Marcus Carson
Tom R. Burns
Dolores Calvo
(eds.)

Paradigms in Public Policy

Theory and Practice of Paradigm Shifts in the EU

Policy action is driven, shaped and regulated by the ways in which cognitive frames and interests shape and define issues and analyses – and the involvement of particular authorities, experts, problem-definitions and solutions. To understand these processes is particularly important in the realm of democratic policymaking, where agents driven by divergent interests and alternative principles struggle to preserve or reform policy, law, and institutions. This book analyzes continuity and change in EU policy and provides a systematic understanding of the interactions between ideas, organized actors, and institutions in political, administrative and related social processes. The EU policy studies make up a rich empirical territory, ranging from food security and chemicals to energy, climate change, and gender.

"This is a highly innovative book that offers a thorough appraisal of key EU public policy paradigms in a truly interdisciplinary way, combining theoretical analyses and empirical case studies."
Alberto Martinelli (University of Milan)
"This book breaks new theoretical ground in elaborating a dynamic cultural/institutionalist framework, improving our understanding of how cognitive and normative models interact with social institutions, actor configurations and contested ideas and policymaking frames."
Barbara Hobson (Stockholm University)
"This collection of essays is the most important expression to date of how ideas, cognitive frameworks, actors, and institutions interact to shape policy."
Rogers Hollingsworth, Jr. (University of Wisconsin)

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Preface

Understanding continuity and change in society constitutes one of the fundamental challenges to social scientists, policymakers, and everyday citizens. Such an understanding is particularly important in the realm of democratic policymaking, where agents driven by divergent principles and alternative goals struggle to preserve or reform policy, law, and institutions. The works collected in this volume offer an approach to systematic and deeper understanding of stability and change in public policy.

One of the key elements in this collected work is that its investigations and theoretical analyses contribute to the understanding of how "ideas matter" in policy and institutional change. Policy action is driven, shaped and regulated by the ways in which cognitive perspectives frame problem situations and analyses – and also call for and legitimize the involvement of particular authorities, experts, problem – definitions and solutions.

Over the past twenty years a constellation of concepts, principles, and models has emerged which entail a promising new approach to capturing the interactions between ideas, organized actors, and institutions in political, administrative and related social processes. This work investigates and theorizes *public policy paradigms,* within which policy ideas are embedded and on the basis of which policies are framed, articulated, and implemented. To our knowledge, this book is the first comprehensive theoretical and empirical treatment of public policy paradigms. It considers theoretically the architecture of paradigms, their role in framing and organizing action, and the ways in which paradigm transformations are brought about. The theory construction draws upon three major developments in the social sciences: institutional theory, cognitive sociology, and social movements theory.

This book presents key early works that introduced and applied the concept of public policy paradigm, then seeks also to extend those efforts by specifying and analyzing processes of paradigm formation and development based on the "sociology" and "politics" of paradigms (innovation, competition, alliance formation, proselytizing, power and control processes, etc.). The paradigm concept itself is of course most often associated with Thomas Kuhn's work. Kuhn's paradigm was inherently political in nature, making it suitable for the examination of conceptual models that apply to the political sphere, as in this book. The broader conception of what may be referred to as "the socio-politics of paradigms" is therefore particularly applicable to public policy processes such as those investigated in this book.

The general goal of this book is to develop and apply public policy paradigm theory in investigations and analyses of policy dynamics and developments. The theory might be characterized as "cultural-institutional", in that it emphasizes the importance of socially transmitted cognitive-normative models, institutional rule-based structures that organize human activity, and ways in which organized actors mobilize and struggle to realize their ideals as well as to pursue more mundane interests. This approach is illustrated through a selection of a few classic studies relating back to the earliest applications of the paradigm concept to issues of public policy: Jane Jenson in 1989, Peter Hall in 1992, and William Coleman et al. in 1996. We include these together with Yves Surel's systematic comparative overview of paradigm theory and other cognitive approaches to policymaking. We are very fortunate to be able to reproduce all of these key articles here and also provide additional case studies and analyses from our own EU research on policymaking. These cases cover policy territory ranging from food security and chemicals to energy, climate change, and gender.

The individual case studies identify the mechanisms linking ideas and cognitive frameworks to institutional arrangements and to policy outcomes and developments. The cases focus on the actors who formulate or bear ideas trying to exercise influence over policymaking; they also identify and analyze the conditions under which actors manage to exercise their influence – or fail to do so. Policy paradigms serve, among other things, as a conceptual structure within which public issues and problems can be framed and provide a type of modern totem around which supporters of the paradigm may collect and coordinate. But paradigms also constrain and bias policies that policymakers are likely to consider and select.

In sum, we see the emergence of a systematic theory and body of empirical knowledge of what are referred to as *public policy paradigms*. The theory combines cognitive-normative models, institutional analysis, and strategic interactions in which organized actors seek both to realize their ideals and pursue their interests. An important goal of this book has been to set out the foundations of the theory and provide a range of applications. The book also identifies several of the methodological principles and rules of method that characterize public policy paradigm research. Finally, in a more general sense, the book illustrates the usefulness and potentialities of public policy paradigm research program(s).

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Contents

Part Four: Extensions and Conclusions

Abbreviations

ACC	American Chemical Council
AI	Asbestos Institute
AmCham	American Chamber of Commerce
ANDEVA	Association Nationale De Défense Des Victimes De L'amiante (Nat'l Assoc. of Asbestos Victims)
AOSIS	Association of Small Island States
BEUC	European Consumers' Organization
BSE	Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, A.K.A. Mad Cow Disease
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CC	Competitivity Council
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism (Kyoto)
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CEEP	European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation
CEFIC	European Chemical Industry Council
CJD	Creutzfeld-Jacobs Disease
CMR	carcinogenic, mutagenic or toxic for reproduction
COP	Conference of the Parties under the UN Framework Convention on Climate-Change
COPA	Comité Des Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles
CSC	Catholic Confédération Des Syndicats Chrétiens
CSTEE	Scientific Committee on Toxicity, Ecotoxicity, and the Environment
DAC	Development Assistance Committee in the EU
DG	Directorate General of the EU Commission
EAGGF	European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
ECHA	European Chemicals Agency
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defense Community
EEA	European Environmental Agency
EEB	European Environmental Bureau
EFSA	European Food Safety Authority
EFTA	European Free Trade Area
EINECS	European Inventory of Existing Commercial Chemical Substances
ELINCS	European List of Notified Chemical Substances
EP	European Parliament
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EPC	European Political Community
EPHA	European Public Health Alliance
ERT	European Round Table of Industrialists

ETS	Emission Trading Scheme
ETUC	European Trade Union Confederation
EWL	European Women's Lobby
FGTB	Fédération Générale Du Travail De Belgique
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GHG	Green house gases
GM/GMO	Genetically Modified/Genetically Modified Organism
Group 77	In the UN context a coalition of developing countries
IBAS	International Ban Asbestos Secretariat
ICCA	International Council of Chemical Associations
IG	Intergovernmental Conference
ILO	International Labor Organization
IPCS	International Program on Chemical Safety
JI	Joint Implementation (Kyoto)
LRI	Long-range Research Initiative of the Chemical Associations (CEFIC, ACC, ICCA)
MEP	Member, European Parliament
NAP	National Allocation Plan for ETS and Kyoto mechanism
NGO	Non-government organization
NRC	Natural Resources Canada
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC	The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration, US Dept. Of Labor
PAM	Policies and Measures
PBT	persistent, bioaccumulative and toxic properties
POP	persistent organic pollutants
REACH	Registration, evaluation, authorization, and restriction of chemicals
SCORE	Stockholm Center for Organizational Research
SEA	Single European Act
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TPA	Third Party Access in the EU gas regulation
TUTB	Trade Union Technical Bureau
UN	United Nations
UNCED	UN Conference on Environment and Development ("Earth Summit", "Rio Summit")
UNCHE	UN Convention on the Human Environment
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Program
UNICE	Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe
V-CJD	Variant Creutzfeld-Jakobs Disease
vPvB	very persistent and very bioaccumulative
WAVE	Women Against Violence Europe
WEU	Western European Union
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWF	World Wildlife Fund

Introduction

The policy paradigm concept has emerged over the past decade and a half as a useful tool for analyzing and comprehending the interactions between ideas, institutions, and organized actors engaged in political and administrative processes.[1] It has proven to be a particularly interesting and useful approach with which to investigate and theorize about public policy paradigms within which policy ideas are located and the basis upon which policies are formulated. The paradigm concept is of course most often associated with Thomas Kuhn's work.[2] Much of Kuhn's analysis using his paradigm concept was inherently political in nature, making it potentially suitable for the investigation of conceptual models that apply to the political sphere, as demonstrated in this book. The broader conception of what might be referred to as a "socio-cognitive" model of politics of paradigms is therefore par-

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[1] The concept continues to be used in a manner closer to Thomas Kuhn's original usage: see Ritzer (1975), Dunlap et al (2002), and Dunlap (2008), among others (see footnote 2).

[2] *A Note on Thomas Kuhn:* One cannot take up the notion of paradigm without also acknowledging the scholar who introduced the concept into the humanities and social sciences. This is all the more important given that policy paradigm shares some characteristics with Thomas Kuhn's scientific paradigm (Hall, 1993), although there are fundamental differences also. We (and others who use the concept) draw on the familiarity of Kuhn's concept, and refer specifically to his work in the process of elaborating it as a concept for use in the public policy context. Like the Kuhnian paradigm (Kuhn, 1962), a policy paradigm is a cognitive model shared by a particular community of actors and which facilitates problem solving. It provides a conceptual framework that helps actors interpret events and their causes, aides in their identification and definition of relevant problems and solutions, and suggests what kinds of criteria might provide useful measures of success or failure. Kuhn's concept of scientific paradigm shares these characteristics.

Kuhn's central concept for describing the process of theory replacement in science was fundamentally political; he emphasized the persuasive aspects of scientific discourse, including the use of power and inherent path dependencies, and even employed political metaphors such as "revolution" to describe a certain type of innovative period in science (Restivo 1983). But whereas conflicts over norms and values are intrinsic to disputes in relation to politics and policymaking, science is generally seen as operating in much more settled territory. Kuhn's characterization of science as a largely interest and values-driven enterprise is part of what generated such intense controversy about his work (Stephens 1973; Kuhn & Conant et al. 2000; Ohlsson 2000). How well suited the concept is to conceptual developments in either the natural or social sciences has remained a subject of controversy, but that is a separate matter and not a debate to be taken up here. Our claim is that the paradigm concept is very suitable to the analysis of politics and public policy.

ticularly applicable to public policy processes. We see the need for a more comprehensive theoretical framework making use of the concept of *public policy paradigm*, which has already proven quite useful in investigating and explaining such matters as:

- complex ideas as political objects and political forces;
- effect of such ideas on the real world, that is in the formulation of public policies and programs with real consequences;
- the components of public policy paradigms, their characteristic dimensions, their complexity.[3] This consideration may be extended to deconstruct or decode deep assumptions or ideological underpinnings, for instance concerning the role of public authority, principles of institutional arrangements, and the nature of certain types or groups of human beings (or humanity in general).
- the key mechanisms of paradigm formation and development;
- the conditions of paradigm politics and paradigm shifts. Paradigm politics may be analytically distinguished from other forms of politics, for instance, politics as usual, the politics of (re)distribution, where, for instance, an established paradigm defining fairness or justice is not at issue.
- the institutionalization (and de-institutionalization) of a public policy paradigm.

1. Theoretical and Methodological Points of Departure

The work presented in this book lies at in the intersection of three expansive bodies of literature: the literature on policymaking and policy processes, socio-cognitive analyses, and the "new" institutionalism. These are briefly discussed in this and section 2.

1.1 Theories of Public Policy and Policymaking Processes

The voluminous literature on public policy dates back more than fifty years. The multitude of strategies and approaches can be roughly categorized based on whether they place their emphasis on the influence of a) structural characteristics of society or policymaking institutions (Lasswell 1951; Easton 1965; Kitschelt 1986; Steinmo & Thelen et al. 1992); b) on the role of cognitive factors such ideas, norms, ideology, culture and attention in policy change (Gamson 1992; Hall 1993; Kingdon 1995; van Dijk 1998; Bacchi 1999; Baumgartner and Jones 2002; Jones and Baumgartner 2005); c) or on the characteristics and configurations of actors (typically collective) in preserving or challenging existing policies or pressing for new ones (Lasswell 1951; Olson 1971; Dalton and Kuechler 1990; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Knoke, Pappi et al. 1996; Sabatier 1999).

These categories do not provide clean distinctions, especially given that the increasing tendency over time has been to straddle categories, typically with one pro-

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[3] Thomas Kuhn notoriously left the paradigm concept underspecified.

viding a dependent, the other an independent variable. For example, while the cases presented in Steinmo et al. (1992) emphasize the structural factors that generate powerful path dependencies, they also examine the role of competing ideas or changing power relationships that contribute to divergence from established patterns. Hall's 1989 anthology is approached from a similar historical institutionalist perspective, but with a shift of emphasis to analyzing the role of Keynesian ideas in driving institutional changes in economic policy. Sabatier's advocacy coalition framework can be characterized as a theory of coalition politics, yet it focuses on shared elements of sometimes divergent belief systems as the glue that binds groups of actors that coalesce to press for particular policy remedies. In contrast, Haas's (1992) epistemic communities constitute a very different type of actor configuration, bound more by shared core values than particular policy goals.

The clear tendency in the scholarly work noted above is a realization that the categories are interconnected by feedback loops that make them simultaneously dependent and independent variables. This generates serious problems for theoretical or methodological frameworks that approach characteristics such as policymaking institutions, societal cleavages and alliances, interests, or belief systems as more or less fixed. And while we would identify the contents of this book as emphasizing and elaborating the role of ideas in policymaking processes, our more general ambition is to specify important linkages between the three broad categories of ideas/culture, institutions, and actors and show how they interrelate. We will return to these shortly. First, however, we briefly take up two broad research traditions in which our efforts are rooted.

Neo-institutional theories recognize that these compromises are not merely the result of packages of bargains made by state actors pursuing their economic self-interest. Rather, they are the result of bargains and compromises made by changing configurations of influential actors who are guided by their own cognitive models of how the world is constructed, and from within which they pursue their perceived ideal and material interests. This research is therefore guided by the view that rationality is context bound, operating within the parameters of these cognitive models (Nee 1998). This theoretical orientation broadly challenges perspectives in which the role of rationality dominates in the policy process (Andersen 2001). Indeed, Majone has gone so far as to argue that "policymaking can hardly be considered a rational enterprise" (Majone 1992). Although the role of rationality in policy making may be circumscribed, rationally constructed explanations are important in the process of giving accounts for decisions made.

1.2 The Importance of Policy Ideas and Cognitive Models

As scholars, we may see the world not only through our individual perspectives, but through the collective scientific frameworks with which we take in, evaluate, sort, and in other ways manage the information available to us (Sabatier 1999; cf. Kuhn 1962). This is no less true for actors engaged in activities such as political

debate and policy processes. In each case, such models are social constructed and transmitted and may have real material consequences.

Efforts to map out the architecture of socio-cognitive models are plentiful in the public policy and social movements literature, some of which is addressed to the question of how particular ideas become policy or formal rules, and how claims are framed and anchored to make them relevant to the intended audience. The common theme among these diverse approaches is the attempt to systematically relate policy ideas to one another, to interested actors, and to change processes. This broad body of work characterizes conceptual systems in terms of *culture* (Geertz 1973; Johnston 1995; Lane and Ersson, 2002), *ideology* (Tilton, 1990:248-280; Thompson, 1990; Cormack, 1992; Denzau and North, 1993; van Dijk, 1995), *belief systems* (Gelb, 1989; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier, 1999b), *policy paradigms* (Burns and Carson, 2005, 2002; Carson, 2001, 2004; Andersen, 1999; Coleman et al., 1997; Hall, 1993; Hall, 1992), *frames or master frames* (Snow et al., 1986; Snow and Benford, 1992; Benford and Snow, 2000; Fligstein, 2001a; Hobson, 2003b), and *discourses* (Dryzek, 1996a; Hobson et al., 2002; Jakobsson, 2002). These concepts address themselves to many of the same general phenomena, although with varying emphases and at different levels. As a consequence of the proliferation of concepts that has taken place, often largely in isolation from one another, there are important areas in which these diverse concepts overlap and tend to shade into one another in general use. However, as both Oliver and Johnston (2000) and Surel (2000) note, these various conceptual categories differ in scope, function, and focus. Because they do different kinds of work, they are not interchangeable.

Pamela Oliver and Hank Johnston (2000) provide a telling example of this general phenomenon in their critical analysis of developments in framing theory, a particularly important theoretical and research agenda in the social movements research of the past two decades. Both recognized social movement scholars themselves, Oliver and Johnston highlight the ways in which the concepts of frame or master frame have often come to be used in place of ideology. They argue "the power of frame theory is lost if 'frame' is made to do the work of other concepts" and moreover, that "frame concepts are most powerful precisely if they are sharply distinguished from ideology (Oliver and Johnston 2000:37-38). The core distinction is that a "frame" is a "schemata of interpretation" (Goffman 1972) that enables actors to make sense of an occurrence or event by placing it in context. For Oliver and Johnston, that context is captured in the concept of ideology. The "framing" activities that social movements or other actors engage in refer to the frequently conscious processes by which a claim or phenomenon is contextualized and anchored in a particular system of ideas or beliefs. Framing theory benefits from pairing with ideology or a similar concept that provides the necessary tools for analyzing the interrelated system of assumptions, values, norms, and beliefs *within which*

issues are framed. They acknowledge, however, that ideology also comes with certain complications.

We shall return to ideology in a moment, but given the plethora of overlapping concepts, we share Oliver and Johnston's sense of need for a bit of organizing and specification of concepts to improve clarity. Our primary goal is to locate the policy paradigm concept among the numerous complementary and somewhat overlapping concepts. The sketch we offer here has limited ambitions, therefore, and should not be taken as an effort to produce any kind of full-fledged typology.

"Culture" is likely the most all-encompassing concept of those we list. As Johnston and Klandermans (1995:4) note, cultural "codes, frames, institutions, and values have evolved over long periods of time and, for the most part, function as the broadest and most fundamental context for social action". Yet they also acknowledge culture as "broad and often imprecise...difficult to operationalize". Margaret Archer (1996) has observed that culture and structure are often juxtaposed as opposites, and more or less mutually exclusive. Taking issue what that characterization, she makes the case that culture contains its own characteristic structure and logic which can be specified in terms of its many sub-elements. The phenomenon characterized by concepts such as ideology, paradigms, and frames constitute some of those sub-elements of culture. Overall, we understand culture in Blumer's (1969) sense of the term to mean the characteristic ways in which members of a society or social group tend to conceptualize, attribute meaning, and interact in relation to the various spheres of social activity. In Blumer's usage, culture need not be internally consistent or coherent; it is rather the sum total of characteristics that he identifies.

In contrast to culture, "ideology" is conceptualized by most social theorists as a system of beliefs (Thompson, 1990; Eyerman and Jamison 1991; van Dijk 1998). As such, it possesses structure as well as a need for some measure of internal consistency and coherence. Ideology as it is generally employed entails some set of causal explanations derived from a collection or complex of basic underlying assumptions (which may remain hidden or taken for granted). The question of whether these assumptions and explanations represent some kind of Marxian "false consciousness" or are an accurate depiction of real conditions is one of the significant points of debate around the concept of ideology (Thompson, 1990). An important byproduct of the long and rich history of ideology is that the concept has accumulated a good deal of baggage, including competing conceptions and pejorative uses that create significant problems. This history and diversity has been summarized quite well elsewhere (see for example, Thomson, 1990; van Dijk, 1998) and we shall not dwell on it here. However, two of the issues are particularly relevant. First, the level of generality at which ideology is often used contributes to its being perceived as only loosely coupled to empirical reality. Adams (1989), for example, argues "there is no division between theory and understanding: the two are conflated so that the theory is the understanding [...] these theories are self-validating.

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Such a view of ideology describes a belief system that is largely impervious to empirical reality. A somewhat more sympathetic view would argue that ideology must be tempered with reality if it is to be in any way implemented. This is the general direction advocated by scholars such as Thompson, van Dijk, and Oliver and Johnston. We are sympathetic to these goals, but it does leave three important questions on the table. First, can the long and complex history of ideology as a concept be meaningfully settled so that it does not remain a distraction and a deterrent for its use? Second, given the impossibility of answering the first question, is taming ideology by making it a middle-range theoretical and analytical concept the best way to address the gap identified by Oliver and Johnston (2000) and others. Third, would successfully taming ideology and bringing it down to earth deprive us of a useful meta-level concept?

These are not merely rhetorical questions. Because it is understood by many as a type of belief system that lacks any day-to-day rootedness in reality, we see ideology as well suited to describing a very general level of belief system. Other concepts are available to fill the middle level space in which policy-related ideas and belief systems must be much more closely bound to actual social conditions – especially those defined as problems. It is here we see concepts such as belief systems and policy paradigm to be especially important. A systematic examination of specific formulations of these two concepts is taken up by Yves Surel in the next chapter, so rather than dwell on it here we note that like Surel, we understand Hall's adaptation of paradigm concept to be quite similar to belief system as described by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith. However, belief system is also a more general concept.

The overriding reasons for preferring the concept of policy paradigm can be summarized in terms of 1) its operation at the analytical level at which policymaking takes place (see chapters of Coleman and Hall); 2) the specific conceptual elements and problem-solving notions it entails, and which are linked to or become embodied in institutional arrangements (Burns and Carson, 2004; Carson, 2001; Andersen, 1999); and 3) its emphasis on contradiction and incommensurability as generating conditions conducive to change (Hall, 1993). This includes the emergence of anomalies that an institutionalized paradigm has difficulty explaining and coping with – and that may in fact be a byproduct of the successes and failures of policies guided by that paradigm (Burns and Carson, 2002).

In addition to being used to characterize oral and written communication and symbolic action, the term "discourse" is sometimes used to describe a conceptual model that we would refer to as a policy paradigm, ideology, or belief system. The multiple traditions that make use of the concept of discourse or discourse analysis (Chilton, 2005), suggest, as did Oliver and Johnston earlier, that it is best not to overextend the conceptual tools that are available. We therefore employ the concept of discourse to describe the various kinds of communication that constitute a paradigm, express the details of its institutionalized form, and which may be used to challenge an established paradigm. As already noted, all or part of a policy para-

digm may constitute a "frame", but they are not the same thing. Framing is carried out by referencing a particular paradigmatic element or the paradigm as a whole.

2. Investigating Public Policy Paradigms

2.1 Defining Policy Paradigm

Policy paradigm is a powerful cognitive-normative concept that permits the analysis of distinctly different, sometimes incommensurable ways of conceptualizing the issues, problems, interests, goals, and remedies involved in policymaking. It can be characterized as containing a generally coherent complex of assumptions and principles, simplifying metaphors, and interpretive and explanatory discourses. It represents a shared conceptual framework through which adherents envision "how things should be" and "how the world works", and with which they define the kinds of issues that should be considered social problems. This conceptual framework helps impose order on a chaotic environment in which actors engaged in making or influencing public policy are frequently required to make decisions with limited expertise, inadequate or contradictory information, and often on a comparatively short time frame.

Within this context, the policy paradigm conditions choices and frames potential opportunities by shaping the conceptual parameters – the boundaries of what is thinkable, possible, or acceptable, and it endows certain courses of action with meaning. It defines the kinds of actions and institutional structures considered to be good or bad, the boundaries between right and wrong, appropriate and inappropriate, and the sense of what does or does not constitute a problem. A policy paradigm enables actors to interpret events and their causes, invests certain actors with credibility and authority, suggests what the various rights and responsibilities of actors should be, and guides action (Burns and Carson, 2002; Hall, 1993). A given paradigm is therefore realized in three types of processes: cognition and meaning, expression and action, and in its institutionalization.[4]

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[4] Other research dating from the 1980s using the paradigm concept in the sense of the work presented here more than in the Kuhnian "scientific paradigm conception" has been carried on by an international group including Giovanni Dosi, Leda Gitahy, and Carlota Perez, and Hubert Schmitz (Dosi, 1982, 1984; Gitahy, 2000; Perez, 1983, 1985; Schmitz, 1989). They developed the concept of the techno-economic paradigm to conceptualize the technical, managerial, and organizational ideas and practices applied in administering and regulating industrial production. They were interested in describing and analyzing, among other things, the diffusion and establishment of the new paradigm of Neo-fordism of industrial organization, one differing significantly from the old Fordist/Taylorist paradigm. The paradigm structure, methods, and management techniques and related practices were largely drawn from, or adapted from the Japanese model – but adapted and conceptualized in, for instance, the Brazilian context. They observed and analyzed how norms, models of behavior, and practices were revised, if not transformed in some instances.

The central theoretical concept of our work, public policy paradigm, is essentially a shared model of reality that guides policymakers' problem-solving activities. The various interested groups and individuals in society may share this model, or may challenge it. The policy paradigm concept has been employed in several settings to analyze the effects of systematic conceptual changes on public policy (Jenson 1989; Hall 1992; Hall 1993; Coleman 1998; Carson 2001; Burns and Carson 2002; Carson 2004; Burns and Carson 2005; Carson 2008). Jane Jenson (1989) for example, employs "societal paradigm" as a conceptual model for analyzing changes in the ideas guiding labor market and social in pre-World War I France and the United States. Peter Hall (1993; 1992), outlines a concept of policy paradigm shift generated by policy anomalies and failures leading to a broader, partisan policy debate. Coleman et al. (1997) describe an alternative path to paradigm change that is more negotiated and corporatist in nature. Andersen (1999), Carson (2001, 2004), and Burns (2008) employ it to understand unanticipated policy developments in European Union policy.

The policy paradigm concept fits within a wider theoretical framework emphasizing the role of social institutions in conditioning policymaking processes and other forms of social interaction. With only a few exceptions, however, relatively little has been done to elaborate the paradigm concept beyond Hall's adaptation. Several factors argue that such elaboration is likely to produce additional insights regarding the process of policy change in general, as well as developments specific to the European Union. An important theoretical goal of this anthology, therefore, is to further elaborate the concept of policy paradigm, its internal logical architecture, and its relationships with institutions, actors, and their discourses.

Our particular development of the paradigm concept builds on Jenson (1989), Hall (1993), Coleman, (1998), Andersen (1999), Surel (2000), Campbell (2002), Burns and Carson (2002, 2005), and Carson (2001, 2004, 2008), who have conceptualized the paradigm as a socio-cognitive model employed in solving public issues or problems. Andersen (1999:2) characterizes policy paradigms as a category of "cultural frame", a concept also employed by Fligstein (2001a). Surel (see Chapter 2 in this book) considers both Hall's policy paradigm and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's (1993) belief system in similar terms, as a specific type of "cognitive and normative frame" applied to policymaking, and within which individual issues or policy questions can be contextualized and "framed". These usages are consistent with the definition of paradigm used in this work.

Significant changes in policy – such as the rise and fall of Keynesian economic policies, the emergence of strong environmental policies, or the unfolding of programs aimed at improving equality between women and men – often unfold over periods of time that extend to a decade or more (Pierson, 2001; Sabatier, 1999c, 1999b; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Even in situations of urgent crisis, the seeds of that crisis often can be traced back to earlier developments, including the results of actions or inaction guided by earlier policies. In contrast to many sociological ap-

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proaches, historical institutionalism (Steinmo, et al., 1992; Hall, 1989) employs the historical timeline to provide analytical structure, identifying "historical preconditions", tracing changes in values, normative beliefs, and policy models over time as they are formalized and institutionalized. This constitutes the socio-historical and cognitive environment within which institutions are created and function; events and developments are embedded in this broader context. This approach shares some of the character of the historian's particularistic reading of social change, while embracing the capacity of a sociological analysis to understand overall patterns of social interaction and change. This strategy informs important efforts within the welfare state literature, for example, to trace the conditions that have contributed to the evolution of welfare state arrangements (Korpi, 1994; Esping-Andersen, 1992; Steinmo, 1989; Baldwin, 1990). A strength of this approach is that it generates a great deal of rich detail. An important weakness is that its explanations sometimes tend toward functionalism or simple path dependency, explaining historical preconditions with earlier preconditions; change that represents divergence from that path is more difficult to explain (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992:14-15). Although this tendency is common, it is not universal, however, as illustrated by Peter Hall's (1989) efforts to tackle it directly. Hall and his collaborators present a compelling picture of the emergence and development of Keynesian ideas in guiding economic policy in the US and Europe, and how they were institutionalized in unique ways in specific institutional environments.

The historical institutionalism demonstrates that while discrete preferences are shaped by institutional context, broader goals and what constitutes self-interest are as well (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). It also illustrates especially well the powerful tendencies toward path dependencies and stability (Immergut, 1992). Taking important cues from sociology, Hall's approach (1993, 1992, 1989) significantly expands this picture, giving systematic expression to the role of a coherent complex of policy ideas by tracing their adoption and institutionalization in formal policy over a period spanning two decades.

2.2 Core Tenets

Ideas Matter – It should already be clear that our basic starting point is a core assumption that "ideas matter". This is no longer a controversial assertion, as evidenced by the expanding academic emphasis on the power of ideas in politics and policy during the past two decades. Denzau and North (1993:1) argue, for example: "it is simply not possible to make sense out of the diverse performance of economies and polities both historically and contemporaneously if individuals really knew their self interest and acted accordingly. Instead, people act in part upon the basis of myths, dogmas, ideologies, and 'half-baked' theories". More recently, Campbell (2002) argues that still more effort needs to be devoted to understanding "how

ideas, that is, theories, conceptual models, norms, world views, frames, principled beliefs, and the like, rather than self-interest, affect policy making".[5]

The ideas we are most concerned with here are interconnected and interdependent – particularly in the form of structured complexes of ideas that constitute the conceptual models through which actors perceive and understand the world. The conceptualizations of an issue or the kinds of issues that are to be handled in a policy area are therefore considered fundamentally important. At the same time, the feedback effects of new or existing policies may have a profound effect on the conceptual models. Conceptual models structure and constrain where and how policy alternatives are developed, what kinds of rules and actions are seen as appropriate and legitimate, and which kinds of actors are considered to be the appropriate and legitimate authorities for dealing with the issue. The work presented in this anthology therefore emphasizes the role of ideas and ideals in the processes by which actors seek to initiate new policies and restructure policymaking institutions or defend those already established.

An acknowledgement that perceptions of interests are inherently subjective and model dependent has important consequences for assumptions about policy decisions and the notion that preferences are guided by rationality and the self-interest of powerful actors. Clear cut policy preferences based on self-interest may be difficult to straightforwardly determine. It is well-understood that policy preferences and the perception of self-interest are likely to be guided by perceived opportunities for material gains, by cognitive models that define what is "right and appropriate", and by the nature and quality of relationships with other actors. These separate kinds of considerations often collide and conflict with one another because they can be difficult to measure, weigh against one another, and evaluate in comparable terms. There is also great variation in the way in which "interests" or "self-interest" are defined[6]. They are frequently used in largely economic terms to mean material interest (see, for example, Moravcsik, 1998). This stands in contrast to motivations guided by "a logic of appropriateness" (March and Olsen, 1989), which are driven by more altruistic-like values and norms. In short, rationality is dependent on the cognitive model being used, "bounded rationality" limits the ability to

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[5] Campbell (2002:21) points out the undue stress on "interests" to the neglect of ideas: Political sociology and political science have focused on how the pursuit of self-interest affects politics and policy making in advanced capitalist societies. This has been true for pluralist, elite, neo-Marxist, historical institutionalist, and rational choice theories. Scholars have paid far less attention to how ideas, that is, theories, conceptual models, norms, world views, frames, principled beliefs, and the like, rather than self-interests, affect policy making. This is surprising given Max Weber's famous dictum that ideas have profound effects on the course of events, serving like switchmen who direct interest-based action down one track or another.

[6] Our use of the term "interest" distinguishes between "ideal" and "material" interests, although where not specified, "interests" can be taken to mean material interests.

weigh alternatives, and the information available for making decisions is often either insufficient or incorrect (Denzau and North 1993).

In general, the analytical strategy is to trace the process of fundamental policy change as it evolves from ideas and through action to become institutionalized. The basic elements of this change process include: a) the emergence of new phenomena that are defined as problems or the redefinition of existing phenomena as pressing problems, then impelled by new claims and demands for structural change made by organized interests and policy entrepreneurs, b) the replacement of an established complex of policy ideas with a new one that is not comparable in the same terms, and c) the institutionalization of the new set of ideas in the form of new norms, policy competencies, revised or new organizational structures and goals, and new types or groups of actors defined as having a legitimate role to play. This brings us to our next core assumption.

Institutions Matter Also – A second core tenet, which also has become a cliché within academic discourse, is that "institutions matter". At the heart of the "new" institutionalism (Burns and Flam, 1987; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Brinton and Nee, 1998; Hollingsworth et al., 2002) lies a common recognition and understanding that both "socio-cognitive" and "structural" factors provide the context, the impetus, and the tools for political struggle and other forms of social interaction, although there are diverse strategies for applying this shared core[7] (Hall and Taylor, 1996). The core tenets enumerated here are part and parcel of the new institutionalism – particularly the sociological institutionalism that provides much of the theoretical grounding for this work

The "new" institutionalism, and the sociological neo-institutionalism in particular, seeks to integrate the reciprocal influences of socio-cognitive phenomena and

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[7] Of Hall and Taylor's three major categories of neo-institutional approaches, the new institutional economics is less useful in this context because it continues to relegate conceptual models largely to the background. In general, it can be said that the new institutional economics breaks from mainstream rational choice theory with the concession that there are both cognitive and structural constraints that underlie preference formation and "rational" choices. If rational choices are context bound, then institutions can be seen as part of the context that creates constraints. But seen from the individual level of "rationality within constraints", or "context-bound rationality" (Brinton and Nee, 1998; Nee, 1998; Bourdon, 1996), one can distinguish as "context" not only structural/institutional constraints, but also cultural/cognitive constraints. Such cognitive constraints are pushed into the background largely through the assumption of rational actors seeking to maximize their material self-interest, although important concessions have been made to the problems of the limits of rationality and to incomplete and unevenly distributed information. Diverging still further from the strict rationality assumption is economic historian Douglass North. North (1981) points to the importance of belief systems, in this case in terms of ideology, in explaining individual and group preferences and action that cannot be accounted for by rational choice models. He points out that preferences and beliefs are shaped not only by institutional arrangements, but also by lived experience, and goes as far as calling for a new theory of ideology to more systematically account for the ways in which cognitive models both structure constraints and serve as enabling tools.

structural forces on human interaction and agency. Socio-cognitive factors are generally grouped under concepts such as "ideas" "norms" and "frames", as well as complexes of these individual elements under concepts such as "paradigms", ideology and "mental models", and even "culture". This provides the broad cognitive context for the public policy paradigm, which is the concept used to map the relationships between public policy and changing complexes of ideas. Structuring is conceptualized in terms of institutions, which can be characterized as complexes of rules and procedures that shape human interactions in a given sphere of activity (Burns and Flam, 1987). Agency, typically collective, is seen as embodied in a broad range of actors. This encompasses organizations at multiple levels, including states, transnational and supranational organizations, NGOs, corporations, policy networks, etc. It also includes individual actors – typically in specialized roles such as "policy entrepreneurs" or "skilled individuals" (Fligstein, 2001b). Also considered part of the neo-institutional family is historical institutionalism, which emphasizes the importance of historical context and the ways in which it influences the development of public policy over time.

The sociological neo-institutionalism includes a variety of approaches that emphasize cognitive and ideational factors (Burns and Carson, 2002; Campbell, 2002; Fligstein, 2001b; Hobson, 2000a; Ahrne, 1994; Arditi, 1994; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). These often draw implicitly or explicitly on Berger and Luckmann's (1969) classic work, which among other things emphasizes the socio-cognitive processes by which practices become institutionalized (Scott, 1987:493). "Institutionalization involves the processes by which social processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rule-like status in social thought or action" (Meyer and Rowan, 1977:341). This suggests an important link between socio-cognitive models and institutions, which Scott (1987:497-498) summarizes in his insight that "institutionalized belief systems constitute a distinctive class of elements that can account for the existence and/or the elaboration of organizational structure". Attention to these "classes of elements" permits the construction and analysis of the belief systems to which he refers.

Ideas do not float freely and conceptualizations are often contested. Some conceptual models of issues and policy sectors are better established than others, and they may be supported and reinforced by established rules-of-the-game (both formal and informal) that guide how and by whom such questions are to be dealt with, and how rules are to be made or altered. Institutions are conceptualized here as systems of rules that govern social interaction and may be normative (shared understandings) or formalized (i.e. laws, procedures, etc.) (North, 1991; Burns and Flam, 1987). Institutionalized systems of rules condition power relationships (Burns and Flam, 1987). They also generate inertia, or path dependencies, based on how similar issues have been handled in the past, especially the recent past, and based on the power relationships defined in those rules and the underlying assumptions embedded in them (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). There may be substantial in-

consistencies, incompatibilities, or incommensurability, between what is considered the most compelling way of thinking about a set of policy issues or problems, and the way in which existing institutionalized rules dictate that it should be dealt with. This can result in obstacles to effective problem solving, undermined legitimacy, and political tensions that destabilize the existing social order (Burns and Carson, 2002).

Two established strategies for integrating cultural/cognitive factors within the new institutionalism entail relating them to social organization or the institutionalized structures of discrete spheres of societal activity that they inspire (Ahrne, 1994; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Burns and Flam, 1987), or to the historical timeline (Pierson, 1998; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Hall, 1989). Each of these is relevant to the case studies taken up in this research. For example, there has long been an awareness of "organizational culture" as a distinct phenomenon embedded in "organizational structure" (Perrow, 1979). The European Commission, for example, is a "multi-organization" (Cram, 1994), with the various Directorates General (DGs) guided by distinctly different organizational missions and cultures. The sociological and historical institutionalisms use in varying degrees existing institutional/organizational structure and time frames to impose order on the flow of ideas. At the institutional level where the Treaties help define EU competence in the various policy sectors, there are different logics reflected in the procedures, voting rules, capacity to act, etc. These have developed over time, so that it is possible to trace the evolution of paradigmatic ideas as new ones become institutionalized (Pierson, 1998), replacing earlier guiding logics.

Actors, Networks, and Alliances – A third tenet in our approach is that "actors, networks, and alliances matter". Where constellations of individual and organized actors emerge in competition with one another, they may take a variety of different forms. They are characterized in the literature as policy networks (Coleman et al., 1997; Knoke et al., 1998), policy advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993), epistemic communities (Haas, 1992), social movements (McCarthy and Zald, 1967), peak organizations, and the variety of terms describes the different logics that define them.

Organized actors may choose to engage or not to engage on a particular set of policy proposals based on a number of different rationales. Such rationales may be relational (helping allies or seeking to block opponents), interest-based (such as engaging as an opportunity to gain public attention or to protect financial or power interests), values or ideals-based (engaging in pursuit of ideal interests), or more typically, some combination of these. For example, choices to engage may be conditioned by the quality and nature of relationships with other organized or individual actors (Bordieu, 1996). For example, an organization may lend its support as a favor to an ally or repay a debt – or in an effort to punish an organization seen as unfriendly. It is considered natural that organizations that share common overall goals and values would join forces to support specific policy proposals. However, it

is also quite common for groups sharing common goals to take different sides in particular policy struggles. An interesting current example is the way in which environmental organizations were divided in their support of the climate change legislation in the US House of Representatives (known as the Waxman-Markey Bill). That split was based on very different ideas about how to achieve shared goals. A contrasting picture is found in the kind of "strange bedfellows" coalitions that form to support specific proposals, yet are composed of organizations whose long-term goals are values are in at odds with one another. Such an example can be found in Hajer's (1995) analysis of ecological modernization, in which business and environmental groups came together in spite of their pursuit of very different long-term agendas. A third variation on this theme is the case in which an organized actor lends support not because of support for a particular policy proposal, but because a secondary or side effect of the proposal serves other goals in which the organization is interested. This is also a common phenomena and often part of weaving together alliances that are sufficiently powerful to prevail on a given policy proposal. In the EU context, there are frequently overlaps between actors pursuing substantive policy goals and those who wish to move authority to the European level – or block such developments.

The important point with these differing examples is that the diverse array of types of alliances is possible based a combination of relational factors, material interests, and shared conceptual models, and the ways in which particular elements are held to be more central and important than others and thereby prioritized.

2.3 Key Features of Public Policy Paradigm Theory

The public policy paradigm is a shared conceptual model used for political problem solving. However, it is more encompassing than a simple problem solving model, since it is the model used to construct the very problems it is used to address (see Bacchi, 1999; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). It does so, starting from core assumptions, by defining priority among competing policy principles and goals. Within that context, the paradigm delineates the suitable means for achieving goals, and identifies what kinds of expertise should be considered legitimate and relevant, and who should be considered competent authorities responsible for decision making and for implementing corrective measures. The actors who advance the model are themselves are likely to be defined in it, giving it a self-referential aspect. When institutionalized, a policy paradigm shapes the production and distribution of societal resources, forms guidelines for how benefits and related costs are distributed, structures power relationships, and defines "logics of appropriateness".

Overall, this book presents three key results about public policy paradigms:
(I) **The functions/uses of public policy paradigms** in interpreting social reality, identifying problems and solutions, and guiding judgment and policymaking and its implementation;

(II) **The structure of policy paradigms**. "Paradigm" may be investigated in terms of its particular properties as well as in terms of its function – and the relationship between its internal structure and its functions. A public policy paradigm defines problems or types of problems and their sources which are to be publicly addressed, and identifies the available strategies and resources to deal with these problems (or categories of problems). It defines also actors (and their roles in what take place), for instance, those who should have public authority in relation to the application and development of public policy and, in particular, this policy paradigm. Included in this are also "other agents" ("the other") including scapegoats (Jews, immigrants, Muslims, etc.) or conditions of fate/"destiny". Furthermore, a paradigm usually identifies agents capable (knowledgeable, authoritative experts) of dealing with the problems ("experts", "good fairies", magicians). Note that experts, for instance, do not usually control material resources or have great economic or political power (but, nevertheless, may play influential roles).

(III) **The socio-political process of transforming or constructing and establishing a paradigm** (related to the social construction of "problems" to be solved, designs, strategies, decisions). Here, of course, one is alerted to the mechanisms (rational, non-rational, or irrational, or even self-destructive) that drive paradigm developments. The work presented here identifies five basic social mechanisms of public policy paradigm shifts: (i) *Change in perspective of a dominant agent*. For instance, an authoritarian leader or dictator changes her perspective, adopts a new paradigm, and puts it into operation. (ii) *A power shift* brings a new agent with another paradigm to leadership (those involved may include outside actors or possibly an alliance of some insiders and outsiders). Replacing an earlier elite to institutionalize the new paradigm may occur through force, as in a coup d'etat or a violent revolution, through democratic process, such as elections or nominations, or through societal negotiation. Demographic mechanisms are also important bringing about generational/cohort shifts. (iii) *Negotiation among multiple agents* producing a new order – with compromises – is a common mechanism. One can distinguish between cooperative "negotiation" (because of convergent of interests ("solidarity of interests") or because of solidarity of sentiments ("solidarity coordination"), on the one hand, or competitive or antagonistic "negotiation", on the other hand. (iv) *Diffusion and mimicry* of a New Institutional Paradigm (mimetic function) (for example, Campbell refers to the diffusion of world environmental culture through NGOs and UN agencies). (2002:25). Autonomous agents are inter-connnected in communication networks which spread "new practices" and "ideas". (v) *Unintended agentic development of a new institutional paradigm* The actors who introduce and develop the changes leading to a new paradigm often do not intend to do so, but instead *drift* into what turns into an unexpected and unintended paradigm shift.[8] A new tech-

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[8] Cultural change, associated with an eventual paradigm shift, may occur in the most subtle and incremental ways. An institutional order may erode as a result of actors introducing in an ad hoc manner alien rules into the domain. For example, market concepts and conduct rules such as

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nology or technique, new institutional positions or member competencies and commitments which, to all appearances, only lead to relatively minor changes in the institutional procedures and rules may in the long run actually cause problems which cannot be effectively analyzed and dealt with within the framework of the established paradigm – and give rise to consideration of radically new approaches and principles.

The policy paradigm concept offers a number of advantages. Its components can be identified, and as we show, there is a logical structure to a public policy paradigm. At the same time, the theory allows for – and seeks out – gaps and contradictions, both within a paradigm and between a paradigm and the institution(s) in which it is embedded. A policy paradigm also is recognized as incomplete – which may result in unanticipated problems. These offer "cracks" in which claims can be made successfully.

Other advantages of the paradigm concept lie in its relation to other important concepts related to ideas and cognitive processes. For example, a paradigm is the basis of framing processes and the production of frames. It is free of the intellectual and political baggage often associated with ideology. It explains path dependencies and change processes in the complex relationships between actors, institutional arrangements, culturally-rooted understandings.

Finally, the policy paradigm speaks to different kinds of collectivities. Policy advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) may be composed of groups that advocate radically different paradigms, but which coalesce around agreement on a specific paradigmatic element shared in common: a shared problem definition, a preferred set of remedies, trust in a particular type of expertise. In contrast and epistemic community is formed by those who develop and adhere to a public policy paradigm. That is, "paradigm-epistemic communities" consist of networks of professionals and experts with an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge, who share a set of normative beliefs, causal models, notions of empirical validity, and a common policy enterprise (Campbell, 2002:30; Haas, 1992).

3. Overview of the Book

We have divided this book into four parts. Part I consists of this chapter and that of Yves Surel in the following chapter; Part II, a section with previously published articles that may be considered early classics in the application of the policy paradigm concept; Part III contains our own case studies of paradigm shifts in specific policy sectors in European Union policy and Part IV offers analysis and some concluding reflections.

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profit seeking may be applied to such domains as the family, community, or health care system, and result in the attenuation of the earlier organizing principles such as solidarity and justice – in turn leading to the disappearance of the entire old patterns of activity and their replacement by new ones.

In the next chapter Yves Sorel gives an insightful analysis and overview of three important cognitive-normative approaches in policymaking research. This defines the larger context of the work presented in this book.

Part Two of the book provides a selection of a few studies of public policy paradigm shifts, which have become classic exemplars. Jane Jenson is one of the first, if not the first, to apply the paradigm concept to public policy. In Chapter 3, Jenson's 1989 article considers historical shifts in France and the USA before 1914, focusing on the introduction of legislation "protecting" the conditions under which women participated in certain occupations as well as providing infant and maternal protection. In Chapter 4, Peter Hall analyzes the shift in England from Keynesian economic policy to monetarism with a 1993 article that quite rightly received widespread attention.[9] Coleman (1998) and Coleman et al. (1997) responded to Hall, challenging the generality of his model of abrupt shifts. Coleman argued rather that shifts in paradigms could be negotiated in a more or less gradual way and accomplished substantial change through a piecemeal transition.

Part Three presents a selection of cases from our EU comparative policy research (1997-2008), in which we investigated a number of paradigm shifts in diverse sectors. We found the EU was a crucible of public policy initiatives and major policy shifts. The case studies included here concern food (Chapter 8), chemicals including the special case of asbestos (Chapters 9 and 10), climate change (Chapter 12), and gender (Chapter 13). Svein Andersen, in adddition to his own EU research program has also collaborated with us on our EU research program, and contributes a chapter here (Chapter 11) on the EU policy paradigm shift relating to natural gas in Europe. Chapter 14 concludes Part Three, identifying the different patterns of shifts and de-

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[9] In Hall's perspective, Keynesianism and monetarism were quintessential examples of public policy paradigm differences: (1) policy prescriptions or strategies diverged; (2) their models of the situation (causal factors) also differed – they were based on a fundamentally different conception of how the economy itself worked. While Keynes viewed the private economy as unstable and in need of intermittent fiscal adjustments, monetarists saw the private economy as stable and that discretionary policy was an impediment to efficient economic performance. This was an argument against fiscal activism.

On the other hand, Keynesians attributed fluctuations in economic output and inflation to the cycle of the "real economy" or excessive wage and price pressure; on the other hand, monetarists took the position that fluctuations in output and inflation were primarily caused by excessive changes in the rate of growth of the money supply. Keynesians believed also that they could reduce the rate of unemployment by altering the fiscal levels, while monetarists contended that the jobless were not the responsibility of the state because unemployment would converge on a "natural rate" fixed by conditions in the labor market rather than by the macroeconomic stance." The paradigm change entailed a radical shift in the hierarchy of goals guiding policy, the instruments relied on to effect policy, and the setting of those instruments.

The policy regime shifts entailed also changes in the discourses employed by policymakers and in the analyses employed by policymakers and in the analysis of the economy on which policy was based. And the locus of power/authority shifted away from administrators (and economists) to mass media people and the leadership of the government.

velopments in the case studies. The chapter also draws conclusions about what the results show concerning EU policymaking and the integration process.

Part Four concludes the book. We synthesize PPP theory based on the research of others as well as our own. It is argued that a PP paradigm is an idealized rule regime with a particular structure (diverse components or complexes); it takes ideal (or purely conceptual forms) as well as operative or practical forms. Also, the chapter identifies the processes whereby regime shifts take place.

The Role of Cognitive and Normative Frames in Policymaking

Yves Surel

There has been an increasingly important shift in the analysis of public policy in recent years, with the development of an approach which emphasises the influence of ideas, general precepts and representations, over and above social evolution and state action. This approach is based on the belief that cognitive and normative elements play an important role in how actors understand and explain the world, and has stimulated a variety of works from various approaches. However, what these have in common, be it more or less explicit, is the goal of establishing the importance of the dynamics of the social construction of reality in the shaping of historically-specific and socially legitimate frames and practices (Berger and Luckmann 1969).

This new research orientation, emphasising the importance of cognitive and/or normative elements, has been the object of attempts at modelling, with a view to systematising and conceptually constructing the role of these logics of the social construction of knowledge and meaning in State action. Amongst numerous works, three approaches can be identified, informed by a recognition of the importance of values, ideas and representations in the study of public policy. Developed separately in the course of the 1980s, albeit informed by quite different perspectives, these conceptual models are primarily based on notions of paradigm (Hall 1993), of *advocacy coalition* (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, Sabatier 1998), or on the notion of the *référentiel*, as defined by Bruno Jobert and Pierre Muller (Jobert and Muller 1987; Faure et al. 1995). According to Peter Hall, recourse to such conceptualisations is especially well-suited to the analysis of political phenomena, and in particular to public policy insofar as "politicians, officials, the spokesmen for social interests, and policy experts all operate within the terms of political discourse that are current in the nation at a given time, and the terms of political discourse generally have a specific configuration that lends representative legitimacy to some social interests more than others, delineates the accepted boundaries of state action, associates contemporary political developments with particular interpretations of national history, and defines the context in which many issues will be understood" (Hall 1993, 289).

In spite of what are at times important differences, these conceptualisations all share a macro-level questioning which aims to shed light on the influence of global

social norms on social behaviour and public policy, and to integrate into the analysis at times previously neglected normative variables (cf in particular the voluminous literature which focuses exclusively on cognition and expertise, Radaelli 1995). Cognitive and normative frames, which as a general expression brings together paradigms (Hall), belief systems (Sabatier) and *référentiels* (Jobert and Muller), are intended to refer to coherent systems of normative and cognitive elements which define, in a given field, "world views", mechanisms of identity formation, principles of action, as well as methodological prescriptions and practices for actors subscribing to the same frame. Generally speaking, these frames constitute conceptual instruments, available for the analysis of changes in public policy and for the explanation of developments between public and private actors which come into play in a given field.

The main purpose of this article is therefore to offer a critical review of these different models, by isolating their internal characteristics, and to see what type of research orientation they give rise to, explicitly or implicitly, for the analysis of public policy.

Elements of Cognitive and Normative Frames

The three notions discussed below include very similar elements, albeit grouped differently. Within each grouping we can make an analytical distinction between three or four elements which may be located on a hierarchical scale (Table 2.1) established with reference to the original definition of the notion of paradigm (Kuhn 1970; Chalmers 1987; Surel 1995). These different elements which combine to produce a coherent paradigmatic frame, include: (a) metaphysical principles, (b) specific principles, (c) forms of action, and (d) instruments.

Table 2.1. Elements of cognitive and normative frames

	Paradigm	Advocacy Coalition Framework	Référentiel
Metaphysical principles	Policy paradigm	Deep core	Values Images
Specific principles		Policy core	Norms
Forms of action	Choice of instruments		Algorithms
Instruments	Specifications of instruments	Secondary aspects	

(a) Metaphysical principles

The different models evoked here are first built on the belief that values and metaphysical principles define what is sometimes called a "world view", abstract precepts circumscribing what is possible in a given society, identifying and justifying

the existence of differences between individuals and/or groups, and locating various social processes on a hierarchical scale. For Sabatier, for example, the *deep core* includes "basic ontological and normative beliefs, such as the relative valuation of individual freedom versus social equity, which operates across virtually all policy domains" (Sabatier 1998, 103). This first grouping of elements can therefore be located in the normative stratum where we also find elements which condense values specific to a given frame, in the form of representations, beliefs etc.

For example, in his study of the macro-economic policies pursued in Great Britain in the 1970s and 1980s (Hall 1992), Peter Hall identifies a shift from Keynesian-inspired principles to neo-liberal or monetarist ones. Underlying each of these models was a different world view. In the neo-liberal model, the rational and responsible individual was placed to the fore, the model thereby allying itself to a simplistic form of social Darwinism ("the beneficial effect of the market will ensure that the best come out on top, who will thus enhance the prosperity of all"). On the other hand, the Keynesian paradigm recognised the existence of collective duty to cure the ills of modern society, starting from a vision of economic processes which challenge the necessary and beneficial nature of the free hand of the market.

(b) Specific principles

In second place, these cognitive frames comprise specific principles, which in various ways follow from the most general and abstract principles. Drawing on Kuhn, this second layer includes elements, notably hypothetical-deductive statements, which allow the operationalisation of values in one domain and/or particular policy and/or subsystem of public policy. It is undoubtedly at this level that the differences between the models are the greatest. Whilst the work of Peter Hall implicitly rests on a hierarchy of degrees of abstraction (even if the normative and cognitive elements are both covered by the general notion of policy paradigm) Sabatier argues that the principles which allow us to make distinctions are very closely connected to differences in diffusion and social embeddedness. For Sabatier, there is a difference between the *deep core* and the *policy core* which is not only linked to their position in the hierarchy (the deepest and most general beliefs appearing in the *deep core*) but also concerns their scope: the *deep core* affects the whole of society (or at least a sizeable community) whereas the *policy core* refers only to a subsystem of public policy.

To put it more generally, taking the original conceptualisation of Kuhn, we have, above all, a cognitive component which defines legitimate strategies with respect to objectives more or less explicitly prescribed by general principles. Peter Hall thus shows that the differences between Keynesian and monetarist paradigms hinge on distinct macro-economic policy objectives (the fight against unemployment in the first case, against inflation in the second). And these specific principles are closely related to the normative stratum, insofar as they aim to define clear prescriptions for public-policy making. For example, the European Monetary Union

was inspired by a monetarist "world view", that helped to define suitable precepts for the formulation of macro-economic policies (McNamara 1998).

(c) Forms of action

The above-mentioned grouping of cognitive and normative elements is linked to practical considerations of the most appropriate methods and means to achieve the defined values and objectives. Again, by analogy with Kuhn's work, for scientific methods to be inextricably linked to metaphysical principles and hypothetical-deductive models specific to a particular paradigm, it is necessary to identify forms of action appropriate for the trajectories sought, with respect to the values which characterise a frame. In other words, cognitive and normative frames not only construct "mental maps" but also determine practices and behaviours. In the case of the State, they delimit the choice of instruments to implement a particular strategy.

Peter Hall, using the same example as before of macro-economic policy, shows that the techniques employed vary considerably according to the paradigm adopted. The mechanisms used to boost consumption through an expansive budgetary policy characteristic of Keynesian approaches, contrast, for example, with the monetarist's emphasis on control of the money supply and the more systematic use of monetary policy instruments. The mobilisation of instruments is therefore by no means a neutral decision; rather it matches certain normative and practical imperatives laid out by the previous elements.

(d) Instruments

Finally, the last level is concerned with the specification of instruments which is shaped by the whole of the frame, to ensure their congruence with the other elements. In Paul Sabatier's analysis of the role of secondary aspects within belief systems characteristic of an "advocacy coalition", he includes for example minor decisions which may, within a particular program, be concerned with budgetary allocations, administrative regulations and so on. The cognitive and normative frame therefore delimits the scope of the necessary and potential instruments and the relative importance of each of them (legislative or regulatory mechanisms, interest rate level etc.).

Overall, it is the combination of these elements, which gives rise to particular mental maps. The definition of a "societal paradigm" offered by Jane Jenson sums up well what underpins the specificity of these cognitive and normative frames, that is to say, "a shared set of interconnected premises which make sense of many social relations. Every paradigm contains a view of human nature, a definition of basic and proper forms of social relations among equals and among those in relationships of hierarchy, and specification of relations among institutions as well as a stipulation of the role of such institutions. Thus, a societal paradigm is a meaning system as well as a set of practices" (Jenson 1989, 239). Beyond their differences, these distinct conceptualisations all in fact posit the existence of an ensemble of general principles and values defining the relations and identities of actors, in par-

ticular through forms of thought which delimit, hierarchically rank and legitimate social distinctions, all the while setting priorities for action in a given community. In addition, the consequences of these different cognitive and normative societal frames are to legitimate some groups rather than others, mark out the terrain for public action, as well as to define the possibilities for change in a particular subsystem. They thereby determine as much the world views themselves as the practices that follow from them.

However, such models raise problems linked to the different allocation of the elements making up a cognitive and normative frame. Thus, the articulation between the different layers is at times ambiguous, at others, deterministic. Far from always clarifying the relations between metaphysical principles, forms of action and practical elements, in fact these models most often posit an internal coherence and a hierarchical ordering which enhance the normative elements. Furthermore, the links between these cognitive and normative variables and the institutional context are rarely made explicit, the problem made all the worse by the semantic imprecision in the terms at times introduced by the various tendencies of neo-institutionalism (ideas forming an explanatory variable of institutions in one case are themselves institutions in others, cf. Hall and Taylor 1996; for the sociological institutionalism, cf. Powell, Di Maggio, 1991).

The Fundamental Dynamics of Cognitive Frames

Certain authors (cf. notably Mériaux 1995) have underlined the more or less explicit functionalist perspective present in these different approaches. Beyond the particular inspirations and origins of each model, it is in fact possible to see that cognitive frames all sustain several fundamental processes which act as the social functions of integration in a given community. In setting up a view of the world and determining legitimate practices, they seem in particular to be shaped by the production of identity mechanisms and the distribution of power (1), as well as by their capacity to manage social tensions (2).

(1) The production of identity and the allocation of power

As in the cultural conception of ideology put forward by Geertz (Geertz 1964), one of the principal "functions" of a cognitive and normative frame shared by a certain number of actors, is effectively to develop a "collective consciousness" in them, in other words, a subjective sense of belonging, producing a specific identity. Cognitive and normative frames allow actors to make sense of their worlds, and to locate themselves and develop in a given community, by defining the field for exchange, by allowing meaning to be conferred on social dynamics, and by determining the possibilities for action. They thereby contribute to the construction of individuals or groups as social actors in a particular field.

The management of the connection between values, representations, global norms etc and their "counterparts" at the level of the subsystem always underlies a

paradigm or a *référentiel* (the global/sectoral relationship, in Jobert and Muller's terms), this articulation resulting in identity production. The existence of a cognitive and normative frame is therefore both a source of boundaries, which constitute a group and/or an organisation and/or a subsystem in itself, and a source of forms of articulation and the overlapping of these boundaries, allowing the adherents of a particular matrix to view themselves in relation to a wider whole. The configuration of the medical profession is a good example of this, in the way it has established the norms and principles of its constitution which in turn define the legitimate boundaries of the profession itself, as well as the nature of its relations with other actors; patients, the State, social security agencies (Hassenteufel 1997).

Similarly, cognitive and normative frames are fundamentally constituted and modified by the interplay of actors. Far from being simple "revelations", paradigms are, on the contrary, the product as well as the determinant, of exchanges between individuals, groups and the State in a given society. From this point of view, Sabatier, as well as Jobert and Muller, underline the privileged role of certain actors in public policymaking, both in producing and diffusing cognitive and normative frames. As such, the notion of the *policy broker* in Sabatier's work refers to a category of actors characterised by their capacity to make the link between one subsystem and another, and to facilitate the integration of subsystems of public policy in the global public sphere. For Jobert and Muller, these mediators, genuine organic intellectuals in the Gramscian sense, "hold a strategic decision-making position insofar as they construct the intellectual context in which negotiations and conflicts take place, and alliances are created, which lead to the taking of decisions" (Muller 1994, 50).

What the modification of such a paradigm or global *référentiel* leads to is thus a decentring of sites of power, more than the substitution of one elite for another (Hall 1993). As a paradigm shift occurs, it is the nature and stability of social exchanges which are transformed through the reallocation of power. In the case of the macro-economic policies analysed by Hall, the shift to a monetarist paradigm, whilst being based on a change in the political elite with the return of the Conservatives to power under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, above all brought about a transformation of the relationships between the Treasury and other government departments (in a particularly long-lasting and significant way for the conduct of policymaking).

Still, such approaches leave to one side or marginalize other basic variables which focus primarily on the interests of actors, partially because of the conditions under which such forms of understanding public policy came into being. As Radaelli (1995) reminds us, the placing to the fore of cognitive and normative variables dates primarily from the work of Lindblom which, since the 1960s, has tended to question traditional approaches focused on the nature of interests and power relations in the shaping of decision-making and public policy. Consequently, even if the logics of power relations are present in most of these works, they are

subordinate to the focus on the identification of actors sharing the same cognitive and normative frame.

The relationship between interests and cognitive and normative variables has recently been made clearer in a response by Paul Sabatier to certain critiques of his *advocacy coalition framework*. More or less "summoned" to locate himself in relation to supporters of rational choice models, Sabatier clarified that from his point of view, actors are only rational at the instrumental level, maximising exclusively at this "lower" level the resources available to them, according to defined objectives. Yet the determination of these objectives is fundamentally linked to cognitive and normative frames specific to a given subsystem. Sabatier therefore considers that "actors always perceive the world through a lens consisting of their preexisting beliefs" (Sabatier 1998, 109).

If we accept this position on the relationship between values and interests (which many do not, at least *a priori*), this last variable can nevertheless serve to clarify certain important processes. How can the structure of interests, for example, influence the production of cognitive and normative frames? Is there not an asymmetry in resources and positions which explains why a particular category of actors succeeds in playing the role of mediator or *policy broker*? Furthermore, what is the degree of internal homogeneity of a subsystem identified by the sharing of the same cognitive and normative frame?

(2) The management of tension and conflict

To answer these questions we need to explore the second basic dynamic isolated above to describe the "functioning" of cognitive and normative frames: how a frame is able to manage social tensions and to contain conflict. The coherence of cognitive and normative factors in the same frame is in fact successively characterised by the setting up of a causal explanation of the ongoing processes (Stone 1988), then by defining principles and particular practices for action. It is usually necessary to manage the tensions inherent in "anomalies" in the social organism in seeking not so much the means to resolve them (political activity is not interested in solutions to enigmas, cf Schon and Rein 1994), as a way to deal with their effects and consequences. Each subsystem thus succeeds, through the cognitive and normative frame which characterises it, in managing the conflicts and tensions arising from its location in global society.

The management of social tensions does not, however, mean the disappearance of all forms of conflict, given the multiplicity of paradigms in each subsystem. Most of the models evoked here recognise the existence of competing paradigms in any context, each sustained by distinct configurations of actors. Such dynamics appear in Sabatier's model, which shows clearly that "within the subsystem, [...] actors can be aggregated into a number (usually one to four) of 'advocacy coalitions', each composed of actors from various governmental and private organizations who

both (a) share a set of normative and causal beliefs and (b) engage in a non-trivial degree of co-ordinated activity over time" (Sabatier 1998, 103).

Instead of unifying and homogenising the social sphere where it "functions", the paradigm consequently acts more as a bounded space for conflict, between the subsystem and the global community, as inside the subsystem itself (Jobert makes a distinction here between "debates which take place within the same *référentiel* and controversy about the *référentiel* itself", Jobert 1992, 221). A cognitive and normative frame thus marks out the terrain for social exchanges and disagreements, rather than simply supporting an unlikely consensus. A dominant paradigm is thus by no means an exclusive one.

Table 2.2. The dynamics of cognitive and normative frames

The appropriateness of these cognitive and normative frames, notably for understanding transitional phases where social tensions are revealed which require new adjustments based on new principles, is best represented visually in a simplified form (see Table 2.2). General changes such as in the social division of labour generate tensions in structures and entrenched social values, which in turn lead to new definitions of basic assumptions and to certain behavioural changes. These also imply a new conception of the individual defined as a producer, and the adaptation of different social spaces. Such approaches are located in a developmental, indeed an evolutionary, perspective, which explains why the notion of change is one of their fundamental attributes.

Paradigm Change

The processes discussed above beg a level of questioning, beyond that concerning their components and their dynamics, as to the elements which provoke a break and thereby characterise a shift from one frame to another. If we consider this more closely, what these different models primarily aim to explain are the ways in which change comes about in public policy, and alongside this, the evolution of power relations in a given subsystem of public policymaking. By so doing, they

have helped 'relativise' classical approaches to understanding policymaking based on individual rationality, both theoretically and in terms of their explanatory power. Indeed, recognition of the importance of cognitive and normative logics has led to a reconsideration of the traditional conclusions of incrementalist theories (Lindblom 1959). Centred on the idea of a paradigm shift as the bearer of "extraordinary" changes in public policy, these approaches are therefore interested in a complex host of social processes, which oblige most social actors to make radical normative and cognitive adaptations, going beyond the simple and marginal adjustments required by incrementalism. Two tendencies dominate here: that which looks for causes or bearers of change, and the analysis of the various forms of these changes.

Bearers of Change

In the identification of 'elements of rupture' which can instigate a paradigm change, different approaches highlight particular dynamics capable of modifying felt cognitive and normative stability. Two general elements seem able, separately or together, to prompt the development of new global norms, namely, transformations of economic conditions, and/or a serious crisis affecting the subsystem under consideration.

A more or less substantial modification of economic dynamics and structures seems to be one of the principal triggers of crisis, adjustment or production of cognitive or normative frames. Sabatier's model, in part presented in terms of 'systems', thus considers socio-economic variation as one of the possible elements of these "exogenous shocks" which comprise "changes in socio-economic conditions, public opinion, system-wide governing coalition, or policy outputs from other subsystems" and which are "a *necessary, but not sufficient*, cause of change in the *policy core* attributes of a governmental program" (Sabatier 1998, 118, emphasis in original).

To take an example, neo-liberalism may be conceived as a form of response to the economic oil crises of the 1970s, and to more recent economic transformations. At the end of the 19th century, Emile Durkheim identified the phenomenon of anomie, resulting from transformations caused by ruptures to traditional socioeconomic structures, in his analysis of the consequences of the social division of labour (Durkheim 1964). Similarly, we can hypothesise that the industrial revolution was gradually able to modify the underlying assumptions and contexts of social exchanges and public policy. However, beyond its detrimental effects, the consequences of the industrial revolution also obliged social actors to rethink the contexts and assumptions of their actions in order to confer meaning and legitimacy on a set of processes which would otherwise have been perceived as problematic.

Another event or series of events which may spark a particularly serious political crisis is war; either with a foreign power or a civil war. This kind of a shock can provoke a trauma leading most political actors to more or less consciously try to make a clean slate of the past, in order to solve the problems perceived as provok-

ing the crisis, and to argue for different institutional frameworks and principles for action. Accordingly, this kind of trauma tends to destroy the prevalent paradigm and can help individuals and organisations to define alternative way of thinking. Thus the wars experienced by France in the 19th century can be understood as catalysts, if not the direct triggers, of important re-evaluations of the fundamental principles upon which socio-political stability was built at the time. In particular, the shock of the defeat of 1940 was a genuine trauma for the French, signalling a change in the way France was viewed in the world, in the guiding principles of state action and in the perception of social hierarchies and legitimate social exchanges.

Elements of the above theories may be used in conjunction with those developed in the work of John Kingdon and John Keeler on "political windows" (Kingdon 1984; Keeler 1993). Analysing the different processes which traditionally characterise public policy, John Kingdon was able to show that the culmination of favourable dynamics may allow the opening of a political window, that is "an opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problems" (Kingdon 1984, 173). Whilst suspending the ordinary conditions of politics, such situations not only permit greater input into agenda-setting but also offer the actors concerned a wider scope for action, which effectively allows them to modify public policy in a non-incremental way. As a result, changes in public policy paradigms are achieved.

Different Ways of Achieving Change

Whilst the analysis of different ways of achieving policy change is at the heart of Peter Hall and Paul Sabatier's work, it is a more marginal consideration for Jobert and Muller. Peter Hall (1993) clearly articulates the main orientations of this shift in the analysis in policymaking which seeks to challenge the conclusions traditionally drawn by public policy analysis. Following Lindblom's work on the contexts of decision-making, which are revealed to be complex to the point of allowing only marginal (incremental) changes in public policy, most research in this area has concluded that the state is relatively unchanging. In practice, political and administrative actors can only advance public policy through what they learn from the environments they are located in, or from their own capacity for action (for a review of the literature on learning, see Bennett and Howlett 1992).

All the approaches to public policy discussed here acknowledge the relevance of these ways of achieving change. This is particularly so for the *advocacy coalition framework* model which, whilst accepting a priori the possibility of change in the *deep core* of belief systems, nonetheless considers this to be extremely rare, Sabatier going as far as to coin it a "religious conversion". The notion of learning appears in the recent works of Bruno Jobert (1994) as a means of modifying the coherence and the degree of generality which formerly characterised the notion of the *référentiel*. More systematically, the theme of learning is also found in two of the ways of achieving a change in public policy isolated by Peter Hall. Here, learning remains a pertinent

notion to describe occasional adjustments which affect the "lower" levels of cognitive and normative frames. Speaking of first and second order changes, Hall shows that it is learning which explains instrumental changes in the first order, second order changes mainly concerning "the development of new policy instruments" (Hall 1993, 280).

However, Peter Hall adds the possibility of third-order changes to these traditional mechanisms, which he describes as processes through which "not only were the settings of policy changed but the hierarchy of goals and set of instruments employed to guide policy shifted radically as well" (Hall 1993, 283-4). This is analogous to Kuhn's conceptualisation of a paradigm crisis, such processes thus primarily referring to the growing incapacity felt by actors to view changing social relations according to previous frames.

Concerning public policy programs, a political crisis can consequently come about, characterised by "a phase of public policymaking during which dominant representations no longer succeed in interpreting the development of a social field in a way that satisfies the actors concerned, and can therefore no longer successfully structure and legitimate the action of the State. It is in this sense that a 'political crisis' produces problems [...]" (Muller and Surel 1996, 93). This last notion is close to that of "anomaly" used by Hall with reference to Kuhn's work, which describes the growing incapacity of a given paradigm to manage social tensions or to offer satisfying and/or legitimate public policy solutions, thus reaching a "critical juncture" (Collier and Collier 1991) which itself creates favourable conditions for the more or less substantial re-evaluation of the general or specific principles of the subsystem under consideration. Taking the example of macro-economic policies pursued by the British government in the 1970s in response to the oil crises, Hall shows that the Keynesian strategies employed for counter-cyclical economic revival (primarily boosting demand) produced unintended consequences, due to the combination of inflation and unemployment. The resulting loss of confidence in the Keynesian paradigm as the dominant reference point of macro-economic policy opened the way for the neo-liberal paradigm to take hold (Hall 1992, 1993).

The Multiplicity of Cognitive and Normative Frames

These different elements, relating to the components, the "functions" as well as to the forms of a change of cognitive and normative frames, constitute the principal features of these different conceptualisations. An increasing number of empirical studies informed by these models testifies to their success, which can undoubtedly be explained by their capacity to integrate certain long-standing questions in political science into the field of public policy analysis. In particular they seek an articulation within the antagonistic pairing of conflict and cooperation, which, according to Jean Leca (1997), is the Janus' face of political science. Similarly, such modelling has attempted, more or less explicitly, to construct certain dynamics associated with the dialectical oppositions between thought and action, past and present, continuity

and change, order and disorder, unity and division, and so on. Lastly, from the viewpoint of public policy analysis, it has been possible to develop models, separate from those informed by a rationalist position, which are capable of explaining the processes of "extraordinary" change in public policy.

A number of critiques have nonetheless emerged recently, pointing to the problematic implications of these approaches for both empirical and theoretical research. The excessive emphasis on cognitive and cognitive variables as well as the methodological problems they pose (How are cognitive and normative frames to be identified? To what extent are they appropriate to describe the practices of actors and the development of public policy?) have sometimes led to the purely rhetorical use of these notions, underestimating the forms of mobilisation, of diffusion, indeed of instrumentalisation, that these frames have at times been subject to. Isolating the role of cognitive and normative macro-frames effectively poses a problem of identification and explanation of the multiplicity of these principles, values and global representations within different units of analysis, as well as of the hierarchical co-existence of societal paradigms, both old and new. Rather than going no further than the falsely naive statement that the same frame produces varied social usages, it may be more useful to question these differences through the construction of spatial, temporal and even intersectoral comparisons, whilst also seeking to integrate certain variables which have hitherto been neglected or marginalized: the interests of actors, and the role of institutions (Hall 1997).

Constructing a Comparative Analytical Grid

If, for example, we suppose that a nation is a subsystem, each country being subjected to a similar meta-norm (neo-liberalism in the recent past), it may effectively be possible to isolate discrepancies in the diffusion of these societal paradigms. The particular reception of the same societal paradigm in each country allows us to identify and compare the dynamics of the operationalisation of these norms, in part linked to the specific structure of interests and institutional configuration in each national context.

In the course of the 1980s, the same meaning has not been accorded to neo-liberal ideology in France, Britain, the United States and Germany for instance. The particular instrumentalisation of very similar normative inputs has not produced the same cognitive and normative frame in each country. To put this very simply, we could say that the neo-liberal norm was taken on board with relative ease and in full, in the United States and Britain, while it was more strongly contested in France and Germany (Jobert 1994). Likewise, representations of Europe vary from one country to another, beyond the presumed unity of the ideas promoted by EU agencies. The usage of the concept of "Europe", notably in government speeches which seek to legitimate current reforms in monetary policy, varies strongly from one Member State to another, in some in an attempt to justify the status-quo (Britain), others building on it to push forward significant public policy changes (Italy).

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The same kind of hypotheses can equally be applied to research based on temporal comparisons (Bartolini 1993). Taking the nation state as the basic unit of analysis, we can seek to construct relatively simple indicators (number of privatisations, financial market reforms etc.) where variations reveal the mechanisms of time-lag between the different countries. Alongside the different modes of adaptation in each country, we find different rhythms, first in the uptake of a new frame, with some countries ahead and others behind, as well as in their diffusion and development. Equipped with such an array of hypotheses, we can for example, draw attention to the relatively early embracing of neo-liberal ideas in the United States, and attempt to isolate the pertinent variables which explain these different forms and sequences of adoption. The turning points, during which a shift seems to occur more quickly, could equally be correlated with certain trigger factors such as a change of government, an "objective" and/or "subjective" worsening of a crisis, or external pressures.

This analytical grid can finally be used to explore intersectoral comparisons, showing how the same global dynamics produce a variety of outcomes according to the sector. Within the same country, certain socio-economic fields are found to be more or less in sync with new cognitive and normative frames. The different processes which result from this may be associated as much with a strategy of closure and/or resistance as with a partial adaptation to global logics, or even a total conversion of the sector to the new precepts, modes of action and instruments implied by the new global *référentiel*.

Such examples show that the spread of new ideas, principles of action and forms of action does not come about in a "revolutionary" way from scientific development, but rather from a more or less radical re-evaluation of ways of legitimising groups and social exchanges, as well as through more or less substantial modifications to legitimate frameworks and forms of public policy. In practice, the penetration of neo-liberal ideas has provoked strong resistance from mechanisms intrinsic to national policy styles, in particular due to the mobilisation of interest groups. Furthermore, such an analysis also reveals the existence of institutional and normative grids specific to each country, which play a part in modifying the substantial content of dominant cognitive and normative frames to ensure their compatibility with the previous structures of exchange and action characteristic of that country.

In seeking to understand the factors which explain these specificities and the various forms of resistance to the same general principles in different countries, Pierson (1997) shows the importance of the influence of the past in the structuring of institutional and normative configurations in each country. He makes use of the notion of "historical causality" developed by Stinchcombe (1968) to shed light on the existence of a logic of "path dependency". This logic includes the processes of the progressive sedimentation of normative and institutional frames of social exchange and public policymaking, a sedimentation which is then able to determine mechanisms of resistance and/or "translation". The implanting of customs within

bureaucracies and the enmeshing of interests and values between the groups concerned and administrative departments therefore appear amongst the constitutive factors of institutional, relational and cognitive grids which have a bearing on the penetration of new global cognitive and normative frames.

Factors Underpinning the Variation in Frames

We can attempt to isolate certain elements which account for spatial and/or temporal and/or sectoral differences, arising from the mechanisms of variation of a similar global cognitive and normative frame. Several factors are relevant here, namely (1) the extent and the nature of the previous paradigm, and (2) the institutional configurations specific to each country which act as filters to the dominant paradigm.

(1) The importance of the previous societal paradigm

The emergence of a new frame is not a case of the substitution of one paradigm for another, as Kuhn posits for the natural sciences, but rather occurs through associations and new hierarchical rankings of elements that may already exist. Far from making a clean slate of the past, a new societal paradigm must in effect be composed of previous cognitive and normative structures, which explains possible re-translations of the elements of the frame, possible "delays" from one subsystem to another in the adoption of these new elements, and above all, the mechanisms of resistance a new frame gives rise to. Neither does a dominant paradigm "destroy" previously legitimate frames, rather it comes to constitute the reference point in relation to which these older structures must adapt.

Consequently, the diffusion of a new paradigm gives rise to complex and at times contradictory mechanisms of adaptation. For example, the European Monetary Union was not just an application of a "pure" neo-liberal policy paradigm. On the contrary, Kathleen McNamara was able to show that "the governments of Europe followed a pragmatic, not ideologically purist, type of monetarism" (McNamara, 1998: 67), which was the outcome of the previous policy paradigms and the product of European political leader's bargaining.

(2) Specific institutional configurations

In this general expression, which seeks to integrate interests and institutions in the analysis of cognitive and normative frames, we can bring together the particular political and administrative structures of a country or a sector, the forms of organisation of social exchanges in a particular field, or the judicial framework determining the rules of the game and the hierarchies between actors, the instruments etc. The modes of structuring social exchanges, sometimes institutionalised even within political or administrative departments, comprise a host of factors able to explain

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both variations in the translation of a particular cognitive and normative frame, and its diverse rhythms of diffusion. Indeed, several authors have underlined the importance of coalitions, arenas and forums, constituted around precise public policies, and formed around a particular paradigm, which are thus able to act as centres of resistance and/or grids modifying the content as well as the progress of a new set of cognitive and normative models (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Sabatier 1993; Jobert 1994; Radaelli 1998).

Defining the arena as a group of actors sharing particular "orders of comprehension" (taking up this idea from Dunsire 1978), Dudley and Richardson (1996) were able to show how this was so in policies on the development of trunkroads in Britain. The structuring of policies around a number of mechanisms mastered and legitimated by the transport department, engineers, and lorry-drivers' union representatives, allowed the establishment of a kind of protective shield against any outside influence for many years. The enmeshing of the dominant normative and cognitive structures, the institutionalisation of social exchanges in a specific context, and a number of public programs operated as screens to new paradigms, if the "institutions" themselves were not challenged. In the precise case of British trunkroads, it seemed that a transformation of dominant values (increased value placed on the protection of the environment) in conjunction with economic crisis (increase in the cost of fuel, decrease in public investment) contributed to the undoing of the existing coalition and at the same time the displacement of the logics of exchange (integration of new actors, notably environmental groups) and the legitimate cognitive and normative models. Such an example shows the possible succession of forms of change: an incremental logic, when the entrenched institutional and normative grids continue to function; a change of paradigm, associated with internal and/or external destabilisation of these same legitimate grids.

Generally speaking, these notions arise out of the hope to isolate the sites of mobilisation of cognitive and normative frames and to see how the interests of actors and the variable institutionalisation of their relationships tends to modify the content and the scope of a societal paradigm. However, it is not only a question of occasional adjustments to original theorisations, essentially centred on the dynamics of diffusion, as these still leave to one side the question of the modes of production of cognitive and normative frames. How do they emerge in a given field? According to what power relations and what balance of power? Do cognitive and normative frames not sometimes constitute the post-hoc rationalisations for institutional transformations or changes in power relations (cf. on this point, Majone, 1992)?

These sets of problems are undoubtedly less a basis for the rejection of the analytical models discussed here than a starting point for complementary research, as well as a warning against the sometimes excessive use of cognitive approaches. In certain cases, such notions have tended to fuel an invasion of erudite discourse (similar to that concerning the "social construction of reality", cf de Lara 1997). This undoubtedly relates once again to their aptitude for questioning the processes