WARSAW STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORY 1

Maciej Górny

The Nation Should Come First

Marxism and Historiography in East Central Europe



PETER LANG EDITION

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IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORY
Edited by Dariusz Stola / Machteld Venken

VOLUME 1

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List of Abbreviations

AK – Armia Krajowa (Home Army)
BUW – Biblioteka Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego (Warsaw University Library)
CISH – Comité International des Sciences Historiques
CPSU – Communist Party of the Soviet Union
ČAVU – Česká Akadémie Věd a Umění (Czech Academy for Sciences and Arts)
ČČH – *Český Časopis Historický*
ČMM – *Časopis Matice Moravské*
ČSAV – Československá Akademie Věd (Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences)
ČSHS – Československá Historická Společnost (Czechoslovak Historical Society)
DAW – Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften (German Academy of Sciences)
DHG – Deutsche Historiker-Gesellschaft (German Historians' Society)
DN – *Dzieje Najnowsze*
FRG – Federal Republic of Germany
GDR – German Democratic Republic
GLP – Gromady Ludu Polskiego (Communes of the Polish People)
GOSR – Great October Socialist Revolution
GWU – *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*
HČSAV – *Historický Časopis Slovenskej Akademii Vied*
HZ – *Historische Zeitschrift*
JfGO – *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*
KH – *Kwartalnik Historyczny*
KPD – Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of Germany)
KSČ – Komunistická Strana Československa (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia)
NKVD – Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs
NSDAP – Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei
NSZ – Narodowe Siły Zbrojne (National Armed Forces)
PAN – Polska Akademia Nauk (Polish Academy of Sciences)
PH – *Przegląd Historyczny*
PPR – Polska Partia Robotnicza (Polish Workers' Party)
PPS – Polska Partia Socjalistyczna (Polish Socialist Party)

PRL – Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa (People's Republic of Poland)
PTH – Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne (Polish Historical Society)
PZPR – Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (Polish United Workers' Party)
SAV – Slovenská Akadémie Vied (Slovak Academy of Sciences)
SAVU – Slovenská Akademia Vied a Umeni
SD – *Soudobé Dějiny*
SED – Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany)
SHS – Slovenská Historická Spoločnost (Slovak Historical Society)
SNP – Slovenské Národné Povstanie (Slovak National Uprising)
U.S. – United States (of America)
TDP – Towarzystwo Demokratyczne Polskie (Polish Democratic Society)
VHD – Verband der Historiker Deutschlands (Association of Germany's Historians)
VŠPHV – Vysoká škola politických a hospodářských věd (School of Politics and Economy)
ZfG – *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*
ZfO – *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung*
ZfO-F – *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung*

Introduction
Writing Comparative Histories of Historiography

In her recently published, brilliant book about Romantic-era historiographies of Central and Eastern Europe, the Hungarian historian Monika Baár comes to the conclusion that the presumed differences between these historiographies and their supposed detachment from dominant Western European historiographies were not as compelling as had been heretofore believed. Similarities are so frequent, and so deeply ingrained, that "on closer inspection the historical narrative reveals the existence of a general template of national historiography in our era, which comprised a core story and numerous omnipresent tropes."[1] Not only do national historiographies share similar narrative patterns – they also relate to the same myths and images. For example, one of the things they share is the belief in the uniqueness of their own story.

Romantic-era historiography, which in Central and Eastern Europe is associated with founding father figures or innovators who reframed the task of the historian, shaped our ways of thinking about the past. In time, Romantic narratives came to be criticised and opposed, but the voices rejecting the domination of national historiography by the Romantic idea can often be seen singing the same tune. While taking positions similar to the ones chosen by Romantic historians, the critics also employed similar arguments. At first, Marxism served as an inspiration for a research attitude opposed to the early 19th century modes of historical thinking. Since the late 19th century, it has inspired social scientists. Its influence in Central and Eastern Europe peaked in the 1960s. Polish and Hungarian historians especially enjoyed success in using their methodological backgrounds and local competencies in cooperative work with the foremost scholars of France or the United States. In general, the encouraging climate for comparative research in economic and social history of the region and beyond contributed to what may have been the most productive period in the modern history of Polish and Hungarian historiography. The more austere regimes in other Eastern bloc countries – such as the GDR or Czechoslovakia –

1 Monika Baár, *Historians and Nationalism: East-Central Europe in the Nineteenth Century*, Oxford 2010, 295.

made similar development decidedly harder to achieve, but even there one could find scholars who combined Marxist thought with an interest in comparative history and international cooperation.

Before this Marxism-inspired intellectual ferment began, each Eastern bloc country went through a more or less prolonged period of forcible, swift Sovietisation. Marxism ceased to be just one of the many options that could be embraced in one's methodology or worldview. Reframed as Marxism-Leninism, or historical materialism, it became the publicly endorsed doctrine that defined the boundaries of history, as well as science. This book discusses four Marxist-Leninist historiographies in three real-socialist countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia and the GDR. My attention will focus on the way these historiographies dealt with the tradition of national historiography. Approaching revolutionary manifestos and projected institutional or methodological changes with caution, I inquire how Czech, Slovak, Polish and East-German self-declared Marxist historians approached dominant national discourses about the past. To what lengths were they prepared to go in reinterpreting the Romantic framework in a Marxist vein (as described by Monika Baár)? And if the two were irreconcilable, were historians ready to leave tradition behind or subordinate Marxist terminology and a materialist philosophy of history to a traditional way of thinking about the past?

There is, then, at least one reason why a comparative analysis suits Marxist historiographies better than historiographies of the early 19th century. Here, the similarities are not limited to traits generally common to all Western historiographies. The correspondences, perhaps enforced, but nonetheless, real, also grew out of the region's existing political situation and the imposition of a singular methodology. This makes the dearth of actual comparative research on the Communist era even more unusual. The "singularity" of the GDR's historical narrative, which Matthias Middell observed at the turn of the millennium, often proves to have been made up of elements common to history writing in other Eastern Bloc countries as well.[2]

This attempt to partially fill the gap is based on a set of straightforward assumptions. Two of them seem to be of key importance in the context of my research. At the same time, they rather pointedly illustrate the problems faced by comparative history, bound up as they are with a specific practical example.

First, the comparison in question must not fail to take account of mutual influences, the interactions between different historiographies, as well as the influence of Soviet historiography on East Central European historians. Otherwise

2 Matthias Middell, "Kulturtransfer und Historische Komparatistik – Thesen zu ihrem Verhältnis," *Comparativ* 10 (2000), 1, 30.

the image resulting from the comparison would amount to nothing more than a schematic juxtaposition. According to Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, this is one of the major dangers of comparative study. However, it can be averted if the comparative study is informed by knowledge gained from the study of cultural transfers. Werner and Zimmermann propose a *histoire croisée*, which „breaks with a one-dimensional perspective that simplifies and homogenizes, in favour of a multidimensional approach that acknowledges plurality and the complex configurations that result from it. Accordingly, entities and objects of research are not merely considered in relation to one another but also *through* one another, in terms of relationship, interactions and circulation."[3] In relation to Marxist historiographies discussed in this book, this translates into the necessity not only to take mutual influences into account, but also to reflect on the relationships between these countries and other states beyond East Central Europe. The image of Slovak historiography – whether Marxist or not – is never complete if it does not reflect on its relationship to the work of Hungarian historians. A similar focus is necessary when studying the works from GDR historians, whose attitude toward West German historians and historical narratives is particularly relevant to the study of East German historiography. As I also believe, it is important to note that no transfer of ideology or interpretative framework culminates in a state of total domination or the formation of one historiography by another. This observation is particularly useful when considering the relationships between any one of the Eastern bloc historiographies and Soviet historical sciences. Even if one could never treat them as equal, to describe any one of these relationships in terms of unilateral domination would be fundamentally inaccurate. Middell's idea of comparative history moving from bilateral toward multilateral perspectives finds an apt illustration in the comparative study of Marxist-Leninist historiographies.[4] By juxtaposing two examples "cleansed" of non-bilateral influences, not only would we produce a distorted image, we would also make it more difficult to develop a proper reading of the complex processes behind the adoption of intellectual currents, ideologies or even systems of science.

Second, I believe that a comparison should not be "rigid," i.e., limited to an analysis of the way each historiography treats a specific, narrowly defined topic. Already in its heroic period during the early 19th century, historiography was both an inspiration for the study of problems faced by the community and a source of answers to such problems – concerning questions of the community's genealogy, its rightful territory, or characteristics of its collective psychology.

3 Michael Werner, Bénédicte Zimmermann, "Beyond Comparison: Histoire croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity," *History and Theory* 45 (2006), 38.

4 Middell, "Kulturtransfer," 39-40.

At the same time, historians gave substance to the fundamental myths undergirding these communities. As a rule, they aimed to make their compatriots happy rather than forcing them to critically rethink their own positions or self-evaluations. If we focus on the themes that recur throughout different national cultures, the myths that tell the same old story with the support of different details, then chronological turning points will prove to be of secondary importance. Instead of rigidly comparing Marxist interpretations of specific epochs, I begin my analysis by examining the role particular historical phenomena played in the collective memory as well as in the historiography of a given nation, which is important because historiography comprises both a part of that memory and a medium for its dissemination. I believe that this kind of functional comparison can yield many positive results, even if it often leads one to connect ostensibly unrelated facts. The reader of this book will easily notice that this functional comparison is used, for instance, to set the Czech and Slovak national revival against the Polish uprisings. The Medieval expansion of East German feudal lords or the battle of the Teutoburg Forest, that pitted Germanic barbarian tribes against the Roman legions, are seen simply as different examples of the same historiographical narrative. Looking for instances of social revolt against growing feudal oppression, Marxists from different countries of the Eastern bloc traversed national histories with apparent ease, building analogies between events as far apart as the Great Peasant Revolt and the activities of the Carpathian robbers. Such unusual juxtapositions grow out of Thomas Welskopp's Max Weber-inspired idea of fashioning comparative models that can prove useful in describing different circumstances.[5] The goal is not to come up with a universal schema, but rather – as Welskopp and Weber claim – to lend substance to an idea of how things would have developed had history taken a different route. A comparative study produces data about *potential* possibilities of historical development, which, while speculative, are still more realistic than pure speculation.

The history of historiography in general, and particularly the history of Marxist historiography, can benefit greatly from this kind of comparative study, or *histoire croisée*, and not only because new facts might be uncovered, relations between different countries highlighted, and mutual inspirations and borrowings underlined. In my opinion, however, the greatest premium which this kind of approach can provide us is the rare chance to take temporary leave of our own backyard and look at it from the outside, through the eyes of another. In this

5 Thomas Welskopp, "Stolpersteine auf dem Königsweg. Methodenkritische Anmerkungen zum internationalen Vergleich in der Gesellschaftsgeschichte," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 35 (1995), 365-367.

light, what once was considered exceptional often proves extremely typical and schematic, that which seemed dangerously pathological becomes the grim norm, and that which looked quite obvious seems suddenly inexplicable. The comparative approach is therefore useful outside of comparative studies as well. Some of its tools appear to be indispensable if we are to advance any reliable historical claims that go beyond stating obvious facts.

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The circle of people to whom I owe a debt of gratitude for the help and inspiration they offered during my work on this book is very broad and continues to expand. To all those whom I thanked in the Polish (2007) and German (2011) editions, I would like to add the employees of my home institution, the Institute of History at the Polish Academy of Sciences, without whose aid this considerable undertaking would not have gained the necessary financial support. The translator, editor and publisher know how highly I value their involvement in our common work. Finally, at the risk of sounding ingratiating, I would like to thank the quite sizeable group of reviewers of previous editions of my book. The differences between the successive editions are to a significant extent due to their critical observations.

Chapter I
Method

One of the most intriguing characteristics of the history of Marxist historiography in the last twenty years is its separation from the agenda of a "general" history of historiography. It is, on the one hand, a somewhat-"natural" side effect of the largely unchallenged position that the year 1945 is a turning point in recent history. But it is also, on the other hand, a reflex of post-1989 historical and political debates which spread their influence over historical science. Polish, Slovak, Czech, and German authors decisively distinguish between the historiography of the 19th century and that of the interwar period on the one side, and postwar Marxist-Leninist historical science on the other. Attempts at unifying both periods are rare and, even if they meet in the same book, the qualitative difference between them is emphatically marked. One of the most frequent oppositions discussed after 1989 was embodied in the contrast: "continuity or discontinuity." Whereas the answer seems to be more than obvious: Marxism of the Soviet type has nothing to do with "normal" historiography. It was an attempt – to use the formulation of Polish historian of science Piotr Hübner – to decapitate the intellectual elite.[6]

This post-1989 narrative identifies Marxist methodology as a part of an external attempt to subordinate and control the historians' milieu. As soon as the deepest incursions of Stalinism had abated, historians were able to go back to their previous ideals, running their business more or less as usual.[7] Even when – as happened after 1968 in Czechoslovakia – there was a backlash of a strong dictatorship and a revitalisation of Stalinist narratives, the dichotomised picture remains dominant: a clear division between historians on one side and Communist party functionaries on the other.[8]

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6 Piotr Hübner, "Stalinowskie 'czystki' w nauce polskiej," in: *Skryte oblicze systemu komunistycznego. U źródeł zła*, ed. Roman Bäcker & Piotr Hübner, Warszawa 1997, 220.

7 See Maciej Górny, "'Przełom metodologiczny' na łamach 'Przeglądu Historycznego' na tle wybranych czasopism historycznych w Europie Środkowowschodniej," *Przegląd Historyczny* 2006/1, 39-48.

8 See Michal Kopeček, "In search of 'national memory.' The politics of history, nostalgia and the historiography of communism in the Czech Republic and East Central Europe,"

The notion of discontinuity, as it is being used in the post-1989 history of historiography, refers not only to the scientific policy of Communist regimes, but also to dominant historical narratives. As Rafał Stobiecki puts it, Marxists – rather unwittingly – destroyed elemental social ties of historical continuity linking state and nation.[9] The East Central European Marxism of the 1950s was thus clearly perceived as a gap in the development of historical science. In the historical debates that arose immediately after the collapse of Communism in East Central Europe, the notion of "white spots" (among others) was intended to represent the difference between 'Communist' historiography and the new, truly scientific, non-ideological historical science. The debates submitted to the logic of the totalitarian paradigm. Whereas Polish historians discussed the status of the People's Republic of Poland (Polska, Rzeczpospolita Ludowa, PRL), describing it variously as a case of Soviet occupation or limited independence, of a totalitarian or authoritarian regime etc.;[10] in Czechoslovakia the Communist regime was declared unlawful and criminal; the thematic rupture, coupled with an increased interest in the history of political resistance and dissent, automatically brought on criticism of pre-1989 historiography.[11] One of the interesting effects of this process was a sudden popularity of source literature, epitomising the "historical truth."

To historians of historiography, the events of 1989 brought open access to archives, including the archives of the Communist party. It allowed them to study issues such as the balance of power in historical institutions, ways in which authorities influenced historians, personal connections, interdependences and conflicts, which were previously more or less known, but had no available evidentiary support in the documentary record. These new possibilities aroused an immense interest in the history of historiography in 1990s, especially in Germany. Dozens of historians (most prominently Konrad Jarausch, Matthias

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in: *Past in the making. Historical revisionism in Central Europe after 1989*, ed. Michal Kopeček, Budapest 2008, 78-80.

9 Rafał Stobiecki, *Historia pod nadzorem. Spory o nowy model historii w Polsce (II połowa lat czterdziestych – początek lat pięćdziesiątych, Łódź* 1993, 182. See also his article, "Between Continuity and Discontinuity: A Few Comments on the Post-War Development of Polish Historical Research," *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung* 2001/2, 214-229.

10 The 1990s public debate over the nature of the Communist regime in Poland is analysed by Anna Magierska, *Dylematy historii PRL*, Warszawa 1995. For an international perspective, consult *Obrachunki z historią*, ed. Włodzimierz Borodziej, Warszawa 1997.

11 For the post-1989 East Central European debates on the legacy of Communism, consult the collective volume: *Narratives unbound. Historical studies in post-communist Eastern Europe*, eds. Sorin Antohi, Balázs Trencsényi, Péter Apor, Budapest 2007.

Middell and Martin Sabrow) agreed concerning the end of these political debates: "To escape from the vicious circle of mutual accusations and egoistic self-admiration, we need to critically historicise GDR historiography."[12] From this perspective, new research should focus on a comparison between East German and other historiographies of the East Bloc as well as historical science in Nazi Germany.

This approach became a wholeheartedly embraced practice in Poland, in the Czech Republic, and in Slovakia. Polish works devoted to this aspect of history focus on such phenomena as the conference in Otwock (1951-52, planned as an official imposition of Marxism on Polish historiography), the Party-governed colleges, or the Institute of History at the Polish Academy of Sciences (founded in 1953 under Marxist auspices). Research on Czechoslovak historiography develops more or less along the same lines. The turning points in this case are: the last democratic congress of Czech historians in 1947, the purges accompanying the Communist takeover in 1948, and institutional changes concomitant with the persecution of professors and students. German and Polish historians were the first to analyse the impact of political censorship on historical writings.[13] The main research question for all the scholars in this field is whether continuity was maintained in historical sciences, or if Stalinism did cause a personnel and institutional break.

The *Verwissenschaftlichung* (which in this context means "professionalisation") of research on GDR historiography became the topic of a special issue of *Historische Zeitschrift* in 1998.[14] Some of the texts it includes may be treated as research suggestions for the near future (and in fact Czech

12 Konrad Jarausch & Matthias Middel, "Einleitung. Die DDR als Geschichte: Verurteilung, Nostalgie oder Historisierung?," in: *Nach dem Erdbeben. (Re-)Konstruktion ostdeutscher Geschichte und Geschichtswissenschaft*, eds. Konrad Jarausch & Matthias Middel, Leipzig 1994.

13 Zbigniew Romek, "Cenzura w PRL a historiografia – pytania i problemy badawcze," in: *Metodologiczne problemy syntezy historii historiografii polskiej*, ed. Jerzy Maternicki, Rzeszów 1998; *Cenzura w PRL – relacje historyków*, ed. Zbigniew Romek, Warszawa 2000; idem, *Cenzura a nauka historyczna w Polsce 1944-1970*, Warszawa 2010; Siegfried Lokatis, "Die Zensur historischer Literatur in der DDR unter Ulbricht," in: *Die DDR-Geschichtswissenschaft als Forschungsproblem*, eds. Georg Iggers, Konrad Jarausch, Matthias Middel & Martin Sabrow, München 1998; idem, "Die Zensur historischer Literatur in der DDR," in: *Geschichte als Argument. 41. Deutscher Historikertag in München 17. bis 20. September 1996. Berichtband*, eds. Stefan Weinfurter & Frank Siefarth, München 1997.

14 *Die DDR-Geschichtswissenschaft als Forschungsproblem*...

scholar Martin Nodl adopted a majority of them to Czech historiography).[15] These were, to name but a few: relations between East German historians and their ideological opponents from the Bundesrepublik,[16] opposition to and collaboration with the authorities, and relations between power and historical science, or censorship. The same topics are discussed at least to an extent in Polish, Czech and Slovak historical works.

The same *Sonderheft* included a text by Frank Hadler and Georg Iggers, discussing the possibility of a comparative analysis of various Communist historiographies.[17] John Connelly's analysis of Polish, Czechoslovak and East German universities under Stalinisation is without a doubt a prominent example of the advantages offered by such an approach.[18]

The first appeals for the use of postmodernism in research on Marxist historiography were made in Germany. In the aforementioned special issue of *Historische Zeitschrift* from 1998, Konrad Jarausch proposed postmodernism as a tool for interpreting East German historical science.[19] In 2000, during a congress of German historians in Aachen, the issue was debated by Jarausch, Matthias Middell and Martin Sabrow, among others.[20] Their postulates were almost immediately – at least in a formal sense – put into practice, with contemporary German authors analysing the *Meistererzählung* (master

15 Martin Nodl, "Možné přístupy ke studiu dějin české historické vědy v letech 1945-2000," *Soudobé Dějiny* 2001.

16 Martin Sabrow, "Die Geschichtswissenschaft der DDR und ihr 'objektiver Gegner'"; Rainer Eckert, "Die Westbeziehungen der Historiker im Auge der Staatssicherheit"; Wolfgang Mommsen, "Die DDR-Geschichtsschreibung aus westdeutscher Perspektive," all in: *Die DDR-Geschichtswissenschaft als Forschungsproblem….*

17 Frank Hadler & Georg Iggers, "Überlegungen zum Vergleich der DDR-Geschichtswissenschaft mit den 'gespaltenen' Historiographien Ostmitteleuropas nach 1945," in: *Die DDR-Geschichtswissenschaft als Forschungsproblem…*

18 John Connelly, *Captive University. The Sovietisation of East German, Czech and Polish Higher Education 1945-1956*, Chapel Hill – London 2000.

19 Konrad Jarausch, "Historische Texte der DDR aus der Perspektive des linguistic turn," in: *Die DDR-Geschichtswissenschaft als Forschungsproblem....*

20 Konrad Jarausch & Martin Sabrow, "Das Konzept der 'historischen Meistererzählung' als Maßstab eines deutsch-deutsches Historiographievergleichs," in: *43. Deutscher Historikertag Aachen 2000. Skriptheft 2 Eine Welt – eine Geschichte?,* eds. Max Kerner, Peter Droste, Angelika Ivens & Cornelia Kompe, Aachen 2000; Matthias Middel, "Historische Meistererzählung und Institutionalisierung in der Geschichtswissenschaft," in: ibidem; Martin Sabrow, "Bauformen einer erneuerten nationalen Meistererzählung in der DDR: das Lehrbuch der deutschen Geschichte," in: ibidem.

narrative) and the *Herrschaftsdiskurs* (discourse of power) within the GDR.[21] The best practical example of the advantages and disadvantages of this method is Martin Sabrow's book *Das Diktat des Konsenses. Geschichtswissenschaft in der DDR 1949-1969*.[22] It is based on broad archival research and describes not only various aspects of party dictate, but also the initiatives of historical circles. Sabrow analyses (in a very detailed, but somewhat tiring manner) mechanisms for the creation of rules in GDR historical discourse. The image he comes up with is much more complicated than a one-way model of the subordination of science to politics. Sabrow points to the moments when historians themselves disciplined their colleagues, creating an efficient system of self-control and thus reducing the need for direct political intervention. But, surprisingly, Sabrow devotes relatively little attention to a seemingly vital problem – the analysis of historical narratives, rhetoric, style or strategies of argumentation. Thus, his analysis is not a deconstruction of the content of GDR historiography but a description of historical sciences in the GDR. Because of this, one might wonder whether postmodernist notions are truly useful in this type of analysis. Nevertheless, Sabrow's influence on later international research cannot be denied. In some cases – as in the recent monograph of Slovak Marxist historiography by Adam Hudek – the outcome may be a well-balanced mix of institutional and textual analysis.[23]

Sabrow's interesting attempt has one more feature that seems characteristic of the new type of German research into the history of science in the GDR. The question whether or not East Germany was a totalitarian state hinges upon the issue of research professionalisation. German authors generally relate to contemporary definitions of totalitarianism, concluding that none of them fully describes the GDR: the dictatorship of the Communist Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED) was seriously limited, *ergo*, the GDR could not have been a totalitarian state. This explains why John Connelly's claims concerning the Sovietisation of Central European universities met with a rather cold response in Germany.[24] Instead of referring to abstract models, Connelly compared the reality of scholarly work in the GDR to the situation of

21 See *Die historische Meistererzählung. Deutungslinien der deutschen Nationalgeschichte nach 1945*, eds. Konrad Jarausch & Martin Sabrow, Göttingen 2002 (herein especially: Martin Sabrow, "Auf der Suche nach dem marxistischen Meisterton. Bauformen einer nationalen Gegenerzählung in der DDR").

22 Martin Sabrow, *Das Diktat des Konsenses. Geschichtswissenschaft in der DDR 1949-1969*, München 2001.

23 Adam Hudek, *Najpolitickejšia veda. Slovenská historiografia v rokoch 1948-1968,* Bratislava 2010.

24 See Konrad Jarausch's review in *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung* 2002/2.

scholarship under Polish and Czechoslovak Stalinism. Such a comparison inevitably leads to the conclusion that, even if none of these countries was actually totalitarian, East Germany came surely the closest to clear-cut totalitarianism.

In the programmatic article cited above, Konrad Jarausch opposed deconstructivism in the history of historiography to a simplified formula, within which Marxist historiography is analysed exclusively in its legitimising function. Jarausch noted that "The common critique of the instrumentalisation of historiography in the GDR leads to the tricky question: what to do with all those libraries full of East German intellectual heritage." Postmodern analyses are supposed to yield as broad an image of historiography as possible, and not be restricted only to one function of it (regardless of its importance). Nevertheless, despite all the conceptual differences, those two different approaches often lead to similar effects. Characteristically, a number of recent works on the historical legitimisation of political power in East Central Europe show a solid background in theories of sociology, visibly exceeding the typical level of engagement with sociological theory for each of the respective historiographies.[25] Although historiography is not always accorded a central position (for instance, by Marcin Zaremba), it is always referred to as an important legitimising tool. In most cases, however, historians dealing with the process of legitimisation through historiography look at the problem from the perspective of rulers and their need for history (or their fear of history) rather than considering historiography as a science or art with its own tradition. Furthermore, the period researched (whether it is a Communist or Nazi dictatorship) is often treated in isolation from the rest of national history, as an abnormality contrasting with the supposedly "normal" before and after.[26] All this leads back to the simplified ascriptions of totalitarianism. The paradox is even more striking if we consider that those works commonly conclude that Communists eagerly borrowed nationalist ideas – in other words, that they borrowed a lot from their predecessors.

Opposition towards the tendency to treat Marxist historiography, or, more generally, the culture of the Communist period, in isolation may have different reasons behind it. According to Jarausch and Sabrow, Marxist historical science should not be compared to "normal" historiographies of the democratic, liberal West. They believe that the research on historiography in the GDR should be conducted without reference to what was happening simultaneously in the

25 Marcin Zaremba, *Komunizm, legitymizacja, nacjonalizm. Nacjonalistyczna legitymizacja władzy komunistycznej w Polsce*, Warszawa 2001; Michal Kopeček, "Ve službách dějin, ve jménu národa. Historie jako součást legitimizace komunistických režimů ve střední Evropě v letech 1948-1950," *Soudobé Dějiny* 2001/1.

26 See Marcin Zaremba, *Komunizm, legitymizacja, nacjonalizm…,* 398.

Federal Republic of Germany.[27] Within this scheme, historiography is perceived as a part of the *Herrschaftsdiskurs*, but it is also a science, so East German historians should not be judged in the same way as journalists of *Neues Deutschland*. GDR historiography is supposed to be analysed only as an aspect of the SED's dictatorial rule.

Another German-American historian Georg Iggers seems to be of a different opinion. He questions sharp distinctions between historiography under dictatorial and democratic rule. In both cases, history serves non-scientific purposes. From this point of view, Marxist historians of the Eastern Bloc may stand in line with Michelet, Droysen or Palacký.[28] Iggers obviously believes that "objective historiography" is a purely normative term, but as Karl Popper said, historians may try to show *wie es eigentlich nicht gewesen*.[29]

The idea of supporting the treatment of the history of historiography as a continuous effort, without subjecting the 45 postwar years to exclusive treatment, seems very appealing. The works of John Connelly and others highlight the fascinating encounters between tradition and "Sovietisation," including the pressures applied and concessions made in view of creating a new compromise. To answer the question whether historical science maintained continuity during the era or not, we should refer not only to the dimension of personal or institutional politics; of equal importance are the questions whether Marxist historiographies follow in the footsteps of their bourgeois predecessors, and if so, how. The title of one of Sabrow's books, *Das Diktat des Konsenses*, could be used to describe relations not only between historians and authorities but also between Marxist historical narratives and the national traditions in Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia.

Assuming that a broader perspective on the analysis of Marxist historiographies is useful and needed, we should draw methodological inspiration from at least a small part of the history of "classic" historiography. In the process, we will probably notice that scholars researching 19th century historiography have already raised a number of questions that are still untouched

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27 Martin Sabrow, "Die DDR-Geschichtswissenschaft im Spiegel ihrer Gutachterpraxis," in: *Geschichte als Argument. 41. Deutscher Historikertag in München 17. bis 20. September 1996. Berichtband*, eds. Stefan Weinfurter & Frank Siefarth, München 1997, 198.

28 See *Proceedings Actes. 19th International Congress of Historical Sciences. University of Oslo 6-13 VIII 2000*, Oslo 2000, 87-88; *Die Mauern der Geschichte. Historiographie in Europa zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie*, eds. Gustavo Corni & Martin Sabrow, Leipzig 1996; idem, "Historiography in the 20th century," in: *The Misuse of History. Symposium on "Facing Misuses of History,"* Oslo 28-30 June 1999, Strasbourg 2000.

29 Idem, "Geschichtsschreibung und Politik im 20, Jahrhundert," in: *Die Mauern der Geschichte…*, 33.

or have only been addressed recently by historians of Marxist historiography. For instance, manipulations of historical memory were discussed in a well-known essay by Herbert Butterfield, *The Whig Interpretation of History*, published in 1931.[30] Links between past heroes and current political trends were characteristic of Marxist historiographies as well.

In mid-1950s, Butterfield postulated that historians should raise the heretofore neglected question of the impact of historical science on European nations over the previous 150 years.[31] This area was visited not only by Butterfield himself, but also by numerous other scholars. In East Central Europe, this question was researched as well, primarily by the most eminent representatives of the so-called Łódź school of the history of historiography: Marian Henryk Serejski and Andrzej Feliks Grabski. Both analysed various forms of historical thought, without restricting themselves to the so-called scientific discourse. Both also held historiography in high regard as a science concentrating on a broad complex of problems, including considerations of organisational structures, theoretical foundations and interpretations of the past.[32] According to Serejski and Grabski, a historian of historiography should be interested in both historical institutions and the content of historical books – a far from obvious statement for many contemporary historians dealing with the Communist period. This perspective not only accepts but demands an interest in everything that shapes popular historical knowledge.

Both postulates were fulfilled in detailed works by the two historians of the Łódź school. Where Serejski wrote about references to "nation" and "state" in Polish historical thought,[33] Grabski described phenomena occurring on the margins of professional historiography, such as the works of Franciszek Duchiński, the 19th century Polish-Ukrainian author of the theory of the Russians' non-Slavic origin, or of the political aspects of 19th century historical

30 Herbert Butterfield, *The Whig Interpretation of History*, London 1968 (reprint of the 1931 edition).

31 "An aspect of the history of historiography which has been somewhat neglected is the examination of the role which historical study and historical thinking played in the development of European nations during the last one hundred and fifty years" – Herbert Butterfield, *Man on His Past. The Study of the History of Historical Scholarship*, Cambridge 1955, 30.

32 Rafał Stobiecki, "Wprowadzenie," in: Andrzej F. Grabski, *Dzieje historiografii*, Poznań 2003, XIII.

33 Marian H. Serejski, *Naród a państwo w polskiej myśli historycznej*, Warszawa 1973; *Historycy o historii. Od Adama Naruszewicza do Stanisława Kętrzyńskiego 1775-1918*, ed. Marian H. Serejski, vol. I, Warszawa 1963, *Historycy o historii 1918-1939*, vol. II, Warszawa 1966.

competitions.[34] A similar approach can be found in the writings of other Polish authors, such as Andrzej Zahorski's or Andrzej Wierzbicki's works on 19th century historical culture.[35] The latter wrote a short book *Konstytucja 3 Maja w historiografii polskiej*, which is of particular interest for the present study.[36] Wierzbicki describes the 19th century debates on the 1791 Polish Constitution, but then moves on to a discussion of Marxist authors. Zahorski follows a similar pattern in his writings. Neither of the two authors introduces any division between the "normal" pre-1945 historiography and its "Stalinist" incarnation; by doing so, they achieve a clear and coherent narrative of specific intellectual debates.

The idea of a history of historiography as a broad panorama of concepts and events shaping an image of the past is surely not new. This kind of approach is familiar to the history of ideas and collective memory. With respect not only to the history of historical science, but also to the culture of Bohemia (including German Bohemian historiography) and Slovakia, it can be found in the brilliant work of synthesis by František Kutnar and Jaroslav Marek.[37] *The German conception of history*, one of the early books by Georg Iggers, offers a similar perspective.[38] Iggers applies ideas of German historicism to the German national awakening, especially the *Befreiungskriege*, which – according to him – played for Germany a role equivalent to that of the French revolution.[39] Josef Macůrek's book on East European historiographies since 1946, although devoted for the most part to professional science, deals with politics and culture, and may be perceived as a powerful and continuously appealing manifesto of

34 Andrzej F. Grabski, "Na manowcach myśli historycznej. Historiozofia Franciszka H. Duchińskiego," in: idem, *Perspektywy przeszłości. Studia i szkice historiograficzne*, Lublin 1983; idem, *Historiografia i polityka. Dzieje konkursu historycznego im. Juliana Ursyna Niemcewicza 1867-1922*, Warszawa 1979; idem *Kształty historii*, Łódź 1985; idem *W kręgu kultu Naczelnika. Rapperswilskie inicjatywy kościuszkowskie (1894-1897)*, Warszawa 1981.

35 See Andrzej Zahorski, *Spór o Stanisława Augusta*, Warszawa 1990 (2nd edition); Andrzej Wierzbicki, *Naród-państwo w polskiej myśli historycznej dwudziestolecia międzywojennego*, Wrocław 1978; idem, *Wschód-Zachód w koncepcjach dziejów Polski*, Warszawa 1984; idem, *Historiografia polska doby romantyzmu*, Wrocław 1999.

36 Andrzej Wierzbicki, *Konstytucja 3 Maja w historiografii polskiej*, Warszawa 1993.

37 František Kutnar & Jaroslav Marek*, Přehledné dějiny českého a slovenského dějepisectví. Od počátků národní kultury až do sklonku třicatých let 20. století,* Praha 1997 (2nd ed.).

38 Georg G. Iggers, *The German Conception of History. The National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present*, Middletown 1968.

39 Ibidem, 7.

European cultural unity.[40] Macůrek strongly opposed submitting European historiography to geopolitical divisions: it is singular and should be treated as such. In addition, such a division would be very problematic for Macůrek himself, as his book on Eastern European historiography does not discuss either Czech or Slovak historiographies. Should they be placed in the West, or did Macůrek perceive them as being somewhere in-between the two poles?

There seems to be enough evidence not to doubt the usefulness of the research frames of older historiography for the analysis of East Central European Marxist historiographies. On the contrary: they may help to develop a complex picture including not only institutions and the scientific policy of party and state, but also all the interconnections between historiography and historical tradition, the imaginings of the national past, the history of ideas and collective memory, and, finally, historical myths.

In 1986, Jerzy Jedlicki formulated the idea that "Nations which in their history experienced (and still experience) mostly failures and humiliation and which still share the same feeling of unfulfilled individual and group aspirations, those nations search in their history not so much for learning, but for compensation."[41] It is worth mentioning that in other conditions the same "creative" attitude towards history may be found also among those who win, as was the case with the aforementioned Whigs. Already in the Middle Ages, the imagined ethnogenesis of European nations was based on myths that proved surprisingly durable. The 19th and 20th century debate between the "Latin school," which claimed that Romanians were descendants of the Romans, and historians who stressed their Dacian and Daco-Roman heritage should suffice as an example. Both intellectual strains shared the conviction that Romanians, whether they derived from Romans or Dacians, were the first inhabitants of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania, a contention by which they demonstrate their difference from Hungarians or Slavs. Such "political" myths belong in the broad "margins" of historiography researched by Grabski and other aforementioned Polish, Czech, and German historians (I put "margins" into quotation marks because, in fact, the myth is often more important – and no less true – than the fact on which it is built).[42]

The 19th century is a particularly rich research field in this respect as the period saw the birth of many "historical traditions," not only in the nations

40 Josef Macůrek, *Dějepisectví evropského východu*, Praha 1946.

41 Jerzy Jedlicki, *Źle urodzeni czyli o doświadczeniu historycznym. Scripta i postscripta*, Londyn-Warszawa 1993, 166.

42 See Petr Čornej, *Lipanské ozvěny*, Praha 1995 a reception history of the Medieval battle of Lipany and a companion to the book *Lipanská křižovatka, Příčiny, průběh a historický význam jedné bitvy*, Praha 1992.

discussed in this study. The problem was illustrated by Lucian Boia in the example of Mihal Viteazul, who is said to have united Romanian lands and who in fact ruled over Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania, albeit for one year only (1599-1600). This fact did not prevent him from playing the role of a national hero in the works of Mihail Kogălniceanu and Nicolae Bălcescu in mid-19th century.[43] Other "national rebirths," "awakenings," and "renaissances" could yield many analogous examples. The Czech "national awakening" is the best known and, to some extent, universal example because – due to the path-breaking research by Miroslav Hroch – it is used as a referential frame for other equivalent phenomena.[44]

Vladimír Macura authored a very concise analysis of the Czech "national awakening." He believed that the very idea of comparing the efforts of a national movement to an awakening is connected with a mythical, non-linear understanding of time.[45] Macura's works offer a catalogue of various strategies used by Czech patriots to "discover" (or construct) a national past, sometimes resulting in brand new national traditions.[46] He also raised the question of the imagined traditions originating in the 19th century, claiming that "we were made of illusions, myths and mystifications."[47] The task of the scholar is not to demystify ideas of the past, even in a just cause, but rather to discover the origins of the social or national imagined past and the mechanisms governing it.[48]

As already mentioned, the "Czech" perspective is also applied by non-Czech authors, sometimes even in a much sterner manner, as in the case of Maria Bobrownicka, who stressed the cultural infertility of the Slavic myth in Central and South-eastern Europe, especially in Bohemia and Slovakia.[49] Boia's book showed that attempts to describe national myths using historical categories can meet with a violent reaction.[50] Maria Janion and Maria Żmigrodzka analyse the

43 Lucian Boia, *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, Budapest 2001, 39.

44 Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe*, Cambridge 1985.

45 Vladimír Macura, *Znamení zrodu. České národní obrození jako kulturní typ*, Praha 1995, 79-80.

46 See Vladimír Macura *Český sen*, Praha 1998 as well as Robert Burton Pynsent, *Questions of Identity (Czech and Slovak Ideas of Nationality and Personality)*, Budapest 1994.

47 Vladimír Macura, *Masarykovy boty a jiné sem(o)fejetony*, Praha 1993, 16.

48 See Jiří Rak, *Bývali Čechové... České historické mýty a stereotypy*, Praha 1994, 7.

49 Maria Bobrownicka, *Narkotyk mitu. Szkice o świadomości narodowej i kulturowej Słowian zachodnich i południowych*, Kraków 1995, 39.

50 Lucian Boia describes the violent critiques of his approach which followed the publication of his *Istorie şi mit în conştiinţa românească*, Bucureşti 1997 – see. Boia, *History and Myth*, 1-2.

myths of Polish Romanticism in an only slightly different manner, with relation to literature.[51]

The formation of nations in the 19th century has become one of the most popular topics of comparative research over the past few decades. Christoph Conrad and Sebastian Conrad stress that this approach is useful also for work in fields that are traditionally considered "untranslatable," i.e. national in a very strict sense. In other words, the belief in the uniqueness of nations is one of the most common forms of faith.[52]

Vladimír Macura analysed 19th century patriotic culture, as well as Czech myths of the Communist period.[53] There are undoubtedly serious differences between Communist ideology and the "national awakening," starting with a completely different definition of time. While the reborn Czech nation saw itself in an eternal cycle, socialist culture was based on the notion of a new beginning and perceived time as running toward a strictly defined goal along the lines of progress.[54] This might raise some doubts as to the concept of a continuity of ideas between the 19th century and the Communist period. To eliminate those doubts, I propose to forego theoretical considerations for a moment and to concentrate on the phase of development of Soviet historiography which was supposed to set the tone for East Central European historical sciences after 1945.

The Bolshevik takeover was not directly followed by any general change in Russian historiography. It was only in 1926 that a Marxist Historical Society was created, and a new methodological orientation was officially approved at an historical congress in 1928-1929. The new interpretation of Russian history was inspired mainly by Mikhail N. Pokrovsky. He attacked Russian historiography, criticising particularly all attempts at portraying Russia as a unique and special case of a country following its own *Sonderweg*. According to Pokrovsky, Russia had developed just as any other country, it was simply backward. Traditionally crucial elements of Russian history, such as the country's territorial expansion, were seen not as any particular tsar's success, but as a result of the development of trade (by this token even Alexander Nevsky was a servant to capital). The christianisation of Russia was deemed "an incident" and wars against the Tatars were viewed as a struggle between two cultures at the same stage of development. Pokrovsky accused tsardom of imperialism, and interpreted the

51 Maria Janion & Maria Żmigrodzka, *Romantyzm i historia* (2nd edition), Gdańsk 2001.

52 Christoph Conrad & Sebastian Conrad, "Wie vergleicht man Historiographien?," in: *Die Nation schreiben. Geschichtswissenschaft im internationalen Vergleich*, eds. Christoph Conrad & Sebastian Conrad, Göttingen 2002, 19-20.

53 Vladimír Macura, *Šťasný věk – Symboly, emblémy a mýty 1948-89*, Praha 1992.

54 See Rafał Stobiecki, *Bolszewizm a historia. Próba rekonstrukcji bolszewickiej filozofii dziejów*, Łódź 1998, 65.

Polish-Russian wars of the early 17th century not as Polish aggression but as a social struggle against the tsar. Even more strikingly, Pokrovsky claimed that Russians were most likely of Finnish origin, which likened his approach to Franciszek Duchiński's fantastic theories formed in the mid-19th century.[55]

The domination of Pokrovsky's interpretation of history did not last long. He died in 1932, and his theories were rebuked only two years later. They were characterised as abstract, unusable in school education, and indebted to inappropriate sociological frameworks. But in fact – as foreign commentators noted – it was Pokrovsky's hostility towards Russian national traditions that invited the most disapproval.[56] His sociological leanings were soon displaced by a Stalinist model of historiography, referring in many respects to earlier interpretations of Russian history.[57] The new narrative of national history was to be filled with a Russian-Soviet patriotic spirit, and was indebted to the Russian heirs of German historicism in its method. Like Ranke, Karamzin and others, Soviet historians referred to the state as a focal point of history. The importance of each state was estimated according to its military power. Even the term "historicism" was adapted in the USSR as "Marxist-Leninist historicism," letting it survive the next crisis of historiography in 1945 when "western" notions fell out of fashion.[58] Russian nationalism achieved its peak in Soviet historiography during World War II. Josef Macůrek noted almost immediately after its end that "You could see everywhere that the Russian past was viewed not in Marxist, but in patriotic terms, as a fight for independence and freedom against numerous aggressors and plunderers, above all 'against the German element'; it was described as the Russian people's eventual rise to power, the development of outstanding military skills, but was simultaneously also a struggle for freedom only, which hugely affected the universal culture. Russian science elevated the moral and spiritual forces in Russians, and we may say that it contributed to this historical victory in the defence of Russia, civilisation, and the national existence of many nations conquered by the Germans."[59]

The victory of "national values" over Pokrovsky's interpretation was not easy, with some Russian Marxist historians seriously fearful of a relapse of nationalism. During the Russian offensive of May 1944, Anna Pankratova

55 See Macůrek, *Dějepisectví*, 259-264.

56 Ibidem, 260.

57 Н. В. Иллерицкая, "Становление советской историографической традиции: наука, не обретшая лица," in: *Советская историография*, ed. Ю. Н. Афанасьев, Москва 1996, 165-170.

58 Por. Eduard Thaden, "Marxist Historicism and the Crises of Soviet Historiography," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 2003/1, 17-20.

59 Macůrek, *Dějepisectví,* 264.

issued a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, criticising the re-evaluations of historical figures such as Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great or Alexander I. She observed that Soviet historians (and Soviet propaganda) had lost sight of the fact that the masses were the subject of history, not the leaders. In late May and early June 1944, a meeting took place in Moscow between representatives of the two tendencies of interpretation of national history, all aspiring to be Marxist. While they came to no final solution, Pankratova was later punished for distributing material pertaining to the meeting.[60]

An interesting variant of the same evolution occurred in Ukraine. The situation of historians there was even more uncertain than in Russia. Not only did they not know whether they should interpret the history of Ukraine from a "class" or "national" perspective, but they also had to determine the role played in it by Russia. Soviet Ukraine had its own Pokrovsky in a young historian, Matvyi Yavorsky. His theses on national history competed with the dominant "national" interpretation of Mikhailo Hrushevsky. Javorsky rejected the idea of the nation as the driving force of history; at the same time, he was not at all pro-Russian. In his interpretation of the Bolshevik revolution in Ukraine, he underlined its peculiar characteristics which were dissimilar to those of the Russian Revolution. Javorsky's success – the official condemnation of Hrushevsky's interpretation - was almost immediately followed by his own fall. Javorsky was arrested in 1933; Hrushevsky, who had been recognised as 'fascist', died a year later. During the war, the historical policy in Ukraine bowed to the necessity of boosting confidence in national values, but still without any clear guidelines. *Zhdanovshchyna*, which for Russians meant the campaign against "Occidentalism" and liberalism, for Ukrainians was also a fight against nationalism. This increased the chaos in the Marxist interpretation of Ukraine's history. Finally, as in Russia, Ukrainian Marxist historiography similarly adopted the Hrushevskyian "national" paradigm, combining it with elements of historical materialism.

By the second half of the 1940s, other, newly conquered nations were expected to adjust multiple professions, including those related to the historical sciences, to the Soviet model. However, Marxism, soon to become the only acceptable methodology, was no longer understood in the same way in Bolshevik Russia. Its Soviet variation borrowed heavily from the tradition of Russian historiography and the Russian national tradition. The variations formulated in the satellite countries were also less likely to break away from

60 Maureen Perrie, *The Cult of Ivan the Terrible in Stalin's Russia*, Houndmills 2001, 99-102.

existing traditions than to revise and re-evaluate them, along with the perspectives on Russia's role in the history of Central and Eastern Europe.

This current work attempts for the most part to find an answer to one question: how did the Marxist historians of Poland, Czechoslovakia and the GDR employ national historical and historiographical traditions? The reader will likely spot the differences between the mode of analysis of Marxist-Leninist historiographies proposed herein and their previous evaluations. Outlining the relationships between different Marxist-Leninist historiographies, I usually (though not without exceptions) put stress on "lateral" relations (between Polish, Czech, Slovak and East German historians) more than on "vertical" relations (between each satellite historiography and Soviet historiography). Analysing the content of Marxist works, I rarely depend on Party publications (though statements on historical matters from relevant directorships will be frequently referenced). I strive to maintain a focus on historical publications without tampering with the facts, if possible, even if the works in question fail to retain a proper scientific profile. Finally, in my analysis of the views of Marxists, I put greater stress on elements of continuity and on references to non-Marxist historiographical traditions – that is, while conscious of a lack of continuity in numerous aspects of scholarly life, I focus on the signals of a continuity of historical thought. All these factors of my analysis constitute a deliberate attempt at presenting a different, and, in my opinion, more complete, perspective on Marxist historical sciences in Central and Eastern Europe. It is more of an invitation to debate than a closing remark on a past discussion.

The extent and propriety of using the terms "Marxist" and "Stalinist" with reference to the intellectual or cultural phenomena of the Stalinist period remains questionable. Georg G. Iggers points to differences between "Western Marxism" and the official Marxist philosophy of international Communist parties. Leszek Kołakowski, on the other hand, claims that Stalinism was in a certain sense a form of Marxism: Marxism-Leninism of the Soviet type was deeply dependent on "classic" Marxist thought. This view naturally does not indicate that Stalinism as such was the only possible and logically necessary extension of Marx's thought.[61]

There is, on another note, no specifically original concept behind the time frame which I have chosen for this study. The dates differ between the countries under discussion – I accept the boundary dates specified by Polish, Czech, Slovak and German scholars. In the case of Poland, these are 1948 or 1949 and

61 See Georg G. Iggers, *Historiography in the Twentieth Century. From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge*, Middletown, Conn. 1997, 78-79; Leszek Kołakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism: The Founders, The Golden Age, The Breakdow*n, New York 2000, 1110-1118.

1956; with respect to Czechoslovakia, the years 1948 and 1963 are assumed to mark the beginning and end of the Stalinist period. Allowing for lengthy publication processes, I used 1965 as a final boundary date for my research, and in some cases went as far as 1968. In the history of the GDR, the starting date of the Stalinist period is widely assumed to be 1949 (which is, by the way, also the date of the country's formation itself), and the closing date is put at the end of the 1960s, a period which saw an ongoing centralisation of schooling, an introduction of another school reform, as well as generational changes in scholarly circles.[62]

62 These dates refer to the generally applied chronology of cultural history and, as such, are not always accepted by historians of historiography. Nevertheless, they represent not only the main turning points in the scientific policy in the Soviet bloc but also prove to be flexible enough to reflect specific features of historiography (i.e., the time needed for the publication and reception of a given publication). For the criticism of my approach, see Martin Nodl, *Dějepisectví mezi vědou a politikou. Úvahy o historiografii 19. a 20. století,* Brno 2007, 106.