Petr Drulák / Šárka Moravcová (eds.)

Non-Western Reflection on Politics

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Petr Drulák /
Šárka Moravcová (eds.)

Non-Western Reflection on Politics

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Acknowledgements

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Introduction: For a Global Dialogue

Petr Drulák

In recent decades, Europe and the USA witnessed dynamic growth in non-Western parts of the world. At first, this growth was mainly economic. But recently it has also started to change political realities, and has made non-Western elements much more present in the Western imaginary than ever before. The former peripheries are starting to see eye to eye with the former centre. The time of genuine global dialogue has come. However, while non-Western leaders, thinkers and activists are familiar with Western perspectives of the world, their Western counterparts tend to ignore non-Western perspectives. This dooms any attempt at dialogue between the two sides.

This book tries to remedy these conditions. It starts with the assumption that the greatest challenge for the West when it faces "the rest" is conceptual. Westerners understand the world on the basis of deeply ingrained concepts while assuming that everyone else is bound to share these concepts. This book shows that the reality is different. It introduces non-Western concepts but it also provides non-Western readings of seemingly familiar Western concepts. By doing this it points to the obstacles which may hamper a genuine dialogue as well as to opportunities which may be exploited. It may also offer non-Western experiences as a potential remedy for some of the current woes of the West.

The obstacles start with an unavoidable need for such labels as those of the West and the non-West. They provide necessary references for discussion (Acharya and Buzan, 2010; Waever and Tickner, 2009; Tickner and Blaney, 2012). However, they may also mislead that discussion. To limit their potential for misleading, a brief discussion of these labels is in order.

The West and the Non-West

The current reflection on politics has been based on concepts which come from the Western tradition. They reflect the historical experience of Western Europe and of the USA, and they draw on the intellectual legacy mainly constituted by Greek philosophy, Roman law, the Christian religion and the Enlightenment. Also, these concepts are in a dialectical relationship with the institutional practice of the sovereign state and the state system. On the one hand, the concepts provide intellectual building blocks to the institutional framework of the state.

On the other hand, the concepts themselves are shaped by and embedded in the institutional framework of the state.

The Western concepts of politics are still relevant for at least three reasons. First, they help us examine the Western political experience to which they are linked. Second, given the global conceptual and institutional hegemony of the West, they also give us access to the Westernised political reality of the contemporary world. Third, by default, these concepts are abstract; they try to transcend the Western experience which engendered them and to strive for a more general or even universal validity. In this respect, they can be useful for studying non-Western political experience, too.

On the other hand, each of these factors is being challenged by the rise of non-Western actors and the transformation of the state order. Non-Western actors, Westernised though they may be, produce political practices which may not fit in the Western conceptual matrix, or only seem to fit in it, as concepts used by the West tend to have different meanings in different contexts. For example, this is the case with the concept of democracy in India or in Islamic countries. In addition to this, the technological and mental reality of the world of today is increasingly at odds with its political division into supposedly independent states. Globalisation does not make the state disappear, but it leads to its thorough redefinition, including the redefinition of the ways we think about world politics. The voice of the West will still be important in the redefinition process, but it will not be the only voice and it may not even be the dominant voice. In these conditions, the threshold for the universal validity of any concept will be much higher than it had been when Western universalism went unchallenged.

The focus on politics exposes the domain where dialogue is most needed and where misunderstandings are most likely to occur. The authors are aware that the very concept of politics is Western and contested at that. However, no single concept of politics is imposed here, and the familiar distinctions of Western political analysis are avoided. These include, for example, the distinction between politics, policy and polity or that between domestic and foreign policy. Instead, the chapters focus on particular concepts which are significant to the political experience of the examined communities.

Trying to encourage a dialogue at the level of such concepts is a more open approach towards non-Western communities than previous efforts, which merely tried to find non-Western political theories (Acharya and Buzan, 2010; Waever and Tickner, 2009; Tickner and Blaney, 2012). Western political theories are products of the Western academic production, being subject to its specific rules. Therefore, a quest for political theories outside the West is likely to lead to the conclusion that there are no such theories there or that they are

but imitations on the Western models. This is especially the case if such a quest is conducted by scholars who are educated and socialised within the Western academe and who consciously and subconsciously adhere to a very specific representation of what theory is. While reflection on politics is practiced in many different places, the theorising of politics is a part of Western intellectual practice.

But even the focus on concepts may be biased and limiting. The way we currently understand concepts as such is a product of Western social theories, such as Max Weber's, which privilege a particular understanding of reason and modernity. In this respect, the products of non-Western reflection may often seem too vague and too particular to qualify as concepts at all. Moreover, these products may not resemble any concept at all, as they may take the shape of pictures and diagrams, for example. Therefore, for non-Western reflections on politics to be addressed, a more open understanding of concepts is needed, and non-conceptual expressions cannot be ignored. On the one hand, this seems to make the dialogue between Western and non-Western thinking extremely difficult, as the common ground on which the dialogue could take place seems to be extremely thin. On the other hand, these difficulties are easily overestimated, especially if the labels of the West and the non-West serve as tools of homogenisation and reification.

The post-orientalist West of today is well aware of the danger of homogenising the non-West as a single entity (Acharya and Buzan, 2010). Thus, the homogenising label of the Orient, which would include regions and cultures as disparate as the Middle East, India and China, has been phasing out for some time in the West. Instead, the very word "the non-West" signals that it is a technical term which has no positive homogenising meaning. However, it is often forgotten that the homogenisation of the non-West has been linked with an equally troublesome homogenisation of the West which is still quietly performed both in the West and outside it. But what does the West stand for?

In geopolitical terms, the West roughly corresponds to NATO, the EU, Australia and neutral European countries. However, if the West is defined in terms of the production of political concepts, then it narrows down to a network of English-language leaders, universities and publishers that are based in the USA and, to some extent, in the UK. The network is open to authors and ideas from a variety of places. Thus, the network includes ideas from the ancient Greeks, the French poststructuralists, German philosophers and even a handful of explicitly non-Western figures. Their ideas provide inputs into the process in which this Anglo-American network reads, transforms, elaborates on and presents these ideas according to its own homogenising intellectual habits. The outputs tend to grossly differ from the inputs. Thus, the current Aristotelian,

Kantian or Foucauldian perspectives on politics do not have much in common with the original works of Aristotle, Kant or Foucault. Usually, they only present their own simplified and distorted versions the original ideas.

Thus, the centre/periphery model not only applies to the traditional, but now changing, relationship between the West and the non-West, but it also characterises the intellectual production inside the West. Therefore, what comes down as Western thinking about politics actually masks huge internal diversity. Hence, the rationalism, individualism, materialism and essentialism for which Western political thinking is criticised by non-Western voices only represent its hegemonic face. There are also Western traditions of mysticism, holism and relationalism which tend to be marginalised nowadays. These margins of the West are both intellectual – i.e. non-mainstream, heterodox discourses – and geographical – i.e. areas which are not much affected by the network. It would be wrong to assume that these will fully overlap with non-Western perspectives. However, the concepts from the margins provide much better starting points for global dialogue between the West and the non-West than do the concepts which currently dominate in the West.

The Plan of the Book

The main contribution of the book is, first, its inclusive approach towards reflection on political thinking in Africa, Latin America, Eastern Asia and the Islamic world, as these regions are usually ignored in mainstream political science. Second, it provides an analysis of both original non-Western concepts and how the traditional Western concepts have been imported and implemented in specific non-Western areas.

In this respect the book differs from related studies which also examine non-Western political thinking and which were an invaluable source of inspiration for this project. These studies use a different analytical framework (Acharya and Buzan, 2010; Waever and Tickner, 2009; Tickner and Blaney, 2012), only focus on a particular region to provide the alternative to Western political thought (Arif, 2000; Marquez, 2008; Van Hensbroek, 1999), or reflect on only a few political concepts (Aswini, 2004; Shilliam, 2012; Wiarda and Boilard, 1998). Also, there are two regions which are missing from the book – Eastern Europe and Southern Asia. Both Russia and India would fit into the project. Russia would be particularly interesting as a possible exemplification of a dialogue between the West and the non-West inside a single political and intellectual setting. Therefore, the reasons why the two countries were left out have nothing

to do with the intellectual merits of their investigation – their absence is merely due to the specifics of the project in which this book originated.

The book is divided into three parts. The four chapters of the first part reflect on challenges which arise when Western and non-Western knowledge meet. Arlene Tickner investigates this encounter from a perspective of thinking about international relations in Latin America. The theories which she presents do not come from intellectual traditions which are fundamentally different from those of the West. On the contrary, they could be considered offshoots of Western thinking. On the other hand, their roots are located in an economic and geopolitical setting which does fundamentally differ from that of Western Europe and the United States.

Thus, Tickner identifies the ECLA school as an important milestone in the evolution of IR theories in Latin America. In the 1950s and 1960s the Economic Commission for Latin America of the UN (ECLA) produced and inspired research that challenged the modernisation theory, which assumed a global spreading of liberal Western progress and dominated in the Western thinking about the rest of the world. The ECLA school, pointing to the blind spots of modernisation theory, started a significant intellectual dynamic by inspiring the dependency theory, which, since the 1960s, has tried to remedy what it saw as the weaknesses of the school by enriching it with Marxist insights. The dependency theory in turn raised the criticism of the realist theory of peripheral autonomy in the 1980s, to which the theory of peripheral realism reacted in the 1990s. Hence, Tickner shows how Latin American IR theories critically develop on the grand paradigms of Western social thinking – namely progressive liberalism, Marxism and political realism – by elaborating on these paradigms in the context of Latin America.

Like Latin America, Africa was also heavily exposed to European political and intellectual colonisation. The colonialism marginalised and destroyed the local political experience and left the impression that before the arrival of Europeans, Africa lived in an ahistorical and apolitical state of nature. This wrong impression is still very much alive in the West despite the growing evidence of significant intellectual achievements and historical development in pre-colonial Africa. Some of these achievements can take the shape of political concepts which are not only relevant for African politics but also can be applied elsewhere. Thus, Francis Nyamnjoh dedicates his chapter on Cameroonian politics to the concept of *njangi*.

Even though the basic principle of njangi can be easily summarised as "you scratch my back, I scratch yours", the social and political practices within which it is embedded and which, in turn, it produces are fairly complex. Thus, Nyamnjoh argues that the practice of njangi cannot be properly understood

within the individualist perspective on politics which became dominant in Anglo-American political science. Njangi does not deny the existence of the individual or their interests, but it shows how these are constituted by social networks within which individuals are embedded and without which they could not get access to political power. Nyamnjoh also shows how flexible the relations within these networks can be and how their internal hierarchies can change. Moreover, he points out the relevance of njangi beyond Cameroonian politics by pointing to the related Nigerian concept of godfatherism and arguing that election campaigns in the USA can also be analysed by using the concept of njangi.

Islamic countries have been Europe's neighbours and rivals for centuries. They used to be the feared or despised "other" against which the West used to construct its identity. Since the 1990s, they seem to be coming back to that role again. Therefore, the need for a dialogue and for paths to mutual understanding is particularly urgent here. In response to this, Petr Kratochvíl dedicates his chapter to the topical issue of the Muslim understanding of democracy.

On the one hand, Kratochvíl rejects the wide-spread belief that Islam and democracy rule each other out. He points to several concepts in the tradition of Islamic political thinking which provide for democratic procedures and which may be drawn on in the current quest for democratic governance in Muslim countries. On the other hand, Kratochvíl also observes that possible Muslim democracies are likely to differ from those in the West. He argues that the concept of secular democracy which the West tends to see as universal is not applicable to Muslim societies where secularism tends to be undemocratic as democracy and the revival of Islam go hand in hand. In this respect, he reminds us of the current Western debate about post-secular democracy.

Finally, while the previous three chapters address traditions in close contact with the West for centuries, Chinese thinking tread its own path, which only occasionally crossed the paths of others. China's contacts with the West were irregular and frequently interrupted. These contacts also suffered from Western imperialism, Chinese indifference towards the West, and, later, Chinese backlash against the West. This was exacerbated by profound differences between the two intellectual traditions. Against this background, Petr Drulák investigates one of the results of the most recent encounter between China and the West – namely the rise of a Chinese theory of international relations.

Reviewing some of the major contributions to current Chinese debate about international relations theory, the chapter looks for what makes Chinese political thinking different from its Western counterpart and what its sources are. It argues that the uniqueness of Chinese perspectives comes from a particular understanding of reality developed both by means of concepts and non-

conceptually. It emphasises relationality over individuality and focuses on incessant and non-progressive change. Drulák argues that the non-conceptual approach which focuses on relationality and change may be associated with one of the founding texts of the Chinese intellectual tradition, the Book of Changes, which he introduces as a metaphysical source of Chinese political thinking.

The four chapters in the second part of the book deal with concepts which non-Western communities developed in order to understand and practice politics and which are embedded in their intellectual traditions. To start with, Šárka Moravcová examines the concept of the *liberation project* which was elaborated by the Mexican thinker Leopoldo Zea. Even though Latin American political thinking tends to be embedded in Western, particularly American, theories and concepts, this does not mean that it lacks all of the concepts which come from Latin American countries' political experience.

In this respect, Zea challenged American and European dominance in Mexican intellectual life. He suggested an emancipatory strategy, both political and intellectual, which was partly inspired by Hegel and Marx but took its own original shape by taking into account the mixture of races and other realities of Latin American societies. Zea emphasised self-affirmation of the marginalised by the rise of their historical consciousness, which he saw as a pre-condition for their liberation. Moravcová argues that his ideas correspond to some extent to the program of the Zapatistas, a resistance movement in the Mexican province of Chiapas.

In the next chapter, Petr Skalník uses his anthropological research in Ghana to focus on the ancient institution of chieftaincy, about which he makes two important observations. First, he argues that African politics can only be understood if religious traditions are taken into account. In this respect, his research could be considered an innovative contribution to political theology from a non-monotheistic perspective. The need for the sacred in politics which the chapter examines goes beyond African societies. Even though the relation between the chief and the sacred as it is investigated in the chapter is unique to the Ghanaian context, the question it raises is more general. Second, Skalník argues that the traditional concept of the chieftaincy, which was more or less erased by European colonisers, included both hierarchical elements of obedience to the chief and democratic elements of the chief's political control. In this respect, a resurrection of the original institution of the chieftaincy may enhance democratic institutions in African societies without imposing Western models of democracy upon them.

The following chapter deals with classical Islamic concepts by focusing on how they are understood in modern Egypt. Miloš Mendel argues that the an-

cient concepts of the house of Islam (*dar al-islam*), the house of war (*dar al-harb*) and emigration (*hijra*) are essential for any understanding of contemporary Islamic political thinking. He presents a variety of scholarly and political interpretations to explain different scenarios of the relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims both in international relations and inside mixed societies in which Muslims and non-Muslims live together. Thus, he argues that the house of Islam can be understood inclusively – including not only Islamic societies but also all societies where Muslims can practice their religion – but also exclusively – excluding basically everyone apart from the members of a specific sect. In this respect, the potential for conflict and migratory pressures can often depend on how broadly the house of Islam is interpreted.

The last chapter in the second part introduces several concepts which come from the Chinese tradition. Wang Fan introduces a series of concepts which go back to the classics of Confucianism and Daoism, and which he summarises under three broad conceptual categories: holism, dialectical thinking and self-discipline. Wang argues that these concepts lay the ground for a perspective on international politics which is less confrontational than the one that prevails in the West. Thus, he contrasts the Chinese concept of interaction with the Western concept of the game, criticising the latter for promoting confrontational thinking about politics. In a similar vein, Wang argues that Chinese emphasis on self-discipline and self-control brings about more co-operative attitudes than Western efforts to discipline and control others. In this respect, he suggests inverting the logic of the security dilemma, suggesting that each international actor should first ask himself to what extent he threatens others by his actions rather than only asking how others threaten him. Wang then applies these concepts to an analysis of Chinese security policy in East Asia.

The final part of the book introduces Western concepts which are used to address the political experience of non-Western subjects. The three chapters show how Western concepts such as dependence, human rights or multilateralism have developed different meanings in non-Western countries than they hold in the West.

Traditionally, Latin America and Africa were regions where Western influence was particularly strong. This is addressed by Miroslav Jurásek's chapter on theories of dependence. Jurásek introduces two different perspectives within this Marxism-based theoretical school: a Latin American concept by Andre Gunder Frank and an African concept by Samir Amin. Comparing the two concepts, Jurásek points to important differences between them which concern, for example, the speed of the transition to socialism, the relative significance of domestic and global factors and the polarity of the international system.

There have been several neuralgic points in the encounters between the West and the Islamic world which have lasted for more than a millennium. Presently, the Islamic reception of the Western concept of human rights is one of these. In her chapter, Zora Hesová points to the suspicion with which human rights have been met in Muslim countries from the very start. Initially, human rights were viewed as a neo-colonial project which was suspected of undermining post-colonial regimes. Nowadays, they are likely to be criticised for being at odds with the Islamic tradition, namely, for being too individualistic, ignoring the social relations of the Islamic community and lacking the idea of virtues and obligations. However, Hesová also distinguishes a number of intellectual and political positions on human rights in Islam, and she analyses recent draftings of constitutions in Egypt and Tunisia with respect to these positions.

Finally, despite their profoundly different and influential traditions, two East Asian great powers, China and Japan, have been adopting Western political concepts since they opened their doors to the West in the middle of the 19th century. However, they have given their own meanings to these concepts, and these meanings usually differ from the original meanings of the concepts. Connecting with that tradition of reinterpretation, in the last chapter, Michal Kolmaš investigates how the concept of multilateralism, being one of the key concepts of US foreign policy since 1945, is understood in Japan – a de facto protectorate of the USA after 1945 turned later into an ally. He observes the relatively late entry of the word "multilateralism" into the Japanese language as well as the different understanding of the word in Japan. Unlike the Americans, the Japanese see the relation between multilateralism and bilateralism as complementary rather than opposite, and they consider multilateralism to be a functional tool rather than a normative order.

It is impossible to summarise the findings which the chapters of this volume offer, and there is no common denominator to which they could be brought. However, they all show that it is possible to have a global dialogue between the West and the non-West. Some of the chapters point to profound differences between the two, and they give us an idea about how high the obstacles to a genuine dialogue between them are. On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that these obstacles are insurmountable. Many of them actually disappear when Western political thinking is understood broadly enough to include the whole of the Western tradition and not only its current narrow Anglo-American mainstream. In this respect, the editors hope that their location in Central Europe, which is a traditional margin of the West, may offer more advantages than disadvantages to the global dialogue.

Core-Periphery Knowledge Exchange: The Case of Latin America

Arlene B. Tickner

Knowledge designed in the global North often has limited relevance when inserted into distinct social and cultural contexts, and may even be dysfunctional and counterproductive. In the case of International Relations (IR) theories such as realism and liberalism, which are rooted in the roles and actions of great powers, conceiving of the centrality of power in either strategic-military or economic terms is largely unhelpful for thinking about countries located in the global South (Neumann 1998). Even worse, dicta such as "the strong do what they will while the weak do what they must", spoken by Thucydides over 2,000 years ago, reinforce the idea that the periphery is irrelevant to the study of world politics. In this sense, Kenneth Waltz's (1979: 72) claim that "it would be […] ridiculous to construct a theory of international politics based on Malaysia and Costa Rica" provides a fairly accurate picture of the state of the field, even today.

Notwithstanding the considerable gap that exists between North and South in academic disciplines such as IR in terms of the intellectual division of labour, and of the power relations derived therein, relatively few efforts have been made to determine how knowledge travels between core and periphery, and how it is transformed in the process of being absorbed by local geocultural filters. In this chapter, I briefly explore some distinct instances of IR knowledge production in Latin America and its exchange with the United States in order to illustrate the complexities that such processes may entail. Latin America is an interesting site for examining this problem mainly because the region has been part of the US sphere of influence for much of its independent history, and has been exposed to continuous political, economic, cultural and intellectual influence.

In addition to accounting for the transfer of knowledge from North to South, Latin America's dependent status vis-à-vis the United States has also spurred its wariness towards ideas produced in the United States. Dependency theory, touted as the one authentically peripheral formula for confronting problems of development and global insertion, was largely a reaction against the prevailing US-produced theory of development, modernisation theory. Similarly, in the case of the discipline of IR itself, a growing sense of urgency regarding the political and economic dependence of the region accounts for the emergence of scholarship that attempted to define and problematize autono-

my as the main goal of the periphery in its global interactions (Tickner, 2003). In consequence, the study of world politics in Latin America has been characterised by complex interactions between incoming US influences and their assimilation (or rejection) within existing intellectual, political, economic and cultural frameworks.

I argue that the importation of dominant IR knowledge by the periphery necessarily entails its transformation and adaptation to local contexts. Additionally, although it is often claimed that the global South does not produce theory per se, Latin America offers an example of autochthonous intellectual production about global affairs. Dependency theory in particular is one instance not only of a knowledge created by Latin American scholars that is tailored to regional needs, but also of a Latin American knowledge that was exported to the countries of the North, where it was avidly consumed. Peripheral autonomy and peripheral realism also constitute markedly local attempts to understand the region's international relations and draw from distinct intellectual sources, including existing IR knowledge that was largely imported from the United States.

Modernisation Theory and ECLA School Thinking

During the 1950s and 1960s two distinct schools for explaining underdevelopment in Latin America tended to coexist if not compete with each other: modernisation theory and ECLA school led originally by Raúl Prébisch, the first director of the Economic Commission for Latin America. Modernisation theory, which was popularised in the 1960s as the predominant United States approach to development problems, seeks to explain underdevelopment and modernisation as a linear process through which different societies acquire Western values that allow them to make the transition from traditional societies to modern societies. The central hypothesis of modernisation theory is that the values, institutions and attitudes characterizing traditional societies constitute the primary causes of underdevelopment as well as the central obstacles to modernisation in regions such as Latin America (Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1978). As a result, modernisation theory tends to characterise developing countries as "dual" societies in which traditional, agrarian, backwards regions coexist with dynamic, modern, industrial areas. The transition to modernisation occurs primarily through the acquisition of Western values on the part of the modern political elite.

In an attempt to offer an alternative approach to development distinct from modernisation theory, ECLA sought to explain the underdevelopment of

the region through an analysis of the effects of the international capitalist exchange system. Consequently, ECLA-school thinking attempts to show how the expansion of capitalism, the international division of labour and the insertion of Latin American economies into the global system produced asymmetrical relations between the large core countries and the nations of the periphery (United Nations, 1950). Given the inelastic demand for primary products, the concentration of production for export in the area of primary goods is identified as the primary cause of the unequal terms of trade experienced by Latin American countries (Fishlow, 1988: 90).

As a result of its diagnosis of the causes of underdevelopment, ECLA pointed to the need to gear production towards manufactured goods in order to make the region's economies less vulnerable to shifts in the global market. This, in turn, required an active state role in order to redirect the productive process. The elimination of large landholding (*latifundio*) interests, the creation of an enlarged internal consumption market and the incorporation of the marginalised rural population also constituted central aspects of ECLA's proposal (Cardoso, 1972: 48). Although these policy recommendations were widely embraced in a great majority of countries in Latin America, the crisis of the first stages of import substitution industrialisation (ISI) in the late 1950s and 1960s led to a series of critiques concerning the viability of the proposed development strategy. In addition to creating a new type of dependence upon imports and foreign development, ISI was identified as the cause of severe sectoral imbalances, including a weakened agricultural sector, reduced labour absorption capacity, fiscal crises and inflation.

Dependency

Dependency theory was celebrated as the first genuinely peripheral approach to development and international insertion. In general terms, the diverse authors grouped together under the dependency label seek to explain economic underdevelopment in the periphery as the product of the specific nature of global capitalism, as well as examining the ways in which external dependency has moulded internal processes in ways that reinforce inequality and exclusion. This school of thought was heavily influenced by Lenin's theory of imperialism and the Economic Commission on Latin America's early work on development problems in the region. The great majority of dependency writers also target modernisation theory as a particularly deficient analytical framework for understanding problems of underdevelopment.

While dependency theory clearly shares many of ECLA's key assumptions – mainly those of the unequal nature of exchange in the global economy and the consequent bifurcation of the international system into core and periphery – many dependency authors reject the gradualist modernisation project proposed by ECLA, arguing instead in favor of the need for radical social change.

In their classic book *Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina* (1969), Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto base their analysis of underdevelopment in the region on a core assumption shared by all dependency authors: underdevelopment is a direct result of the expansion of the capitalist system, which links diverse economies to the global system according to their respective productive apparatuses (Cardoso and Faletto, 1969: 23). Dependence is maintained through this international division of labour and by the specific relations of economic and political domination contained therein. The construction of strategic coalitions between the ruling classes in the core and the periphery and the semi-feudal exploitation of marginalised zones of peripheral nations to nurture urbanisation and modernisation in cities constitute just two manifestations of this situation. According to the authors, a comprehensive understanding of dependency entails not only an analysis of external forces but also an analysis of the particular configuration of class relations emerging within dependent countries (Cardoso and Faletto, 1969: 30). Both the external and the internal social, economic and political dimensions of dependency become equally important when examining the emergence of social formations in distinct historical periods.

The central hypothesis of the authors is that the formation of social groups in, as well as the political evolution of Latin American countries took different paths depending on whether the export-oriented growth stage of the late nineteenth century (the transition stage) was characterised by domestic control of the productive system or foreign-controlled enclave economies (Cardoso and Faletto, 1969: 55). Specifically, these two types of insertion into the global economy, characterised by distinct dominant class configurations, led to diverse possibilities in the nature of the state, the structure of class domination, the incorporation of the middle and popular classes and the respective levels and types of national development. Capitalism acquired concrete manifestations in distinct national contexts depending on the ways in which local, class and state interests were historically constituted and articulated.

According to authors such as Theotonio dos Santos (1968; 1973), Cardoso (1972) and Osvaldo Sunkel (1980), a markedly different stage of dependence was inaugurated in Latin America between the 1930s and the 1950s due to the shift from primary goods production to industrialisation in many countries of the region. Transnational dependency is premised on an international division

of labour that highlights the importance of the more industrialised Latin American economies for international financial interests, as both a source of investment and a source of growing consumer markets. Santos observes that capitalist industrialisation in the region and the presence of foreign capital, in fact, constitute two facets of the same process (1968: 1).

Transformations in the nature of global capitalism necessarily entail changes in relations of domination and subordination between the core and the periphery. Cardoso (1972: 43-44) maintains that this stage of dependency led to new forms of strategic interaction between multinational corporations and the local bourgeoisie and distinct types of negotiation with the local state. The specific nature of transnational dependency in distinct national contexts was thus determined by the relative weight of international business and state capitalism (Santos, 1973: 60).

For Cardoso (1974), associated dependent development is the principal result of transnational dependency. Contrary to popular assumptions that imperialism and dependency impede growth in the economies of the periphery, in situations characterised by industrialisation development is not incompatible with dependency. In other words, Cardoso contests arguments based upon the zero-sum nature of capitalist development. Echoing this, Santos (1973) argues that multinational corporate activity is concentrated precisely in those countries that exhibit high levels of economic and technological growth, given their greater potential for establishing monopolistic control over the production, distribution, consumption and capitalisation aspects of industrialisation. Although constituting a motor of economic growth, industrialisation and modernisation, transnational capitalism also distorts the political, economic and social structures of the host country (Sunkel and Fuenzalida, 1980: 45) because it is circumscribed by capitalist interests in the core as well as dominant class interests in the core and the periphery. Capitalist development in the periphery is also highly exclusionary, leading to higher concentrations of wealth between rich and poor and limiting economic dynamism to small pockets of development (Cardoso, 1972: 47).

Guillermo O'Donnell (1972) shows how economic modernisation and industrialisation in Latin America, instead of producing conditions favourable to democracy, became associated with the rise of political authoritarianism in Brazil and the countries of the Southern Cone. It also modified the productive structure of the dependent countries in a negative manner. This bureaucratic authoritarianism was grounded in the argument that internal order was necessary to control the rising demands of the popular classes, and for development to advance in a successful fashion.

Dependency Perspectives and IR Thinking

Dependency became the primary conceptual lens through which problems of underdevelopment and class conflict were viewed by most of the social sciences in Latin America during the late 1960s and 1970s. Dependency perspectives also provided significant cues for rethinking the region's international relations given their insight on issues related to the state, national development and sovereignty, among others. Contrary to modernisation theory and, to a lesser degree, ECLA-school thinking, which examine the state as a unit of analysis largely insulated from the effects of global capitalism, dependency theorists illustrate that processes of state development are intimately related to this system (Sunkel, 1980; O'Donnell and Linck, 1973). One of the primary manifestations of dependency reveals itself at the level of the state, whose consolidation is constrained by the changing nature of capitalism.

National development is highlighted by both ECLA school and dependency as one of the central goals of peripheral nations. While each points to the international division of labor as the principal obstacle to achieving this objective, dependency writers express an acute awareness of the role of history in determining the possibilities for and barriers to development. Dependency is not a fixed condition; rather, it is constantly changing as a result of transformations in the modes of production characterizing distinct countries. Nevertheless, throughout all the stages of dependency, the dominant classes are shown to be fundamental to the preservation of dependent relations with the core.

According to David L. Blaney (1996: 461), "dependency theory constitutes international society as an interweaving of two logics – the logic of capitalism…and the logic of sovereignty". Although the majority of the authors grouped together under the dependency label fail to make explicit reference to the problem of sovereignty, their treatment of the role of capitalism and imperialism in establishing the economic and political rules of the game within the periphery allows for the conclusion that one of the defining characteristics of dependency is precisely the absence of sovereignty (Cardoso and Faletto, 1969; Cardoso, 1972; Santos, 1972). In this regard, the attainment of sovereignty constitutes a precondition for development (Blaney, 1996: 466).

It is no less interesting that dependency constituted an eloquent reaction to the ethnocentrism characteristic of modernisation theory, which tended to represent regions such as Latin America as "backward" precisely because they had failed to exhaust the same stages of development as the developed world. In contrast, dependency argued that underdevelopment and development in distinct parts of the globe were produced historically as a result of global capitalist dynamics.