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Caroline Y. Robertson-von Trotha [ed.]

NationEUrope

The Polarised Solidarity Community



Nomos

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Preface

This collection of essays is based essentially on the discussions of the 19th and 20th Karlsruhe Dialogues in 2015 and 2016 on the topics of ‘Global DemocracITIES. Between Triumph and Decline’ and ‘NationEUrope. The Polarised Solidarity Community’. Since the topics of ‘NationEUrope’ and ‘global democracities’ are closely interlinked, an interdisciplinary overview of historic and recent developments as a basis for understanding and debating the rapidly changing alignments within the European context is more important than ever. From the aspirations of migrants and changes in civil society over present and anticipated political crises – including rising populism and extremism in many European countries, as well as in countries with a large influence through their emigrant populations such as Turkey, but also in many other parts of the world – to independence movements, such as the one in Catalonia, or the concept for the realisation of a global parliament of mayors, a wide range of themes is discussed. A crucial focus is placed on ways to maintain European unity and includes questions with regard to the structural architecture of the European Union, its fundamental values, and collective identities.

All contributions have one thing in common: they convey and reflect important aspects, developments, and solutions concerning the future of European existence, European unity, global democracy, and the chances and opportunities of cities globally interacting with each other on a new level of global governance. Some essays were written at an early stage and may not take account of the most recent developments.

The Karlsruhe Dialogues would not have been possible without the support of numerous people and organisations. I would like to especially highlight the generous contributions of our main sponsor, the Art and Culture Foundation as well as the Social Foundation of Sparda Bank Baden-Württemberg eG. I would also like to express my gratitude to the other sponsors and co-organisers for their outstanding cooperation: the ZKM | Center for Art and Media Karlsruhe, the Karlsruhe Chamber of Industry and Commerce, the Badisches Staatstheater Karlsruhe, ARTE Deutschland, the cinema Schauburg Karlsruhe, and the city of Karlsruhe.

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Preface

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And finally, I would like to sincerely thank NOMOS for the support I have received over the years. Following volume 1 of the present series with the title *Europa in der Welt – die Welt in Europa* (2006) and volume 5, *Europe: Insights from the Outside* (2011), this is the third collection of essays on the central subject of Europe.

Karlsruhe, May 2018

Caroline Y. Robertson-von Trotha

NationEUrope and the Challenges of the European Narrative: Introductory Remarks

Caroline Y. Robertson-von Trotha

The vision of a ‘United Europe’ based on common values, with the aim of securing prosperity and a better quality of life, goes back to at least the 19th century, long before the experience of two World Wars: “A day will come when all nations on our continent will form a European brotherhood. [...] A day will come when we shall see [...] the United States of America and the United States of Europe face to face, reaching out for each other across the seas” – these words of the French writer Victor Hugo were spoken at the International Peace Congress of Paris in 1849, over 100 years before the founding process of today’s European Union.

European enlargement and integration processes have been accompanied by waves of rational and enthusiastic emotional support of its citizens. However, complacent attitudes – in particular of young people – before the recent rise of youth unemployment in many southern European countries also contributed to the mobilisation of discontent when the young engaged in critical expression in the aftermath of the financial crises of 2008.¹ At the same time, a more general expression of Euroscepticism and national orientation, observable through the rejection of a collective European policy, has been ongoing and increasing in recent years. It is mostly visible when nations are forced to harmonise standards and regulations, thus questioning local cultural traditions and everyday routines.

The varying depths of EU membership become immediately obvious due to central differentiating categories: Six countries are not part of the Schengen Agreement; the euro zone consists of 19 member states of which some, such as the United Kingdom, remained outside by choice or because they did not fulfil the economic requirements. General criticism, often with regard to growing

1 Cf. *Liz Alderman*: Young and Educated in Europe, but Desperate for Jobs, in: *The New York Times*, 15.11.2013; <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/16/world/europe/youth-unemployment-in-europe.html> [31.01.2018]; *David N. F. Bell/David G. Blanchflower*: Young People and the Great Recession, in: *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, No. 2, Vol. 27, 2011, pp. 241-267.

tendencies of centralisation, unnecessary degrees of harmonisation and bureaucratisation, and ongoing disregard for the implementation of feasible concepts of subsidiarity on the one hand, and clashes of interest at the regional and national levels on the other hand, have led to increasing disenchantment, scepticism, and an outspoken anti-European sentiment.² Multi-faceted large-scale pressures of globalisation, technological change, digitisation, ageing societies, and flows of migration have added to the uneven development within the European space, thus facilitating scapegoat explanations. General processes of individualisation and ‘desolidarisation’ as well as a simultaneous pluralisation of many societies and cities are further contextual aspects of societal change. Within this setting, the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ or ‘migrant crisis’ – now dominating the political arena – has not been the beginning cause of an anti-European Union sentiment, but it has served to magnify and bundle ongoing pressures of discontent.

Since the refugee crisis beginning in 2015 and the Brexit referendum in the UK taking place in June 2016, rising scepticism in many member states has been more in public focus and has given cause to the theory that Euroscepticism has increasingly given way to more radical forms of Europhobia and neo-nationalism.³

Within the scope of the 19th and 20th Karlsruhe Dialogues on the topics of ‘Global DemocracITIES. Between Triumph and Decline’ and ‘NationEUrope. The Polarised Solidarity Community’, which were held in 2015 and 2016, we discussed the challenges and problems that Europe has been facing and how these do not only affect the European but also the global community and democracy. Questions were debated, such as: Is there or can there be a real consensus concerning what Europe is and which values it represents? Is the idea of a European Union, as it was formulated by its founding generation and as it has been further developed in a number of European treaties ever since, still being shared among its current 28 member states? Do the member states share common goals and expectations? What does ‘solidarity community’ mean in this context, which interests and expectations were important for the accession of

2 Cf. *Paul Taylor*: *The End of European Integration. Anti-Europeanism Examined*, London 2008.

3 Cf. *Thierry Chopin*: *Euroscepticism and Europhobia. The Threat of Populism*, in: Robert Schuman Foundation, 14.12.2015; <https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0375-euroscepticism-and-europhobia-europe-under-the-test-of-populism> [31.01.2018].

nation-states into the European Union, and how different are their respective practical political problems and their priorities pertaining to those problems? What priority does the European community have in comparison to national interests, and how can the principle of subsidiarity be realised in today's globalised and glocalised world without immediately calling into question the basic pillars of a European solidarity community? What reforms, therefore, does the EU need, and which of them can be implemented, and in what ways? In this book, central questions and issues will be addressed.

Reviewing the short history of the European Union, a seemingly paradoxical, parallel process of enlargement and deconstruction of the European vision of 'unity in diversity' becomes obvious. After the fall of the so-called 'iron curtain' in 1989 and the founding of the European Union with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, new member states without recent experiences of democratic rule and also without experiences of cultural diversity joined the European Union.⁴ The optimistic impression that the long-term vision of a united European state of nations was now only a question of time gained popularity. At the same time, the possibility of a reverse development of deep underlying distrust, which now increasingly endangers the European project itself, had been underestimated. The lack of trust in multilateral negotiation, the time required for real economic advancement to be visible at local and personal levels, and the effects of national identity politics all contributed to the disintegration of optimism in the European Union. Transfer politics and financial support for the inclusion of new member states became increasingly unpopular in western and south-western countries. 'Nation first' rhetoric and the sovereignty of the national population – at the ideological level – alleged and real democratic deficits at the pragmatic political level are now among the most commonly given reasons for anti-European sentiment.

The concept of Euroscepticism itself is not a precise term. As with many terms serving as analytical, containing tools of description, inviting debate both in the scientific and the everyday cultural and political arenas, the underlying connotations change, interpretations become more varied and controversial, and can finally lead to a superficial labelling in everyday usage. Euroscepticism would appear to be one of these phrases. Expressions of critical debate and positive Euroscepticism, signalling involvement and at least some degree

4 Cf. *European Central Bank: Five Things You Need to Know about the Maastricht Treaty*, in: ECB, 15.02.2017; https://www.ecb.europa.eu/explainers/tell-me-more/html/25_years_maastricht.en.html [31.01.2018].

of qualitative argument, have given way to a populist and negative anti-European sentiment. As early as 2002 – before the financial crisis in 2008 and long before the migrant crisis and its viral media representations in the summer of 2015 – the label ‘eurosceptic’ had taken on significance both as a personal and public attitude.⁵

Growing distrust and rejection of the European Union thus centre on the very core of policy direction, calling central elements of the *European narrative* into question. Based on “the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law”⁶, these include peacekeeping, security, economic prosperity, free movement, and cultural enrichment grounded on a liberal democratic paradigm. The connectivity and interdependence of collective European politics have not led to a corresponding collective European identity. On the contrary, identities are increasingly nationally oriented, often reducing European belonging to its functional dimension. According to a Eurobarometer survey of 2008, 91% of the people who were interviewed felt an attachment to their country whereas only 49% felt attached to the European Union.⁷

With the rise of populism, the merits of the European Union are – more than ever – questioned at the level of goal-oriented functional politics and national benefit. Perceptions of a European whole appear lost and represent a major challenge. While identities and identity politics often tend to divide on the basis of ethnic, national, religious, regional, or cultural affiliation, identity remains a complex construct offering simultaneous multi-levels of belonging; therefore, concepts of identity can either deter or support collective and personal inclusion and integration.⁸ In general, narratives, storytelling, and the building of myths play a formative and educational role. They provide orientation and togetherness over time. In situations of conflict and the interconnectiveness of memories and complex pasts, they can act as bridges to build or re-

5 Cf. *Chris Flood*: Euroscepticism. A Problematic Concept, UACES 32nd Annual Conference and 7th Research Conference, Queen’s University Belfast, 2-4 September 2002.

6 Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU); http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/20000222/libe/art6/default_en.htm [31.01.2018].

7 Cf. *European Commission*: Eurobarometer 68. Public Opinion in the European Union, May 2008; http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb_68_en.pdf [31.01.2018], p. 67.

8 Cf. *Caroline Y. Robertson-von Trotha*: Die Dialektik der Globalisierung. Kulturelle Nivellierung bei gleichzeitiger Verstärkung kultureller Differenz, Karlsruhe 2009.

build trust. Simultaneously, they can also have the opposite effect, fostering segregation, cultural divide, and conflict. For this reason, it is important to understand how the positive effects of a common *European narrative* can form, support, and give substance to the European motto adopted in 2000: *in varietate unitas* – ‘united in diversity’.⁹ In the European context, positive narratives of a better future are necessary – albeit not sufficient – in order to support this central concept and to foster integration.

It is of little surprise that the *peace narrative* and the aspect of overcoming the atrocities of the NS era were predominant in the founding years of the European Union – the ensuing trust and friendship between France and Germany remain a central narrative of European integration. Taking current media headlines in many member states into account and analysing the present widespread anti-European sentiment, it is hard to remember that as recently as 2012, the present EU with its 28 member states was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for “over six decades [having] contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe”.¹⁰ Despite reservations about the judgement of the awarding body, the intention was clear – to stress the importance of solidarity and ‘unity in diversity’ for the peace process. In the years leading up to the Nobel Peace Prize, surveys have however clearly indicated the loss of trust in the European project.¹¹ The *peace narrative* had already lost its credibility through the lack of solidarity and common action during the Balkan Wars.¹² In his comment on a pending visit of Joe Biden – former US Vice President – to Kosovo, Bosnia, and Serbia in 2009 – 14 years after the end of the war –, Edward P. Joseph points to the inability of the European Union to agree on a viable policy towards Bosnia.¹³ He underlines the constant lack of a responsible European security policy in the Western Balkans: “Five EU states still do not recognize Kosovo. The European Union

9 Cf. *European Union: The EU Motto*; https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/motto_en [31.01.2018].

10 The Nobel Peace Prize for 2012, press release, 12.10.2012; https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2012/press.html [31.01.2018].

11 Cf. *Jose Ignacio Torreblanca/Mark Leonard: The Continent-Wide Rise of Euroscepticism*, in: European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2013; https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR79_EUROSCEPTICISM_BRIEF_AW.pdf [31.01.2018].

12 Cf. Balkan Wars, in: New World Encyclopedia, 10.05.2016, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Balkan_Wars [31.01.2018].

13 Cf. *Edward P. Joseph: Europe’s Balkan Failure*, in: Foreign Policy, 14.05.2009; <http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/05/14/europes-balkan-failure> [31.01.2018].

lacks a viable policy toward Bosnia, leaving Washington to lobby most consistently for the steps that would bring the country into the EU".¹⁴ Although this comment does not adequately take account of inner-state borders and claims within and between Bosnia and Herzegovina¹⁵, which in their turn have a central role in slowing down the process of possible EU membership, it is a clear indication of the complexities and the important role of regional identities and border relationships. More significantly, a young generation often cannot relate to historical pasts.¹⁶

Examples giving more recent evidence of collective solidarity and multilateral agreement include the European reaction to the annexation of the Crimean peninsula in March 2014 and to the involvement of Russia in the Ukrainian conflict. The sanctions on Russia, imposed by the EU in September 2014, were linked to the complete implementation of the Minsk Agreements by the European Council in March 2015.¹⁷ For the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania with populations including a significant number of Russian nationals, recognisable and unmistakable collective EU action was of high relevance to diminish security fears.

The implications of the shift and varying perceptions of the *security narrative* are evident. Traditionally, it was a responsibility of individual member states; in recent years, however, security questions have centred more and more on the increasing terrorism within European boundaries as a collective agenda. Policy increasingly emphasises both issues of external border security

14 Ibid.

15 In particular regarding the unresolved constitutional relationship with the Republika Srpska.

16 For further information, cf. *Richard Fry et al.*: How Millennials Today Compare with Their Grandparents 50 Years Ago, in: Pew Research Center, 16.03.2018; <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/16/how-millennials-compare-with-their-grandparents> [31.01.2018]; *Eleanor Robertson*: Why Are the Baby Boomers Desperate to Make Millennials Hate Ourselves?, in: The Guardian, 04.09.2015; <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/04/why-are-the-baby-boomers-desperate-to-make-us-millennials-hate-ourselves> [31.01.2018]; and *Brian O'Malley*: Millennials and 'Their Destruction of Civilization', in: Forbes, 25.04.2016; <https://www.forbes.com/sites/valleyvoices/2016/04/25/millennials-and-their-destruction-of-civilization/#20f9e3d02830> [31.01.2018].

17 Cf. *European Union*: EU Sanctions against Russia over Ukraine Crisis, in: European Union Newsroom; https://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu-sanctions-against-russia-over-ukraine-crisis_en [31.01.2018].

and internal security. The need for the transnational exchange of information in the context of terrorism, radicalisation, and organised crime has led to a series of institutional arrangements at EU level.¹⁸ After the 9/11 attacks of 2001 in the United States – with their spectacular images of the collapsing World Trade Center towers –, the train attacks in Madrid in 2004, and the coordinated terrorist attacks in London in 2005, security issues have been more in public focus. The younger series of attacks in Paris in 2015 and in Nice, Berlin, Stockholm, London, and Barcelona in 2016 and 2017 has led to increased security coordination that, in some cases, faces the challenge of national arrangements and non-cooperation. The structural challenge of segmented data bases allowing informational exchange but at the same time protecting privacy concerns remains a major issue. Notable collective EU security advances are not in the public eye.¹⁹ At the same time, the further transnational institutionalisation of security control is accompanied by the legitimate public concern on individual rights, privacy, and data misuse.

Similarly – despite objective data on growth and prosperity and despite the central role it once had and often still plays – the *economic narrative* has lost its attraction. The concrete promise of regional and national economic enhancement is a central pull factor for European affiliation. Requirements for harmonisation and adherence to central regulation in many policy fields, with their implications for the loss of national sovereignty, can be regarded as the cost of economic benefit. The widely differing levels of prosperity, major infrastructural standards, and levels of unemployment across European space, however, remain.

Based on the conviction that economic prosperity acts both as a motor and guarantee for collective political action, the six founding countries of the former European Economic Community (EEC) recognised the need to protect trade against external competition and envisaged a harmonised future built on the principles of a common market without internal trade barriers. Since then, remarkable success has been achieved, be it the once celebrated realisation of the Schengen Area without passport controls, the monetary Euro union, the

18 Cf. *European Commission*: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council. First Progress Report towards an Effective and Genuine Security Union, Brussels 2016.

19 Cf. *Pierre Berthelet*: How the European Union Is Making Major Strides Fighting Terrorism, in: *The Conversation*; <https://theconversation.com/how-the-european-union-is-making-major-strides-fighting-terrorism-82866> [31.01.2018].

free movement of people and services, or the common policies on agriculture, fisheries, trade, and regional development. In the aftermath of the massive refugee movement in 2015, Schengen and the Dublin Regulation in particular now symbolise the deep polarisation of European opinion.

A central issue can generally also be identified in the widening and enlargement process to the present size of 28 member states. Before the ratification of all major European treaties – including the Maastricht Treaty, the Treaty of Nice, the European Constitution, and the Lisbon Treaty – the European integration project was accompanied by a particular scrutiny, often including increased Euroscepticism²⁰ and directly addressing issues of lost sovereignty.

As some have suggested, the process of debate on the European treaties itself led to increased levels of anti-Europeanism.²¹ Under widely differing historical and political constellations, the ongoing integration process has increased the complexity of European arrangements at all levels. It has also produced very different institutional and motivational settings with respect to future expectations and developments. The consensus process on including new member states has always been accompanied by a discussion of the pros and cons, including not only the political arena but also a wide-scale general debate within the larger societal and cultural context. The gradual deepening process as documented in the treaties, the varying speeds of transformation and adaptation to regulative norms, the growing politicisation of national identities – coupled with growing perceptions and realities of uneven economic development –, and the complex dynamics of these factors have led to an increase in eurosceptical attitudes. Austerity policies and the high levels of youth unemployment, particularly in the South, compliment negative narratives and scenarios.

‘Taking back control’ is a central and highly politicised populist alternative to what is increasingly perceived as an illegitimate and undemocratic transfer

20 Cf. *Mehlika Ozlem Ultan/Serdar Ornek*: Euroscepticism in the European Union, in: *International Journal of Social Sciences*, No. 2, Vol. IV, 2015, pp. 49-57; *Viljar Veebel*: Looking at Various Facets of Euroscepticism. A Good Platform to Find the Best Way Forward in Europe; http://www.liia.lv/en/publications/euroscepticism-in-small-eu-member-states-546?get_file=3 [31.01.2018].

21 For example, cf. *Nick Startin/Simon Usherwood*: Euroscepticism as a Persistent Phenomenon, in: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, No. 1, Vol. 51, 2013, pp. 1-16.

of power to Brussels. An early example is the debate on the Common Agriculture Policy in 2004 by Martin Ferris, a spokesman of the Irish republican party Sinn Féin:

“The acquiescence of successive Governments since 1973 has contributed to a situation in which this State is operating at a considerable disadvantage as a relatively minor player in a game in which, whatever the voting procedures and informal alliances, favours the large states, and corporate economic interests”.²²

He quotes John Locke as one of the founding fathers of constitutional democracy who held that the legislature “cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands, for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others”.²³ The questions of citizenship rights, subsidiarity, and the building of identity to foster European citizenship based on active and passive electoral rights remain at the centre of European debate.

Depending on historic developments across European space, certain elements of the *European narrative* are more prominent than others and lend themselves to political controversy within the national context. Political debate is necessary in order to further develop the European Union. Increasingly, however, anti-European populism endangers rational open debate. The Brexit referendum serves as an example.

The *freedom of movement narrative*, most often regarded as one of the central benefits and ‘rewards’ of EU membership and also a key motivating bridge for the establishment of European identity, was one of the major mobilising factors of the ‘Vote Leave campaign’ focusing on Eastern European immigration. According to findings of the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey, 73% of those who feared immigration under the EU’s freedom of movement regulations voted Leave.²⁴ The survey concludes that the poll can be seen “as a litmus test of the merits of the EU project”.²⁵ The correlation between concern on the topic of immigration and a lower level of education points to personal

22 Ferris, Martin: Transfer of Power to Brussels Is Bad for Democracy, in: The Irish Times, 28.08.2004; <https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/transfer-of-power-to-brussels-is-bad-for-democracy-1.1155309> [31.01.2018].

23 Ibid.

24 Cf. May Bulman: Brexit. People Voted to Leave EU because They Feared Immigration, Major Survey Finds, in: The Independent, 28.06.2017; <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/brexit-latest-news-leave-eu-immigration-main-reason-european-union-survey-a7811651.html> [31.01.2018].

25 Ibid.

fears on the competitive effects in employment and housing sectors. With 831,000 Polish-born residents, UK migration figures of 2015 register Poland as the number one country of non-UK origin, overtaking India.²⁶ This pattern of xenophobia and ‘new white racism’ against European citizens is remarkable in several aspects, particularly in the case of Poland. During World War II, many Polish refugees joined the British army. In 1947, as a result of the communist regime in Poland, many of them requested permission to settle in the UK. The now often forgotten Polish Resettlement Act of 1947 was the first act of its kind in the UK and legalised the right to stay.²⁷

The ensuing diaspora and contribution of former Polish citizens to the rebuilding of the British economy shows similar patterns to diaspora contributions in other countries, notably the role of the so-called ‘Turkish guest workers’ in Germany. Migration from Poland is still negatively registered, although reverse migration and its effects can now be observed. Many people of Polish and Hungarian descent have left the UK, often going to other EU countries and causing a shortage of labour in both seasonal areas of employment as well as in the social and health sectors including highly qualified personnel such as medical doctors. Commenting on statistics from the Office for National Statistics in February 2018, which attested the number of below 100,000 migrants from the EU for the first time in 5 years, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), amongst others, has warned that “businesses up and down the country” already suffer from the shrinking number of EU workers coming to the UK.²⁸ The general rise of racism through the Brexit debate culminated in the so-called ‘Windrush scandal’ which targeted and questioned the legitimacy of citizenship rights of thousands of British citizens arriving from the Caribbean in the 1940s and 1950s.²⁹

26 Cf. *Office for National Statistics*: Population of the UK by Country of Birth and Nationality. 2015; <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/population-andmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/ukpopulationbycountryofbirthandnationality/august2016> [31.01.2018].

27 Cf. *Marek Pruszewicz*: How Britain and Poland Came to Be Intertwined, in: BBC News, 01.09.2014; <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-28979789> [31.01.2018].

28 *Wright, Robert*: EU Migration to Britain below 100,000 for First Time in 5 Years, in: *Financial Times*, 22.02.2018; <https://www.ft.com/content/9534df4a-17ba-11e8-9376-4a6390addb44> [28.02.2018].

29 Cf. *Eckehard Korthals*: London – Before & After Brexit, Berlin 2018.

The complexity and dynamics of the pro and anti-European feeling can be observed in both the build-up to the Brexit referendum and its aftermath. In the debates leading to the UK joining the EU in 1973, the divisions of opinion had been already widespread.³⁰ Within the UK itself, its geopolitical position as an island traditionally shapes identities of ‘We’ and ‘The Continent’. Complex identities of the ‘lost’ Empire, the (British) Commonwealth of Nations, and a special transatlantic relationship to the USA all contributed to the controversies surrounding EU membership. Within its own historical development, it is worth noting that the UK has had the experience of limiting the freedom of movement within the context of post-colonial adaptation. Once a right of citizens within the Commonwealth of Nations wishing to come to the UK, freedom of movement has been restricted since 1983.³¹ Privileges, however, remain. The relationship between ethnic diversity, cultures of belonging, and racism cannot be understood without taking these factors into account. Early policies against rising racist sentiment and the right-wing British National Front included the Race Relations Act of 1965 with the aim of reducing immigration and the Race Relations Act of 1968 as its counterpart with the aim of enabling “the more effective ‘integration’ of immigrant communities”.³²

Leading up to its 60th anniversary, criticism and calls for a reform of the European Union were obvious. Nationalism and neo-nationalist movements in many European countries have increased in popularity and visibility. Despite the growing eurosceptical opposition, nobody, however, thought it possible that the construction of European unity itself would be called into question. Two years ago, on 23 June 2016, the fragility of European unity became a reality: in a referendum, 51.9% of the United Kingdom electorate voted to leave the European Union, causing shock and disbelief across Europe. Since then, Brexit, set to take place on 29 March 2019, has dominated UK politics.

30 Cf. 40 Years Ago. Britain Joins the EEC, in: Bodleian Library, 14.01.2013; <http://blogs.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/archivesandmanuscripts/2013/01/14/40-years-ago-britain-joins-the-eec> [31.01.2018] and The UK’s 50-Year EU Debate, in: Chatham House – The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 10.06.2016; <https://www.chatham-house.org/publication/uks-50-year-eu-debate> [31.01.2018].

31 Cf. Prove You Have Right of Abode in the UK; <https://www.gov.uk/right-of-abode/commonwealth-citizens> [31.01.2018].

32 *The National Archives*: Discrimination and Race Relations Policy; <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/themes/discrimination-race-relations-policy.htm> [31.01.2018].

A fitting warning by Donald Tusk – President of the European Council – as reaction to the prospective withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union states: “Handle with care. What is broken cannot be mended”.³³ It did not show much impact in the early negotiation phase.

Already shortly before the actual Brexit referendum, the British author and professor of politics Anthony Glee, opening keynote speaker at the 2016 Karlsruhe Dialogues, predicted that “[i]f the British do vote to leave the European Union, neither Britain nor the European Union can be the same any longer”.³⁴ Despite an agreed transition period lasting till 31 December 2020 “to get everything in place and allow businesses and others to prepare for the moment when the new post-Brexit rules between the UK and the EU [come into force]”³⁵, the ensuing future relationship between the UK and the EU remains unclear and raises questions of uncertainty in many sectors. This will very much depend on whether there will be a ‘soft’ or a ‘hard’ Brexit or no agreement at the end of negotiation. Central issues including determining factors, such as “how much the UK owes the EU, what happens to the Northern Ireland border and what happens to UK citizens living elsewhere in the EU and EU citizens living in the UK”³⁶, are still not clear, with less than a year left to come to an agreement. These are among the most often publicly discussed questions along with the younger discussion on evolving effects of emigration: increasingly, the loss of trade and employment, with major companies threatening to not invest any further – until guarantees are given – or even to leave the UK completely, are slowly changing the awareness of what Brexit may actually mean.

33 Quoted in *Ian Traynor/Nicholas Watt*: Risk of EU Breakup Is Real, Tusk Warns Ahead of Crucial Summit, in: *The Guardian*, 15.02.2016; <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/feb/15/risk-of-eu-break-up-is-real-tusk-warns-ahead-of-crucial-summit> [31.01.2018].

34 *Glee, Anthony*: Challenging Europe. Germany’s EU Ambitions, speech held at the 20th Karlsruhe Dialogues 2016 ‘NationEUrope. The Polarised Solidarity Community’.

35 *Hunt, Alex/Wheeler, Brian*: Brexit. All You Need to Know about the UK Leaving the EU, in: *BBC News*; <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887> [31.01.2018].

36 *Ibid.*

The vote for Brexit undoubtedly marked the beginning of a turn in events in the history of the European Union. It also serves as an example of the challenge of addressing complex questions involving legitimate democratic criticism at both the national and European level.

The regulation of border control can be regarded both rationally and emotionally as a major instrument of sovereignty that accordingly carries a high potential for the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. Agreements on legitimate mechanisms of control within the European Union are therefore central to policy development.

Due to the crisis of the European refugee policy in 2015 and the continuing influx of migrants, individual countries have at times reintroduced border controls within the Schengen Area. This stands in direct contrast to the original commitment to the freedom of movement policy but can be applied in special circumstances for a limited amount of time. Within the European Union itself, in particular – but not only – in the Schengen Area, the closing of borders was unprecedented.

The presently most controversial and contested aspects of the ‘one Europe – unity in diversity’ paradigm relate to national sovereignty, border controls, and freedom of movement. Within the context of the *cultural enrichment narrative*, this is often associated with populist anxieties of ensuing religious and cultural dominance due to the increase of the Muslim population arriving in the EU as refugees, identity, and sovereignty issues become intertwined.

A lack of communication, often also of interest and empathy for the other, the failure to disseminate the *cultural enrichment narrative* as an observable factor of globalised realities together with missing historical knowledge on the push and pull factors of migration from and to Europe, the failure to more clearly convey the differentiated histories on the facts of European assimilation through migratory processes, the lack of intercultural competence, and a general appreciation of diversity are just some of the reasons explaining why present European perceptions have become so critical. Both institutional arrangements and personal communicative and intercultural skills are indispensable in order to foster and appreciate the normality of socio-cultural change within a globalising world. The present European crisis demonstrates the ongoing challenge in and for Europe to convey an inclusive European identity of diversity. In this sense, the *narrative of cultural enrichment* must establish a clear reciprocal understanding of acceptable pluralistic cultural difference, thereby identifying both debatable acculturative adaptation and non-debatable red lines. Communicative intercultural competence is necessary to pave the way to a better understanding between European countries and regions and is of particular

relevance to encourage interaction and exchange between socio-cultural milieus within cities and neighbourhoods. Dialogue between cultures is not a sufficient but a necessary condition to support a better understanding of realistic goals and limits to a more critical multicultural European self-image. This must be built on a democratic and constructive implementation of the *cultural enrichment narrative* and oriented on humanistic European ideals and the universal Human Rights Convention. Particularly in the East European countries, but also in Germany, conveying intercultural competence within the broader concept of orientational knowledge as an important step in this direction has so far been insufficiently considered as a key qualification within formal and informal education.³⁷

In many countries, the rise of populist sentiment, strengthened by biased media representation, has supported a neo-nationalistic image of mono-cultural identity. False facts and emotionalised arguments have led to the weakening of the basic understanding of what Europe stands for. The example of the UK demonstrates the potential of anti-European mobilisation through the media. The over-average rise in numbers of people coming from Eastern Europe on a permanent basis as a consequence of the freedom of movement guarantee was highly politicised through the tabloid media. As early as 2008, a study by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism showed the negative portrayal of Polish migrants following the enlargement of the European Union in 2004.³⁸ Analysing the coverage of three national newspapers – two tabloids later prominent in concerns of anti-European sentiment and strong supporters of the Leave campaign, namely the *Daily Mail* and *The Sun*, in contrast with *The Guardian* – the general polarisation of the media on free movement becomes apparent. Based on a content analysis of the first coverage of a report by the Association of Police Officers in April 2008, the study observes that though reported facts and arguments were similar, the interpretations were not.

37 Cf. *Caroline Y. Robertson-von Trotha*: Periskop – Interkulturelle Kompetenz in der Patchwork-Gesellschaft. Europäische Integration zwischen individueller Identität und gesellschaftlichem Konsens, in: *Ludger Hünnekens/Matthias Winzen* (eds.): *Dissimile – Prospektionen. Junge europäische Kunst*, Baden-Baden 2003, pp. 25-32.

38 Cf. *Alexandra Frech*: 'Mass Migration', Crime and 'Decent People'. The Portrayal of Polish Migrants in British Newspapers, in: Reuters Institute, 2008; <https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/research/files/Mass%2520Migration%252C%2520Crime%2520and%2520Decent%2520People%2520-%2520The%2520Portrayal%2520of%2520Polish%2520Migrants%2520in%2520British%2520Newspapers.pdf> [31.01.2018].

As can be expected, headlines differed in size and wording. A further relevant finding is the criticism of the “gullible liberal media”, the heading “Bias and the BBC”, and the comment focusing on a “pro-migration lobby” interpretation of the leaked police report.³⁹ This illustrates the early role of the media in the build-up of anti-European sentiment leading to the Brexit campaign.

The discussion of the future of the EU and of necessary reforms and new structures fails because – not only in the UK – national problems and interests are often regarded as being in direct conflict with European policy. This is doubtless often the case and underlies the latent structural problematic of one-sided national reportage and orientation. Generally, the causalities of local benefits are not discussed within the larger European context. On the contrary: in the national media, the EU is often popularly identified as the cause of uneven development, thus weakening the legitimacy of the *economic narrative*. Again, this emphasises the need for the development of a long overdue European public⁴⁰ which remains despite all efforts a central problem of communication.

Shifts to both the populist right and the extreme left pose threats of legitimacy to the EU’s existence in its present form. Within this general context, we can also identify independence movements within member states themselves which have many historical and motivational roots supporting past, ongoing, or revived identities of national, regional, or ethnic sovereignty. Most recently, the modern Catalan independence movement, first drawing wide attention in 2010, became stronger after the Brexit referendum. In a – from Catalan perspective – binding referendum on 1 October 2017, 90% – out of the 40% turnout – voted in favour of independence. The Catalan declaration of independence on 27 October 2017, however, was – as anticipated – declared null and void by the Spanish government. Along with the example of Scotland and further European regions, Catalonia refers to the problematics of present constitutional arrangements at both the EU and at national levels. Whereas the conditions of becoming a member are tied to clear normative standards and procedures, this does not apply to the opposite process of separation.⁴¹

39 Ibid., p. 26.

40 Cf. Krisen machen stärker. Die Karlsruher Soziologin Robertson-von Trotha über die Folgen eines möglichen Brexit, in: Badisches Tagblatt, Nr. 138, 17.06.2016.

41 Cf. *Caroline Y. Robertson-Wensauer: Ethnische Identität und politische Mobilisation. Das Beispiel Schottland, Baden-Baden 1991.*

Based on the ‘Home Rule Movement’ which formed its early political objectives in 1853⁴², the independence movement in Scotland has a long history and is now gaining renewed strength due to the Brexit referendum. A clear majority of 62% of the Scottish electorate voted for ‘remain’ in the European Union.⁴³ This has renewed the periodically recurring debate with regard to sovereignty as seen from a Scottish perspective. Constitutionally, the UK Parliament retains parliamentary sovereignty for the United Kingdom as a whole, where a majority is also required to mandate a referendum on Scottish independence. Further fired by the denial of consent for the UK withdrawal bill from the EU by the Scottish Parliament⁴⁴, a renewed debate on the possibility of a second Scottish independence referendum has gained momentum.⁴⁵

Paradoxically, in the independence referendum of September 2014 – which during its campaign served to divide the nation on similar issues as in earlier campaigns leading to devolution⁴⁶ – the majority for remaining within the United Kingdom was also influenced by those who voted remain because of the constitutional issue regarding membership of an independent Scotland within the EU. Some only voted against independence because of the expected loss of EU membership. This is also the main reason given for a second independence referendum. The threat of losing EU membership, the uncertainty of future membership negotiations, and both pragmatic considerations of economy but also the historical sense of European identity were major issues.

42 For further information, cf. *T. M. Devine: The Scottish Nation. A Modern History*, London 2006.

43 Cf. *Hunt/Wheeler: Brexit. All You Need to Know about the UK Leaving the EU*.

44 Cf. *Akash Paun: The Scottish Parliament Has Rejected the Brexit Bill – Are We Heading for a Second Independence Referendum?*, in: Institute for Government, 15.05.2018; <https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/scottish-parliament-has-rejected-brexit-bill-are-we-heading-second-indep-referendum> [15.05.2018].

45 On 28 March 2017, the Scottish Parliament voted for negotiations with the UK Government for a section 30 order enabling a second independence referendum in late 2018 or early 2019. Two days later, a formal request was made which has remained unanswered.

46 Cf. *Robertson-Wensauer*, 1991.