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# Central Asia Today:

Countries, Neighbors, and the Region

Sunatullo Jonboboev/  
Mirzokhid Rakhimov/  
Reimund Seidelmann (eds.)



Cuvillier Verlag Göttingen  
Internationaler wissenschaftlicher Fachverlag



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# INTRODUCTION

REIMUND SEIDELMANN

This book summarizes interim results of the collaborative research project “Patterns of Regional and Interregional Cooperation: Central Asia, its Neighboring Countries, and Europe” (2012-2015) conducted by Bielefeld University/Germany, TU Dortmund University/Germany, and Giessen University/Germany funded by Volkswagen-Foundation/Germany and directed by Prof. Dr. Christoph Schuck, Prof. ret. Dr. Reimund Seidelmann, and Prof. Dr. Andreas Vasilache in cooperation with Prof. Dr. Sunatullo Jonboboev (University of Central Asia, Dushanbe/Tajikistan) and Dr. Mirzokhid Rakhimov (Academy of Sciences, Tashkent/Uzbekistan). The project aims at analyzing the political, economic, and social dynamics in Central Asia from a comparative and an inclusive regional perspective and continues Central Asian political studies in Giessen from 2004 onward and later in Bielefeld and Dortmund as well. Taking governance, transformation, and regionalization studies into account the project’s focus is on the dynamics of governance in Central Asia including its perspectives in the ongoing decade. In contrast to other studies on Central Asia this projects understands Central Asia not as an isolated region but as interdependent with its neighbors, transregional organizations, and global politics. Therefore the research covers not only the five Central Asian countries but their neighbors such as Xinjiang/China, Kashmir/India, and Russia – plus EU–Central Asian relations – as well. In addition to the broadening of the geographical scope the project understands governance in a wider sense, i.e. as a multidimensional concept combining political, economic, socio-cultural, and ecological dimensions. And following a multi-actor approach the project interrelates the state with non-state actors and subscribing to a multilevel approach it combines intra- with inter-state, regional with transregional, and transregional with global patterns and dynamics.

Following the line of earlier research and former cooperation projects about Central Asia and neighboring Xinjiang etc.<sup>1</sup> and in contrast to many other studies on Central Asia in the West this project and this book gives special room for scholars from Central Asian countries and their neighbors, who have been raised after independence and after the beginning of transformation processes in the region and in its neighborhood. Understandably, their views and their identification with their countries and region might differ from projections of norms, models, and political priorities, which can be found in studies done from outside the region and sometimes imply unreflected interests of the development aid industry or conceptual colonialism. Adding contributions from scholars, who have been involved in politics and diplomacy of Central Asian countries, supplement the picture. Thus, describing countries and

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<sup>1</sup> See for example Reimund Seidelmann/Ernst Giese (eds.), *Cooperation and Conflict Management in Central Asia*, Peter Lang Frankfurt etc. 2004.



## Introduction

developments and pointing to their and the region's problems is based on views from the countries and the region under study this book aims to encourage a dialogue of equal partnership between scholars from different regions, academic schools, and political views, which seems necessary and fruitful.

The book is organized in three parts. The first part includes country studies with special reference to the country-region relations, which is regarded as a necessary condition to understand the region and regionalization processes. The contributions of Serik Raushan, Aijan Sharshenova, Goolbahor Iskandarova/Sunatullo Jonboboev, Merjen Esenova, and Mizokhid Rakhimov/Oybek Abdimuminov on the countries of Central Asia demonstrate both the common features and problems as well as the structural heterogeneity of the region. In addition, these studies introduce the intraregional conflicts and their structural conditions. The second part describes the relation between the Central Asian region and its countries to the three most influential and important neighbors – China, India, and Russia. Including such studies results from the understanding of Central Asia as not an isolated region but an interrelated – historically, geographically, economically, ethnically, etc. – many-states actor, which is interrelated with its neighbors in general and object of their cooperation and power projection strategies in particular. It is needless to say that the contributions by Yuyu Zhang, Suhail Ahmed, and Sergey Yun present an outside view and differ in their approach and evaluation from those in the first part. But it has to be reminded that the basis of all international politics is to understand, respect, and then to talk to the others in the spirit of constructive partnership. The third part looks at the regionalization and transregionalization process from different angles and highlights specific problems, dynamics, and shortcomings. It is a general agreement under all book contributors that the Central Asian region and its neighbors need more bilateral cooperation as well as the widening and deepening of their regionalization and transregionalization processes. Although this view can refer both to the historic Silk Road structures and to the idea of creating a “New Silk Road” this is not easy to implement in view of diverging and sometimes conflicting interests, past and ongoing nation-centered nation-building dynamics, and the heterogeneity of political, economic, and socio-cultural structures, which are described in the book's different country studies but constitute a condition for further self-determined progress. In the center of the third part is the debate with contributions of Serik Beimenbetov, Nazira Momosheva, Sadridin Rahimov/Mirzokhid Rakhimov, Enrico Fels, and Khudoberdi Kholiknazarov about perspectives, possibilities, and limits of regionalization and transregionalization through multilateralism, supra-nationalism, and integration. These studies are complemented by Steve Schlegel's analysis of the influence of the OSCE in stabilizing weak states. In addition – and to contribute to the debate on Islamism – Mush-taq Kaw presents a Muslim view on today's Islamization or re-Islamization of Central Asia, while Sunatullo Jonboboev comments it from a different angle. Both are not only illustrating the broad range of views about such issues – and the necessity for a constructive debate about it – but as well might be helpful to understand the revitalization of religion in



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Central Asia after years of Soviet secularization as well as the role of the Soviets in the history of Central Asia's modernization and transformation. And more important Kaw's and Jonbobojev's contribution help to reopen the debate on fundamental values and their consequences for political concepts, structures, and behavioral patterns.

Once again – this book aims to contribute to an ongoing debate, which has to take the views of the countries of and around Central Asia adequately and seriously into account and which reflects the multitude of historic, geographic, economic, ethnic, and political factors and their dynamics. Such a debate about the past, the present, and the future of Central Asia from a Central Asian perspective is not only interesting for transformation, nation-building, and regionalization studies but as well a necessity to define the concepts and strategies for developing self-determined Central Asia further.

The editors thank the contributors for presenting their views, VolkswagenStiftung for funding the project including this book, and the staff of Center for international Development and Environmental Research (ZEU) of Justus-Liebig-Universität Giessen for their assistance in publishing.

Giessen, in January 2014





# Part I

## The Countries of the Region





# KAZAKHSTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA

RAUSHAN SERIK

## 0 ABSTRACT

*This contribution provides first an overview about the history, the political geography, the economy, and the political system of Kazakhstan and second a detailed description of its foreign policy. As one of the largest and most efficient economy in Central Asia, Kazakhstan's economy is based on the extraction and export of mineral products with Russia and China as its main trading partner. Its presidential political system has undergone recent reforms to improve governance and democratic structures. Its foreign policy can be considered as a multi-vector policy with mainly the neighbourhood countries, Russia and China, and international organisations. Main issues are water security, economic stability, ethnic peace, effective border protection, and the continuation of its non-nuclear policies.*

## 1 INTRODUCTION

The following description and analysis of Kazakhstan in Central Asia is divided into two sections. The first and more informational section gives a general idea of the geographical location, natural resources, history, and development of independent Kazakhstan. Also shown is the life activity of Kazakhstan, its internal socio-economic development, as well as the foreign policy of the country. The second section is devoted to the analysis of contemporary trends and features of development of the Central Asian region and looks at the role of Kazakhstan in ensuring security and sustainable development of both the country and the whole region. The purpose of the proposed research is to show an objective picture of the development of today's Kazakhstan and to examine the challenges, risks, and threats to regional security in the context of the current geopolitical and economic situation in Central Asia with a focus on economic and water security as well as an analysis of the impact of the processes on the sustainable development of the region and the role of Kazakhstan in ensuring a stable mutually beneficial cooperation in the region.

In the following special attention is given to the problem of ensuring security in the region in two dimensions – economic and water plus energy. This study is based on official documents, statistical data, scientific, and practical experience of experts from Kazakhstan, Russia, and Central Asia. It has to be underlined that mostly Kazakh sources are used deliberately to show the vision of the scientists of Kazakhstan and the position of national experts. The uniqueness of this study is that verbal primary sources were used, i.e. presentation of the views of experts and senior leaders, that have been heard while attending international and regional conferences on important security issues in Central Asia. In



particular, speeches and quoted opinion (partly published in the press) of authorized officials are taken into account such as the Assistant to the President – Secretary of Security Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan (RK) M. Tazhin, Head of the Analytical Department of the Security Council of Kazakhstan, E. Tukumov, director of *Institute for World Economy and Politics* (IWEPP) under the *Foundation of the First President* S. Akimbekov, director of KazISS under the President B. Sultanov, as well as CSTO General Secretary N. Bordyuzha and others. In my opinion, exploring the views of competent individuals in this area allows to present an objective picture of the existing threats and challenges, to realize its importance for Kazakhstan and for the entire region, and to understand the strategic goals for the country and mid-term plans.

Concerning the methods of research this study is based on the general methodological principles, which allow more fully and objectively examine the problems of the Central Asian region. In particular, the following methods were used: Content analysis of documents and research materials, systematic and historical approach, benchmarking analysis, monitoring of the current situation, expert evaluation, and forecasting to determine the broad outlines of prospects for the development of the situation in the region.

## **2 HISTORY OF THE FORMATION, INTERNAL POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN**

### **2.1 Kazakhstan at the Present Stage: General Information**

Kazakhstan occupies an area located in the heart of the Eurasian continent; therefore it is rightly considered as an Eurasian country. In territorial terms, Kazakhstan is on the 9<sup>th</sup> of the largest country in the world – with a territory of 2.724.9 square kilometers. The Republic of Kazakhstan has borders with five countries: Russia in the East, North and North-West (a border of 6.477 km), Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan in the South (Uzbekistan 2.300 km, Kyrgyzstan 980 km, Turkmenistan 380 km), and China in the South-East (1.460 km).

Kazakhstan with its vast territory is one of the relatively sparsely populated countries in the world – a population of approximately 6 person per 1 sq. km. The country's population for 2013 is 17.053 thousand [1]. Over recent years there has been population growth due to natural increase, increased immigration, and decreased emigration. Also one of the important facts in the field of population increase is the policy pursued by Kazakhstan from 1992 onwards to support the re-immigration of ethnical Kazakhs, who were forced to leave the country and expressed a desire to return back to their motherland.

The following table gives an overview about the main socio-economic indicators:

**Table 1: Main socio-economic indicators**

Population (1.10.2013, thsd., person)	17 099
Rate of unemployment (October 2013, % estimated data)	5,2
Average monthly wages and salary (September 2013., tenge)	105 905
Inflation: (October 2013, per December 2012, %)	3,6
(October 2013, per September 2013, %)	0,3
GDP (January-june2013 %)	105,1
Short-term economic indicator (January- September 2013 to January- September 2012)	104,6

Source: Thqe Agency of Statistics of the RK

Kazakhstan's population is multiethnic; the country is inhabited by 131 ethnic groups. The census shows the following shares:

**Table 2: Ethnic composition (in % of total population) [2]**

	currently	In 1999
Kazakhs	63,1	53,4
Russians	23,7	30,0
Uzbeks	2,8	2,5
Ukrainians	2,1	1,4
Uyghur	1,4	1,4
Tartars	1,3	1,7
Germans	1,1	2,4
Others	4,5	5,0

Basically, inter-ethnic relations in the country are characterized by stability and favorable dynamics.

The role and place of religion in the contemporary Kazakh society is fundamentally changing. Today, religion is playing an increasingly important role – particularly in the social and public processes – due to the fact that a large part of the population is eager to recover traditional



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values and moral principles. Currently, religious groups in Kazakhstan show the following composition:

**Table 3: Composition of confessions**

	In 1000's	In %
Muslims	11.237,9	70,2
Christians	4.190,1	26,2
Jews	5,3	Near 0,0
Buddhists	14,6	0,1
Others	30,1	0,2

**Table 4: Oil and gas potentials (in million tons):**

Resource	Explored resources	Probable resources	Predicted time frames of production, years*
Oil, billion tons	about 5	9,3	Up to 70
Gas, trillion m <sup>3</sup>	2—3	6	Over 70
Condensate, billion tons	0,31	1,8	-

\* predicted terms of production depend on the final size of stocks, production level, world prices and other conditions

Source: Committee of geology and MINT RK subsoil use

Kazakhstan has high potential in natural resources; they play an important – if not dominant – role in the dynamic economic development of the country. Among 110 Mendeleev elements in a subsoil of the Republic of Kazakhstan 99 are revealed, 70 have been explored, 60 elements extracted and in use. On the territory of Kazakhstan, with a population of only about 0,25 % of the world population, there are more than 50 % of the world reserves of tungsten, 21 % stocks of uranium, 23 % of chromium ore, 19 % lead, 13 % zinc, and 10 % copper and iron. In terms of proven reserves of natural resources Kazakhstan holds the following positions in the world: 1<sup>st</sup> place in reserves of zinc, chromium, tungsten and vanadium ores, 2<sup>nd</sup> place in the reserves of uranium, 3<sup>rd</sup> place in the reserves of asbestos, wollastonite, rhenium, manganese, 4<sup>th</sup> place in the reserves of lead; 6<sup>th</sup> place in the reserves of phosphate ore and gas; 7<sup>th</sup> place in the reserves of iron ore, silver and oil, and 9<sup>th</sup> place in the reserves of coal, copper, and gold. Kazakhstan belongs to the first ten countries in the world on explored reserves of hydrocarbons. Among CIS countries, Kazakhstan holds the 2<sup>nd</sup> place (after Russia) on oil and the 3<sup>rd</sup> place (after Russia and Turkmenistan) for gas. Prospective oil-and-gas areas makes more than 62 % of the territory of the republic. Today the state balance



of RK considered stocks on 256 oil, gas, oil and gas and oil-gas condensate fields; 2/3 of the taken stocks fall to the share of 6 fields/deposits; of these, more than half belong to the giant Kashagan and Tengiz deposits [3]. It should be noted that the exploitation of production at Kashagan started in September 2013. Kazakh share of world reserves of oil consists amount to 3,2 % and of gas to 1,5 % (see table 4). However, it is necessary to understand that these given estimates are very conditional and in addition they constantly change; every year updated data appear, forcing in a new way to look at a situation with stocks of hydrocarbons around the world as well as in Kazakhstan, in particular.

## 2.2 The history of Kazakhstan's Statehood

### 2.2.1 Kazakh Khanate (15th – 18th century)

The reference point in the establishment of Kazakh statehood is believed to be the emergence of the Kazakh Khanate in 1456. The formation of the Kazakh Khanate was closely linked to the history of both the Golden Horde and Mogulistan. In the period of the 15<sup>th</sup> - 18<sup>th</sup> century most of present-day Kazakhstan was part of the Golden Horde. The South (Zhetysu of today's Kazakhstan) was part of Mogul Stan – the state of Chagatais which was established in 1370 after Tamerlane seized power in Central Asia. From the second half of the 14<sup>th</sup> century, the processes of splitting and later of disintegration of the Golden Horde began. Many different independent khanates emerged in the territory of Kazakhstan, among which the formation named the State of Nomadic Uzbeks by historians was distinguished. This khanate reached its zenith under Khan Abulhair (1429-1468). The population of this khanate were Uzbek-Kazakhs. In the late 1450's Sultan Dzhanibek and Sultan Kerei, with tribes of Alshyns, Argyns, Kereis, Kypchaks, and Zhalairs, moved to the territory of Mogulistan. In 1456 Sultan Kerei was elected khan in the territory of present-day Southern Kazakhstan as the supreme ruler of the Kazakhs, which constituted the beginning of the history of the establishment of Kazakh statehood [4].

Ever since the emergence of the Kazakh Khanate on Central Asia's map the word Kazakh has become an ethnonym – the name of a people. From the emergence of the Kazakh Khanate the gradual process of its expansion started because of various Kazakh tribes voluntarily joining. Under Khan Yesim the process of uniting Kazakh tribes into one state was completed. That period included the division of the Kazakh people into three Zhuzes<sup>1</sup> – Great (Uly), Middle (Orta) and Little (Kishi). Despite the relative distinctiveness, representatives of

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<sup>1</sup> Zhuz is an economically and geographically specific district inhabited by a group of communities which, until the formation of the Kazakh ethnos, was the territory of a tribal union. The word Zhuz means "part" or "side". The foundations of the formation of Zhuzes were a merger of certain tribes into tribal unions.



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all three Zhuzes spoke one language. There were tiny differences in dialects but they could understand one another perfectly. There were also differences in everyday life, dresses, furniture and utensils and folklore.

The social relations of the Kazakhs were conditioned by the nomadic lifestyle – domestication of livestock and grazing it on pastures, and the consecutive processing of products of economic activity. One of the earliest forms of ownership was the ownership of livestock, and this phenomenon helped to deepen property and social differentiation. At the same time, some scientists believe, there was no private ownership of land, in contrast to sedentary societies. Land belonged to a community or tribe. Routes of roaming had been developed by centuries-long experience. Kazakhs grazed their livestock on hills in the summer and on the plains in winter. Crafts and household trades related to the processing of animal products – tanning, blacksmith and shoe-making – also played a particular role in the economy of Kazakhs. Carpentry and jewellery also developed at that time.

The Kazakh Khanate was not a centralised state and its political and administrative system was influenced by the nomadic lifestyle and living conditions of the population. The khanate consisted of feudal possessions (uluses), which were headed by sultans, who were descendants of Genghis Khan. The head of state was the khan, who combined supreme powers (civil, military, and administrative). The Kazakh Khanate reached its highest level of development in the 17<sup>th</sup> century under Khan Tauke (1687-1817). Scientists credit his rule with the establishment of the legal basis of Kazakh society – the Zheti Zhargy (Seven Principles) code of laws. This code regulated land, military, judicial, and family relations; it also detailed punishment for criminal offences.

After the death of Khan Tauke feudal internal fights worsened, as a result of which the Kazakh Khanate was politically divisive. In that period the foreign political situation also worsened. Volga Kalmyks and Yaitsk Cossacks raided the Kazakh Khanate from the West, Siberian Cossack and Bashkirs from the North and Bukhara and Khiva troops from the South. However, the chief enemy were the Dzungars or Western Mongolian tribes, which were united by the Dzungarian Khanate. Dzungars advanced into the steppe gradually: Fierce fights interchanged with truces and therefore raids stopped for some time, but peaceful periods were short-lived. The Dzungarian Khanate strengthened and grew, demanding new resources [5]. In spring 1723, Dzungars launched a large-scale assault on the Kazakh Khanate. This war was remembered as years of great disaster. Kazakhs had to retreat and moved away to Khiva, Samarkand, and Bukhara. After receiving a temporary respite, and, with a desire for revenge the Kazakh people managed to consolidate and offer armed resistance. A year later Kazakhs, led by Khan Abulhair, achieved a number of victories and relieved the Dzungars of Otrar, Shymkent, Turkestan, and Sairam. In 1726 the tribal leaders of all three Kazakh Zhuzes held a congress and elected a sardar – the supreme commander-in-chief of united Kazakh troops. Little Zhuz Khan Abulhair became the sardar and led the Kazakh militia to several victories, including the well-known battle at Bulanty in the Ulytau foo-



thills in Central Kazakhstan and the Anrakay battle near Lake Alakol. But despite the victories Khan Abulhair called his numerous troops back and returned to his tribal lands in Western Kazakhstan. This was prompted by an agreement that he, as a victor over the Dzungars, was to occupy the throne of the Kazakh khan, but Sultan Abilmambet was elected khan, which seriously offended Abulhair. This started another fight for power and the Kazakh Khanate was split, as a result of which the Little and Middle Zhuzes adopted Russian citizenship. From that time on Kazakhstan's history was linked to that of the Russian Empire.

### 2.2.2 Kazakhstan in the Russian Empire

Kazakhstan's accession into the Russian Empire was conducted in several phases, starting in the first half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century and lasting until the 1860's. Rapidly developing Russia was interested in relations with Kazakhstan in order to ensure security on traditional trade routes through the Kazakh Khanate to Central Asia and to build a buffer zone on the Southern borders of the empire. In the 16<sup>th</sup> century Russia was already close to Kazakh tribal lands; Russian towns had already emerged in the border areas – Tyumen, Tobolsk, and Tomsk. Trade was on the rise and the Russian Empire's influence grew in Kazakh lands. The Little Zhuz joining Russia was a historically forced step because by the middle of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, after China destroyed Dzungaria, there was the danger of the victor's expansion. In 1730 the Little Zhuz khan, Abulhair, proposed that the Russian government set up a military union. This was turned down and instead it was suggested that his khanate become a Russian protectorate. On February 19, 1731, Empress Anna Ioannovna signed a decree regarding the Little Zhuz voluntarily joining the Russian Empire. On October 10, 1731, Abulhair and a majority of tribal leaders of the Little Zhuz signed a treaty and took an oath on the inviolability of the treaty. It is worth noting that even though the Middle Zhuz, then ruled by Khan Ablai, was to a lesser extent linked to Russia, while the Great Zhuz was occupied by the Dzungars and the Kokand Khanate, Abulhair's separate treaty became the beginning of the constantly growing influence of Russia on the lives of Kazakhs [6]. In 1740 the Middle Zhuz also became a Russian protectorate. In 1741-1742, the Dzungars again raided the lands of the Middle and Little Zhuzes, but the involvement of Russian troops forced them to withdraw. Khan Ablai himself was captured by the Dzungars but was released a year later following mediation by the Orenburg Governor. As a result of the weakening of the Kazakh khans' power and the remoteness of this new region of Russia, part of the lands of the Middle Zhuz, which formally became a Russian protectorate, and the lands of the Great Zhuz fell under the Kokand Khanate. In 1787, some Kazakh tribes of the Little Zhuz, which were pressed by the Khiva Khanate, were allowed to cross the Ural River and settle in trans-Volga regions. This decision was officially fixed by Emperor Paul I in 1801, when 7.500 Kazakh households set up the vassal Bukei (Interior) Horde, headed by Sultan Bukei. This period was also signified by the emergence of the national liberation movement of Kazakhs. The movement, led by Srym Datov, was directly linked to the tsarist government's attempts to regulate the internal lives of



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dependent Kazakh tribes. After adopting the Russian protectorate the significance of the khan power declined, and the vertical power pyramid – khan-sultans-tribal leaders – fell into pieces because each tribal leader tried to independently agree with border and central authorities. As a result, this increased internal confrontation and open disobedience to the Russian administration and increased the number of attacks on border posts, which then froze the trade with Central Asia in the 1790's. Only by 1797 had Russia managed to pacify the majority of Kazakh tribes and the rebellion subsided. Srym Datov had to move to lands governed by the Khiva Khanate. In 1818, several tribes of the Great Zhuz announced the adoption of Russian protectorate. In the following 30 years – sometimes under pressure, sometimes voluntarily – most tribes of the Great Zhuz became Russian subjects. In 1822, Emperor Alexander II signed a number of additional documents: The Statute on Governing the Zhetysu and Syrdarya Oblasts and the Statute on Governing Turgai, Ural, Akmola, and Semipalatinsk Oblasts. Bukei Horde became part of Astrakhan Province. The Semirechiye Cossack Troops were established from Cossacks moved from Siberia in the territory of Zhetysu which was regained from the Kokand Khanate.

The continued incorporation of Kazakhstan into the Russian Empire was not conducted without conflict. The longest and largest rebellion in the 19<sup>th</sup> century was the one led by Khan Kenesary Kasymov between 1837 and 1844 and covered the entire territory of the Middle Zhuz and parts of the Little and Great Zhuzes. It was caused by discontent against the rapid colonization of lands and the strengthening and expansion of military border lines and the shrinking life expanses of nomads, who lost the last remnants of independence. This discontent helped Khan Kenesary unite a great number of Kazakh tribes. Military actions started in spring 1838 with the siege and burning of the Akmola fort and then rebels moved towards the Turgai River. In September 1841 the leaders of the three Kazakh zhuzes elected Kenesary Kasymov khan and declared the revival of the One-Kazakh Khanate. In August 1841 rebels laid siege on Kokand fortresses in Sozak, Zhana-Kurgan, Ak-Mechet, and Zhulek. Some victories over the Kokand Khanate helped to expand Kenesary's army and the situation in the steppe stabilised in that period. Aiming to improve the khanate's economic situation, Kenesary banned obstacles to and raids on trade caravans, which paid good taxes. Diplomatic correspondence was established and Russian, Bukharan, and Khivan envoys were received. As a result, some Russian officials responsible for relations with Asia – Orenburg Governor-General Perovsky in particular – started advocating talks and proposing a semi-autonomous unit similar to the Bukei Horde. Tsar Nicholas I's response to these projects ("there will not be two monarchies in one kingdom") was straightforward and the conflict was solved militarily in 1843: Kenesary and the remnants of troops loyal to him were destroyed in a battle on Lake Issyk-Kul. Meanwhile, the administrative management of Kazakh lands by the tsarist government continued and in 1850 Kazakhstan was divided into four regions with capitals in Uralsk, Turgai, Akmolinsk, and Semipalatinsk. It should be noted that the governance of vast



territories of Central Asia was complicated because there were shortages of resources for the establishment of administrations and of skilled bureaucrats.

In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century peasants from Russian and Ukrainian provinces were moved to Turkestan. According to the Statute on Governing the Turkestan Territory only “Russian subjects of Christian faith from the rural folk” were allowed to settle. Migrant peasants were offered over 3 million sq m of land each. This process was sped up during famines and with the start of the Stolypin reforms. Shortages of farmland in the European part of Russia and the possibility of receiving free land encouraged Russian peasants to move to the Urals region, Siberia and Turkestan [4]. The census conducted in 1897 showed that out of 8 million people living in Turkestan, Russians numbered about 700.000 people. Over a half of them lived in Semirechiye and Syrdarya Oblasts. By 1916 Russians accounted for a quarter and a tenth of the local population respectively. Between migrant peasants and local population there was some distribution of labour: The local population was involved in animal husbandry and grew cotton and watermelons, melons and gourds and crafts, while Russian settlers supplied bread, vegetables and were involved in dairy production. Famines in central regions of Russia prompted new waves of migration. Tens of thousands moved to the Turkestan territory in 1905-1906 and in December 1910 the tsarist government allowed the Migration Directorate to seize the nomads’ lands and hand them over to the Russian migrants. Migration bureaucrats used this right to seize not only pastures from Kazakhs but also winter grounds with cultivated land. This land confiscations heavily damaged the nomadic lifestyle of Kazakhs because under the disguise of excess land the government seized pastures. All this combined with other factors led to the greatest rebellion in Kazakhstan’s history – a national liberation rebellion led by Amangeldy Imanov in 1916. The rebellion was more organised in Turgai Oblast where large-scale military actions covered the entire central Kazakhstan. Rebels laid siege to the regional capital – Turgai. The tsarist government was forced to send regular troops to rebel areas and the rebellion was crushed by spring 1917.

Industrial production in the region started to take roots at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The mining in the gold and coal sectors developed rapidly. At the turn of the centuries the construction of railways helped develop trade both in Kazakhstan and abroad. The development of capitalist production formed multiethnic working classes, 60 % to 70 % of which were Kazakhs. Within the empire, Kazakhstan and Russia formed a single administrative and economic entity. Russian settlers and local Kazakhs were actively involved in economic and cultural relations that grew into friendship between the peoples. As a result, the fates of the Kazakh and Russian peoples were intertwined. Today it is precisely these two ethnic groups that constitute a reliable foundation for stability in Kazakhstan’s multiethnic society.



### 2.2.3 Kazakhstan in the USSR

The next stage in the development of Kazakh statehood started during 1917, a critical year for the country. By that time Kazakhstan already had its national cultural elite, who put forward ideas for independent development. The Kazakh public, led by Alikhan Bukeikhanov at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, tried to re-establish the Kazakh statehood in 1917 as the Alash autonomy [6]. In July 1917 the party Alash mainly made up of representatives of national intelligentsia was created; Alash's main idea was to achieve Kazakhstan's economic and political independence and adopt a capitalistic system in the country. Alash members fought for Kazakhstan's independence using legitimate political methods. The main ideological difference between the Alash party and Bolsheviks concerned issues surrounding the class-repressive nature of the state. Alash members had consistent views on issues of democratizing the government system. In their platform they advocated the presidential form of government that was the most advanced at the time and a democratic nature of elections to ensure the participation of all people regardless of their origin in the election processes; Alash spoke in favour of personal immunity, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly. But after the Soviet government established its power throughout Kazakhstan, the leaders of the Alash party had to recognise it as the central government of all ethnic minorities of Russia. Nevertheless, despite this, they set a number of demands for the central Soviet government to ensure the independence of the Alash autonomy to a certain extent. Their chief demand was to unite all lands of the Kazakh people within the Alash (Kazakh) autonomy, or restore the territorial integrity that was destroyed during colonisation. A significant role in the consolidation of Kazakh lands (governed by the Kazakh Revolutionary Committee (Kazrevcom) and other administrative-territorial units) and the future uniting of the Kazakh republic was put forward at an expanded meeting of Kazrevcom on October 27, 1919. This meeting discussed the issue of convening an All-Kazakh Congress of Soviets to solve the problem of uniting the Kazakh people into one Soviet autonomous state, which would have great political significance. One of ideologists and Alash's heads, Akhmet Baitursynov, made a number of proposals: First the Soviet government should give the Kazakh people the right to self-government and second the residents of some regions, which earlier opposed the Soviet government, should be pardoned. The expanded Kazrevcom meeting decided to convene an All-Kazakh Conference of Soviets to discuss the problem of uniting the Kazakh people. This conference was held in Aktobe on January 3 – 11, 1920, and gathered 250 delegates from Turgai, Ural, Akmola, Syrdarya, Semirechiye, Fergana and Trans-Caspian Oblasts, and Alash party members. The conference's resolution *On the Union of Kazakh Oblasts* stressed the need to unite all Kazakh oblasts into the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), which would join the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Based on this draft, the chairman of the Soviet of People's Commissars (SPC) of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), Vladimir Lenin, and the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets (ACEC), Mikhail Kalinin, signed in the



following the decree *On the Establishment of the Kyrgyz (Kazakh) Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic*. According to official statistics from 1920, the Kazakh ASSR covered an area of 1.871.239 sq km and its population amounted to 5.046.000 people. Ethnic Kazakhs accounted for over 46 % of the total population.

The declaration of the Kazakh ASSR became a major step in ensuring the territorial integrity of Kazakh Soviet statehood. At the same time, Southern regions, populated by Kazakhs, were still part of the Turkestan ASSR. Moreover, significant numbers of Kazakhs were dispersed in the territories of the Khorezm and Bukhara People's Republics: Kazakhs accounted for 19,3 % of the Turkestan ASSR, 1,5 % of the Bukhara People's Republic, and 3,5 % of the Khorezm People's Republic. The national-state demarcation of multiethnic Central Asia was conducted in 1924 and it focused on the Turkestan ASSR, the Khorezm, and the Bukhara People's Republics. It resulted in the establishment of the Uzbek SSR and Turkmen SSR; the Tajik ASSR as part of the Uzbek SSR; the Kyrgyz ASSR as part of the RSFSR, while the Kazakh districts of former Semirechiye and Syrdarya Oblasts which, which had been part of the Turkestan ASSR, were transferred to the Kazakh ASSR. Thus, the territory of the Kazakh ASSR increased by 700.000 sq km and its population by 1.468.000 people. The reform of the republic's administrative division had been completed by the beginning of 1925; after the capital city of the Kazakh ASSR was moved from Orenburg to Ak-Mechet (present day Kyzylorda), and Orenburg and the districts around it had been transferred to the RSFSR. Thus, by 1925 almost all Kazakh lands had been united into one republic and the task of ensuring its territorial integrity had been completed.

In 1936 the Kazakh ASSR was transformed into a Soviet republic and this was enshrined in the Soviet Constitution of 1936. Based on and in line with the Soviet Constitution, a new constitution was drafted for the Kazakh SSR. The 10<sup>th</sup> extraordinary All-Kazakh Congress of Soviets, held in late March 1937, adopted the Constitution of the Kazakh SSR, which consisted of 11 chapters. In accordance with this constitution, the Kazakh SSR was declared a socialist state of workers and peasants. It also declared that the entire power belonged to workers represented by the Soviets of Workers' Deputies. The economic basis of the Kazakh SSR was the socialist economic system and the socialist form of ownership of production tools and means. Socialist property had two forms – state and collective-cooperative. The small private holdings of peasants and craftsmen were allowed if they were based on personal labour and excluded the exploitation of someone else's labour. It was stated that the economic life of the Kazakh SSR was defined and directed by a state economic plan. The 1936 constitution also declared that the Kazakh SSR voluntarily united with other Soviet republics into the USSR – a union state and had the right to freely leave the USSR. The constitution also defined the republic's administrative-territorial organization and specified that the territory of the Kazakh SSR could not be changed without its consent. It also recognized single Soviet citizenship and citizenship of the Kazakh SSR. The spheres of powers of the Kazakh SSR and its supreme bodies of government system were clearly defined.



## Part I: The Countries of the Region

The supreme body of government of the Kazakh SSR was the Supreme Soviet which was recognized as the only legislative body. Deputies of the Supreme Soviet were elected by popular vote for four years. The Supreme Soviet elected the presidium of the Supreme Soviet consisting of a chairman, two deputy chairmen, secretary, and 15 members. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was given the right to issue legislative decrees and was delegated other powers. Deputies of the Supreme Soviet enjoyed parliamentary immunity. The constitution also defined the structure of the central bodies of government. The supreme executive body of government of the Kazakh SSR was the Soviet of People's Commissars, which was responsible for and accountable to the Supreme Soviet and its presidium. The Soviet of People's Commissars set up people's commissariats: Union-republican and republican. The local bodies of government were the Soviets of Workers' Deputies. At the end of 1936, the Kazakh SSR was divided into eight oblasts; by 1945 there were 16 regions in the Kazakh SSR.

On April 20, 1978, the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR adopted a new constitution. Its preamble stated that a society of genuinely free people of labour in which the prosperity and culture of people had been steadily improving had been created. It was claimed that the Kazakh SSR was an equal republic of the USSR, which united all peoples and ethnic groups. But these provisions of the constitution did not reflect the real state of Kazakh society in which discontent was brewing over the worsening living conditions, the Communist Party's diktat and the absence of any hope for the republic's sovereignty. This discontent was openly manifested in Almaty in December 1986. Legally the Supreme Soviet was able to solve all issues which fell under the jurisdiction of the Kazakh SSR. However, this was just a formal provision because all those issues were preliminarily solved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) and only after that were they legally adopted.

In 1986 there was an event that was a harbinger of Kazakhstan's independence. On December 16, 1986, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan held its 5<sup>th</sup> plenum and discussed the sole organizational issue – the replacement of the political figure, who had governed the republic for no less than a quarter of a century: First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, Dinmukhamed Kunayev. Gennady Kolbin, who had previously been first secretary of the Ulyanovsk Oblast Committee of the Communist Party and who had won Mikhail Gorbachev's approval for actively pursuing an anti-alcohol campaign in Russia's Ulyanovsk Oblast, became the new head of Kazakhstan. No adviser of Gorbachev in the Kremlin, neither he himself, had analysed the situation at the time and could not predict people's reaction to an unknown person gaining power in Kazakhstan. Kremlin functionaries continued to regard Kazakhstan as their patrimony. Even the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan was not informed about the new appointment. On December 16, 1986, first a small group of working and student youth staged a protest action in Almaty against the Communist Party's decision. The rally was



peaceful and was of political nature, but it did not call for the overthrow of the constitutional system nor attack any other ethnic group. On the second day when the number of protesters reached several thousand – mainly students – Moscow ordered the Blizzard-86 operation, aimed at dispersing protesters using army units, special-task troops, police, and the KGB [7]. The December 1986 events, which shocked the entire world, proved that a new generation whose national consciousness was above all defined by the honour of its people had emerged in the Kazakh lands. It was the first time in 70 years the younger generation had delivered a worthy rebuff to all the hardships experienced by Kazakhstan because of the administrative-command and often simply violent policy of the central government in Moscow. This was the beginning of the movement towards democracy as part of perestroika across the entire Soviet Union.

Perestroika gave rise to some democratization in the society. For example, the election legislation was amended in 1989. With the aim of ensuring the representation of public organizations it was decided to allow them to elect a quarter of all members of the Supreme Soviet. Public organizations elected members of the Supreme Soviet at their congresses and republican conferences. Another novelty was that members of the Supreme Soviet were relieved of their jobs for the duration of their parliamentary mandate. This was the first, small step towards parliamentarianism. But from 1987 onward production fell in the USSR and, as a consequence, in Kazakhstan too. At the same time, the party-government system became increasingly paralyzed. In 1989 the 15<sup>th</sup> congress of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan relieved Gennady Kolbin of his post of first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan and replaced him with Nursultan Nazarbayev, who then started to implement his own programme with the following priorities:

1. the strengthening of social stability, civil, and interethnic accord;
2. the drafting and conducting a programme of economic reforms; and
3. the carefully defining and dividing powers between republican and central government bodies.

In accordance with the Kazakh SSR Law *On the Adoption of the Post of the President of the Kazakh SSR and Making Amendments and Addenda to the Constitution of the Kazakh SSR* of April 24, 1990, the 1978 constitution included the new chapter “President of the Kazakh SSR”, which stipulated provisions on the status and powers of the president. That same day N. Nazarbayev was elected as the republic’s first President by a decision by the Supreme Soviet of Kazakhstan. And after the break-up of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new independent sovereign state in Central Asia, the Constitution of the Kazakh SSR ended corresponding to new political, economic, social and ideological realities and in October 1990 the *Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Kazakh SSR* was adopted. The Constitutional Law *On State Independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan*, adopted December 16, 1991, blocked the effect of the Constitution of the Kazakh SSR of 1978 without abolishing it legally,



because the basic provisions for the new independent state and the corresponding new conceptual ideas and principles required the adoption of a new constitution.

### **2.3 Political development**

Thus, in 1990 the Republic of Kazakhstan appeared on the political map of the world as a new independent state. December events of 1986 became a forerunner of finding of independence of Kazakhstan, and in the subsequent such historical event as disintegration of the USSR preceded the latter also. The basic principles of independence and of the political system of Kazakhstan were set in the first Constitution (adopted in 1993 and later fixed in the new Constitution approved by a national referendum in August 1995. In 1998, 2007, and 2011 amendments to the Constitution were introduced, which led to formation of a new design of a state system in which the principle of constitutionalism (division and mutually control of branches of power) is accurately reflected; also the principle of people's sovereignty is significantly strengthened. The new architecture of the redistribution of power and responsibility led to the strengthening of role of the President in the state and the representative bodies and – which was an innovation for the political practice of Kazakhstan – of the institutes of civil society represented by the parties and the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan. This new and optimal balance of power and responsibility answered the three main political tasks of development of the republic at the current stage:

1. to evolutionary advance to steady democracy,
2. to increase the reliability and stability of the political system, and
3. to strengthen of efficiency and transparency of public administration.

Kazakhstan is an unitary state with a presidential government. The supreme representative body with legislative functions is the Parliament of RK, which consists of two chambers: Senate and Mazhilis. The chief executive is the Prime Minister heading the government of the republic. For ensuring strict implementation of the Constitution of RK the Constitutional Council is created. In addition, the Supreme Court is the supreme legal authority.

Strengthening of national security is one of the necessary mechanisms to provide the stable and steady formation of any state. The basis of the system of the national security of Kazakhstan has a fundamental legal base: First, the law RK “About National Security” adopted in 1998, second the Strategy of National Security for 2006-2010, and third the Military Doctrine and the Concept of Military Reform. To ensure its national security Kazakhstan adheres to a multivector policy with the allocation of strategic partners. Now RK security rests on various systems of collective security – SCO, OSCE, CSTO and CICMA –, which allow to observe the balance of interests of leading powers of the world within Kazakh territory, and thus provides a durable base of national security of RK. Following independence and sovereignty



the most pressing issues of preservation of territorial integrity and ensuring national security have been resolved. So, in 1991 and by the decree of the President of RK the nuclear facilities in Semipolatsinsk had been closed, and in May 1992 with the signing of the Lisbon Protocol the dismantling of the nuclear weapon located in the territory of Kazakhstan took place. In 1994 the Budapest Memorandum, which guarantees Kazakhstan's security and safety, was signed by the Russian Federation, the USA, Great Britain, and also later by France and the People's Republic of China. It should be noted that before the destruction of the the nuclear arsenal of Kazakhstan this capacity totaled 1.216 nuclear warheads established on 104 ballistic SS-18 intercontinental missiles stationed on Kazakh territory, which exceeded the nuclear potential of Great Britain, France, and China. In addition and in the context of better ensuring national security was the transfer of the capital of Kazakhstan from Almaty to Akmola in 1997 because of geographical, ecology-seismological, and geopolitical factors.

Besides the multilateral security frameworks mentioned above the military security of the Republic of Kazakhstan is ensured through a policy of cooperation and good neighborly relations between states, based on the principles of equality, non-interference in internal affairs, and peaceful settlement of international disputes. Currently, Kazakhstan has created an optimal three-branch structure of the Armed Forces, consisting of the Army, Air Defense Forces, and the Navy. In addition Kazakhstan established a process of improving the system of planning and interagency cooperation in matters of military security [8]. In the framework of CSTO Kazakhstan established a special division and subscribed it to the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), which increases its cooperation through joint operational and combat training. Through SCO Kazakhstan is actively involved in strengthening the anti-terrorism capacity of security organizations, which again includes participation in joint counter-terrorism exercises. Further, Kazakhstan expanded the range of military and military-technical cooperation with Russia, China, and NATO countries and other countries in order to strengthen national and regional security. For example, in connection with updating the Afghan problem Kazakhstan offers to help the NATO forces for the period of withdrawal of coalition troops from Afghanistan. Back in April 2013 at the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Istanbul Process on Afghanistan, the President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev said that "Kazakhstan is ready to open the port Aktau to NATO cargo to complete the mission "Enduring Freedom "in Afghanistan" [9]. It should be noted that since the beginning of operations of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, Kazakhstan annually assists the coalition in the framework of the agreement on the transit of goods with the alliance, as well as on the basis of bilateral agreements with the United States, Germany, France, Spain, and the UK.

## 2.4 Social and Economic Development

In sum, Kazakhstan's socio-economic development results from agriculture, resource extraction, and industry. Given the amount and quality of Kazakh resources, the economic development is dominated – or depends mainly – on mineral resource extraction. The country has five major economic areas:

- Northern Kazakhstan: advanced in agriculture, mining of iron ore and hard coal, machinery, production of petroleum products and ferroalloys, power engineering,
- Eastern Kazakhstan: non-ferrous metallurgy, power engineering, machinery and forestry,
- Western Kazakhstan: the largest oil and gas producing region, machinery, instrumentation, production of construction materials in particular shell rock, chalk and cement,
- Central Kazakhstan: ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, machinery, livestock sector, and
- Southern Kazakhstan: cotton, rice, wool, grain, fruit, vegetables, tobacco, grapes, hemp, also developed non-ferrous metallurgy, instrumentation, light and food industries, fisheries and forestry.

Following standard procedures the Kazakh economy can be first defined in terms of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP): According to data of the RK Statistics Agency, the volume of GDP for January-December 2012 was 30.072.528,8 million Tenge and, compared to the same period of the previous year has increased in real terms by 5,0 % (GDP growth in 2011: 7,5 %). Within the GDP structure for the considered period the production of goods amounted to 43,7 % and services to 52,9 %. The largest share in GDP belongs to the mining (17,4 %) and manufacturing (11,0 %) and also wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles, etc (14,7 %). The following table gives further details:

**Table 5: Growth rate of sectors of the national economy (volume index, %)**


Industry (January-August 2013 to January-August 2012)	102,0
Agriculture (January-August 2013 to January-August 2012)	101,8
Construction (January-August 2013 to January-August 2012)	102,1
Trade (January-August 2013 to January-August 2012)	112,5
Transport (January-August 2013 to January-August 2012)	107,3
Communication (January-August 2013 to January-August 2012)	114,4

Source: The Agency of Statistics of the RK

## Kazakhstan and Central Asia

Given the resource potential the Kazakh export is dominated by the global trade with mineral resources from Kazakhstan. The main export recipients are China (17,9 %), Italy (16,8 %), Netherlands (8,1 %), Russia (7,3 %). Among the countries from which Kazakhstan imports, Russia ranks first place (despite the recent year's reduction of its share by 4,4 %), followed by China (16,8 %) and Ukraine, which specific share increased by 2% that allowed it to outstrip Germany and to rank third. Export with the countries of the Customs Union amounted to 6.837,8 million \$ (3,7 % less than 2011) and import to 17.787 million \$ (11,7%). Figure 1 gives further details:

**Figure 1: Share of the countries in export and import 2012 (in %):**




Source: The Agency of Statistics of the RK

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While Kazakhstan exports raw materials from the mining sector, fuel, and products of its metallurgical and chemical industry its main imports consists of cars and related equipment, devices and machinery, chemical production, fuels, minerals, foodstuff, and finished products and consumer goods:

**Figure 2: Export and import 2012 of main commodity groups (in %):**



Source: The Agency of Statistics of the RK

Today, the economic policy of RK developed a new course – “a comprehensive economic pragmatism on the principles of profitability, return from investments and competitiveness”. Within this course Kazakhstan is faced by a number of strategic tasks such as

- the modernization of its macroeconomic policy,
- the development of new approaches on infrastructure development,
- the introduction of a new natural resources management system,
- the modernization of agriculture, and
- the development of new policy concerning water resources.



### 3 FOREIGN POLICY

#### 3.1 Kazakhstan's Multi-Vector Foreign Policy

Since obtaining independence Kazakhstan's foreign policy has been based on a principle of multi-vector relations; this was declared by Nursultan Nazarbayev as soon as he was elected to the country's President on December 01, 1991. President Nazarbayev understands that multi-vector policy means

“the development of friendly and predictable relations with all states that play a significant role in global politics and represent practical interest for our country. Kazakhstan, because of its geopolitical position and economic potential, cannot limit itself to narrow-regional problems. This would not be understandable to not only our multiethnic population but the entire international community. Kazakhstan's future is both in Asia and Europe, in East and West. By pursuing exactly this policy will we be able to avert any manifestations of threats to Kazakhstan's security. We will be able to strengthen favourable external conditions by economic and political transformations in our country” [10].

This position results from the country's geopolitical position, its multiethnic and religiously diverse population, and the level of economic development as a whole and the role of raw material exports in particular. In terms of strategic directions, the RK has currently the following priorities:

- strategic cooperation with Russia and China,
- friendly relations with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan,
- strengthening the Customs Union and Common Economic Space,
- participation in the activities of intergovernmental organizations such as CICMA, SCO, the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), and CSTO,
- constructive engagement with the USA, the EU countries as well as organizations such as the OSCE and the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO),
- cooperation with states and international organizations of the Islamic world, including the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), the League of Arab States (LAS), and others, and
- partnerships with the countries of Asia Pacific Region (APR).

Currently, in the area of foreign-policy activities, Kazakhstan faces a new task – the modernization of the country's foreign policy. This course has been designated on December 14, 2012, during a speech as part of the President's annual address to the people of Kazakhstan “Strategy “Kazakhstan-2050”: New Political Course of the Established State” [11]. In this speech the President highlighted the necessity of the country's modernization associated with the modern trends in the world politics, especially with the fast-changing



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international situation and the arc of instability stretching from North Africa and the Middle East to Northeast Asia, which in return has a threat to national security of the country. Thus, the priorities of the foreign policy modernization are:

- strengthening regional and national security,
- intensification of economic and trade diplomacy,
- intensification of international cooperation in cultural and humanitarian, scientific and educational and other fields, and
- strengthening the legal protection of citizens and their family and business interests abroad.

According to the priority areas of foreign policy modernization Kazakhstan faces the following tasks:

1. To promote the foreign-policy national interests on the principle of pragmatism and take measures towards the diversification of foreign policy, by developing economic and trade diplomacy for protection and promotion of national economic and trade interests.
2. To contribute to the stabilization in Central Asia through fully facilitating to the elimination of possible preconditions of conflicts in the region, pursue solution for vital social and economic problems, and to find ways to solve the water, energy, and other problems.
3. To support all progressive international initiatives and to contribute to global security.
4. To strengthen defense capability and military doctrine and to participate in various mechanisms of defensive deterrence.

### **3.2 The Nuclear-Free Status of Kazakhstan**

As it has been mentioned above the nuclear issue played an important role in the history of independent Kazakhstan. The policy of Kazakhstan in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is defined by country's foreign policy, the basis of which is adherence to consolidation of international security, development of cooperation among the states, and increasing the role of international organizations in settlement of global problems and conflicts. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and obtaining independence in 1991, Kazakhstan became the owner of the 4th-biggest global arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, including 1216 nuclear warheads for intercontinental ballistic missiles plus nuclear reserves for strategic bombers. Kazakhstan's inherited nuclear arsenal exceeded those of the United Kingdom, China, and France and it was enough to destroy completely everything alive on earth [12]. Today and already at this time, the world was and is already well aware of all the destructive power of nuclear weapons and international status of countries possessing them. Of course, for a new state like Kazakhstan there existed a strong



temptation to get hands on such a powerful tool to ensure national security. Aside from the stockpiled nuclear weapons, Kazakhstan had the necessary infrastructure and resource basis for the production of the components of nuclear weapons. In particular, Kazakhstan accounts for 21 % of global proven uranium reserves. In addition, Kazakhstan had the world's second largest nuclear testing facilities. Thus, with such nuclear capabilities, Kazakhstan attracted attention from global geopolitical centers immediately, especially when in the early 1990's and despite the complicated economic situation the country could afford to preserve a small amount of nuclear weapons in its warehouses. Discussions on the need to preserve nuclear potential preoccupied Kazakh politics in order to guarantee security and deter the ambitions of potential foes. The arguments of supporters of the preservation of nuclear weapons were the following:

1. The arsenal could be an effective tool for deterring ambitions of a potential enemy;
2. The arsenal would compensate the imbalance of military capabilities in the field of conventional arms and of the number of armed forces.
3. The nuclear weapon would give Kazakhstan the status of a regional superpower.
4. The preservation of the nuclear complex is important for the development of scientific and technological capacity, fundamental, and applied science.
5. A very tempting idea: Not the immediate abolishment but the reduction of the nuclear potential down to minimal level of nuclear deterrence and then after 20-30 years to decide this problem.

In these circumstances, the international community watched the official decision of Almaty. Today, one can proudly say that Kazakhstan took the bold and only important decision, which is able to be truly the guarantor of the national security of the country. Even today it is hard to even imagine what negative effect a Kazakh decision to obtain the status of nuclear power would have had. Therefore one has to pay tribute to the wisdom of the Kazakh leaders, who withstood pressure from local hawks and did not give in to the temptation of nuclear ambitions. The first step that laid the foundation of Kazakhstan's future policy of non-proliferation was the closing of the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site; on August 29, 1991, President Nazarbayev signed a historical decree to shut down the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing ground. In 1991 the heads of state of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine established in the Almaty Declaration on Strategic Nuclear Forces a mechanism of joint control over the nuclear arsenal of the former USSR to bar any failures in maintenance of a due level of nuclear safety and confirmed adherence to international obligations of the USSR in the field of reduction of strategic offensive arms [13]. On May 23, 1992, representatives of the given countries and the USA signed in Lisbon the five-sided protocol, which specified their responsibilities for the implementation of the Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms (START) with reference to those Strategic Nuclear Forces placed in territory of the four states. The Lisbon Protocol also contained obliga-



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tions of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to join the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as countries not possessing nuclear weapons. On December 05, 1994, at the OSCE Budapest summit Russia, the USA, and Great Britain signed the Memorandum of Security Assurances in connection with Kazakhstan's Accession to the NPT as a denuclearized state. This document recognized Kazakhstan's full and strict performance its obligations on the complete withdrawal of nuclear weapon from its territory. China and France also assured Kazakhstan of its security.

But having completely withdrawn its nuclear arsenal, Kazakhstan faced the problem of destruction of nuclear weapons' infrastructure on its territory and the conversion of former military production and other facilities for the civilian purpose. With the assistance of the International Agency on the Atomic Energy (IAEA) the Coordination Plan of technical assistance to Kazakhstan on operation of the atomic power station, physical protection of nuclear materials, and installations was developed with participation of Great Britain, the USA, Sweden, and Japan. In 1992 Kazakhstan has started the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, also known as " The Program of Nunn-Lugar", which includes a complex of projects on destruction and disinfecting infrastructure and objects of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons remaining in Kazakhstan, dismantling strategic offensive arms, creation of an export control system, improvement of management and control over nuclear materials, and conversion of defensive industry. On December 13, 1993, the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Kazakhstan ratified the NPT. Kazakhstan's joining the NPT was an important stage in realization of country's foreign policy. As a member of the NPT, Kazakhstan strictly adheres to obligations of the treaty, a unique multilateral agreement in the field of control over nuclear weapons obliging members to undertake measures on nuclear disarmament. On February 14, 1994, Kazakhstan became a member of the IAEA. On July 26, 1994, the Agreement on Guarantees between the Government of Kazakhstan and the IAEA was signed in Almaty and later ratified on June 19, 1995. All nuclear objects are under control of the IAEA and all nuclear activities of Kazakhstan is carried out according to its rules and standards.

Kazakhstan was the first country in the CIS to withdraw all nuclear weapons from its territory; the last step was the removal of nuclear warheads that remained underground at the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing ground on May, 27, 1995. Since then Kazakh land has been fully free of nuclear weapons. Following this, U.S. Senator Richard Lugar speaking at a conference in Washington on February 22, 2003, stated that Kazakhstan's wise and bold choice to give up nuclear weapons was in striking contrast to events in India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran, which is why the world should particularly value the policy adopted by Kazakhstan. He noted that if the international community were to look for success stories in this sphere, it should turn to Kazakhstan's example [14]. In September 1996, at the 51st session of the UN General Assembly Kazakhstan signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTB) and ratified it on November 14, 2001. By joining the CTB, Kazakhstan has made a significant contribution to strengthening the verification regime of the treaty, actively cooperating with its Pre-



paratory Commission by creating the Global Monitoring Network. Kazakhstan made a significant contribution to the execution of field experiments of spot inspections, which is one of the most important components of the CTBTO.

Further and related to the vigorous activity in the field of nuclear disarmament during the period of 1994-1996, Kazakhstan became a member to the Conference on Disarmament in 1999. Kazakhstan is also a member to the Chemical Weapon Convention (CW). Thus, Kazakhstan's decision on voluntary give-up of the status of nuclear power based on the principles of humanism was an unprecedented and absolutely new step in building civilized global interstate relations.

At the same time, the need to address new security challenges, strengthening measures to combat international terrorism required a revitalization of Kazakhstan's accession to the multilateral non-proliferation regime (NPT). For example, on May 13, 2002, Kazakhstan became the 40th member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The purpose of Kazakhstan's participation in the NSG is the activation of measures against terrorism, counteraction of WMD proliferation, and strengthening the control over use and movement of nuclear materials and production of dual purpose. In July 2005 Kazakhstan joined the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), known as "Krakow Initiative", which seeks to involve all states to take steps to stop the flow of items for weapons of mass destruction at sea, in the air, or on land. On March, 21, 2009, the Treaty on Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Central Asia, signed on September 08, 2006, in Semei, Kazakhstan, went into force. Kazakhstan welcomed the treaty becoming effective and believes that it will contribute to global non-proliferation process and promote regional and international security. The new denuclearized zone in Central Asia has a number of unique features:

1. One of the zone's state – namely Kazakhstan- possessed in the past the fourth-largest nuclear arsenal.
2. For the first time a denuclearized zone is created in the Northern hemisphere of the globe.
3. This treaty becomes the first multilateral agreement in the security domain, which brings together all five Central Asian countries.
4. Finally, for the first time a denuclearized zone has been created, which borders upon two nuclear states.

Further, it has to be underlined that the Protocol on Negative Security Assurances is an integral part of the treaty. Under the Protocol the nuclear weapon states pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any states member to the treaty [15].

On June 18, 2009, over 25.000 locals, Kazakh dignitaries, and world media gathered in Semey city to celebrate the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Kazakhstan's decision to stop nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk Test Site. The meeting was held in Semey where President Nursultan Na-



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zarbayev appealed to the international community to back the peaceful mission of Kazakhstan. In his speech President Nazarbayev emphasized that the refusal to conduct nuclear testing has become possible due to courage and enthusiasm of millions of Kazakhs that put an end to the crimes against lives and health of the whole people of Kazakhstan. Besides he noted that “starting from the first days of the country’s independence, Kazakhstan did not leave its citizens alone with their problems. The work on social rehabilitation of the population and the territories suffered the harm of the nuclear tests is being constantly carried out. For these purposes the state utilized nearly KZT 34 billion (approximately \$215 million)”. In December 2009, the UN General Assembly unanimously accepted a resolution put forward by Kazakhstan proclaiming August 29, the day when in 1991 President N. Nazarbayev signed a decree on the closure of Semipalatinsk Test Site, as the ‘International Day against Nuclear Tests’. Recognizing the negative impact of nuclear testing on human life and the environment, as well as the importance of ending nuclear tests as one of the key means of achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world, the resolution sets out to commemorate a significant date in Kazakhstan’s – and indeed – the world’s history. Thus, the international community has fully appreciated Kazakhstan’s contribution to this nuclear disarmament programme. Paying a visit to Kazakhstan in April 2010 UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said “I highly commend the extraordinary leadership of president Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, who courageously closed this nuclear test site and initiated the nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia. That’s a big milestone.” [16]. During the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., in April 2010 President Obama praised President Nazarbayev “as really one of the model leaders in the world on nonproliferation and nuclear-safety issues”. President Obama and other leaders also took a positive view on President Nazarbayev’s proposition to establish an International Nuclear Fuel Bank on Kazakh territory. President Nazarbayev highly praised the antinuclear initiatives and achievements of the U.S. President in ensuring international security, namely the convocation of the Global Nuclear Security Summit, signing the new START treaty with Russia, and adopting the new U.S. nuclear posture review, which had become a great step towards establishment of the nuclear-free world. Currently, an important area of cooperation between Kazakhstan and the IAEA is to host on its territory an international nuclear fuel bank. Kazakhstan is the largest producer of uranium and – possessing the expertise and capacity for processing highly enriched uranium to low enriched form – intends to contribute to the development of peaceful use of nuclear energy. It, therefore, offers to host on its territory an international nuclear fuel bank under the surveillance of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and provide guarantees for its safe and secure storage. Kazakhstan also believes that establishing an international stockpile of low enriched uranium under IAEA auspices will bring benefit to all states by gaining access to nuclear fuel, without prejudice to their sovereign right to develop its peaceful domestic nuclear power programs in accordance with the provisions of the NPT and the IAEA Statutes. At the same time, Kazakhstan supports the legitimate and inalienable right of each state party to the NPT to develop and use peaceful nuclear energy in compliance with all the requirements of the IAEA.



It should be noted that this problem is very serious and the issue of the deployment of nuclear bank in Kazakhstan has both its supporters and opponents. Supporting experts say that the object does not pose any environmental threat to the country. As noted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs E. Idrisov “Nuclear fuel bank does not incur any environmental, ecological and other threats. It clearly demonstrates our commitment to non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy” [17]. International experts also confirm that Kazakhstan has a sound production, processing and storage of radioactive materials. At the same time, this issue annoys a certain part of the civil society of Kazakhstan, which is concerned about the idea and the potential negative consequences of placing a nuclear fuel bank in Kazakhstan; skeptical voices underline the implicit high risks of man-made disasters related to the fuel bank. However, despite this discussion this issue has already been in the negotiation process, has found support from the international community, and has been approved by the leaders of several countries in the world. Up to now the following activities have occurred:

1. One has determined the location of a nuclear fuel bank at Ulba Metallurgical Plant, which for several years engaged in the production and storage of low-enriched uranium,
2. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan developed a plan to explain to the public concept and details of the nuclear fuel bank,
3. Today Kazakhstan and the IAEA agree on the text of an agreement to host an international bank of low-enriched uranium in our country and plan to sign before the end of 2013.

In conclusion one should note that it can be considered as immoral to make the issues on nuclear safety a small coin while solving the other problems of inter-state relations. Today's world still cannot exist without nuclear power and this industry is one of the most promising – at least in the next decades. Therefore the most important thing is that the international community avoids the military uses of nuclear energy and develop a nuclear-free world – a view, which is supported by Kazakhstan since the beginning of its independence.

### **3.3 Kazakhstan and the International Organizations**

At the heart of the foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan is the strengthening of cooperation with global and regional international organizations, which contributes to the implementation of the national strategic interests of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Since independence Kazakhstan attaches great importance to cooperation with universal international organizations like the United Nations. As a result of the adoption of resolution 46/224 the Republic of Kazakhstan was adopted unanimously by the UN, thus Kazakhstan is a full member of the UN since March 2, 1992. In autumn 1992 at the 47<sup>th</sup> session of the UN General Assembly the Kazakh delegation took part in the UN forum as a full member for the first time. At this session President Nazarbayev delivered a speech to define the key principles and as-



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pects of Kazakhstan's foreign policy and the country's plans to enter the international arena as an active independent and sovereign player. Also during this speech the president proposed one of Kazakhstan's first initiatives to the international community – one that concerned the creation of a special forum – the Conference for Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA). As part of its activities in the UN, Kazakhstan pays particular attention to cooperation in ensuring regional security and organizing peacekeeping operations. In December 1995 and along with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan signed an agreement on the creation of a joint peacekeeping battalion in Central Asia under the control of the UN. In 1996 Kazakhstan joined the UN system of reserve agreements for possible involvement in peacekeeping operations. Kazakhstan's close involvement in peacekeeping activities was proven by the creation of the Kazakh peacekeeping battalion (Kazbat) in 2003, whose subunits took part in mine clearing in Iraq between 2003 and 2008. In 2003 Kazakhstan and the UN also signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding contributions to UN preparatory measures and expressed readiness to provide troops, armored, and transport means of Kazbat for peacekeeping operation and showed interest in closer involvement in the UN system of purchases for peacekeeping operations. As a result, Kazakhstan deserved the UN's recognition as a state that adopted a balanced and constructive approach to solving topical international problems.

In August 2003 Kazakhstan proposed to hold the first UN ministerial conference to discuss problems of landlocked countries. This conference resulted in the adoption of a UN General Assembly resolution on the Almaty Program of Action on cooperation between developing landlocked and transit countries. An important event in relations between Kazakhstan and the UN was the former UN General Secretary Kofi Annan's visit to Astana in October 2002. During the visit Mr Annan praised Kazakhstan as a regional leader in preventing conflicts. He also noted that Kazakhstan had achieved significant results in switching from an administrative-command to a market economy and managed to preserve stability in the country as well as adopting a bold position on nuclear disarmament [18]. Kazakhstan's election to the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) on November 02, 2006, became an important event in cooperation between Kazakhstan and the UN and was again a sign of the recognition of the country's constructive role in the activities of the UN. Thus, from 2007 Kazakhstan represented Asia's interests in this structure. In Kazakhstan there are various specialized agencies, programs, and funds of the United Nations. Their collective efforts are aimed at achieving the strategic development priorities, which are enshrined in a special UN Declaration at the Millennium Summit in 2000. The main document regulating the activities of the UN system in the Republic of Kazakhstan, is a Program on Assistance Framework (UNDAF); Kazakhstan realizes now the third step of this program, i.e. UNDAF 2010-2015. Under this program, special importance is given to the following areas of cooperation: Economic and social well-being of citizens with emphasis on the most vulnerable groups, environmental sustainability, and good governance by strengthening the institutions of civil society and the



media [19]. April 06-07, 2010, was the first official visit of the UN General Secretary Ban Ki-moon in Kazakhstan. The UN chief praised the courage and vision of Kazakhstan's leadership and also noted the exceptional achievements of Kazakhstan in the field of nuclear disarmament. In March 2011 the UN General Secretary announced his decision to appoint a Kazakh diplomat, K. Tokayev, to Deputy General Secretary of the UN, the general director of the UN Office in Geneva, and the Personal Representative of the General Secretary of the UN Conference on Disarmament [20]. It should be noted that for the first time in the history of the United Nations office in Geneva an Asian was appointed to that post – a decision which came as a surprise to the entire international community. In turn, the appointment to such a high position in the United Nations was a great honor for all Kazakhs and had a positive impact on the country's image as a state with a particular responsibility to strengthen global and regional security. Thus, over the past 20 years, cooperation between Kazakhstan and the United Nations has been very productive. UN agencies have supported the development of a number of policies, programs, and legislation in the area of macro-economic reform, social aspects, improving the management of health, and environmental protection. The most important of these is the long-term development strategy "Kazakhstan-2030". The future of the UN-RK cooperation will be based on the country's strategic objectives set out in the strategy of the President of Kazakhstan in 2050, the most current trends which include assistance in the economic, social, and political modernization of the country, aimed at promoting initiatives of Kazakhstan in the field of multilateral cooperation and regional integration.

In addition to cooperation with the UN Kazakhstan involved itself actively in the OSCE. Kazakhstan joined this organization on January 30, 1992. It signed the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE in the same year on July 08 and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe on September 23. The invitation extended by the leading Western countries to join the Organization was perceived in Kazakhstan as a step towards forming a new European security architecture based on equality and absence of dividing lines. Having become a full member of the pan-European conference, Kazakhstan took an active part in the processes of its further development, including its conversion into an international organization. President N. Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan participated in the OSCE Summits held in Helsinki (1992), Budapest (1994), Lisbon (1996) and Istanbul (1999). Each year, Kazakhstan is represented at the meetings of the OSCE Ministerial Council by its Foreign Minister [21]. In 1995 Kazakhstan established its Permanent Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna, which ensured the country's direct participation in the OSCE. Since 2008 and in view of the Chairmanship in 2010 there has been an independent Mission of Kazakhstan to the OSCE. In 1995 the OSCE established the regional Liaison Office in Central Asia in Tashkent. In 1999 the OSCE Centre in Almaty was opened; it was renamed the OSCE Centre in Astana in 2007.

Special attention was paid to the application of Astana for the Chairmanship of the OSCE. It should be noted that this initiative was first announced in Kazakhstan in 2003 and from that point a new phase of cooperation began. Further deepening of cooperation was the signing



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of a number of documents, among which was the Protocol to the Memorandum of Understanding with the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, contributing to accelerate the reform of the electoral law and the judicial system in Kazakhstan. Thanks to democratic reforms, Kazakhstan's candidacy had been approved to chair the OSCE in 2010 [22]. Over this year, Kazakhstan has coordinated the work of the 56 member countries of the OSCE. It should be noted that Kazakhstan's chairmanship has played an important role in resolving the situation in Kyrgyzstan. Also on the list of priorities of Kazakhstan's chairmanship in the OSCE was the Afghan problem [23]. The most important achievement during the presidency of Kazakhstan in the OSCE was the resumption of the practice of holding Summits of Heads of State and Government. On December 01-02, 2010, at the Summit in Astana the OSCE has adopted the historic declaration "Towards a Security Community". This paper introduced the concept of a Eurasian security space and expanded the traditional area of responsibility of the OSCE. In an effort to revive the "spirit of Helsinki", the purpose was to strengthen Kazakhstan trust between participants of the Summit as well as contribute to a close and fruitful cooperation in the development of approaches to renew the Organization. Currently, Kazakhstan remains active in the OSCE and is making efforts to fully act as a bridge between the East and the West.

One good example of successful cooperation within the framework of regional partnership is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The Republic of Kazakhstan was one of the founders of the organization, regards the activities of the SCO as a priority of foreign policy, and positions the organization as a practical and an important instrument of regional cooperation in the political, military, and cultural sphere [24]. Cooperation in the SCO allowed and allows Kazakhstan to resolve a number of territorial disputes, the systematic and transparent reduction of armed forces in the border areas, and to defuse the residual elements of the military and political tensions. June 11, 2010, Kazakhstan assumed the duties of chairmanship of the SCO. The most important priority of Kazakhstan's chairmanship was the strengthening of regional and global security – this of course taken into account the fact that the SCO is not a military-political bloc directed against third countries. It is first of all an organization that seeks to implement the statutory goals and objectives for peaceful cooperation – i.e. regional cooperation not by force and military means. During the presidency of the RK the SCO had completed the formation of three-level mechanism for cooperation on the fight against the drug menace. Kazakhstan has made a significant contribution to the development of anti-drug strategy of the SCO member states for 2011-2016. It was during the presidency of Kazakhstan that a protocol of understanding between the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) and the Central Asian Information and Coordination Centre for combating illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances was signed [25]. For Kazakhstan the fact is important that the interaction within the SCO is in line with the country's geopolitical and strategic plans. SCO's activities contributed to the integration of China into the structure of regional cooperation; because of this Kazakhstan received securi-



ty guarantees including the non-use of nuclear weapons by signing a number of strategic agreements with China. The presence of the two regional powers (China and Russia) in the SCO objectively harmonize their interests and influence, especially in trade, economic, military, and political spheres. In sum, interaction within the SCO is of practical interest for Kazakhstan in terms of encouraging regional integration, fighting traditional and new threats and challenges, pursuing its economic policy, ensuring energy security, and solving the situation in Afghanistan. Further boosts to the SCO's activities will help to further pursue Kazakhstan's foreign policy.

The mechanisms of economic integration are realized through the activities of the regional association as the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC). Kazakhstan plays a significant role in the promotion of interstate economic cooperation and actively participates in the activities of this organization. Being the successor of the Customs Union, the EAEC offers a structured decision-making system, aimed at the promotion of the formation of the States Parties of the Common Economic Space [26]. EAEC constitutes an international economic organization established for the effective promotion of its members of the formation of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space as well as other goals and tasks associated with the deepening of integration in economic and humanitarian fields. Over the past three years the participating countries including Kazakhstan actively moved towards integration. Thus, since January 01, 2010, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan established a unified customs space on their territories. On July 06, 2010, the Customs Code throughout the territory of the Customs Union came into force: From July 01, 2011, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus abolished customs and moved custom control to the outer contour of the borders of the Customs Union. Currently, the main Eurasian integrators systematically form the next stage of integration – the Eurasian Economic Union, which is to be created by 2015 [27]. In this regard President N. Nazarbayev proposed on October 24, 2013, at the Summit of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council to dissolve the Eurasian Economic Community and to focus efforts on the Customs Union because the Eurasian Economic Community duplicates the Eurasian Economic Union [28].

## **4 THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA: CONDITIONS, PROBLEMS, AND PERSPECTIVES**

### **4.1 The Establishment and Development of the Diplomatic Relations of Kazakhstan with Central Asian Countries**

The Central Asian governments take a key interest in the foreign policy strategy of Kazakhstan. Although in the external economic terms the Central Asian countries do not play the role for Kazakhstan, which is played by Russia, China, the EU countries, or the USA, potentially they are able to play a more significant role. This is due to the obvious factor of



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geographical proximity of Central Asian countries and therefore the interdependence of their transport and communications, the water and energy sectors, and the similarity of a whole sector of foreign policy, and economic challenges of these countries. The bilateral cooperation between the Central Asian countries plays a significant role on the regional level. In this regard, the Kazakh government aims to resolve all controversial issues and strengthens the bilateral relations with its neighbors in the region. It should be noted that to the present all border issues in the relations between Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian republics have been successfully resolved. The issues of security, transportation and transit, hydro-power as well as investment, financial, and commercial activities have been regulated in the wide spectrum of bilateral policies, which are described in the following.

Kazakh-Kyrgyz relations: Diplomatic relations between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic were established in October 15, 1992. The legal base of bilateral cooperation makes up more than 150 documents – the main of which are the Treaty of Eternal Friendship in April 08, 1997 and the Treaty on Allied Relations in December 25, 2003. Interstate relations between the two republics are developing in a spirit of strategic partnership on the basis of good-neighborhood and equality. The bilateral contacts are supported by visits on the highest political level in the meetings of the Kazakh-Kyrgyz Intergovernmental Council, which was created for the economic, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation as well as the joint Investment Fund with a budget of \$ 100 million \$.

Kazakhstan is one of the leading trading partners of Kyrgyzstan. The volume of bilateral trade in January-May 2013 was 357,9 million \$ (2012: 1,1 billion \$, 2011: 750,3 million \$). Kazakhstan exports to the Kyrgyz Republic petroleum products, non-ferrous metals, machinery and metal, uranium-containing raw materials, hard wheat varieties. Kyrgyzstan exports electricity, electric motors, light bulbs, raw materials for the light industry and the food processing industry, agricultural products, animal husbandry to the Republic of Kazakhstan [29]. More than 400 joint enterprises such as in the energy sector, gas transmission industry, general industry, construction materials, and in the banking sectors are operating in Kyrgyzstan. As for Kazakhstan more than 250 enterprises are working with the support of the Kyrgyz investment in such areas as trade, tourism, construction, water purification and distribution, transportation, and advertising [30]. An important indicator in the Kazakh-Kyrgyz relationships is the support and assistance to Kyrgyzstan in difficult social and economic circumstances. For example, during the coup in Kyrgyzstan (April 07, 2010) and in further ethnic clashes Kazakhstan has played a significant role in stabilizing the situation in Kyrgyzstan as a Chairman of the OSCE and as a fraternal republic. In order to settle the situation, to return into the legal field and for the prevention of war, Kazakhstan has supported a departure of the President K. Bakiev from the Kyrgyz Republic. In addition, due to the political crisis and ethnic conflict held in the South of Kyrgyzstan the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan had rendered a humanitarian aid to the victims which made up 11,6 million \$, which helped to stabilize the situation and reduce the intensity of tension in the country [31]. In general, the



cooperation between the Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan is developing relatively fast, although there are a number of bilateral problems mainly in economic issues but as well as in particular, the most urgent topics for Kyrgyzstan are the transit of transportation, water and energy problems, and the resolution of the issue of labor migration. On the other hand Kazakhstan is interested to solve the issues of ownership in the Kyrgyz Republic, the debts of number enterprises, etc. In general, these issues are discussed regularly and do not overshadow the relatively close relationship between the two countries. Seen in terms of the volume of investments in the economy of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan is one of the first investors among the foreign partners of Kyrgyzstan and Astana supports Kyrgyzstan in the issues relating to the entry into the Customs Union. Creation of the Kazakh-Kyrgyz Investment Fund offers a promising perspective for the implementation of new joint projects. The most promising areas are in issues like trade, hydropower, industrial cooperation, transport and communications, processing and supply of agricultural products, and tourism.

**Kazakh-Tajik relations:** Diplomatic relations between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of Tajikistan were established in January 07, 1993. The bilateral cooperation is developing in the spirit of mutual friendship and good neighborliness, its legal basis is based on more than 75 documents from 1993 onward [32]. The bilateral trade between Kazakhstan and Tajikistan from January to May 2013 amounted to 223,3 million \$ (2012: 604,8 million \$, 2011: 405,2 million \$), with exports of 536,5 million \$ (2011: 357,4 million \$) and imports of 68,2 million \$ (2011: 47,8 million \$) [31]. The range of goods exported to Tajikistan include herbal products and livestock, chemicals, timber, mineral products, and manufactured goods. Tajik exports are mainly textile products, metals and metal products, herbal products, and food. The bilateral cooperation includes the strengthening of military-technical cooperation and in particular safeguarding the security in Central Asia after the withdrawal of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2014, which is a very urgent topic for both countries. The most important part of the intraregional cooperation is the construction and operation of hydropower plants and dams in the upper reaches of major rivers. The “upper” states – Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – consider water as their national strategic resource and seek to treat this issue as an economic one; the “lower” states – Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – are convinced of the artificiality of this approach and fear for the stability of the water flow. However, Kazakhstan is sympathetic to the difficulties experienced by Tajikistan and is therefore ready to engage in projects for construction of hydroelectric power stations; but also it seeks common understanding in these matters with Uzbekistan, which is certainly important to the success of such initiatives. In addition, Astana is offering follow-up activities in the water and energy issue to the partners in Central Asia in respecting the peculiarities of each country.

**Kazakh-Turkmen relations:** Diplomatic relations between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan were established in October 05, 1992. The legal base of bilateral cooperation consists of 65 documents, fundamental of these is the Treaty on Friendly Relations and Cooperation from



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May 19, 1993. The political dialogue between two countries can be defined as always constructive; there is no controversy on the main issues of bilateral relations and international politics. The history of relations between the two countries did not show any trouble spots; Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are completely neutral to each other and relations between the countries are characterized by passivity. When G. Berdymukhamedov became President of Turkmenistan, relations between two countries intensified significantly. In May 2007 the Turkmen leader made the first state visit to Kazakhstan, in December 2009 there was a working visit of the President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev to Turkmenistan, where the gas pipeline “Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China” was put into service. In May 10-11, 2013, the President of Turkmenistan visited Kazakhstan; during this meeting the Turkmen-Kazakh section of the transnational railway “North-South” (railway Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran) was discussed. This rail link opens new possibilities for the development of the Caspian region, including the expansion of the transport, industrial, and social infrastructure. Trade and economic cooperation between the two countries has been developing steadily although Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have much greater potential to increase bilateral trade. An important mechanism is contributing to the development of Kazakh-Turkmen cooperation in trade and economic sphere is the bilateral Intergovernmental Commission on economic cooperation. Currently, the volume of the bilateral trade is growing. From January to May 2013 it amounted to 223,4 million \$ (2012: 344,6 million \$, 2011: 182,9 million \$) with export figures of 63,9 million \$ (2012: 165,6 million \$, 2011: 116,2 million \$) and import figures of 159,6 million \$ (2012: 179,0 million \$, 2011: 66,7 million \$). Kazakhstan exports are mainly vegetables, tobacco, flour, and chemical products; its imports are mainly oil, cotton and textile products, natural gas (transit), liquid pumps, construction materials, and mineral and chemical products [33]. It should be noted that cooperation in the energy sector is one of the main trends in the Kazakh-Turkmen cooperation. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are interested in exporting energy resources to foreign markets – for example, Astana is interested in Kazakhstan’s oil export in a Southerly direction towards the Persian Gulf. In turn, the territory of Kazakhstan is a transit country to transport Turkmen natural gas to the North – that is to Russia and beyond to Europe. In general, it should be noted that the cooperation between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan shows a positive tendency. Kazakh-Turkmen relations are shaped by mutual economic interest and the interest in expanding the geography of transport routes. It is clear that both countries are interested in the harmonization of energy policies – primarily related to export gas to foreign markets.

**Kazakh-Uzbek relations:** Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan established diplomatic relations in November 23, 1992. 114 documents have now been signed between the two counties – the base of which is the Treaty of Eternal Friendship. At present 173 Uzbek enterprises are working due to the participation of Kazakh capital – including 48 joint ventures that operate in areas such as trade, construction, food processing, machinery and light industry, and metal. Kazakhstan exports grain, food, energy, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, and chemical prod-