις βούλεται μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐδενὸς κεχωρισμένον, οἷον ἐν τῷ ἐπακτροκέλης τὸ κέλης (οὐδέν). (13) τὸ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην, ὅτι φύσει τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὅταν γένηται σύμβολον, ἐπεὶ δηλοῦσί γέ τι καὶ οἱ ἀγράμματοι ψόφοι, οἷον θηρίων, ὧν οὐδέν ἐστιν ὄνομα.

(14) Τὸ δ' οὐκ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ὄνομα. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ κεῖται ὄνομα ὅ τι δεῖ καλεῖν αὐτό· οὔτε γὰρ λόγος οὔτε ἀπόφασίς ἐστιν. ἀλλ' ἔστω ὄνομα ἀόριστον²,

(15) τὸ δὲ Φίλωνος ἢ Φίλωνι καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, οὐκ ὀνόματα ἀλλὰ πτώσεις ὀνόματος. (16) λόγος δὲ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κατὰ τὰ αὐτά, ὅτι δὲ μετὰ τοῦ ἐστιν ἢ ἦν ἢ ἔσται οὐκ ἀληθεύει ἢ ψεύδεται, τὸ δὲ ὄνομα ἀεὶ· οἷον Φίλωνός ἐστιν ἢ οὐκ ἐστιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ πω οὔτε ἀληθεύει οὔτε ψεύδεται.

(17) Ῥῆμα δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον, οὗ μέρος οὐδὲν σημαίνει χωρὶς, καὶ ἐστιν ἀεὶ³ τῶν καθ' ἑτέρου λεγομένων σημείων. (18) λέγω δ' ὅτι προσσημαίνει χρόνον, οἷον ὑγίεια μὲν ὄνομα, τὸ δὲ ὑγιαίνει ῥῆμα· προσσημαίνει γὰρ τὸ νῦν ὑπάρχειν. (19) καὶ ἀεὶ τῶν καθ' ἑτέρου λεγομένων⁴ σημείον ἐστιν, οἷον τῶν καθ' ὑποκειμένου ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ.⁵

(20) Τὸ δὲ οὐχ ὑγιαίνει καὶ τὸ οὐ κάμνει οὐ ῥῆμα λέγω· προσσημαίνει μὲν γὰρ χρόνον καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ τινος ὑπάρχει, τῇ δὲ διαφορᾷ ὄνομα οὐ κεῖται· ἀλλ' ἔστω ἀόριστον ῥῆμα, ὅτι ὁμοίως ἐφ' ὅτουσιν ὑπάρχει, καὶ ὄντος καὶ μὴ ὄντος.

(21) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ὑγίανεν ἢ τὸ ὑγιανεῖ οὐ ῥῆμα ἀλλὰ πῶσις ῥήματος· διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ ῥήματος, ὅτι τὸ μὲν τὸν παρόντα προσσημαίνει χρόνον, τὰ δὲ τὸν πέριξ.

(22) Αὐτὰ μὲν οὖν καθ' ἑαυτὰ λεγόμενα τὰ ῥήματα ὀνόματά ἐστι

(23) καὶ σημαίνει τι — ἴσῃσι γὰρ ὁ λέγων τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ ὁ ἀκούσας ἠρέμησεν —, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐστιν ἢ μὴ, οὐπω σημαίνει· οὐ(δὲ) γὰρ τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι σημείον ἐστὶ τοῦ πράγματος, οὐδ' ἂν τὸ ὄν εἴπῃς (αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ) ψιλόν. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστι, προσσημαίνει δὲ σύνθεσιν τινα, ἣν ἄνευ τῶν συγκειμένων οὐκ ἐστὶ νοῆσαι.

(24) Λόγος δὲ ἐστὶ φωνὴ σημαντική, ἥς τῶν μερῶν τι σημαντικόν ἐστὶ κεχωρισμένον, ὡς φάσις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς κατάφασις. (25) λέγω δέ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος σημαίνει (μὲν) τι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἢ οὐκ ἐστὶν· ἀλλ' ἔσται κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις, ἂν τι προστεθῇ.⁶ (26) ἀλλ' οὐχὶ⁷ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου συλλαβὴ μία. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν τῷ μῦς τὸ ὕς σημαντικόν, ἀλλὰ φωνὴ ἐστὶ νῦν μόνον. ἐν δὲ τοῖς διπλοῖς σημαίνει μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐ καθ' αὐτό, ὡς προεῖρηται.⁸

(27) Ἔστι δὲ λόγος ἅπας μὲν σημαντικός, οὐχ ὡς ὄργανον δέ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται, κατὰ συνθήκην. (28) ἀποφαντικός δὲ οὐ πᾶς,

ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχει. (29) οὐκ ἐν ἅπασι δὲ ὑπάρχει, οἷον ἡ εὐχὴ λόγος μὲν, ἀλλ' οὔτε ἀληθὴς οὔτε ψευδής. (30) οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι ἀφείσθωσαν· ῥητορικῆς γὰρ ἢ ποιητικῆς οἰκειότερα ἢ σκέψις· ὁ δὲ ἀποφαντικὸς τῆς νῦν θεωρίας.

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- 1) M.-P.: πρώτων.
 - 2) In some codices there follow the same words as after ἀόριστον ῥῆμα: ὅτι ὁμοίως ἐφ' ὁπουοῦν ὑπάρχει καὶ ὄντος καὶ μὴ ὄντος.
 - 3) M.-P.: ἔστι δὲ.
 - 4) M.-P.: καὶ αἰετῶν ὑπαρχόντων.
 - 5) M.-P. excludes ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ.
 - 6) M.-P. puts ἀλλ' ἔσται προστεθῆ between brackets and a semicolon behind.
 - 7) M.-P.: οὐχ ἢ.
 - 8) M.-P.: ὥσπερ εἴρηται.

Aristotle : On judgement

(1) First we must determine what onoma and what rhema is, and after that, what negation, affirmation, statement /or: proposition/, and sentence.

(2) These spoken forms are symbols of mental impressions, and the written forms are symbols of the spoken forms.

(3) And just as the letters are not the same everywhere so are not the vocal forms; (4) but what all these forms /sc. the written and spoken ones/ are originally symbols of, the mental impressions, they are the same everywhere /or: in all people/, and what the latter are likenesses of, the things, they are also the same. (5) Of these matters we speak in our book *De anima*, for this is a different subject.

(6) Now just as there are in the mind concepts which are neither true nor false as well as such as are necessarily the one or the other, so there are likewise in speech, (7) because in composition and division lies falsity or truth.

(8) The onomata and the rhemata alone are like concepts without composition and division, for instance 'man' or 'white', when nothing is added; for then they are neither false nor true. (9) This is proved by the fact that even a word like goat-stag signifies something, but not at all something true or false without the addition of existence or non-existence, whether absolutely or temporally.

(10) The onoma is a vocal form with conventional timeless meaning, no part of which is significant separately; (11) for in (the name) *Kallippos* '(h)ippos' in itself does not signify something as it does in the sentence '*kalòs hippos*' (a fine horse). (12) But certainly it is not quite the same with the composite words as it is with the incomposite ones, for in the former a part is in no way ever significant, while in the latter it tends to be, but is not separately, e.g. in '*epaktrokélēs*' (a light piratical skiff) '*kélēs*'

(a light fast-sailing ship) has no meaning of its own.

(13) "Conventional" is said because no word is by nature, but only when it becomes a symbol; the inarticulate sounds, namely, of wild animals, for instance, also manifest something, but nothing in them is a word /or: onoma/.

(14) 'Non-man' is no onoma. In fact, no name has yet been set down with which to call it, for it is neither a sentence nor a negation; so let it be an 'infinite onoma'. (15) On the other hand, 'Philonos' or 'Philoni' and other such forms are no onomata, but cases /or: modifications/ of an onoma. (16) Their definition is in all respects the same, but that together with 'is', 'was' or 'will be' it does not express anything true or false, which the onoma always does; 'Philo's is', for instance, or 'Philo's is not' does not say anything true or false.

(17) Rhema is what consignifies time, no part of it has separate meaning, and it is always the sign of what is said of something else. (18) By "consignifies time" I mean that, for instance, 'health' is an onoma, but 'is healthy' is a rhema, because it additionally signifies its being now in someone. (19) And it is always the sign of something said concerning another, being either of or in a subject.

(20) But 'is not-well' or 'is not-ill' I do not call rhemata, though they consignify time and are always predicated of someone; but the difference has got no name yet; so let it be an infinite rhema, because it can likewise be said of anything, whether existent or inexistent. (21) Neither are 'was healthy' or 'will be healthy' rhemata, they are cases /or: modifications/ of the rhema. The difference is that the rhema consignifies the present time, but the other forms indicate the time before or after.

(22) When the rhemata are spoken alone, as such, they are onomata (23) and signify something - for the one who utters

them forms the notion, and the hearer is satisfied -, but whether they are or are not they do not indicate, because 'esse' or 'non esse' is no sign of reality, not even if you say nothing but 'ens' (being); for it is nothing in itself, but it consignifies a composition, which, without the components one cannot apprehend.

(24) The sentence is a significant vocal form of whose parts some have meaning separately, i.e. words, not affirmations. (25) 'Anthropos' (man), for instance, signifies something, but not that it exists or does not exist; it will become an affirmation or a negation when something is added. (26) But no single syllable of 'anthropos' (has meaning): in 'mice' 'ice' is not significant, but is now only a vocal sound. In compounds, however, it /the part or syllable/ signifies, yet not by itself, as we said already. (27) Every sentence is significant, not organically, but, as I said, conventionally. (28) Not every one is a proposition, only that in which there is truth or falsity, (29) and that is not in all of them; a wish, for instance, is a sentence, but neither true nor false. (30) We pass over the other kinds, which are better considered in rhetoric or poetics. We are only concerned with the proposition.

Commentary to Aristotle

(1) The very first sentence acquaints us with the difficulty of translating a text like this: the fluctuation of meaning resulting from the polysemy of the principal terms in the text, and the vagueness of expression caused by an insufficient vocabulary.

The meanings of *onoma* are: name, word, noun; of *rhema*: everything spoken, expression, verb. As these different significations form one semantic field in the mind of the speaker they are not always clearly distinguishable. Here, in our text, *onoma* and *rhema* have always been translated with 'noun' and 'verb', and fittingly, indeed, but almost exclusively in the first part, for in 14, 15, 16 and in 20, 21 *onoma* and *rhema* no longer mean 'noun' and 'verb', but 'subject' and 'predicate', significations derived from the predominant function of *onoma* and *rhema* and which one would expect to find right at the beginning, because the elements of the proposition are subject and predicate, not noun and verb. As neither the one nor the other translation fits everywhere and as there is no word in the modern languages that covers the same semantic field as does *onoma* or *rhema*, we prefer to use the Greek words. As in Aristotle and in all his exegetes they doubtless signified the elements or material principles of the sentence or proposition, a Greek scholion in the cod. Paris. Reg. 2064 is all the more interesting: "Every proposition consists at least of subject and predicate and the relation (*schésis*), the relation which subject and predicate have to each other ... this relation

the Ancients called *hýlē*." (LSJ does not know the word in that sense). This sounds extraordinary; but perhaps the *schésis* does not mean more than the copula (also unknown to LSJ)? Still I cannot imagine how *hýlē* should mean the one or the other.

The text says: "First it must be set down or determined ...", not: defined, as the commentators understood the word; for real definitions are not given of *onoma* and *rhema* nor of what follows. It still remains a puzzle why Aristotle should have chosen this illogical order of enumeration, which, of course, he could not follow in his treatise. We have, therefore, our doubts concerning the authenticity of our text right at the beginning.

(2) If one sees the immediate continuation in section 10, as some commentators did, the sections 2 to 9 appear like an intermission, which they are not. If one keeps in mind that Aristotle's sole subject is the proposition or judgement as the recipient of truth or untruth, one will at once see that in these 'intermediate' sections he lays the foundation of his theory: the proposition or judgement being the interpretation, true or false, of reality, by linguistic means, their analysis and ontologic relation to 'the things' had to be the starting-point. Language - there is no proper word for it in his text - is principally and primarily regarded as something spoken, as a product of voice. This word, Gr. *phōnē*, L. *vox*, means the voice as well as everything it produces, from a single sound to a complete sentence. In this sense I have rendered it by 'vocal form' as the most general expression, sometimes by 'word' or even 'language', as the context seemed to require it. The constant use of 'voice' would not only have sounded strange, but also incomprehensible.

The commentators have taken great pains to explain why Aristotle says "*τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ*", translating it "ea quae sunt in voce" and taking it for a neutral expression (what

is in the voice); now it cannot mean "whatever the voice produces", because not everything in the voice has meaning. In fact, the expression refers to the first sentence. In the last chapter Aristotle uses the expression again; speaking of opinions he says: "if indeed those in the voice follow those in thinking". And after that, 24a, he says: "the spoken (en tē phōnē) affirmations and negations are symbols of those in the soul". So it is clear that here he says: "The onoma and rhema, the negation, affirmation etc. that are spoken are "symbola", i.e. signs, signals, tokens, of what is in the soul or mind (psychē is the emotional as well as the intellectual self) as an impression or concept." A páthēma (like its Latin equivalent passio) is something passive: a suffering, emotion or affection as well as what happens to you or what you experience. Plato, in the *Respublica*, speaks of those four παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα (511D, that is: understanding, thinking, believing, and guessing, not so much four different mental activities as four states or processes caused in the mind. Here it is best called an impression from the outside, which, seen from the inside, is an imagination or a concept: this is the exact word, for 'conceive' is 'receive' or 'get pregnant' and also 'form in the mind', 'think', and 'concept' is the thing conceived as well as the notion. That is how we have to understand 'páthema', which Aristotle does not explain: a percept coupled with a notion, which depends on experience and memory, as when one perceives a very peculiar sort of building and registers at once, as the result of a simultaneous act of abstraction, 'palace' or 'chapel' etc., or when one sees something rapidly moving: 'a running child' or 'a dog is running' etc. - these are the onomata and rhemata and sentences as pathemata of the soul or mind, and in general they presuppose or are simultaneous with, the corresponding words.

And, he says, "ta graphōmena", i.e. the written onoma and rhema etc. are signs of the spoken ones. So they exist in three forms: mentally, vocally, and graphically, and there must needs be a direct correspondence between them: the vocal forms are the primary symbols of the mental impressions or concepts, and the graphic forms are their secondary symbols. So far 'the things' have not yet been mentioned.

(Note concerning 'sýmbolon' and 'sēmeion'. In 2 Aristotle calls the onoma and rhema "symbola" of the mental impressions, and in 4 "semeia" of them; on the other hand, he also calls the written forms "symbola" of the spoken ones: this clearly proves that he does not make any difference between symbolon and semeion. It would have been unnecessary to point this out if nobody had claimed that there was such a difference. I learn from André Joly (Harris 1972: 39, note 63) that symbolon has been declared a "signe conventionnel" and the semeion a "signe naturel" so that they represent the thesei-physei-opposition. What a surprise!)

(3, 4) What follows is the most important part of Aristotle's linguistic theory. He states as a well-known fact that there are different languages (phōnaí) in the world, just as there are different writing-systems (grámmata), which he expresses somewhat inexactly as "the letters and the words are not the same for all" instead of: the different peoples have different words for the same concepts and different characters for the same sounds. But he does not say that the one follows from the other nor does he indicate any cause. To this variety of naming and writing he opposes the identity of the original significates of the spoken and the written forms, the concepts or notions (again he says that they are the same for all). Again he does not indicate any cause, it is simply stated as a fact and sounds rather plausible, too, because he does not say:

"all human beings form the same notions in their minds", but speaks of the pathemata of the soul, that is, of what enters it from the outside, making it appear a purely passive process. And then only he comes to the things (prágmata, res). In a subordinate clause he states that the relation between concept and thing is one of likeness (homoiōma, similitudo) or image, and then that the things themselves are also the same, sc. for all. There is no deduction, no conclusion from indubitable facts, everything seems to be common knowledge and self-evident.

The first essential element of this theory is the word - concept - relation, with which Socrates operates in Cratylus; and as the word is only a symbol or sign, not a secret image of a concept, the famous question of the ὀρθότης τῶν ὀνομάτων (the rightness of names), which was the subject of Cratylus, can no longer arise. Thus Aristotle tacitly rejects a theory expounded by Plato and others. This is remarkable progress, and 10 points in the same direction. And by stating (13) that "no word is by nature" he decides the old controversy whether the words are phýsei (by nature) or théseis (by institution). It is characteristic of Aristotle's style that he does not even mention that there is an opposite opinion.

But now the question is: what is the meaning of "the notions are the same to all (πάνσι)" and "the things are the same"? He really speaks of identity (αὐτὰς, ταὐτά), not of equality or resemblance. As real, i.e. absolute identity ($A = A$) does not exist between two things, it can only be said of one thing that it is identical with itself at any moment, not during all the time of its existence if it is a thing of nature, for instance from the single seed to the tree, from the baby to the old man: so the things of nature are not identical with themselves individually because they keep changing. Nor are they identical with one

another - a tree with a tree, a cat with a cat, a mountain with a mountain etc. - because nature does not produce two identical things. Not the sameness of products, but their infinite diversity and variation is characteristic of nature, and so human notions of those things cannot be the same either. Identity in the proper sense being impossible, Aristotle can scarcely have meant it, but only a partial one, an equality or likeness. So much about "the same" in general. Let us proceed with the text.

The notions can only be the same of the same things, that is, the identity of the things is the precondition of the identity of notions, and so Aristotle's statement would be a tautology. On the other hand, it must have been obvious that the things were not at all the same for all, as the diverse peoples lived in diverse surroundings, so different indeed that to some the forest, to others the mountain, to others the sea was unknown. This, then, cannot be the meaning. Therefore the sameness of the things can only mean their existence outside man and independent of him, their objectiveness: as a whole they are the same to the whole of mankind; and further, it may mean this: The things are the same to all, that is: a cow is a cow, a river is a river, a bird is a bird to every human being, that is: everyone perceives an animal as different from an inanimate thing, a horse as different from a man, Socrates as different from Plato, that is: the genus and the species and the individual are each the same in everyone's perception, and everyone will give different definitions of them, but all will give the same of each; and only what they are by definition and is expressed in a proposition counts here. The notions or impressions must be the same because the things imprint their likenesses in the soul, the sensual perception being independent of the human will. Or: the senses apprehend the things and cause a mental image of them,

their "likeness", which, of course, is something essentially different, the transformation of a three-dimensional thing into an abstract entity. In short: the genus man, the animal rationale mortale, is one and the same, and the surrounding world is one and the same, both being nature, and so mankind must needs apprehend it in the same way, and the notions must be the same: this, I think, is the underlying conviction. Some commentators seem to be of the same opinion, when they explain: a Roman, a Greek, and an Israelite who see a man, a horse, and a lion would each in his language call, without fail, the first a man, the second a horse, the third a lion, 'homo', 'ánthrōpos' and 'ādām' meaning the same notion 'animal rationale mortale', whereas nobody would call the man a horse or a lion, that is, if they tackle the problem at all. So we can say that Aristotle seems to have regarded the human soul quasi as a photographic plate, on which the things leave their pictures. And as there was no idea yet of the thing-in-itself, man conceived the things as they were, and the things were as he conceived them. This is a very abstract and mechanical conception, untenable even for the sensual apprehension, which, as everybody knows, is different even when several people have been told to observe one and the same phenomenon. But Aristotle does not speak of that, he thinks of the mental perception, and that is not without consciousness, in other words: it is always influenced by human interest, which differs from individual to individual or from community to community and so renders a truly objective perception impossible. To human consciousness the things do not exist independently, but always in a certain relation, according to their being of no, of small, of great, of vital interest, that is: they have significance, and according to their significance - the same things in different surroundings have different significance - they are

named, a fact which is proved by etymological research.

The important consequence of Aristotle's theory is the correspondence of notion and thing (a wrong notion is said to be no notion), which is the precondition of the interpretation of reality (thingness and world of things) in a proposition that is true. The relation of the word to the mental impression (páthema) is that of a sign or symbol, the relation of the mental impression to the thing is that of a likeness or image (homoíoma). Now the concrete thing, a single real object can only leave its individual picture in the soul or on the photographic plate, and only something like it can be imagined or evoked before 'the mind's eye', for instance, a tree in the form of an oak or pine or poplar, whereas the word signifies a notion, the genus tree, not a species nor an individual appearance. So Aristotle's famous theory omits the specific human process of abstraction and analogy, the precondition of language. That is the cause of its inconsistency: the notion tree, the significate of the words dóry, arbor, tree, Baum, cannot be an image of the real trees. The gap will be filled by the commentators.

"In this passage", says K.O.Apel (1976: 36f), "which is as concise as it is fundamental, Aristotle established nearly as a common-sense dictum, the intersubjective identity of possible meanings as correlated to the ontological structure of things and thereby independent, in principle, of the use of words." Which I doubt.

From this fundamental doctrine of only one way of apprehending the world it followed that the same notions or forms of intellection found their expression in all languages, only in different ways, and as the notions, by their special properties, demanded certain logical combinations, the 'parts of speech' and their construction had to be the same, too; in other words: the grammar was essential and universal,

the vocal forms were accidental and individual: the former was permanent, the latter was changing. And as only something permanent or eternal could be an object of science, this was universal grammar, while a grammar of a particular language was only a practical guide, what the Romans called an 'ars' and the Greeks a 'téchnē'. From the three fields of existence: the things, the notions, and the words, the Modistae deduced the modi essend, intellegendi, and significandi, which survived them in different forms. Their Tractatus de modis significandi were the first philosophical or universal grammars (grammatica speculativa). The preference, during centuries, for the logical structure of LANGUAGE meant the neglect of phonetics of languages, and the conviction that GRAMMAR could be learnt from one language rendered the study of several superfluous. From antiquity onward, the approach to LANGUAGE was logic, 'linguistics' was a part of it.

(5) The reference περὶ τούτων (of these things) is rather vague. In De anima Aristotle speaks of sensual apprehension and mental perception, the passive character of sensation and thinking, especially in II, 5 and 12 and in III, 4 and 8 of the likeness of notion and thing, but not of the notions and things being the same. Though reading the relevant passages of De anima does not really further our understanding of this section of De interpretatione, I will quote the following statements from it: "The soul is quasi the totality of all that is (τὰ ὄντα πάντα)" (431b 20). "The sensation is caused by the sensible things" (417b). "The sensitive faculty (τὸ αἰσθητικόν) is in potentia like the sensible in actu" (418a 3). "The mind is the εἶδος εἰδῶν (the form of the forms, essence of essences), and the sensation is the εἶδος of the sensible things. As no thing (pragma) exists separated from the qualities perceived by the senses, the intelligible forms are contained in the perceptible forms, the

abstract ones as well as the sensual qualities"(432a 2-7). After all, neither in *De interpretatione* nor in *De anima* the pragma is defined; so the possibility that it does not only mean the real objects, but also (perceptible) actions is not excluded. The word has concrete and abstract meaning (originally the latter); the onoma signifies ὄνομα ἢ πρᾶγμα, as Dionysius Thrax says (§ 12): something corporal or an action, something concrete or abstract.

(6) The sections 6 to 9 form the second part of this paragraph, syntactically connected with the beginning by "Ἔστι μὲν οὖν" (2), "Ἔστι δέ, ὥσπερ" (6): to the first correspondence between written, spoken, and mental forms, sc. onomata and rhemata, which was formal, a second is added, one of content. This part has a very questionable form: the logical order is disturbed. Suddenly Aristotle speaks of νόημα (concept, thought) without explaining that it is the same as the páthema, he speaks of truth and falsity without explaining what their criteria are and why they can only be found in a combination of concepts, not in a single concept. The goat-stag example proves nothing, it only repeats the assertion that a noun alone is neither true nor false.

He begins with the statement that the voice expresses what is in the mind, which is already self-evident, sc. concepts or thoughts, which are of two sorts: they are either void of truth and falsity or must needs contain the one or the other, "because (γὰρ) in composition and division lies falsity or verity", but that is no cause, naturally. And what, indeed, are we to think of 8, which says that onomata and rhemata themselves or alone are like a concept without composition, like 'man', when nothing is added, for (γὰρ) they are neither false nor true, which, again, is no cause or reason; the redundancy is striking.

The logical order could be restored by changing the syntactical connections in the following way: (7) As falsi-

ty and verity lie in composition and division, (8) the onomata and rhemata are without them simple concepts, for instance, 'man', 'white', for, if nothing is added, they are neither true nor false.- But the redundancy in an otherwise so laconic text remains.

Let us now turn to the meaning of 6 to 8. No word, that is a single concept, alone, whatever its meaning, is true or false, for instance, 'man' or 'white', only the composition of two concepts in the form 'Man is white' or a division like 'Man is not white' (division, because thus the notion 'white' is separated from the notion 'man'), that is a proposition, has the quality of truth or falsity. The "concepts /or notions/ which are neither true nor false" are, therefore, all single words and all non-propositional sentences, e.g. interrogative or imperative ones. Truth and falsity lie in the predication. It is rather curious that after stating here (8) that the onomata and rhemata are concepts, Aristotle, in 23, should deem it necessary to prove that the rhemata signify something! As to "for instance 'man' or 'white'", it is striking proof of the equivocation in 'onoma' and 'rhema': where one expects a noun and a verb one finds two nouns, the first being meant as subject, the second as predicate¹⁾ in the familiar example of a proposition; this is quite clear, for 'white' could only be used predicatively. In the sentence of which he thinks, "ἄνθρωπος λευκός ἐστι", 'leukós' is regarded as the predicate and 'esti' as belonging to it. Ammonius calls it 'proskatēgorūmenon' (predicated additionally), which I tentatively render with 'compredicate' and his translator William of Moerbeke simply leaves out. Because of that model sentence I think that it should read "τὸ ἄνθρωπος ἢ τὸ λευκός" (the word *ánthrōpos* and the word *leukós*). That

1) In *Categoriae* 4 the examples for unconnected words are also: man, white, runs, conquers.

indeed he calls the adjective a rhema here is proved by 20a 31f, where he calls 'non-man' and 'not-just' infinite onoma and rhema and 20b 1, where he says: "If onoma and rhema change places, they signify the same" (instead of "the sentence signifies the same"), "for instance 'ἔστι λευκός ἄνθρωπος' 'ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος λευκός'. There can be no doubt then that the adjective alone is called rhema. But this is in conflict with the later definition of the rhema as "that word that consignifies time". The two acceptations cannot be harmonised, the consignification of time being the fundamental difference between onoma and rhema. The only explanation I can think of is that 'leukós' is negligently called rhema instead of 'leukós estin'. "ὅταν μὴ προστεθῇ τι" = 'when something is not added': I cannot believe that Aristotle should express something quite definite so vaguely and should do so again in 25: "'Man' signifies something, but not that it exists or does not exist; it will become an affirmation or a negation εἴαν τι προστεθῇ, if something is added." I think that in both cases it should read τί = what? Anthrōpos tí (estin)? Tí (esti) leukón? = Man - what? What (is) white? See also my commentary to 25. - It becomes clear that to indicate existence in reality is to be true or to contain truth, and to indicate what has no existence in reality is to be false or to contain falsity.

(9) One might as well translate: "There is a token of this" But that does not matter. Nobody seems to have noticed that that "ὁ τραγέλαφος σημαίνει μὲν τι" is wrong, it ought to be "τὸ τραγέλαφος": the goat-stag, of course, signifies nothing, but the word goat-stag signifies a fantastic animal. When the word, not its significate is meant, the neutral article is put before it, as in "τὸ ἀνθρώπος". As there were neither articles nor quotation-marks in Latin, one wrote "id quod dico homo" (what I pronounce homo), a rather

clumsy expression; the scholastics used the word *ly*, of uncertain origin, as an article.

What the text offers here is a would-be argumentation *a maiori*: He takes 'tragélaphos', a combination of *trágos* (goat) and *élaphos* (stag) as a word without correspondence in reality (though later it also signified something real) and asserts, without any proof, that it signifies something (the concept of a hybrid, a figment), yet nothing true or false; the stag is real, the goat-stag is unreal, but they are not the one true, the other false, only when I assert the existence of the unreal thing do I make a false proposition, and when I assert its non-existence or negate its existence, I make a true proposition, either in the absolute form "The goat-stag exists (or: is)" or with indication of time, for instance, "The goat-stag existed". Now, if this is valid of an onoma like goat-stag, it is valid of every onoma.

(10) Chapter 2 treats the onoma. No definition is given, the three qualities named - conventional meaning, without time, and not consisting of significant parts - evidently do not make one, for the first and the third could be said of every word, the second of all word-classes except the verb. The most astonishing fact is that this 'definition' neither says what an onoma signifies nor what its function in the sentence is, whereas the function of the rhema is stated twice (in 17 and 19). While we may find that the first was already said in *Categoriae* 4: the onoma signifies substance, the omission of a statement like "the onoma is either the substance spoken of or the accident said to be inherent in it" is unexplainable, the more so as Aristotle is primarily or even only interested in subject and predicate, not in the definition of noun and verb. But in either respect his words are insufficient. Though the logician will define noun and verb other than the grammarian, they

are not two different things to them. Here, for comparison, the definition of the noun in the first European grammar, which goes under the name of Dionysius Thrax (§ 12): "The noun is an inflective part of speech that signifies something concrete (sōma), e.g. stone, or something abstract (prāgma), e.g. education, and is used generally, e.g. man, horse, and individually, e.g. Socrates." And Priscian determines (p.55): "It is the property of the noun to signify substance and quality." p.56f: "The noun is a part of speech that attributes to every underlying person or thing the general or the peculiar quality." (But as he uses the words corpus and res, the equivalents of soma and pragma he may also mean the same as Dionysius).

Let us consider in detail what Aristotle says of the onoma. We can pass over its being a meaningful vocal form, which is self-evident. This meaning is "katà synthēkēn", and as there is not at first a mere vocal form, which is later given a meaning and used as a sign, but form and meaning are simultaneous and one, both are kata syntheke, i.e. based on a convention, conventional. This is beyond doubt, despite Joseph Engels' (1963) interesting attempt to prove that - against all interpreters - "syntheke" here is the same as synthesis and that Aristotle teaches that the signification is effected by the combination of sounds, which is out of the question. One of his arguments is that in the famous 20th chapter of the Poetica Aristotle calls every word a meaningless or meaningful "phōnē synthetē", a composed vocal form, so that there "synthetē" takes the place of "kata syntheke" here. But that does not prove anything. That the latter means 'conventional' is clearly shown in 13 and in the Ethica Nicomachea 1133a and 1134b. M.S. Barreto (1970) has thoroughly refuted Engels' theory.

We may pass over Coseriu's interpretation of "σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην" as "not natural, but historically moti-

vated", in other words: "historically necessary" "in purely functional respect". We think that the chief point is the convention: it presupposes a language community; we may even say that such a community consists of nothing but such conventions, it is the embodiment of the speaker - hearer - relation, the precondition of communication and understanding, of the social product language. It is a pity that Aristotle does not say how he conceives this convention and that only the two Greek commentaries extant explain the expression; in the Latin translations it disappears. Aristotle contrasts it with 'by nature' (physei) so that 'kata syntheke' seems to become the equivalent of thesei (positione): by position or arbitrary determination or by institution; one might even think of the pregnant sense of 'ὄνομα τιθεσθαι τινι' = nomen ponere alicui = give a name to, and understand 'thesei' as 'by name-giving'.¹⁾ Anyway, the word or name or onoma is not wholly a product of nature - only materially -, but a product of the human will, whether of an individual or of a community: being conventional it is arbitrary. The word in its duality of "phōnē sēmantikē", a voice with a meaning, or a vocal form set as a sign for something, is a free human creation, not based on the nature of the thing - it is also the Saussurean, the modern view.

(If we take it for granted that the words (vocal form + meaning) are arbitrary it need nevertheless not be true because we know nothing about the original vocal forms from which our present words are somehow derived, and so cannot detect the motivation, i.e. the mental, sensual, synaesthetic or symbolic connection between thing and sign. It seems more probable, because natural, that there had been one than not. For man has still preserved the tendency to give meaningful names to new things, not anyone).

1) θέσις ονόματος = name-giving in Plato's Cratylus 390D.

It is strange that neither Aristotle nor any one of his commentators ever thought of the many onomatopoetic nouns and verbs in the Greek and Latin languages as examples of names motivated by the nature of the things, vocal imitations of nature. They would not only have been exceptions from the rule of arbitrariness, but also from the experience that different peoples have different words for the same things, almost international words, for instance: Gr. kók-kyx, L. cucus, cuculus, Fr. coucou, E. cuckoo, Sp. cuco, It. cuccù, Gm. Kuckuck. The explanation may be that, on the one hand, Aristotle was not interested in such words because they would scarcely ever be part of a proposition, and that, on the other hand, such vocal forms were not regarded as real words which had to signify something, but as mere sound-imitations. I am not thinking here of the 'bre-kekekéx' in Aristophanes' *Ranae*, but of nouns like 'to blityri' and 'ho skindapsós', the first being originally the 'twang of a harp-string', the second a 'four-stringed instrument' (and so, doubtless its sound) and which are both quoted as examples of meaningless words since the second century (Sextus Empiricus, Galenus, and others). So much about 'katà synthēkēn'.

In 13 the text is again not correct. No name, word or noun, it says, is by nature, it comes into being only by being made a symbol, in other words, when the name is made a name. Of course, not the onoma becomes a symbol, because the onoma is, in any case, something with a meaning, it is the mere phōnē, a vocal form, that is set as a sign and so becomes a word. It would be sufficient to put "φωνή" between "ὄταν" and "γένηται σύμβολον" in order to give the obvious meaning the correct expression. (By the way, no commentator has found the wording faulty!) As the comparison with the wild animals shows, the onoma is an articulate vocal form that signifies, that is, it consists of a defi-

nite number of sound elements and therefore can be written with letters and carries a definite meaning, whereas the animals produce inarticulate and therefore unspellable and unwritable sounds or noises, which do not signify (*sēmaí-nein*), but only manifest or express something (*dēlūn*); and among these noises (*psóphoi*) there is no onoma. But "udén" is grammatically incorrect: it ought to be "udeís".

The third factor of the definition is "without time" or "timeless", the one difference between noun and verb, the other being the function. As the rhema is defined as that which consignifies time, it was not necessary to state that the signification of the onoma was without time if the one was only meant as the negation of the other. So I think that it means that the onoma signifies something 'áchronon' or independent of time: the *usía*, *substantia*, substance, as *Categoriae* 4 says. If we understand "ἀνευ χρόνου" thus, the signification of the onoma would at least be indicated in the 'definition'.

There follows the fourth factor: no part of the onoma has a meaning of its own. This seems quite superfluous to us, but it was not in Aristotle's time. It clearly states (and it is repeated in 17 and 26) that the word is the smallest semantic unit, even if the vocal unit is composed of two smaller ones: this composition makes one word and one notion. That is to say: the meaning of a word cannot be found by an analysis into smaller parts, which was the normal procedure of the contemporary 'etymologists', who wanted to prove a word true (*étymon*) by finding its original form and meaning (to *étymon*), the very procedure adopted by Socrates in Plato's *Cratylus*. The conviction was that the 'truth' of a word consisted in the accordance of its (reconstructed) meaning with the nature of the thing named. That was an opinion Aristotle had to combat. Without hinting at anybody he tacitly discards the wide-spread belief

in the 'natural rightness' of words as well as the methods developed to demonstrate it, because it is opposed to his chief doctrine that, in the field of language, truth is only in composition, i.e. in a combination of onoma and rhema, a declarative or affirmative sentence. The other reason is that he cannot allow any etymological interpretation of the elements of a sentence to distort the meaning of a judgement or premiss and so to destroy the syllogism. Any sophistry had to be strictly excluded. As it is so important he stresses the fact of the indivisibility of the word three times: it is a well-defined lexical unit. The conformity of word and thing is eliminated, the word as a source of truth replaced by a conventional phono-semantic unity. Dionysius Thrax will define the word as "the smallest part of the composed sentence (τοῦ κατὰ σύνταξιν λόγου), and Priscian will repeat: "the smallest part of the construed, i.e. of the correctly composed (in ordine compositae) sentence."

(11,12) While Aristotle does not explain what exactly he means by "kata syntheken" and "aneu chronou" he devotes six lines to the illustration of the last part of the 'definition'; he goes a step further by declaring that even in a compound the components have not a separate signification though they seem to. Again he does not offer any proof, he just states the fact. It is rather awkward that he should choose a man's name as an example, because just as in Philip(p)(e) 'phil-' does not mean 'friend' nor 'ipp-' 'horse' and nobody thinks of him as a horse-friend, so neither 'kal(l)-' nor '(h)ippos' have their proper meanings in the name, while they have them in the expression 'kalôs hippos' (he calls it 'logos', which he normally uses in the sense of 'sentence' in this text; it would then mean the species 'incomplete sentence'). But what about the second part of 'Kallippos'? Are we to write it 'hippos', i.e. with spir-

itus asper (as Waitz does) or simply 'ippos' (as Minio-Paluello does)? For he can only argue that the well-known 'hippos' is without its proper meaning in the compound, while the second part is really 'ippos', which is no Greek word, so that the example is of no use. But perhaps Aristotle thought the spiritus asper negligible, for in 26 we find the same case of neglected breathing: in the word *m̄ys* (mouse), he declares, *ys* has no meaning, which for itself it has: *h̄ys* (pig).

Let me quote here a pertinent passage from the commentary of Leo Magentinus: "The words with their proper breathings and accents are meaningful, but without them they signify nothing: *ορος*, for instance, signifies nothing without the breathing, for, with the spiritus lenis, it means *ὄρος* (mountain), with the spiritus asper *ὄρος* (boundary); and *αῖνος* without accent and breathing means nothing, but as an oxytone and with the spiritus asper it signifies 'pure', while with the spiritus lenis and the accent on the first syllable it signifies a species of plant, *ἄϊνος* is a plant (chaste-tree); and *υς* cut off from *μῦς* as a syllable counts as meaningless."¹⁾

The fact that Aristotle first gives an example of a compound and then goes on: "But certainly it is not quite the same with the composite words as it is with the incomposite ones" and then gives another, and this time adequate example of a compound, leads to the cogent conclusion that instead of 'Kallippos' a simple noun like '*m̄ys*' in 26 must originally have stood. There it appears as a misplaced repetition, here it really belongs, before the Kallippos-example, which sounds genuine enough. Then we would have the logical passing from the simple noun, whose parts can never have meaning, to the composite noun, whose parts "pretend". i.e. have the appearance, to have their proper meanings,

1) Quoted by A. Busse in his Ammonius edition, p. XXXVIf.

but in reality have not. the rather rare word epaktrokélēs is composed of épaktron (a light skiff) and kélēs (a light fast-sailing ship) and signifies 'a light piratical skiff! The two components almost mean the same thing, but that the one is a rowing-boat, the other a sailing-boat, which makes the combination incomprehensible. But Aristotle certainly did not choose this example because one cannot learn from the components what sort of a ship it is, but meant it as a normal case, sc. that the construction means one particular thing, not a composition of two things or qualities signified each by one part, for instance: kick-start, mother-country, and many others of the sort, but, on the other hand, there is the mass of compounds like sea-bear, sea-bathing, which mean exactly the combination of the partial meanings so that everybody who knows the words sea, bear, and bathing understands at once what the compound means. And when we remember that he chose the compound tragelaphos as signifying something unreal, impossible, we wonder whether he did so out of his knowledge of natural history or because of the obvious incompatibility of its components. Indeed, I think that he did consider the partial meanings as forming one whole.

(14) From here on, the commentators say, Aristotle shows another, a narrower definition of the onoma. That seems rather curious, but one may say so insofar as he now only thinks of the subject-function of the onoma. Just as the rhema was verb as well as predicate, its counterpart, the onoma, I think, was understood as the noun and subject-word. And this aspect is now clearly in the foreground.

In the modern translation 'non-man' is one word, but in Greek it was 'uk anthropos' (in Latin 'non homo') because the hyphen was unknown; still it was meant as one word. No wonder that there existed no name yet for that construction 'Non-man' is, of course, a noun like 'man', but, says Ari-

stotle, it is not fit for subject because it signifies nothing, and so nothing can be said of it: a definite statement is impossible, except such as 'Non-man is a noun' or 'Non-man means nothing'. It is clearly not a sentence, and it is not a negation(which has the form 'Socrates is not an ass'), but a negatived noun. As it signifies nothing finite he proposes to call it an infinite noun (aóriston ónoma). 'Non-man' will constantly be used as a negatived noun in the affirmations and negations of the following chapters. Waitz and Minio-Paluello here omit a subordinate clause which several MSS contain and which is repeated in the parallel passage in 20:"because it can likewise be said of anything, whether existent or inexistent". I think that it is impossible that Aristotle should have given the reason for his name-giving only in the second place and omitted it in the first. No, with regard to style as well as to content it is required here and makes the parallelism complete.

(15,16) Then the cases are excluded because they, too, cannot be the subject of a proposition, nor of any sentence. (Later commentators will dwell expansively on these words of the philosopher, discussing the question whether the nominative is also a case or not). But one can also argue that the genitive is no onoma, no name because it is not the name with which a thing is called, and that alone can be the subject of a sentence. Note that Aristotle does not speak of the ungrammaticality of a combination like 'George's eats', but, strictly from the logician's standpoint, says that it does not express anything true or false. But the striking fact is that he admits propositions in the past and future tenses as stating something true or false, while in 21 he will exclude these tenses from the rhema proper just because a valid judgement can only be given in the present tense. 16 and 21 are irreconcilable. The only possible correction would be the elimination of the words

ἣ ἦν ἣ ἔσται.- The words from "which the onoma" to the end could be omitted without any loss to the text.

(17, 18) Chapter 3 treats the rhema. Just like 2 and 6, 10 and 17 are connected: "ὄνομα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ" - "ῥῆμα δέ ἐστι" How are we to understand "τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον"? Literally it is "the time-connoter"; if we take it as a neutral form: "that which consignifies time"; but if after the article a noun has been omitted, as it often is, then it can only be onoma, and it means: "The rhema is the onoma that additionally signifies time." For that is what he explains: the difference between the onoma *hygieia* (health) and the rhema *hygiaínei* (is healthy) is that the latter *prossēmai-nei*, that is: signifies additionally (sc. to the onoma) that health now subsists in somebody. In Aristotle's logic "ὑπάρχειν" has a special meaning: it denotes (according to LSJ) "the subsistence of (qualities) in a subject" or the notional predicate-subject-relation. The general notion is *ύγιεια*; when I say 'Σωκράτης ύγιαίνει', it is the same as 'ύγιειά ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ Σωκράτει' (Socrates is healthy = Health is in Socrates), or: 'ύγιεια ύπάρχει ἐν τῷ Σωκράτει' = Health inheres in Socrates.- From the grammatical viewpoint the statement that the verb is "τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον" is correct as there is no other word-class that signifies something together with its time.

The remarkable thing is that the connotation of time, which is the only definition given here, appears to be only of linguistic, not of logical value, since it is at once excluded from the rhema: only the present tense is recognised as the proper tense of the rhema, that is: as the expression of timelessness required in a general judgement. So the time-connoter connotes the timelessness of the verbal predicate, which meets that of the nominal subject, and all that is left of the rhema is its notional content (= onoma) + the copula of existence.

The fact that no part of the rhema has meaning of its own (one might think of prefixes) is unnecessarily repeated, while the fact that it is a vocal form with conventional meaning is omitted. There is no convincing reason for that, and I feel sure that if one element of the onoma definition was repeated the other must have been too. Or he wanted to stress the indivisibility of the word.

Then the function of the rhema is determined (while that of the onoma was omitted) and is at once repeated in 19, and in the same words. If in 17 Minio-Paluello decides for "ἔστιν δέ" instead of "καὶ ἔστιν αἰ" I can see no reason for adding the "δέ" and omitting the "αἰ", nor does "ὑπαρχόντων"¹⁾ instead of "καθ' ἑτέρου λεγομένων" make any difference. But the omission of "ἡ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ", which is discussed by all the commentators, is scarcely justifiable. "σημεῖόν ἐστιν", "is the sign", that is: signifies. The rhema signifies what is said of another (person or thing), and does so always, which is repeated in 19; that means that the rhema is always predicate. But Aristotle does not contradict himself: the infinitive is counted as an onoma; a simple imperative is not considered, being no part of the proposition; and the rhema used as a form and thus as subject is outside its normal function and therefore irrelevant. He thinks of the rhema only in the third person.- I do believe that not the second, but the first occurrence of "and is always the sign ..." has to be cancelled because it is incomplete without "being either of or in a subject" and not in its place: Aristotle gives the following determination: The rhema is the onoma + connotation of time, with-

1) He seems to have decided for this version, which is preserved in none of our MSS, but, according to Ammonius, was found in Porphyry's text, (Stephanus knew it too) in order to avoid the doublet; but Ammonius in his Commentary /50/ rejects this version.

out any meaningful part - by connotation I understand ... and it always signifies something said of another, being either of or in a subject. These are the two sorts of enunciation already defined in *Categoriae*: either the genus is predicated of a species, as in 'Man is an animal', or a quality is predicated of something, as in 'Man is white'; while the first enunciation is essential, the second is accidental, saying what inheres in the subject. So it appears that "or in a subject" is indispensable here.

(20, 21) bring the perfect parallel to 14: the infinite form and the cases. While in Latin there occur nominal non-compositions (non corpus, non sutor, non orator), the corresponding u(k)-compounds are not to be found in Greek (LSJ does not record any); there are examples of negated verbs: u phēmí, but they have a definite meaning: 'I do not say' = 'I deny'. The verbum infinitum is the invention of a logician and practically of no use. The unhyphenated form "u kârnei" seems to be part of a normal negation, but that, of course, is wrong. A negation is the opposition of an affirmation, for instance, 'Socrates laborat' or 'Socrates est laborans' - negation: 'Socrates non laborat' or 'Socrates non est laborans', meaning: It is not true that Socrates works. The affirmation is declared not valid. But the verbum infinitum is something different, it is 'non-laborat'; so the proposition 'Socrates non-laborat' or 'Socrates est non-laborans' really says nothing of the subject because the predicate is infinite and thus cannot be called a rhema. But why mention and exclude such a form at all if it does not exist in normal language? Did it only appear a necessary construction for the demonstration of the possible forms of negation: negated onoma, negated rhema, negated sentence? At the beginning of ch.10 he repeats that 'u hygiainei' (is not-healthy) is not a rhema, but an "aóriston rhema"(infinite predicate); yet - this is interesting - in

his examples of affirmation and negation he never uses a negatived verb, but always a negatived adjective: *u dikaios* (not-just, as against 'unjust', 'not just, and 'just'.)

(21) There follows, according to pattern, the exclusion of the "cases" of the rhema, i.e., curiously enough, the tenses alone; he does not mention the moods, though one should expect him to say that only a rhema in the indicative mood is a real rhema because it can figure in a proposition. But no, he does not exclude subjunctive, optative, imperative, but past and future tenses as if a judgement using one of them were not possible, e.g.: 'Caesar was a dictator.', 'N. will succeed R.' So the hermeneia, the interpretation of reality is narrowed down to *S is P.* - Note concerning "cases": The Greek word *ptōsis* = Latin *casus* means 'a fall', all sorts of it, for instance the fall of dice, in Latin therefore also 'event', 'accident', and it is perhaps with regard to this that the Greeks called all the inflectional and derivational forms of words, just as they 'fall' or turn out in speech, *ptōseis*, but most often the word means the cases of the noun in grammar, which 'casus' exclusively means.

Now in ch.5 Aristotle sticks to the distinction of rhema and ptosis when he says: "Every declarative sentence is, by necessity, based on a rhema or a ptosis of a rhema", admits the tenses past and future in it, and repeats that "if 'is' or 'was' or 'will be' or something like that is not added to 'man' there is no declarative sentence. He gives as its definition: "The simple statement is a significant vocal form concerning the inherence or non-inherence of something at different times."

Section 21 again proves that Aristotle, from the beginning, thinks and speaks only of the rhema as *katēgórēma*, as predicate, in a *prōtasis*, a proposition, or premiss in a syllogism; so he need not even justify his decision not to