

ILLUSTRATED HISTORY

OF THE
**STURMGESCHÜTZ-
ABTEILUNG 202**

ROBERT SZÁMVEÉRI



NORBERT SZÁMVÉBER

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STURMGESCHÜTZ-ABTEILUNG 202



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Seventy years after the end of World War Two there are still many issues of historical interest that have not been researched and described in sufficient detail.

When the managing director of Peko Publishing House called upon me to write the detailed combat history of one of the most successful German assault gun units in World War II, *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202*, I suddenly found myself in a difficult situation. To the best of my knowledge, no detailed history has ever been penned about this outstanding unit which destroyed more than 1,000 confirmed Soviet AFVs (armoured fighting vehicles) during the savage war fought in the eastern theatre. Only a generalized overview of its outstanding achievements is available in excerpts of war diaries (long out-of-print) written by veterans who served in the unit and in some excellent general works on the German assault artillery.

Moreover, I unfortunately had to face the fact that some of the German divisions that, according to evidence in archival documents, owed much to this assault gun-unit often forgot to mention its name and accomplishments in their own formal histories. The lack of contemporary sources must have played a great part in this.

To my best knowledge, *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202*'s own records have not survived the hell of war. So, without any guide, my work was exactly like a criminal investigation: each and every 'suspicious' archival and bibliographical source had to be collected and examined minutely for details concerning this unit. I wouldn't say that I found all traceable sources, nor that my work is a perfect unit history of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202*. However, I did my best to write the combat history of the third most decorated assault gun unit in the German land forces in the most detailed way. So if you, dear reader, have any archival record, document or photo relating to this unit or can correct any shortcoming in the content of this work, I would be interested to hear from you through the publisher's e-mail-address so that any new information might be included in a new, extended edition of the history of this outstanding formation.

In the course of my work I received invaluable help from my friends Péter Barnaky, Péter Kocsis and Mátyás Pánczél. Mr Thomas Anderson helped me in a way he may not know about. Thank you all! But as always my greatest gratitude goes to my wife and my two sons, who endured, smiling, all that went with this work.

Budapest, in May, 2015

The author

INTRODUCTION

ARMoured SUPPORT FOR THE GERMAN INFANTRY

During World War I, the attacking infantry – within the last one-or-two hundred metres from the enemy trenches – always found themselves facing the fire of machine guns and other firearms that survived friendly preparatory fire, as well as the resistance of the remaining elements of fortification. For this reason the Germans developed a light 3.7 cm gun that, moving forward in the infantry's order of battle, could knock out remaining defensive elements by direct fire, clearing the way towards the enemy's positions. A new infantry arm of service was formed around this weapon: assault troops heavily equipped with hand grenades. The combination worked perfectly well.

However, the manually portable gun proved too clumsy in the field and its crew was exposed to the defensive fire. Because of this emerged the idea of the mechanically propelled (self-propelled) gun carriage which, with the realization of the necessity for anti-tank defence, soon appeared on the battlefield.

Refreshing the concept of the accompanying artillery piece, the Germans mounted a 7.7 cm field gun on a tracked towing vehicle and put it to service with the *Reichswehr*. However, its 50 hp engine was not powerful enough to propel the 6.8-ton vehicle. Later they tried to 'crossbreed' a 7.5 cm field gun with a 100 hp chassis, but it wasn't accepted for use either. Finally, in 1932 Germans ceased experimenting with self-propelled accompanying guns.

In 1935, Erich von Manstein – who was a colonel at that point in time – raised the issue of the need for mechanized accompanying guns. The well-known term of the 'assault artillery' (*Sturmartillerie*) originated with him, though the word itself is not a German 'invention'. In World War I, the French referred to heavy tanks employed to support their infantry as *l'artillerie d'assaut*. A year later Manstein worked out the principles of its employment. German ground forces backed the idea and, on 15 June 1936, they commissioned the development of a prototype assault gun.

Developed as a self-propelled 'accompanying gun' for the infantry, and manufactured with a short barrelled (L/24) 7.5 cm main armament that was very effective against personnel and field fortifications, the StuG. III assault gun was

first employed in May 1940, during the western campaign. At that time the six-gun battery was the largest formation of these weapons. Eighteen combat vehicles were deployed in three batteries then, in mid-June, a fourth battery joined them with an additional six assault guns. In 1941, three assault gun battalions (each with three batteries of six guns) participated in the Balkans Campaign. Until 1943, German assault artillerymen were trained at Jüterbog near Berlin with *Artillerie-Lehr-Regiment 2 (mot.)*. After that, work continued at Burg, near Magdeburg, at the so called assault-gun school.

Between 1940 and 1942, 826 StuG. IIIs were produced. These were equipped with the short-barrelled, 7.5 cm main gun (*Kampfwagenkanone 37 L/24*). However, to achieve a more effective anti-tank defence – due to the mass appearance of modern Soviet tanks – these assault vehicles were subsequently equipped with longer barrelled 7.5 cm guns (*L/43s* then *L/48s*) with higher armour penetration capabilities that enabled them to operate as self-propelled anti-tank reserves in combat focal points.

When Germany attacked the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, its *Heer* (army) had 11 assault gun battalions and seven independent assault gun batteries. The assault gun units (each subordinated to a corps) effectively supported the German infantry during attacks, counterattacks and in defence but mostly provided ‘back up’ against the Soviet AFVs that usually appeared in superior numbers. Orders were issued to set up the staff of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* on 29 August 1941. On 10 September 1941, the staff of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* was formed at Jüterbog (*Wehrkreis III*) with three assault-gun batteries under its command.¹ The replacement unit became *Sturmgeschütz-Ersatz-Abteilung 200*² when it was relocated to Schweinfurt (*Wehrkreis VIII*).

Seven StuG. III assault guns made up a battery each of which consisted of the assault gun of the battery commander and six other guns divided equally into three platoons. Battalions were equipped with three batteries giving them a total complement of 21 assault guns. The battalion commanders led their assault guns from half-track armoured vehicles.

The period of time between raising the unit and its arrival in the theatre was unusually short (just three weeks) and it is therefore it is highly probable that the personnel of these units were assembled from officers, NCOs and enlisted men who had already undergone training as assault artillery troops. Consequently, after their transfer to *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202*, there wasn’t a lot more to be done in terms of training until their departure for the front line apart from developing team spirit and familiarising themselves with their vehicles by conducting exercises in different formations and practising live-fire manoeuvres.

1 The staff battery of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* was set up on 20 September 1941.

2 It was changed on 1 May 1942. From then on, *Sturmgeschütz-Ersatz-Abteilung 300*, located in Neisse, was tasked with the replacement of personnel.

In September 1941, units of the German *Heeresgruppe Mitte* (Army Group Centre) fighting in the area of Smolensk were significantly reinforced before the launch of Operation 'Typhoon' against Moscow in early October 1941. The assigned forces were rested and losses in equipment partly replaced. Infantry divisions with reduced strength were reinforced with heavy artillery and assault artillery guns. One of *Wehrmacht's* youngest assault artillery units, *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202*, was ordered to join the attack without delay.

PART I

IN HEERESGRUPPE MITTE

CHAPTER 1

IN THE SECTOR OF THE GERMAN 4. ARMEE NEAR MOSCOW

1941

Operational Background

Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 was introduced under the command of the *4. Armee* into the sector of *Heeresgruppe Mitte*. It fought in the area south-west of Wjasma in October 1941 for the first time during Operation ‘Typhoon’.

16 SEPTEMBER 1941

The German *Armeekorps 4* informed the staff of *IX. Armeekorps* that transportation of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* was to begin on 20 September 1941 and ordered it move from Jüterbog to Smolensk where it would be temporarily subordinated to the *IX. Armeekorps*.³

19 SEPTEMBER 1941

The headquarters of the *IX. Armeekorps* issued orders according to which the infantry divisions would receive support from the arriving assault gun battalion. Two-thirds of the unit were assigned to *183. Infanterie-Division*, but one battery was put under the corps’ direct command.⁴

3 National Archives and Records Administration (Washington). Henceforward: NARA. T314, R406 (*IX. Armeekorps*), F000346.

4 NARA T315, R1416 (*137. Infanterie-Division*), F000264.

20 SEPTEMBER 1941

Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 came under the command of *IX. Armeekorps*.⁵

22 SEPTEMBER 1941

The staff of the *IX. Armeekorps* planned to subordinate the whole of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202*, which presumably began arriving from 25 September, to the *183. Infanterie-Division*.⁶

26 SEPTEMBER 1941

The *IX. Armeekorps* drew up plans for the deployment of the assault artillery battalion. According to the order of battle, which came into effect on 28 September, one assault gun battery would be attached to each of the *263. and 292. Infanterie Divisionen* with the battalion staff and the remaining battery remaining subordinated to *183. Infanterie-Division*.⁷

27 SEPTEMBER 1941

At 1120 hours⁸ the staff of *IX. Armeekorps* informed the *4. Armee* by telegram that the promised *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* (along with other army units) still hadn't arrived. However, the battalion commander reported to the corps that the transport of his unit was in progress.⁹

29 SEPTEMBER 1941

At 2202 hours, the *IX. Armeekorps* reported to the staff of the *4. Armee* that *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* had arrived in the sector of the corps.¹⁰

30 SEPTEMBER 1941

The batteries of the assault gun battalion finally arrived at the infantry divisions of *IX. Armeekorps*.¹¹ On the same day the *263. Infanterie-Division* issued orders for its own attack across the Ustrom River at 0630 hours on 3 October as part of Operation 'Typhoon'. According to this plan, its most important task was to contain the Soviet troops in positions facing them.

During the attack, the division's reinforced *Infanterie-Regiment 483* would advance to Hill 247.6 and Hill 260.7 north-west of Sadki, jumping off from the area of Mal. Tischowo North–Bossjawo public bridge in an easterly direction then

5 NARA T314, R409 (*IX. Armeekorps*), F000022.

6 NARA T315, R1416 (*137. Infanterie-Division*), F000329.

7 NARA T315, R1416 (*137. Infanterie-Division*), F000386.

8 Unless otherwise indicated, times and dates quoted according to the German documents are given in Berlin time and not in local time.

9 NARA T314, R406 (*IX. Armeekorps*), F000792.

10 NARA T312, R147 (*Armeeeoberkommando 4*), 7686891.

11 NARA T314 R407 (*IX. Armeekorps*), F000482.

turning northwards, together with the 2. *Batterie/Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202*, III. *Bataillon* and the regimental pioneer platoon of *Infanterie-Regiment 463*, 1. *Kompanie/Pionier-Bataillon 263*, and the 1. *Kompanie/Panzerjäger-Abteilung 263*. The hill was to be reached by the group in one phase by taking advantage of terrain thickly overgrown with mountain pines.¹²

The staff and 1. *Batterie* of the assault gun battalion waited for the order to launch the offensive operation under the command of *Infanterie-division 183* while 3. *Batterie* was subordinated to *Infanterie-Division 292*.¹³

Infanterie Division 292 had already been advised of the detailed plan of the imminent offensive in a divisional order the day before, on 29 September. According to this, most of the 3. *Batterie/Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* was subordinated to *Infanterie-Regiment 508* and one section of the battery was put under the command of *Infanterie-Regiment 507*. The plan was for the assault gun battery to be brought forward across a bridge that would be built at Oserensk.¹⁴

1 OCTOBER 1941

According to an oral report submitted at 0650 hours by the adjutant of the assault gun *Abteilung*, the staff battery and the maintenance squad were stationed in the area of Metwedewa from 1300 hours. The advance message centre (*Meldekopf*) was set up at Rukino, in the corps' ammunition dump. In the evening the command post of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* was located near the command post of *Infanterie-Division 183* in the western part of Berniki.¹⁵

3 OCTOBER 1941

At 0500 hours, the four divisions of *IX. Armeekorps*¹⁶ launched their attack. The three infantry divisions (a total of nine battalions in the first echelon) attacking in the main direction along the 10 km frontline were supported by 50 artillery batteries and *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202*.¹⁷

At night the assault guns were drawn forward to their jump-off positions so that they could participate in the attack in the area of Wjasma. The batteries of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* assigned to the infantry divisions received orders to attack at daybreak. The AFVs rolled forward to open the way for the German infantry through the Soviet defence. However, in the sector of the 1. *Batterie*, which was subordinated to *183. Infanterie-Division*, the German attack collapsed in an hour. By that time six out of the seven assault guns had struck mines and been had been

12 NARA T315, R1416 (137. *Infanterie-Division*), F000449.

13 NARA T315, R1416 (137. *Infanterie-Division*), F000458.

14 NARA T315, R1919 (292. *Infanterie-Division*), F000156.

15 NARA T314, R407 (*IX. Armeekorps*), F000482.

16 The fourth division of *IX. Armeekorps*, 137. *Infanterie-Division* didn't receive any assault guns.

17 NARA T315, R1923 (292. *Infanterie-Division*), F000592.

disabled. None of the AFVs were destroyed, but their tracks and suspensions were damaged. *Oberleutnant* Hans-Gerhard Maurischat, platoon leader of *1. Batterie*, left to bring forward towing vehicles to rescue the immobilized assault guns, but disappeared in the area of Nowo Tischowo without a trace. Despite a thorough search, he was never found.¹⁸

By around noon, only one assault gun remained operational. Its commander was *Leutnant* Heise. However, by then the AFV had almost used up its ammunition. When the assault gun turned to collect more ammunition, a Soviet anti-tank gun fired on it from the edge of a nearby forest. The German assault gun then fired on the supposed Russian firing position with its last three shells which had been reserved to meet any unforeseen contingency. However the attempt failed: neither Heise (the commander of the assault gun) nor *Unteroffizier* Barth (the gunner), was able to spot the Soviet anti-tank gun. After a half-turn, the German assault gun started back on its quest to rearm but at that moment it was hit by a Russian shell that struck its armour with a deafening crash. The StuG was able to make it to a depression where nonetheless it became disabled. The Soviet anti-tank shell had damaged one of its road wheels and its track, which luckily for the crew only became detached after they had reached cover.

The first action of the other two batteries was equally unsuccessful. For example, the *2. Batterie* lost its commander and his entire crew, all of whom were killed by a direct hit.¹⁹

The assault guns of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* had failed to provide the required support for the infantry. The attack was described in the war diary of the *292. Infanterie-Division*:

*The attack is launched at 0530 hours. The infantry attacks with a great dash – the artillery fire is accurate. The attack is making progress despite the very stubborn resistance and the well-directed, violent Russian artillery fire, even though most of the assault guns strike mines or get stuck.*²⁰

4 OCTOBER 1941

Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 had only four combat-ready assault guns left. These came under the command of *Leutnant* Heise, who was given the task of conducting reconnaissance with *Radfahr-Schwadron 219* (219 Bicycle Squadron) of the *183. Infanterie-Division* towards the division fighting on their left flank because a gap had opened up between them. The leader of the bicycle-squadron was *Rittmeister* Hans-Hermann Sachenbacher. *Leutnant* Heise recalled the action:

18 Kurowski, Franz – Tornau, Gottfried: *Sturmgeschütze – Die Panzer der Infanterie*. Würzburg, 2008. p. 76. The authors of the book cover the battles of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* fought in October 1941 with a day's delay, compared to the data of contemporary operational documents. It has been corrected in the present text.

19 Kurowski, Franz – Tornau, Gottfried: *Sturmgeschütze – Die Panzer der Infanterie*. Würzburg, 2008. p. 76.

20 NARA T315, R1918 (*292. Infanterie-Division*), Kriegstagebuch Ia vom 3. Okt. 1941.

We fought our way forward a couple of hundred metres to high ground from where a wide view opened up. We recognised at once that this wasn't a 'no man's land' anymore. Russians were lying everywhere in the surrounding cornfields, masterfully camouflaged. It was extremely difficult to identify their machine-gun nests, not to mention their nasty mortars, which were impossible to hit most of the time. While we were busy cleaning up our immediate surroundings with fire, I received a radio message from Leutnant Sch., leader of the Second Platoon. He reported that the other assault gun had slipped into a Soviet trench along the total length of one of its tracks. The hull was trapped on the edge of the trench. Since I was fully aware of the difficulties of the required towing operation, I radioed him to wait till I could come to his aid. Because Rittmeister Sachenbacher had just informed me that he considered the mission accomplished and was pulling back his men, I asked him to stay and provide fire support for us while we recovered the stuck assault gun. Obviously he was not able to inform his men about this, because when I looked back shortly afterwards, I only saw the last helmets of his infantry disappearing far in the rear behind us.

Meanwhile Leutnant Sch. tried to tow out the assault gun with his own vehicle, but it too was trapped – just like the other one – two metres behind it. Neglecting our own defence I then had to pull out Leutnant Sch.'s gun with my second gun. The enemy fired at us with infantry weapons. We suffered casualties. When at last Leutnant Sch. broke free, he provided fire support for us with his gun. The group returned with the sad balance of several dead from this mission, at the end of which my own gun struck a mine, too!²¹

5 OCTOBER 1941

At 0700 hours two infantry regiments (*Infanterie-Regimente 507 and 508*) of the 292. *Infanterie-Division* received two assault guns each (supposedly repaired during the night) from 3. *BatterieI Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* for the attack planned to be launched in the morning across the area of Jelnja in a north-easterly direction.²²

Infanterie-Regiment 508 advanced with two StuG. III assault guns. The regiment encountered minimal resistance and were soon fighting 1.5 km north-east of Leonidow. At the same time *Infanterie-Regiment 507* and two of its assault guns met considerable Soviet resistance in the area of Leonowo on Hill 236.1. The Hill was eventually taken at around 1400 hours because the '*Russians had to be smitten one by one in their foxholes*'.²³

German pioneers cleared passages through a minefield allowing the assault guns from the 1. *BatterieI Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202*, together with elements of

21 Kurowski, Franz – Tormau, Gottfried: *Sturmgeschütze – Die Panzer der Infanterie*. Würzburg, 2008. p. 77.

22 NARA T315, R1919 (292. *Infanterie-Division*), F000163-164.

23 NARA T315, R1918 (292. *Infanterie-Division*), Kriegstagebuch Ia vom 5. Okt. 1941.

183. Infanterie-Division to reach the railway north Jelnja. During this action, the German AFVs participated mainly in fighting down Soviet artillery batteries that had presented difficulties not only for the infantry but for the assault guns as well.

6 OCTOBER 1941

The *1. Batterie* of the assault gun battalion could deploy only two of its StuG. IIIs. Under the command of *Leutnant* Heise and *Leutnant* Pickert, they set off to seize Dorogobusch 30 km east of their position together with an advance detachment of the *183. Infanterie-Division*.

Following preparation by the 21 cm mortars of *Schwere Artillerie Bataillon 833* (833 Heavy Artillery Battalion), elements of *292. Infanterie-Division* took Jelnja at 0845 hours. If the *3. Batterie/Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* still had combat-ready assault guns they too might have participated in capturing the town.²⁴

7 OCTOBER 1941

Following the two assault guns of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202*, an advance detachment of *183. Infanterie-Division* (*Rittmeister* Sachenbacher's bicycle squadron), pressed forward, passing through a number of Soviet settlements without significant contact with the enemy. During their advance they encountered Soviet supply columns which they fired on and destroyed.

As the Germans pushed forward, 20 aircraft appeared in the sky above a settlement. Luckily for the German ground troops these were Ju 87 'Stuka' dive bombers. Having evidently seen the unfolded marking panels on the German assault vehicles they swung around in a wide circle before flying further to the east.

The two StuG. III assault guns were only 800 m from Dorogobusch when *Leutnant* Heise looked through his periscope binoculars and saw vehicles and throngs of enemy soldiers milling around in front of the settlement and a significant Soviet force retreating towards the town. However, the bicycle riflemen of the German advance infantry detachment had dropped behind leaving the assault guns without infantry support.

At around 1400 hours, the advance detachment of *183. Infanterie-Division* with the two assault guns of the *1. Batterie* at their head, broke into Dorogobusch before the main forces of *IX. Armeekorps* and, during continuous action, established a bridgehead on the north bank of the Dnieper. This bridgehead was successfully defended together with two bridges that had been captured intact despite the fact that Soviet troops were still fighting in the settlement (until the next morning).²⁵ *Leutnant* Heise wrote the following about the fighting:

²⁴ NARA T315, R1923 (*292. Infanterie-Division*), F000592.

²⁵ NARA T315, R1923 (*292. Infanterie-Division*), F000593.

My first thought was that I start at full throttle and take the entrance to the settlement by surprise. At that moment my loader reported: 'Herr Leutnant! We have almost no ammunition left!' I stopped to discuss the situation with my friend, Pickert, who stayed right behind me. The ammunition situation was no better with him. We had 20 shells altogether so a private action would have been too risky.

Meanwhile the Soviets had noticed us. The enemy set up an anti-aircraft battery at the entrance of the place in a hurry, and its guns were aimed at us. Using up some of our valuable shells we destroyed the battery while it was still unlimbering.

It soon it became clear to me that we had to exploit the confusion among the Russians. We had to dash forward or else the enemy would complete the establishment of its defensive position and our advance detachment would be too weak to breach that.

Following a brief check with my driver, Wachtmeister Frenzel, we headed for the settlement at full throttle behind an enemy column that turned away to the right, inside the locality. All at once indescribable confusion broke out. Russians were swarming around us, lurking behind house walls and hedges. I saw frightened faces but also fists grasping Molotov cocktails. It was clear to me that we mustn't stop for a moment. If the Russians found out that we were all by ourselves, we would be dead meat.

We fired our few remaining shells into the column ahead of us at point-blank range. That must have been a terrible shock to the enemy because they didn't even attempt to knock out Pickert's vehicle or my own, or shoot at us, as we stood in our the open entrance hatches.

Clanking and crashing, literally shooting our way clear, our two assault guns drove through the rubble. The street was more or less clear. It was then that I noticed a side road turning at right angles towards a valley and directly towards a long timber bridge. It had to be the bridge over the Dnieper, the upper reaches of which flowed through Dorogobusch. I abruptly turned in that direction because we needed to take that bridge while it was still undamaged!

A guard stood in the middle of the 100 m long bridge. Our shell – the last one, according to the report of the loader – swept him away. With butterflies in our stomachs we dashed across the bridge. Then we found ourselves alone, on the opposite bank of the Dnieper, discussing what to do. Meanwhile Leutnant Pickert had driven straight on. Obviously he hadn't noticed when we had turned.

Now we were attracting the fire of the Soviet infantry. Then we saw the enemy closing on us from the opposite bank of the river. 'Get the submachine guns out – one for the loader and the other for me!' I yelled.

We opened fire but both guns failed to feed after the first shots. They were covered with sand and had jammed. The same thing happened to my P08 pistol. Then a dozen egg-grenades came to our rescue. This is how we used them: we stuck our head out of the entrance hatch for a moment, then pulled it back; the enemy shot at us revealing his position. We threw the grenades in their direction, and gained a moment's peace.

The whole thing lasted for about 10 minutes, but for us it seemed an eternity. We could hardly wait for the bicycle riflemen to arrive. Before they showed up, a low-silhouetted

vehicle appeared on the opposite bank of the Dnieper and raced across the bridge towards us at breakneck speed. We didn't believe our eyes – it was our ammunition vehicle. The driver had calculated that we must have run out of ammunition. Luckily enough they had been able to push their way through the Russian units despite their absurdly soft-shelled vehicle.

As we stacked our ammunition, we could hear the din of bicycle riflemen arriving at the entrance to the settlement, and see Pickert's gun. He had found us at last. He drove across the bridge and picked up his ammunition. After this we established radio-contact with Rittmeister Sachenbacher. The cyclists reached us and with this, Dorogobusch was ours.

Towards evening, the Russians tried once again to recapture Dorogobusch with artillery support. By the light of the burning houses the struggle for the town continued. By dawn, 7 October [correctly: 8 October (Author)], the settlement was securely in our hands. For capturing Dorogobusch Rittmeister Sachenbacher was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. The crews of the assault guns were decorated with Iron Cross 1 Class.²⁶

8/9 OCTOBER 1941

Elements of *Infanterie-Regiment 509* were drawn into a savage woodland battle by the Soviet troops south of Potschinok in the sector of *Infanterie-Division 292*. The hard-pressed infantry were pulled out of the hole by the assault guns of the *3. Batterie/Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202*. Nevertheless, Soviet soldiers put up strenuous opposition, and fought skilfully.²⁷

On 9 October, the staff of the *IX. Armeekorps* decided – based on the battle order that was about to come into force the following day – that the whole of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* would operate under the command of *137. Infanterie-Division*.²⁸ The reason for this was that as from 10 October the *183. Infanterie-Division* would be detached from the corps and although the assault gun battalion had been supplied through the latter division till 11 October, from 12 October it was assigned to *137. Infanterie-Division*.²⁹

During its attack covering the period 3 to 9 October 1941, the *IX. Armeekorps* clashed with elements of a total of 13 Soviet divisions. In the course of the fighting the forces of the German corps – besides others – took 20,908 prisoners and destroyed or captured 108 various guns and five AFVs. The Soviet AFVs fought exclusively in the sector of the *183. Infanterie-Division*.³⁰

12 OCTOBER 1941

The Quartermaster General of the German Land Forces (*Heer*) issued a general order that applied to every assault gun unit in relation to requests for additional

26 Kurowski, Franz – Tornau, Gottfried: *Sturmgeschütze – Die Panzer der Infanterie*. Würzburg, 2008. pp. 77-78.

27 NARA T315, R1918 (292. *Infanterie-Division*), Kriegstagebuch Ia vom 8. Okt. 1941.

28 NARA T315, R1416 (137. *Infanterie-Division*), F000642.

29 NARA T314, R409 (*IX. Armeekorps*), F000423.

30 NARA T315, R1923 (292. *Infanterie-Division*), F000593.

assault guns. According to this order, the growing need for assault guns could only be partially covered by AFVs from the production lines and from repair. In such circumstances, the Quartermaster General emphasized again the importance of the recovery of assault guns knocked out or broken down, as well as their transport to the army tank equipment depot at Magdeburg–Königsborn, because the ability to provide additional vehicles decisively depended on this. Requests for the supply of assault guns had to be submitted to the Quartermaster General of the *Heer* in two copies that included the following content:

- The chassis number of the assault gun damaged or knocked out.
- The location of the assault gun damaged or knocked out (a sketch-map was requested in the case of unrecovered AFVs and in the case of recovered vehicles the location of the unit accommodating them).
- For assault guns already transported to the rear area, the place and time of their dispatch and the number transported.³¹

15 OCTOBER 1941

From noon, the assault gun battalion should have been allocated to the 268. *Infanterie-Division*, subordinated to *IX. Armeekorps*, but it didn't come to that.³² *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* was relieved from its assignment with *IX. Armeekorps* that morning and dispatched to the sector of the German *Panzerarmee Kommando 2* together with other independent artillery units. The forces were to reach the area of Karatschew (40 km south-east of Brjansk) as soon as possible, following the Spass-Djemenskoje–Kirow–Brjansk route prescribed for them.³³

31 NARA T314, R409 (*IX. Armeekorps*), F000443.

32 NARA T314, R409 (*IX. Armeekorps*), F000602-604.

33 NARA T314, R406 (*IX. Armeekorps*), F001062.

CHAPTER 2

IN THE SECTOR OF THE GERMAN 2. PANZERARMEE, IN THE AREA OF OREL, TULA AND BOLCHOW 1941

Operational Background:

From the second half of October 1941, Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 fought in the southern foreground of Orel then, from early November, they were operating south-west of Tula under the command of the 2. Panzerarmee in the German offensive against Moscow. The assault gun unit was driven back into the area of Bolchow during the counter-offensive launched by the Soviet Red Army on 5 December, 1941.

18 OCTOBER 1941

Shortly before midnight, *Panzerarmee Kommando 2* (the command of the 2 Panzer Army) informed the staff of XXXXVII. *Panzerkorps* by telephone, that *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* had arrived to Orel and had been subordinated to the corps, together with other units. There was a good reason for that: the XXXXVII. *Panzerkorps* had been assigned the task of launching an attack on Fatesh from a northerly direction with the available forces of the 18. *Panzer-Division* (without *Panzer-Regiment 18*), because one of the armoured divisions of XXXXVIII. *Panzerkorps* had been halted by Soviet counter-attacks and needed help to reach the Kursk–Kromy highway.³⁴ The assault gun battalion was needed to compensate for the lack of tanks.

19 OCTOBER 1941

The plan for the attack was drafted by the staff of the XXXX. *Panzerkorps* according to which, jumping off from the area of Karatschew, a motorcycle rifle battalion, a towed artillery battalion, an armoured pioneer company, a tank destroyer company and an anti-aircraft artillery battery of the 18. *Panzer-Division* would launch an attack through the area of Kromy, along the road to Fatesh the following day. As an enforcement, the II. *Bataillon/ schwere Artillerie-Regiment 71* (with 15 cm field howitzers and 10 cm field guns), the III. *Bataillon* of the motorized *Infanterie-Regiment 60*, the whole of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* plus a bridge column were subordinated to the division.³⁵

³⁴ NARA T314, R1100 (XXXXVII. *Panzerkorps*), F000113.

³⁵ NARA T314, R1100 (XXXXVII. *Panzerkorps*), F000115.

21 OCTOBER 1941

The *18. Panzer-Division* finally commenced its attack on Fatesh. From 1745 hours the town was shelled by the artillery of the German division.³⁶

22 OCTOBER 1941

German troops together with the assault guns of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* took the town of Fatesh. The forces of the *18. Panzer-Division* and the StuG. III assault guns clashed with elements of the Soviet 29 Cavalry Division, the 38 Motorcycle Regiment and the AFVs of the 133 Tank Brigade. According to their reports, the Germans destroyed nine Soviet heavy tanks during the fighting. During the night, four more Soviet AFVs were reported as destroyed; two had been hit by StuG. III assault guns after nightfall and another two had struck mines.³⁷ The Germans reported a total of 18 AFVs destroyed (15 of them heavy AFVs) and the capture of 110 POWs and 30 motorcycles³⁸ in the course of occupying the town and mopping up the surrounding area.

23 OCTOBER 1941

Part of the assault gun battalion moved back from the area of a bridge being built as a substitute for one that had been blown up in the northern part of Fatesh at around 1010 hours.³⁹

26 OCTOBER 1941

The assault gun battalion was subordinated to *2. Panzerarmee* in theory, but practically it hadn't yet been relieved from assignment with the *XXXXVII. Panzerkorps*.⁴⁰

3 NOVEMBER 1941

At 1445 hours, the *LIII. Armeekorps* made a request by telegram to the headquarters of the *2. Panzerarmee* for, amongst things, an assault gun battalion to be subordinated to them. The operational staff officer of the corps made this request because the corps, which formed the southern flank of the army, was fighting along vital railroads that would undoubtedly be employed by the Soviets to deploy new formations to get behind the southern (right) flank of the army which was without artillery cover. Should this happen, the horse-drawn artillery of the subordinate infantry divisions would not be able to intervene because they had been immobilized by the poor condition of the roads. To this end, the assault artillery was badly needed.⁴¹ At

36 NARA T315, R710 (*18. Panzer-Division*), F001060.

37 NARA T315, R710 (*18. Panzer-Division*), F001060.

38 NARA T314, R1100 (*XXXXVII. Panzerkorps*), F000127.

39 NARA T315, R710 (*18. Panzer-Division*), F000042.

40 NARA T314, R1312 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000017.

41 NARA T314, R1311 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F001032.

2315 hours the HQ of the 2. *Panzerarmee* informed the staff of *LIII. Armeekorps* by telephone that the assault-gun unit under the command of *18. Panzer-Division* – stationed in Orel at that time – had been subordinated to the corps.⁴²

4 NOVEMBER 1941

Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 was relieved from its assignment with the *XXXVII. Panzerkorps* and attached to *LIII. Armeekorps*.⁴³ At 1900 hours the latter corps informed *167. Infanterie-Division* by telegram that it had already received one of the batteries of the assault-gun battalion.⁴⁴ That battery was stationed in Tschern at that time and under the direct command of the division commander who was allowed to deploy the assault guns only in an emergency.⁴⁵

5 NOVEMBER 1941

The *LIII. Armeekorps* issued orders according to which the assault gun battalion (without its *1. Batterie* which was subordinated to *167. Infanterie-Division*) should temporarily remain in corps reserve in Plawsk, though it was planned to deploy it later in the sector of *112. Infanterie-Division*.⁴⁶

The *1. Batterie* meanwhile, under the direct command of the *167. Infanterie-Division*, was to be used in the focal point of the attack by the division's infantry – a matter in which even the artillery commander of the corps did not have a voice.⁴⁷

6 NOVEMBER 1941

The representative of the commander of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* received the mission of observing routes of march for a possible deployment around Teploje, as well as to provide direct security to Plawsk.⁴⁸

Until the 11 November 1941, the assault gun battalion fought defensive battles in the area south-east of Plawsk and took part in the destruction of the Soviet troops encircled there.⁴⁹

The commander of the *LIII. Armeekorps*, *General der Infanterie* Karl Weisenberger, visited the commander of the *112. Infanterie-Division* and proposed deploying *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* in the focal point of the division's infantry.⁵⁰

42 NARA T314, R1310 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000422.

43 NARA T314, R1100 (*XXXVII. Panzerkorps*), F000147. In contrast, according to the documents of *LIII. Armeekorps* the shift in subordination had already taken place by 3 November 1941. NARA T314, R1312 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000808.

44 NARA T314, R1310 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000424.

45 NARA T314, R1311 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000695.

46 NARA T314, R1311 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000694.

47 NARA T314, R1313 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000226 and T315, R1477 (*167. Infanterie-Division*), F000827.

48 NARA T314, R1310 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000434.

49 NARA T314, R1310 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000032.

50 NARA T314, R1313 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000221.

7 NOVEMBER 1941

General der Infanterie Karl Weisenberger visited the commander of the *167. Infanterie-Division*, who wanted to attach the *1. Batterie/Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* – subordinated to the division at that time – to *Infanterie-Regiment 331* for the next day's attack which was to be launched from the area of Wassiljewskaja towards Bororodizkoje. A *Leutnant* from the battery reported that they had only two combat-ready assault guns at that moment but that two more would be operational by the next morning.⁵¹

However, the war diary of the *167. Infanterie-Division* recorded at 1715 hours shows that the *1. Batterie*, subordinated to the division, was still not deployable because only two of the six assault guns had so far arrived at Roshestweno. Moreover, even those two StuG. IIIs were in need of repairs due to technical defects.⁵²

After nightfall, a total of three assault guns of the battery were operational and these were attached to *Infanterie-Regiment 331* for deployment, on the right flank of the regiment, at the focal point of the attack.⁵³

For the next day's attack a battery was relieved from its assignment with *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* and attached to *Infanterie-Regiment 339*.⁵⁴

According to the war diary of the *167. Infanterie-Division*, the *2. and 3. Batterien* of the assault gun battalion were subordinated to the division in the evening.⁵⁵

8 NOVEMBER 1941

At 0700 hours the aforementioned bridge collapsed under one of the three assault guns and it fell into the Plawa River. This forced the other two assault guns to cross the river through a ford a little further to the north, at Ostrowki. Due to the accident, the assault guns were now to be deployed not on the right flank of the infantry regiment but on the left. The regiment launched the attack at 0830 hours, and the infantry – with the support of the two assault guns – took Oserki Nishnije at around 1100 hours.⁵⁶ Following that *Leutnant* Heise encircled Teploje with two StuG. III assault guns and two infantry companies.⁵⁷

Fresh units from two Soviet rifle divisions⁵⁸, brought up to full strength, launched a forceful attack on the troops of the *167. Infanterie-Division* south of Nowosselki,

51 NARA T314, R1313 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000218.

52 NARA T315, R1477 (*167. Infanterie-Division*), F000832.

53 NARA T315, R1477 (*167. Infanterie-Division*), F000833.

54 NARA T315, R1477 (*167. Infanterie-Division*), F000833.

55 NARA T315, R1477 (*167. Infanterie-Division*), F000837.

56 NARA T315, R1477 (*167. Infanterie-Division*), F000833.

57 On the night from 10 to 11 November, the Soviet troops ceased their attacks on the encircled German battle group. One of the gun commanders was killed in action. Horst Kudicke, a war correspondent from the *Luftwaffe*, joined the assault guns in action. He replaced the loader in *Leutnant* Heise's AFV, and proved himself worthy of the task. See Kurowski, Franz – Tornau, Gottfried: *Sturmgeschütze – Die Panzer der Infanterie*. Würzburg, 2008. p. 79.

58 According to data obtained by German reconnaissance, those were the 6 Guards- and 283 Rifle Divisions. In the course of the interrogation of the POWs, the Germans were told that there were also '25-ton' tanks subordinated to the 6 Guards-Rifle Division (probably from an independent tank brigade that was assigned to them). Soviet tanks are distinguished by weight in German reports of the first months of the campaign against the Soviet Union. The T-34 tanks were designated as '26-ton' tanks.

along the railroad. The commander of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202*, *Hauptmann* Marder, reported the following to the *LIII. Armeekorps* at 1915 hours:

*The enemy is very stout and gives the impression of being impeccable. Russians obviously use tanks as guns. Battle is fierce at the railway-embankment.*⁵⁹

Forces of the *LIII. Armeekorps* reported 10 Soviet AFVs knocked out or captured.⁶⁰ More were knocked out by assault guns. At 2015 hours, the *167. Infanterie-Division* gave orders by radio to *Infanterie-Regiment 315* to launch an attack from Pokrowskoje towards Sergejewka the following day with its forces arranged in echelon to the right. For this mission one battery (six assault guns) of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* was subordinated to the regiment.⁶¹

9 NOVEMBER 1941

The Soviets continued their attack on the *167. Infanterie-Division*. At 0730 hours the assault guns of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* arrived at the division command post and were dispatched to *Infanterie-Regiment 315*.

The regiment was to attack from Pokrowskoje area in a north-easterly direction. At 1530 hours the infantry division reported that its infantry regiment had taken the small forest north-east of Pokrowskoje and had observed Soviet AFVs south-east of the settlement. This prompted the division's commander to order *Infanterie-Regiment 315* to stop in the sector they had reached and to take and hold the sector Pokrowskoje–small forest–Sergejewka–2.5 km west. However *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* – which had been tasked with providing support – had only eight combat-ready StuG. III assault guns left.⁶²

At 1750 hours, *Hauptmann* Marder reported to the corps that his assault guns would stay ahead of the infantry and about 300 m behind the main combat line for the night.⁶³ The drivers slept in their vehicles.⁶⁴

In the day's fighting, *Leutnant der Reserve* Schneider, a platoon leader of the assault gun unit, was killed in action and *Hauptmann* Meißner, a battery commander, was wounded.⁶⁵

Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 was not the only formation equipped with AFVs that had been subordinated to *LIII. Armeekorps* that day. In the two armoured

59 NARA T314, R1310 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000448.

60 NARA T314, R1311 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000669.

61 NARA T315, R1477 (*167. Infanterie-Division*), F000836.

62 NARA T314, R1310 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000452.

63 NARA T314, R1310 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000454.

64 NARA T315, R1479 (*167. Infanterie-Division*), F000375.

65 NARA T313, R108 (*Panzerarmeeoberkommando 2*), F7352704.

regiments of *Panzer-Brigade 5* there were a total of nine Panzer IIs, 31 Panzer IIIs and six Panzer IVs in combat-ready condition.⁶⁶

At 2350 hours *Panzer-Regiment 18* received orders from the corps to assemble in the area of Kondyrjowka and to refuel its AFVs at the supply base of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202*, which was subordinated to *112. Infanterie-Division*.⁶⁷

10 NOVEMBER 1941

The right flank of *Infanterie-Regiment 315* launched an attack at 0700 hours with the support of the assault guns of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202*. It soon it became apparent that the southern flank of the *112. Infanterie-Division* in the area of Mochowaja was threatened by three newly arrived Soviet cavalry regiments. Because of this, *I. Bataillon* of the infantry regiment was ordered there.⁶⁸

11 NOVEMBER 1941

Elements of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* (with 12 assault guns) in cooperation with the forces of the strengthened *Infanterie-Regiment 331/167. Infanterie-Division*, annihilated the 107 Cavalry Regiment of the Soviet 29 Cavalry Division during their vigorous advance in Nikitinskoje area. During the battle the Germans took 400 POWs, captured eight guns, and shot a Soviet political officer (commissar) dead.⁶⁹

In the course of the attack *Leutnant Heise* drove his assault gun immediately behind that of his battery commander who advanced at the point of the *Kampfgruppe* (battle group). The leading assault gun stirred up the powder snow reducing the visibility for those travelling behind. *Leutnant Heise's* StuG caught up with the leading AFV from the left so that he could see more clearly. He recalled this mission as follows:

Getting a clear view, I soon became aware of a closed settlement about 1 km from us. It had to be Nikitinskoje if the map was reliable. I wondered why my battery commander wasn't heading there – instead, he was sweeping round the settlement to the left. A little later I asked him if we weren't moving in the wrong direction. We stopped and soon we realized that we had gone around Nikitinskoje. My battery commander, seeing me overtaking him on the left, thought that I knew the area better and wanted to take the lead. So he followed me to the left, and I, trying to keep the distance needed, came more and more to the left, and by so doing, the whole Kampfgruppe moved in the wrong direction.

So then we turned right and rolled towards Nikitinskoje at high speed from an entirely different direction from the one we had planned. We fanned out as we approached the place and launched our attack on the partly abandoned positions. We were able to

66 NARA T314, R1312 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000016.

67 NARA T314, R1310 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000456.

68 NARA T315, R1477 (*167. Infanterie-Division*), F000838.

69 NARA T314, R1312 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000732.

capture almost the whole enemy formation together with their horses and heavy weapons without suffering any casualties. Only a few of them managed to escape on horseback.⁷⁰

The Cossack unit was alarmed but when they saw that the *Kampfgruppe* had passed the settlement the alarm was called off. Due to that, even the commander of the cavalry regiment fell into German captivity.

The assault guns participating in the attack were withdrawn to the supply base of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* in Roshestwenno after 2100 hours to draw ammunition and refuel their AFVs.⁷¹

The assault gun-formation knocked out six of the twelve Soviet medium tanks destroyed between 6 and 11 November 1941 in the sector of the *167. Infanterie-Division*.⁷²

12 NOVEMBER 1941

The assault guns of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* knocked out another '25-ton' Soviet tank in the sector of *167. Infanterie-Division* (presumably in the area of Nikitskoje).⁷³

The assault gun unit continued to pursue the Soviet troops until 26 November, finally encircling them in the area of Bogorodizk–Jepifan–Stalinogorsk.⁷⁴

During the day the assault-gun battalion came under the direct command of the corps but after discussions between the division commander and *Hauptmann* Marder certain assault gun platoons remained with the units of *167. Infanterie-Division*.⁷⁵

13 NOVEMBER 1941

Most of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* (without the *Kampfgruppe* subordinated to *167. Infanterie-Division*) was stationed temporarily at Plawsk.⁷⁶ Only five assault guns under the command of *Oberleutnant* Lechens remained with the infantry division.⁷⁷ In accordance with the day's orders issued by the *167. Infanterie-Division*, the five assault guns remained in Roshestwenno for maintenance work in preparation for their move to the area of Ogarewo on 15 November.⁷⁸

15 NOVEMBER 1941

In the evening elements of the *112. Infanterie-Division* were fighting in the middle of Bogorodizk. One battery (probably the 3.) of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* was

70 See Kurowski, Franz – Törnau, Gottfried: *Sturmgeschütze – Die Panzer der Infanterie*. Würzburg, 2008. p. 79.

71 NARA T315, R1479 (*167. Infanterie-Division*), F000383.

72 NARA T315, R1479 (*167. Infanterie-Division*), F000386.

73 NARA T314, R1312 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000725.

74 NARA T314, R1310 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000032.

75 NARA T314, R1311 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000683.

76 NARA T314, R1311 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000668.

77 NARA T315, R1477 (*167. Infanterie-Division*), F000845.

78 NARA T315, R1479 (*167. Infanterie-Division*), F000379.

sent to the southern exit of the settlement through Lomowka, and from midnight it was attached to that infantry division.⁷⁹

The staff of the *167. Infanterie-Division* subordinated another battery (probably that of *Kampfgruppe 'Lechens'*) with five assault guns to *Infanterie-Regiment 315* and ordered them to arrive at the division command post in Nowowoskressenskoje by 0730 hours.⁸⁰

17 NOVEMBER 1941

To support the attack of the reinforced *Infanterie-Regiment 33* on Nikitskoje, the staff of the *167. Infanterie-Division* attached three assault guns of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* to the regiment. They were to move out from Lewino at 0600 hours and then report to the commander of the *II. Bataillon/ Infanterie-Regiment 331*.⁸¹

In the sector of the *112. Infanterie-Division*, the *3. Batterie* of the arriving assault-gun unit was promised to *Infanterie-Regiment 110* at 1345 hours.⁸²

18 NOVEMBER 1941

At 2100 hours the assault guns in the rear were brought forward to the sector of the *167. Infanterie-Division* because there were only two combat-ready AFVs left with *Infanterie-Regiment 315*. Ammunition supply for the assault guns arrived at Gorbartschewo.⁸³

Leutnant Vetter from the *3. Batterie/Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* reported the following in his dispatch about the day's fighting in the sector of the *112. Infanterie-Division*:

I arrived at around 1530 hours on 18 November 1941 with three combat-ready assault guns at the III. Bataillon of Infanterie-Regiment 110 (Leutnant von Gammingen), north of Iwanowskoje. I was immediately briefed by Hauptmann Meißner and I joined the attack that was launched from a narrow valley. The gun of Oberwachtmeister Schramm failed to fire after the first shots because, due to decreased air pressure, the barrel was unable to recoil in its cradle. Wachtmeister Pirklbauer and I supported the infantry attack that was to be carried out on a hill in front of us. We shelled the Russian infantry and machine-gun nests from 100–300 metres. It was marvellous how little influence our fire had on the Russian infantry. Despite the effect of the fire of our machine guns, mortars and guns, the Russian infantry was closing on us, unfaltering. In the thickening darkness the attack was brought to a halt. The guns were withdrawn to the jump off position next to a kolkhoz [collective farm] and we were set the task of securing it.⁸⁴

79 NARA T314, R1310 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000478.

80 NARA T315, R1479 (*167. Infanterie-Division*), F000402.

81 NARA T315, R1479 (*167. Infanterie-Division*), F000409.

82 NARA T315, R1269 (*112. Infanterie-Division*), F000671.

83 NARA T314, R1310 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000490.

84 NARA T314, R1313 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000374.

According to the war diary of the *112. Infanterie-Division*, *Leutnant Vetter* reported to the staff of the division at 1830 hours that he used his only combat-ready assault gun in the gap between *Infanterie-Regiment 110* and *Infanterie-Regiment 256* to cover the interface of the two regiments.⁸⁵

19 NOVEMBER 1941

The elements of the assault gun battalion that had not been subordinated to the divisions were stationed at Bogorodizk under the command of the *LIII. Armeekorps*.⁸⁶

However, the *3. Batterie/Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* was still fighting in the sector of the *112. Infanterie-Division*:

On 19/11/1941 we were subordinated to Infanterie-Regiment 256, and received the mission of accompanying the assault there. On the way, one of the assault guns suffered track damage and the other two, soon after the infantry launched their attack, were bogged down in the marshy terrain. In the afternoon the assault gun with the track damage was brought forward (by Wachtmeister Pirklbauer) to the infantry and deployed there. On the same afternoon, three prime movers were placed at our service from Mörser-Abteilung 735⁸⁷ for our attempts to recover the stuck assault guns. One of the guns could be partly pulled out but our recovery efforts proved unsuccessful.⁸⁸

Having had its track damage repaired, the lone assault gun knocked out a Soviet AFV in the sector of *Infanterie-Regiment 256*, in the area of Weljminowa, at around 1400 hours.⁸⁹

20 NOVEMBER 1941

Of the five assault guns of *Kampfgruppe 'Lechens'* deployed in the sector of the *167. Infanterie-Division*, three were allocated to *Infanterie-Regiment 339* to support its attack. The other two remained subordinated to *Infanterie-Regiment 315*.⁹⁰

Infanterie-Regiment 339 launched its attack at 1010 hours towards Krutaja with the support of the assault guns of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202*. Soviet resistance was encountered for the first time 1.5 km south of the settlement at 1150 hours. The Germans reached the outskirts of the village but their attack was halted there by Soviet mortar and machine-gun fire. At 1330 hours, following an effective artillery preparation, the Germans resumed their attack and, with the support of three *StuG. III* assault guns, they broke into Krutaja at around 1400 hours.

85 NARA T315, R1269 (*112. Infanterie-Division*), F000679.

86 NARA T314, R1311 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000649.

87 Correctly: *schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 735*.

88 NARA T314, R1313 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000374.

89 NARA T315, R1269 (*112. Infanterie-Division*), F000685.

90 NARA T315, R1479 (*167. Infanterie-Division*), F000414.

The vicious battle lasted until 2000 hours. The Germans suffered 333 dead and 104 wounded.⁹¹

At *Infanterie-Regiment 315*, only one assault gun remained available to carry out tasks the following day.⁹²

The 3. *Batterie*, attached to the 112. *Infanterie-Division*, was still to meet its trials. *Leutnant* Vetter's dispatch read:

The towing vehicles of the Mörser-Abteilung should have been put at our disposal for the recovery attempts but were retained instead on the corps' orders. I kept on trying to recover our vehicles with the pioneers of the infantry and with my men. On that day Oberwachtmeister Schramm went on the mission instead of Wachtmeister Pirklbauer. I placed guards next to the guns that had been bogged down. At around 1800 hours I reported to the command post of Infanterie-Regiment 256 to be briefed about the situation. I was informed that the Russians had attacked our infantry positions with strong forces but the positions were still held. After an hour I observed that white flares⁹³ streaking across the sky were quickly drawing nearer to us. I joined my assault guns and ordered them to load the radio sets and all demountable equipment onto the field kitchen and the ammunition trailers, and to move off in the direction of Iwanowskoje under the command of Wachtmeister Ring. The field kitchen received enemy machine-gun fire as soon as it started off. I stayed with my men at the gun and provided cover. My gun was set up between the eastern exit from Kuliski and the western exit from Mal. Jemanowka, in a ravine. Everything had been silent so far.

I stopped some infantrymen who arrived at my gun from Jemanowka and asked them about the situation. They told us that they had been at Jegorjewskoje with the I. Bataillon when the Russian attack was launched. Russians came hard and fast. There was an enormous artillery preparation prior to the attack and murderous heavy machine-gun fire all the while, so the few men of our side were unable to stand their ground in the face of the attack. They had to leave about 30 wounded behind when they crawled out from a barn and broke through to us by a round-about route after nightfall.

We were running short of ammunition. We were a bit loud while talking, and from the west part of Mal. Jemanowka, from a kolkhoz about 150 m away, an anti-tank gun opened fire at us. Upon that we retreated towards Koliski. The Russians didn't let us alone all through the way there. I found more infantrymen from the I. Bataillon, who arrived rather confused, and I sent them to the regimental command post.

I moved behind the houses with my men, parallel to the direction to the command post. On the way, I met some officers from the regiment who tried to flock the foot soldiers together. Oberstleutnant von Dobinick, commander of Infanterie-Regiment 256, ordered

91 NARA T315, R1477 (167. *Infanterie-Division*), F000856.

92 NARA T315, R1479 (167. *Infanterie-Division*), F000420.

93 The German troops indicated the position of their forces by the use of flares.

the soldiers to stand in line and had them counted. Finally, the soldiers had to line up according to their respective companies and battalions. Having ordered them to form a U-shape around himself, the Oberstleutnant called their attention to the graveness of the situation. He made clear that we had to retreat, but we also had to prevent the Russians from any further advance by any means. To this end, the artillery took up positions with two batteries in front of the houses to deliver direct fire on the enemy. The infantry present would be deployed to defend the settlement which was to be held under any circumstances. Should they fail, he said, it would be a shameful memory for all of us. Finally, the Oberstleutnant issued the order that the settlement had to be defended. The infantrymen's ammunition was supplemented from the artillery's stock and infantry soldiers were deployed to defend the settlement. I was assigned to the commander of the staff company with my men and took over the task of providing cover in its sector.

The Russians ceased their attacks for the night. The commander's calm and thoughtful style and exemplary attitude gave new vigour and purpose to the soldiers. At the decisive moment, he assembled the remains of the infantry that had been forced to retreat in panic from the gang of greedy marauders that afternoon and early evening, leaving some anti-tank guns, a light infantry gun, a heavy infantry gun and a lot of heavy machine guns behind.⁹⁴

According to the war diary of the 112. *Infanterie-Division*, not long before 1400 hours, two more assault guns of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* were held in divisional reserve in the area of Iwanowskoje together with the *II. Bataillon / Infanterie-Regiment 258* and elements of *Panzerjäger-Abteilung 112*.⁹⁵

By evening, with the support of just one assault gun, the *II. Bataillon/Infanterie-Regiment 258* had seized and held the hill in the north-eastern foreground of a kolkhoz 2 km north-east of Iwanowskoje.⁹⁶

21 NOVEMBER 1941

In the early morning the assault guns of the *3. Batterie/Sturmgeschütz-Abteilungen 202*, became trapped in the mud but had not been secured. *Leutnant Vetter* wrote in his dispatch:

On 21 November 1941, in the early morning hours, I started off on the road to Iwanowskoje to meet Herr Hauptmann Meißner who was supposed to arrive with a towing vehicle to recover the assault guns and to take the recovery vehicle to the guns by a roundabout route to hide it from the eyes of the Russians. I couldn't catch sight of the recovery vehicle but at around 0730 I met Hauptmann Meißner to whom I reported the critical situation. The Russians tried to press forward that day but our

⁹⁴ NARA T314, R1313 (*LIII. Armee-korps*), F000374-375.

⁹⁵ NARA T315, R1269 (*112. Infanterie-Division*), F000693.

⁹⁶ NARA T315, R1269 (*112. Infanterie-Division*), F000695.

artillery used ricochet-fire against them so wonderfully that they gave up all desire for further advance. However they still occupied the hill to the north and from there they shot towards Kuliski with mortars and towards Iwanowskoje with even heavier calibre guns. We had to give up our recovery attempts because our recovery equipment was insufficient.⁹⁷

The commander of the *LIII. Armeekorps*, *General der Infanterie* Weisenberger, visiting command post of the *112. Infanterie-Division*, pointed out:

[...] assault guns assigned to the division and dropped out [of battle] must be recovered and towed away. The assault guns must be prevented from falling into the hands of the enemy.⁹⁸

23 NOVEMBER 1941

Three assault guns of the assault-artillery unit of *Kampfgruppe 'Lechens'* received orders to be in the area of Kamenzy by 0930 hours where they would be subordinated to *Infanterie-Regiment 315*.⁹⁹

Later, the assault guns provided support for the elements of *Infanterie-Regiment 339* during their successful attack to take Urwanki. The infantry, together with the assault guns, were soon halted and withdrawn because the *112. Infanterie-Division* did not join in the successful advance. However, the staff of the *167. Infanterie-Division* only became aware of this when *Oberleutnant* Lechens reported the matter to them in the evening.¹⁰⁰

At 1540 hours, the *112. Infanterie-Division* informed the staff of the *LIII. Armeekorps* that the attack it had planned to carry out in the direction of Donskoj railway station could not be launched for the time being because there were Soviet snipers operating in the surrounding industrial area and there was only one combat-ready assault gun left under the division's command.¹⁰¹ This assault gun was fighting with the *II. Bataillon/Infanterie-Regiment 258* at an industrial plant 1 km south-east of Wassiljewskaja at around 1640 hours then, at 1755 hours, it intervened at Hill 113.3. At 1900 hours *Infanterie-Regiment 258* reported that its *II. Bataillon* – with the decisive help from the assault gun – had taken the plant.¹⁰²

97 NARA T314, R1313 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000375.

98 NARA T314, R1313 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000204.

99 NARA T315, R1479 (*167. Infanterie-Division*), F000445.

100 NARA T315, R1477 (*167. Infanterie-Division*), F000862.

101 NARA T315, R1269 (*112. Infanterie-Division*), F000713.

102 NARA T315, R1269 (*112. Infanterie-Division*), F000715.

24 NOVEMBER 1941

Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202 submitted a request to the corps to withdraw all of its assault guns from the front line because they were inoperable without ice cleats installed on their tracks.¹⁰³

Elements of the assault gun battalion unsubsidiaried to the divisions were still located in Bogorodizk.¹⁰⁴ At 0045 hours, in the sector of the *112. Infanterie-Division*, *Infanterie-Regiment 258* was given the task, together with the subordinated assault-gun battery of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202*, of joining the attack of *167. Infanterie-Division* that was to be launched at 0900 hours with the aim of seizing the hills 1.5 km north-east of Wassiljewskaja.¹⁰⁵ The war diary of the infantry division recorded:

*Shortage of assault guns, dropped out due to the lack of ice-cleats and maintenance in the workshops.*¹⁰⁶

25 NOVEMBER 1941

At this point in time there were only three assault guns left in each of the three batteries of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202*.¹⁰⁷

In the recent battles, the infantry that the assault guns had supported had also sustained significant losses. For example, the combat strength of the rifle companies of *167. Infanterie-Division* amounted to, on average, about 52 men and the rifle divisions of the *112. Infanterie-Division* had been reduced to around just 33 soldiers.¹⁰⁸

27 NOVEMBER 1941

From 27 November until 5 December 1941, the assault gun battalion fought in the battle of Tula and participated in the drive towards Rjasan and Kashira.¹⁰⁹

On the first day, five StuG. III assault guns of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* provided support for *Infanterie-Regiment 339* in the sector of the *167. Infanterie-Division* in the battle for Olchowez. Deployable elements of the regiment were assembled into assault squads (with at least 20 infantrymen per assault gun).¹¹⁰ Following a short artillery preparation, the settlement went into German hands at around 1400 hours. German forces took at least 200 prisoners inside the settlement and an additional 500 prisoners in its vicinity. They also captured, among other items, 15 medium and light AFVs.¹¹¹

103 NARA T314, R1310 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000510.

104 NARA T314, R1311 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000637.

105 NARA T315, R1269 (*112. Infanterie-Division*), F000717.

106 NARA T315, R1269 (*112. Infanterie-Division*), F000721.

107 NARA T314, R1312 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000013.

108 NARA T314, R1312 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F001347.

109 NARA T314, R1310 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000032.

110 NARA T315, R1479 (*167. Infanterie-Division*), F000458.

111 NARA T314, R1312 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F001333.

The corps called the attention of its subordinate infantry divisions to the special circumstances of employing the assault guns:

*We are pointing out that assault guns, despite the ice cleats received, are not able to advance in the midst of the present weather and road conditions. Unit commanders, with whom the assault guns are to be deployed, are advised to keep this circumstance in mind when reconnoitring an area and to always involve the commanders of the assault guns when determining the route of march.*¹¹²

28 NOVEMBER 1941

The corps put the assault guns from elements fighting under the command of the *112. Infanterie-Division* under the direct control of the battalion staff again with immediate effect.¹¹³

However, assault-gun *Kampfgruppe 'Lechens'*, which was deployed in the sector of the *167. Infanterie-Division*, remained in Olchowez where it was subordinated to *Infanterie-Regiment 339*.¹¹⁴

2 DECEMBER 1941

Assault-gun *Kampfgruppe 'Lechens'* was under direct command of *167. Infanterie-Division* at Gribowka.¹¹⁵

3 DECEMBER 1941

The assault-gun *Kampfgruppe* was subordinated to *Infanterie-Regiment 331* and was brought forward from the area of Wasiljewskoje to the regiment.¹¹⁶

4 DECEMBER 1941

Assault-gun *Kampfgruppe 'Lechens'*, now under direct command of the staff of the *167. Infanterie-Division*, was sent to the command post of *Infanterie-Regiment 315* and ordered to be ready for immediate action on both regimental front lines.¹¹⁷

From 6 December until 26 December 1941, *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* fought a defensive battle in the area of Tula and Jefremew against Soviet units carrying out the Moscow counter-offensive.¹¹⁸

112 NARA T314, R1311 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000632.

113 NARA T314, R1311 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000630.

114 NARA T315, R1479 (*167. Infanterie-Division*), F000464.

115 NARA T315, R1479 (*167. Infanterie-Division*), F000483.

116 NARA T315, R1479 (*167. Infanterie-Division*), F000486.

117 NARA T315, R1479 (*167. Infanterie-Division*), F000490.

118 NARA T315, R1479 (*167. Infanterie-Division*), F000490.

11 DECEMBER 1941

The whole of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* was subordinated to the *112. Infanterie-Division* from 1200 hours.

The forces of the *LIII. Armeekorps* were given the task of defending positions along the Don and Shat between Michailowka and Stublenka, and to prepare for withdrawal towards the south-west.¹¹⁹

12 DECEMBER 1941

At 1025 hours, the assault guns of the assault-artillery unit and the *3. Kompanie Panzerjäger-Abteilung 112* were subordinated to *Infanterie-Regiment 258*. At 1130 hours the regiment reported that two combat-ready assault guns had arrived.¹²⁰

At 1510 hours *Infanterie-Regiment 256* reported by telephone that a Soviet attack had been launched from the area of Koshanka and to defend against that they needed the two assault guns.¹²¹ However they still had not arrived by daybreak.¹²²

THE NIGHT OF 12/13 DECEMBER 1941

In the sector of *Infanterie-Regiment 258 (112. Infanterie-Division)* an assault gun of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* had to be blown up at around 0235 hours because it slid off the road and couldn't be made combat-ready because the German units had already begun their withdrawal.¹²³

At 0745 hours assault guns were ordered into the area of Weljminowa and put under direct command of the division. Their deployment might have been requested by *Infanterie-Regiment 256*. In the afternoon at 1345 hours the *StuG. III* combat vehicles were ordered into the area of Pritonj with their march to be carried out before nightfall.¹²⁴

15 DECEMBER 1941

After 0700 hours, during the retreat of the *112. Infanterie-Division*, two assault guns of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202*, several recovery vehicles and anti-tank guns of *Panzerjäger-Abteilung 112* as well as the heavy artillery of the division became hopelessly stuck due to snowdrifts and ice-covered roads and consequently had to be blown up. The other assault guns were ordered into a blocking position with a pioneer platoon and anti-aircraft heavy machine guns on the northern part of Jewlewo to prevent Soviet units from the crossing the river there.¹²⁵

119 NARA T314, R1311 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000229-230.

120 NARA T315, R1269 (*112. Infanterie-Division*), F000767.

121 NARA T315, R1269 (*112. Infanterie-Division*), F000769.

122 NARA T315, R1269 (*112. Infanterie-Division*), F000771.

123 NARA T314, R1312 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F001209.

124 NARA T315, R1269 (*112. Infanterie-Division*), F000773.

125 NARA T315, R1269 (*112. Infanterie-Division*), F000781.

At 1545 hours, the assault guns were subordinated to *Panzerjäger-Abteilung 112* and were ordered to take up position at Oserki to be available for the division next morning in the area of Tjoploje.¹²⁶

16 DECEMBER 1941

At 0940 hours the *LIII. Armeekorps* placed the assault gun battalion under its own direct command, with effect from the day before, that is from 15 December.¹²⁷ The commander of the assault guns said farewell to the division at around 1500 hours.¹²⁸

17 DECEMBER 1941

In the afternoon, three assault guns of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* were again subordinated to the *112. Infanterie-Division* and ordered to its command post.¹²⁹ At 1830 hours the assault guns were attached to *Panzerjäger-Abteilung 112* and given security tasks at the railway junction south of Tjoploje.¹³⁰

18 DECEMBER 1941

The *LIII. Armeekorps* issued orders to its subordinate units to retreat behind the Oka River because the Soviet troops advancing westwards from the area of Tula threatened the northern flank of the *2. Panzerarmee*. In relation to that, *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* had to retreat to the northern foreground of Bolchow. The unit had to dispatch the assault guns subordinated to *112. Infanterie-Division* (providing support for *Infanterie-Regiment 258*) in time – around noon – to allow them to use the Plawsk–Tschen route.¹³¹ In the evening the three assault guns were put back under the direct command of the *LIII. Armeekorps*.¹³²

20 DECEMBER 1941

Apart from the corps units, and besides *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202*, three infantry divisions (*112., 167., 296. Infanterie-Divisionen*), one motorized infantry regiment (*Grossdeutschland*)¹³³, a horse-drawn infantry regiment (*Infanterie-Regiment 171*) and *schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 735* (armed with 21 cm mortars), fought under subordination to the *LIII. Armeekorps*.¹³⁴

On that day measures were taken by the headquarters of the *2. Panzerarmee* to ensure that of the 64 replacement tanks and 13 replacement assault guns

126 NARA T315, R1269 (*112. Infanterie-Division*), F000783.

127 NARA T314, R1311 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000219.

128 NARA T315, R1269 (*112. Infanterie-Division*), F000787.

129 NARA T314, R1311 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000589.

130 NARA T315, R1269 (*112. Infanterie-Division*), F000796.

131 NARA T314, R1311 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000217.

132 NARA T315, R1269 (*112. Infanterie-Division*), F000802.

133 This regiment had own assault guns in his 16th *Kompanie*.

134 NARA T314, R1312 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000005.

arriving from Charkow to Kursk, the latter should be sent to Orel and delivered to *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202*.¹³⁵ This implies that that the total losses of the unit were equal to that number and thereby to its shortage of combat vehicles compared to its original TOE (Table of Organization and Equipment) strength at the time of its first deployment on 3 October 1941.

25 DECEMBER 1941

Ten cubic metres of fuel and 0.4 cubic metres of engine oil were issued from the Orel railway station to the assault gun unit.¹³⁶

27 DECEMBER 1941

The defensive battle, in which *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* also participated, of the *LIII. Armeekorps* began north-east of Orel,¹³⁷

28 DECEMBER 1941

In the late afternoon, Soviet troops crossed the Oka River south-east of Tolkatshi, penetrated into the defences of the *112. Infanterie-Division* and pushed towards Bolchow.

At 0845 hours, the German infantry division had requested the corps to send the three assault guns promised to them earlier into the area of Chmelewaja and to direct the commander to report to the regimental command post of *Infanterie-Regiment 256* in Kolodesi. Due to the deteriorating situation the division would have deployed the assault guns to *Infanterie-Regiment 258* in the area of Kriwzowa at 1130 hours.¹³⁸

At 1320 hours the *LIII. Armeekorps* held out the prospect of transferring five assault guns to the division.¹³⁹

At 1630 hours the adjutant of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* reported to the staff of *112. Infanterie-Division* by telephone.¹⁴⁰

But the corps had other plans for the assault guns. To contain the Soviet advance, two companies from *Schützen-Regiment 33*, belonging to the *4. Panzer-Division's* order of battle, were dispatched on vehicles provided by the *LIII. Armeekorps* to delay the Russian advance. When, in the late afternoon, the four assault guns of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* reached Bolchow they were sent after the motorized infantry companies.¹⁴¹

135 NARA T314, R1310 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F001030.

136 NARA T313, R108 (*Panzerarmeeoberkommando 2*), F7352492.

137 NARA T314, R1310 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000033.

138 NARA T315, R1269 (*112. Infanterie-Division*), F000857.

139 NARA T315, R1269 (*112. Infanterie-Division*), F000859.

140 NARA T315, R1269 (*112. Infanterie-Division*), F000861.

141 NARA T315, R195 (*4. Panzer-Division*), F000747.

According to the war diary of the *112. Infanterie-Division*, the commander of *LIII. Armeekorps* only announced that the assault guns had begun to move off at 2215 hours.¹⁴²

29 DECEMBER 1941

The Soviet troops continued their attack in the sector of the *112. Infanterie-Division*. They pressed forward from the penetration at Kriwzowa to reach the area 7 km south-east of Kriwzowa–Bloschnja–5 km north of Bloschnja–Kolodesi–northern foreground of Kolodesi.

Kampfgruppe 'Marder' – consisting of elements of the *4. Panzer-Division* (the 6. and 8. *Kompanien* of the motorized *Schützen-Regiment 3*); the assault guns of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202* with seven StuG. IIIs led by the commander and the 6. *Kompanie/ Schützen-Regiment 33* – set off at around 0400 hours from Bolchow to join forces with the 8. *Kompanie/112. Infanterie-Division* that had been forced to retreat from Bogrinowa, 7 km south-west of Kriwzowa. The plan was to carry out an attack from a south-westerly direction to retake Bogrinowa before capturing Chmelewaja, a settlement 2 km north-west of Kriwzowa.¹⁴³

The StuG. III assault guns and the motorized rifle company reached the area of Kischkino between 0400 and 0500 hours. At around 0900 hours, the *Kampfgruppe* launched an attack together with the *I. Bataillon/ Infanterie-Regiment 258* and had mopped up the village in heavy fighting against weakening Soviet resistance by 1700 hours.¹⁴⁴

During the day *Kampfgruppe 'Marder'* successfully pushed back the Soviet units fighting southwest of Kriwzowa to the sector 3 km west of the settlement.¹⁴⁵

The medical officer of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202*, *Unterarzt der Reserve* Dr Scheuer, was wounded in the course of the day's fighting.¹⁴⁶

At 1935 hours *Kampfgruppe 'Marder'* reported to the corps, that although they had cleared the Soviet troops from Bogrinowa, the situation was still extremely dangerous because the enemy threatened to breakthrough in the direction of Bolchow.¹⁴⁷

30 DECEMBER 1941

Hauptmann Dr Hans Marder, commander of *Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202*, was killed in action together with his driver in the area of Kriwzowa. A salvo from a Soviet machine-gun shot them dead.

142 NARA T315, R1269 (*112. Infanterie-Division*), F000863.

143 NARA T314, R1312 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F001088.

144 NARA T315, R195 (*4. Panzer-Division*), F000747, and also T315, R1269 (*112. Infanterie-Division*), F000871.

145 NARA T314, R1312 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F001081.

146 NARA T313, R108 (*Panzerarmeeoberkommando 2*), F7352731.

147 NARA T314, R1310 (*LIII. Armeekorps*), F000644.