

Lidia Jurek

# *Polish Risorgimento*

Visions of the Modern Polish Nation  
and their Italian Foundations



**EASTERN EUROPEAN CULTURE,  
POLITICS AND SOCIETIES**

Edited by Irena Grudzinska-Gross  
and Andrzej Tymowski

**PETER LANG**  
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# **Introduction**



“... il comune destino, e il comune scopo, fecero sì, che la Polonia e l’Italia si incontrassero nelle loro aspirazioni per il risorgimento nazionale, che ugualmente reagissero alle correnti di pensiero europee e che portassero alla letteratura contemporanea, al movimento religioso e alla vita politica, degli elementi nazionali simili.”<sup>1</sup>

Of all the foreign political influences which helped shape 19<sup>th</sup>-century Polish national discourses, the model of Italy at the time of the Risorgimento was one of the most important. Between 1848 and 1871, the Poles were creating cultural constructions of Italy to explain their own national problems. They retrospectively, or prospectively, projected these interpretations onto Poland. Subsequently, the Poles often defined Polish national identity through comparison with the unifying Italy, therefore crafting their own nation through the discourse on Italian nationhood.

The reason why the Poles were keenly interested in the Italian path to independence was that their own state – the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had been partitioned at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Since then the Poles had feverishly searched for viable models of national struggle. This loss of statehood, on the verge of the modern era of nation-building processes, had an evident impact on the shape of Polish nationalism. The curious Polish case in the absolutist continental Europe was that until 1795 the Poles defined their nation politically as the multiethnic stratum of gentry having an equal share and a decisive voice in its rule. Once this political definition was invalidated, the Poles lost the only definition (and *raison d’être*) they had. After the initial chaos and lamentation (Kościuszko’s cry *Finis Poloniae!*), new national concepts promptly began to emerge, concepts which helped to construct the community around novel values. They had to replace the political definition, because in the new circumstances, the old definition had consigned the Polish nation to oblivion.

At first there was a shared conviction that the matters could, and ought to be, simply reversed. Several attempts to reconstitute the previous status of the gentry-nation (for example, militarily: Kościuszko’s Insurrection, assisting Napoleon, and through active diplomacy in Vienna) initiated the autonomy of the Polish Kingdom under the Russian tsar. Within 15 years, however, this

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1 A. Lewak, *Polska korespondencja J. Garibaldiiego*, Krakow 1932, p. 15.

autonomy appeared to be a chimera which led to the long November uprising (1830-31). The failure to regain independence by the only available means was a shock for the nationalists who understood that to preserve their traditional political culture, they rapidly needed to extend the number of people sharing their 'national desire', and importantly, those willing to struggle for it in the future. This is how the new chapter in the construction of the Polish nation started. The simple political definitions were slowly abandoned and replaced by contentions over the new visions of a nation. In their course, the Polish elite became increasingly divided, a nation was de-territorialised and other strata were admitted to citizenship.<sup>2</sup>

Under these new and challenging circumstances, nationalists searched for strategies which might save the Poles from national oppression whilst retaining their national distinctness. In search of practical models for the above, they turned to Italy which at the time of the Risorgimento appeared to be one of the most relevant and immediate models. Achieving victory by resorting to struggle, diplomacy and cultural heritage, Italy provided the Poles with especially vital stimuli for their ideological debates. These directly corresponded with the chief Polish dilemma in the nineteenth-century – whether to fight, or not. From the outset of the Springtime of Nations, Italy was persistently evoked in the discussions on the sense of revolutionary struggle. It was presented variously as a safe haven for émigrés, or as a source of mad revolutionary mayhem, as a steadfast ally in the Polish struggle for unification, a nation experiencing similar dilemmas and belonging to the same circle of civilization, which was to underline the occidental and anti-panslavic orientation Poles should adopt in their national identity construction.

The motto from the beginning of the introduction comes from Adam Lewak, one of the most renowned specialists on 19<sup>th</sup> century Polish-Italian relations. What he argues here is that it was due to the parallels of their national predicaments that the Poles and Italians reacted to the political, national and religious challenges of the epoch in similar ways. This premise is shared by the majority of experts on this subject (K. Morawski, M. Handelsman, B. Biliński, G. Maver and W. Giusti). They contributed to the view commonly accepted nowadays that the Italians and the Poles went through very similar nation building processes in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Both Polish and Italian historians believe that their countries shared the same national goals and that they also shared the

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2 P. Brock, *Polish Nationalism, in: Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, ed. by P. F. Sugar, I. J. Lederer, Seattle, London 1994, p. 316.

same ideas for achieving them. These premises have led to another vision concerning the firm friendship and cooperation between Poles and Italians:

“L’amore e la fratellanza tra Italia e Polonia avevano infatti una larga risonanza nell’animo delle due nazioni. (...) La Polonia era cattolica come l’Italia; la Polonia come l’Italia si ribellava ai trattati di Vienna ed aspirava all’unità nazionale; esuli italiani e polacchi si incontravano nei luoghi dell’esilio e, quasi spontaneamente erano portati a collaborare; la cultura classica latina aveva solide tradizioni in Polonia ed i romanticismo, presso tutte e due le nazioni, presentava, sia pure con differenze notevoli, analoghe caratteristiche patriottiche”.<sup>3</sup>

The words ‘fraternity’, ‘cooperation’ and ‘analogy’ all underpin the historiography describing the Italian-Polish contacts. However, given its somewhat romantic bias, the historiography has, to date, failed to render a complete picture of Polish reactions to the Italian Risorgimento. While it is now generally accepted that the geopolitical transformation which Italy underwent in the 19<sup>th</sup> century intensely nourished Polish political life, the manner in which the Italian influence has typically been described fails to present the full complexity of the matter.

In reality, while the ultimate goals of the Poles and Italians were the same – independence and unification – their differing geopolitical circumstances called for different solutions to these national predicaments. Many Polish nationalists found the Italian model of achieving independence and its state organization to be unsuitable for their own circumstances. In particular, Italians and Poles had different views on the role of religion for their national struggles. To achieve unification, the Italians needed to challenge the secular power of the pope, who ruled over the middle part of the peninsula. Moreover, the pope opposed the revolutionary unrest in Europe and cooperated with Italy’s most powerful political enemy, Austria (in the context of alliance between throne and altar). By contrast, the Poles were oppressed not only by Catholic Austria, but were also undergoing stronger denationalization processes introduced by both Protestant Prussia and Orthodox Russia. Therefore, they were not willing to contest religion, which was seen by many as a means of national resistance.

Consequently, this thesis demonstrates that contrary to the views of Lewak or Giusti, Italian and Polish elites differed in their reception of European political currents as well as in their own original ideas concerning the nation. By the same token, the Polish reception of Italian ideas on national sovereignty did not always run as smoothly as has been widely assumed. Drawing on the example of the successfully unifying peninsula, the Poles carefully, and selectively, chose elements of the Italian struggle that they wanted to imitate, or

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3 W. Giusti, *Mazzini e gli Slavi*, Varese, Milan 1940, pp. 25-26.

to oppose. Quite often there were differences in opinion and so the Risorgimento in fact triggered new political divisions amongst the Polish elite. These aspects of the Italian impact on Polish national thinking have been neglected by historians who have emphasised the similarities between both national movements.

## Themes and perspectives

This thesis seeks to offer a more thorough and complete survey of the reception of the Risorgimento by the Poles. For the first time in the literature, the negative Polish receptions of Italy will be given scrupulous attention, contrasting to previous investigations which have tended to emphasise their positive evaluation.<sup>4</sup> The inclusion of the negative narratives of the Risorgimento will serve to explore the more complete spectrum of the extent to which Polish national discourses were stimulated by the Italian movement. Analysing roughly two decades of the crowning moment of the Risorgimento, we may see how this process fertilized Polish national thinking.

The *first* argument which is systematically developed on this basis is that Polish intellectuals eagerly and multifariously imagined *risorgimental* Italy and appropriated the symbols, philosophy and the accumulated significance of the Italian movement for Polish needs. Drawing from the Italian model, the Poles built their national visions and discussed various projects of reconstructing the nation.

The *second* key aspect of this study touches on the quest for viable models of self-determination as conducted by intellectuals deprived of their nation-state. Besides its general influence on Europe and beyond, the successful national programme of Italian unification had an especially strong impact on the elite members of nations striving for sovereignty, such as the Poles, Irish, Hungarians or Southern Slavs. For them the victorious Risorgimento was the most relevant symbol of hope and source for political instruction. This raises the question as to

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4 Apart from the short studies of Bogdan Szlachta on the Krakow conservatives and the ultramontanes' positions to Italy, other Polish authors while recognizing the ultramontanes' reluctant attitude did not engage with or analyse in depth this interesting case study, usually claiming that this was a movement of secondary importance. As for the Krakow conservatives, oddly enough, the renowned historian S. Kieniewicz classified the main press title, "Czas" as being liberal, having a non specified attitude toward the 'Roman Question' and welcoming the advances of Garibaldi with satisfaction and enthusiasm. S. Kieniewicz, *La Nation polonaise et le Risorgimento*, in: *Il nuovo Regno d'Italia, 1861. Atti del XL Congresso di storia del Risorgimento Italiano*, Turin 1961, Rome 1963, p. 359.

how stateless elites approached other cultures, as well as what they appropriated from those cultures, and how this was implemented. There are many studies tracing the Italian impact on the development of British, Spanish or American national self-representations. In such cases the Risorgimento was viewed by the general public with a special focus on more philosophical issues, such as that of the basic concept of freedom. By contrast, the elites of downtrodden peoples looked for more practical inspiration for their national struggles.

This study presents an opportunity to look at an important aspect of the genesis of national identity-making in the specific stateless and multicultural context from which Polish nationalism emerged. It sheds additional light on the nation-building practices of Eastern Europe, which on the level of theory have remained understudied, or still fall prey to simplification, with the Kohnian dichotomy on Western civic and Eastern ethnic nationalism being the most persistent.<sup>5</sup> These prevailing perspectives strongly essentialized East European nationalisms and gave them a solely Herderian birth certificate, interpreted as the source of their negative aberration. According to these theoretical apriorisms, it is the history of the Eastern peoples which has predestined them toward ethnic, illiberal, exclusive, organic, and in a word 'Eastern', nationalism.<sup>6</sup> The Western type, on the other hand, has always navigated towards civil, voluntaristic, liberal, inclusive and proper nationalism. These premises became the starting point for the research on typologies of nationalisms since Hans Kohn and later John Plamenatz codified them in their influential works.<sup>7</sup>

These post-war perspectives have long informed research on East European nationalisms and have only been challenged in recent decades by scholars from Poland – Andrzej Walicki (1982, 1989, 1994), Bulgaria – Maria Todorova (1997), Romania – Dan Dungaciu (1999), Hungary – Attila Melegh (2006) and from afar, such as Stefan Auer from Melbourne (1997).<sup>8</sup> New and revitalizing

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5 J. P. Arnason, *Nations and Nationalisms: Between General Theory and Comparative History*, in: *The Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism*, ed. by G. Delanty, K. Kumar, London, New Delhi 2006, pp. 44-56.

6 On this dichotomy, see, for instance: D. Miller, *On Nationality*, Oxford 1999; M. Hechter, *Containing Nationalism*, Oxford 2000.

7 H. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, New York 1944; J. Plamenatz, *Two types of Nationalism*, in: *Nationalism. The Nature and Evolution of an Idea*, ed. by E. Kamenka, Canberra 1973.

8 A. Walicki, *Philosophy and romantic nationalism: the case of Poland*, Oxford 1982, pp. 64-74; Idem, *The age of enlightenment and the birth of modern nationhood*, Notre Dame, London 1989, pp. 88-93; Idem, *Poland between East and West: the controversies over self-definition and modernization in partitioned Poland*, Cambridge 1994;

perspectives have arrived from colonial and postcolonial studies (Edward Said's influential idea of orientalism for example) – Larry Wolff, Maria Todorova, Visna Goldsworthy, Milica Bakić-Hayden, Iver Neumann and Ezequiel Adamovsky have disclosed the 'hegemonic' Western discourses on the East.<sup>9</sup>

This study discusses the variety of national visions which were elaborated by the Poles using references to the Risorgimento. Their diverse and contradictory relationship proves that there was not a steady, uncontested and natural progression of Poles toward ethnic nationalism (toward which the East was seemingly doomed on account of its socio-cultural and political appearance). The nationalism project in this region was realised along fairly similar lines as it was in the West and it was constructed (and not given) through discourses which were adapted to the changing political circumstances. The Polish reactions to the Risorgimento reveal the polyphonic character of Polish national discourses. In principle the divisions within the Polish political milieu were home grown and exacerbated by the loss of Polish sovereignty, by the question of in whose interests should a future independent state be established and influenced by the upheavals of 1830-31, both in Europe and in Poland. The Polish debate on the Risorgimento reflected a further development of political-ideological positions in reply to ongoing events; it was an adaptation of ideas and tactics derived from the study of Italian experience which often deepened the existing – or provoked new divisions and in the course of which tentative national ideas solidified into comprehensive national concepts which remained present in the Polish consciousness until the present time. The three main political stands discussed here, with considerable Italian inspiration, worked out – to borrow the language of J. Jedlicki – a variety of visions of future Poland and elaborated the complex vocabulary necessary to articulate them.<sup>10</sup>

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M. Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, New York, Oxford 1997; D. Dungaciu, *East and West and the "Mirror of Nature" Nationalism in West and East Europe - Essentially Different?* in: *A Decade of Transformation, IWM Junior Visiting Fellows Conferences*, Vienna 1999; A. Melegh, *On the East-West Slope. Globalization, nationalism, racism and discourses on Central and Eastern Europe*, Budapest 2006; S. Auer, *Two Types of Nationalism in Europe?* "Russian and Euro-Asian Bulletin" 1997, vol. 7, no. 12; Idem, *Liberalism in Central Europe*, London, New York 2004.

- 9 E.g. L. Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment*, Stanford 2004; V. Goldsworthy, *Inventing Ruritania: the imperialism of imagination*, New Haven, London 1998; I. Neumann, *Uses of the Other. 'The East' in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis 1999; E. Adamovsky, *Euro-Orientalism and the Making of the Concept of Eastern Europe in France, 1810-1880* "The Journal of Modern History" 77, 2005.
- 10 J. Jedlicki, *Dzieje inteligencji polskiej do roku 1918*, vol. 2: *Błędne koło*, Warsaw 2008, p. 33.

In the case studies, the political factors behind the evolution of Polish nationalism are specified: loss of statehood, three different natures and policies of the partitioners, two aborted titanic revolts (1830, 1863), and lack of political support from foreign powers for the Polish cause (which was granted to other struggling nationalities, such as the Greeks, Belgians, Italians, and Romanians). These factors are set against the European background: the onset of the Romantic Herderian and Michelet' nationalisms, revolutionary struggle against the Holy Alliance and secular-religious conflict. Here the significance of the French Revolution to the Polish thought should be emphasized. As B. Szlachta observes, though the émigré democrats and moderate liberals from Czartoryski's circle were in principle in opposition, in their minds the Polish thought merged into one with the revolutionary ideals of 1798, which expressed the national question only in the political and social forms, disregarding legal circumstances of the new order.

We shall see that notwithstanding the different conditions of the development of Polish nationalism (statelessness), the very mechanisms of nation-building processes did not differ dramatically from those in other European nations. Both in Polish and West European cases the discursive creations of nationalism (described by Hobsbawm, Ranger), the means and limitations of reaching the public (Anderson, Gellner, Hroch), appeals to the emotions (Stearns) and overwriting of existing identities (Smith, Banti) were similar.<sup>11</sup> In the Polish case the nationalizing project was not carried out by the state, but was, rather, a voluntary assignment of the social elite, of the intelligentsia who given its mainly gentrified origins (which epitomized the national community prior to 1795) felt entitled to speak on behalf of the nation. It aspired to (re)create a state in which its political culture could be freely realised. In this sense, Polish nationalism was not far removed from that of Italy or Germany.

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11 *The invention of tradition*, ed. by E. Hobsbawm, T. Ranger, Cambridge 1983; B. Anderson, *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*, London 1983; E. Gellner, *Nations and nationalism*, Oxford 1983; M. Hroch, *Social preconditions of national revival in Europe: a comparative analysis of the social composition of patriotic groups among the smaller European nations*, Cambridge, New York 1985; *Emotion and social change: toward a new psychohistory*, ed. by P. N. Stearns, C. Z. Stearns, New York 1988; A. Banti, *La nazione del Risorgimento: parentela, santità e onore alle origini dell'Italia unita*, Turin 2000.

The similarity of the Italian, German and Polish cases was conspicuous for John Breuille.<sup>12</sup> Thus when creating his typology of nationalisms he attempted to place them in the category of ‘unification nationalism’. All three developed under the conditions of the lack of a nation-state and all aimed at unity during the nineteenth century. Furthermore, all three were confined to social and political elites whose aims were remote from popular interests and thus had limited internal support. Instead, they all enjoyed sympathy from public opinion in Western Europe and moreover, all of them were inclined to legitimate their programme in ‘historical-cum-territorial’ terms (the German Confederation, the peninsula, the historic Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth).<sup>13</sup> Finally, in all these cases, national discourses seem to predominate over expressions of regional identities (linguistic minorities had still not strongly articulated their claims).<sup>14</sup>

The more recent typology by Michael Hechter presupposes that the ‘unification nationalism’ involves the merger of politically divided but culturally homogenous territories.<sup>15</sup> Although the elite of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was culturally Polonized, the gentry was still far from being culturally homogenous, not to mention the profound ethnic divisions between the other strata. Perhaps the best elucidation would be to situate Polish nationalism somewhere between the ‘unification’ and a ‘peripheral’ type, with the latter attempting to secede from an expanding power. This type corresponds fairly well with the character of many East European national movements, which gained a strong stimulus in struggling against neighbouring hegemonic powers and their growing state-building nationalisms (German, Russian). These struggles were paralleled by the emancipatory struggles of internal minorities (e.g. Slovaks against the Hungarians, Ukrainians against the Poles).<sup>16</sup> East

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12 J. Breuille, *Nationalism and the State*, Manchester 1993, p. 11. Breuille claims that the case of Polish nationalism is particularly difficult to be classified, and as whole it can be placed in all existing categories.

13 Ibidem, p. 121.

14 Nevertheless, Breuille also discerns differences between German, Italian and Polish unification nationalisms. They are of the political nature: the first two consisted in unification of a number of nominally sovereign states, with the leadership from one of them and they necessitated appealing to remote history to legitimate their claims. The Polish nationalist movement, on the other hand, concerned territory that was fully occupied and was not concentrated around one free centre. It had to act against the governments which controlled it, whereas German and Italian nationalist could cooperate with Prussian and Piedmontese states. Moreover the Poles did not have to look far into the past to offer historical justification for their claims.

15 M. Hechter, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

16 M. Cornis-Pope, J. Neubauer, *Towards a History of the Literary Cultures in East-Central Europe: Theoretical Reflections* “ACLS Occasional Paper” 2002, no. 52, p. 10.

European movements were fully dialectical: Polish nationalism, to that extent, appeared as a reaction to the de-nationalizing practices of the partitioners, a tendency which is addressed in this thesis.

Polish nationalists placed particularly strong emphasis on identity and history as a means of overcoming the internal incongruities and inspiring those inhabiting the former Polish territory to collective action. This emphasis on the historicity of nationhood, especially its time-honoured culture embodied in myths and symbols, has been recognized by ethnosymbolists (such as Anthony Smith) as an important strategy of nation-building. The outcome depended on the creative and receptive actions of the people. However, as we shall see this cultural facet of nationalism did not automatically entail the ethnic exclusivity of its Polish (or Eastern) version.

The *third* aspect of the thesis, which has implications for studies beyond Poland, concerns the relationship between nationalism and religion. As outlined above, the religious question provoked by the Italian movement became one of the most contentious issues which drove a wedge between sections of the Polish elite. A large part of the Polish elite used this opportunity to underscore and promote the Catholicity of the Polish nation. Similarly, the religious imperative became a lens through which the oppressed Irish nationalists, Spanish or American Catholics perceived the Italian movement.<sup>17</sup> The Risorgimento was an important fault-line, splintering the European religious outlook and not only moving forward the secularization process (what is typically emphasized) but also consolidating Catholic support around the pope anew. In the Polish case, it had a very strong dividing impact and in the long run became one of the cornerstones for the modern Catholic outlook of Polish nationalism. The example of Poland demonstrates how religion, universal in nature, may become adapted to serve national purposes.<sup>18</sup>

Importantly, the present thesis provides arguments to substantiate the idea that Polish modern nationalism was originally not necessarily bound to Catholicism (A. Walicki, G. Zubrzycki, B. Porter). Although, as ethnosymbolists claim (A. Smith, J. Armstrong, A. Hastings), old religious communities provided the material from which modern nations could later be built, these were the nationalist narratives which retrospectively constructed and

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17 J. O'Brien, *Irish public opinion on the Risorgimento 1859-60* "Irish Historical Studies" 2005, vol. 34, no. 135; P. D'Agostino, *Rome in America: Transnational Catholic Ideology from the Risorgimento to Fascism*, Chapel Hill 2004; A. Elorza Domingues, *El Risorgimento visto por la prensa Espanola* "Revista de Estudios Politicos" 1963, no. 128.

18 A. Kloskowska, *National Cultures at the Grass-Root Level*, Budapest 2001, p. 28.

reinforced this religious continuity.<sup>19</sup> The discourse on the anti-religious facet of the Risorgimento performed by the Poles, who remained partly under the rule of Orthodox and Protestant states, contributed to the construction of a national memory of a ‘primordially and eternally Catholic Polish nation’. The Polish case shows how in the state of emergency, religion may become a national marker. This always involves the selection and annihilation of inconvenient and alternative memories and identities (Hobsbawm and Ranger). Case studies on the conservatives and ultramontanes demonstrate the circumstances in which religion and Polish national identity were renegotiated and finally entangled, that is to say religion became nationalized. The case study on the democrats on the other hand (who ascribed a sacred nature to the nation) contributes to the description of ‘religionization’ of the nation (F.W. Graf, P. Walkenhorst, H. G. Haupt).<sup>20</sup> These descriptions of the role of religion in Polish national projects may, in part, challenge the thesis that the collapse of religion and the secularisation process were the conditions for the success of nationalism.<sup>21</sup> Instead, it shows that in certain circumstances the success of nationalism was conditioned by its merging with religion.

Last but not least, the present thesis revolves around the role of the intellectual elite in the 19<sup>th</sup>-century nation-making process. Given its statelessness, the educated elite played a crucial role in nationalist projects; it was an inventor and a carrier of national identities. Therefore in the thesis two elements of the processes of creating national identity met – first, the contribution that the intellectual elite made to the creation of national consciousness and, second, one of the ways in which national identities are constituted, through cultural transfer and contact with the ‘other’. The main actors in this research are the Polish intellectual elite, while the elements of the transferred culture have been selected from the framework of the Italian Risorgimento.

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19 G. Zubrzycki, *The crosses of Auschwitz. Nationalism and religion in post-communist Poland*, Chicago, London 2006, p. 21.

20 The insightful analysis of this literature on the relationship between nation and religion: H.G. Haupt, *Religion and nation in Europe in the 19th century: some comparative notes* “Estudos Avancados” 2008, vol. 22, no. 62.

21 H. U. Wehler, *Nationalismus*, Munich 2003.

## Historiographical account and contribution to current research

The goal to assess the contribution of the Risorgimento to the formation of Polish identity places the present thesis within the recent scholarly interest in the significance of cultural transfer and in the constructed nature of national identifications. In the studies on nationalism, analysing cultural transfer means identifying new sources from beyond the national culture which contributed to the development of national ideologies. The Risorgimento was at an early stage recognized as an important source which nourished the narratives and ideologies of many nations.

One of the key publications in this context was the volume *Il nuovo Regno d'Italia*, which demonstrated that the Risorgimento was not just a great Italian affair, but that it exerted an influence on the political philosophies and actions of many European states, among them: England, Greece, France, Germany and Poland.<sup>22</sup> Similar, though less numerous studies were conducted for Spain, the Balkans, and the United States.<sup>23</sup> Recently, the significance of the Risorgimento

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22 *Il nuovo Regno d'Italia, 1861...* The volume includes articles on Italian impact on England (D. Beales), on Greece (A. Daskalakis), on France (J. Leflon and P. Guiral), on Germany (T. Schieder) and on Poland (S. Kieniewicz).

23 E.g. M. Leporatti, *Nicola Balcescu e il risorgimento nazionale in Romania*, Rome 1971; F. Guida, *L'Italia e il Risorgimento balcanico: Marco Antonio Canini*, Rome 1984; R. M. Peterson, *Echoes of the Italian Risorgimento in Contemporaneous American Writers* "PMLA" 1932, no. 47, 1; many works by: H. Marraro, among them: *American opinion on the unification of Italy, 1846-61*, New York 1932. Some British works in the older style: E. Morelli, *L'Inghilterra di Mazzini*, Rome 1965; H. W. Rudman, *Italian nationalism and English letters: figures of the Risorgimento and Victorian men of letters*, New York 1940; also: I. M. Pascual Sastre, *La Italia del Risorgimento y la Spana del Selenio democratico (1868-1874)*, Madrid 2001.

Especially interesting is the literature on connections with other oppressed nations struggling for their independence with the Risorgimento. It covers almost the whole of European East, the Balkans, Romania and Hungary. One of the initiators of the research on the Risorgimento's role for the political, religious and national thinking of the Eastern Europeans was Angelo Tamborra. A. Tomborra, *Cavour e i Balcani*, Turin 1958; see also: F. Guida, *L'Europa centro-orientale*, in: *Bibliografia dell'età del Risorgimento 1970-2001*, Florence 2003; P. Fornaro, *Risorgimento italiano e questione ungherese (1849-1867). Marcello Cerruti e le intese politiche italo-magiare*, Rubbettino 1995; S. Delureanu, *Il Risorgimento italiano nella stampa romena*, in *Saggi di storia del giornalismo in memoria di Leonida Balestreri*, Savona 1982; Idem, *I democratici romeni e il Comitato Democratico Europeo (1850-1857)*, in: *Mazzini e gli scrittori politici europei (1837-1857)*, ed. by S. Mastellone, Florence 2005; *Risorgimento: Italia e Romania 1859-1879. Esperienze a confronto*, ed. by G. Lami, Milan-Bucarest 1992, N. Stipaevic, *Serbia e Italia nel XIX secolo* "Quaderni giuliani di storia" 2000, vol. XXI; B. Valota,

has been studied with particular reference to the British national conceptions. The differences between recent British studies and earlier literature are conspicuous. Over the last two decades Anglophone scholarly interest in the Risorgimento has undergone an important change, the reasons for which Lucy Riall discerns in the approach to 19th-century nationalism pioneered by, for example, Anderson, Hobsbawm as well as the methodologies of the new cultural history.<sup>24</sup> They resulted in the renewed interest in the Risorgimento which reaches for new conclusions about its origins, expressions, its appeal and long-term impact. Undoubtedly, these new approaches have breathed new intellectual life into the timeworn subject of the Risorgimento. One of the most recent volumes, most fitting in these new analytical concepts, is *Giuseppe Mazzini and the Globalization of Democratic Nationalism*; where a variety of papers have presented in a new light the extent to which Mazzini's work and life influenced nations across Europe, the Americas and India.<sup>25</sup>

In the recent years, authors such as Lucy Riall, Paul Ginsborg, Maurizio Isabella, Maura O'Connor and Lucy Turner Voakes attached special importance to the implications of the cause of Italian freedom to the circulation of liberal ideas in Britain. For example, M. Isabella claims that the Risorgimento helped define the identity of Britain as a political community.<sup>26</sup> M. O'Connor, on the other hand, argues that the English middle classes' fascination with Italian desire to create a sovereign state helped recast the British political landscape.<sup>27</sup> Studies such as these reveal the employment of the 'Italian Question' in the

*Giuseppe Mazzini's 'Geopolitics of Liberty' and Italian Foreign Policy toward 'Slavic Europe'* "East European Quarterly" 2003, no. 37, 2.

- 24 The quote comes from the call for papers written for the conference 'The Risorgimento revisited', held in New York, in April 2008.
- 25 *Giuseppe Mazzini and the Globalization of Democratic Nationalism, 1830-1920*, ed. by C. A. Bayly, E. F. Biagini, Oxford 2008.
- 26 M. Isabella, *Italian Exiles and British Politics before and after 1848*, in: *Exiles from European revolutions: refugees in mid-Victorian England*, ed. by S. Freitag, London 2003. See, also: Ch. P. Brand, *Italy and the English Romantics*, Cambridge 1957; P. Ginsborg, *Il mito del Risorgimento nel mondo britannico: 'la vera poesia della politica'* "Il Risorgimento" 1995, vol. 48; M. O'Connor, *The Romance of Italy and the English Imagination*, London 1998; L. Turner Voakes, *English liberal culture and the Italian question, c. 1850-1918*, EUI PhD thesis, Florence 2009. Moreover, Elena Bacchin is working on the project, *L'Italia degli inglesi. La Gran Bretagna filo-italiana nell'età del Risorgimento (1847-64)*, where she traces the transfer and cultural translation of the Italian national and patriotic discourse to the British political environment (through the analysis of the language of the propaganda which promoted popular enthusiasm for the Italian cause in Britain).
- 27 M. O'Connor, *op. cit.*, p. 1; A. Korner, L. Riall, *Introduction: the new history of Risorgimento nationalism* "Nations and Nationalism" 2009, no. 15, 3, p. 398.

formation of political allegiances beyond the peninsula and the way in which it anticipated the coming of first ‘global moments’ in the politics (to borrow the terminology of Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier<sup>28</sup>).

Cultural and political ideas which sprang up out of the Italian movement became a part of a campaign of national liberations in different parts of the world. The Risorgimento contributed to a wide-reaching reevaluation of political attitudes. This new perspective on globalization and communication (encouraging an investigation of the role of networks, new communications forms and media) has led to a re-analysis of the Risorgimento’s role in different national cultures. As well as for Britain, this has been compellingly undertaken for the United States. The monograph by Paola Gemme, *Domesticating foreign struggles: the Italian Risorgimento and antebellum American Identity* shows how the United States reinvented itself at home through a discourse about foreignness, more precisely through a deliberate misreading of the Italian Risorgimento.<sup>29</sup> Discussing Italian political prospects provided an opportunity for Americans to voice controversies about their own politics, which led to the creating, and strengthening, of their national myths and archetypes, among others the influential republican prototype. Gemme’s work was recently complemented by Dennis Berthold’s *American Risorgimento*, where he reproduces Italy as a cultural construction produced in America for satisfying American needs in the uncertain decades surrounding the Civil War.<sup>30</sup>

The impact of the ‘Italian moment’ was no less visible in Poland, and where discussing Italy the Poles were discussing, revising and sometimes constructing their own national conceptions. In doing so they used Italy as a running commentary for the changes Poland was undergoing at the same time. Similarly to the above-mentioned American studies, the present thesis focuses on the uses of the discussion of Italian political prospects in articulating the domestic Polish national concerns. This specific approach, combined with updated methodological and theoretical perspectives in national studies, is the rationale behind conducting new research on the topic.

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28 Those authors define a global moment as an “event of a popular significance that appealed to people in discrete and distant locations. It was a focal point for a whole set of different hopes and anxieties that coalesced around the notion of an interconnected future”, S. Conrad, D. Sachsenmaier, *Introduction*, in: *Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s-1930s*, ed. by S. Conrad, D. Sachsenmaier, New York 2007, pp. 12-13.

29 P. Gemme, *Domesticating foreign struggles: the Italian Risorgimento and antebellum American Identity*, Athens 2005.

30 D. Berthold, *American Risorgimento. Herman Melville and the Cultural Politics of Italy*, Columbus 2009.

As regards the state of the art, across the decades of the twentieth century numerous studies have created a very rich historiography of Polish-Italian relations. We can distinguish two main currents: the first focusing on artistic and cultural relations; the second concentrated on their political counterparts. In general, the majority of works on Polish-Italian relations are written within the cultural framework (from basic syntheses on cultural contacts to more detailed monographs examining influences in a particular artistic field).<sup>31</sup>

The second current in the historiography of the Polish-Italian relations, characterized by its reference to political issues, was initiated by Marcei Handelsman and his students Kalikst Morawski, Mieczysław Żywczyński and Adam Lewak.<sup>32</sup> They fruitfully continued Handelsman's approach after the war (the historian tragically died in a concentration camp), together with Emanuel Halicz, Stefan Kieniewicz, Henryk Batowski, Jerzy W. Borejsza, Jerzy Wszolek, Leszek Kuk, and Stanisław Kalemka. Their focus was on the contact between Polish and Italian democratic movements, particularly on Mazzini and Garibaldi (*cf.* numerous Lewak's articles). In their articles Żywczyński and Kalemka concentrated on the religious question, Wszolek and Kuk devoted their attention to Hôtel Lambert's initiatives in Italy, and the diplomatic relations were covered by Ludwik Bazylow and Jerzy Zdrada.<sup>33</sup> From the Italian side, Polish-Italian contacts were analysed especially by Giovanni Maver, L. Elda Funaro, Giovanni Spadolini, Enrico Damiani, Marina Bersano Begey, Ennio di Nolfo, Giampiero Bozzolato, Guido Franzinetti, Wolfango Giusti, *ed al.*<sup>34</sup>

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31 These studies were conducted by, among others: Stanisław Windakiewicz (1863-1943), Walerian Preisner, Bronisław Bilinski, Mieczysław Brahmer, Krzysztof Żaboklicki, Henryk Barycz, Joanna Ugniewska, Anna Tylusinska, Emanuele Kanceff, Richard Lewanski, Danuta Quirini Poplawska, Andrzej Litwornia and some Italian scholars, such as Giovanni Maver, Andrea Ciampani, Giampiero Bozzolato, Luca Bernardini, Vittorio Branca *ed alia*.

32 Kalikst Morawski is also the author of two bibliographical articles treating the historiography of Polish-Italian relations: K. Morawski, *Gli studi sul Risorgimento in Polonia* "Rassegna storica del Risorgimento" 1934, Idem, *Gli studi sul Risorgimento in Polonia (1934-1959)* "Rassegna storica del Risorgimento" 1960.

33 Apart from the role of the Risorgimento, some attention has been given to the impact of the preceding Italian influences, e.g. the works on the reception of Machiavellian thought in Poland. H. Barycz, *Myśl i legenda Machiavella w Polsce w. XVI i XVII* "Nauka i Sztuka" 1946, no. 2, 2; J. Malarczyk, *La fortuna di Niccolò Machiavelli in Polonia*, Wrocław 1969.

34 G. Maver, *Podróże polskich pisarzy do Włoch*, Rome 1946; idem, *Literatura polska i jej związki z Włochami*, Warsaw 1988; G. Spadolini, *Risorgimento italiano e risorgimento po-*

As has already been indicated and will be discussed in due course, these works laid a strong foundation for the creation of the still present image of close cooperation between Poles and Italians during the time of their national struggles. They identify major personalities as well as the most significant themes in these struggles. They note that despite the considerable geographical distance between these two lands and despite their economic, political and cultural differences, the Poles and Italian were close because both were oppressed by invaders and they held similar aspirations.<sup>35</sup> The literature to date covers well the cooperation of Poles and Italians at the military level, especially the participation of the Polish insurgents in Italian military encounters.<sup>36</sup> What has been of special interest to many authors are the circumstances in which Poles cooperated with Italians during the Springtime of Nations. In particular, much focus has been given to the history of the Polish legion, formed by the most famous Polish poet, Adam Mickiewicz.<sup>37</sup> The publication crowning this, to some extent exalted writing on Polish-Italian relations, was the fruit of the cooperation of the historians from both countries, and was published under the telling title: *La nazione polacca e l'unita d'Italia. Catalogo-almanacco dedicato alla fraternita italo-polacca....*<sup>38</sup> Many of the works from the political current

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- lacco: una comune lotta per la libertà dall'Ottocento ad oggi: discorso pronunciato all'Università di Torun in occasione del conferimento della laurea "honoris causa", Rome 1993.*
- 35 E. Halicz, *The Poles and the Unification of Italy*, in: Idem, *Polish National Liberation Struggles and the Genesis of the Modern Nation*, Odense 1982; Idem, *I Polacchi e il Risorgimento (1859-1866)* in: *Problemi dell'Unita d'Italia*, Rome 1962, A. Lewak, *Od związków węglarskich do Młodej Polski*, Warsaw 1920; Idem, *Udział Polaków w włoskich walkach o wolność*, Warsaw 1929, vol. I; K. Morawski, *Polacy i sprawa polska w dziejach Italii w latach 1830-1866*, Warsaw 1936.
- 36 S. Kieniewicz, K. Morawski, *La Polonia e il risorgimento italiano*, Rome 1960; J. Belkot, *Nie opuszczajcie Polski! Pośród głosów poetów włoskich o powstaniu styczniowym*, in: *Toruńskie studia polsko-włoskie II, Studii polacco-italiani di Toruń II*, ed. J. Belkot, Z. Witkowski, Toruń 1992; L. Elda, *L'Italia e l'insurrezione polacca: la politica estera e l'opinione pubblica italiana nel 1863*, Modena 1964; G. Franzinetti, *Piemonte Italiano e Piemonte Galiziano. Alcune osservazioni su metafore e modelli storici*, in: *Polonia, Italia e culture slave: Aspetti comparati tra Storia e Contemporaneita*, ed. by L. Marinelli, M. Piacentini, K. Żaboklicki, Warsaw, Rome 1997; K. Jaworska, *M Bersano Begey e la tradizione polonofila piemontese* "La Nuova Antologia" 1993, vol. 128, no. 2185; Idem, *La Polonia*, in: *Movimenti risorgimentali nell'Ottocento Europeo*, ed. by C. Vernizzi, Turin 1993; *La Polonia, il Piemonte e l'Italia. Omaggio a Marina Bersano Begey*, Alessandria 1998.
- 37 M. Handelsman, *Rok 1848-1849 we Włoszech i polityka ks. Adama Czartoryskiego*, Krakow 1935.
- 38 *La nazione polacca e l'unita d'Italia. Catalogo-almanacco dedicato alla fraternita italo-polacca in occasione della mostra storica 'Italia Polonia nel Risorgimento' nel cen-*

presented the Risorgimento as a foreign phenomenon generally reinvigorating the Polish national movement. A very interesting and condensed article by S. Kieniewicz *La nation polonaise et le Risorgimento* is an apt case in point.<sup>39</sup>

The pervasive emphasis on the positive nature of Polish-Italian relations is still a characteristic feature of the historiography on this topic. Its selective character and methodological imprecision has largely belittled the significance of the divisions among Poles on the Italian and Roman Questions. This may be a consequence of the profile of Polish historiography, which after 1918 aimed at the consolidation of the newly established state and tried to reconcile the two contradictory figures: that of a Polish revolutionary (supporter of the Risorgimento) and that of a Polish Catholic (supporter of Rome). This is, of course, far from surprising because at the initial stage of state formation the distortion of history is always a common practice as there is usually an urgent need to consolidate the sense of national unity and, by the same token, to conceal the strength of internal divisions.<sup>40</sup> It was the case with Italy after 1860, where the myth of the harmonious cooperation between the fathers of the Risorgimento was established and followed until the new wave of *revisioismo antirisorgimentale* with works such as that of D. Mack Smith (disclosing internal conflicts in Italy).<sup>41</sup>

This was also the case with Poland after 1918. The two main figures of the Polish struggle for independence represented two different streams embedded in the mid-19<sup>th</sup>-century traditions: Józef Piłsudski – revolutionary, and Roman Dmowski – Catholic. The historiography after 1918 made efforts to bring

*tenario dell'unita d'Italia e dell'insurrezione polacca del 1863*, ed. by S. Kieniewicz, M. Bersano Begey, B. Meriggi, R. Picchio, C. Verdiani, K. Morawski, A. Tamborra, F. di Tondo, Rome 1963.

39 S. Kieniewicz, *La nation polonaise...*, p. 353. The author claims that notwithstanding the fact that the Poles had neither official diplomatic relations with Italy nor a government, they discussed whether to take part in the Italian struggle and took very different positions regarding the Italian problems. Kieniewicz argues that the Italian inspiration made a key contribution to the outbreak of the January uprising. The most recent works by Olga Płaszczewska and Monika Gurgul go in the direction of the analysis of the visions of Italy in the Polish literature and press, but more in the cultural than political perspective. O. Płaszczewska, *Wizja Włoch w polskiej i francuskiej literaturze okresu Romantyzmu 1800-1850*, Krakow 2003; M. Gurgul, *Echa włoskie w prasie polskiej (1860-1939)*. *Szkice bibliograficzne*, Krakow 2007.

40 Similar phenomenon is described e.g. for French post-war national identity creation in: *Une poignée de misérables: l'épuration de la société française après la Seconde Guerre mondiale*, ed. by M. O. Baruch, Paris 2003.

41 D. Mack Smith, *Cavour and Garibaldi 1860: a study in political conflict*, Cambridge 1954.

together the two traditions.<sup>42</sup> In a nutshell, the narrative concentrates, on the one hand, on the Polish freedom fighters cooperating with Italian revolutionaries, and, on the other, on the great role of the Catholic faith and patriotic clergy in strengthening Polish identity. Even though the works (published between 1930 and today) by authors such as Mieczysław Żywczyński, Hanna Dylągowa or Andrzej Walicki dealt with the other side of the coin and also demonstrated cracks in the Polish-Church relations during the post-partitioned period, they did not really change the prevalent conception. In the communist period when they were read, the importance of the Church as a stronghold of liberty pushed their theses somewhat aside from popular imagination and endorsed the view of the vital role of the Church in Polish resistance against the partitioners. This happened despite the fact that these authors, unlike many others at the time, worked without prejudice and with good historical craft.<sup>43</sup> Finally, it must be noted that there were few attempts to look at the religious problem of the Risorgimento as a factor dividing Polish opinion on Italy. This problem was, however, concisely analysed in the articles by Stanisław Kalemka and Ettore Ancheri.<sup>44</sup>

## Methodology

To explore the issues raised above, this thesis analyses the cultural transfer of ideas – those which the Poles gleaned from the Risorgimento, and which they appropriated and later proposed for their own national community. This cross-national perspective seeks to understand the process of the movement of ideas and their impact on different national discourses in Poland.

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42 In fact, first attempts to do so were undertaken already in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and again with the use of Italian context, see: S. Buszczyński, *Italia e Polonia*, Venice 1883.

43 This cannot be said of other works on the Polish-Vatican relations released as a part of the communist propaganda with the essential aim of compromising the Holy See in the eyes of Polish society (e.g. the largely forgotten works by Nowicki, Pelka, Bieńkowski).

44 E. Ancheri, *L'atteggiamento della stampa polacca verso il moto unitario italiano (1859-1862)*, in: *Relazioni tra Padova e la Polonia. Studi in onore dell'Università di Cracovia nel VI centenario della sua fondazione*, Padova 1964; S. Kalemka, *La presse polonaise sur la question de l'unification de l'Italie dans les années 1985-1861* [1990] "Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento" 1986, no. 1; Idem, *Raz jeszcze o stosunku pasy polskiej do kwestii zjednoczenia Italii*, in: *Toruńskie Studia Polsko-Włoskie, Studii polacco-italiani di Toruń*, Toruń 1986; B. Cygler, *Wielka Emigracja wobec problemu likwidacji władzy doczesnej papieża w latach 1849-1862*, in: B. Grott, *Religia chrześcijańska a idee polityczne*, Krakow 1998.

Although Polish and Italian historians have devoted considerable attention to the contacts between their nationalists, this was undertaken without clear methodological agendas. The present thesis explores this area by focusing on the transfer of ideas between Italy and Poland which were related to the strategies of national survival. The perspective of transfer studies, to borrow the language of Benedicte Zimmermann and Michael Werner, underlines foreign contributions to the concept of a national culture.<sup>45</sup> To paraphrase the popular saying we may contend that ‘No nation is an island’ since it usually develops in contact and under the influence of foreign factors.<sup>46</sup> The identification of these factors allows us to place what has sometimes been regarded as a singular national phenomenon within a broader context, and by so doing, historicize it and debunk the myths of the exceptionality of many national paths. This applies to both cultural and political aspects of national performances (we speak nowadays not only of the cultural but also of the political transfer, namely the migration of political practices across national borders).<sup>47</sup> *Transfergeschichte*, *histoire croisée* or *diffusion theory* help reveal borrowings and highlight phenomena that might have similar grounds but have been interpreted differently within their specific contexts.<sup>48</sup> In the case of Italy and Poland, similar factors triggered the ideas of revolution, the appeal to the European public sphere and the employment of religion for national purposes, yet these ideas often differed in their very core as well as in the way they were applied in due practice.

Polish intellectuals writing on Italy, who played the role of intercultural agents, operated very selectively according to their own sensibilities and the extent to which they were able to identify their own strivings with the Italian movement. Other factors that contributed to the varying receptions of the Risorgimento were: the changing situation in the Italian Peninsula and the local conditions of tripartite Poland. Finally, the visions of Italy were conditioned also

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45 M. Werner and B. Zimmermann, *Beyond comparison: Histoire croisée and the challenge of reflexivity* “History and Theory” 2006, vol. 45, no. 1. For an interesting literature using the category of cultural transfer, see: *German Culture in Nineteenth-century America. Reception, Adaptation, Transformation*, ed. by Lynne Tatlock, Matt Erlin, New York 2005.

46 The paraphrase inspired by Carlo Ginzburg, *No island is an island: four glances at English literature in a world perspective*, New York 2000.

47 H. te Velde, *Political Transfer: An Introduction* “European Review of History” 2005, no.12, 2, p. 206.

48 M. Petruszewicz, *The modernization of the European periphery; Ireland, Poland, and The Two Sicilies, 1820-1870: parallel and connected, distinct and comparable*, in: *Comparison and history: Europe in cross-national perspective*, ed. by D. Cohen, M. O’Connor, New York 2004, p. 155; E. Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovations*, New York 1962.

upon the medium used. Certain literary genres (media) were often predisposed to convey particular types of messages. In the present thesis the political literature is analysed, comprising first of all the press (here circa 25 press titles were examined), but also other forms of publicist writings, brochures, pamphlets, memorandums, official and private correspondence.

The abundance of Polish allusions to the Risorgimento proves the importance of Italy as the point of reference for the Polish elite. This phenomenon must have originated in the self-conscious sense of affinity (connection, equipollence) that Polish recipients felt to Italy. As the motto of this introduction reflects, Polish nationalist thinkers perceived their country as comparable to Italy and they were actively looking for lessons from the other's experience. This is a common phenomenon described, for example by Marta Petrusiewicz in her reflections on Polish, Irish and Italian modernizers, who were consciously looking at the implications of the experience of others for their national cases.<sup>49</sup>

The movement of ideas was shaped by the Polish receptiveness, yet it was taking place within the parameters of the 'influence capacities' of Italy. Current scholarship, following the tendencies of literary studies, questions the viability of the influence model as an explanatory tactic, because the term is hazy and implies passivity of the recipient.<sup>50</sup> With regard to the realm of thought, it is believed that the dynamic consciousness of larger groups renders any authorial attributions not pertinent, the reason for this being that the original ideas are usually muddled up in the discourse of a given culture so that it becomes impossible to distinguish them and measure their actual influence.<sup>51</sup> Being most sceptical about the use of the concept of influence in history, Quentin Skinner suggested that its usefulness might be restored by re-formulating, in a looser manner, the types of relationship which are going to be explained. Instead of establishing direct influences, Skinner maintains that the historian might wish only to suggest the influence of merely a certain 'ambience' on the different

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49 In the abovementioned diffusion theory it is also referred to as *over-likeness*: 'citing foreign models as if they were especially suited to your own national situation'. This aspect of reception of foreign examples usually served as a stimulus for political innovation. Loc. Cit. ; H. te Velde, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

50 The hazy concept of influence is often replaced by or divided between less contested terms, such as inspiration, reception, impact, appropriation, effect, or legacy. See, for instance, *The Impact of Italy. The Grand Tour and Beyond*, ed. by C. Hornsby London 2000, p. 5

51 G. S. Wood, *Influence in History*, in: *The Purpose of the Past. Reflections on the uses of history*, New York 2008, p. 21.

kinds of political commitment.<sup>52</sup> Following the above suggestion, this thesis avoids tracing authorial influences and concentrates instead, with all the risks but also the benefits of the usage of the term, on the influence of the ‘*risorgimental* ambience’ on Polish national thinking.<sup>53</sup>

Assuming a broader perspective on the very content of the Italian influence, one can see that generally it depended on the underlying needs of those intermediary Poles who introduced it to the Polish public. They were selectively interested in the remarkable cultural past of Italy, the beauty of its landscapes, beneficial properties of the climate, and in the events of the Italian national unification. Regardless of the area of interest, however, the majority of the authors referred to their own national problems. To this end, they were using Italy as a background for the presentation of different Polish problems.<sup>54</sup>

Of great importance for this thesis is the inclusion of remarks on Poland within the texts on Italy, which was a common practice among most of the Poles writing on Italy, regardless of their profession. Artists, literati, travellers, politicians, and revolutionaries were all keen on picturing Poland against the Italian background. For example, Adam Mickiewicz famously contrasted the melancholic beauty of a Polish birch with the perfection, verging on artificiality, of an Italian aloe (in his epic poem *Mister Thaddeus*) creating the most well-known metaphor of the intimate familiarity of Poles with their homeland.<sup>55</sup>

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52 Q. Skinner, *The Limits of Historical Explanations* “Philosophy” 1966, vol. 41, no. 157, p. 211.

53 The concept of influence was also criticized by M. Foucault, who found it too passive as well as concealing the actor and the agency. Consequently, what was proposed instead was the term ‘appropriation’, which located the agency in the person of the maker or the receiver. Etymologically, *ad proprius* - to make one’s own – suggests an active and intentional innovation. However, this work presents cases (such as the democrats’ attitude to religion) which indicate that sometimes reactions to Italian affairs were inadvertent; beyond the authorial intentionality of the cultural intermediaries. On the ‘appropriation’, see: R. S. Nelson, *Appropriation*, in: *Critical terms for art history*, ed. by R. S. Nelson, R. Shiff, Chicago, London 2003, p. 160.

54 The historical background was used for illustrating the public morals (in novels, dramas, e.g. A. Asnyk, *Cola Rienzi*, Krakow 1873); the geographical background – for juxtaposing Italian landscape with the character of native lands (in poems, travel accounts) and underlining the difficult fate of exile; the cultural background – for admiration, positioning the Polish culture in the same civilization trajectory (correspondence, memoirs, essays); the social background – national self-identification (self - other); the political background – for discussing the issue of national independence (treatises, memorandums, letters, articles) beyond the censorship limitations.

55 ‘I na południu, w owej pięknej włoskiej ziemi;/ Któż równać się może z drzewami naszymi?/Czy aloes z długimi jak konduktor pałki?/Czy cytryna karlica z złocistymi gał-

Jakub Gordon, a travelogue writer and an exile, who described himself as a ‘tourist under duress’, contended that while his eyes were wandering along the beauty of the Italian landscape he longed even more for another land, one more closely corresponding to his own sentiments and imagination.<sup>56</sup> Similar observations may be found in the accounts of J. I. Kraszewski (of a more cultural nature) or J. Klaczko (more political) from their Italian sojourns. In the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, however, the beauty of the Italian landscape, architecture and art was overshadowed by the political triumph of the Risorgimento. This political affair gained a central place in all Polish writings on Italy. From the treasury trove of influences and from many different Polish representations of ‘Italy’, this thesis seeks to identify those created for political and nation-building ends and with the use of political media. The choice of this slant means that only those visions of Italy that were employed in political debates will be treated here, whereas the undoubtedly powerful expressions of national identity through, for example, travel writing, art or *belles lettres* will be omitted.

The last question about the content of the Italian influence touches upon the issue of what exactly Italy offered the Poles in the framework of politics and national ideology between 1848 and 1871. These were national projects more than the models of a nation, because throughout most of this period both Italy and Poland remained, quite literally, ‘imagined communities’. Deprived of their states, administration and borders, they relied on their inhabitants’ resourcefulness in cultural visualization of their political entities. This ability was very limited socially and the actual number of those willing and able to imagine themselves as a part of Polish and Italian nations did not usually correspond with the numbers which the groups of national ideologues claimed it covered. This is far from surprising since apart from the internal social problems that were a legacy of feudal relations and left the masses nationally unconscious, the rulers over the Polish and Italian lands attempted to erase the local elites’ former identifications. Even the very name ‘Poland’ was challenged during the 19<sup>th</sup> century<sup>57</sup>, and similarly ‘Italy’ was famously and influentially downplayed

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ki./ Z liściem lakierowanym, krótka i pękata./Jako kobieta mała, brzydka, lecz bogata?/  
Czyż nie piękniejsza nasza pocziwa brzezina./ Która jako wieśniaczka, kiedy płacze  
syna./ Lub wdowa męża, ręce załamie, roztoczy/ Po ramionach do ziemi strumienie  
warkoczy.’ *A. Mickiewicz, Pan Tadeusz, czyli ostatni zajazd na Litwie*, (Paris 1834)  
Warsaw 2006, pp. 39-40.

56 J. Gordon, *Turysta z musu*, Lviv 1873, pp. 7-8. Maksymilian Jatowt, pseud. Jakub Gordon was an exile, known especially as a reporter from his travels to America during the Civil War, but also to Kazachstan, and Italy.

57 In the convention of 26<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1797, the three partitioning powers pledged to remove the very name of Poland from official usage for good. Then the name was revived however

by the Austrian diplomat Metternich to the status of a mere ‘*geographical expression*’. The impact of this statement was enhanced by the most quoted statement, uttered allegedly by d’Azeglio: “Now that Italy is made, we must make the Italians”.<sup>58</sup>

The question as to whether the Italians constituted a nation in the time of the Risorgimento has remained a disputed issue ever since. In recent decades, the success of the Italian national project has often been attributed to the role of imagination, invention and the modern means of cultural dissemination of the national content (G. Bollati).<sup>59</sup> However, some scholars, most prominently among them Alberto M. Banti, have argued that the Italian nation was not merely an ‘imagined community’, but it existed already in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and was set in the emotional sphere of the cultural nationalism and its sentimental dimension (with the aid of the widely cherished concepts of kinship, holiness and honour).<sup>60</sup> Nonetheless, the cultural images were not translated into mass political engagement in the Risorgimento, thus many historians insist on the research on the conscious invention of Italy by the political elite.<sup>61</sup>

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in 1815 and described Russian partition as the Polish Kingdom, although the concurrent name: the Congress Kingdom was more popular. After the January uprising, as part of repressions, again the adjective ‘Polish’ was abolished in favour of the name: The Vistula Land.

- 58 *Fatta l’Italia dobbiamo fare gli italiani* – on the authorship of these words, see: S. Patriarca, *Italian vices. Nation and Character from the Risorgimento to the Republic*, Cambridge 2010, p. 51.
- 59 E.g. G. Bollati, *L’Italiano: Il carattere nazionale come storia e come invenzione*, Turin 1983; A. Banti, *Nobili, Risorgimento e formazione discorsiva nazional-patriottica* “Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento” IV 2001. The same author published on literary roots of the Italian national identity, *La nazione del Risorgimento...*
- 60 J. Breuille appreciates that Banti found a middle way between primordialism and modernism: ‘Banti makes the powerful point that nationalism appropriates sentiments of Catholicism, monarchism and family. It is indeed difficult to see how the idea of nation – if genuinely modern and not rooted in early ethnic or national sentiments – could achieve resonance, especially at a popular level, without exploiting already strongly rooted emotional idioms. The modernity resides in the forms of communication and the focus on nation, not in the deep moral and emotional underpinnings of the message communicated.’ Banti’s emotional framework is more convincing in explanation as to why individuals are prepared to die for the national idea (which purely modernist theory fails to clarify); J. Breuille, *Risorgimento nationalism in the light of general debates about nationalism* “Nations and Nationalism” 2009, no. 15, p. 441. In the same volume also: L. Riall, *Nation, ‘deep images’ and the problem of emotions*, p. 402.
- 61 In this context, it is worth consulting the 15 (3) issue of “Nations and Nationalism” from 2009, which is devoted to the discussion of A. Banti’s vision of Italian nationalism. Among especially interesting articles, see: A. Körner, L. Riall, *Introduction: the*

Therefore both Poles and Italian nationalists were operating in the realm of the imagination, which is especially characteristic of national elites without a state, who are forced by the political circumstances to develop beyond-civic criteria of national distinction.<sup>62</sup> They can go in the direction of e.g. ethnic or cultural identifications. Although it is often believed that “the Poles manifested their aspirations for the restitution of their state mainly through conspiracies and risings”,<sup>63</sup> this thesis proves that it was cultural and national discourses which kept the memories of independence alive and helped the elite spread a national sentiment among the masses.<sup>64</sup>

If it was through discourses that Polish identity was reshaped, it is necessary to notice that neither Polish nor Italian elite was ideologically homogenous. In this sense it is difficult to speak of them as unified groups. In Poland after partitions the first late 18<sup>th</sup> century divisions related to the mode of the pro-independence struggle and to the possible alliances (pro-French, pro-Russian, self-reliant orientations). Here the impact of the French revolution on the Polish intelligentsia was also important. During Kościuszko Insurrection 1794 there was the possibility of a new conception of the nation – i.e. the Jacobin conception of the nation based on liberty, equality and fraternity – strongly republican, anti-aristocratic, and anti-clerical (the so-called Polish Jacobins, Hugo Kollataj group of radicals) which survived in various forms and informed

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*new history of Risorgimento nationalism*; M. Isabella, *Emotions, rationality and political intentionality in patriotic discourse*; above cited J. Breuilley. An overview of the literature on the Risorgimento: J.A. Davis, *Rethinking the Risorgimento?* in: *Risorgimento in modern Italian culture*, ed. by N. Bouchard, Rosemont 2005.

62 K. Romaniszyn, *Europe and the Formation of the Polish State, Nation, and National Identity*, in: *Entangled identities: nations and Europe*, ed. by A. Ichijo, W. Spohn, Aldershot 2005, p. 159.

63 A. Chwalba, *Historia Polski 1795-1918*, Krakow 2002, p. 596.

64 J. Dybiec, *Not Only by Sword. Polish Culture and Scholarship in Struggle for Maintaining Poland's National Identity*, p. 329-330. In his work *The role of Polish culture in the Polish nation's liberations strivings*, Janusz Żarnowski noted that the preponderance of patriotic and national elements in artistic works produced a very emotionally-oriented type of culture; J. Żarnowski, *The role of Polish culture in the Polish nation's liberations strivings* “Polish Western Affairs” 1979, vol. XV, no. 2. Many Polish scholars would claim that the total subordination of the Polish culture to the national purposes was a unique example in the history of the nations deprived of their autonomy. “The struggle to preserve this culture, the role it played as a substitute for other spheres of life, especially state life...are and will continue to be a subject of scientific research and theoretical reflection”. K. Żygulski, *Wstęp do zagadnień kultury*, Warsaw 1972, p. 213.

Polish political ideology.<sup>65</sup> After 1831 new splits were provoked by the recriminations as to who was to blame for the failure of the November uprising, later this discussion was extrapolated to the debate over the reasons for the loss of sovereignty in general and it was finally accompanied by the diverse ‘patriotic attitudes’ suggested in order to break the Polish political deadlock (those dissociating themselves from the Polish political tradition and those looking at the despotic Polish neighbours’ appetites as the reason for Poland’s obliteration). All these divisions have been exacerbated by the revolutions of 1848-9 and the following revolutionary, anti-Church facet of the Risorgimento, which Poles were discussing and using as an illustration to their concepts.

### **The actors of the study – the intelligentsia**

The role of the elite – cultural input providers in the building of national communities – is a compelling object of study as it offers alternative explanations to politically determined visions of the past. According to the constructivist theory of nationalism (Gellner, Anderson, Hobsbawm)<sup>66</sup> intellectuals, as the creators of discourses, played a major role in the process of fashioning national identifications. For E. Gellner nationalism seems to arise from a new form of modern education that creates both the intelligentsia and the media through which intellectuals are able to reach their audience. E. Hobsbawm has pointed at the role of the intellectuals in inventing and codifying traditions that were later internalized by the masses. Moreover, special appreciation and emphasis on the centrality of intellectuals to the emergence of national consciousness is given by Grigor Suny and Michael Kennedy. They notice that intellectuals were usually both enlighteners and the articulators of national ideas, especially in conditions of unfreedom and general social unconsciousness.<sup>67</sup>

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65 M. Janowski, *Dzieje inteligencji polskiej do roku 1918*, vol. 1: *Narodziny inteligencji, 1750-1831*, Warsaw 2008, p. 117. The Polish Jacobins operated later in the conspirational Association of Polish Republicans, (Towarzystwo Republikanów Polskich), some of them emigrated and joined the Polish Legions in Italy, others became a part of the government of the Duchy of Warsaw and later Congress Poland (J. Zajęcsek; Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk). During the November Uprising they contributed to Patriotic Society (Towarzystwo Patriotyczne).

66 E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism (New Perspectives on the Past)*, Oxford 1983; B. Anderson, *op.cit.*; E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and nationalism since 1780: programme, myth, reality*, Cambridge 1992.

67 *Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation*, ed. by R. G. Suny, M. D. Kennedy, Ann Arbor 1999, p. 3.

In the absence of rigid definitions applicable to the East European intellectual elite, the problem of finding a common, unquestioned term to denote the main actors in this study may not be entirely resolvable. The word ‘intellectuals’ does not seem to be accurate since this thesis also explores the practices of people who may not be credited as ‘thinkers’. Moreover, they do not correspond with K. Mannheim’s and M. Hroch’s understanding of intellectuals as socially unattached and without clear social foundation.<sup>68</sup> It may be tempting to generalize and assume that the Polish democrats usually came from the petty gentry, the ultramontanes represented to a significant extent the clergy, the Krakow conservatives – the landowners, and Hôtel Lambert was perceived as a faction of the aristocrats. While such generalisations are inaccurate, they are, nonetheless, the first identifications which come to mind with regard to the groups studied here. As a matter of fact, among the democrats there were also representatives of the wealthy gentry; the ultramontane clergy often recruited from the former landowners, and a good handful of members of Hôtel Lambert had lower family status.

In the view of the defectiveness of the category of intellectuals when applied to this thesis, a different category may instead prove valid. Abandoning the social stratum framework and considering individuals and their practices: Adam Czartoryski<sup>69</sup> as author of essays and memorandums, his son Władysław, who was described as an excellent intellectual<sup>70</sup>, Julian Klaczko as a recognized European journalist<sup>71</sup>, Adam Mickiewicz as a poet and a philosopher, Maurycy Mann and Jan Koźmian as publicists and editors-in-chief of leading periodicals, Stanisław Tarnowski as a professor of the Jagiellonian University, etc., it becomes evident that most of them belonged to the literati, men of letters, the cultural elite, people who made a theoretical contribution to the national visions. At the same time, they often tried to turn their words into action and would occasionally perform the functions of legionaries, diplomats or deputies rather than intellectuals. What they had in common was, by and large, their social anchoring in the nobility. Even if they did not actually originate from the Polish gentry (e.g. J. Klaczko of Jewish origin, J. Lelewel of a German descent, T. Krępowiecki from the Warsaw bourgeoisie, J.N. Janowski from a peasant family), they aspired to the code of behaviour of the Polish nobility, and upon

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68 M. Hroch, *In the National Interest. Demands and Goals of European National Movements of the Nineteenth Century: A Comparative Perspective*, Prague 2000, p. 216.

69 A. Czartoryski was the author of numerous poems, short stories, essays, political brochures, and memorandums.

70 M. Kukiel, *Władysław Czartoryski*, PSB, p. 303.

71 J. Klaczko published in many recognized foreign newspapers, such as “Deutsche Zeitung”, “Revue de Paris”, “Revue Contemporaine” and “Revue des Deux Mondes.”

achieving it, usually through higher education, they were admitted as members to this stratum. As Miroslav Hroch observes, education and social status were much entangled in Eastern Europe, especially university education, which had been of an aristocratic nature for so long that even non-nobles who acquired it were perceived as nobility.<sup>72</sup> The noble origins and the noble code of behaviour were the first features of the Polish intelligentsia as a group to be recognized, and quite soon, criticized.<sup>73</sup> As for the name itself, for the first time the group called themselves *inteligencja*, in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century and since then a definition of this notion remains a moot point.

Undoubtedly, the intelligentsia was equipped (although not as much as in state-endowed communities) with the means necessary for the ‘inventing of tradition’. This interesting paradigm proposed by E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger poses new questions for the case of state-less and middle class-less East European nations, because in contrast to Western Europe, here it was not the state or educated and rich bourgeoisie that was the carrier of modern national ideas, but the group originating mainly from impoverished landowners usually divorced from political power.<sup>74</sup>

Antonio Gramsci’s category of ‘organic’ intellectuals may be useful, in part. According to his theory, organic intellectuals emerge out of local circumstances to shape public thought and mobilize various forms of collective action. They are ‘permanent persuaders’, in contrast to ‘traditional’ intellectuals working to legitimize the existent hegemony.<sup>75</sup> Polish *intelligents* had to play the role of dissenters opposing the existent power and trying to create the alliances needed to establish a counter-hegemonic formation by mobilizing the ‘subaltern’ population within the existent political order. However, in the Polish case, at the same time, they were acting in defence of their political privileges and so were not free from relations to power as such.

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72 M. Hroch, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

73 Studies on intelligentsia by J. Chałasiński, *Spoleczna genealogia inteligencji polskiej*, in: J. Chałasiński, J. Ulatowski, *Przeszłość i przyszłość inteligencji polskiej*, Rome 1947; J. Czepulnis-Rastenis, *Inteligencja polska XIX i XX wieku*, Warsaw 1978.

74 The gentry in former Poland had the spirit and traditions of fighting men and the recollection of a monopoly on power in the state, which encouraged it to be the sole exponent of the national idea. These origins made them directly involved and fairly effective in the matters of national organization. B. Giesen, *Intellectuals and the Nation: Collective Identity in an Axial Age*, Cambridge, New York 1998, pp. 63-64; L. Namier, *1848: the revolution of the intellectuals*, Oxford 1946, p. 13.

75 B. Fontana, *Hegemony and power: on the relation between Gramsci and Machiavelli*, Minneapolis 1993, p. 100.

Social historians dealing with East Europe propose to view the national aim as the essence of the socio-historical phenomenon of the intelligentsia. The circumstances of the dawn of this notion have been highlighted by such scholars as Jerzy Jedlicki, Martin Malia, Aleksander Gella, and Andrzej Walicki. They have scrutinized Eastern and Central Europe as the areas where particular social and political prerequisites existed for the emergence of a group responsible for the survival of the national idea, who did not expect any significant financial reward for their work.<sup>76</sup> Neither they, nor Western scholarship itself, has considered duty towards the nation as the main preoccupation of Western intellectuals.<sup>77</sup> While the Eastern intelligentsia was to be a group with a ‘national mission’, the Western intellectuals were to be a status group of creators, distributors, and employers of culture, and, shortly after, custodians of abstract moral ideas like reason, justice and truth.<sup>78</sup>

The peculiar characteristics of the Polish intelligentsia stem from the divorce between the state and intellectuals in 1795. In the West the intellectuals could join the ranks of administration and political bodies. Conversely, for the Poles the 19<sup>th</sup> century was a period of almost complete separation between the

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76 At the same time, the Polish historians noticed that there were considerable differences even within the Eastern European intelligentsias. It all depended on the historical conditions in which the societies were to develop themselves. For instance, Walicki states that the Polish members of the intelligentsia did not have to demonstrate their social radicalism or political opposition, which were constituent elements of the identity of Russian intelligentsia. As he notices, Poles could be moderate, religious, even conservative, but they had to be united by the sense of the national mission. A. Walicki, *Polish conceptions of the intelligentsias and its calling*, in: *Words, Deeds and Values. The Intelligentsia in Russia and Poland during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, ed. by F. Dzorling, A. Pereswetoff-Morath, Lund 2005, p. 4.

77 The sociology of intellectuals has accepted three different approaches to its subject. Firstly, the so-called Dreyfusards, Julien Benda or Pierre Bourdieu treated intellectuals as potentially a class-in-themselves, which has interests that distinguish them from other groups in society. Secondly, Antonio Gramsci and Michel Foucault considered intellectuals as primarily class-bound people, who were representing their group of origin. Finally, Karl Mannheim, Edward Shils and Randall Collins treated intellectuals as relatively class-less “aggregation between, but not above, the classes”, so they were supposed to be able to transcend their group of origin to pursue their own ideals. Ch. Kurzman, L. Owens, *The Sociology of Intellectuals* “Annual Review of Sociology” 2002, 28; K. Mannheim, *The problem of the Intelligentsia*, in: Idem, *Essays on the Sociology of Culture*, London 1956, p. 106.

78 *Intellectuals and Politics in Central Europe*, ed. by A. Bozoki, Budapest 1999, p. 2. More on the subject, e.g.: *The Public Intellectual*, ed. by H. Small, Oxford 2002; L. A. Coser, *Men of Ideas. A Sociologist’s View*, New York 1997.

power and the *intelligents*.<sup>79</sup> During the first decades the elite tried to cooperate with the state apparatus. After the November uprising and the cultural repressions which followed, Polish intellectuals ultimately lost both their influence on power and their identification with the state. Moreover, being aware of the deepening backwardness of Polish lands, they started to see themselves as the only hope for modernizing Poland by initiating social reforms, which were carried out by the state administrations in the West. As dissenters, they joined the ranks of conspirators and usually paid a heavy price for their engagement. This sacrifice only reinforced the conviction of having a special mission as a group. J. Jedlicki observes that it was under the circumstances of daily confrontations with the authoritarian reform blocking regimes that the group identity of the Polish intelligentsia was forged.<sup>80</sup> It performed functions that were guaranteed elsewhere by the modern statehood and structures solidifying civil society.

It can be assumed that it was precisely these specific historical conditions that gave rise to the intelligentsia – a culturally united social stratum of educated people, characterized by their charismatic sense of a national calling.<sup>81</sup> The activities of the *intelligents* did not necessarily involve highly intellectual or expert practices. While intellectuals in the West underwent professionalization and started to become specialists in given disciplines, the East European *intelligents* were, in principle, very versatile and rarely specialized. They were well-read and had a modicum of knowledge of everything. This broad-spectrum (though not profound) knowledge qualified them for their position and endowed them with the ability to play the role of the spokesmen of the nation.

All in all, calling the group under study here ‘the intelligentsia’ may be not entirely conventional; however there are sound reasons to do so. The problem of using the term may be solved by following the editors of the volume *Intellectuals and Articulation of the Nation* and focusing not on the *intelligents*

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79 Other explanations of the phenomenon of ‘intelligentsia’ have an economic background. This applies mainly to the slow progress of Industrial Revolution in the East and the resulting lack of a strong middle-class. All the same, we can trace the causes of weakness of Eastern middle-classes in the preceding periods. Since this is an established view that most modern European cultures are the product of bourgeois development, the lack of strong bourgeois in the Polish national culture was to differentiate it from other European cultures; more about this, among others, A. Gella, *The Life and Death of the Old Polish Intelligentsia* “The Slavic Review” 1971, no. 30, 1, p. 12; A. Gella, *Development of Class Structure in Eastern Europe*, New York 1988, p. 144.

80 D. Nałęcz, *Recenzja ‘Dziejów inteligencji polskiej do roku 1918’* “Gazeta Wyborcza” 27.04.2009.

81 A. Gella, *The Life...*, p. 132.

themselves, but on their practice, which does not necessarily have to have been carried out by those who claim themselves (or are designated by others) to be intellectuals, or *intelligents*.<sup>82</sup> These individuals wrote, created the discourses of the nation, edited newspapers, contributed to the codification of national traditions in *belles-lettres*, while at the same time actively participated in the political arena. They published manifestos, organized national movements, gathered co-nationals in associations, raised the Polish cause on the general European scene, and sometimes even mobilized military movements around the cultural frame they had intellectually articulated beforehand. Jerzy Jedlicki, in the latest *opus magnum* on the subject, maintains that the key to understanding the notion of intelligentsia may lie not in its definition or geographical distribution, but in identifying who attached a special significance to it and why.<sup>83</sup> In other words, the intelligentsia existed where it was for specific purposes identified and named as such.

Naturally the social category could be abandoned here in favour of simply analyzing the Italian influence on Polish visions of the nation. However, a fundamental aspect of this thesis is that it revolves around the processes of transfer of national conceptions forged in the course of ideological debates, which almost exclusively involved the national educated elite. In the cases of both Italy and Poland, people at large had little say in the nation-formation processes, and their opinions are barely traceable. In the words of Patrice Dabrowski “had the insurrections succeeded, the Poles might have found themselves in a position not unlike that of Italy, where the state was created before the nation, according to d’Azeglio’s saying”.<sup>84</sup> The Polish-Italian contacts between the non-elites were rather few; moreover, these were intellectuals who provided media through which nationalism was disseminated and can now be studied. Finally, the importance of the intellectual elite also stems from the fact that it was one of the social groups most acquainted with the worlds which remained external to their own. Through reading and travelling it was usually first to discern differences and build national bonds outside of them. The new elements which it employed to its national morphologies were often inspired by other national cultures, which is the assumption lying at the heart of this project – the national discourses were forged both from within and from

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82 R. G. Suny, M. D. Kennedy, *op.cit.*, p. 403.

83 We can speak of the intelligentsia when different educated strata – military, civil, clerical and other – voluntarily contribute to one goal as if their education imposed on them the duty of being a national avant-garde. J. Jedlicki, *Przedmowa*, in: *Dzieje inteligencji polskiej do 1918 roku*, part I: M. Janowski, *Narodziny inteligencji*, Warsaw 2008, p. 9.

84 P.M. Dabrowski, *Commemorations and the shaping of modern Poland*, Bloomington 2004, p. 14.

outside national borders and became a part of the genesis of Polish national identity.

## Time frame

The period 1848-1871 can be divided into sub-periods. Even though the research interest starts with the Springtime of Nations, the genesis of the Polish attitude towards those events requires us to look back at the third decade of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, especially at the November Uprising in 1831. In this phase Polish-Italian relations were marked by the philosophy of Romanticism and the messianic idea of a nation. Most attention has been devoted to the final point of this phase – the revolutionary years 1848-1849. The second sub-period spreads between the end of the Springtime of Nations and the Italian years of independence 1859-1861. It starts with the breakdown of the Romantic ideology and the Romantic conception of a nation after the failure of ‘European revolution’. At that point Poles slowly started to become aware (as Andrzej Walicki puts it) that the universalistic ideas lost with ‘the national egoism’ which had brought the most desirable effects.<sup>85</sup> These hopes were ultimately shattered by an important turning point for the Polish national conceptions – the failure of the January uprising in 1864. The period between 1861 and 1871 was also the time of continuation of the Italian unification, Prussian unification and the emergence of Austria-Hungary. All these events changed the political constellation in the area and stimulated the growing popularity of a new ideology in the Polish lands (the era of positivism).

The closing date 1871 was the year when many threads intertwined. For both the Italian and Polish nations it hailed the end of an old and the beginning of a new phase of national development. With the outbreak of Franco-Prussian War in 1870, the French withdrew their garrison from Rome and the Italians took over the city, which officially became the capital in early 1871. The Risorgimento, in its main principle, was complete. At the same time, the ferocious debates over the Roman Question, which had for many years divided European and also Polish public opinion, ran their course. The following year Giuseppe Mazzini died and with him the interest of Polish émigrés in Italian political thought waned. Moreover, now Italy had to confront new political challenges, which were different from the Polish ones, thus it ceased to constitute a direct model for Poland. The specialist in Polish-Italian cultural relations Walerian Preisner described that period thus:

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85 A. Walicki, *Mesjanizm Adama Mickiewicza w perspektywie porównawczej*, Warsaw 2006, p. 37.