CURRENT TRENDS IN LINGUISTICS

VOLUME 9

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CURRENT TRENDS
IN LINGUISTICS

Edited by

THOMAS A. SEBEOK

Research Center for the Language Sciences
Indiana University

VOLUME 9

Linguistics in Western Europe

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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

In a statement issued by the (Pugwash) Conference on Science and World Affairs, meeting in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, in September, 1964, we read: 'Proliferation of scientific literature raises one of the greatest obstacles facing efficient advancement of science today.... An urgent need has arisen for the development of a world-wide, systematic, coordinated and, as far as possible, integrated effort to store and retrieve scientific information. The existing abstracting services and systems for machine coding and indexing cover limited areas of scientific information; they are being developed independently so that information stored in one of them is not freely exchangeable with that stored in others.' Responding to the challenge implied, the 1966 General Assembly of the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) and the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) approved proposals for a joint study of the feasibility of a world scientific information system. The report of this study, known as UNISIST (United Nations scientific and technical information), is being published by UNESCO as I am composing this Introduction. Among its twenty-one recommendations — many of which have a good chance of being successfully implemented, if for no other reason because of compelling economic realities — there is an underlying concern with practical methods for reviewing, evaluating, and compacting newly generated information. In the unanimous opinion of the UNISIST study group, the 'gate-keeping' functions which editors and other referees perform for science should be strengthened; efforts to maintain high standards for the published literature must be unrelenting.

During this past decade, our own discipline has, it seems, gone the other way: the communication network that has, octopus-like, enmeshed linguistics in this period has an alarmingly growing component that typically assigns primary responsibility for quality control to the author, with minimal, if any, editorial processing. All of us are inundated with so-called working papers, emanating from departments and other centers of linguistic activities of varying degrees of respectability, containing quantities of seldom digestible — if sometimes appetizingly packaged and labeled — pulp. As Amitai Etzioni remarked in a recent *Science* editorial, calling for quality filters in information systems: 'Any paper that meets some very loosely defined criteria...is circulated, and the potential user is provided with no clues as to the relative merit of each item. It might seem that the user would be delighted at having all the material

he wishes at his fingertips, but actually much of his time is being wasted as *a high proportion of the material circulated and retrieved is without discernible value'* (emphasis in the original, in Vol. 171, No. 3967, January 15, 1971).

The *Current Trends* series was basically conceived and designed as a kind of *ad hoc* system of quality filters, to provide the linguistic community with one trustworthy device for restraining — if not curing — the cancerous spread of unneeded information. The prescription — which I have described in my Introductions to previous volumes — is extremely simple: each article is assigned to the best available scholar for any given subject, as determined by the Editorial Board for that volume, and then the prime quality control for that particular topic becomes his responsibility.

Since the appeareance, in 1971, of Vol. 6, *Linguistics in South West Asia and North Africa*, Vol. 7, *Linguistics in Sub-Saharan Africa*, and Vol. 8, *Linguistics in Oceania*, several modifications have been made in the over-all plan of the series, and I should like now to recapitulate its status as a whole.

Since the reviews of Vols. 1-4 listed in my Introductions to Vols. 6 and 8 have appeared, I have profited from that by Wolfgang Veenker, of Vol. 1, in *Ural-Altaische Jahrbücher* 42.231-8 (1970), and that by Gyula Décsy, of Vol. 3, *Ibid.* 238-44. Another valuable account of Vol. 4, by Carlos Patiño Rosselli, was published in the *Thesaurus* of the *Boletin del Instituto Caro y Cuervo* 24/3. 1-6 (1969).

Vol. 10, *Linguistics in North America*, and Vol. 11, *Diachronic, areal, and typological linguistics*, are both in press, and will undoubtedly appear in 1972.

Vol. 12, *Linguistics and adjacent arts and sciences*, has expanded to colossal bulk partly due to the vastness of the coverage, but also, in part, because of the exceptionally exhaustive treatment of several of the subjects included. Although some of the articles are already in press, others are still being edited at this time. We now envisage a book, in at least three separate tomes, of some 2,500 pages, in the standard format of this series.

As originally conceived, Vol. 12 was to have included a single collaborative chapter, by Edward Stankiewicz and Dell Hymes, on 'Current trends in the historiography of linguistics'. The absurdity of the task soon dawned upon all of us concerned. Accordingly, we have added an entirely separate volume to the series, Vol. 13, *Current trends in the historiography of linguistics*, the table of contents of which features some twenty-five chapters, by as many different authors of international renown. The Associate Editors, with whose collaboration this book was planned, include, in addition to Hymes and Stankiewicz, Hans Aarsleff (Princeton University), Robert Austerlitz (Columbia University), and Luigi Romeo (University of Colorado); each of the five will also contribute a chapter and, in addition, Stankiewicz has taken the initiative for a bibliography of historical writings on Western linguistics since 1945.

The Index to *Current Trends in Linguistics, Vols. 1-13*, much discussed in previous Introductions, will thus become Vol. 14 of the series, instead of as announced earlier. As conceived at the moment, it will be an in-house project of the publisher's.

In the Introduction to Vol. 7, I summarized the support of the U.S. Office of

Education, for Vols. 4-7 and 11-12, totalling $265,186; and in Vol. 8, I summarized the
support of our National Science Foundation, for Vols. 1-3, 8, and (partially) 10,
totalling $130,602. Vol. 9 was supported by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research,
by Contract No. F44620-68-C-0046, with the Center for Applied Linguistics, in the
amount of $49,046. Thus the grand total of AFOSR, NSF, and USOE aid to the
series so far amounts to $444,834. The assistance of yet a fourth agency of our
government, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and of several foreign
sources, will be detailed in forthcoming Introductions where pertinent.

Since the commissioned article on Romanian linguistics had to be dropped from
Vol. 1, at the last minute, I am happy to see an excellent one appear here instead,
however incongruously from an areal standpoint. Professors Marcus and Slama-
Cazacu were also gracious enough to extend their respective coverages, for the sake
of completeness, to Eastern Europe.

It is frustrating to have to exclude from Vol. 9 — as it had to be from Vol. 5 — a
treatment of Gypsy linguistics, because the respective Editorial Boards failed to
approve the manuscripts that were submitted.

Many of the chapters had to be translated from French, German, Italian, or
Spanish; acknowledgements are variously due to the following translators: Jeannette
Clausen, Serge Davidenkoff, Kathleen Fenton, Laurence Gretsky, Janet Hadda,
Donald Lenfest, Jean Umiker, William Wieland, and Richard Zacharias.

Professor Marvin I. Herzog's over-all help with the translation and editing of the
chapter on Yiddish was truly indispensable, as was also Professor Curtis Blaylock's
similar assistance with the chapter on Catalan.

Finally, I want to express my warmest gratitude to Professor William G. Moulton
for his contribution at very short notice, upon the tragic loss of Emil Petrovici, who
had originally taken on this assignment, but whose paper was still incomplete when
he died. Let this book be dedicated to his memory.

Bloomington, April 1, 1971   THOMAS A. SEBEOK

CONTENTS

APPENDICES

MASTER LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAAd	*Archivio per l'Alto Adige* (Florence).
AAHG	*Anzeiger für die Altertumswissenschaft*. Herausgegeben von der Österreichischen humanistischen Gesellschaft (Innsbruck).
AaNO	*Aarbøger for nordisk Oldkyndighed og Historie* (Copenhagen).
AAntH	*Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarium Hungaricae* (Budapest).
AAPSzeged	*Acta Academiae paedagogicae Szegediensis — Series paedagogica et psychologica* (Szeged).
AASF	*Suomalaisen Tiedeakatemian Toimituksia/Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae, Series B* (Helsinki).
AAT	*Atti della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, Classe di scienze storiche e filologiche* (Turin).
AAWL	*Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz, Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Klasse* (Wiesbaden).
ABAW	*Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse* (Munich).
AbPAW	*Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin).
AC	*L'Antiquité Classique* (Louvain).
ACILR 10	*Actes du Xe Congrès international de linguistique et philologie romanes, Strasbourg 23-28 avril 1962*. 3 vols. Paris, Klincksieck, 1965.
ACLS	*American Council of Learned Societies Newsletter* (New York).
Acme	*Annali della Facoltà di Filosofia e Lettre dell'Università Statale di Milano* (Milan).
AcOr	*Acta Orientalia*. Ediderunt Societates Orientales Danica Norvegica Svecica (Le Monde Oriental) (Copenhagen).
ADA	*Anzeiger für deutsches Alterum und deutsche Literatur* (Wiesbaden). (Supplement to ZDA.)
ADAW	*Abhandlungen der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Klasse für Sprachen, Literatur und Kunst* (Berlin).
Aegyptus	*Aegyptus* (= *Revista Italiana di Egittologia e di Papirologia*, Milan).
AEM	*Anuario de Estudios Medievales* (Barcelona).
Aevum	*Aevum* (= *Rassegna di scienze filologiche, linguistiche e storiche*, Milan).
AFLT	*Annales publiées par la Faculté des Lettres de Toulouse* (Toulouse).
AfO	*Archiv für Orientforschung* (= *Internationale Zeitschrift für die Wissenschaft vom Vorderen Orient*, Graz).
AfrAb	*African Abstracts*. A Quarterly Review of Ethnological, Social and Linguistic Studies appearing in current periodicals/Bulletin analytique africaniste (London).
Africa	*Africa* (= *Journal of the International African Institute*, London).
AfrLS	*African Language Studies* (London).
AGI	*Archivio Glottologico Italiano* (Florence).
AILA Bulletin	*Bulletin of the International Association for Applied Linguistics* (Danderyd, Sweden).
AILC	*Anales del Instituto de Lingüística de Cuyo* (Mendoza, Argentina).
AION-G	*Annali, Istituto Universitario Orientale, Sezione Germanica* (Naples).

AION-L	*Annali, Istituto Universitario Orientale, Sezione Linguistica* (Naples).
AION-R	*Annali, Istituto Universitario Orientale, Sezione Romanza* (Naples).
AION-S	*Annali, Istituto Universitario Orientale, Sezione Slava* (Naples).
AIS	*Sprach- und Sachatlas Hallieng und der Südschweiz.*
AIV	*Atti dell'Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettre ed Arti, Classe di Scienze morali e lettere* (Venice).
AJA	*American Journal of Archeology* (New York).
AJMenD	*American Journal of Mental Deficiency* (Willimantic, Connecticut).
AL	*Acta Linguistica Hafniensia* (= *International Journal of Structural Linguistics*, Copenhagen).
ALA	*Atlante linguistico delle Alpi* (Turin).
Al-An	*Al-Andalus* (= *Revista de las Escuelas de estudios árabes de Madrid y Granada*, Madrid and Granada).
Albania	*Albania* (Brussels and London).
ALC	*L'Atlas linguistique de la France: Corse.*
ALEA-P	*Publicaciones del Atlas Lingüístico [etnografico] de Andalucia* (Granada).
ALF	*L'Atlas linguistique de la France.*
ALFUP	*Atti del Laboratorio di Fonetica dell' Universita di Padova* (Padva).
ALH	*Acta Linguistica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* (Budapest).
ALI	*Atlante Linguistico Italiano* (Turin).
ALL	*Archiv für lateinische Lexicographie und Grammatik* (Leipzig).
ALM	*Atlante Linguistico Mediterraneo.*
ALMA	*Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi.* Bulletin Du Cange (Brussels).
AlmÖAW	*Almanach der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Vienna).
ALPI	*Atlas Lingüístico de la Península Ibérica.*
ALPO	*Atlas linguistique des Pyrenees-Orientales* (Paris). 1966.
ALR	*Atlasul Linguistic Român/Atlasul Lingvistic Romín* (Bucharest).
ALUOS	*The Annual of the Leeds University Oriental Society* (Leiden).
AM	*Asia Major* (London).
AmA	*American Anthropologist* (Menasha, Wisconsin).
AmADeaf	*American Annals of the Deaf* (Washington, D.C.).
AMAT	*Atti e Memorie dell'Accademia Toscana di Scienze e Lettre 'La Colombiana'* (Florence).
AMCILR	*Actas Memorias del VII Congreso de Lingüística Romanica*, 1953. Barcelona, 1955 (1957).
AMCISO VII	*VII Congresso internazionale di scienze onomastiche.* Atti del congresso e memori dela sezione toponomastica. Florence, 1962-63.
AMPs	*Annales médico-psychologiques* (Paris).
AnnBret	*Annales de Bretagne* (= *Revue publiée par la Faculté des Lettres de Rennes*, Rennes).
AnnIPhO	*Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire orientales et slaves* (Brussels).
AnnMAfrC	*Annales, Musée Royal de l'Afrique Centrale, Sciences humaines/Annalen, Koninklijk Museum voor Midden-Afrika, Wetenschappen van de mens* (Tervuren, Belgium).
AnnMidi	*Annales du Midi* (Toulouse).
AnnNorm	*Annales de Normandie* (Caen).
AnnThijm	*Annalen van het Thijmgenootschap* (Utrecht).
AnnUP	*Annales de l'université de Paris* (Paris).
ANPE	*Annales Neérlandaises de Phonétique Expérimentale* (Amsterdam).
AnPs	*L'année psychologique* (Paris).
ANPsyBel	*Acta Neurologica et Psychiatrica Belgica* (Brussels).
Anthropos	*Anthropos* (= *Revue internationale d'ethnologie et de linguistique/Internationale Zeitschrift für Völker- und Sprachenkunde*, Freiburg, Switzerland).
Antiquity	*Antiquity.* A Quarterly Review of Archaelogy (Cambridge).
AntJ	*The Antiquarian Journal.* Being the Journal of the Society of Antiquaries of London (London).
ÅNVA	*Det norske videnskaps-akademi: Oslo, Årbok* (Oslo).
AO	*Archiv Orientálni.*

AÖAW   *Anzeiger der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-histori-
            sche Klasse* (Vienna).
AOH   *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* (Budapest).
AOR   *Annuari de l'Oficina Romànica de Lingüística i Literatura* (Barcelona).
AORLBelg   *Acta oto-rhino-laringologica Belgica* (Brussels).
APCILA   *Actes du Premier Coloque International de Linguistique Appliquée, 26-31 octobre
            1964, Nancy* (= *Annales de l'Est, Publiées par la Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences
            humaines, de l'Université de Nancy.* Memoire no. 31). 1966.
APhS   *Acta Philologica Scandinavica* (= *Tidsskrift for nordisk sprogforskning,* Copen-
            hagen).
APsNP   *Archivio di psicologia, neurologia e psichiatria* (Milano).
AR   *Archivum Romanicum* (Florence).
A&R   *Atene e Roma* (= *Rassegna trimestrale dell'Associazione Italiana di Cultura Classica,*
            Messina and Florence).
Arabica   *Arabica* (= *Revue d'études arabes,* Leiden).
Arbor   *Arbor* (= *Revista general de investigacion y cultura,* Madrid).
Arch   *Archivum* (= *Revista de la Facultad de Filosofia y Letras, Universidad de Oviedo,*
            Oviedo).
ArchASJE   *Archiv za arbanasku starinu, jezik i etnologiju* (Belgrade).
ArchD   *Archiv für Diplomatik, Schriftgeschichte, Siegel- und Wappenkunde* (Cologne and
            Graz).
ArchFAr   *Archivo de Filologia Aragonesa* (Saragossa).
ArchGPs   *Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie* (Leipzig).
ArchK   *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* (Marburg).
ArchL   *Archivum Linguisticum.* A Review of Comparative Philology and General Linguis-
            tics (Glasgow).
ArchP   *Archeion Pontou* (Athens).
ArchPs   *Archives de psychologie* (Geneva).
ArchPsN   *Archiv für Psychiatrie und Nervenkrankheiten.* (Incorporating ZGNPs) (Berlin).
ArchPsy-B   *Archiv für Psychiatrie* (Berlin).
ArchSSL   *Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen* (*und Literaturen*) (Braunschweig).
ArchV   *Archiv für Völkerkunde* (Vienna).
ArchZ   *Archivalische Zeitschrift* (Munich).
Arkiv   *Arkiv för nordisk Fiologi* (Lund).
Arv   *Arv* (= *Tidskrift for nordisk folkminnesforskning/Journal of Scandinavian Folklore,*
            Uppsala and Copenhagen).
ASAW   *Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, Philo-
            logisch-Historische Klasse* (Berlin).
ASGIM   *Atti del Sodalizio Glottologico Milanese* (Milan).
ASLU   *Acta Societatis Linguisticae Upsaliensis* (Uppsala).
ÅSLund   *Årsbok utgiven av Seminarierna i slaviska språk.* Jämförande språkforskning, finsk-
            ugriska språk och östasiatiska språk vid Lunds Universitet (Lund).
ASNP   *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa.* Lettere, storia e filosofia (Florence).
ASNS [ASNSL] *Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen* [*und Literaturen* — beginning with
            vol. 56, 1876] (Brunswick).
ASoc   *L'Année Sociologique* (Paris).
AsS   *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques* (Bern).
Athena   *Athena.* Syngramma periodikon tes en Athenais Epistemonikes Hetaireias (Athens).
Athenaeum   *Athenaeum.* Studi periodici di letteratura e storia dell'antichità (Pavia).
ATopPir   *Actas de la Reunión de toponimia pirenaica-Jaca, 1948* (Zaragoza). 1949. (= (I)
            RTP.)
AUB   *Analele Universităţii din Bucureşti. Seria Ştiinţe Sociale* (Bucharest).
AUC   *Acta Universitatis Carolinae* (Prague).
AUI   *Analele Ştiinţifice ale Universităţii 'Al. I. Cuza'. Secţiunea III* (Jassy).
AUMLA   *AUMLA* (= *Journal of the Australian Universities Language and Literature Associ-
            ation,* Christchurch, New Zealand).

AUO-Ph   *Acta Universitatis Palackianae Olomucenais, Facultas Philosophica* (Olomouc).
AUT   *Turun Yliopiston julkaisuja/Annales universitatis Turkuensis* (Aboensis) (Turku).
Aut Aut   *Aut Aut* (= *Revista di filosofia e di cultura*, Milan).
AUTim   *Analele Universității din Timișoara. Seria Științe Sociale* (Timișoara).
AuÜ   *Afrika und Übersee*. Sprachen, Kulturen. Folge der Zeitschrift für Eingeborenen-Sprachen (Berlin).
AVglPhon   *Archiv für Vergleichende Phonetik* (Berlin).
BAB   *Académie Royale de Belgique, Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences morales et politiques/Koninklijke Belgische Academie, Mededelingen van de Klasse der Letteren en der Morele en Staatkundige Wetenschappen* (Brussels).
Babel   *Babel* (= *Revue internationale de la traduction/International Journal of Translation*, Avignon).
BABL   *Boletín de la Academia de Buenas Letras* (Barcelona).
BAE   *Boletín de la Real Academia Espanola* (Madrid).
Baessler-Archiv *Beiträge zur Völkerkunde*. Museum für Völkerkunde, Berlin-Dahlem (Berlin).
BAGB   *Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Bude*. 4th série (Paris).
BALF   *Bulletin de l'Académie Royale de Language et Littérature Françaises* (Brussels).
BALI   *Bollettino dell'Atlante Linguistico Italiano* (Turin).
BalkE   *Balkansko ezikoznanie/Linguistique balkanique* (LingB) (Sofia).
BALM   *Bollettino dell'Atlante Linguistico Mediterraneo* (Venice and Rome).
BArch   *Balkan-archiv*. Fortsetzung des Jahresberichtes des Instituts für Rumänische Sprach (Leipzig).
BASc-Lisboa   *Academia das Sciencias*. Boletim da Classe de Letras (Segunda classe)/Boletim da segunda-classe (Lisbon).
BB   *Beiträge zur Kunde der indogermanischen sprachen* ("*Bezzenbergers Beiträge*").
BBCS   *Bulletin of the Board of Celtic Studies* (Cardiff).
BBMP   *Boletín de la Biblioteca de Menéndez y Telayo* (Santander, Spain).
BByzA   *Berliner Byzantinische Arbeiten*. Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (Berlin).
BCH   *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique* (Paris).
BCLC   *Bulletin du Cercle linguistique de Copenhague* (Copenhagen).
BCO   *Bibliotheca Classica Orientalis*. Dokumentation der altertumswissenschaftlichen Literatur der Sowjetunion und der Länder der Volksdemokratie (Berlin).
BCSS   *Bollettino, Centro di Studi filologici e linguistici siciliani* (Palermo).
BCTD   *Bulletin de la Commission Royale de Toponymie et de Dialectologie/Handelingen van de Koninklijke Commissie voor Toponymie en Dialectologie* (Brussels).
BDC   *Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute* (Poona).
BDCat   *Bulletí de Dialectologia Catalana*. 1913-1936.
BDE   *Boletín de Dialectología Española*. Abadía de San Cugat del Vallés (Barcelona).
BDHA   *Biblioteca de Dialectología Hispanoamericana*.
BDLC   *Bolleti del diccionari de la llengua catalana*. 1933.
BDR   *Bulletin de Dialectologie romane*. Société de dialectologie romane (Hamburg).
BE   *Bălgarski Ezik* (Sofia).
BECh   *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes* (Paris).
Belfagor   *Belfagor* (= *Rassegna di varia umanità*, Florence).
BF   *Boletim de Filologia* (Lisbon).
BFE   *Boletín de Filología Española* (Madrid).
BFM   *Boletín de Filologia* (Montevideo).
BFPhLL   *Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège* (Paris).
BFR   *Boletim de Filologia* (Rio de Janeiro).
BFS   *Bulletin de la Faculté des Lettres de Strasbourg* (Strasbourg).
BFUCh   *Boletín de Filología. Instituto de Filología de la Universidad de Chile* (Santiago, Chile).
BGDSL   *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur* (Halle).
BHi   *Bulletin Hispanique* (= *Annales de la Faculté des Lettres de Bordeaux*, Bordeaux).
BHS   *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies* (Liverpool).

Biblica	*Biblica*. Commentarii editi cura Pontificii Instituti Biblici (Rome).
Biblos	*Biblos*. Universidade Faculdade de Letres (Coimbra).
BICC	See Thesaurus.
BICS	*Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London* (London).
BIEA	*Boletin del Instituto de Estudios Asturianos* (Oviedo).
BIEg	*Bulletin de l'Institute Égyptien. Ve série* (Cairo).
BijdrTLV	*Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*. Uitgegeven door het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (The Hague).
BILAL	*Bulletin d'information du Laboratoire d'analyse Lexicologique* (Besançon).
BiOr	*Bibliotheca Orientalis* (Leiden).
BIS	*Buletin i Institutit të Studimeve* (Tirana).
BIShk	*Buletin i Institutit të Shkencavet* (Tirana).
BJR	*Bulletin des jeunes Romanistes* (Strasbourg).
BK	*Bedi Karthlisa* [Le destin de la Géorgie] (= *Revue de Kartvelologie*, Paris).
BL	*Bibliographie linguistique publiée par le Comité International Permanent des Linguistes/Linguistic Bibliography* (Utrecht and Antwerp).
BLI	*Beiträge zur Linguistik und Informationsverarbeitung* (Munich). (Formerly BSI.)
BLing	*Bulletin linguistique*. Publié par A. Rosetti (Bucharest).
BLux	*Bulletin linguistique et ethnologique*. Institut grand-ducal (Luxembourg).
BMDial	*Bijdragen en Mededelingen der Dialectencommissie van de Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam* (Amsterdam).
BMFEA	*Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities* (Östasiatiska Samlingarna) (Stockholm).
BMNaam	*Bijdragen en Mededelingen der Naamkundecommissie van de Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam* (Amsterdam).
BMP	*Boletin de la Biblioteca de Menéndez Pelayo* (Santander).
BNF	*Beiträge zur Namenforschung* (Heidelberg).
BNFS	*Bidrag til Nordisk Filologi av studerende ved Kristiania Universitet* (Kristiania, Oslo).
Bohemia	*Bohemia*. Jahrbuch des Collegium Carolinum (Munich).
BPhH	*Bulletin Philologique et Historique du Comité des Travaux Historiques et Scientifiques* (Paris).
BPs	*Bulletin de Psychologie* (Paris).
BPTJ	*Biuletyn polskiego towarzystwa jezykoznawczego/Bulletin de la Société polonaise de Linguistique* (Wroclaw and Cracow).
BRAE	*Boletin de la Real Academia Española* (Madrid).
BRAH	*Boletin de la Real Academia de la Historia* (Madrid).
Brain	*Brain* (London).
BrJEPs	*British Journal of Educational Psychology* (London).
BrJPsych	*British Journal of Psychology* (London).
BRPh	*Beiträge zur romanischen Philologie* (Berlin).
BRSVAP	*Boletin de la Real Sociedad Vasongada de Amigos del Pais* (San Sebastian).
BS	*Behavioral Science*.
BSE	*Brno Studies in English* (Brno).
BShkSh	*Buletin për shkencat shoqërore/Botim i Institutit të Shkencave* (Tirana).
BSI	*Beiträge zur Sprachkunde und Informationsverarbeitung* (Munich and Vienna). (See also BLI.)
BSIFFA	*Bollettino della Società Italiana di fonetica, foniatria e audiologia* (Padua).
BSL	*Bulletin de la Société de Linguistique de Paris* (Paris).
BSOAS	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* (London).
BT	*The Bible Translator*. Periodical for the Assistance of Bible Translators (London).
BUShT (Ser.ShkSh)	*Buletin i Universitetit Shtetëror të Tiranes. Seria Shkencat Shoqërore* (Tirana). (From 1964: *Studime historike* and *Studime filologjike*.)
BVSAW	*Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, Philologisch-historische Klasse* (Berlin).
Byzantion	*Byzantion* (= *Revue Internationale des Études byzantines*, Brussels).

ByzNgrJb	*Byzantinisch-neugreichische jahrbücher.* Internationales wissenschaftliches organ (Berlin-Wilmersdorf).
ByzZ	*Byzantinische Zeitschrift* (Munich).
CAIEF	*Cahiers de l'Association Internationale des Études Françaises* (Paris).
CAJ	*Central Asiatic Journal* (The Hague and Wiesbaden).
CanadJPs	*Canadian Journal of Psychology/Revue Canadienne de Psychologie* (Toronto).
Caucasica	*Caucasica* (= *Zeitschrift für die Erforschung der Sprachen und Kulturen des Kaukasus,* Leipzig).
CBLFT	*Congresso Brasileiro da Língua Falada no Teatro.*
CCM	*Cahiers de civilisation médiévale* (Poitiers).
CdE	*Chronique d'Egypte.* Bulletin Périodique de la Fondation Egyptologique Reine Élisabeth (Brussels).
CDI	*Carta dei Dialetti Italiani* (Bari).
CEAfr	*Cahiers d'Études Africaines* (Paris).
Ce Fastu?	*Ce Fastu?* (= *Rivista della Società Filologica Friulana,* Udine).
CEG	*Cuadernos de Estudios Gallegos* (Santiago de Compostela).
Celi	*Celi.* Rakstu Krajums (Lund).
Celtica	*Celtica* (Dublin).
CFiloz	*Cercetări de Filozofie* (Bucharest).
CFS	*Cahiers Ferdinand de Saussure* (Geneva).
ChDev	*Child Development.* Society for Research in Child Development (Washington, D.C.).
CIELB	*Colóquio Internacional des Estudos Luso-Brasileiros.*
CIFU	*Congressus internationalis Fenno-Ugristarum Budapestini habitus 20-24 IX 1960.* Ed. by Gy. Ortutay. Budapest, Akadémiai Kiádo, 1963.
CILR	*Congres international de linguistique romane.*
CITA	*Congrès international de toponymie et d'anthroponymie.*
CJL	*Canadian Journal of Linguistics/Revue canadienne de Linguistique* (Toronto). (Continuation of JCLA.)
CLex	*Cahiers de Lexicologie* (Besançon).
CLing	*Cercetări de Lingvistică* (Cluj).
CLTA	*Cahiers de linguistique théorique et appliquée* (Bucharest).
C&M	*Classica et Medievalia* (= *Revue danoise de philologie et d'histoire,* Copenhagen).
ČMF	*Časopis pro Moderní Fiolologii* (Prague).
CMRS	*Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique* (Paris and The Hague).
CompL	*Computational Linguistics.* The Computing Centre of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Budapest).
Contact	*Contact.* Bulletin of the International Federation of Modern Language Teachers (Beograd).
Convivium	*Convivium* (= *Revista di lettere, filosofia e storia,* Turin).
Cortex	*Cortex* (Varèse).
CPC	*La Cybernétique et la Pédagogie cybernétique* (Paris).
CPh	*Classical Philology* (Chicago).
CQ	*The Classical Quarterly* (London).
CR	*The Classical Review* (London).
CRAI	*Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* (Paris).
CSIFU	*Congressus secundus internationalis Fenno-Ugristarum Helsingiae habitus 23-28 VIII 1965, Pars 1, Acta linguistica.* Ed. by Paavo Ravila, Helsinki, Societas Fenno-Ugrica, 1968.
CSP	*Cahiers Sextil Pușcariu* (Seattle).
CTL	*Current Trends in Linguistics* (The Hague). 1963-.
CultNeol	*Cultura Neolatina.* Bolletino dell'Istituto di Filologia Romanza della Università di Roma (Modena).
CUnam	*Cuadernos de la Cátedra Miguel de Unamuno* (Salamanca).
DBI	*Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* (Rome). 1960-.
DBR	*Les Dialectes Belgo-Romans* (Brussels).
DCEC	*Diccionario Critico Etimologico de la Lengua Castellana* (Madrid and Bern). 1954.

DEEH	*Diccionario Etimologico Espanol e Hispanico* (Madrid). 1954.
De Homine	*De Homine.* Centro di Ricerca per le Scienze Morali e Sociali (Florence).
DEnl	*Dizionario enciclopedico italiano.* 12 vols. (Rome). 1955-61.
DEtl	*Dizionario etimologico italiano.* 5 vols. (Florence). 1950-57.
DF	*Danske Folkemaal* (Copenhagen).
DHLE	*Diccionario Historico de la Lengua Espanola.* 1960-.
Diogène	*Diogène* (= *Revue internationale des sciences humaines,* Paris).
Dívus Thomas	*Dívus Thomas.* Commentarium de philosophia et theologia.
DJbVK	*Deutsches Jahrbuch für Volkskunde* (Berlin).
DLZ	*Deutsche Literaturzeitung für Kritik der internationalen Wissenschaft* (Berlin).
DmB	*Driemaandelijkse Bladen* (= *Tijdschrift voor taal en volksleven in het Oosten van Nederland,* Groningen).
DNVA	*Det norske videnskapsakademi* (Oslo).
Doklady APN	*Doklady Akademii Pedagogičeskix Nauk RSFSR* (Moscow).
Downside Review	*The Downside Review.* A Quarterly of Catholic Thought (Downside Abbey, Stratton on the Fosse, Bath).
DR	*Dacoromania* (Cluj).
DS	*Danske Studier* (Copenhagen).
DU	*Der Deutschunterricht.* Beiträge zu seiner Praxis und wissenschaftlichen Grundlegung (Stuttgart).
DUJ	*The Durham University Journal* (Durham).
DVLG	*Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte* (Stuttgart).
EA	*Études Anglaises* (Paris).
EC	*Études Celtiques* (Paris)
EClás	*Estudios Clásicos* (Madrid).
ED	*Enciclopedia Dantesca* (Rome).
EETS	*Early English Text Society* (London).
EFon	*Estudios Foneticos* (Madrid).
EFOu	*Études Finno-ougriennes* (Paris).
EGerm	*Études Germaniques* (= *Revue trimestrielle de la Société des Études Germaniques,* Paris).
EI	*Enciclopedia Italiana.* 36 vols. (Rome). 1929-38.
Éigse	*Éigse.* A Journal of Irish Studies (Dublin).
EJ	*Eusko-Jakintza* (Bayonne).
ELA	*Études de linguistique appliquée.* Publications du Centre de linguistique appliquée de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences humaines de Basançon (Paris).
ELH	*Enciclopedia Lingüística Hispanica.*
ELT	*English Language Teaching* (London).
Em	*Emérita.* Boletín de lingüística y filología clásica (Madrid).
Epigraphica	*Epigraphica* (= *Rivista Italiana di Epigrafia,* Milan).
ER	*Estudis Romanicos* (Barcelona).
Eranos	*Eranos.* Acta philologica Seucana (Uppsala).
Erasmus	*Erasmus. Speculum scientiarum.* International Bulletin of Contemporary Scholarship/Bulletin international de la science contemporaine (Wiesbaden).
Eriu	*Eriu* (= *The Journal of the School of Irish Learning,* Dublin).
ES	*English Studies.* A Journal of English Letters and Philology (Amsterdam).
EspA	*Español Actual* (Madrid).
EStn	*Englische Studien* (Marburg).
ETAb	*English Teaching Abstracts* (London).
ETC.	*ETC.* A Review of General Semantics (Chicago).
EtL	*Études de Lettres.* Bulletin de la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Lausanne (Lausanne).
EUC	*Estudis Universitaris Catalans.*
Euphorion	*Euphorion* (= *Zeitschrift für Literaturgeschichte,* Heidelberg).
Euskera	*Euskera* (Bilbao). 1920-1935, 1956-.

E&W	*East and West*. Quarterly published by the Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente (Rome).
FB	*Het Franse Boek* (Amsterdam).
FD	*Fonetica și Dialectologie* (Bucharest).
FdaM	*Le Français dans le Monde* (Paris).
FdL	*Forum der Letteren* (Leiden).
FEW	*Französisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch*. By W. von Wartburg.
F&F	*Forschungen und Fortschritte* (Berlin).
FFC	*Folklore Fellows Communications* (Helsinki).
FiA	*Fiamuri i Arbërit* (Cosenza).
Fil	*Filología*. Universidad nacional. Facultad de filosofía y letras. Instituto de filología. Sección románica (Buenos Aires).
Finite String	*The Finite String*. Center for Applied Linguistics (Washington, D.C.).
FL	*Foundations of Language* (= *International journal of language and philosophy*, Dordrecht, The Netherlands).
FLing	*Folia Linguistica*. Acta Societatis linguisticae Europaeae (The Hague).
FM	*Le Français Moderne* (= *Revue de linguistique française*, Paris).
FMod	*Filología Moderna* (Madrid).
FMSt	*Folkmålsstudier* (Helsinki).
Förh	*Förhandlingar vid sammankomst för att dryfta fragor rörande svenskans beskrivning*.
Fornvännen	*Fornvännen* (= *Tidskrift för svensk antikvarisk/Journal of Swedish Antiquarian Research*, Stockholm).
Fremdsprachen	*Fremdsprachen* (= *Zeitschrift für Dolmetscher, Übersetzer und Sprachkundige*, Leipzig).
Froðskaparrit	*Froðskaparrit*. Annales Societatis scientiarum Faeroensis (Tórshavn).
FRPh	*Forschungen zur romanischen Philologie* (Münster)
FS	*French Studies* (Oxford).
FT	*Finsk Tidskrift* (Åbo).
FUF	*Finnisch-ugrische Forschungen* (= *Zeitschrift für Finnish-ugrische Sprach- und Volkskunde*, Helsinki).
FVL	*Forschungen zur Volks- und Landeskunde*. Academia republicii populare romine. Sektion fuer gesellschaft-wissenschaften (Sibiu, Transylvania).
Germanistik	*Germanistik* (= *Internationales Referatorgan mit bibliographischen Hinweisen*, Tübingen).
GGA	*Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen* (Göttingen).
GH	*Gure Herria* (Ustaritz Basses-Pyrénées).
GHÅ	*Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift* (Gothenburg).
GIF	*Giornale Italiano di Filologia* (Naples).
GjAlb	*Gjurmime albanologjike*. E përkoshhme shkencore e Katedrës Albanologjike të Falkultetit Filozofik të Prishtinës/Albanološka istraživanja/Recherches d'albanologie (Pristina).
GL	*General Linguistics* (Lexington, Kentucky).
GLL	*German Life and Letters* (Oxford).
GLECS	*Comptes rendus du Groupe Linguistique d'Études Chamito-Sémitiques* (Paris).
Glotta	*Glotta* (= *Zeitschrift für griechische und lateinische Sprache*, Göttingen).
GNDBiH	*Godišnjak Nančnog društva NR Bosne i Hercegovine*. Balkanološki Institut (Sarajevo).
Gnomon	*Gnomon* (= *Kritische Zeitschrift für die gesamte klassische Altertumwissenschaft*, Munich).
GQ	*German Quarterly* (Lancaster, Pennsylvania).
GR	*The Germanic Review* (New York).
GRM	*Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift* (Heidelberg).
GSLI	*Giornale Storico della Letterature Italiana* (Turin).
GUÅ	*Göteborgs Universitets Årsskrift/Acta Universitatis Gotoburgensis* (Gothenburg).
Gymnasium	*Gymnasium*. Vierteljahreszeitschrift für humanistische Bildung (Heidelberg).

HA	*Handes amsoreaj. Hajagitakan ousoumnatherth/Handes Amsorya* (= *Zeitschrift für armenische Philologie*, Vienna).
HBVK	*Hessische Blätter für Volkskunde* (Giessen).
Helikon	*Helikon* (= *Rivista di tradizione e cultura classica*, Naples).
Hermathena	*Hermathena* (= *Dublin University Review*, Dublin).
Hermes	*Hermes* (= *Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie*, Wiesbaden).
Hesperia	*Hesperia* (= *Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens*, Athens).
HFM	*Historisk-filosofiske meddelelser udgivet af det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab* (Copenhagen).
HiD	*Hylli i Dritës.*
Historia	*Historia* (= *Zeitschrift für alte Geschichte*, Wiesbaden).
HM	*L'Hygiène mentale* (Paris).
HMP	*Homenaje a Menendez Pidal* (Madrid). 1925.
Homme	*L'Homme* (= *Revue française d'anthropologie*, Paris and The Hague).
HR	*Hispanic Review* (Philadelphia).
HSPh	*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* (Cambridge, Massachusetts).
Humanitas	*Humanitas* (= *Revista do Instituto de Estudos Clássicos da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Coimbra*, Coimbra).
HZnMTL	*Handelingen van de Zuidnederlandse Maatschappij voor Taal- en Letterkunde en Geschiedenis* (St. Agatha-Berchem, Brussels).
IA	*Iranica Antiqua* (Leiden).
IBK	*Innsbrucker Beiträge zur Kulturwissenschaft* (Innsbruck).
IC	*Information and control* (New York and London).
ID	*L'Italia Dialettale* (Pisa).
IDEA	*Instituto de Estudios Asturianos.*
IdgJb	*Indogermanisches Jahrbuch* (Strasbourg).
Idioma	*Idioma* (= *International Modern Language Review*, Munich).
IF	*Indogermanische Forschungen* (= *Zeitschrift für Indogermanistik und allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft*, Berlin).
IIJ	*Indo-Iranian Journal* (The Hague).
IJAL	*International Journal of American Linguistics* (Baltimore).
IJSLP	*International Journal of Slavic Linguistics and Poetics* (The Hague).
ILB	*Inqueritó Linguístico Boleo.*
IncL	*The Incorporated Linguist* (London).
Inquiry	*Inquiry.* An interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy and the Social Sciences (Oslo).
IRAL	*International Review of Applied Linguistics in Language Teaching/Internationale Zeitschrift für angewandte Linguistik in der Spracherziehung* (Heidelberg).
Iraq	*Iraq.* Published by the British School of Archaeology in Iraq (London).
ISK	*Instituttet for Sammenlignende Kulturforskning/The Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture Publications. Series B* (Oslo).
Islam	*Der Islam* (= *Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur des Islamischen Orients*, Berlin).
ÍT	*Íslenzk Tunga/Lingua Islandica* (Reykjavik).
It	*Italica.* American Association of Teachers of Italian (Chicago and New York).
It Beaken	*It Beaken.* Meidielingen fan de Fryske Akademy (Assen).
IzvAPN	*Izvestija Akademii Pedagogičeskix Nauk RSFSR* (Moscow).
JA	*Journal Asiatique* (Paris).
JAF	*Journal of American Folklore* (Philadelphia).
JAfrH	*The Journal of African History* (London).
JAfrL	*Journal of African Languages* (London).
JanL	*Janua Linguarum. Series minor, maior, and practica* (The Hague).
JAOS	*Journal of the American Oriental Society* (New Haven, Connecticut).
JbAChr	*Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum* (Münster).
JbAWG	*Jahrbuch der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen* (Göttingen).
JbAWL	*Jahrbuch der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz* (Wiesbaden).
JbBAW	*Jahrbuch der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Munich).
JbDAW	*Jahrbuch der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin* (Berlin).

JbFL	*Jahrbuch für fränkische Landesforschung* (Kallmünz-Opf).
JbHWA	*Jahrbuch der hamburgischen wissenschaftlichen Anstalten* (Hamburg).
JbIRS	*Jahresbericht des Instituts fur rumänische sprache zu Leipzig* (Leipzig).
JbKNA	*Jaarboek der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen* (Amsterdam).
JbKVAW	*Jaarboek van de Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België* (Brussels).
JbMNL	*Jaarboek van de Maatschappij der Nederlandse Letterkunde te Leiden* (Leiden).
JbMU	*Jahrbuch, Marburger Universitätsbund* (Marburg).
JbPh	*Jahrbuch für Philologie: Idealistiche Philologie* (Munich).
JbRESL	*Jahrbuch für romanische und englische Sprache und Literatur.*
JbSAW	*Jahrbuch, Sächsische Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig* (Berlin).
JČ	*Jazykovedný Časopis* (Bratislava).
JCLA	*The Journal of the Canadian Linguistic Association/Revue de l'Association canadienne de linguistique* (Edmonton, Alberta). (See CJL.)
JdS	*Journal des Savants* (Paris).
JdT	*Journal des Traducteurs* (Montreal).
JEA	*The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology* (London).
JEGP	*The Journal of English and Germanic Philology* (Urbana, Illinois).
JEOL	*Jaarbericht van het Vooraziatisch-Egyptisch Genootschap'Ex Oriente Lux'/Annuaire de la Société orientale 'Ex Oriente Lux'* (Leiden).
JFORL	*Journal Français d'oto-rhino-laryngologie* (Paris).
JGyLS	*Journal of the Gypsy Lore Society* (Edinburgh).
JHS	*The Journal of Hellenic Studies* (London).
JIPhonA	*Journal of the International Phonetics Association* (London). (Formerly MPhon.)
JJewS	*The Journal of Jewish Studies* (London).
JL	*Journal of Linguistics.* Journal of the Linguistics Association of Great Britain. (London).
JMS	*Journal of Maltese Studies* (Valetta, Malta).
JNPsych	*Journal de neurologie et de psychiatrie* (Brussels).
JPs	*Journal de Psychologie* (Paris).
JPsych	*Journal de Psychologie normale et pathologique* (Paris).
JRAI	*Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* (London).
JRAS	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* (London).
JRS	*The Journal of Roman Studies* (London).
JSAfr	*Journal de la Société des Africanistes* (Paris).
JSAm	*Journal de la Société des Américanistes* (Paris).
JSFOu	*Suomalais-ugrilaisen seuran aikakauskirja/Journal de la Société Finno-ougrienne* (Helsinki).
JsIF	*Južnoslovenski Filolog* (Belgrade).
JSOc	*Journal de la Société des Océanistes* (Paris).
JSS	*Journal of Semitic Studies* (Manchester).
JWAfrL	*The Journal of West African Languages* (London).
Kadmos	*Kadmos (= Zeitschrift für vor- und frühgriechische Epigraphik*, Berlin).
Kant-Studien	*Kant-Studien.* Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft (Bonn).
KDVS	*Det Kongelige danske Videnskabernes Selskab. Hist.-Filo. Meddelelser* (Copenhagen).
KJbFRPh	*Kritischer Jahresbericht über die Fortschritte der romanischen Philologie* (Munich and Leipzig).
Klio	*Klio.* Beiträge zur alten Geschichte (Berlin).
Kokalos	*Kokalos.* Studi publicati dell'Istituto di storia antica dell'Università di Palermo (Palermo).
Kratylos	*Kratylos.* Kritisches Berichts- und Rezensionsorgan für indogermanische und allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft (Wiesbaden).
KV	*Kalevalaseuran Vuosikirja* (Helsinki).
KVATL	*Kon. Vlaamsche Acad. voor Taal- en Letterkunde. Verslagen en Mededelingen* (Ghent).

Kybernetika   *Kybernetika* (Prague).

KZ   *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung auf dem Gebiete der indogermanischen Sprachen.* Begründet von A. Kuhn (Göttingen).

Langages   *Langages* (Paris).

Language + Automation   *Language + Automation.* Quarterly Bibliography (Washington, D.C.)

Latomus   *Latomus* (= *Revue d'études latines,* Brussels).

LB   *Leuvense Bijdragen* (= *Tijdschrift voor germaanse Filologie,* Louvain).

LBerichte   *Linguistiche Berichte* (Braunschweig).

LbR   *Limba Română* (Bucharest).

LC   *Revue 'Langage et comportement'* (Paris).

LEC   *Les Études Classiques* (Namur).

LES   *Lebende Sprachen* (Berlin-Munich).

LeSt   *Lingua e Stile* (= *Quaderni dell'Istituto di Glottologia dell'Università degli Studi di Bologna,* Bologna).

Lg   *Language* (= *Journal of the Linguistic Society of America,* Baltimore).

LGRPh   *Literaturblatt für germanische und romanische Philologie* (Heilbron).

LHMA   *Leges Hispanicae Medii Aevi.*

LingB   *Linguistique balcanique* (Sofia).

Lingua   *Lingua. International Review of General Linguistics/Revue Internationale de linguistique générale* (Amsterdam).

Linguistics   *Linguistics.* An international review (The Hague).

Linguistique   *La Linguistique* (= *Revue internationale de linguistique générale,* Paris).

LISL   *Letopis Instituta za serbski ludospyt w Budysinje pri Nemskej Akademiji wedomoscow w Berlinje. Rjad A. Rec a literatura/Jahrbuch des Instituts für sorbische Volksforschung in Bautzen bei der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenscha,'ten zu Berlin* (Bautzen).

LIt   *Lettere Italiane* (Florence).

LLBA   *Language and Language Behavior Abstracts* (The Hague).

LLFR   *Lexicologie et lexicographie françaises et romanes, orientations et exigences actuelles. Strasbourg, 12-16 Novembre 1957.* Ed. by Paul Imbs. Paris, éd. du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. 1961.

LM   *Les Langues Modernes* (Paris).

LN   *Lingua Nostra* (Florence).

Lochlann   *Lochlann.* A Review of Celtic Studies (Oslo).

Logopedia   *Logopedia.* Zagadnienia kultury zywego słowa (Lublin).

LR   *Les Lettres Romanes* (Louvain).

L&S   *Language and Speech* (Teddington, Middlesex).

LSFU   *Lexica Societatis Fenno-Ugricae* (Helsinki).

LsNS   *Lundastudier i nordisk språkvetenskap* (Lund).

LT   *Levende Talen.* Berichten en mededelingen van de 'Vereniging van Leraren in Levende Talen' (Groningen).

LUÅ   *Lunds Universitets Årsskrift/Acta Universitatis Lundensis* (Lund).

LUI   *Lessico Universale Italiano* (Rome). 1968-.

Lustrum   *Lustrum* (= *Internationale Forschungsberichte aus dem Bereich des Klassischen Altertums,* Göttingen).

MA   *Le Moyen Âge* (= *Revue d'histoire et de philologie,* Brussels).

MAev   *Medium Aevum* (Oxford).

Maia   *Maia* (= *Rivista di letterature classiche,* Bologna).

MALinc   *Atti della Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Memorie della Classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche* (Rome).

Man   Man. A Record of Anthropological Science (London).

MASO   *Mejerbergs Arkiv för svensk ordfskning* (Gothenburg).

MDAI(K)   *Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, Abteilung Kairo* (Wiesbaden).

Mél. ling   *Mélanges linguistiques publiés á l'occasion du VIIIe Congrès Internationale des Linguistes à Oslo, du 5 a 9 août, 1957.* Comité de rédaction: Iorgu Iordan, Émile

	Petrovici, A. Rosetti. Secrétaire: V. Şuteu. Bucharest, éd. de l'Academie de la République Populaire Roumaine. 1957.
Methodos	*Methodos. Linguaggio e cibernetica/Language and Cybernetics* (Milan).
MFÅ	*Modersmålslärarnas Förenings Årsskrift* (Stockholm).
MH	*Museum Helveticum* (= *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für klassische Altertumwissenschaft/Revue suisse pour l'étude de l'antiquité classique*, Basel).
Mind	*Mind*. A quarterly review of psychology and philosophy (London).
Minos	*Minos* (= *Revista de filología egea*, Salamanca).
MIO	*Mitteilungen des Instituts für Orientforschung*. Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (Berlin).
MIÖG	*Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung* (Graz and Cologne).
MKNA	*Mededelingen van de Koninklijke Nederlandsche Akademie van Wetenschappen, afdeling Letterkunde* (Amsterdam).
ML	*Modern Languages* (= *Journal of the Modern Language Association*, London).
MLatJb	*Mittellateinisches Jahrbuch* (Cologne).
MLFA	*Modersmålslärarnas Förenings Årsskrift* (Gothenburg).
MLForum	*Modern Language Forum* (Los Angeles).
MLJ	*Modern Language Journal* (Ann Arbor, Michigan).
MLN	*Modern Language News* (Baltimore).
MLQ	*Modern Language Quarterly* (Seattle).
MLR	*The Modern Language Review* (Cambridge).
MM	*Maal og Minne*. Norske Studier (Oslo).
Mn	*Mnemosyne*. Bibliotheca Classica Batavia (Leiden).
MNCDN	*Mededelingen van de Nijmeegse Centrale voor dialect- en naamkunde* (Assen).
MNy	*Magyar Nyelv* (Budapest).
MPh	*Modern Philology* (Chicago).
MPhon	*Le Maître Phonétique*. Organe de l'Association Phonétique Internationale (London). (Formerly JIPhonA.)
MS	*Mediaeval Studies* (Toronto).
MSFOu	*Mémoires de la Société Finno-ougrienne* (Helsinki).
MSL	*Mémoires de la Société de Linguistique* (Paris).
MSLL	*Monograph Series on Language and Linguistics, Georgetown University* (Washington, D.C.).
MSpr	*Moderne Sprachen* (Vienna).
MSpråk	*Moderna Språk* (Stockholm).
MSS	*Münchener Studien zur Sprachwissenschaft* (Munich).
MT	*Mechanical Translation* (Cambridge, Massachusetts).
Mu	*Muttersprache* (= *Zeitschrift zur Pflege und Erforschung der deutschen Sprache*, Lüneburg).
Muséon	*Le Muséon* (= *Revue d'études orientales*, Louvain).
MVN	*Mededelingen van de Vereniging voor Naamkunde te Leuven en de Commissie voor Naamkunde te Amsterdam* (Louvain).
NALF	*Nouvel Atlas linguistique de la France*.
NAWG	*Nachrichten von der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Philologisch-historische Klasse* (Göttingen).
NDVS-F	*Naučnye doklady Vysšej školy, Filologičeski nauki* (Moscow).
NdW	*Niederdeutsches Wort* (Münster).
Nerthus	*Nerthus*. Nordisch-deutsche Beiträge (Düsseldorf and Cologne).
Nervenartz	*Nervenartz* (Cologne).
Neuropsychologia	*Neuropsychologia* (Oxford).
NJb	*Niederdeutsches Jahrbuch*. Jahrbuch des Vereins für niederdeutsche Sprachforschung (Neumünster).
NJKA	*Neue Jahrbücher für das Klassische Alterum* (Leipzig).
NJWJ	*Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung*.
NM	*Niederdeutsche Mitteilungen* (Lund).

NMA	*Norsk Målførearkiv* (Oslo).
NMon	*Neuphilologische Monatsschrift.*
NMWP	*Neusprachliche Mitteilungen aus Wissenschaft und Praxis* (Berlin).
NoB	*Namn och Bygd* (= *Tidskrift för nordisk ortnamnsforskning*, Uppsala).
NoVidSF	*Det Kongelige Norske Videnskabers Selskabs Fordhandlinger* (Trondheim).
Nph	*Neophilologus* (Groningen).
NPhM	*Neuphilologische Mitteilungen.* Bulletin de la Société neophilologique de Helsinki (Helsinki).
NphZ	*Neuphilologische Zeitschrift* (Berlin).
NRFH	*Nueva Revista de Fílologiá Hispánica* (Mexico).
NS	*Die Neueren Sprachen* (Frankfurt am Main).
NSE	*Norwegian Studies in English* (Oslo).
NsvS	*Nysvenska Studier* (= *Tidskrift för svensk stil- och sprakforskning*, Uppsala).
NTg	*De Nieuwe Taalgids* (Groningen).
NTL	*Nordisk tidskrift for vetenskap, konst och industri.* Utgiven ar Letterstedtska föreningen (Stockholm).
NTPs	*Nederlands tijdschrift voor de psychologie en haar grensgebieden* (Amsterdam).
NTS	*Norsk Tidsskrift for Sprogvidenskap* (Oslo).
NTTS	*Nordisk Tidsskrift for Tale og Stemme* (Copenhagen).
NTU	*Nordiska texter och undersökningar* (Uppsala).
N&V	*Nova et Vetera* (= *Tijdschrift voor onderwijs en opvoeding*, Brussels).
NVSS	*Det Kongelige Norske Videnskabers Selskabs Skrifter* (Trondheim).
NWIG	*Nieuwe West-Indische Gids* (The Hague).
NyIroK	*Nyelv- és Irodalomtudománi Közlemények* (Cluj).
NyK	*Nyelvudományi Közlemények.* A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia nyelvtudományi bizottságának megbizásából (Budapest).
OA	*Oriens Antiquus* (= *Rivista del Centro per le antichità e la storia dell'arte del Vicino Oriente*, Rome).
ODS	*Ordbog over det danske sprog.*
ODVS	*Det Kongelige Danske videnskabernes Selskab.* Oversigt over Selskabets Virksomhed (Copenhagen).
OE	*Oriens Extremus* (Wiesbaden).
Ogam	*Ogam.* Tradition celtique (Rennes).
OGand	*Orientalia Gandensia.* Jaarboek van het Hoger Instituut voor Oosterse, Oosteuropese en Afrikaanse taalkunde en geschiednis bij de Rijksuniversiteit te Gent (Leiden).
OLZ	*Orientalistische Literaturzeitung* (Berlin).
Onoma	*Onoma.* Bulletin d'information et de bibliographie/Bibliographical and Information Bulletin (Louvain).
Onomastica	*Onomastica* (Lyon and Paris).
Or	*Orientalia.* Commentarii periodici Pontificii Instituti Biblici (Rome).
Orbis	*Orbis.* Bulletin international de documentation linguistique (Louvain).
OrChr	*Oriens Christianus.* Hefte für die Kunde des christlichen Orients (Wiesbaden).
Oriens	*Oriens* (= *Milletlerarasi Şark Tetkikleri Cemujeti Mecmuasi/Journal of the International Society for Oriental Research*, Leiden).
Orpheus	*Orpheus* (= *Rivista di umanità classica e cristiana*, Catania).
OS	*Orientalia Suecana* (Uppsala).
OSlP	*Oxford Slavonic Papers* (London).
OSUÅ	*Ortnamnssälskapets i Uppsala Årsskrift* (Uppsala).
Paideia	*Paideia* (= *Revista letteraria di informazione bibliografica*, Genoa).
PAPhilosS	*Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* (Philadelphia).
PAS	*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (London).
PBA	*Proceedings of the British Academy* (London).
PBB(H)	*Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur.* Begründet von H. Paul und W. Braune (Halle).
PBB(T)	*Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur* (Tübingen).

PEQ   *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* (London).

PEur   *Paedagogica Europaea.*

PFLE   *Presente y Futuro de la Lengua Espanola.*

Phil & Phen   *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.* International Phenomenological Society, State University of New York at Buffalo (Buffalo, New York).

Philologus   *Philologus* (= *Zeitschrift für das klassische Alterum,* Berlin and Wiesbaden).

Philosophy   *Philosophy* (= *Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy,* Macmillan Ltd., Basingbroke, Hampshire).

Phonetica   *Phonetica* (= *Internationale Zeitschrift für Phonetik/International Journal of Phonetics,* Basel and New York).

PhP   *Philologica Pragensia* (Prague).

PhQ   *Philological Quarterly* (Iowa City).

PICL 4   *Actes du quatrième congrès International de Linguistes, tenu à Copenhague du 27 Août au 1er Septembre 1936.* Copenhagen, Einar Munksgaard, 1938.

PICL 7   *Proceedings of the Seventh International Congress of Linguists, London, 1-6 September, 1952.* Published under the auspices of C.I.P.L. (Permanent International Committee of Linguists) with the assistance of UNESCO. General editor: F. Norman. Assistant editor: P. F. Ganz. London, International University Booksellers, 1956.

PICL 8   *Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Linguists/Actes du Huitième Congrès International des Linguistes, Oslo 5-9 August, 1960.* General editor: Eva Sivertsen. Oslo, Oslo University Press, 1958.

PICL 9   *Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Linguists, Cambridge, Mass., August 27-31, 1962.* Ed. by Horace Lunt. Janua Linguarum series maior 12, The Hague, Mouton & Co., 1964.

PICL 10   *Actes du Xe Congrès International des Linguistes, Bucarest, 28 août-2 Septembre 1967.* Rédacteur en chef, A Graurs. Éditions de l'Académie de la République Socialiste de Roumanie, Bucarest, 4 Vols. 1969-1970.

PICPS 4   *Proceedings of the Fourth International Congress of Phonetic Sciences, held at the University of Helsinki, 4-9 September, 1961.* Edited by Antti Sovijärvi and Pento Aalto. The Hague, Mouton & Co., 1962.

PICPS 5   *Proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Phonetic Sciences, held at the University of Münster, 16-22 August, 1964.* Ed. by Eberhard Zwirner and Wolfgang Bethge. Basel and New York, S. Karger, 1965.

PICPS 6   *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Phonetic Sciences, held in Prague, September 7-13, 1967.*

Pirineos   *Pirineos* (= *Revista del Instituto de Estudios Pirenaicos,* Zaragoza).

Platon   *Platon.* Deltion tes Hetaireias Hellenon Philologon (Athens).

PLG   *Probleme de lingvistică generală* (Bucharest).

PLPLS   *Proceedings of the Leeds Philosophical and Literary Society, Literary and Historical Section* (Leeds).

PMLA   *Publications of the Modern Language Society of America* (New York).

Poetica   *Poetica* (= *Zeitschrift für Sprach- und Litteraturwissenschaft,* Munich).

PP   *La Parola del Passato: Rivista di Studi Classici* (Napels).

PSE   *Prague Studies in English* (Prague).

PsF   *Psychologie Française* (Paris).

PT   *Pedagogisk tidskrift* (Stockholm).

QCFLP   *Quaderni del Cirdolo filologico e linguistico padovano* (Padua).

QIGB   *Quaderni dell'Istituto di Glottologia della Università di Bologna* (Bologna).

RALinc   *Atti della Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Rendiconti della Classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche* (Rome).

RAss   *Revue d'Assyriologie et d'Archeologie Orientale* (Paris).

RABM   *Revista de Archivos, Bibliotecas y Museos* (Madrid).

RBPh   *Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire/Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Filologie en Geschiedenis* (Brussels).

RCCM   *Rivista di cultura classica e medioevale* (Rome).

RDialR	*Revue de dialectologie romane*. Société de dialectologie romane (Hamburg).
RDyTP	*Revista de Dialectología y Tradiciones Populares* (Madrid).
RE	*Revue d'Egyptologie*. Publiée par la Société Française d'Egyptologie (Paris).
REA	*Revue des Études Anciennes* (Bordeaux and Paris).
REArm	*Revue des Études Arméniennes* (Paris).
REByz	*Revue des Études Byzantines* (Paris).
REG	*Revue des Études Grecques* (Paris).
REI	*Revue des Études Indoeuropéennes*.
REL	*Revue des Études Latines* (Paris).
RENLO	*Revue de l'École Nationale des Langues Orientales* (Paris).
REIsl	*Revue des Études Islamiques* (Paris).
REJuiv	*Revue des Études Juives* (Paris).
RES	*The Review of English Studies* (London).
RESEE	*Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes* (Bucharest).
RESl	*Revue des Études Slaves* (Paris).
Rev. Neurol	*Revue Neurologie* (Paris).
RevPhonA	*Revue de Phonétique Appliquée* (Mons).
RevR	*Revue Romane* (Copenhagen).
REW	*Romanisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*. By W. Meyer-Lübke.
RF	*Romanische Forschungen*. Vierteljahrschrift für romanische Sprachen und Literaturen (Frankfurt am Main).
RFE	*Revista de Filología Española* (Madrid).
RFH	*Revista de Filología Hispánica* (Buenos Aires).
RFHC	*Revista de la Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias*. Univ. de la Republica (Montevideo).
RFIC	*Rivista di Filologia e d'Istruzione Classica* (Turin).
RFiloz	*Rivista de Filozofie* (Bucharest).
RFL	*Revista da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa* (Lisbon).
RFRG	*Rivista de Filologie Romanică și Germanică* (Bucharest).
RGand	*Romanica Gandensia* (Ghent).
RH	*Romanica Helvetica* (Bern).
RHA	*Revue Hittite et Asianique* (Paris).
RHi	*Revue hispanique*.
RHiM	*Revista Hispánica Moderna* (New York).
RHLaguna	*Revista de Historia Canaria* (La Laguna).
RHLF	*Revue d'Histoire Littéraire de la France* (Paris).
RhM	*Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* (Frankfurt am Main).
RhVJ	*Rheinische Vierteljahrsblätter*. Mitteilungen des Instituts für geschichtliche Landeskunde der Rheinlande an der Universität Bonn (Bonn).
RI	*Revista Iberoamericana*.
RicLing	*Ricerche linguistiche*. Instituto di glottologia dell'Università di Roma (Rome).
RIÉB	*Revue Internationale des Études Basque/Revista Internacionel de estudiós vascos*. Société des études basques 'Eusko-Ikaz-Kuntza' (Paris).
RIEBalc	*Revue internationale des études balcaniques*.
RIGI	*Rivista indo-grecá-italica di filologia, lingua, antichità* (Naples).
RII	*Revista Ingauna e Intermelia* (Albenga, Liguria, Italy).
RIL	*Rendiconti dell'Istituto Lombardo di Scienze e Lettere, Classe di Lettere e scienze morali e storiche* (Milan).
RILD	*Revista italiana di litteratura dialettale* (Sora).
RIOno	*Revue Internationale d'Onomastique* (Paris).
RJb	*Romanistisches Jahrbuch* (Hamburg).
RL	*Revista Lusitania*.
RLaR	*Revue des Langues Romanes* (Montpellier).
RLaV	*Revue des Langues Vivantes/Tijdschrift voor Levende Talen* (Brussels).
RLFE	*Revista do Laboratório de Fonética Experimental* (Coimbra).
RLI	*La Rassegna della Letteratura Italiana* (Genoa).

RLing   *Revue Roumaine de Linguistique* (Bucharest).
RLLProv   *Revue de Langue et Littérature provençales* (Avignon).
RLR   *Revue de Linguistique Romane* (Lyons and Paris).
Ro   *Romania* (Paris).
Romanoslavica *Romanoslavica* (Bucharest).
RomN   *Romance Notes* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina).
RomPh   *Romance Philology* (Berkeley and Los Angeles).
RP   *Revista de Portugal. Série A: Língua portuguesa* (Lisbon).
RPF   *Revista Portuguesa de Filologia* (Coimbra).
RPh   *Revue de Philologie, ce Litterature et d'Histoire anciennes* (Paris).
RPs   *Revista de psihologie* (Bucharest).
RR   *The Romanic Review* (New York).
RRSSPs   *Revue roumaine des sciences sociales. Série de psychologie* (Bucharest).
RSC   *Rivista di Studi Classici* (Turin).
RSEt   *Rassegna di Studi Etiopici* (Rome).
RSlav   *Ricerche Slavistiche* (Rome).
RSLig   *Rivista di Studi Liguri* (Bordighera).
RSO   *Rivista degli Studi Orientali* (Rome).
(I)RTP   *la Reunión de Toponimia Pirenaica* (See ATopPir.)
RUB   *Revue de l'Université de Bruxelles* (Brussels).
RVF   *Revista Valenciana de Filología*.
Saga-Book   *Saga-Book of the Viking Society for Northern Research* (London).
Saga och Sed   *Saga och Sed* (= *Gustav Adolfs Akademiens årsbok*, Uppsala).
SAlb   *Studia Albanica* (Tirana).
Sananjalka   *Sananjalka. Suomen Kielen Seuran vuosikirja* (Turku).
SAO   *Studia et Acta Orientalia* (Bucharest).
SAOB   *Svenska Akademiens ordbok* (Lund).
SAOL   *Svenska Akademiens ordlista* (Stockholm).
SaS   *Slovo a Slovesnost* (Prague).
SbBAW   *Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse* (Munich).
SbDAW   *Sitzungsberichte der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Klasse für Sprachen, Literatur und Kunst* (Berlin).
SbFAW   *Sitzungsberichte der Finnischen Akademie der Wissenschaften/Proceedings of the Finnish Academy of Science and Letters* (Helsinki).
SbKAW   *Sitzungsberichte der kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historischen Klasse.*
SbÖAW   *Sitzungsberichte der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse* (Vienna).
SbPAW   *Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin).(=SbDAW 1944-.)
SbSAW   *Sitzungsberichte der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig. Philosophisch-historische Klasse* (Berlin).
Scandinavica   *Scandinavica.* An International Journal of Scandinavian Studies (London and New York).
SCauc   *Studia Caucasica* (The Hague).
SCelt   *Studia Celtica* (Cardiff).
SCL   *Studii si Cercetări Lingvistice* (Bucharest).
SClas   *Studii Clasice* (Bucharest).
ScoGS   *Scottish Gaelic Studies* (Aberdeen).
ScoS   *Scottish Studies* (Edinburgh).
ScS   *Scandinavian Studies.* Publication of the Society for the Advancement of Scandinavian Study (Menasha, Wisconsin).
ScSl   *Scando-Slavica* (Copenhagen).
SCŞt   *Studii şi Cercetări Ştiinţifice* (Jassy).
SDS   *Sprachatlas der deutschen Schweiz*.

SE	*Studi Etruschi* (Florence).
SEEJ	*Slavic and East European Journal* (Bloomington, Indiana).
Sefarad	*Sefarad* (= *Revista del Instituto Arias Montano de Estudios Hebraicos y Oriente Próximo* (Madrid and Barcelona).
Semiotica	*Journal of the IASS* (Paris-The Hague).
Semitica	*Semitica* (= *Cahiers publiés par l'Institut d'études sémitiques de l'Université de Paris* (Paris).
Sf	*Sprachforum.*
SFenn	*Studia Fennica* (Helsinki).
SFFBU	*Sborník Prací Filosofické Fakulty Brněnské University* (Brno).
SFI	*Studi di Filologia Italiana.* Bollettino dell'Accademia della Crusca (Florence).
SFil	*Studime filologjike.* Universiteti Shtetëror i Tiranës, Instituti i Historisë dhe i Gjuhësisë (Tirana).
SFr	*Studi Francesi* (Turin).
SFSS	*Samlingar utgivna av Svenska fornskriftsällskapet* (Stockholm).
SG	*Studium Generale* (Berlin, Göttingen, and Heidelberg).
SGGand	*Studia Germanica Gandensia* (Ghent).
Shêjzat	*Shêjzat/Le Pleiadi* (Rome).
SHib	*Studia Hibernica* (Dublin).
SI	*Sprachkunde und Informationsverarbeitung.*
SicGym	*Siculorum Gymnasium* (= *Rassegna semestrale della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell'Universita di Catania* (Catania).
SIFC	*Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica* (Florence).
SIL	*Studies in Linguistics* (Buffalo, New York).
Sinologica	*Sinologica* (= *Zeitschrift für chinesische Kultur und Wissenschaft*, Basel).
SINSU	*Skrifter utgivna av Institutionen för nordiska språk vid Uppsala universitet* (Uppsala).
SIsl	*Studia Islamica* (Paris).
SJA	*Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* (Albuquerque, New Mexico).
SKGAAF	*Skrifter utgivna av Kgl* (= *Gustav Adolfs akademien för folklivsforskning* (Uppsala).
Skírnir	*Skírnir* (Reykjavík).
SkS	*Skola och samhälle* (Stockholm).
SkSb	*Skandinavskij sbornik/Skandinaavia kogumik/Skrifter om Skandinavien* (Tallinn).
SKST	*Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seuran toimituksia* (Helsinki).
SL	*Studia Linguistica* (= *Revue de linguistique générale et comparée*, Lund).
SLAL	*Skrifter utgivna genom Landsmålsarkivet i Lund* (Lund).
SLI	*Studi Linguistici Italiani* (Freiburg, Switzerland).
SlR	*The Slavonic and East European Review* (London).
SMe	*Studi Medievali.* 3rd series (Spoleto).
SMEA	*Studi Micenei ed Egeo-anatolici.* A cura del Centro di Studi Micenei ed Egeo-anatolici, Universita di Roma (I 1966 = Incunabula Graeca II), Rome.
SMIL	*Statistical Methods in Linguistics* (Stockholm).
SMSpr	*Studier i Modern Språkvetenskap/Stockholm Studies in Modern Philology* (Stockholm).
SMSR	*Studi e materiali di storia delle religione* (Bologna).
SMV	*Studi Mediolatini e Volgari* (Pisa and Bologna).
SNF	*Selskab for nordisk filologi* (Copenhagen).
SNMA	*Skrifter fra Norsk malførearkiv* (Oslo).
SNoF	*Studier i nordisk Filologi.* Skrifter utgivna av Svenska Litteratursallskapet i Finland (Helsinki).
SNPh	*Studia Neophilologica.* A Journal of Germanic and Romance Philology (Uppsala).
SNSA	*Skrifter fra Norsk stadnamnarkiv* (Oslo).
SNSS	*Skrifter utgivna av Nämnden för svensk språkvård* (Stockholm).
SO	*Studia Orientalia.* Edidit Societas Orientalis Fennica (Helsinki).
SocSciI	*Social Science Information/Information sur les sciences sociales.* International Social Science Council (Paris).

Sociologus   *Sociologus* (= *Zeitschritt für empirische Soziologie, Sozialpsychologische und Ethnologische Forschung*, Berlin).
SOF   *Südost-Forschungen* (Munich).
SoK   *Sprog og kultur* (Aarhus).
SOM   *Studia Onomastica Monacensia* (= *VI Internationaler Kongress für Namenforschung, München, 24-28 August 1958*).
SovEtn   *Sovetskaja Etnografija* (Moscow-Leningrad).
Sp   *Speculum.* A Journal of Medieval Studies (Cambridge, Massachusetts).
SPh   *Studies in Philology* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina).
SpL   *Spiegel der Letteren* (= *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandse literatuurgeschiedenis en voor literatuurwetenschap*, Antwerp).
Sprache   *Die Sprache* (= *Zeitschrift für Sprachwissenschaft*, Vienna).
Sprachmittler   *Der Sprachmittler.* Bundessprachenamt (Hurth bei Köln).
Sprachspiegel   *Sprachspiegel.* Mitteilungen des Deutschschweizerischen Sprachvereins (Zürich).
Språkvård   *Språkvård* (= *Tidskrift utgiven av Nämnden för svensk språkvård*, Stockholm).
SprB   *Språkliga bidrag.* Meddelanden från Seminarierna för slaviska språk, jämförande språkforskning, finsk-ugriska språk och östasiatiska språk vid Lunds Universitet (Lund).
SprSUF   *Språkvetenskapliga Sällskapets i Uppsala förhandlingar* (Uppsala).
SRAZ   *Studia Romanica et Anglica Zagrebiensia* (Zagreb).
SSL   *Studi e saggi linguistici.* Supplemento alla rivista 'L'Italia dialettale' (Pisa).
SSLF   *Skrifter utgivna av Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland* (Helsinki).
SSSPh   *Stockholm Studies in Scandinavian Philology* (Stockholm).
SsvOÅ   *Sydsvenska Ortnamnssällskapets Årsskrift* (Lund).
StIs   *Studia Islandica/Íslenzk frádi* (Reykjavík).
StLog   *Studia Logica* (Warsaw).
STL-QPSR   *Speech Transmission Laboratory — Quarterly Progress and Status Report* (Stockholm).
StUB   *Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai. Psychologia-Paedagogia* (Cluj).
STZ   *Sprache im Technischen Zeitalter* (Stuttgart).
SULMA   *Skrifter utgivna genom Landsmals- och folkminnesarkivet i Uppsala* (Uppsala).
Suomi   *Suomi* (= *Kirjoituksia isänmaallisista aiheista. Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura*, Helsinki).
SuPs   *Schule und Psychologie.*
SuSuomi   *Suomalainen Suomi* (Helsinki).
STZ   *Sprache im Technischen Zeitalter* (Stuttgart).
SUKOL   *Suomen Uusien Kielten Opettajien Liitto* (Helsinki).
SvLm   *Svenska Landsmål och Svenska Folkliv/Archives des traditions populaires suédoises* (Stockholm).
SymbOsl   *Symbolae Osloenses.* Auspiciis Societatis Graeco-Latinae (Oslo).
Symposium   *Symposium.* A Journal devoted to Modern Foreign Languages and Literatures (Syracuse, New York).
Syria   *Syria* (= *Revue d'art oriental et d'archéologie*, Paris).
TA   *La Traduction automatique* (The Hague and Paris).
TA Informations Formerly TA (The Hague and Paris).
TAPA   *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* (Lancaster, Pennsylvania).
TCLC   *Travaux du Circle Linguistique du Copenhagen* (Copenhagen).
TCLP   *Travaux du Circle Linguistique du Prague* (Prague).
TDeaf   *The Teacher of the Deaf* (Exeter, Devon).
TDRL   *Trabajos sobre el domina románico leonés* (Madrid).
Te Reo   *Te Reo* (= *Proceedings of the Linguistic Society of New Zealand*, Aukland, New Zealand).
TeT   *Taal en Tongval* (= *Driemaandelijks Tijdschrift voor de studie van de Nederlandse volks- en streektalen*, Bosvoorde, Belgium).

Teuth	*Teuthonista* (= *Zeitschrift für Dialektforschung und Sprachgeschichte*, Bonn, Leipzig, and Halle).
Theoria	*Theoria*. A Swedish Journal of Philosophy (Lund).
Thesaurus	*Thesaurus*. Bolétin del Instituto Caro y Cueva (Bogatá).
Tietolipas	*Tietolipas. Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura* (Helsinki).
TIJa	*Trudy Instituta Jazykoznanija* (Moscow).
TIL	*Travaux de l'Institut de Linguistique, Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Paris* (Paris).
TIPL	*Travaux de l'Institut de phonétique de Lund* (Lund).
TLL	*Travaux de Linguistique et de Littérature*. Publiés par le Centre de Philologie et de Littératures romanes de l'Université de Strasbourg (Strasbourg).
TLP	*Travaux Linguistiques de Prague* (Prague).
TP	*T'oung Pao*. Archives concernant l'histoire, les langues, la géographie et les arts de l'Asie Orientale (Leiden).
TPhS	*Transactions of the Philological Society* (Oxford).
Tribus	*Tribus* (= *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie und ihre Nachbarwissenschaften vom Linden-Museum*, Stuttgart).
TsNTL	*Tijdschrift voor Nederlandse Taal- en Letterkunde*. Uitgegeven vanwege de Maatschappij der Nederlandse Letterkunde te Leiden (Leiden).
TsVUB	*Tijdschrift van de Vrije Universiteit van Brussel* (Antwerp).
TTL	*Tijdschrift voor Toegepaste Linguistiek/Review of Applied Linguistics* (Louvain).
UAJb	*Ural-Altaische Jahrbücher* (Wiesbaden).
UAS	*Indiana University Publications, Uralic and Altaic Series* (Bloomington and The Hague).
UBA	*Universitetet i Bergen, Årbok* (Bergen).
Učenye zapiska LGU	*Učenye zapisk LGU. Serija filosofskix nauk* (Leningrad).
UCPL	*University of California Publications in Linguistics* (Berkeley and Los Angeles).
UE	*The Use of English* (London).
UfFP	*Udvalg for Folkemaals Publikationer* (Copenhagen).
UJDS	*Universitets-Jubileets danske Samfund*. Skrifter (Copenhagen).
ULMA	*Landsmåls- och folkminnesarkivet i Uppsala.*
Ungar. Jb.	*Ungarische Jahrbucher* (Berlin). (Now UAJb).
Universitas	*Universitas* (= *Zeitschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Literatur*, (Stuttgart).
Us Wurk	*Us Wurk*. Meidielingen fan it Frysk Institüt oan de Rijksuniversiteit yn Grims (Groningen).
UUÅ	*Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift/Recueil de Travaux publié par l'Université d'Uppsala* (Uppsala).
UZISI	*Ucenye zapiski Institute slavjanovedenija* (Moscow).
VD	*Via Domitia* (Toulouse).
VIDSL	*Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für deutsche Sprache und Literatur*. Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (Berlin).
Vir	*Virittäjä. Kotikielen seuran aikakauslehti* (Helsinki).
VIRS	*Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für romanische Sprachwissenschaft*. Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (Berlin).
VJa	*Voprosy Jazykoznanija* (Moscow).
VKNA	*Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, afdeling Letterkunde*. Nieuwe reeks (Amsterdam).
VKR	*Volkstum und Kultur der Romanen* (Hamburg).
VMKVA	*Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie voor Taal- en Letterkunde, Verslagen en Mededelingen* (Ghent).
VMU	*Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta. Serija VII: Filologija* (Moscow).
VPs	*Voprosy Psixologii* (Moscow).
VR	*Vox Romanica* (= *Annales Helvetici explorandis linguis Romanicis destinati*, Bern).
VSlJa	*Voprosy slavjanskogo jazykoznanija* (Moscow).
VSS	*Det norske videnskabers selskat*. Skrifter (Kristiania [Oslo]).

WB   *Weimarer Beiträge* (Weimar).
WI   *Die Welt des Islams* (Leiden).
Wissenschaft und   *Wissenschaft und Weltbild* (= *Zeitschrift für die Grundfragen der Forschung*, Wien).
Weltbild
WO   *Die Welt des Orients* (Göttingen).
Word   *Word* (= *Journal of the Linguistic Circle of New York*, New York).
WR   *Die wissenschaftliche Redaktion.* Beiträge, Aufsätze, Vorträge aus dem Bibliogra-
                   phischen Institut (Mannheim).
WS   *Wiener Studien* (= *Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie*, Vienna).
WSlav   *Die Welt der Slaven* (= *Vierteljahrsschrift für Slavistik*, Wiesbaden).
WSlJb   *Wiener Slavistisches Jahrbuch* (Vienna).
WT   *Wetenschappelijke Tijdingen* (Ghent).
WuS   *Worter und Sachen* (Heidelberg).
WVM   *Wiener Volkerkundliche Mitteilungen* (Vienna).
WW   *Wirkendes Wort.* Deutsches Sprachschaffen in Lehre und Leben (Düsseldorf).
WZKM   *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* (Vienna).
WZKSO   *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens und Archiv für indische Philo-
                   sophie* (Vienna).
WZUB   *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Humboldt-Universität.* Gesellschafts- und Sprach-
                   wissenschaftliche Reihe (Berlin).
WZUG   *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Universität Greifswald.* Gesellschafts- und Sprach-
                   wissenschaftliche Reihe.
WZUH   *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Martin Luther-Universität.* Gesellschafts- und
                   Sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe (Halle-Wittenberg).
WZUJ   *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Universität Jena.* Gesellschafts- und Sprach-
                   wissenschaftliche Reihe (Jena).
WZUL   *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Karl-Marx Universität.* Gesellschafts- und Sprach-
                   wissenschaftliche Reihe (Leipzig).
WZUR   *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Universität Rostock.* Gesellschafts- und Sprach-
                   wissenschaftliche Reihe (Rostock).
YCS   *Yale Classical Studies* (New Haven, Connecticut).
YWMLS   *The Year's Work in Modern Language Studies* (London).
ZA   *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie und verwandte Gebiete* (Berlin).
ZAA   *Zeitschrift für Anglistik und Amerikanistik* (Berlin).
ZAPs   *Zeitschrift für angewandte Psychologie.* (See ZPs.)
ZÄS   *Zeitschrift für ägyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde* (Berlin).
ZBalk   *Zeitschrift für Balkanologie* (Wiesbaden).
ZCPh   *Zeitschrift für celtische Philologie und Volksforschung* (Tübingen).
ZD   *Zeilsprache Deutsch.* Goethe-Institut (Munich). (Formerly Deutschunterricht für
                   Auslander).
ZDA   *Zeitschrift für Deutsches Altertum und deutsch Literatur* (Wiesbaden).
ZDL   *Zeitschrift für Dialektologie und Linguistik* (Wiesbaden). (Formerly ZMaF.)
ZDMG   *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* (Wiesbaden).
ZDPh   *Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie* (Berlin).
ZDPV   *Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina-Vereins* (Wiesbaden).
ZDS   *Zeitschrift für deutsche Sprache* (Berlin). (Fortführung der Zeitschrift für deutsche
                   Wortforschung).
ZDW   *Zeitschrift für deutsche Wortforschung* (Strasbourg).
ZEthn   *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie.* Organ der Deutschen Gessellschaft für Volkerkunde
                   (Brunswick).
ZfDK   *Zeitschrift für Deutschkunde* (Berlin and Leipzig). (Fortführung der Zeitschrift für
                   den Deutschen Unterricht.)
ZFSL   *Zeitschrift für französisches Sprache und Literatur* (Wiesbaden).
ZGNPs   *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie* (Berlin).
ZMaF   *Zeitschrift für Mundartforschung* (Wiesbaden). (See also ZDL.)

Z. Neurol. Psychiat.	*Zeitschrift für Neurologischen Psychiatrie* (Leipzig).
ZNU	*Zeitschrift für den Neusprachliches Unterricht* (Berlin).
ZOf	*Zeitschrift für Ostforschung*. Länder und Völker im östlichen Mitteleuropa (Marburg [Lahn]).
ZPhon	*Zeitschrift für Phonetik, Sprachwissenschaft und Kommunikationsforschung* (Berlin).
ZPs	*Zeitschrift für Psychologie* (Leipzig). (Incorporating ZAPs.)
ZRG(GA)	*Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte Germanistische Abteilung* (Weimar).
ZRPh	*Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie* (Tübingen).
ZRU	*Zeitschrift für den Russisch-Unterricht* (Göttingen).
ŽVND	*Žurnal vysšei nervoi deja tel'nosti*. Im. I. P. Pavlova (Moscow).
ZSl	*Zeitschrift für Slawistik* (Berlin).
ZSlPh	*Zeitschrift für Slavische Philologie*.
ZVS	*Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung* (Göttingen).

OTHER ABBREVIATIONS

ABLA	Association Belge de Linguistique Appliquée (Louvain). (See also BVTL.)
ACL	Association for Computational Linguistics (Washington, D.C.).
ADNV	Allgemeiner Deutscher Neuphilogen-Verband (Berlin).
AFLA	Association Française de Linguistique Appliquée (Paris).
AIEL	International Association for Latin Epigraphy (Paris).
AIIC	International Association of Conference Interpreters (Geneva).
AILA	Association Internationale de Linguistique Appliquée (Danderyd, Sweden).
AIMAV	Association Internationale pour le Recherche et Diffusion des Méthodes Audio-visuelles et Structuro-globales (Brussels).
ANILS	Associazione Nazionale Insegnanti Lingue Straniere (Rome).
ANLA	Association Norvégienne de Linguistique Appliquée (Trondheim).
APLV	Association des Professeurs de Langues Vivantes de l'Enseignement Public (Paris).
APLV/VLLTB	Association des Professeurs de Langues Vivantes (Brussels).
ASLA	Association Suédoise de Linguistique Appliquée/Svenska Föreningen för Tillämpad Språkvetenskap (Lund).
ATALA	Association pour le Développement de la Traduction Automatique et de la Linguistique Appliquée (Paris).
ATEPO	National Federation of Associations for the Education of Pupils from Overseas. (Formerly Association for the Teaching of English to Pupils from Overseas.) (Nuneation, UK).
AVLA	Audio-Visual Language Association (Langley/Bucks).
BAAL	British Association for Applied Linguistics (Reading).
BDÜ	Bundesverband der Dolemtscher und Übersetzer (Germersheim).
BELC	Bureau pour l'Enseignement de la Langue et de la Civilisation Françaises à l'Étranger (Paris).
BERSHA	Bureau d'Études et de Recherches ou Sciences Humaines Appliquées (Paris).
BVTL	Belgische Vereniging voor Toegepaste Linguïstiek (Louvain). (See also ABLA.)
CAL	Center for Applied Linguistics (Washington, D.C.).
CBL	Cercle Belge de Linguistique/Belgische Kring voor Linguistiek (Brussels).
CECMAS	Centre d'Études des Communications de Masse (Paris).
CELGA	Centro do Ensino de Linguística General e Aplicada (Coimbra).
CETIS	Centre de Traitement de l'Information Scientifique.
CILA	(a) Commission Interuniversitaire Suisse de Linguistique Appliquée (Neuchâtel). (b) Centro Italiano de Linguistica Applicata (Rome).
CILT	Centre for Information on Language Teaching (London).
CIPL	Permanent International Committee of Linguists (Nijmegen).

CNR	Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (Rome).
CNRS	Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique (Paris).
COLING	International Conference on Computational Linguistics (Stockholm).
CRDML	Committee on Research and Development in Modern Languages (London).
CREDIF	Centre de Recherches et d'Études pour la Diffusion du Française (Paris).
CRLLB	Center for Research on Language and Language Behavior (Ann Arbor, Michigan).
CSFLS	Centro di Studi Filologici e Linguistici Siciliani.
CSIC	Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificos (Madrid).
DFG	Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (Bad Godesberg).
DSA	Deutscher Sprachatlas (Marburg).
ETIC	English-Teaching Information Centre (London).
EUROCENTRE	Foundation for European Language and Educational Centres (Zürich).
FILLM	International Federation for Modern Languages and Literatures (Cambridge, UK).
FIPLV	International Federation of Modern Language Teachers (Beograd).
FIT	International Federation of Translators (Paris).
GAL	Gesellschaft für Angewandte Linguistik (Stuttgart).
IAI	International African Institute (London).
IALP	International Association of Logopedics and Phoniatrics (Barcelona).
IASS	International Association for Semiotic Studies (Paris).
IATEFL	International Association of Teachers of English as a Foreign Language (Hounslow/Middx.).
ICOS	International Committee of Onomastic Sciences (Louvain).
IdS	Institut für deutsche Sprache (Mannheim).
IDV	Internationaler Deutschlehrerverband (Hellerup, Denmark).
IFS	Informationszentrum für Fremdsprachenforschung (Marburg).
IPA	International Phonetic Association (London).
IRA	International Reading Association (Newark, Delaware).
MLA	Modern Language Association (London).
NATE	National Association for the Teaching of English.
NCTE	National Council of Teachers of English.
OFINES	Oficina Internacional de Información y Observación del Español (Madrid).
PIAC	Permanent International Altaistic Conference (Bloomington, Indiana).
PUF	Presses Universitaires de la France (Paris).
SDL	Studiengemeinschaft deutscher Linguisten (Bonn).
SIL	Summer Institute of Linguistics. (Branches in the UK and Germany).
SLE	Societas Linguistica Europaea (Kiel).
SLI	Società di Linguistica Italiana (Rome).
UIO	International Union of Orientalists (Munich).
VLLTB	Vereniging van Leraren in Levende Talen (Brussels). (See also APLV/VLLTB.)
ZWO	Zuiver Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (The Hague).

PART ONE

FIELDS OF LINGUISTICS

THEORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

PETER HARTMANN and SIEGFRIED J. SCHMIDT[1]

INTRODUCTION: GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

Much as the nineteenth century bequeathed a multiplicity of anticipatory trends to the entirely different orientation of the twentieth, so the years between 1918 and 1945 form an important stage in the methical development of the philosophy and theory of language. During these years, trends were established which would lead, in the presence of a corresponding working hypothesis, to the conquest of a new plane in linguistic methodology. It will be most appropriate to represent the interwar period as a whole picture identified by its chief characteristics — possible after the passage of a certain interval — because historical hindsight allows even the causes, origins, and catalysts of intellectual movements to be recognized.

Linguistic philosophy had been and remained active, generally, above all in the domain of German philosophy. In rough geographic terms the pursuit was most advanced in central Europe. The reason was the continuing status in Germany of philosophy as an unquestionably legitimate branch of knowledge. Therefore, when philosophers turned to language as their object, the necessary disciplines were most favorably prepared. Of course, this primacy did not last, as the following portrayal will show, yet the preponderance of linguistic thinking next came to be located even more in the Germanic area — in west central Europe.

For linguistic science in west and central Europe, in contrast, there followed the notable development, not to say surprise, that, in the course of a few decades, the original center of work in linguistic science, namely Germany, withdrew almost entirely out of the discussion which had extended since about 1900 into the international plane. Generally, the expansion of linguistic science had very soon restricted itself to a mere ring of schools or centers which surrounded German territory: the Prague School, the Geneva School, Copenhagen, London. These localized movements were clearly directed toward general linguistics; German linguists consistently and persistently pursued the kinds of conclusion offered by the older historical approach.

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[1] The central importance of a portrait of linguistic philosophy makes it necessary to invite a specialist as collaborator: Dr. Siegfried Schmidt, lecturer in philosophy at the University of Karlsruhe. His is the opening section 'Linguistic Philosophy in Western Europe' and the corresponding portion of the bibliography.

In practice, the division of labor was obvious, and there was indeed no lack of German questioning as to exactly why this should be. The truth is that the situation in the first half of our century was that of a centrifugal diffusion, whereby the younger, more abstract, and theoretical school of thought was becoming the more influential.

The old middle European center remained in the position which it had attained and consolidated approximately between 1850 and 1900; that of comparative linguistics. It occupied itself with historical linguistics, language change, linguistic typology, and philological perspectives in a compatible total outlook which can only be understood as a product of its own premises. One might better say, as a basic conception of scientific task and intention, which must be seen as hardly justified by today's advanced standards of theory. If one wants to examine more closely intellectual preconditions, one ventures into the broad and — from the stand-point of intellectual history — important philosophical systems that have conditioned their time; they consequently conditioned also scientific endeavor.

At this point, further specification would constitute digression, but a necessary introduction to the understanding of linguistic philosophy will be provided in Section 1, where a beginning will be made toward a philosophically oriented pre-history of the older historical-comparative linguistics. In fact in these decades of the last century it was still true of linguistics what is true of the earlier stages of thought in any specific discipline: the Zeitgeist or broad basis of community thought that can indeed have notable influence even on scientific tendencies and expectations acted as an important place of origin for specific thought structures in individual disciplines. In other words, circumstances did not yet exist to which man is today accustomed — the relative emancipation of specialized occupations from their previous interdependence. Such autonomous arts and sciences can in turn have THEIR influence on the temper of the times, thus reversing the former direction of the process. Even this situation lends itself to very broad characterization: in individual cases, the infant linguistic science very soon and very emphatically assumed the role of stimulus to the world outside its home territory.

One can say that the dominant conception of Science was a temporary derivative of a philosophical position which was established upon assumptions like 'Man is a historical being', 'The world exists in history', and similar generalities. This position is still current in large areas of the West German University curriculum. It is essentially unopposed by philosophical faculties; to study their science is to understand and master historical grounds or traditions. One must recognize and take into account this still valid background in order to comprehend how deep was the incipient change outside German linguistics, beginning about 1900, and how explosive a role modern linguistics can play (not only in West Germany) when it is recognized as the vehicle for antihistorical (theoretical-rational) tendencies. Again it must be said that this retrospective characterization is meant to represent a general situation with tendencies and consequences for which there is, in case it is desired, abundant evidence.

We may return to the special theme and omit any further evaluations, although it

is also valid to consider the contemporary assessment of scientific history in light of both previous and present perspectives. The advantage becomes particularly clear in an assessment of a discipline explicitly devoted to basic research. Since the Second World War, it has become possible to regard linguistics in the only way that seems necessary or correct to the *Zeitgeist* of today: not as historically contingent phenomena but as simply the rational response to those phenomena.

The following presentation is in two parts: 1) linguistic philosophy in Western Europe and 2) linguistic theory in Western Europe. Instructive developments and positions are documented in the bibliography — the factual complexity, especially of the first part, can only be suggested in the text. The second part describes the newer research centers and the situation in the old German territory. It can, of course, be determined and demonstrated that the participation of history in the discoveries is consistent. That is to say, even in the most recent conclusions, points of contact with other positions become apparent either immediately in the approach or relatively soon in the practice. The resulting interrelationships contribute to an always complex and differentiated picture.

The following presentation of philosophy and theory makes a parallel distinction between philosopher and theoretician. This is legitimate insofar as the two directions have not in fact resolved their different premises and grown into a united and cooperative movement. The necessity for cooperation has already been stressed upon occasion (Wein 1963; Schmidt 1967a, b). A precondition for cooperation would be agreement on general principles of inquiry which could provide a broadly differentiated base for useful partnership. Simple specialization in questions of formulation, increasing efficiency in established practices of general research or even a purely idealizing or abstracting elevation of factual yields would hardly suffice. Looked at in this way, the achievement of a synthesizing and autonomous theoretical dimension is still in the future of the linguistic discipline, and one must limit himself in this presentation to characterization of the various thought complexes.

Because of the still missing unified perspectives, it is also sufficient to make the proposed distinctions by means of very loose definitions. We understand under 'linguistic-philosophical' statements simply all those about language by authors who qualify as philosophers, regardless of the realization that *ad hoc* observations naturally occur within the framework of otherwise oriented systems, and regardless of the question of whether or not a distinctly linguistic direction as such can be distinguished, or, from the standpoint of philosophy, whether or not linguistics itself can be justified. In contrast to this, we understand under 'linguistic-theoretical' statements, those which are made with the intention of contributing to the understanding of language as behavior, with the eventual purpose of achieving a level of knowledge that would allow the multiple features of this universal phenomenon to be brought together in an inclusive and usable form for the genus 'language'.

It is obvious that, after a classification of authors into philosophers and theoreticians, it will not be possible to make a corresponding classification of their respective

ideas that is clear and unambiguous. Indeed, one sees theoretical passages in philosophical treatises, and passages in theoretical tracts that more accurately belong to philosophy. To trace such complexities and to note individual occurrences of such interpenetrating levels would be an extremely wearying assignment, which is more reasonably that of methodological history. The resulting kaleidoscopic mosaic would so clutter the basic structure with details as to prevent a coherently informative picture. We will therefore conform to the proposed working distinction because it allows a certain orderliness in the interest of a comprehensive survey.

SECTION ONE: LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY IN WESTERN EUROPE

1. LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY TO THE END OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

'Linguistic philosophy' in the sense of the occupation of philosophy with problems of language has been in evidence since the beginning of European philosophy. 'The drama "Philosophy and Language" is as old as philosophy itself' (Wein 1965:161). The starting point of linguistic philosophy as such is, however, as recent as the beginning of this century. Since that time the discipline has become continuously more distinct.

From the beginning of Greek philosophy, thinkers representing changing systems were cognizant of language and tried to bring it, if not into the center, at least into the general limits of their arguments. From the time of Heraclitus' first *logos*-speculations through the sophists' discussion about the mimetic or conventional character of language (*phýsei-thései* debate), continuing in Plato's discovery of the dialectical structure of language (in the sense of a sensuous representation of ideal conceptions), and up to Aristotle's first attempts to explicate the relationship between grammatical and categorical forms, a tradition of philosophical concern with language revealed itself. It revealed itself in the framework of epistemology, ontology, metaphysics, and logic. Its theses and arguments are even now the stuff of historically oriented philosophizing.

Above all there is an almost unchanged tradition of philosophical inquiries into the problem of semantics. Addressing the question of which model can best be applied to the connection between the sign vehicle (*Zeichenbasis*) and the means of purposefully conveying its informative relevance (sense, meaning, concept), a broad tradition of explanations (whether idealistic, empirical, rational, or nominalistic) grew up: namely the controversy over language and concept that had been the subject of varying metaphysical critiques since the sophists. At the beginning of modern philosophy, Locke and Leibnitz attempted to combine a critique of language and the formulation of an ideal language for all purposes of exact scientific and philosophical investigation. With these efforts, they bequeathed to following generations the utopia of a versatile,

logically pure language in the sense of an exact mathematical symbolism as universal notation for all rational insights and their dissemination.

J. G. Hamann, J. G. Herder, and W. von Humboldt were the first to formulate the themes which are even today determining factors in philosophical reflection about the function and accomplishment of language. The themes characterize philosophical activities of men from Cassirer to Wittgenstein, activities which qualify to be predicated as 'linguistic philosophy'. In this sense, linguistic philosophy concentrates on the theme of the CONSTITUTION OF MIND as evidenced by language. This problem can in turn be divided into subordinate themes: 'language as system', 'language and thought/language and knowledge', 'language and reality', 'language and society'. The aim is to promote linguistic philosophy as a form of modern theory of knowledge.

While the great systematic idealists (Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) have treated language as periphery or ignored it altogether (cf. E. Heintel 1960), there has since Hamann emerged beside this dominant Zeitströmung a philosophy (Herder, F. and A. Schlegel, W. von Humboldt, O. F. Gruppe) which functions as a critical complement to or systematic criticism of (still viable) conceptually speculative metaphysics. Language as 'organon' and 'criterion' of reason, language as 'mother of reason and revelation' are Hamann's expressions for the thesis that the human capacities for language and for reasonableness are inseparably related. Language as the realization of the possibility of human reason and reflection, and as form for reflective faculties, language as categorical means to expressing the outlook of a people, language as energy and/or 'inner form' — these are the most important themes of W. von Humboldt, who has inspired first of all German and American neo-Humboldtians such as B. L. Whorf, L. Weisgerber, and their schools. With Humboldt's exemplary work the practice of including the state of linguistics — as confirmation or refutation — in philosophical argumentation was begun. It was a practice that has since rendered it nearly impossible to discover an exact border between philosophy of language and linguistics, that is, between the scientific and philosophical theorems of any given author.

In the late nineteenth century attempts were begun to harmonize Humboldt's constitution theory of language with various traditional systems (of philosophy and natural science) above all those of Kant and Hegel (cf. S. J. Schmidt 1968a:1). Ernst Cassirer's grand attempt (1923), conceived under the influence of all the linguistic advances of his time, to develop a neo-Kantian linguistics of Humboldtian character has remained the most conclusive testimony of this trend. Russell, Whitehead, Frege, Wundt, Husserl, and Marty document through their works the effort to effect admission into linguistics of the most immediate concerns of their time: logic, psychology, and phenomenology.

The question of what is 'philosophical' about linguistic philosophy has been answered (implicitly or explicitly) since Hamann, Herder, and Humboldt in somewhat the following manner: a philosophical perspective on language is primarily the view of its role as constitutive framework of rational knowledge and thinking; in short, as

the surface configuration or vehicle for knowledge. This aspect of the character of language (as a structure of signs or a guide to actions) was propelled into the foreground, and language, as relationship between subject and object, was pushed into the background. History relates that epochs of intensive occupation with linguistics coïncide with those where questions of principle and method in philosophy and/or scientific disciplines are concerned (cf. J. Stenzel 1934:4). Always when the issue of the origin, boundaries, and certainty of human knowledge becomes acute, attention turns to the dimension in which knowledge is formulated and conveyed — that is, intersubjectively documented. If one wants to conceptualize the relation between dimensions which is immediately associated with European philosophy, it would take this form: intensification of philosophical preoccupation with linguistics, critical metaphysics and transcendental inquiry seem to be directly related (cf. S. J. Schmidt 1968a:1). In other words: 'That the basic questions of philosophy cannot be solved until there is agreement about the nature of language may belong among the few universally accepted presuppositions of contemporary philosophical discussion' (Wieland 1962:7).

The astounding impetus to linguistic-philosophical considerations at the beginning of the century (cf. G. Küng 1963:1), which must be seen as closely connected with primary discussions in logic, mathematics (Frege, Hilbert, Brouwer), and physics (Einstein, Planck, Bohr, Heisenberg) speaks for the systematic plausibility of the thesis that linguistic philosophy must be regarded as the relevant form of a critical theory of knowledge (cf. Wein 1960). J. Stenzel has recognized (1934:4) very clearly that a definition of linguistic philosophy is complicated by the 'confusion of language with the essentials of philosophy as such'. The opinion is still current that there exists an aporetic state of affairs with regard to defining the boundaries of the area of 'linguistic philosophy' (Wein 1961:3; cf. also 1963:1).

A systematic determination of the research area for a linguistic philosophy is hardly possible since it would entail the findings of the most varied fields from linguistics to biology. Not by accident has linguistic philosophy realized itself as a critical reflection on knowledge and method in areas where language appears as a theory-producing component and as requiring definition of function. For these reasons it is hardly to be expected that an observation of the course of West European linguistic philosophy will be consistent; the best that can be hoped is the pursuit of a few central themes and a tentatively categorizing sketch of the heterogeneous fullness of linguistic philosophy from the most diverse sides.

2. LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS

At the end of the First World War, linguistic philosophy was offering itself as foundation for further examination, supported by Humboldt's knowledge-theory oriented linguistics and E. Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen*. Linguistic philosophy was involved in an attempt to develop a semantic dimension with a priori laws of reference

autonomous from the system of signs. Informed by physiological linguistics (R. von Raumer, E. von Brücke, R. Kleinpaul, E. Sievers, et al.) and linguistic psychology (H. Steinthal, W. Wundt, A. Marty, J. van Ginneken, E. Fröschels, G. Runze, et al.), the position developed (above all in Germany, since France was dominated by the followers of Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl, de Saussure, A. Meillet, and their sociological emphasis) into an idealistic, philosophically ambitious combination (cf. Arens 1955). On the one side, language structure, semantics, and syntax were pursued (J. Ries, W. Porzig, J. Weisgerber, J. Trier) or language was understood aesthetically as artistic creation (B. Croce, K. Vossler). On the other side, an attempt was made to conceive of language as constituting the principle of philosophy, as constituting the principle of a conscious view of the world (language as 'spiritual intermediary' in the works of Weisgerber, Porzig, Trier, F.N. Finck, G. Schmidt-Rohr, J. Stenzel).

At the same time, professional philosophers began to formulate the logical and social relevance of the knowledge-theory function and faculty of language. In so doing, they were able to refer back to previous studies of the most varied nature. These were already available or could be further elaborated; they included theories corresponding to Platonism (E. Husserl), Aristotelianism (in the sense of Brentano's psychology, A. Marty), skepticism (F. Mauthner), or existential-phenomenological constructs (M. Heidegger).

England after the Second World War could already claim the authority of a traditional linguistic criticism of metaphysics reaching back to Locke. With G.E. Moore's essay "The refutation of idealism" (1903) and with *Principia Ethica* from the same year, critical objections to Hegelian neo-idealism began with calls for 'common sense' and 'ordinary language' as their methodological justification. A similar and contemporaneous rejection of all metaphysics and adoption of logical linguistic analysis had been promoted since the early years of the century by B. Russell (1918, 1924b). He prepared the groundwork for logical positivism in England and also for the neopositivism of the Vienna Circle in Austria and Germany.

3. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AS EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSTITUTION THEORY

If one surveys the linguistic-philosophical works of non-positivist persuasion up to the Second World War with a view to distinguishing origins and themes, something like the following picture presents itself: to the temper of mind current since W.D. Whitney, W. Scherer, and H. Steinthal, linguistics is not science but intellectual or historical culture. This view has recourse to Humboldt's theory of language as *ergon* and *energeia*, especially to his conception of the 'inner linguistic form' seen as the principle of growth and structure for the hierarchy of meaning (general perspective) in language. This view encouraged an idealistic linguistics with (purposeful) resemblances to philosophical reflections. From all this are derived the following, closely related central themes of this period:

a) Interpretation of language as a whole; interpretation of the nature of language as symbolic form

b) Fresh interpretation of the inner form: language as expressing the *Weltanschauung* of a language community

c) Semantic and syntactic study

d) Interpretation of one's native language as objectified society

e) Interpretation of the relationship of language and thought.

Arising from these studies or inspired by them, intensive interest in language occupied philosophy after World War One. This interest can be characterized as follows:

The revival of Herder's criticism of Kant for neglecting to derive his whole system from language attracted philosophers of the most varied disciplines and persuasions. It caused them to give systematic attention to the entire field of linguistic problems and to restate them as philosophic problems. The resulting linguistic philosophy of this time is a reorientation of all familiar schools and divisions: theory of knowledge, ontology, phenomenology, transcendental logic; pure, philosophical, general, and a priori theories of grammar; philosophical semantics and semasiology; linguistic sociology, aesthetics, and metaphysics (cf. F. Kainz 1936).

What nevertheless permits the grouping of non-positivistic language philosophers active during this time is that given all differences of approach, the themes and conclusions are mostly comparable and/or similar. Common to this group is the preliminary grasp of language as system, structure, or organism (see the exemplary presentation of F. de Saussure). On this basis, the following aspects were emphasized:

a) Speech as a system of acts or functions

b) An individually psychological interpretation of the speech faculty

c) Sociological interpretation of the connection between a language and its linguistic community, in the manner of the reinterpretation begun by G. Ipsen and H. Naumann (bibliographies of this theme are those of Kainz 1937 and K. Hermann 1936).

d) The constitution of linguistic content or sense (also misleadingly termed the 'constitution of reality')

e) Language as a generator of spiritual culture

f) Language as objective being.

This thematic orientation was methodologically grounded in epistemology by Kainz (1936): linguistic philosophy in the narrow sense Kainz designated as a linguistically critical theory (linguistic logic and linguistic critique = theory and critique of knowledge), and asked as its relevant questions: 'How are thinking and speaking related?' — 'Can reason be independent of language, how is "pure" knowledge related to its linguistic embodiment, how does language contribute to certainty ...?' (1936:397).

E. Heintel's amplification of Kainz demonstrates how little the latter's delineation of themes has changed. Heintel claims for linguistic philosophy the status of a separate discipline concerned with the 'interpretation of all of philosophy with reference to language' (1959a:467). The central theme of this discipline according to Heintel is

to be the *logos* problem, considered as the constitutional problem of meaningful objectivity. Ontology, transcendentalism, and existential analysis meet still today within the context of an interpretation of language as reflection.

Now that general introductory remarks have been dispensed with, it is appropriate to trace the development of the constitution theory of linguistics through the arguments of representative writers. E. Cassirer's major work which was based on Kant and Humboldt, *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen* (First Part, 'Die Sprache' 1923) takes off from the premise 'that general theory of knowledge in its traditional formulation and limitations is not adequate for a methodical inquiry into the workings of the mind'. What is needed is a 'general theory of spiritual expressive forms' (seen as symbolic forms) which would permit 'sorting out of the "different categories of understanding" of the world' (Foreword, p. v). Cassirer therefore returns to Dilthey's attempt at a hermeneutic foundation for the humanities in the form of his theoretical constitutional idealism. To observe and portray language as independent spiritual form, that is, as its 'pure philosophical *Gestalt*' and 'from the standpoint of a specific philosophical "system"' is an effort that Cassirer rightly regards a 'challenge not accepted since the first tentative works of Wilhelm von Humboldt' (p. vi). Cassirer knowingly separates this task from the trend of the late nineteenth century which favored the achievement of a philosophical framework through positivistic psychology (Wundt, Steinthal, Marty).

Cooperation between empirical and philosophical linguistics is understood by Cassirer to be the mutual realization that linguistic questions must be formulated as the systematic generalities of philosophy. Answers to these questions, in contrast, will appear only as the products of empirical investigation (p. vii). This idea can still be considered the classical statement of the relation of the two approaches to language.

Employing comprehensive materials on African, North American, and Oceanic languages, Cassirer seeks to demonstrate that a likeness-theory of knowledge is untenable and must be supplanted by a constitution theory. No increment of knowledge exists in itself as simple recognition of external reality; rather, each act of knowledge is generated by 'primitive creative' energy. From this conviction Cassirer draws the conclusion that the premises of expressed science, religion, and art are 'self-generated intellectual symbols' (p. 5) which, through their intervention, make objectivity at all intelligible and demonstrable as meaningful experience. 'For the task of language is not finally to *repeat* similarities and dissimilarities already evident but rather to create them in the first place and make them comprehensible' (p. 43).

On the basis of a Kantian transcendentalism (conditioned in part by Hegel), Cassirer explains that each accomplished quantum of knowledge is an act of objectification made possible by sense-realizing intervention of language. Knowing is: setting up in consciousness that something is something, in the sense that it becomes a factor in a system of relations explicable only through language. Subject and objective being do not face each other as ontologically absolute antitheses; rather, they first gain

identity in the process of acquisition of knowledge. They are restricted by the means and criteria of this process (p. 23f.).

Cassirer does not thus arrive at a naively idealistic theory of the linguistic *construction* of reality (in the same sense that Fichte does); instead he proposes a constitution theory in which language has the means to offer us 'progress from the world of mere feelings to the visible and imaginable world' (p. 20). Language must be seen as sense- or form-giving activity, which transforms elements of sensuous impression into precise and objective (because potentially intersubjective) content of our consciousness.

Cassirer contributes his formulation of the Kantian question of the possibility of knowledge in the words of linguistic philosophy. What Kant had claimed to be the 'schematicism' or the connection between observation and concept is for Cassirer language as sense-constituting intervention between observation and logical interpretative systems (p. 26).

Thinking for Cassirer is thinking in language, which must be taken in such a way that it becomes apparent how, in language, 'an entirely distinct structure not only *of* the world but also *to* the world attains to objective sense relations and objective total view' (p. 11).

Kant's critique of pure reason becomes for Cassirer the 'critique of culture'. Language as symbolic transaction does not construct THE world (as *factum brutum*); it permits through its sense-constitutive structure the compiling of a socially significant, socially recurrent, and binding meaning-complex (culture). Cassirer rightly stresses: '... the content of the cultural conception cannot be separated from primary directions of spiritual productivity: "being" is here not to be grasped except in "doing"' (p. 11).

On the prepared ground of Humboldt's linguistic philosophy (which he renewed as early as 1922) stands another investigator, J. Stenzel, who was influenced by the work of K. Vossler, E. Sievers, A. Riehl, E. Husserl, R. Hönigswald, and, above all, E. Cassirer.

With "Sinn, Bedeutung, Begriff, Definition: Ein Beitrag zur Frage der Sprachmelodie" in 1925, Stenzel tried in the framework of a psycho-physical linguistic interpretation to strengthen the theory of meaning as a 'necessary border territory between logic, psychology, and linguistics'. Like Cassirer, he grasps the primary accomplishment of language as the giving of meaning, whereby he tries — oriented as he is in the theory of psycho-physical parallelism — to suspend the Kantian distinction between inner and outer sense through psychological amplification (p. 15). Language shall 'prove to be the most important example of suspension of distinction between inside and outside, body and mind, sense and its expression' (p. 16).

Stenzel characterizes the function of a word as 'meaning', the function of the sentence as 'sense'. The sense of a sentence, conceived as a whole, must in some way be pre-existent before it appears as individual words in the sentence (p. 18). Only out of this initial whole sense can interpretation of the meaning of individual words be successful. The 'I' as physic experiencer creates between specifier and specified,

between whole sense and partial meanings an 'immediate unity', a 'present-tense' through articulation and language (p. 12). Sense for Stenzel is consequently conceived in the sentence as a psychophysical image, as a unity of articulating and articulated psychophysical components (p. 25). In physical-spiritual expressions, the 'I' realizes the unity of itself and the intended circumstances of its knowing attentiveness.

'Language as arrangement of the circumstantial world and of the mind that reflects and comprehends it' — to portray this is Stenzel's undertaking in his *Philosophie der Sprache* (1934). Here also he begins with the experience of the speaking 'I'. The complex sense-experience of the 'I' is articulated through words in syntax.

With the greatest reliance on Humboldt's (Kantian) model, Stenzel maintains that the articulation of sense in language is a process of reflection in which the mind confronts its objectivated self. 'The source of the continuous effect of language on thought is the spirit's ability to constitute itself, its opportunity to witness its objectivated self' (p. 36). Simultaneous to this realization, however, is the 'spiritual saturation' of circumstantial reality — 'its being is conceived according to the linguistic mode of being, it becomes language of another kind ...' (p. 36).

The mind first becomes aware of its own activity when it confronts its circumstantial (substantial) self in the same way as the phenomena of its articulation. In and through language as recurring property of a linguistic community, the 'I' can for the first time communicate as a member of society.

Humboldt's theory of the world-perspective of language necessarily reappears in Stenzel's model: 'language always portrays appearances to us in a peculiar light, and we may position ourselves wherever we wish, we cannot realize appearances for ourselves or others except in a way suggested by this light' (p. 108). Language, as the only phenomenon that encompasses the material and the spiritual, 'can, after all is said, properly be designated the great Mother of everything spiritual' (p. 110).

Cassirer's and Stenzel's linguistic philosophy marks the ground on which neo-Humboldtians even today meet to discuss the influence of language on the world view of a linguistic community. They also employ in their discussion anthropological, psychological, and biological evidence.

The influence of L. Weisgerber and his school on West European linguistic philosophy remains very notable. From an understanding of linguistic philosophy akin to Herder's, Weisgerber attained a method of looking at language in which the border between scientific and philosophical arguments is indistinct. The difficulty is already evidenced in his central themes: mother tongue and formation of the mind; mother tongue and world view (an extensive bibliography can be found in the *Festschrift*, 1959).

Weisgerber builds on Herder's assumption that language is a form of thinking. In the context of the linguistic community, this form is controlled and elaborated. Thinking and speaking are inseparable; the achievements, truths, and falsehoods of a people are preserved in their language. Weisgerber's basic conception allows itself to be concentrated as the Humboldtian thesis that the spiritual domain and linguistic

Gestalt of a people are directly dependent upon each other. Language is the outer appearance of the spirit of a people; yes, the two can even be considered identical.

Thoughts of this kind had already occurred to F. N. Finck (1899, 1905), to Wundt in his *Völkerpsychologie* (1900), to K. Vossler (1904, 1923, 1925), and especially to G. Schmidt-Rohr (1932). Weisgerber now explicated the constructive role of language in the knowledge-gathering process, applying linguistic and above all psychological phenomena (K. Goldstein 1932; K. Goldstein and A. Gelb 1925) in a much more effective and verifiable way. His presentations emphasize the 'inner form of language' which as *enérgeia* forms an image of the world. Language as intersubjective spiritual *enérgeia* and *logos*-agent interposes between the world of things and the speaker a 'linguistic middle-ground' ('sprachliche Zwischenwelt') which links the two. The middle world of language demonstrates and witnesses the spiritual transformation of the world in the domain of spirit.

From his first major work of linguistic philosophy (*Muttersprache und Geistesbildung*, 1929) to his major work after the Second World War (*Vom Weltbild der deutschen Sprache*, 1953–54a), Weisgerber's idealistic theory of knowledge remains relatively unchanged: language is interpreted as TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT, as the instance constituting sense. Using the example of word classes (principally indications of color and relationships), Weisgerber stresses that 'basically, the sound system of the mother tongue is related to the middle world of that tongue. In other words, linguistic denotations are neither unqualified facts of the external world nor imaginative images from another source. Rather, they correspond primarily to a native temper of mind. They seem so inextricably bound to this temper that one is obliged to see them as two aspects of one whole' (1953–54a:13, vol. 2).

J. Trier has developed his field theory on this basis. In his version word classes are interpreted as systematically ordered excerpts from the linguistic-spiritual division of the circumstantial world. W. Porzig, G. Ipsen, and A. Jolles have taken up and amplified these idealistic positions.

An extreme idealism schooled by Croce is advanced by K. Vossler, who attempts to convince us that 'the mind' is 'the only effective cause of the totality of linguistic forms' (1925). According to Vossler's criteria, every thought is realized in linguistic expression; language is the mirror, medium or sign of thought. However, thought must continually free itself from the cocoon of language in order to fulfill itself. The true nature of language is found only in the aesthetic domain because the true nature of language is poetic.

On the foundations of Cassirer, Stenzel, and Weisgerber are based most individual articulations of idealistic linguistic philosophy up to World War Two.

With these positions, P. Matthes attempted in 1926 to join the premises of the *philosophia perennis* in the question of categorical and conceptual systems.

Returning to Hegel, M. Diez proposed (in his posthumously released work, *Sprechen Denken und Erkennen*, 1934) a philosophically directed epistemology which comes to the following conclusions: 'Thinking is that form of imaginative activity which

completes itself in and by language. ... thought comes to consciousness as (interior or exterior) speech' (p. 11). '... thinking is a free process of the constitution of identities in givens through language' (p. 13).

Around these authors who referred back to the classical German idealism and to Humboldt are grouped a number of philosophers who are spokesmen for trends of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but who have never had influence like the idealistic group.

H. Güntert (1925) proposes a sense-oriented philosophy of language as the opposite pole to positivism. H. Ammann attempts a phenomenological 'concentration on the nature of language' that has as its impetus speech and its 'life forms' (1925–28). Linguistic philosophy is understood by Ammann as a 'critique of linguistics'; the products of such philosophy must be assessed for values relevant to methodical study of language. R. Hönigswald (1937) develops a monadic logic of the relationship of language and circumstance that is closest to the neo-critical attitude of A. Riehl. H. Hatzfeld writes a 'critical' (in the Mauthner sense) introduction to linguistic philosophy (1921).

A somehow exceptional position is adopted by one member of the above group: H. Lipps (1929, 1938). Lipps begins with logic and anthropology, and he attempts, with his hermeneutic logic, to develop an argument of existential (Heidegger) character. He does so in opposition to all logistical and all sign or symbol theories of language.

In the realization that is speech, in conversation — not in linguistic logic, but in what words mean — this is where Lipps finds the real foundation of speech and of linguistic philosophy.

Concerning the relations between language, thought, and reality, Lipps adh eres consistently to constitution theory. 'Language orders insofar as its articulations divide the context of reality. The concepts presented by language are not practical but visionary' (^{2}1959:92). — 'My language is a binding basis for my understanding of things ... to speak a language is to deal with its latent relationships to things' (pp. 80, 82). The word is the only means to intimacy with things. To understand meanings is not to grasp something ideal, because 'one does not understand "meanings" but rather one retrospectively understands words in the context of what they mean. In the correspondence of word and context, so-called "meaning" makes its very first appearance' (p. 89).

The progress to concept must be accomplished as an illumination of comprehension; this progress is misrepresented when one juxtaposes circumstance and concept in the sense that concept is adjusted to fit circumstance (p. 63). According to Lipps, the concept of givens is but a mirror of a typical way of conceiving givens.

With this conception of linguistic philosophy, which attempts to begin with the subject and his linguistic activity of knowledge-acquisition, Lipps stands on the threshold of an anthropologically oriented linguistics. Such a system begins not with a metaphysical or logical subject-object separation but rather with an understanding of subject and object as aspects of man's linguistically articulated knowledge

gathering process. The final result of this approach is visible in the writings of Wittgenstein.

From linguistic events and his introspective experience on the one hand and from Husserl's pure semantics and theory of intentional acts on the other hand emerges the method of A. Reichling (*Het woord*, 1935).

Linguistic events are regarded by Reichling not as an abstract sign level but as a factual talking-about-something. In his disagreement with K. Bühler, Reichling emphasizes that language is primarily experienced in the WORD (p. 36). In contrast to Bühler, he credits language with the primary function of representation, because language can neglect every function but one — that of naming.

Linguistic usages are interpreted by Reichling as realized sign-experience, as the action of thinking. The sign is an intentionally conceived unity which is the consequence of a spiritually unifying act. This unity is not completely explained by association; rather, it presupposes an inscrutable and unity-lending act.

In opposition to the tendency of linguistics since K. Brugmann (1925) to offer the sentence as primary linguistic unity, Reichling promotes the individual word as the privileged integer. The word is an autonomous unity explicable as one action substituting for another or as unity-lending action contingent on specified experiential occasions.

The identity (of meaning) of the same word in different contexts cannot be explained by a referent which is a constant. It must instead be explained as a meaning portrayed as unified thought which is actualized in that usage. Therefore, the meaning of a word for Reichling is not an imaginative complex (as it is to Ogden and Richards, 1923); it is a unity of thought which is realized in speech, signaling a definite, intended relationship between speaker and matter. The word *Gestalt* itself already presupposes the meaning; only when I know what a word stands for can I recognize it as a 'word' and use it. This nature of meaning is the same for all words.

In reaction to situational stimuli, linguistic usage perfects itself as an active, contingent thinking; as the structural unit of sentences, the word is the element that mediates reality. In terms of Reichling's premises, speaking is active thinking.

The lively interest in linguistic philosophy during this time documents itself not only in these most important works but in an abundance of actualizing portraits of philosophers of the past. Among many that could be named are J. Stenzel (1922, on Humboldt), E. Hoffmann (1925, on language and archaic logic), O. Funke (1927, eighteenth century in England), E. Fiesel (1927, romantic philosophy), K.J. Abramczyk (1928, on Plato), W. Eisen (1929, on Mauthner), L. Landgrebe (1934, on Marty), K. Büchner (1936, on Plato), F. Manthey (1937, on Thomas Aquinas), E. Benz (1936, on J. Böhme).

The explicitly psychological orientation of linguistic philosophy before the First World War does continue after 1918 (for the state of research before 1918, cf. O. Dittrich 1913). A number of psychological-philosophical works appear which either strive to constitute a psychological reformulation of (linguistic) philosophy itself or

purport to be theoretical and empirical contributions to both philosophy and science. (Exhaustive references are found in Kainz 1941–54). Before and after Bühler and Kainz, who have certainly produced the most significant contributions to linguistic psychology from the perspective of intellectual history, there are a great many authors who can be only briefly alluded to here.

A solution of the origin of language through reliance on an anthropology of key situations for societal activities is sought by K. Vossler (1923b, following the lead of A. Noiré, 1877), O. Jespersen (1924), and H. Ammann (1929a). A theory associated with Plato's conception of the natural efficacy of names is put forward in the language physiognomy of H. Werner (1932) and E. Fenz (1940). N. Ach (1921, 1932) works on the psychological bases of linguistic communication and questions of conceptualization. Often cited works on pathological linguistics in Gelb and Goldstein 1932 (Goldstein 1925) served as confirmation for the field- and world-theories of language.

The greater part of psychological research was carried out in French-speaking territory (F. de Saussure 1916, J. Vendryes 1921a, J. Piaget 1923, Ch. Bally 1926, and the Saussurian H. Delacroix 1924, and E. Buyssens 1928) and also in Scandinavia: A. Noreen (1923) and O. Jespersen (1924).

A theory of signs standing between psychologistic and epistemological extremes is that of K. Bühler (1933, 1934). Psychologically, a conception of language is for him to be subordinated to the perspective of language as activity and as expression. For Bühler, it is the representative function that distinguishes language from sign techniques in the non-human sphere. He begins with the speech act (*parole*) and specifies the achievement of language as conveyance of *Kundgabe*, *Appell* and *Darstellung* (cf. the now famous scheme in 1933a:90). (A similar tripartite discrimination was already in evidence with Husserl and Porzig.)

As seen by Bühler the (complex) linguistic sign possesses three semantic functions: it is a symbol on the strength of its contingency to circumstances and their content; it is a symptom thanks to its dependence on the speaker whose introspection it expresses, and it is a signal to the hearer whose inner and outer attitude it guides.

This organic model of language is founded on the theory of the representative nature of all linguistic phenomena. Specialization of the meaning of linguistic utterances (qua application of signs) is accomplished by situation and context (sign-field and symbol-field).

Important for linguistic philosophy is Bühler's theory of the 'abstractive relevance' of all linguistic signs (cf. in this connection the recent reinterpretation by B. Liebrucks 1964). To this relevance Bühler, in agreement with Gomperz and the scholastic formulation *aliquid stat pro aliquo*, attributes representative function to the linguistic sign. A sign is abstractively relevant because it can serve simultaneously the various functions of portrayal, expression, and *Appell*.

An aspect that has so far been accorded less attention is Bühler's attempted relation of the speech act to the concepts of action (in any case as historical or biographical, not as the synchronic or structural concept like that found in the sociology of T.

Parsons). Bühler distinguishes as perimeters for the concept of action the actor, the field of action, and the needs and opportunity of the actor. In opposition to Husserl's subjectivistic act-theses, he accents the strong social moment of language.

A comprehensively encyclopedic survey of the findings of linguistic psychology to the start of the Second World War has been set down by F. Kainz in his major *Psychologie der Sprache* (1941–54). The spectrum of problems discussed reaches from the foundation of linguistic psychology to its scientific method, from the question of the origin, nature, and achievement of language over individual inquiries into child and primitive language, and animal communication, to linguistic pathology and physiology.

With regard to the central philosophical question of the connection between language and thought, Kainz adheres from the beginning (until 1964) to the position that despite the intimate 'action- and cooperation relations' between language and thought, a systematic and significant separation between these 'productively correlative functions' must be assumed. Thoughts in the process of formation definitely experience three important aids through language: '(1) a clarifying division (differentiation, explication) of the as yet vague sense-directive and therefore a more precise scheme of what is meant (intended); (2) a fixing and objectification of the thought conception which results in the abstract thought content losing its elusiveness through attachment to symbols and presenting itself in more conformable and characteristic form; (3) an increase in exactness, system and completeness of the task of thinking and the representation of its products' (1964:570).

The process-aspect of language does of course not permit a clear structural and sequential separation of speech and thought; linguistic articulation/formation involves itself inextricably in thinking 'which cannot then stand separately beside or before [speech]' (*ibid.*). Every instance of man's understanding his environment in terms of the (also linguistically constituted) 'elementary classes of unmistakeable biological significance' is dependent upon language and linguistic operations. Speaking and thinking are highly correlated processes.

Sociological linguistics is found — to be sure only in its infancy — in all of Western Europe.

In France, investigators include L. Lévy-Bruhl (1922), L. Jordan (1929) and Ch. Bally (1927). In Germany there are sociological studies by L. Weisgerber (1934), K. Vossler (1923b), and W. Benjamin (1935).

A sociolinguistics in the narrower sense, however, can first be ascribed to A. Sommerfelt (1938) and T. T. Segerstedt (1947), M. M. Lewis (1947), and after the war, to the French linguist M. Cohen (1956).

Limited to a few essays is the ethical perspective (in which there was a lively interest in the nineteenth century: K. E. A. Schmidt 1859, J. Bahnsen 1881, G. Runze 1889a-b, W. Wundt 1886) and the aesthetic perspective (Kainz 1924, 1934). These approaches are relegated to the background behind knowledge-theory and psychological interests of the time.

4. LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY AS NEO-POSITIVISTIC SYMBOLISM

An alternative to the method of constitution theory of idealistic alignment is offered in Western Europe primarily by English linguistic philosophy. A major manifestation is the book which appeared in the same year as Cassirer's life work: *The meaning of meaning* by Ogden and Richards (1923).

Moore had grounded his preference for 'common sense' and 'ordinary language' on a critical practice of philosophical analysis; he wished to conceive of the whole of philosophy as an analysis of linguistic arguments, and tried to determine the possibility of verifiable argumentation as such. His goal lay more in the direction of linguistically critical metaphysics (and was embraced by the late Wittgenstein, cf. S. J. Schmidt 1968a:4). Again, Russell's definition of the business of philosophy as logical analysis leads to a purely positivistic rejection of all non-scientific utterances by Carnap and the Vienna circle. In contrast to all these, Ogden and Richards remain in the traditional area of Continental inquiry. This is already clear in their subtitle: *A study of the influence of language upon thought and the science of symbolism*. The authors are in truth close to the positivistic persuasion, but more in the sense of a PSYCHOLOGICAL than a LOGICAL positivism. Their study inspired new schools with its radical sign theory of language which is reminiscent of Ch. S. Peirce's 'semeiotic' and sharply contradicts de Saussure's understanding of signs (in reference to the following, cf. Wein 1963, 1965).

In de Saussure's scheme, the sign represented two psychic entities: the signifier and the signified. Ogden and Richards distinguish between thoughts, words, and things and arrange them in a now famous scheme:

thought or reference

symbol – – – – – – referent

In subsequent Anglo-American literature, the revised concepts 'reference' and 'referent' have become standard. 'Reference' here cloaks in a neutral, nothing but relation-suggesting manner the symbolic application, the symbolic accomplishment, which would otherwise be misleadingly labeled 'thinking' or 'thought'. The position to which the reference has reference is called, with equal neutrality, the 'referent'. As in the case of 'reference', no prejudice is urged concerning its ontological status.

In thinking, interest centers primarily on what is thought about; thinking, however, according to Ogden and Richards, is carried out in the sphere of influence of linguistic symbols. That is to say, all thinking is a form of sign interpretation in the

sense of an intention exercised upon a referent. Interpretation of a sign is identified by the authors with the inclination of the speaker to a referent.

Knowledge is therefore taken to be a causal relationship which is subject to methodical examination by an inductive psychology of thinking. This is based on Pavlov's explication of the conditioned reflex. One recognizes a sign because/when one has learned how its successful (= referent-relating) application occurs in specific situations. This implies that our experience of signs in the past determines our most recent interpretation of symbols. The relationship between symbol and referent is scientifically inexplicable; it is interpreted by mediation of the reference-action.

Implicit here is nothing more than a psychological restatement of what de Saussure had called the arbitrariness of linguistic signs. Of course, de Saussure distinguished sharply between symbol and sign, attributing to the symbol a natural connection to what it symbolizes, while adhering strictly to 'sign' when speaking of language. For Ogden and Richards this distinction plays no role; sign and symbol are used interchangeably.

Besides this psychological model for meaning (which is reminiscent of Aristotle, cf. S. J. Schmidt 1968a:2), the authors introduce the subsequently influential distinction between cognitive meaning (referential use of a symbol) and felt meaning (emotive meaning) whereby emotive meaning includes both subjective and social factors of the sign user's stance to the sign situation and to the other sign users.

A sign/symbol is true, then, when it represents an adequate circumstantial relation in a sentence or utterance. Symbol, reference and referent are bound together in the context of the sign situation. Such a theory of knowledge is however reduced to a psychological theory of signs which has as its basis for reference and judgment empirical experience and authority. With this conception, Ogden and Richards place themselves wholly in the English empirical tradition of Locke and Hume.

Prophetic aspects of their work lie in the reduction of the knowledge process to processes of sign usage (Wittgenstein) and the interpretation of such processes (Ch. Morris). A second anticipation is their dissemination of critical thought about language (linguistic analysis and critique of the structure of linguistic arguments as a means of clarifying confused linguistic philosophy). Their critique is, however, not conceived in the manner of Mauthner's or Russell's; it aims rather at a single interpretation of the representation of circumstance [Gegenstandsbeziehung] through analysis of the sign situation.

Understood in this way, the science of symbols becomes an elementary inquiry which subordinates even the natural sciences under its critical pursuit of meaning (while Russell and Carnap wish to subordinate all science and philosophy under the critique of mathematics and physics).

In historical perspective, Ogden and Richards appear as pathfinders for the field of neopositivistic philosophy dealt with by Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (finished 1918, published 1921).

Wittgenstein qualifies as the only significant linguistic philosopher who neglects (in

his argument) to take account of the state of linguistic research in his time. His subjects are problems treated by his teacher Russell: sentence, variables, identity, generalization, etc. In the *Tractatus* he is concerned above all with the relationship of language and reality, language and thought, language and science, language and logic — in short, all the classic themes of the philosophy of language.

Wittgenstein himself formulated in his Foreword the tendency and theme of his book: 'The book treats the philosophical problems and shows ... that the formulation of these problems derives from a misunderstanding of the logic of our language. One could sum up the total sense of the book in something like these words: what can be said at all can be said clearly; what cannot be expressed must be left unsaid. ... The border [of thought, S.J.S.] can be discerned only in the context of language, and all that lies on the other side of the border is simply nonsense.'

Wittgenstein's early work must be singled out as one of the most effective provocations of philosophy in this century. In a radical, apodictic, and aporetic way, philosophy in the traditional sense is here dismantled and reduced to the category of scientific sentences from which all non-verifiable strings are ejected as linguistic guides to false paths — in other words, as not transparent to the light of true linguistic logic and phrase structure. Nonetheless the *Tractatus* itself contains a proposal for an ontology and theory of knowledge. Stegmüller (1965) is not unjustified when he describes Wittgenstein as an ontologist, transcendental philosopher, and constructivist.

Secondary literature on Wittgenstein has expanded until it is unsurveyable, so remarks here must be held to a minimum.

Typical of Wittgenstein's ontology is the dominance of the concept of structure. The world is not made up of things or atoms but of data (*Tatsachen*), that is, of the existence of facts. The efficacy of procedures is already prejudiced by the concept of 'things'. Fact and procedure have a logical structure. Wittgenstein calls the possibility of structure 'form'. The logical image of a datum is a thought. The image is an ordered collaboration of elements; such collaboration is its structure. The image and the imagined must have the logical form in common; only insofar as this is true can the image be a representation or projection (model) of reality. With the help of sensibly confirmable signs, thoughts are expressed in sentences. The totality of sentences constitutes language. If one substitutes 'image' (*Bild*) for 'thought', the sentence as expression of thought becomes an image of reality ('image' in the sense of mathematical similarity).

How much Wittgenstein with his representational theory is captive to English empiricism, with its ontologically and transcendentally interpreted subject-object scheme, and how distant he is, on the other hand, from Cassirer's constitution of sense [*Sinn*] through language, is shown by the observation in 2.223: 'In order to know whether the image is a true or a false one, we must compare it with reality.'

Wittgenstein's theory of language is singularly name-oriented: the name as simple sign (or undefinable archetypal sign [*Urzeichen*], 3.26) represents a circumstance in a

sentence. It must be noted that for Wittgenstein a name only has meaning in the context of the sentence (3.3). Unlike Ogden and Richards, Wittgenstein distinguishes clearly between sign and symbol. A sign is sensibly confirmable; it becomes symbol or expression [*Ausdruck*] only as a part of the sentence which characterizes that sense (3.31). When a word represents in more than one way, as often happens in colloquial speech, Wittgenstein would maintain not that it simply has multiple meanings but that it belongs to various symbols. 'In order to recognize the symbol in the sign, one must be attentive to meaningful application.' Only in application does a sign become meaningful (3.326, anticipates the *Philosophical investigations*).

Out of the intermixture of sign and symbol and out of the fact that language 'clothes' thought, Wittgenstein conceives a realization of the great possibilities of confusion bred by unenlightened language usage. In his opinion, most if not all traditional problems of philosophy are products of such unexamined and unanalyzed usage, and could be solved and banished by an analysis later labeled 'therapeutic'.

Most philosophical statements are therefore not falsehoods (correctable) but rather largely nonsensical results of a misunderstanding of linguistic logic. Given this premise, all philosophy is or should be linguistic critique qua logical linguistic analysis, not linguistic critique qua adversely critical and skeptical linguistics in Mauthner's sense. If language affords a structurally logical isomorphic image of reality, then the aporetics of language and linguistic philosophy consists in the qualification that what is common to the image and its model cannot be talked about because this is presupposed by every discussion. The sentence therefore can portray reality, but not its logical form, which is the very characteristic that language must have in common with reality in order to portray it. The logical form of reality can only be SHOWN by the sentence. It cannot be EXPRESSED.

A philosophy of language Wittgenstein concludes to be impossible: logical analysis of language eliminates the possibility of a philosophy in the sense of a system of meaningful statements (that is, of synthetic sentences). True statements are afforded only by the natural sciences. Philosophy, however, is not one of the natural sciences; it stands 'over or under, but not beside, the natural sciences' (4.111). This does not mean that it is a superior or inferior discipline; rather it means that philosophy is not a study but something quite different: an ACTIVITY (*Tätigkeit*, 4.112). 'A philosophical work is comprised fundamentally of commentary. ... The goal of philosophy is logical elucidation of thought ... The accomplishment of philosophy is not "philosophical sentences" but the clarification of sentences' (4.112). In this sense philosophy — though rejected as a doctrine — can justifiably be regarded as a critical analytical activity that borders on the disputed fringes of the natural sciences and defines the thinkable. In defining the thinkable it can suggest or signify the unthinkable (4.115). The unthinkable, the mystical, can only be SUGGESTED. The philosophical attempt to conceive the limits of the world outlines the border of the mystical realm. Like every natural science, philosophy can only SAY what is able to be said with clarity, that is, with ability to be verified. But philosophy can SHOW the mystic. The limits of

utterance are the limits of language. They SIGNIFY [*bedeuten*] the limits of every speaker's world.

Wittgenstein's aporetic linguistic philosophy realizes itself in a twofold way:

a) as logical-therapeutic critique of language whose assignment is to correct, through logical analysis of language and through identification of general sentence-form and its relevance to what is represented, the philosophical and scientific notions of the structure of utterances. That is, the assignment of the critique is to reclaim these notions from the metaphysical realm. From the perspective of traditional philosophical systems, this critique is an attempted deletion of all philosophy;

b) as a constructive linguistic philosophy which specifies possibilities of meaningful [*sinnvoll*] utterances and locates their boundaries.

Wittgenstein's validation of the discipline of linguistic philosophy distinguishes it in a characteristic way from theories of the so-called 'Vienna circle' — theories which he had strongly influenced himself during his Vienna years (cf. V. Kraft 1950). M. Schlick, R. Carnap, O. Neurath, and others developed there a theory of knowledge distinctly physical in method. It accepted only verifiable protocol-sentences and their relations as meaningful strings (Neurath 1932–33) and dismissed all traditional philosophical statements as simple misunderstanding of the logic of language. In the methodological eyes of neo-positivism, philosophical statements are without exception pseudo-statements, vacuous statements. Philosophy can therefore be absolutely replaced by scientific logic — that is, by a logical analysis of the concepts and statements of the natural sciences. 'Scientific logic is nothing more than the logical syntax of scientific language' (Carnap 1934:iv).

R. Carnap understands his linguistic-scientific logic as a continuation and fulfillment of Wittgenstein's suggestions (1934:208). Above all he considers it an overcoming of Wittgenstein's aporetics, which are irreconcilable with his positivistic premises. Carnap aims to prove that even statements about the form of sentences, which Wittgenstein had explained were impossible, can be formulated after all. For him, syntax (in the sense of statements about sentences) is subject to 'exact formulation in the same sense as geometry' (p. 209).

Positivistic methodology must be especially interested in revising Wittgenstein's aporetic estimation of the possibility of scientific logic and in evaluating positively his personal estimation of the *Tractatus* as a collection of actually impossible sentences (which are meant to lead to insight into the impossibility of scientific logic). P. Ramsey and O. Neurath had already moved decisively in the direction of this thesis. Carnap now believes himself capable of advancing the alternative whereby he interprets scientific logic as the syntax of scientific language and — as suggested above — maintains it to be feasible: 'Pure and descriptive syntax is nothing other that the mathematics and physics of language' (p. 210).

The interest of the Vienna circle in language was occupied in the following years with developing a physical language as the universal vehicle for all sciences. Great advances have since been made in this working out of a logically correct formal dis-

course. The relevance of this effort to linguistics has in any case remained relatively slight and must remain so for reasons of system, since logical formal languages either entirely disregard or simplify excessively semantic problems of natural languages (in the interest of models of denotation for the relationship between language and reality). The stagnation of logical positivism in questions of linguistic philosophy has its reason in an insufficient cognizance of linguistic research. This stagnation can be overcome only through greater cooperation between the two disciplines (cf. Y. Bar-Hillel 1968).

5. LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY AS 'LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS'

Around the middle 1930s, L. Wittgenstein had turned remarkably away from the position of the *Tractatus*, marking what is today agreed to be the separation between his earlier and later work.

His Cambridge Lectures (cf. G. E. Moore 1954–55) and his *Blue and brown books*, dictated to his pupils, do indeed herald an important shift to new arguments. Still it is certainly misleading to speak of an essential and complete change in Wittgenstein. Too much of the later philosophy is already prepared in the *Tractatus*; the aporetic culmination in the *Tractatus* presses too much toward a new orientation of describable possibilities and realities of language in the social life of a linguistic community.

Unnoticed by Wittgenstein (who in his whole career paid no attention to linguistics, and linguistic philosophy, e.g. the continental one), the English Egyptologist, A. Gardiner, developed a number of arguments comparable to those of the *Books* and the *Philosophical investigations* in his own work, *The theory of speech and language* (1932). Gardiner knew and utilized extensively American and European linguistics and linguistic philosophy; he relied most on Bühler and Jespersen. His work is significantly dedicated to Ph. Wegener, whose *Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen des Sprachlebens* (1885) first validated the importance of the speech situation and the so-called 'sympathetic factors'. Gardiner plans in his book 'to look at the mechanism of speech as a whole' in order to free his perspective from the confinement of special grammatical problems. The goal of his discussion is to describe dialogue as to its social and cognitive value in context. 'The problem here to be studied is, accordingly: How does speech work?' (p. 5). The method he selects to answer this question corresponds, at least in principle, to that later publicized by Wittgenstein and consists in situational and contextual analysis with description of expressions: 'This, then, is my method: to put back single acts of speech into their original setting of real life, and thence to discover what processes are employed, what factors involved' (p. 6). This is Gardiner's premise: that talk is phenomenologically a human activity that requires at least two active partners with a common language who find themselves in confrontation and must want to understand each other. On

the strength of this premise, Gardiner orders linguistics, not under logic or psychology, but under SOCIOLOGY (p. 7).

Gardiner is philosophically interesting because of his primarily semantic and sema-siological emphasis, which interprets the function of talk as a vehicle for the communication of meaning (p. 13). Gardiner opposes the definition of the function of language as employment of articulated sound-symbols for the purpose of expressing thought. Like Wegener before him, he stresses instead the consistently cooperative character of speech and its objective orientation (whereby objects are understood as realities both of the external world and of inner experience). Everything that is capable of being talked about must first of all be transformed in the speaker's mind into a thought (p. 22). The discussed object, like speaker and hearer, is not merely a part of speech but a factor of speaking.

The meaning of a word Gardiner defines as something intralinguistic (something 'philological'); it can be determined only through analysis of the application of the word, since it is not identical to the ostensibly accessible referent. 'We can perhaps best picture to ourselves the meaning of a word ... considering it as a territory or area over which the various possibilities of correct application are mapped out' (p. 36). The meanings of words cannot be assumed to be consistent and homogeneous ideal entities in the Platonic sense; in Gardiner's view they are categorical meanings which realize the attitude of the speaker in his linguistic situation (and so linguistic usage) to the things meant.

These theories of Gardiner's, which are still conditioned by psychological and mentalist conceptions, can, like those of Ogden and Richards, justly claim to have attracted needed attention to the sociological and anthropological premises of linguistic symbolism. They furthermore correspond to the field of interest that Wittgenstein beginning in the middle thirties advertised much more radically and definitively in his *Books*, the *Philosophical investigations*, and the *Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik* (all published posthumously).

Wittgenstein's late philosophy in the *Philosophical investigations* is considered by H. Wein (1963:69) to mark 'the most singularly *philosophical* of today's "linguistic philosophy"'. Here also, in the presence of numerous investigations, suggestions are sufficient.

L. Wittgenstein names as his themes in the Foreword to his *Philosophical investigations*: 'the concepts of meaning, understanding, sentence, logic, the foundations of logic, the states of consciousness, and other subjects'. He assesses the volume himself as a corrector of the 'serious errors' of the *Tractatus*. If the purpose of *Tractatus* is illumination of the logical structure of language, then Wittgenstein's starting point in the *Investigations* is the conviction that there is not ONE language with ONE logical structure, but rather many languages each of which comprises a plurality of 'language games'. These games can serve the most varied ends. The concept 'language game' attributes to language the portrayal of action or life-style. Such portrayal is always interwoven with non-linguistic social activities. Linguistic behavior must be seen as

integrated into the context of social action, of social behavior as such. Language as language games must, according to Wittgenstein, be regarded as a social action which is embedded in a situation qualified by all social norms, expectations, and practicalities.

The sociological and anthropological support for Wittgenstein's theory is similar to the sign-procedure theory of Ch. S. Peirce and Ch. Morris, which incidentally was not known to him. This support realizes itself in a discussion (of the rule concept) available since the *Books*, wherein 'rule' denotes the connective function between the sign user and the result of the sign usage. The importance of rules or the recurrence of signs is originally understood by Wittgenstein to be the condition of the meaningfulness of a sign.

If one attempts to align Wittgenstein's methodology with his central arguments, the following picture presents itself: the philosopher's nominalistic premise demands as its methodological justification the reduction of material questions to symbolic questions — that is, questions of comparisons of phenomena are replaced by those of linguistic substitutes. The turning to social realities makes necessary a philosophy describing the language games in actual situations and at the same time operational linguistic characteristics. The use of the means of language embedded in the conditions of socially integrated events for speech determines possible functions and meaningfulness of the signs used.

Language for Wittgenstein is an intentionally used instrument in the context of concrete social subjects. Linguistic philosophy can only succeed in describing linguistic transactions and the morphology of the usage of expressions by characterizing their meaningful occurrence in language games.

The definition of the meaning of an utterance cannot consist in its conveyance of an ideally unified message; it must instead be the confirmation of familiar similarities of actual usages. With this function, it can reveal criteria for the actual recurrence of expressions. With such qualifications, linguistic philosophy becomes the administrator of the grammar of a word. There is not only one method of philosophy but many, as it were many therapies.

Wittgenstein's influence on the analytical schools of Cambridge and Oxford as well as on Continental and American linguistic philosophy is concentrated in the following areas:

a) Wittgenstein opposes his operational model of meaning to all psychological or idealistic theories. He defines meaning as the socially predictable relevance of a recurrent sign-application;

b) philosophical analysis is a describing activity (not a doctrine) that leaves everything as it is, the search for a normative regulation of language still evident in the *Tractatus* is rejected as a false ambition. With this, Wittgenstein returns to Moore's practice of step by step description of arguments;

c) Wittgenstein operates on the premise that philosophical problems arise through

a 'hexing' of our understanding by the imaginative nature of language — a self-imprisonment in misinterpretable forms;

d) the RESOLUTION of problems is correspondingly interpreted as the DISSOLUTION of problems. With this approach, linguistic philosophy assumes a decidedly therapeutic character and fulfills itself as the diagnosis of inquiry;

e) the regulative principle for all judgments about 'correct' speech practice is the colloquial idiom where words have their 'home', where they continually play out their roles. The task of linguistic philosophy will continue to be to bring back words in philosophical texts from their metaphysical to their everyday usages;

f) in spite of an often attributed persuasion, Wittgenstein does not practice the POSITIVISTIC destruction or self-elimination of philosophy with which he has often been charged. What he does do is to dissolve philosophy as a system and direct it back to the task of clarifying what we believe to know by our intellectual activities. Such knowledge is obscured by the simplicity and predictability of routine experience. In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein no longer insists that every philosophical utterance is and must be nonsensical. (Significant is the absence of the *Leiter-Metapher* at the end of the *Investigations*.) He maintains only that absolute and universal statements are nonsense because they are irrecoverable. Philosophy (linguistic and other) has the job of criticizing and classifying: 'We would like to bring order to our knowledge of linguistic usage: order to a specific end, one of many possible orders, not *the* order' (Paragraph 132).

Charlesworth (1959) accurately detects the paradox of the self-intelligibility of logical positivism and linguistic analysis: both tendencies were convinced that they could practice philosophy without prejudices, without presuppositions. Both the positivistic principle of empirical verification and the appeal by Moore and Wittgenstein to colloquial idiom as the final authority reintroduce the familiar problem of the constitution of mind and reality (as interpreted experience) that we recognized to be the principal theme of Continental linguistic philosophy of a Humboldtian kind.

The interconnections between linguistic analysis and neopositivism were indeed extensive, although both developed relatively independently. In the period between wide recognition of the *Tractatus* and Wittgenstein's lectures, logical positivism attained influence on analytical thinking and only in the form of logical metaphysical critique has this analysis become known outside England.

A. J. Ayer's now famous *Language, truth, and logic* (1946) deserves credit for this dissemination. Ayer, who had studied in Vienna under Schlick and Carnap, attempted about this time to reconcile both Moore's analysis and that of Russell (and implicitly of Berkeley and Hume) with the Viennese positivism.

Ayer's reformulation of Schlick's rigorous principle of verification has become well known. According to Schlick, verification could be achieved only by direct empirical observation. Since this conception excluded both natural laws and scientific hypotheses and prognoses as meaningless, Ayer freed the principle with the qualification that verification can also consist in observations that (can) LEAD TO direct verification

(cf. P. W. Bridgman's 'Operational Definitions' and Einstein's contribution of experimental arrangements of verification of a statement). In the question of analytical and synthetic sentences which is fundamental to neopositivism, Ayer decides that analytical sentences are only true on the strength of their linguistic symbols; analytical sentences are either tautological or true a priori (cf. Wittgenstein). On this basis Ayer dogmatically proclaims the elimination of metaphysics; because he views all sentences as either analytically true (but tautological) or empirically true, no place remains for metaphysical (a priori synthetic) statements. The occupation of linguistic philosophy is consequently nothing more than the critical analysis of linguistic logic with a view to reforming operational definitions. This is to be accomplished by transforming sentences into logically correct sentences. In this way, a reform and refinement of everyday speech shall be effected.

Ayer's position is dogmatically positivistic; it is below the skeptical and self-critical standard of the late Wittgenstein. In any case, his proposal clarifies the insights of the English analysts into the autonomy of the language game. It also demonstrates that an empiristic-logical philosophy must become just as dogmatically metaphysical as any classical dogmatic metaphysics.

6. LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The situation of linguistic philosophy in Western Europe after the Second World War is characterized on the one hand by the acceptance of Wittgenstein on the Continent in the early fifties, and by renewed discussion of the recently extended and modified logical positivism on the other hand (logical positivism's supporters emigrated during the Third Reich either to the United States — Carnap, Feigl, Reichenbach — or to England — Popper, Waismann).[2] This extension of the horizon led to an examination of positivistic and analytic theories by advocates of the most varied schools and tendencies. The result is a mutual penetration of proposals and theories that can no longer even be classified.

There has been no important analytical school outside England since the war, and no neopositivistic school. An exception are the Scandinavian countries, which even now adhere to the analytical and positivistic approaches of the Anglo-American world.

In contrast, the influence of the idealistic linguistics of Weisgerber remains uninterrupted on the Continent. There is even a 'Bonn School' in which traditional linguistics continues to dominate and to renew itself. A strong affinity for linguistic philosophy is preserved in the school's discussion of the metalinguistics of Whorf. Cassirer, Bühler, Stenzel, and Lipps are energetically discussed. Multiple suggestions of Heidegger's existential linguistic theses inspire the influential hermeneutic theory

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[2]   An initial reception of Wittgenstein's thinking and its application to empirical linguistics appeared before the Second World War: J. Schächter (1935).

of Gadamer and his school. This influence is also apparent in Italian and French semantics and semasiology; but beside linguistic structuralist tendencies also gain approval (Lévi-Strauss, Martinet, Greimas).

In England, the analytical and positivistic schools are also sharply at odds; both begin with some significant revisions of their prewar theories. In form, the revisions are more critical and less dogmatic.

Since 1953, W. Schapp has developed an independent theory of 'histories' which resembles in a number of essentials the philosophy of Wittgenstein but which is not directly influenced by this philosophy.

The total West European situation can be summed up in this way: linguistic philosophy is not only accepted as an individual discipline but as a fundamental one, and its systematic role is sometimes exaggerated as the single meaningful philosophic theme of the twentieth century. It is, however, typical for the Continental situation that even following the War there were few universities with a chair in linguistic philosophy. Most linguistic observations are made by those who occupy places in the classical philosophical disciplines. Linguistic philosophy, a critical reflection on knowledge and metaphysics which is applicable to all philosophy and science, remains outside institutions.

The great significance of linguistic questions is witnessed by the realization that investigators from the most varied disciplines concern themselves with such questions: physicists (like W. Heisenberg, C. F. von Weizsäcker), mathematicians (like P. Bernays, A. I. Wittenberg), sociologists (like H. Albert, J. Habermas), anthropologists (like A. Gehlen, H. Plessner, C. Lévi-Strauss), and psychologists (like F. Hörmann) — and above all information theorists and communication scientists (like G. Klaus, D. M. McKay, L. Apostel, B. Mandelbrot, A. Morf).

Scientific and philosophic interest in linguistics after the war has attained unheard of proportions in the intellectual history of West Europe. It has stimulated a comprehensive program of historical treatments of linguistic philosophy, a reinterpretation and fresh interpretation of traditional philosophical systems in the light of language and in the face of consequently differently conceived problems of knowledge and the interpretation of (social) reality.

7. THE DESCENDENTS OF WITTGENSTEIN

On the foundation of Wittgenstein's late philosophy, two analytical schools have firmly installed themselves in England: the schools of Cambridge and Oxford.

The Cambridge School, also designated the school of 'therapeutic analysis', groups itself primarily around A. J. Wisdom (the second inheritor of Wittgenstein's academic chair, following G. H. von Wright). In his essays since 1933 (issued as *Other minds*, 1952, and *Philosophy and psychoanalysis*, 1953) Wisdom continues Moore's (his teacher's) and Wittgenstein's inquiries and methods, above all from the therapeutic

aspect of linguistic philosophy. Wisdom employs Wittgenstein's method in order to answer Moore's question as to the source and character of philosophical inquiries. He does not restrict himself to rejecting metaphysical questions on linguistically critical and logical grounds; he goes on to attempt to show the errors which proceed from such questions. Like the psychoanalyst, the therapeutic philosopher must through his diagnosis bring other philosophers to a recognition of their errors. The goal proposed is the dissolution of philosophy as doctrine and its rejuvenation as activity. This will be achieved first by a new evaluation of metaphysical utterances as enlightening paradoxes and second by the stipulation that philosophers should always be trying to say what cannot be said.

Among other students of this wholly unsystematic school (whose only redemption is its therapeutic effect) are: G. A. Paul, M. Lazerowitz, and N. Malcolm (who has become known by his biography of Wittgenstein, 1958). The considerably more influential Oxford School, also designated the school of the 'philosophy of ordinary language', groups itself around G. Ryle and J. Austin. This school also attempts to establish an independent position with reference to Wittgenstein. Among its members are H. L. A. Hart, S. Hampshire, S. E. Toulmin, P. Nowell-Smith, I. Berlin, G. E. Anscombe, and in a more general sense, K. Baier and J. Urmson.

According to G. Ryle, Wittgenstein's accomplishment was the provision of a method suitable for Moore's informal analysis. The Oxford variation of linguistic analysis is undogmatic and bears no resemblance to positivistic reductionism. It is to be conceived as an instrument or method of philosophy (not as the whole of philosophy) within whose boundaries the actual philosophizing may be done. Moore and Wittgenstein share the conviction that language and speech cannot be characterized with a unified logic. A grammar of the language game is required. The movement is agreed: every kind of utterance has its own logic which is conveyed by the usages that effect it. The school is also agreed on a theory of semantics which conceives of meaning as resulting from usages of expressions and which aims to define messages in terms of these specific usages. Every word in colloquial speech can be cited as final authority for judgment of correct or incorrect use of words. Each word has not one fixed meaning but many meanings in many situations.

Ethical problems understood as meta-ethics which seek finally to describe the nature of ethical utterances are the major preoccupations of the Oxford School (Hare, *The language of morals*, 1952; Nowell-Smith, *Ethics*, 1954; Toulmin, *An examination of the place of reason in ethics*, 1953).

While Ryle has become known through his theory of category faults and the anti-Cartesian theory of consciousness (another opponent of Cartesian fallacy is Strawson 1950), the accomplishment of J. Austin lies in his attention to action-denoting words ('performatives' 1962) whose role in jurisprudence has been worked out by Hart.

The experimental character of philosophy has been especially stressed by S. Hampshire (*Changing methods in philosophy*, 1951). G. E. Anscombe, R. Rhees, and G. H.

von Wright are notable as editors and trustees of Wittgenstein's unpublished writings.

The analytical philosophy which in Harré's view was grounded more on reaction than on insight (Foreword to Waismann 1965) has already passed its peak. Its contribution to the history of philosophy consists in its attempt at a productive and radical self-criticism of the philosophy which Moore had awakened from its post-Hegelian slumber — an attempt at therapy through diagnosis and analysis of the linguistic premises and forms of expressions employed in philosophical utterances. In analytical philosophy, the Socratic idea of philosophy as undogmatic self-critical movement of thought and as discussion of the premises implicit in intellectual talk becomes vital once more. In an age dominated by technology, philosophy assumes the form of a theoretical-analytical activity. It is to be understood as the place of reflective unrest, as a technique for asking questions, as a methodical mistrust, as a medium for critical comparisons. Clarification of knowledge and consciousness and questioning of the preconditions for knowledge gaining are considered by the proponents of analysis to be more justifiable activities for philosophy than the futile attempt to juxtapose a nonscientific system to the prevailing scientific one.

Several commentators have endeavored to offer an inventory and assessment of analysis: F. Waismann (1965), J.O. Urmson (1956), and M.J. Charlesworth (1959). For a critique of analysis from the side of generative grammar, cf. Fodor and Katz (1964).

8. CONTINENTAL LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Unnoticed by academic philosophy and still without influence worthy of mention is the original linguistic philosophy of W. Schapp first revived by H. Lübbe (1960–61).

Schapp begins his philosophy (1953 and 1959), which shows the influence of Husserl's phenomenology, with the 'history' [Geschichte] as irreducible starting point. That is, he begins like Wittgenstein, not with elements but with a given structure. The individual is submerged in 'histories' as the carriers of 'meaning'; only if and when he is thus submerged do details, observations, and other experiences assume their (appropriate) meaning. Language itself is such a history; it relates the members of the linguistic community. The sense of utterances is dependent on the relevant linguistic history in which they have their place. It follows that the interpretation of a concept is likewise dependent upon context; it must be determined and portrayed in the environment of linguistic histories (cf. Wittgenstein's language games). The names of things are titles of past and future histories.

In this premise and in his radical rejection of every philosophical terminology, Schapp stands in close relationship to Wittgenstein's language game- and situation-theory of meaning. His attempt to free himself of the preconceptions represented by (implicitly) ontological interpretations of the traditional grammatical categories is

also reminiscent of Wittgenstein. Schapp endeavors to make grammar once more problematical when he reinterprets it in terms of 'histories'. 'We submit experience to vivisection while the others probe the dead form of the sentence' (1959:323).

Schapp believes a theory of knowledge to be an impossibility. The only meaningful approach is one that works with concrete discourse (as the linguistic demeanor in histories) and seeks to discover descriptive keys to the function and importance of language and its elements.

An equally original but much more suggestive addition to more recent philosophy is the ontological-existential linguistics of M. Heidegger (1954, 1959).

Language is here elevated dogmatically to the revelation of being [Sein]. The individual is not the speaker; 'language itself' is the speaker that expresses being. Man speaks only in the sense that he listens to the 'being' addressing him. Being is demonstrated by language, is the fulfilled word. Things are only things by virtue of language. Man understands givens only because he already understands being (that is, he exists in language). Without being there is no language.

This definition of the connection between language and being circumscribes in Heidegger's existential ontology the problem of the constitution of mind through language. Of course Heidegger makes this connection mystical when he declares language to be 'protecting goddess of being' and the 'house of being'.

The hermeneutic tendency of his philosophy is especially obvious in his exposition of the problem of understanding. Heidegger attempts in his famous etymologies to reconstruct the original defining power of words from their histories (as he understands them). The speech of being to which he is trying very hard to listen is 'the echo of the silence of inner reflection'.

In his word theory, Heidegger reverts back to Husserl and distinguishes between audial configuration, meaning, and the denoted thing; but he mystifies the word in saying that it is grounded inextricably in being if it is 'actually' a word. Only when a word is taken as a word — that is, when it has been stripped of its character as sign and meaning — only then can one hear the address of being in that word.

The key to Heidegger's hypertrophic style lies in the realization that for him thinking is located in the process of language itself, only after that in man; man's thought is 'essential' only when it corresponds to the language in words. This moreover is only possible when the ordinary meanings of words are avoided in favor of the essential meanings inherent in the words. Language speaks. It plays with thought through its concepts. Only when the word is thinking are speakers awakening it. (For criticism of this theory, cf. Schweppenhäuser 1958a.)

A comprehensive survey of linguistic problems in an existential framework is also present in the writings of K. Jaspers (1948; 1964 pagination is cited). Jaspers looks at philosophical tradition and concludes that 'knowledge about language' belongs to the foundations of 'philosophical consciousness'.

In his analysis of the source and accomplishment of language and of its relation to thought, Jaspers treats critique of language and the relationship of language and

philosophy on the one hand, and the relationship of linguistic theory and philosophy on the other. The nature of language in his opinion can not be specified by an empirical science of language because language is a form of 'embracing [*des Umgreifenden*] from which we cannot free ourselves' (p. 10).

The primary phenomenon of language for Jaspers is meaning in the sense 'that I am directed purposefully by the sound to a distant content' (p. 13). Meanings are not autonomous entities. 'It is in words that meanings become accessible' (p. 14). The meanings of words are our imaginations and concepts which 'on their part link up to the being of things in the world. But our imaginations and concepts and with them the being first become clear to us in word-generation; they are then distinctive and firmly possessed' (p. 15).

With this argument, Jaspers stands in the arena of constitutionalism and accepts it as the central theme of his philosophy. Thinking is bound to speaking because thinking requires sensuous reference points which can be supplied only by language. With a metaphor akin to Herder's, Jaspers describes the function of language as sensuous articulation of the motion of thought. Language realizes the sensuous as definite and communicable. Jaspers clearly relies, on the one hand, on the historical dimension for definition. On the other hand, he cites the humanization of every speaker through language and linguistic tradition. Language and speakers therefore constitute a functional unity and whole much like that of speaking and thinking.

Every philosophy has to rely upon a consciousness of language, its nature as images and often misleading metaphors. The spiritual stance of a philosopher can be critically specified by a study of his style and choice of words.

Jaspers separates reflective linguistic philosophy from linguistic science by remarking that for the former language is not only an object of inquiry but also 'a boundary'. Linguistic philosophy is directed to 'the ground of our being, where initially being and thought and truth are simultaneously united in language ... linguistic philosophy seeks in language the ground of transcendence' (p. 78).

A number of philosophers and linguists whose work belongs to the realm of existential philosophy emphasize differing aspects of the Heidegger-Jaspers panorama according to their disciplines or major interests.

A speculative philosophizing about linguistics is offered by E. Otto in his *Sprache und Philosophie* (1949a). He makes a contribution of linguistic philosophy to ontology when he attempts to combine all categorical foundations of human language into a universal grammar.

Language study as analysis of self-consciousness and linguistic philosophy as revelation of mind are practiced by the philologist B. Snell in his *Der Aufbau der Sprache* (1952).

Understanding of language as understanding of being is the transference of Heidegger's existentialism into linguistic philosophy that is attempted by H. H. Holz (*Sprache und Welt*, 1953). Language and myth receive a hymnic-metaphoric treatment from W. F. Otto (1967). An ontological interpretation of linguistic facts (specifi-

cally the copula 'is') is advanced by W. Bröcker and J. Lohmann in essays in the periodical *Lexis* (1948).

In accordance with existentialism, philologists and philosophers also speculate on the interpretation of literature (following Heidegger's example) with a view to discovering the 'characteristic being of language'. Here one could name W. Schadewaldt, H.-G. Gadamer, F. Martini, J. Pfeiffer, and E. Staiger. A survey of such tendencies and their great appeal has been compiled by G. Siewerth in his collection of essays, *Philosophie der Sprache* (1962).

Of particular interest in this connection is the hermeneutic theory of H. G. Gadamer which is developed in *Wahrheit und Methode* (1965). Language is here evaluated as *Lebensvorgang* of understanding, as a process of revealing the world (p. 422). Language does not therefore constitute a self-sufficient existence contrasted to that of the world; it has its 'own mode of existence only in that the world shows itself in language' (p. 419). Language is here, as in Heidegger, credited with an active nature and is considered as discharge of hermeneutic understanding. All previous attempts to describe language and its functions rationally failed, in Gadamer's view, because the lively 'onrushing' nature of language as happening cannot be forced into categories and classifications.

A middle ground between the dogmatic theses of Heidegger and the non-existential philosophies is the goal of F. G. Jünger in his *Sprache und Denken* (1962). E. Jünger (*Geheimnisse der Sprache*, 1963) concerns himself with a semantic theory of the sound which is relevant only to the literary aspects of language. A new version of expressive doctrine in the speculative area between psychology and philosophy is advanced by H. Strehle in a work hailed as the beginning of a new branch of research: *Vom Geheimnis der Sprache* (1956). A 'critique of historical reason' which surmounts all exclusive characteristics of linguistic philosophy and scientific linguistics, and also solves all hitherto unsolved problems from the origin of language to the criticism of ideology, is the promise of J. Lohmann in *Philosophie und Sprachwissenschaft* (1965). J. Brun (1961) and E. Zwirner (1962) have worked out a theory of linguistic signs influenced by that of Cassirer.

Projects oriented toward rethinking and promotion of traditional philosophy from the linguistic aspect make up the works of B. Liebrucks and E. Heintel. In his opus of six projected volumes (*Sprache und Bewusstsein*, 1964–1966), Liebrucks develops a dialectic philosophy to define the relationship of language and consciousness. In wide-ranging investigations of the thought of Descartes, Kant, Hamann, Herder, Humboldt, Hegel, and Marx, he explicates in encyclopedic breadth his theses of the linguistic nature of consciousness and of philosophy. He recommends at the same time the replacement of historical philosophy with linguistic philosophy.

The works of E. Heintel are traveling in nearly the same direction. He would like to resolve the 'singular tragedy of German intellectual history' which he regards as the failure to 'unite' in the time of German idealism 'the deep understanding for the nature of language on the one hand [Hamann, Herder, Humboldt] with the *niveau*

and seriousness reached by methodical philosophical reflection on the other hand' (1960:xviii). Heintel intends a linguistic interpretation of transcendental questions which would integrate now-differentiated discussions of comprehension and constitution of mind (1967).

Between the existential-hermeneutic and transcendental-dialectic groups, there is a third group of authors worthy of notice. Their work is without presuppositions and assumes a conciliatory role in the dispute between philosophical tradition since Humboldt and the theories of logical positivism and analysis. Here it is most appropriate to name K.-O. Apel, E. Specht, H. Wein, G. Jánoska, and P. Krausser.

K.-O. Apel (1959, 1963, 1964–65, 1966) offers a number of penetrating analyses which bring hermeneutic and positivistic philosophies closer together through reflection on their common elements. It should be noted that an exact account of contemporary standpoints elevate his work above a hasty compendium.

Another middle position which is anthropologically oriented and is indebted to Peirce, Morris, and Wittgenstein on the one hand and Descartes, Nietzsche, and N. Hartmann on the other is held by H. Wein (1960, 1961, 1963, 1965). He stresses in the framework of his inquiries into twentieth century linguistic philosophy the aporetic outlook of analytical linguistics. He accents the tentative sign theories of Peirce and de Saussure and expands them with anthropological considerations of the sign situation and the model for the language game.

E. K. Specht (1963, 1966, 1967) endeavors to formulate an ontology according to the experiences of neopositivism and linguistic analysis. P. Krausser (1959), who has become well known as the translator of B. L. Whorf, combines phenomenology, ontology (in the sense of N. Hartmann) and metalinguistics.

G. Jánoska has outlined an independent 'ontosemantic' method which attempts to resolve nominalistic and realistic tendencies, the role of constitution and receptivity in preliminaries to perception and knowledge into one model, that is correctly oriented toward the social reality of language. The model is contained in his book *Die sprachlichen Grundlagen der Philosophie* (1962), which must be counted among the most plausible meditations in more recent linguistic philosophy.

The advantages and weaknesses of past linguistic philosophies are weighed also by J. v. Kempski (1964) who is especially important to philosophy because of his action-theory treatment of reality as the realm of linguistically indicated possibilities for actions.

Central questions of the theory of knowledge concerning the relationship of language, thought, and reality are discussed by the Frenchmen P. Chauchard (*Le langage et la pensée*, 1956) and M. Foucault (*Les mots et les choses*, 1966).

Building on the foundation of philosophy of science and logic, another group of authors tries to render linguistic questions more precise and to clarify the criteria for their solution.

G. Frey (1965) investigates the reflexive structure of consciousness in relation to language and seeks to demonstrate structures that manifest themselves in language.

A significant role in the representation of logical-positivistic and logistical thought in the German-speaking area falls to W. Stegmüller (1954, 1956, 1957, 1965) who is especially interested in promoting a rational and unprejudiced discussion of positivistic and analytical tradition and in freeing crucial passages of the neopositivistic theory from dogmatic tendencies. In this interest he is an interpreter of Carnap, Tarsky and followers, and of Wittgenstein.

A critical assessing analysis of the most important fundamental theories of logical positivism and analysis has been set forth by H. Delius (1958, 1963). With G. Patzig, E. Scheibe, E. Leinfellner, H. Haller, and H. Lenk, Delius belongs among the few scientifically and logically trained linguistic philosophers in Germany and Austria.

A simultaneously positivistic and analytic theory of meaning whose distinctive feature is the designation of meanings as 'officeholders' has been advanced by N.E. Christensen (*On the nature of meaning*, 1965).

A clearly exceptional position in this panorama is taken by P. Lorenzen. His proposal for an operational logic and its attendant action theory of language has inspired a number of pupils (F. Kambertel, K. Lorenz, J. Mittelstrass). W. Kamlah (who in recent years has brought his views very close to those of Lorenzen) and Lorenzen begin (in 1967) with the assumption that we always speak as people among other people and as people in the world. Any fundamental theory of knowledge must proceed from this assumption; that is, critique of knowledge is effectual only in the form of critique of language. From elementary and easily verified forms of utterance (predictators and elementary utterances), the authors postulate a systematic structure of linguistic actions and their possible interpretations. It is but consequent that the authors and their followers plan a proposal for reasonable discourse about behavioral norms — that is, a linguistically critical operational ethic.

A Marxist philosophy conditioned by logic, theory of signs, and cybernetics is pursued by G. Klaus (1963, 1964, 1965a, b), E. Albrecht (1967), and W. Schmidt. (The last places special emphasis on semantics.) While Klaus strives more for semiotics and information theory with specific reference to linguistic problems of the theory of knowledge implicit in them, Albrecht sets out to bring in traditional linguistics, logic, and philosophy as props for his mimetic proposal for a Marxist interpretation of speech and thought. Logical-linguistic analyses directed toward a semiotic semantics of reality-portraying sign systems are submitted by F. Schmidt (1961, 1966). The ideological aspects of middle class neopositivism from a Marxist viewpoint are explicated by A. Neubert (1962).

In addition to these studies by professional philosophers, a great tradition has continued to expand since the Second World War: the tradition of philosophical reflections rendered by specialists in linguistics or language science.

Authors like Weisgerber, Trier, Porzig, Glinz, G. Kandler, H. Gipper, and S. Öhmann, or J. Fourquet continue to work out positions originally developed before the war under the influence of more recent research from all the neighboring disciplines. In some cases, they begin anew on the basis of this information. Under the influence of Weisgerber, research into the mother tongue with its typical pedagogical

and philosophical framework receives a new impetus (E. Rothacker). Field study and questions of the linguistic world picture [*Weltbild*] attain a new actuality through confrontation with B. L. Whorf's metalinguistic and American anthropological linguistics (Öhmann 1951); a revealing spectrum of these efforts is available in the Festschrift for Weisgerber: *Sprache, Schlüssel zur Welt* (1959).

While onomasiology and semasiology (K. Baldinger 1964, 1966; B. Pottier 1964; K. Heger 1964) prefer to treat semantic questions in a way reminiscent of Ogden and Richards (a way which had been revived and modified in the treatises of S. Ullman), a functionalist and structuralist persuasion in questions of semantics and knowledge-theory dominates the work of the French linguists A. Martinet (1962) and A. J. Greimas (1966).

Suggestions for a philosophical semantics (cf. S. J. Schmidt 1968b) worthy of contemplation are offered by J. R. Firth (1957) in his essays between 1934 and 1951. Like Wittgenstein, Firth stresses most heavily the importance of context for the development and effectuality of the meaning(s) of a word. Consistent with this perspective, he designates the task of linguistics as study of the 'speaking person in the social process'. The meaning of a word is the function of its linguistic form in various contexts: '... the complete meaning of a word is always contextual, and no study of meaning apart from a complete context can be taken seriously' (1957:7). The technique of a linguistic semantics can in the view of Firth only be accomplished by 'a serial contextualization of our facts, context within context, each one being a function, an organ of the bigger context and all contexts finding a place in what may be called the context of culture' (p. 32). These suggestions should be fruitful for a textually oriented linguistic philosophy. Concerning philosophical questions in the investigative areas of generative grammar (like *ideae innatae*, semantic features and categories, language and thought), several scientists attach themselves to Chomsky and his school: M. Bierwisch (1965, 1966, 1967), W. Motsch (1965), K. Ammer (1963), and G. F. Meier (1966).

An atypical position in the group of linguists interested in philosophy is assumed by P. Hartmann, who since 1957 has been dealing directly in philosophical questions conditioned by a broadly founded linguistics. Hartmann's long work volunteers a large number of important considerations for a linguistically informed philosophy. Especially relevant is his theory of meaning which recognizes the text as the primary sign. Also central is his strong emphasis on speech forms and his linguistic philosophical explication of language as the rendering of logic and character which installs above the level of individual matters a level of categorical classifications and defines the construction of utterances as the product of ordered combinations of pluralistically informative complexes.

S. J. Schmidt seeks to present linguistic philosophy as modern theory of knowledge and its unfolding as semantics and methodical literary study, reinforced and continuously corrected by general linguistics like that of P. Hartmann. Schmidt's principal authorities are Wittgenstein and the premises of the action theory.

An abundance of philosophical observations is always available in systematic or

historical treatises prepared by individuals or schools. A few such sources may be enumerated here: K.-O. Apel (1955–57), H. Lübbe (1960–61, 1962), J. Derbolav (1953, 1959), G. Küng (1963), H. Lauener (1962), J. N. Mohanty (1966), H. Schweppenhäuser (1958a), P. Meinhold (1958), E. K. Specht (1955–56, 1963), H. Geissler (1959), K. Ulmer (1950–51), G. Thiel (1965), W. Wieland (1962), and H. Wein (1965). These have all assembled and commented on various aspects of linguistic observations from Plato and Aristotle over Dante and Vico to the classic linguistic philosophies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The broad discussion of Wittgenstein is documented in many studies throughout Europe: B. R. Drudis (1952), Sánchez-Mazas (1953), F. Barone (1951), N. Abbagnano (1953), P. Chiòdi (1955), D. Campanale (1956), J. Hintikka (1955), M. T. Antonelli (1956), E. Stenius (1952, 1960), J. Hartnack (1960), P. Hadot (1959), C. A. van Peursen (1959–60), J. F. Mora (1960), W. Stegmüller (1965), among others. (A survey of the situation and spectrum of present philosophy-oriented language studies in Germany is given in the new volume of the Eighth German Congress for Philosophy 1966, Heidelberg, 1967.)

A history of linguistic philosophy or a tentative comprehensive system has of course yet to be written. This insufficiency damages the historical consciousness of the discipline and discourages its constructive representation in relation to other philosophical disciplines.

Finally, it is necessary to mention some authors who have expressed themselves with regard to themes of linguistic philosophy from their places in various other disciplines.

From the theological side, M. Buber (1967), R. Guardini (1967), G. Söhngen (1962), H.-R. Müller-Schwefe (1966), and P. Wolff (1950) have endeavored to validate language as the word of God and the medium of revelation.

The role of language in jurisprudence and its vocabulary is dealt with by D. Horn (1966) in a way which takes linguistic, philosophical, and communication-theory factors into account. His eventual goal is a semantic communication-theory.

Speculation about the origin of language has been undertaken by M. Kahier (1960), R. Fester (1962), B. Rosenkranz (1961), A. Drexel (1951), E. Rossi (1962), and, in encyclopedic breadth, A. Borst (1957–63).

The relationship of language and technical science is the theme of H. Ichreyt and L. Mackensen (1954).

An instructive survey of the discussion of language psychology is found in H. Hörmann (1967) who also includes an exhaustive bibliography that documents all details.

If one examines present-day West European philosophy, he is aware of continuing interest in linguistic considerations, but he also sees that the sensational nature is waning and that the exaggerated valuation of linguistic philosophy will correct itself. What remains is the insight that there is hardly a discipline concerned with theoretical and methodological questions that can come to relevant conclusions about communi-

cative processes without a corresponding fundamental account of the role of language in the acquisition of knowledge.

This broadening of theoretical and philosophical inquiries, however, is hardly an indication of systematic advance toward linguistic philosophy as an independent discipline. Until the 1960s, West European philosophy (perhaps with the exception of England) was principally concerned with making up time lost in the war. Prewar theories were taken up and worked into newer conceptions; philosophies from outside the Continent were not before now taken properly into account.

It is significant that the impetus for productive new questions has in recent years seldom originated with philosophers; it is rather to be credited to linguists, especially generative grammarians, who have in the U.S.A. developed their own philosophical tendency (Fodor and Katz). New energy is further to be credited to the logicians, advocates of information theory, psychologists, and anthropologists.

The main force of present inquiry is exercised in the areas of epistemology, semantics, and translation-theory. The latest development is that of textual theory.

It is clearer than ever before that a meaningfully and rationally pursued linguistic philosophy is now possible and in the future only in cooperation with all language-related disciplines — above all with linguistics, with sign-theory, information-theory, psychology, and anthropology.

Only with the broadest base can linguistic philosophy hope to attain a form capable of productively uniting and furthering both of the tasks inherited from traditional philosophy:

a) the interest of theories of knowledge in the importance of language for the possibility, limitations, and certainty of knowledge;

b) the critical impulse to permanent discussion of the truth value of scientific and philosophical theories and methods.

Humboldt and Wittgenstein will most probably continue to represent antipodes which are to be accepted as complementary directions in a self-critical, non-aporetic linguistic philosophy.

(written in 1968)

SECTION TWO: LINGUISTIC THEORY IN WESTERN EUROPE

1. OPENING REMARKS

It is helpful to follow a portrayal of philosophic beginnings and developments with a sketch of theoretical events in Western Europe. It can be a summary sketch insofar as these initial premises and developments have, at least in the field of language science, become reasonably widely known. With their characteristic tendencies and contributions, they have indeed become inextricably bound up with the further progress of linguistics (*Sprachwissenschaft*) itself. Aside from this, inaugurators of new approaches and their schools have maintained continual contact with the kind of transactions

represented by monographs, since many such essays have already assumed their important place in the history of science. For this reason we are justified in constant reference to them as well as to the rich bibliographies.

In the matter of the boundaries of a thematic territory, something of this sort is understood under language THEORY — in contrast to linguistic philosophy — all research that has been concerned with the attainment of theoretical insight into and understanding of language as a self-sufficient complex of phenomena. This means on the one hand that the concept underlying such research is one which has not yet assumed the modern technical interpretation of a systematizing description of structures (for instance, in language analysis); rather, it survives as a broader and partly heuristic speculation. It also means, on the other hand, that one will have to distinguish and deal with both implicitly and explicitly theoretical studies and terms. EXPLICITLY theoretical terms can be regarded as those which undertake the task of formulating a theory of language — that is, to reduce its structures to typically disposed systems (for example, the theoretical treatises of Bühler). IMPLICITLY theoretical statements are those which, despite the fact that they are not in their essentials primarily or thematically theoretical, still have theoretical premises, implications, or consequences (for example, some special linguistic inquiries).

The portrayal will follow a sketch of the general background. Nonlinguistic influences which might cause confusion by ordering them under individual cases will be discussed first.

2. THE END OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

The situation after the First World War presents something like the following appearance: explicitly theoretical beginnings which had already been available before 1918 and which were amenable to worthwhile elaboration are few. Very well known and also extensive were the psychological works; such as the psychology of Wilhelm Wundt, whose lasting influence can be detected in citations from many linguists as late as the thirties. The concurring viewpoint of Anton Marty is accorded professional attention even today. While Wundt had wished to understand linguistic configurations and their peculiarly structured events within the framework of his own type of semantics, namely within his doctrine of apperception, Marty concerned himself primarily with clarification of the question of how one could arrive in a plausible way at universal statements about language. The context of this question shows a contrast to the thought of Husserl in the sense that an empirical avenue to the fundamental characteristics of language is opposed to his psychologically a priori grammar.

Controversies of this and other natures which were yielded by other philosophical positions have often thoroughly agitated and otherwise conditioned the actual practice of language science, especially the so-called general reflections on language as self-sufficient manifestation. In spite of controversies, actual examination of the scientific object — that is, analysis of languages or actual interpretation of linguistic

structures — remained as a rule without influence from methodological considerations. The first reason is that these illuminations had not originally been derived from linguistics itself. A second reason is that, in the wider context, linguistics appealed only to the historical interest. Therefore, more penetrating interpretations of discovered material and procedural possibilities were seldom required to play any role at all in specialized scientific investigation. This was especially the case in the very country in which *Sprachwissenschaft* had won considerable respectability in the universities and could consequently have played a leading part in intellectual life: in Germany.

Of much greater importance are the different thoughts of Saussure; although they were also in circulation before the First World War, they proved to be more centrally relevant to existing language science. They not only arose directly out of this discipline, but they also corresponded to an entirely different systematization of linguistic inquiry. In both senses, Saussure's persuasion parallels the nearly contemporaneous rise of phonology: this approach was also suggested by work on linguistic configurations; its appeal was not clearly attributable to the interests of another discipline — for example, of psychology — and phonology likewise afforded a fresh method of scientific inquiry. Here it is adequate to make the simple confirmation that both the phonological and language-system viewpoints have, so to speak, justified their right to prominence in the discipline and that they quite early yielded criteria which have made the newer and more general linguistics since the turn of the century unthinkable without these two components. It must, however, be admitted that, because of the indicated situation in German *Sprachwissenschaft* and in German philosophical faculties, both the new phonology and the contributions of Saussure did not really become accepted or even recognized in Germany except in a fragmented and oversimplified way. In general, this unreceptiveness is another example of characteristic academic intransigence in the country once notable for the decisive impetus it lent to research in linguistics. The context in which Saussurian thought WAS employed fruitfully was a limited one: application of thought about language systems to the lexicon and word-study (Trier, Porzig, Weisgerber).

It must indeed be regarded as an important and singular curiosity that in a large area and one formerly competent in the practice of linguistic research there should be through almost fifty years not more than a minimal development of the THEORETICAL BASIS of language science. The international research situation was favorable to advance. Such an advance would only have been possible in the confines of science oriented universities. In Germany, or, more specifically, in the German universities, intransigent viewpoints and those occupied with opposed conceptions constituted a kind of *communis opinio* which accordingly dominated almost completely the German philosophical faculties and with them the developmental possibilities of *Sprachwissenschaft*. Their conviction was that a true science must have the historical component as its major object and decisive horizon of understanding. Therefore, the role of history can hardly be taken seriously enough and can hardly be elaborated at suffi-

cient length. Therefore, the role of language history and that of the historically comparative emphasis which is its legitimate manifestation were the only necessary and sufficient occupations of *Sprachwissenschaft*. To this is to be added the so-called 'victory over positivism' — that is, over the neo-Grammarian position — by the 'idealistic' school (Croce, Vossler, Lerch, Bertoni). Their axiom of the primacy of the individual mind was reconcilable neither with system-doctrines nor with the sociological component of the Saussurian position. So the sketched isolation of German *Sprachwissenschaft* appears motivated not only by social factors but also by actual theoretical splits (cf. the harsh condemnation of the 'idealists' in Jordan 1962).

The consequence was that many new and promising ideas, beginnings, methods, and claims were not seriously entertained in German universities. This snobbery was in effect even before the time of the so-called Third Reich, during which time, of course, it became inappropriate for primitive political reasons to interest oneself in foreign scientific progress. Even though it is peripheral, this fact must nevertheless be included in any general description of the state of language theory because it was the reason for the uneven development of such theory in Germany. That a great area of linguistics proper should forfeit its contribution to intellectual development for not less than four decades could not remain without implications for the entire field. One can clearly discern within the confines of this single discipline the early tendencies to splintering and partisanship which had long before certain political events prepared and disseminated themselves. They can be ordered under a much more powerful, culturally crucial, but still conceivable theme such as the general attitude and education of a society or land. Subordinated in this way, they would have to be studied as a special topic.

The picture of ideas and developments in Western Europe shows the following universal configurations which define its detailed markings in an infrastructure: there are the prewar movements which continue to exert influence; aside from the thoroughly differentiated and tradition bound philosophical and linguistic deposits (Section 1), these may originate in neighboring disciplines which have become concerned with language (such as linguistic psychology). In this case they may still come in large part from the German realm. They may also originate inside linguistics itself; in this second case they tend to come from outside Germany and to quickly establish themselves. In Germany, with its continuing almost exclusive emphasis on historical research, few modern contributions are found which have an impact on work in the universities.

An interesting situation is thus brought about which can be seen in a simplified overview: Western Europe possessed in the first half of this century still vital older philosophies; these continued to undergo further development. Other characteristically new outlooks were added (for example, existentialism). More specialized linguistic theories like the psychological were also pursued — these were favored by German participation on the international level. Work is then carried out on special approaches

oriented to language itself and therefore more directly applicable to linguistic terms. These approaches gained currency outside the original central area for linguistics, so that Germany was surrounded by numerous centers which soon came to condition international trends without finding more than an echo in Germany. Prague, Geneva, Copenhagen, the United States, and London became promoters of the newer theoretical thought and derive from this status an ever stronger and more active role in pure linguistics. The few attempts to introduce new findings into Germany cannot escape and rise above a (perhaps justified) narrowness.

It is to be noted in passing that a more precisely historical review of linguistics in the broad or narrow sense with attention also to its attained level of INTELLECTUALITY can also be instructive. Such a review would naturally presuppose an account of the connection between scientific progress and the surrounding society. Knowledge of this connection would also be valuable in the broader context. Experience in many lands demonstrates that there is a very regular progress along the scale of diminishing intellectuality. A hobby which has descended to a state of sterile and uninteresting activity — nevertheless maintained with maximal shrewdness and differentiation — is contrasted to an attitude dependent upon the very *Zeitgeist* and no longer 'intellectual' in any ordinary sense. This latter can degenerate into methodological trivia incapable of interpreting even the *Zeitgeist*. It is clear that such working and living conditions and *Zeittendenzen* can play an important role upon the acquisition of just such rarified and fundamental perceptions. Theoretical reflections can in themselves — like those of philosophy — easily reveal traces of contemporary global opinion. In general it is safe to conclude that the initial impression and secondary development of a science are considerably influenced and harmonized by the thought patterns of the time.

3. NONLINGUISTIC APPROACHES AND DEVELOPMENTS

The explicit (thematic) establishment of a theoretical basis for the comprehension and systematization of linguistic phenomena usually comes from nonlinguistic inquiries within the broad context of language science; it often comes from psychology. Outside sources form a bridge to the specifically linguistic philosophies and points of view enumerated above.

It will be profitable to review the way in which a THEORETICAL CONCEPT was understood at the end of the First War. The status of a THEORY as it was meant and cultivated in those days can briefly be described as a methodical or scientifically precise understanding and systematization of basic or common characteristics of a phenomenon such as language. These characteristics are recognizable as belonging to the phenomenon when it is perceived, so that observation, classification, generalization, and determination of dependence come together in the theoretical formulation. The later, more rigorous theoretical concept, whereby the theory of a language can be

identified with its grammar, was not yet in circulation. The earlier ideas of theory were all somehow influenced by ontology; they were always oriented to a grasp of the endowing essential nature of things. In terms of this persuasion, a THEORY OF LANGUAGE was a structure of statements intended to denote such essential features (*Grundcharaktere*) of language which, in turn, specify particular functions in given languages. To such a theoretical conception, this was legitimate. That is, language theory must be constructed 'from the outside in', beginning with that in relation to which language has its function.

3.1   *Psychology*

It seems justified that we move past the already mentioned older psychologies of Wilhelm Wundt (1900) and Anton Marty (1898) without further amplification. They stem from the previous century in their themes and approaches, and despite all the undeniable relevance of their individual insights, they do not have direct influence on more recent linguistic theories (on Wundt, cf. Hurwicz 1918). A decidedly new and suggestive approach was contained in the ideas of Karl Bühler which had been conceived as early as 1907 and which were published in 1934. Not the least characteristic of this author's fresh departure was his increased eclecticism and the systematic nature of his presentation. His theory attempted to conceive of the character of human language in such a way that similarities of sign-traffic between men and between animals can be separated from their constitution as 'man's subconscious judgement of similarity' (p. 10). Bühler's ideas began with rules for signal and sign function, and culminated in the now-famous organon 'model' of language with portraying, appellational, and expressive functions. These functions vary in their dominance with the corresponding dominance of situation, sender, or receiver. The theory finally employs the two constituent 'fields' of reference (referent field = anaphoric) and symbolization (symbol field = naming) to describe the communicative linguistic structures. Other studies by Bühler are listed in the bibliography. Further discussions of psychological language theory were formulated by others such as Deutschbein (1918). In France, psychological influence reveals itself in the instance of Saussure's thought (cf. 4.2(1) below) being continued, with emphasis on its psychological components, by Damourette and Pichon (1947). A relationship between language and thought is also encountered in Sechehaye (1926, 1927); Brunot (1958); Guillaume (1964); Bally (1926).

3.2   *Sociology*

Another extralinguistic source for ideas about linguistic theories has been and is linguistic sociology. The major concern of this discipline is inquiry into the function of language in the framework of internal and external linguistic traffic of the language

community. If one looks back at the period under discussion, he is able to confirm that a sociological perspective capable of organizing linguistic reflections into a system was lacking at that time even as it is lacking in the Europe of today. In its general theoretical orientation, linguistics proper misses even now the fruitful cooperation necessary for progress in this expansive arena.

It remains remarkable, however, that sociologically oriented systems are found since 1900 throughout even that linguistic literature which remains entirely within the confines of linguistics intended only as linguistics. It is clear in the case of Saussure (1916) as it is in that of Ammann (1925), and others. One might say that they began to be aware of the communal dependence of language. A second new direction is the concern with the normalized character of language. Here as elsewhere, there are so many individual observations and findings as to require the vehicle of a full intellectual history of linguistics for their adequate exposition. It is appropriate to note that sociological components of the Saussurian position were further developed in France by Vendryes (1921a-b) and Bally (1926). For them linguistic style appears as the identity of a group. In the history of language change, the social substratum effects the assignment of norms. An exhaustive representation of the linguistic situation of that time is given by Sommerfelt (1938), while Vossler (1923b) sets out to define the boundaries of linguistic sociology. For insight into what became of these sociological reflections, it is necessary to turn to Segerstedt's *Die Macht des Wortes* (1947).

Segerstedt begins with the premise that language is one social phenomenon among others and 'that language is a social function — that is, specialized speech is determined by social factors and can be rendered a real medium of communication only through them. Language is moreover also social in the sense that it is necessary for all highly developed forms of societal life' (p. 15). The distinction between sense (*Sinn*) and symbol is important because 'a word can be assigned no *sense* if it is not first insertable into a general situation. It is not on the level of symbol unless it refers to a system of societal norms which partially bind it to that general situation' (p. 57). More precisely, a graduated hierarchy is constructed from meaning through function to symbol. The effective societal communications are accomplished through symbols; these symbols affirm the function of language as group interaction. This book represents in a good summary and overview the many individual observations by other authors briefly mentioned above. It can also stand for a movement that has since been subject to further growth.

4. THEORETICAL APPROACHES FROM LINGUISTICS

These approaches were partially EXPLICIT in the sense of our preliminary distinction — that is, they were conceived and written about as separate themes as in the publications of L. Hjelmslev (1943) and several German authors. However, other theories were IMPLICIT to the extent that they appeared only in the context of differently oriented