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Vol. 3: The Struggle for European Union by Political Parties and Pressure Groups in Western European Countries 1945–1950

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Documents on the History of European Integration

Volume 3

The Struggle for European Union by Political Parties and Pressure Groups in Western European Countries 1945– 1950

(including 252 Documents in their Original Languages on 6 Microfiches)

Edited by

Walter Lipgens † and Wilfried Loth

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Summary of Contents

Preface

The series "Documents on the History of European Integration" has a twofold goal. On the one hand it should stimulate historiographical work on the history of integration by making accessible important texts from the complex historical debate surrounding integration as well as sketching out initial interpretations. Secondly, these texts should enrich current political debate by recalling the insights and experiences of the past: the wealth of thinking on the necessity and preconditions for European integration, the multiplicity of motives and forces that impelled integration, the range of forms and methods of integration and their various results. Bearing in mind these goals, this publication aims at contributing to the acquisition by the European Community, too often seen in purely technocratic terms, of an historical self-awareness and consequently of a political identity.

Under this publishing project, initially conceived by Professor Walter Lipgens, two volumes were produced, in 1984 and 1986, documenting the development of the European idea during the Second World War. Volume 1 presents the wide-ranging plans for Europe that emerged among resistance groups fighting against German occupation, and further follows up the spread of the European idea in neutral Switzerland, in Fascist Italy and in National Socialist Germany. Volume 2 documents the European debate in Britain, in the numerous exile groups that formed following the conquest of continental Europe by the German army, and in the transnational groupings that were already pursuing policy at a European level during the war. Taken together, the two volumes show the emergence of a widely ramified European unification movement that was certainly neither uniform nor free from internal contradictions, but which had nevertheless, by the end of the war, developed into a real political force.

This volume, the third, documents the European policy debate carried on between the end of the war and the creation of the first European Institutions in 1949/50 in the countries of the later European Community. Accordingly, it reconstructs the milieu in which national governments sought to create European Community structures and at the same time brings out where resistances and difficulties arose at the beginning of the integration process. This documentation will be supplemented by a fourth volume, to appear shortly, which follows the development of transnational European institutions in the immediate postwar years as well as the decision-making process in other transnational institutions involved in European policy, and brings together opinion surveys on European issues from the years 1945 to 1950. In combination with analyses of the various national contexts, it allows a precise assessment of the

fields of force out of which the beginnings of European unification grew, and goes on to explain why some European countries came together in the early 1950s as the "Europe of Six" whereas others did not.

Walter Lipgens did not, alas, live to see the appearance of the "Documents on the History of European Integration". Volume 1 was in press and Volume 2 only just completed in manuscript when he died on 29 April 1984, following a heart attack. Volumes 3 and 4 are therefore appearing under dual editorship: the conception and the major part of the source material used are from Walter Lipgens, while the organizational arrangement, detailed evaluation and editing are mine as second editor, having taken up direction of the publishing project in summer 1984. Some of those who had worked on it had already been brought in by Walter Lipgens; others came in after his death to handle the chapters he had originally wished to do himself. For the outcome I am, of course, solely responsible; I certainly hope to have fulfilled Walter Lipgens's intentions, and I would like to emphasize that without his initiative and prior work it would never have come about.

Another essential factor in the success of the project was support from the Volkswagen Foundation. At both the stage of searching through sources and that of editing, it made possible the support of academic and student co-workers, bore the costs of archive searches and financed translation of the miscellenous texts into English. For all this I am most grateful to the Foundation, its workers and its experts.

I wish also to thank the Principal of the European University Institute, Professor Werner Maihofer, for the constant encouragement he gave to the publishing project; Mrs. Madeleine Lipgens for her willing assistance in interpreting her husband's scholarly manuscripts after his death; and the Publications Committee of the European University Institute for the care with which it has handled the outcome of our research work.

Sincere thanks also go to all workers who in one way or another have helped with bringing out this volume. Sergio Pistone, Finn Laursen, Miriam Hederman, Thanos Veremis and Dimitris Constas had to display enormous patience before the fruits of their research became tangible. Clemens Bott, Armin Heinen, Christoph Stillemunkes and Clemens A. Wurm dealt sensitively and energetically with the chapters that Walter Lipgens had originally wanted to do himself. Paul S. Falla translated the texts from no less than six European languages into English with remarkable exactitude and enthusiasm, making a major contribution to the emergence, from the many mosaic pieces of the documentation, of a coherent overall picture. Heribert Gisch and Christoph Stillemunkes provided valuable help in source searching at the University of Saarbrücken, Susanne Dismer und Ludger Vielemeier with editing at the University of Münster, and Frank Bajohr, Stefanie Goßens, Birgit Hientzsch and Michael Gaigalat with proof-reading at the University of Essen. Last but not least Brigitte Schwab, as Publications Officer of the European University Institute, competently and devotedly helped the volume through the press.

The fact that it was possible for so many workers from different countries and universities to commit themselves to a single joint project is perhaps a sign that what Walter Lipgens always wished for is gradually becoming a reality: that Europeans are approaching agreement about the history of their integration.

Essen, November 1987

Wilfried Loth

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General Introduction

Wilfried Loth

The process of European integration took shape during the years 1945–50. A multiplicity of hopes, impulses and plans combined to bring about treaties, institutions and mechanisms that still constitute the basic structure of 'Europe' as a factor in world politics. With the Benelux Convention, the Brussels Pact and the creation of the Council of Europe, national states that had been fully sovereign in a formal sense began to lay the institutional foundations of joint action. During the same period the Soviet Union strengthened its grip on the East European territories that had become part of its sphere of influence as a result of the war, while the rest of Europe for the most part closed ranks around the new American superpower. Thanks to the Marshall plan and the Nato treaty, the economic recovery and security of the Western countries was closely linked with the American presence in Europe. Within this area there came into being a 'hard core' of states in favour of integration, comprising France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Italy and the new West German Republic. In the European Coal and Steel Community this 'Europe of the Six' for the first time created an organization with powers of its own which to some extent entailed an abandonment of national sovereignty.

The basis of European integration

At the end of the war it could not necessarily be foreseen that European integration would make such progress during the next five years. True, the war had dealt a severe blow to the concept of national sovereignty in Europe.[1] The successful revisionist policy of Nazi Germany and its triumphal victory on the Continent had painfully brought home to the peoples of European states that their governments were unable to guarantee security and that alliances of the traditional kind were likewise an insufficient protection against armed aggression. The European balance of power which had repeatedly succeeded in

1 Cf. the survey of the results of the war by Andreas Hillgruber, 'Eine Bilanz des Zweiten Weltkrieges aus der Sicht der kriegführenden Mächte', in his *Grossmachtpolitik und Militarismus im 20. Jahrhundert*, Düsseldorf, 1974, pp. 53–67; also Wilfried Loth, 'Europa nach 1945: Die Formation der Blöcke', in Wolfgang Benz and Hermann Graml (eds.), *Das Zwanzigste Jahrhundert II: Europa nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg*, Frankfurt, 1983, pp. 23–57.

curbing national ambitions in the past had been shattered by Nazi expansionism. Millions of Europeans had to live for a time under the yoke of the fascist conquerors. They had discovered that the Nazi empire could be overthrown only by a combination of efforts; and resistance to an extreme form of nationalism had caused many of them to rediscover the tradition of shared European values.

At the same time, the war dramatically hastened the transference of power from the European states to the two superpowers. While the Europeans largely exhausted their strength in war, the USA – aided by the absence of competition and by their function as chief provider of war supplies to the European theatre – more than doubled their economic output. Standards of production thus once and for all came to exceed those of European national states, presenting a basic challenge to the competitive power of the European countries and hence to their independence. In the military sphere, the effect of the war was to enhance the world status of the US and also to make the USSR the strongest power on the Eurasian land mass. The European countries had been unable to throw off the Nazi yoke by their own efforts: not only did this gravely diminish their influence in world politics, but it meant that their own affairs largely fell under the control of the two superpowers.

Thus the trend towards common European institutions was fostered in many ways by the effects of the war. The collapse of national states gave rise to a desire for collective security arrangements that would put an end to international anarchy and deter potential aggressors without discriminating against them. The development of productive capacity, together with the pressure of American competition, stimulated a number of initiatives for the creation of larger economic areas; after the collapse of Nazi rule, these in turn called for a new political framework. The rise of the new superpowers encouraged a sense of solidarity among European nations, while making it clear that they must pool their resources in order to maintain their autonomy and compensate for their diminished importance in world politics. Finally, the experience of a common interest transcending the limits of the national state made Europeans readier to accept a postwar order that would not be simply a renewal of prewar conditions. Accordingly during the war plans for joint European institutions were evolved by the most varied sections of society, identical arguments often being put forward irrespective of national differences or party affiliations.[2]

However, the European countries did not all experience the war in the same manner or with the same intensity. In Britain and the neutral countries that were not subjected to totalitarian rule, participation in a future European

2 Cf. the first two volumes of the present series: Walter Lipgens (ed.), *Documents on the History of European Integration*, vol. 1, *Continental Plans for European Union 1939–1945*, Berlin and New York, 1985; vol. 2, *Plans for European Union in Great Britain and in Exile*, 1939–1945, Berlin and New York, 1986. For an introductory survey: Walter Lipgens, 'European Federation in the Political Thought of Resistance Movements during World War II', in *Central European History* 1 (1968), pp. 5–19.

community was seldom felt to be a necessity. On the other hand, countries whose institutions had been shattered felt not only a need for integration but also an urge to recover their national identity. While some industrial circles pressed for the abolition of national economic barriers, others feared the effect of international competition. Among those who did want integration, not all wanted a single European market: others wanted unimpeded access to world trade, or were chiefly interested in particular regional combinations. Still more difficult was it to bridge the gap between victorious and defeated nations. While Germans and Italians could only gain in reputation and importance by embracing the principle of integration, those who had been victims of fascist aggression had to overcome many bitter feelings before they could accept nationals of the defeated countries as economic and political partners.

Another difficulty in the way of integration was that, while the problem of security henceforth called for solution on a world scale, federal associations were only feasible, if at all, in Europe, where the peoples were sufficiently homogeneous and national problems were more or less similar. Regional associations in Europe could no doubt enhance the importance of the European nations in the world; they could help to solve the problems of recovery and facilitate the control of Germany. But unless they were concluded in accordance with the wishes of the US and the Soviet Union, there was a danger that they would exacerbate the tendency to form Eastern and Western blocs. In any case they could not come into being if they were opposed by the superpowers, and at the end of the war the latter were firmly opposed to European regional arrangements. The Russians regarded any kind of association of the Continental states as contrary to their own security; the Americans for their part, perhaps out of deference to Soviet fears, abandoned the idea of a European regional organization after the autumn of 1943.[3] This state of affairs confronted the Europeans with an acute dilemma. On the one hand they needed to press on towards unification if they were to act as an intermediary and peacemaker between the two superpowers; but, on the other, they risked increasing world tension if they went beyond cautious steps pending a hoped-for modification of the Soviet attitude.

For these reasons, at the end of the war it was an open question whether the system of nation states in Europe would be restored or whether, and to what extent, national interests would be tempered by a policy of integration. It was equally uncertain which countries an integrated Europe would comprise. Should it include all European countries, as was hoped by the many who advocated a mediatory role for Europe on the world stage, or only the countries in the Anglo-American sphere of influence, as the adherents of a 'Western' bloc – as yet few in number – thought desirable? Should it comprise all countries with common economic and security interests, or only those that had been profoundly affected by defeat in the world war? Another open question – closely connected with that of geographical limits – was that of the rela-

3 Cf. Walter Lipgens, *A History of European Integration*, vol. 1: *The Formation of the European Unity Movement 1945–1947*, Oxford, 1982, pp. 62–76.

tion of a united Europe to the new world powers, and whether the main emphasis of integration should be economic, political or concerned with defence matters. The answers to these questions depended primarily on decisions by the two world powers and the development of their mutual relations after mid-1945. However, as neither the Americans nor the Russians had as yet firmly decided on their policy in many matters affecting Europe,[4] the Europeans were able to some extent to make their views known and even to influence the course of US-Soviet relations.

The hope of a 'Third Force'

European politics immediately after the war were dominated by hopes of a 'Third Force' Europe, equidistant from the US and the Soviet Union as regards its social system and foreign policy and thus able to mediate between them. No political concept was formulated so frequently as this, and even when not openly expressed it was often assumed to be the most likely basis of future policy.[5] Given the world situation, this was understandable enough. The less disagreement there was between the US and the Soviet Union, the more chance European nations had of remaining independent, while the maintenance of peace also depended first and foremost on amity between the two world powers. In order to enjoy a maximum of independence and security it was in the Europeans' interest to do their best to relieve US-Soviet tension, which was already developing and which they noted with concern. But in so far as they had any hope of succeeding in this, it was most likely to be by joint action.

There were two variants of the 'Third Force' idea: one based on realistic calculations of old-style national security, the other on idealism and the collective-security tradition. The first version was chiefly represented by politicians with long experience of foreign affairs, who hoped that a mediatory influence would result from the reassertion of European strength and the creation of a third nucleus of power in the world, counteracting the trend towards bipolar confrontation. In the second form of doctrine, which was popular in wide circles of the non-Stalinist Left, from Trotskyists to left-wing Catholics, the idea of mediation was combined with one of social policy. Europe was seen as a region which, after the devastation of war, was on the way to a social system uniting the advantages of American-style political democracy with a socialist economic order of the type believed to exist, at least incipiently, in the USSR. Such a Europe would, it was hoped, allay the fears that the two world powers inspired in each other; it would facilitate their mutual understanding and even in the long run help towards a *rapprochement* of their social systems. More important, however, than these differences of emphasis among 'Third Force' adherents was their broad agreement on the need to integrate European

4 On the flexibility of both US and Soviet postwar planning cf. references in W. Loth, *Die Teilung der Welt. Geschichte des Kalten Krieges 1941–1955*, Munich, 1980, 7th edn 1987, pp. 23–69.

5 Cf., e.g., docs. 5, 47, 81, 82, 105, 107, 133, 134, 171, 196.

resources and so combat the tendency towards the formation of an Eastern and a Western bloc.

The chief initiatives for the creation of a 'Third Force' came from the French and Belgian governments. In the spring of 1944 the Free French provisional government under General de Gaulle, from its headquarters in Algiers, sought the support of its British ally for a policy of integrating Western Europe in economic and defence matters, so as to strengthen its independence and in particular make it possible jointly to control the industrial areas of Western Germany. In the late autumn of the same year the Belgian foreign minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, made a similar proposal to the British government. Both attempts were unsuccessful, however. The Foreign Office had in principle favoured closer cooperation with Britain's European neighbours, but no detailed plans had been discussed. Churchill considered it inopportune to pursue such ideas in view of Allied plans for a world security organization, and accordingly British official circles displayed little enthusiasm for West European integration.[6]

Subsequently the European idea became enmeshed in national ambitions. De Gaulle set his sights on a continental Europe under French leadership, and would only consent to British participation in return for agreement on strengthening France by separating the Rhineland and the Ruhr district from the rest of Germany. The smaller states, on the other hand, especially Belgium, wanted British membership as a counterweight to French hegemony and in order to strengthen the European union as a factor in world affairs. The British, however, saw no reason to support the French demands on Germany; and France's uncompromising attitude did not help to dispel their misgivings in regard to integration. Thus further negotiations proved fruitless. When the Belgian government put to the French its plan for integration under British leadership, it encountered as little support as it had previously in London. In November 1944 Churchill, on a visit to Paris, put forward his own plan for an Anglo-French pact; this was warmly welcomed by many supporters of the 'Third Force' idea as a first step towards European integration, but De Gaulle gave it a cool reception.[7]

Thus, in consequence of British hesitancy and French ambition, the postwar settlement in Europe was for the time being uninfluenced by 'Third Force' ideas. The Soviet government remained suspicious of any move towards

6 Cf. René Massigli, *Une comédie des erreurs 1943–1956*, Paris, 1978, p. 48; Paul-Henry Spaak, *Combats inachevés*, Paris, 1969, vol. 1, pp. 159 ff.; tr., *The Continuing Battle*, London, 1971, pp. 84 ff.; Albrecht Tyrell, *Großbritannien und die Deutschlandplanung der Alliierten 1941–1945*, Frankfurt 1987.

7 Massigli, *Comédie*, pp. 51–5; Spaak, op. cit., pp. 170–1 (tr., pp. 89–90); W. Lipgens, 'Bedingungen und Etappen der Aussenpolitik de Gaulles 1944–46', in *VfZG* 21 (1973), pp. 52–102, here pp. 82–4; W. Loth, 'Die europäische Integration nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg in französischer Perspektive', in Helmut Berding (ed.), *Wirtschaftliche und politische Integration in Europa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Göttingen, 1984, pp. 225–46, here pp. 233 f.

union, and instructed the European Communist Parties to block it wherever necessary. As a result, in those countries where the Communists had any influence on government policy – especially France, Italy and Belgium – a tactical alliance between Communist and conservative forces took shape, with the object of restoring the prewar system. This was the easier to achieve as the manifold problems of security and reconstruction had to be solved without delay, and for lack of a tangible alternative the old-style national state became entrenched once more. At the same time – not least because of the impotence of divided Europe – US-Soviet tension rapidly increased, and the gulf between Eastern and Western Europe became more and more manifest. In the spring of 1946, just nine months after the end of hostilities in Europe, the Soviet foreign minister Molotov was uttering public warnings against 'warmongering adventurous groups', while Churchill, now the Leader of the Opposition in Britain, called for resistance to Soviet expansionist aims.[8]

The absence of concrete moves towards union had a disintegrating effect on the 'Third Force' movement, before its many disparate elements could form a single political front. Some of its supporters failed to perceive that developments in Europe were directly contrary to their hopes for the future; in consequence they soon lost touch with political reality. Others were alarmed by the trend towards restoration of the old order and the formation of blocs, but were discouraged by failure and lapsed by degrees into resignation. Others again concentrated their energies on solving the urgent problems of reconstruction within the existing framework. Finally, many who had subscribed only hesitantly to the doctrine of integration, or had not fully thought out its implications, were led by the pressure of circumstances to accord the same absolute priority to old-style national ambitions as they had done in the past.

None the less, the 'Third Force' idea was still vigorously advocated in many quarters. In France, for instance, some Christian Democrats and the Socialists under Léon Blum endeavoured to modify the country's Gaullist foreign policy. Despite several failures they were able to bring about the signature of the Anglo-French alliance (the treaty of Dunkirk, 4 March 1947) without the British having first to agree to the separation of the Rhineland and Ruhr district.[9] In Britain Ernest Bevin, foreign secretary in the Labour government which came to power in July 1945, was pressed by a number of MP's of both parties to commit himself more strongly to integration and thus enable Europe to remain independent.[10] At the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London in September 1945 the Italian foreign minister, Alcide De Gasperi, presented himself as the champion of a new federal

8 Molotov's election speech in Moscow, 6 Feb. 1946, in V. M. Molotov, *Fragen der Aussenpolitik. Reden und Erklärungen*, Moscow, 1949, pp. 26–38; Churchill's Fulton speech, 5 March 1946, in *Vital Speeches of the Day*, March 15, 1946, pp. 329–42, and *The Sinews of Peace*, London, 1948, pp. 93 ff.

9 Cf. W. Loth, *Sozialismus und Internationalismus. Die französischen Sozialisten und die Nachkriegsordnung Europas 1940–1950*, Stuttgart, 1977, pp. 86–97 and 118–27.

10 Cf. Lipgens, *History*, pp. 177, 182, 187, 189–201.

Europe with the support of a broad spectrum of parties in his own country, and after becoming prime minister in December of that year he endeavoured to rouse his Western colleagues to greater enthusiasm for the European idea.[11] Once the immediate day-to-day problems had been more or less solved, many private initiatives led to the formation of associations for European union. The first congress of such associations from various countries was held at Hertenstein in Switzerland in September 1946; three months later an umbrella organization was set up, the Union Européenne des Fédéralistes (UEF).[12]

At the same time it was increasingly felt that Eastern Europe was lost to Soviet Communism and that efforts towards integration had to be confined to the West, no longer as a means of defusing the East-West conflict, but in order to defend Western Europe against armed Soviet aggression. At the same time as the advocates of a European 'Third Force' were holding their first conference at Hertenstein, Churchill caused a sensation by his speech at Zurich pointing once again to the Soviet threat and calling on all states of Europe that were 'willing and able' to form a union.[13] Churchill's suggestion was so contrary to the hopes and expectations that had till then prevailed in Europe that it aroused much more opposition than assent, but it none the less accelerated the process of reorientation. At the end of 1946 Churchill's son-in-law, Duncan Sandys, began to enlist the support of eminent public figures in various countries for a 'United European Movement' (UEM).

The Marshall Plan

The developments in world policy that took place in 1947 altered the framework of the European integration movement in two ways. In the first place the Marshall Plan had the effect of casting the weight of the US behind the integration policy. The movement towards union, which had been increasingly disoriented, was now strengthened in its opposition to the old order. However, the objectives of US policy were to some extent contradictory: on the one hand they hoped for political stability and therefore increased independence in Europe, but on the other they wanted the European economies to become an integral part of the US-dominated world market. On the whole, however, the US demand for coordination of European measures of economic recovery did much to loosen the power of national bureaucracies and restrictions.[14] Meanwhile the Soviet rejection of the Marshall Plan and the subsequent hardening of Cominform policy turned the division of Europe into an accomplished fact.

11 W. Loth, 'Countries in a Weak Situation: Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands', in Lipgens, *History*, pp. 246–68, here p. 257; cf. also references to the background of internal policy in the introduction to ch. II below.

12 Cf. Lipgens, *History*, pp. 296–316.

13 Ibid., pp. 317–22; cf. ch. VII below, doc. 193.

14 Klaus Schwabe, 'Der Marshall-Plan und Europa', in Raymond Poidevin (ed.), *Histoire des débuts de la construction européenne (mars 1948–mai 1950)*, Brussels 1986, pp. 47–69.

Thus the policy of integration was henceforth confined to Western Europe and was closely linked with American efforts to stabilize the Western world.

These developments were at once a bitter defeat and a new stimulus to the 'Third Force' movement. Its adherents had failed to prevent the East-West confrontation, but they were more anxious than ever to mediate between the superpowers and protect Europe from US domination. The objective was now not to prevent the formation of blocs, but to accept it while mitigating its effects. This evolution did not come easily to the advocates of a 'Third Force', especially those in the occupation zones of Germany, where the division of Europe also involved that of their own country.[15] However, the change of policy was facilitated by the fact that the Russians proceeded hermetically to shut off their part of Europe, while the Marshall Plan arrangements provided ample opportunity for strengthening European independence. The 'Third Force' advocates accordingly soon concentrated on taking advantage of these opportunities, and in the setting of the Marshall Plan their ideas actually commanded greater attention than previously.[16]

At the same time, those who wished to form a Western bloc against Soviet expansion also derived encouragement from the new situation. The course of world events soon made their outlook increasingly plausible, especially in circles which had only been shaken out of traditional concepts of nationalist policy by the impact of the East-West conflict. Moreover, apart from the importance of a united Europe in world politics, developments in regard to Germany strengthened the trend towards unification. The US determination to include West Germany in a European recovery programme could not for long be reconciled with unilateral measures of repression and control of that country. It was necessary to create a framework within which German recovery could be kept within manageable bounds – a point especially clear to Germany's West European neighbours.

In the second half of 1947 the activation and reorientation of the European idea led to the formation of a widespread European movement; while the withdrawal of the Communists from the West European governments gave a further stimulus to negotiations for integration. When, in July, the representatives of sixteen nations met in Paris to discuss the modalities of the Marshall Plan, which had till then been left deliberately vague, not only did the Italian and Benelux delegations once more put forward ideas of union, but the French government also came out in favour of integration without further delay. In particular it called for the creation of a European customs union, and made known its interest in aiding and controlling the recovery programme by means of joint economic mechanisms.[17]

15 Cf., e.g., the hesitation of the Social Democrat Carlo Schmid: ch. V below, doc. 152.

16 For this and the following passage cf. W. Loth, 'The West European Governments and the Impulse given by the Marshall Plan', in Lipgens, *History*, pp. 488–507.

17 Cf. Alan S. Milward, 'The Committee of European Economic Cooperation (CEEC) and the Advent of the Customs Union', in Lipgens, *History*, pp. 507–69; id.,

Government initiatives were still on a restricted scale. Bevin was convinced of the desirability of a 'Third Force' to the extent that he endorsed in principle the French proposal for a customs union; but his cabinet colleagues were bent on using the resources of the sterling area to assist national recovery, so that the British government's position remained ambiguous.[18] The Benelux governments were still shy of union without Britain, and the other countries represented in Paris were altogether averse to far-reaching plans for integration, both for political reasons and on account of their economic situation. As a result, Marshall aid was organized without any significant degree of integration. Under American pressure the participating countries signed a convention on 16 April 1948 setting up a permanent coordinating body, the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), but its decisions were still subject to the unanimity rule.

The French, however, were not deterred this time from pursuing the goal of integration, and the idea was kept on the tapis by the European movement, which was steadily gaining in strength. In December 1947 Churchill's United Europe Movement succeeded in creating a Joint International Committee as a coordinating body for most of the pro-European movements; this Committee organized the Congress of the European Movement at The Hague in May 1948, which was attended by over 7,000 statesmen and public figures from various countries. The Congress issued an appeal for a 'European Assembly', to be elected by national parliaments for the purpose of drafting plans for European union and preparing the way for their realization.[19] Three months later the French government endorsed this appeal and added its own pressure for a European parliament which, after a preliminary phase of discussion, was to be given its own powers of decision and thus form 'the nucleus of a federal organization of Europe'.[20]

During 1948 a difference of emphasis was again discernible among the advocates of integration. While orginally hopes of an independent 'Third Force' had been dominant, integration was from now onwards increasingly geared to the consolidation of the Western camp including the US. One reason for this was that the reluctance of the British Labour Party played into the hands of conservative and bourgeois elements on the Continent, both as

The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–1951, London, 1984, pp. 69–89; John W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945–1951*, Leicester, 1984; Pierre Guillen, 'Le projet d'union douanière entre la France, l'Italie et le Benelux', in Poidevin (ed.), *Débuts*, pp. 143–64.

18 Milward, *Reconstruction*, pp. 235–50.

19 Cf. Alan Hick, *The European Movement and the Campaign for a European Assembly 1947–1950*, thesis, Florence, 1980; also the same author's forthcoming contribution to vol. 4 of the present series.

20 Thus expressed in instructions to the French Ambassador in London: Massigli, *Comédie*, p. 157. Cf. Loth, *Sozialismus*, pp. 211 f., and Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, 'Le rôle de la France dans la naissance du Conseil de l'Europe', in Poidevin (ed.), *Débuts*, pp. 165–198.

regards the organization of economic recovery and the direction taken by the European Movement. In addition, fear of Soviet expansion was intensified by the Communist take-over in Prague at the end of February 1948. This event brought more recruits to the cause of Western union, while many who had advocated a 'Third Force' came to see American protection as more important than the assertion of European independence. When, in January 1948, the governments of France, Britain and the Benelux countries entered into negotiations for a multilateral treaty of mutual assistance, many of those concerned still regarded this as a step towards a 'Third Force' Europe; but the Brussels pact, signed on 17 March 1948, in fact turned out to be a stepping-stone towards Nato.[21]

The struggle for the Council of Europe

Considerable efforts were still made to persuade the hesitant British to support the integration policy. In particular the Continental Socialists led by the French SFIO, as well as a minority of the Labour Party including Ronald Mackay and Richard Crossman, urged the government to take energetic steps towards European union; while the French government, itself a coalition including a Socialist element, maintained its invitation to the British to set up a customs union.

The Labour government remained undecided, but consented to certain moves in the direction of a European parliament. At the end of October 1948 Bevin agreed to the French plan for negotiations for a European Assembly, but initially he saw this as being no more than a permanent council of ministers of the Brussels pact countries. When, in December, the negotiating committee agreed upon the project of a ministerial Council of Europe open to all OEEC countries together with a European Consultative Assembly consisting of parliamentarians with rather vaguely defined tasks ('measures to improve understanding'), Bevin vetoed the idea of an autonomous parliamentary assembly. He did not withdraw his objection until the visit to London on 13 January 1949 of Robert Schuman, the new French foreign minister, who threatened that France would if necessary go ahead without Britain. After further detailed discussions the Statute of the Council of Europe, consisting of a Committee of Ministers and a Consultative Assembly, was promulgated in London on 5 May 1949.[22]

21 Timothy P. Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance. The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, London, 1981. For the changing concepts see also Joseph Stengers, 'Paul-Henri Spaak et le traité de Bruxelles de 1948', in Poidevin (ed.), *Débuts*, pp. 119–142.

22 Cf. Loth, *Sozialismus*, pp. 221–3, and Geoffrey Warner, 'Die britische Labour-Regierung und die Einheit Westeuropas 1949–1951', in *VfZG* 28 (1980), pp. 310–30. Text of Statute in *Documents on European Recovery and Defence, March 1947–April 1949*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London and New York, 1949, pp. 140 ff.

The first session of the Consultative Assembly, held in Strasburg from 10 August to 5 September 1949, brought further successes to the integrationists. Going beyond the vague and restrictive terms of the Statute, the first members of the European parliament – who were all prominent party representatives in their national assemblies – were able to establish a Standing Committee which could function between the brief sessions of the Assembly, thus greatly enhancing its political weight. A majority of the Assembly passed a resolution stating that the 'aim and goal' of the Council of Europe was to create 'a European political authority invested with limited functions but real powers'. The Standing Committee was instructed to examine the question of the political authority more closely and make preparations for a special session of the Assembly in January 1950. At the same time the Committee of Ministers was requested to enlarge the powers of the Assembly to a significant extent and to enable the Federal Republic of Germany to become a member before the next session. To make it easier for the Labour government to concur, the Socialists who were in favour of union sought to obtain a general recognition of Socialist objectives: unlike the Hague Congress, the Strasburg Assembly expressed by a majority its desire for European economic union with 'central planning combined with a maximum degree of individual liberty'. It also called for a serious examination of the Ruhr problem and that of the coordination of European basic industries.[23]

These demands and resolutions, however, proved to exceed what the Labour government was prepared to accept for the sake of Western consolidation. At the meeting of the Committee of Ministers on 3–5 November 1949 all the Assembly's desiderata for the widening of its powers under the Statute were rejected under British pressure (the Council's decisions required a unanimous vote). Other recommendations and suggestions, including that for a special session at an early date, were referred to official or inter-state bodies for examination, for which no time-limit was set. The only decision reached was to admit West Germany as an associate member, also the Saarland pending a final determination of its status (the French government wished to ensure its *de facto* autonomy for a long time to come). Thus the Council of Europe was prevented from becoming a constituent body, even before the commissions of the Consultative Assembly had properly begun their work. The parliamentarians at Strasburg who had hoped to induce the British to support European integration felt slighted and bitterly disappointed.[24]

At this point, if not earlier, the integrationist Europeans were confronted with a decision of the first importance. Should they continue to moderate their initiatives so that the British might go on cooperating, or should they go ahead and take substantial steps towards European union – in the hope that if these were a success Britain would after all join in, but also at the risk of driving the

23 Text of resolutions in Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly, First Ordinary Session, 10 Aug.–8 Sept. 1949, Documents (Working Papers), Nos. 73 and 71. On the course of the negotiations see Loth, *Sozialismus*, pp. 244–7.

24 Op. cit., p. 248.

British still further into isolation? This issue was a less acute one for liberal and conservative elements on the Continent: in their view, if the British did not want to join, the necessary steps to consolidate economic recovery and deal with the German problem would simply have to be taken without them. But the Socialists and other 'Third Force' adherents were in a quandary. If supranational solutions were not soon adopted, what was left of European independence would disappear in the general polarization of East and West. Without British participation, however, there was a risk of creating a conservative Europe, perhaps even dominated by a right-wing Germany, which would be equally unfavourable to the 'Third Force' idea. Yet there was no hope of combining supranationalism with British leadership. This dilemma brought about a tactical split within all parties in the Strasburg Assembly, and it is significant that two members of the same party – the French Socialists – were the spokesmen of the respective attitudes. Guy Mollet, the secretary-general of the party, represented the pro-British side, while André Philip, the party's expert on economic policy, spoke for the federalists.[25]

At the beginning of the second session of the Consultative Assembly (7–28 August and 18–24 November 1950), the federalist representatives moved a resolution calling on all members of the Council of Europe to 'conclude without delay a solemn agreement instituting a political authority' whose member states could 'by a majority decide on a common policy with regard to the protection of human rights, external relations, economic affairs and European security'. In addition, states that wished to establish closer organic links among themselves were urged to sign 'a Federal Pact instituting a democratically elected parliament and a Government responsible to the latter'.[26] Mollet, on the other hand, as rapporteur of the Political Committee, put forward a series of proposals which amounted to increasing the powers of the Council of Europe as far as could be done without infringing national sovereignty. These include the amalgamation of the OEEC, the Brussels treaty and the Council of Europe; the coordination of foreign policy by preliminary consultations; regional agreements among individual members of the Council of Europe; 'European departments' in the appropriate ministries of all member states and regular meetings of their departmental heads, and so on. Mollet also proposed that the Consultative Assembly should have power to draft laws that would come into force if approved by the Committee of Ministers, and that 'administrative departments' should be set up for different aspects of politics: in other words, the Council of Europe was to be equipped with quasi-legislative and quasi-executive institutions. Finally he advocated forms of supranational union among individual states for specific purposes, after the model of plans for the internationalization of basic European industries.

25 For this and the following passage cf. Loth, op. cit., pp. 248–50, 270–7; also ch. I, docs. 37 and 38.

26 Text of resolution in Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly, Ordinary Session 1950, Documents (Working Papers), No. 35 of 9 Aug. 1950.

At the end of August, after a lively debate, the Consultative Assembly rejected the Philip resolution by 68 votes to 19 with 7 abstentions, while Mollet's proposals secured a majority and were forwarded to national parliaments for approval. The decisive factor was the fear that the Council of Europe might collapse if federal plans went ahead without Britain. In the following weeks most of the national parliaments endorsed the Strasburg recommendations by large majorities, but the federalists, led by André Philip, conducted a spectacular campaign to enlist public support in Europe for the idea of a 'federal pact' and for the revision of the Assembly resolutions. This had little success, however. Opinion polls from time to time had indeed shown that a majority of West Europeans were in principle favourable towards federalism. But the national governments and decision-makers had at the same time been entrusted by their citizens with the defence of national interests that were often incompatible with the implications of a European federation, so that the hopes placed in a European *entente* and/or a 'Third Force' had no political weight to speak of. When the Assembly reconvened at the beginning of November it caused no surprise that Philip's proposals were again rejected.

However, Mollet's tactics of gradual evolution that had seemed so successful were also doomed to failure. On 13 November, contrary to an assurance given by J. Callaghan at Strasburg, the Labour majority in the Commons rejected Mollet's proposals despite their endorsement by the Council of Europe. After a majority of the Consultative Assembly had rejected the idea of a federal pact out of consideration for Britain's difficulties in accepting a supranational Europe, the evolutionary road via the Council of Europe was now likewise blocked. The European Left had to put up with the fact that Britain was not, or not yet, prepared to have anything to do with community institutions possessing supranational powers.

Adoption of the Schuman plan

The split among the French Socialists over tactics *vis-à-vis* Britain caused them to forfeit the leadership of the movement towards union. A way out of the deadlock now appeared in a quite different direction. On 9 May 1950 Robert Schuman, the French foreign minister, who had till then not been an especially prominent figure, made public a proposal for the creation of a European Coal and Steel Community.[27] The idea of the Schuman plan – to transfer to a supranational authority the responsibility for directing and coordinating basic European industries – had also been in the forefront of the Socialists' European policy since the autumn of 1948, when it became clear that their ideal of completely socializing the basic industries of Europe was not

27 Cf. F. Roy Willis, *France, Germany, and the New Europe, 1945–1967*, Stanford, 1968, pp. 80–129; Gilbert Ziebura, *Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen seit 1945. Mythen und Realitäten*, Pfullingen, 1970, pp. 50–6; Loth, *Sozialismus*, pp. 262–6. On the genesis of the ECSC see Loth, op. cit., pp. 172, 218 f., 241, and Milward, *Reconstruction*, pp. 362–96.

attainable in the foreseeable future. However, initiatives by Philip in the Council of Europe on the same lines as the Schuman plan had foundered owing to British resistance at the end of 1949, and a majority of the Socialists were not yet ready to go ahead without British participation. The decisive feature of Schuman's proposal was that he was prepared to risk a breach with Britain. By making it quite clear from the outset that the French government would insist on the Coal and Steel authority having supranational powers, he confronted the British with the alternative of joining in the next move towards union or refusing to do so.

Schuman was able to do this because either solution was compatible with the basic objectives of his party (the MRP), which was not the case with the Socialists. Schuman and Jean Monnet, the head of the government's planning department and the real initiator of the plan, were chiefly concerned to prevent a collapse of the movement towards unity, which would lead to West Germany dominating the Continent; they also hoped that European union would enable France to play a leading part in world affairs, independent of the US. To improve France's competitive position, French industrialists would be exposed to direct pressure from abroad and would have to give up their traditional conservatism and lack of enterprise. French access to coal supplies from the Ruhr would be ensured beyond the period of Allied control over West Germany, the end of which was already in sight, and German domination of the coal and steel industry would thus be prevented. While the Schuman plan was partly inspired by the 'Third Force' idea, it was not linked with the hope of a socialist order in Europe; on the contrary, Monnet's idea of a prosperous autonomous Europe involved a regime of liberal capitalism within a framework of state control on Keynesian lines. A European community without Britain, i.e. based on a Paris–Bonn axis, was much more acceptable on these premisses than in a Europe such as the Socialists aspired to. If the British did after all join in, they would provide the best defence against German predominance. If they did not, France would still be better protected than in a free-for-all situation without supranational control, and she might even become the political leader of a united Europe. In either case, Europe's position *vis-à-vis* the US would be significantly strengthened.[28]

Lest he should be suspected by Continental left-wingers of pursuing a deliberately anti-British line, Monnet visited London five days after Schuman's announcement and attempted to persuade the British government to agree to the plan. As expected, however, the British jibbed at the supranational principle. On 2 June they returned a firm refusal, while the governments of France, Italy, the Benelux countries and Federal Germany declared in a joint communiqué their intention of negotiating a Coal and Steel union on the lines of the Schuman plan. The French Socialists tried to induce the British to change their minds at an international socialist conference in London, but were again unsuccessful: the Labour leaders made it unmistakably clear that, while they

28 Monnet's memorandum of 5 May 1950, published in *Le Monde* on 9 May 1970, is illuminating as regards the interpretation of the Schuman plan.

had nothing against closer union among Continental countries, they themselves would 'never' take part in a supranational system. Accordingly the French Socialists had no choice but to back the Schuman plan, which they did with a heavy heart. The plan had thus cleared its first major hurdle, and it was evident that a 'united Europe' in the narrower sense could for the time being only come into existence as a 'Europe of the Six', without Britain.

Purpose and arrangement of the present volume

The selected documents in this volume illustrate the attitude adopted during these years of decision by those engaged in European politics, either as active agents or in so far as the process affected them. An outline is given of the European debate in the six countries that came together in 1950 and also in those which later joined the European Community.[29] One purpose of the analysis is to indicate why some countries joined in the process of unification sooner and others later. It will also be seen why the integration of Europe was so closely interwoven with the origins of 'Western union' in postwar politics; why, and in what sense, supranational functionalism became the preferred form of integration; and how the Franco-German alliance came to be at the centre of the integrating process.

However, in addition to tracing the origins of the present European Community, the documentation is intended to illustrate other trends towards integration which remained without effect or did not come wholly into play. These are also relevant to a correct assessment of the situations and decisions that occurred and the factors that determined the course of European integration.

In reconstructing the process of decision, while especial attention has been given to pro-European forces, account is also taken of contrary opinions with which the advocates of union were obliged to grapple. Care is taken to distinguish between the positions of different pro-integrationists with their respective motives, strategies, reactions and assessments of the situation. In addition to illustrating the significance of the chief actors and events that gave an impulse to the process of unification, the work attempts to throw light on the contradiction between the enthusiasm for a united Europe that prevailed in some quarters and the slowness of the actual advance; it also endeavours to make clear the achievements and failures of the different attempts towards integration.

The documents include statements by pro-European groups and associations, the reactions of statesmen and political parties, and contributions by prominent or original writers to the debate on unification and the future of

29 It was not possible to include Spain and Portugal in the survey. Preparations for the present volume were largely completed before the admission of these two countries to the European Community was decided upon; and in any case the omission is justified on practical grounds, as they were scarcely involved in the debate on Europe during the period under review.

Europe. The material is arranged in separate chapters by countries so as to elucidate the background to the national discussion and the development of opinion in each case. To emphasize the continuity of the process, the documents for each country are in chronological order. Introductions to each chapter set the scene and assess the importance of the forces and arguments at work. The selected texts and brief notes on each of them provide an outline of the European situation in the first five years after the war – partly in illustration of conditions that have already been studied in detail by historians, but more often as a first sketch of phenomena whose interrelation has not previously been brought to light.

As in the previous volumes of this edition,[30] the documents are numbered in a single series. A sub-heading in each case indicates the source and the place of publication, and draws attention to any existing translations. The notes are confined to factual information and references; a bibliography to each chapter comprises a list of archival and other sources, monographs and studies. As with the previous volumes, all the texts are given in English; the original documents are supplied in microfiche form for the benefit of any scholars who may require them for the purpose of special studies.

30 Cf. *Doc. Eur. Integr.*, vol. 1, pp. 32 f.

I. French Political Parties and Pressure Groups in the Discussion on European Union

WILFRIED LOTH

Introduction

In France at the end of the Second World War there were many strong reasons for departing from a foreign policy conceived entirely in terms of national interest and security, and adopting instead a policy of European integration.[1] France had just been subjected to aggression provoked by no warlike or imperialist ambitions of her own, and her resources had proved insufficient to defeat the enemy. It was natural therefore to conclude that true security could only be hoped for from a collective organization in which democratic states would combine their strength to safeguard a peace based on law. The measures against Germany that France had secured, to some extent at least, in the treaty of Versailles had been ineffective and had fostered a spirit of revanchism which in the end proved strong enough to overthrow the whole balance of power in Europe. In 1945 it was realized that the necessary measures of control of defeated Germany must be combined with a promise of future equality of rights in a joint organization for peace, so as to prevent, as far as possible, a new spirit of German revanchism developing at the outset. Another consideration was that the scale of industrial production had long exceeded the limits of the nation-state, and the economies of the developed countries were so interwoven that, as the world slump had shown, they were no longer really able to act independently in economic matters. Here too the lesson was that collective structures and institutions were necessary, whether they were regarded (by some) as a condition of the proper working of the liberal-capitalist system or (by others) as the means of transforming it by a socialist revolution.

These factors gave a strong impulse to the movement in favour of collective European institutions with supranational powers in particular fields. Even after the First World War this movement had played an important part in French public opinion, which was basically dominated by 'internationalist'

1 For a full study of the problems outlined below see Wilfried Loth, 'Die europäische Integration nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg in französischer Perspektive', in Helmut Berding (ed.), *Wirtschaftliche Integration im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Göttingen, 1984, pp. 225–246.

ideas from the time of the electoral victory of the *cartel des gauches* in 1924 – although such ideas proved powerless against German expansionism, and their advocates differed on many strategic and tactical issues.[2] As the Second World War presented the problems in acuter form, and the experience of Nazi rule in Europe showed the extent of the danger to which freedom was exposed by nationalism and etatism, ideas on foreign policy were more and more characterized by the rejection of a strictly national viewpoint. Wherever France's future international role was discussed, whether by members of the Resistance or by experts in exile, the answers invariably aimed at transcending the nation-state; and, oftener at least than ever before, stress was laid on the need for partial relinquishment of sovereignty in favour of supranational institutions of a federal kind. Only the Communist resistance leaders firmly opposed the idea of communities transcending national limits; elsewhere there was some residual distrust of supranationalism, but scarcely anyone seriously contested the need for close cooperation, at least, with France's neighbours.[3]

At the same time, plans for integration and federation were confronted by serious obstacles. The new world powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, exercised a strong influence over plans for the security and welfare of Europe – and it was in Europe, if anywhere, that ideas of federal union offered any prospect of success, given the homogeneity of the nations in question and the similarity of their problems. On the other hand, regional unions confined to Europe were no longer adequate to solve current problems; they might even intensify them, if they had the effect of fostering the latent rivalry between the world powers instead of helping to reconcile them. Secondly, owing to the many humiliations of national pride that the French had suffered at Germany's hands in the course of a generation, the rise of internationalism was accompanied by a desire for reinforcement of the sense of national identity, so that the restoration of French *grandeur* exercised a powerful fascination which ignored the facts and requirements of political realism. Finally, the fate of the Weimar Republic and the gradually widening knowledge of Nazi atrocities dealt a heavy blow to the belief that it was possible to cure the Germans of their taste for aggression. Hence the idea of integrating Germany in a collective security organization, necessary though it seemed in order to prevent revanchism, at the same time aroused almost insuperable misgivings.

The objective difficulties that confronted initiatives towards unity, and the conflicting impulses working on French minds, led to contradictory reactions.

2 For an introduction see Raymond Poidevin and Jacques Bariéty, *Les relations franco-allemandes 1815–1975*, Paris, 1977, pp. 223 ff.

3 Henri Michel, *Les courants de pensée de la Résistance*, Paris, 1962; W. Loth, 'Les projets de politique extérieure de la Résistance socialiste en France', in *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 24 (1977), pp. 544–69; Walter Lipgens, 'Ideas of the French Resistance on Future Foreign Policy', in *Doc. Eur. Integr.*, vol. 1, pp. 264–361; Pierre Guillen, 'Plans by Exiles from France', in *Doc. Eur. Integr.*, vol. 2, pp. 279–352.

On the one hand there were clear majorities in favour of the adoption of federalist principles. Thus, in the first months after the liberation, the principle of supranational federation was proclaimed in the programmes of the Socialist party (SFIO), the Christian Democrats (MRP) and the liberals *(Radicaux).* The Consultative Assembly, at the end of its first foreign policy debate on 22 November 1944, unanimously adopted a resolution calling on the government to 'prepare the way for an international organization that will lead the community of states towards a federation of free peoples, so that there shall be no danger of regional arrangements among them leading to the formation of hostile blocs.' On 27 March 1945, after a debate on the new United Nations organization, the Assembly resolved, again unanimously, 'that a lasting peace requires the establishment of an international body with judicial authority, superior to nation states and largely independent of them'. In the discussion on the constitution of the Fourth Republic on 11 April 1946 the deputies adopted an article stating that 'provided there is reciprocity, France agrees to the limitation of its sovereignty so far as may be necessary for the organization and defence of peace' (Art. 46).[4] In summer 1945 a public opinion poll registered 73% agreement that Europe should become a federation of states in which 'all matters of common interest (industry, agriculture, communications, continental defence etc.)' would be administered by a 'democratically elected "Federal government" '; only 17% of those consulted answered 'No', while 10% expressed no opinion.[5]

As against this, impressive majorities supported the foreign policy of General de Gaulle, President of the Provisional Government, which, whatever its long-term aims, concentrated in the first instance on destroying the unity of the German state, exploiting German economic potential and establishing France on the Rhine and in the Ruhr district. Likewise in the summer of 1945, 78% of the French people were in favour of partitioning Germany rather than leaving it as a unitary state; only 12% took the opposite view, while again there were 10% of 'don't knows'.[6] Only a small minority favoured embarking on European federation without first obtaining the agreement of the two superpowers; on the other hand, a broad majority evidently believed that the creation of federal institutions could in some way be combined with traditional methods of coercion *vis-à-vis* the defeated enemy.[7]

4 *Journal Official de la République Française,* Assemblée Consultative Provisoire, Débats 22. 11. 1944, p. 350, and 27. 3. 1945, p. 786; Assemblée Constituante, 11. 4. 1946, p. 1728. For the first party programmes see below, docs. 1 and 2 and introduction to doc. 7.

5 *Sondages,* No. 17, July 1945. Cited, with numerous other expressions of 'internationalist' opinion, in Walter Lipgens, 'Innerfranzösische Kritik der Aussenpolitik de Gaulles 1944–46', in *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte* (VfZG) 24 (1976), pp. 136–98; also W. Lipgens, 'European Union in Public Opinion Polls', in *Doc. Eur. Integr.,* vol. 4 (forthcoming).

6 *Bulletin d'Informations de l'I.F.O.P.,* 1–16 Sept. 1945, p. 173.

7 On this contradiction cf. W. Loth, 'Die Franzosen und die deutsche Frage 1945–1949', in Claus Scharf and Hans-Jürgen Schröder (eds.), *Die Deutschlandpo-*

In practice, therefore, during the first two years after the war France's dominant objective was to obtain security guarantees of the traditional kind against a resurgent Germany. The trend of world politics was further and further away from federalism, and this caused a good deal of resignation and helplessness. De Gaulle's nationalist gospel increased the general hankering for a revival of France's role as a great power, while federalist plans were further discouraged by de Gaulle's alliance with the Communists, whose cooperation he needed for the work of national reconstruction.[8] In these circumstances the only attempt at a move towards federalism in contrast to the polarization of world politics – viz. the plan for a West European association centred on Britain and France, which was supposed to allay Soviet fears of the 'capitalist camp'[9] – was frustrated by France's endeavours to assert her great-power status *vis-à-vis* Britain. De Gaulle was only prepared to associate with the British if they would first help to strengthen France by limiting German potential and exploiting German resources, and he was strong enough, failing such aid, to ensure that the negotiations for a Franco-British alliance came to nothing.[10]

De Gaulle's resignation from the presidency in January 1946 at first brought about no substantial change. There were increasing doubts whether French strength could really be based on keeping Germany divided and exploiting her economically, but the 'maximum policy' *vis-à-vis* Germany, which had prevented the beginnings of a West European association, became more and more of a necessity in terms of French internal politics. The Christian Democrats (MRP), whose representative, Georges Bidault, was Foreign Minister in the first postwar governments, did not dare to abandon that policy for fear of losing their influence with de Gaulle;[11] while the Socialists (SFIO) were careful not to press their objection to it because to do so would have wrecked their coalition with the Christian Democrats and Communists, which offered them the best chance of influencing events.[12] Meanwhile the chances of East-West understanding were becoming increasingly dim. Léon Blum, the Socialist leader, who headed a brief transitional government at the beginning of 1947, was able to pursue the British alliance without insisting on support for France's demands *vis-à-vis* Germany; but the Dunkirk treaty

litik Frankreichs und die Französische Zone 1945–1949, Wiesbaden, 1983, pp. 23–44. The sharp distinction drawn in earlier literature between 'nationalist' and 'internationalist' attitudes is therefore misleading.

8 Cf. Anton William DePorte, *De Gaulle's Foreign Policy 1944–1946*, Cambridge, Mass., 1968; W. Lipgens, 'Bedingungen und Etappen der Aussenpolitik de Gaulles 1944–1946', in *VfZG* 21 (1973), pp. 52–102; W. Loth, *Sozialismus und Internationalismus. Die französischen Sozialisten und die Nachkriegsordnung Europas 1940–1950*, Stuttgart, 1977, pp. 52–9 and 86–97.

9 Cf. doc. 5 below.

10 Cf. Loth, *Sozialismus* (n. 8), pp. 79–86 and 89 f.

11 See Reinhard Schreiner, *Bidault, der MRP und die französische Deutschlandpolitik 1944–1948* (thesis), Trier, 1981.

12 Loth, *Sozialismus*, pp. 93–5.

which was signed on 4 March 1947 came much too late to have an assuaging effect on world politics.[13]

The federalist tendencies in French public opinion and government policy did not become effective until later in 1947, when the 'cold war' came to a head. Federalism was given a concrete frame of reference by the Marshall Plan, which made US economic aid conditional on a measure of integration among the participants. The occasion was seized all the more readily as the brusque Soviet rejection of the Plan facilitated the decision to confine efforts at unification to Western Europe for the time being. At the same time French hopes of playing an independent role as a great power gave way to a realization of the need for an alliance with the US, whose economic help was widely recognized to be essential, and a policy of securing, within that alliance, the maximum degree of autonomy and of security *vis-à-vis* Germany. Since in the nature of things both aims could best be attained through West European community structures, the idea of unification now attracted supporters who had previously held fast to traditional nationalism. Furthermore the Communists had left the government in May 1947 and in October ceased, in accordance with the new Cominform policy, to form an element in the national consensus; hence there was no longer a decisive barrier in terms of internal politics to a policy of West European integration.[14]

As a result of these evolutions of ideas and shifts of power, the union of Western Europe, including the Western Zones of Germany, came to be regarded as a primary objective by the great majority of French political forces, except for a 'traditional' right-wing minority and the Communist ghetto on the left. In the preliminary discussions on the US offer of aid in July 1947 the Socialist government under Paul Ramadier already put forward a plan for a European customs union. In December his Christian Democrat successor, Robert Schuman, reached an agreement with the British which resulted in the conclusion of the Brussels treaty of March 1948 as the nucleus of a 'Western Union'; and in the following August the Radical government of André Marie adopted the plan for a European Assembly to debate the possibility of a united Europe.[15] The extent to which the idea of West European union had gained ground was shown when, on 11 March 1948, the National Assembly adopted an *ordre du jour* by 419 votes to 183 (only the Communists opposing) which called for the 'integration of a federated Germany into a European union'.[16]

13 Ibid., pp. 118–27.

14 Cf. W. Loth, 'The West European Governments and the Impulse given by the Marshall Plan', in W. Lipgens, *A History of European Integration*, vol. 1, Oxford, 1982, pp. 488–507; id., 'Die Franzosen und die deutsche Frage' (n. 7), pp. 40–43.

15 Alan S. Milward, 'The Committee of European Economic Cooperation (CEEC) and the Advent of the Customs Union', in Lipgens, *History* (n. 14), pp. 507–69; Loth, *Sozialismus*, pp. 178 and 211 f.

16 *Journal Officiel*, 11. 3. 1948, p. 1665. As one of many examples of conversion to the idea of West European integration may be cited an observation by Jean Monnet, who as *Commissaire général au Plan* was a key figure in the French national bureaucracy. On 18 April 1948 he wrote from Washington to Prime Minister Robert

As public opinion came to adopt the idea of West European union, the various federalist groups which had hitherto led only a marginal existence drew considerable encouragement, as well as competition, from the ranks of the parties and established politicians. Committed groups had formed the Union Européenne des Fédéralistes (UEF) as early as the end of 1946, and the Conseil français pour l'Europe unie, founded in July 1947, included public personalities of note. At about the same time economic experts who possessed long-standing contacts with Brussels, London and Luxemburg set up the Ligue Européenne de Coopération Économique; European-minded Christian Democrats joined with colleagues in the neighbouring countries to form the Nouvelles Équipes Internationales; internationally-minded French Socialists took the lead in forming the Mouvement Socialiste pour les États-Unis d'Europe; and a group of Deputies founded the Groupe Fédéraliste du Parlement. In the course of 1948 all these bodies acquired a clearly representative character, and by the end of the year – concurrently with the formation of the international European Movement – they combined to form the Conseil français du Mouvement Européen, which, as an umbrella organization, did much to coordinate and strengthen the various integrationist movements in France.[17]

The broad agreement which thus prevailed as to the desirability of West European union concealed a variety of problems, some of which remained controversial, while others were not clearly envisaged but in any case required further decisions.

In the first place, it was not clear whether union should consist of a more or less close association of independent states or should have a supranational dimension. Many statesmen never clarified their own ideas on this point,[18] while others were only convinced in course of time that there was a need for common institutions with independent powers. Others again favoured a

Schuman: 'Everything I have seen and reflected on here leads me to a conclusion which is now my profound conviction: that to tackle the present situation, to face the dangers that threaten us, and to match the American effort, the countries of Western Europe must turn their national efforts into a truly European effort. This will be possible only through a *federation* of the West. I realize all the difficulties, but I believe that only by such an effort can we save ourselves without ceasing to be what we are, and also make a real contribution to preventing war.' Archives Jean Monnet, Lausanne, 22/1; cited in part in Jean Monnet, *Mémoires,* Paris, 1976, p. 323; tr. *Memoirs,* London, 1978, pp. 272–3.

17 The honorary president was Édouard Herriot; the president, Raoul Dautry; vice-presidents Paul Bastid (Radical), Paul Ramadier (SFIO), Paul Reynaud (Independent), Pierre-Henri Teitgen (MRP), and André Siegfried. The *Délegué général* in charge of actual management was René Courtin, a liberal professor of economics who had been a prime mover of the *Conseil français pour l'Europe unie.* For record of the meeting of 21. 12. 1948, Courtin's circular of 14. 1. 1949, and membership list of 1. 12. 1949 see Archives of the European Movement, Bruges. On the founding of the associations see Lipgens, *History* (n. 14), pp. 334–41, 361–85, 600–5 and 623–8; also docs. 16, 19, 24 and 28 below.

18 For instance de Gaulle: cf. docs. 11, 24 and 35.

supranational solution but refrained from pressing it for fear that Britain and the Scandinavian countries, which showed clear repugnance to the idea, might otherwise refuse from the outset to take part in West European integration. Most of the foreign policy experts in what were now the 'pro-European' parties adopted a negative attitude when, in the spring of 1948, parliamentarians belonging to the inter-party 'groupe fédéraliste' called for the convocation of a European Constituent Assembly.[19] However, in November 1949, after the first session of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, the SFIO, the MRP and the Radicals agreed on a resolution expressing the hope that 'a genuine European political authority may be defined and set up as soon as possible'.[20] In April 1950 the Conseil du Mouvement Européen expressed itself in the same sense,[21] thus showing once again that in this phase of France's postwar development (1949–50) there was a clear majority for the creation of supranational West European institutions.

Another point that required definition was that of the role of a united Europe in the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. In 1947 the majority of pro-European forces wanted the continent to become a 'Third Force' which could mediate in the conflict between the two world powers; others saw Europe as a bulwark against Soviet expansion, while some hoped that it could become both a mediator and a defensive force.[22] After the Soviet camp adopted the Cominform policy of ideological warfare, and especially after the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, the desire for closer association with the US became even more significant than that for European union. Some of the 'Western' forces, as they now styled themselves, hoped that a unified Europe might be able to preserve a certain degree of independence within the Western camp; a minority, on the other hand, interpreted the concept of the 'Third Force' in a neutralistic sense.[23]

The subject on which there was least meeting of minds was the role of West Germany in the future European union. Objectively the purpose of integrating the Germans in a European community was to put an end to discrimination while ensuring control over German recovery; subjectively, most Frenchmen hoped to use integration as a means of keeping the Germans in an inferior position for an indefinite time. At first only a few perceived the contradiction between these aims; only with hesitation did the majority come to accept the idea of creating a West German state, and subsequently that of allowing the newly-formed Federal Republic to join the Council of Europe.[24] The obstacles that still stood in the way of an acknowledgment of equal rights became fully evident after the outbreak of the Korean war in summer 1950, when the

19 See doc. 16.
20 *Journal Officiel*, 25. 11. 1949, pp. 6348 f.; adopted by 325 votes to 249.
21 Cf. doc. 36.
22 Cf. docs. 7–13.
23 Cf. doc. 23.
24 Cf. docs. 7, 12, 14, 17, 20 and 29; in more detail Loth, 'Die Franzosen und die deutsche Frage' (n. 7).

problem of a West German defence contribution became acute. The most that the French government at first thought it possible to obtain from the Assembly was the 'Pleven plan' of 24 October 1950, providing for a German auxiliary force under a multinational general staff which would be dominated by France.[25]

Finally, it was a matter of dispute whether, and at what stage, to go ahead with federation even if Britain was not prepared to join in. De Gaulle for his part adopted an extremely reserved attitude, being sceptical of British intentions and inwardly hoping for French leadership of a united Europe. Most of the other French statesmen who favoured unity thought British participation essential for the purpose of giving substance to the federation and counterbalancing German influence. However, after the first session of the Strasburg Assembly, and more emphatically after the Schuman Plan for a European Coal and Steel Community was broached in May 1950, the British made it clear that they were not prepared to reconsider their aversion to federal solutions. In these circumstances the more conservative or liberal-minded Europeanists found it much easier to reconcile themselves to a union without Britain than did the advocates of a socialist Europe, who since the end of the war had looked to the British Labour Government as the leading power in a European 'Third force'. Deterred by the lack of British support, the Europeanists of the Left lost the initiative to the liberal-technocratic branch of the movement, and the majority for a European political authority was thus jeopardized. In the second half of 1950 there was no longer a majority in France for the attempt to create such an authority by means of the Council of Europe.[26]

To sum up, the evolution of French policy from the universalistic peace hopes of the war period to the beginnings of a functional union of the 'Six' in the Coal and Steel Community and afterwards in the European Economic Community was self-consistent but far from direct: it was a time of painful lessons, bold decisions and understandable hesitation. As the documents in this Chapter show in detail, the motives which supported the movement for a West European community with independent powers were extremely varied. In combination they were strong enough, at the turn of the decade around 1950, to give a lasting impulse to the creation of a supranational Europe; but in the long run they were not strong and homogeneous enough to maintain themselves unscathed against traditional nationalistic ways of thinking.

1. Socialist Party (SFIO): Manifesto — 12 Nov. 1944

'Le Parti Socialiste au Peuple de France', final resolution of the Extraordinary National Congress of the SFIO, 9–12. 11. 1944, published in *Le Populaire*, 14. 11. 1944; Italian tr. in *L'Unità Europea*, No. 7, Nov.–Dec. 1944. The section on foreign policy is here given in full.

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25 Cf. Loth, *Sozialismus* (n. 8), pp. 277–86.
26 Docs. 24, 25, 37 and 38.

The process of reconstitution and reconstruction of the SFIO in the Resistance and during the liberation period from the summer of 1944 onwards was marked, more strongly than in the case of any other political group, by the abandonment of nationalistic modes of thought and a deeper commitment to the idea of a supranational community. Both Léon Blum's basic text A l'échelle humaine, *written as early as 1941, and the first policy statements of the Comité d'Action Socialiste in 1943 – at that time an underground association of leading SFIO politicians – called for a 'strong international organization' and a 'superstate to which nations must yield part of their sovereignty'.[1] On 27 August 1944, two days after the liberation of Paris, the party newspaper* Le Populaire *began to publish a series of articles by Charles Dumas advocating a world federation composed of continental sub-federations.[2] Daniel Mayer, the party's general secretary, gave a central place to the federal idea in his address to the Extraordinary Party Congress held from 9 to 12 November 1944 in the Palais de la Mutualité in Paris.[3] The Congress adopted his views, though with some uncertainty as regards the geographical limits of the proposed federations and the means of integrating a defeated Germany.[4]*

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Peace through international democracy

Social democracy, which begins at the national level, can only be fully realized by means of a lasting peace and international democracy.

Faithful to its traditional policy, the Socialist Party declares that the condition for a just, lasting and prosperous peace consists in the political and economic cooperation of all free peoples, that is to say a world organization for collective security founded in justice. This organization must not be placed under the hegemony of one or more great powers, but must be a federation of free nations each of which must yield part of its sovereignty to a higher organization with its own authority, possessing a budget and an army sufficient to ensure the security of all.

This political organization must be supplemented by an economic and social organization with international agencies responsible for raw materials, labour, credit, transport, reconstruction etc.

1 Programme of the C.A.S., Northern Zone, in *Le Populaire,* No. 16 (Édition Zone Nord), 16 Jan.–1 Feb. 1943, most recently repr. in Lipgens, 'Ideas of the French Resistance', in *Doc. Eur. Integr.,* vol. 1, doc. 85; other texts ibid., docs. 78, 89, 100. – Cf. Wilfried Loth, *Sozialismus und Internationalismus. Die französischen Sozialisten und die Nachkriegsordnung Europas 1940–1950,* Stuttgart, 1977, pp. 23–44; id., 'Les projets de politique extérieure de la Résistance socialiste en France', in *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 24 (1977), pp. 544–69.

2 Charles Dumas, 'La France dans le monde', *Le Populaire,* 27. 8. 1944; 'Paix et démocratie', ibid., 28. 8. 1944; 'L'organisation de la paix', ibid., 29. 8. 1944; 'Politique extérieure', ibid., 1. 9. 1944; 'La construction de la paix', ibid., 3 and 4. 11. 1944.

3 Verbatim record in the Secrétariat National du Parti Socialiste, Paris, pp. 21–93.

4 Cf. Loth, *Sozialismus,* pp. 48–52.

Tomorrow's Germany

Only within this framework can effective measures be taken to permit the future integration of Germany, reformed in its structure and mentality, into the civilized community from which it has been cut off by Nazi barbarism.

Germany, purged of its Nazi institutions, must be wholly occupied by the Allies and completely disarmed. Its heavy industry must be socialized and managed by the nations of Europe; big estates must be partitioned, the administration decentralized and war criminals punished; education and the press must be transformed and controlled, in the hope that one day democratic elements and the working masses will themselves turn Germany into a humane and peaceful nation. But the Socialist Party feels obliged to call attention to the dangers of nationalist revanchism that would result from any dismemberment of Germany and any annexation of specifically German territory.

2. Radical Party: foreign policy motion — 21 Dec. 1944

Republican Radical and Radical-Socialist Party, Petit Congrès, 19–21. 12. 1944, verbatim record (in Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, Paris), pp. 472–5 (slightly abridged).

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The Radicals, the party of French liberalism, had long been characterized by a straightforward sense of patriotism which could sometimes turn to nationalism, and by a no less basic internationalism, which found its most consistent expression in the advocacy of a collective security organization. The party included representatives of the first tendency such as Georges Clemenceau, and of the second such as Joseph Caillaux; commoner still among its members were such statesmen as Edouard Herriot, who obeyed first one principle and then the other, so that in practice they often took up self-contradictory positions.[1] When the party was reconstituted after the Liberation this ambivalence showed itself in the combination of traditional demands for security against Germany with the vote for a supranational peacekeeping organization.[2] Party members were inclined to be sceptical or downright hostile to the idea of European federation, in some cases for fear of creating a Western and an Eastern bloc[3] but in other cases because they wanted closer relations between Western Europe and the US.[4] All, however, were in favour of lowering trade barriers, including those between European countries.

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1 Cf. references in Francis O'Neill, *The French Radical Party and European Integration*, Farnborough, Hants, 1981, pp. 9–15.

2 The resolution on the occasion of the party's re-formation was moved by Paul Bastid, a former minister who had been a close collaborator of party chairman Herriot and who exercised a lasting influence on the party's official European policy.

3 For instance, Herriot as late as the autumn of 1947 opposed the formation of blocs as a consequence of the Marshall Plan: cf. O'Neill, op. cit., p. 17.

(...) On the strength of her sacrifices, France is entitled to expect that the United Nations, solidary in peace as they have been in war, will take strong and decisive measures to restore violated rights and prevent another world conflagration of which France would again be the chief victim. (...)

Justice demands that Germany, completely disarmed and deprived of her power to injure others, be sentenced to restore all she has gained by violence and to repair, to the utmost limit of her resources, the enormous damage she has inflicted on humanity. Justice also requires that frontiers, especially that of the Rhine, which is the frontier of European peace itself, should be protected once and for all by new and decisive measures against any revival of warlike aims and any future risk of invasion.

The party welcomes the inception of these new measures in the Franco-Soviet treaty of alliance, which provides for the first time that, in the event of any future move that might make possible a fresh attempt at aggression, France and the Soviet Union would automatically act in concert to prevent it. But this of course is only a first stage. Only an appropriate international authority, to which all the United Nations should belong from the outset, can prevent future wars – it cannot be done by an artificial balance of alliances, that is to say by forming rival or hostile blocs.

But this new League of Nations, designed to make a reality of collective security, a cause which France has always championed, must not be a league of governments, an assembly of sovereign states based on a federation of peoples. It must possess institutions capable of preparing and if necessary imposing the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

Force must be used to serve justice, and to serve nothing else. The Radical Socialist party recalls with pride that after the victory of 1918, associated with the great name of Clemenceau, another of its leaders, Léon Bourgeois, pleaded, though in vain, at the peace conference for an international armed force that would keep order among nations.

Profoundly convinced that peace is indivisible, the party proclaims more emphatically than ever the need to put an end to world anarchy and to protect effectively, in accordance with democratic law, the security of the whole community against the criminal purposes of a single nation or group of nations.

The Radical Socialist party reminds one and all that the war is still going on and that the enemy is still strong enough to counter-attack. It urges the government and people to lose no time in mobilizing the whole of the nation's energy so as to bring the hour of victory nearer.

4 For instance Bastid, during the Resistance period, already used this argument against plans for federation on a European scale: cf. Lipgens, 'French Resistance' in *Doc. Eur. Integr.*, vol. 1, doc. 88.

3. Michel Collinet: 'Europe and its future' May 1945

'L'Europe et son avenir', *Esprit*, vol. 13/6 (= No. 110), May 1945, pp. 773–88; extracts in *Cahier de la Fédération Européenne* No. 2, August 1945, pp. 30–2; passages here from pp. 773, 782–6, 788.

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During the immediate postwar period most of those favouring integration shrank from taking initiatives which might split the European continent and thus stand in the way of peace-keeping on a worldwide basis. However, among democratic socialists and left-wing Catholics there were also those who balanced the need for federal solutions in Western Europe against the difficulties of achieving a world security organization, and concluded that it was wiser to concentrate on the former. In may 1945, in a special number of Esprit *devoted to European problems, Michel Collinet explained the reasons that led him to support federal initiatives in Europe.*[1]

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(...) A true democratic world federation of united nations would require that each state should be responsible for the direction of international affairs in proportion to its population, and in return should sacrifice a large measure of its sovereign rights, especially in political and economic matters. Even today, this is a utopian ideal. It would only make sense if the political development of each nation converged with that of others so as to bring about a sufficient similarity of social systems. (...)

There is a new link among our countries which, while purely affective in character, is none the less very strong. It derives from the sufferings of a common martyrdom: among the French, Dutch and Yugoslav resistance movements there is a greater community of mind and heart than could ever have been conceived in peace-time. The demarcation line between love and hate no longer knows any national frontiers: it runs through each country and applies one marvellously simple criterion: were you for or against the Nazi murderers? Hence we have a bond of the kind that nations have had so much trouble in forging as a basis for their own existence, and a unique historical opportunity to use it to establish a community commensurate with the forces of the modern world, which we shall call the United States of Europe. (...)

A capitalist Europe can only be revived if German heavy industry is helped to its feet by the Allies. We know there is talk of 'internationalizing' that industry, but so far we have heard no details of its future organization. Behind governmental façades the same Anglo-American trusts, linked to their oppo-

1 Cf. Lipgens, 'Innerfranzösische Kritik', pp. 167 f.; similar expressions of view, ibid., pp. 172 f. – In Aug. 1945 Collinet rebutted the charge that European union might be a danger to the USSR, but did not explain how the Soviet leaders could be brought to accept his view: Michel Collinet, 'Pour une union démocratique européenne', in *Cahier de la Fédération Européenne* No. 2, Aug. 1945, p. 6. For the development of the European idea in the Christian Democratic party (MRP) cf. below, docs. 7, 17 and 31.

site numbers in Germany, may well reappear despite the indignant protest of the US Department of Justice. It is even possible that some may envisage the Atlantic bloc as a façade for this integration of German and American capitalism.

If so, and whether we are talking of a unified capitalist Europe or an Atlantic bloc, it must be repeated that, having passed through all the stages of decomposition of the capitalist economy, we in Europe shall once more become a battle-ground between two hostile economic systems.

Most European countries are, in varying degrees, in a transitional phase between capitalism and socialism. The old system can only be revived by massive aid from outside, and the new one is in a state of helpless infancy owing to the physical and moral destitution of the working masses. Any attempt to build a system in a single country is doomed to failure. France, surrounded by capitalist states, could not create a socialist economy, and still less could any other European country. But it should be the duty of a democratic France, taking seriously the interim programme of the Conseil National de la Résistance, to propose to other states, as their liberation progresses, the creation of a European New Deal for the prevention of starvation and unemployment, the restoration of transport and the distribution of credit. By means of such concrete measures designed to rescue the peoples of Europe, it should be possible to throw a bridge over the abyss of desolation into which they have been cast. France today is in a wretched state, but that is no reason why she should not try to promote a democratic order from which famine and fascism are excluded once and for all.

The boundaries of Europe

Not all the nations of Europe are specifically European. Some, like France, have great colonial empires; others, like Britain and the USSR, have links with distant territories. We must reject as senseless any idea of a closed, self-sufficient Europe, a kind of beleaguered fortress *à la* Goebbels. The colonial empires, whether subject to the metropolis or federated with it, can be naturally integrated into a Europe which will thereby become an organized portion of a future world federation. The problem, on the other hand, is more difficult for Britain and the Soviet Union.

Britain has a foot in Europe, but also in the Commonwealth of United Nations *[sic]*. The complete integration of Britain in a federal Europe would threaten to cut her off from the Dominions. (...) Thus, by tradition as well as present necessity, Britain might play a political part in close association with a European federation, without becoming an integral part of it.

Much the same would appear to be true of the USSR, which is itself a federation of states, but whose federal structure is counter-balanced by the centralism of the Communist Party and by the trials endured with such heroism during the war. (...) The integration of the Soviet Union in Europe would make no sense. We must think in terms of fusion on a broadly equal basis, which would involve coordinating the European economy with the collectivized Soviet economy and extending the state monopoly of foreign trade to the

whole area thus formed. This may well take a long time to achieve, unless – which is unlikely – the Soviet Union were to evolve towards a mixed economy and federal Europe, at the same time, towards state collectivism. On the other hand, very close links can be forged in the economic and moral sphere and by means of security pacts like those the Soviet Union has concluded with Britain, France, Czechoslovakia and so on.

The German problem

We have so far said nothing of the German problem as it will present itself when the armed forces of the Reich have been completely destroyed. The solution of this problem, the gravest and most unprecedented in history, is a basic condition of the success or failure of any attempt at European federation. What we must strive for is the possibility of reintegrating what was once Hitler's Germany in the community of free nations. As long as there exists in the centre of the continent a Germany subject to military occupation, under a non-German government and a special regime of control and re-education, there can be no talk of a genuine European federation, but only of a provisional federal nucleus which would perforce be composed of all the former victims of Nazism. A true federation of Europe must contain in its midst a reborn, democratic Germany, admitted on the same footing as other states. But, on the other hand, if we do not want this reborn, democratic Germany to develop one day into a fresh danger to her neighbours, she must be integrated into a European federation that already exists, or at least into what we have called a provisional federal nucleus. (...) Can it be done?

We have argued that the creation of federal states in Europe is a rational means of avoiding the worst consequences of the war. Unfortunately that does not necessarily mean that it will happen. What is rational is not always real; the real world is one of passions and prejudices impervious to logical reasoning, especially in times of upheaval such as the present. But the rational also conflicts with selfish interests, that is to say what short-sighted people regard as their interest. This, we may say, is the very essence of the capitalist system, the most short-sighted of all regimes, which condemns human beings to live for the moment and to long in vain for the broad horizons where freedom is to be enjoyed.

Europe is no longer, as it was a century ago, the spearhead of technical and social progress on this planet. Her present exhaustion (except for Britain, of course) means that in a world of superpowers she has scarcely anything to offer but courage and hope. It may be therefore that she will go the way of Hellenistic Greece and will soon no longer play an active part in political life, or even cease to be an intellectual factor. In that case these great projects will not possess even the semblance of reality.

In any case it may be a very long business to create a European federation, because for many years what was once Germany will be no more than a dark void. During that time many new events may supervene and upset the original plan.

All this may be, but it is not the present question. Our choice is between a

policy of total submission to Anglo-American capitalism – which not even America demands of us, let along Britain – and an independent policy which must seek support in those European democracies that are closest to us and best fitted to understand us, and with whom we should form the federal nucleus that I have spoken of. (...)

4. Raymond Aron: 'The age of empires' July 1945

Raymond Aron, *L'âge des empires et l'avenir de la France*, Paris, 1945; extracts from pp. 23–7 and 253 f.

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In the immediate aftermath of war, the philosopher and political analyst Raymond Aron emphasized the fundamental change in France's international position due to the rise of the new world powers and the altered scale of the economic system. Opposing efforts, which had become illusory, to solve the 'German problem' by traditional means, he argued for increased cooperation among the nations of Western Europe. He regarded federal union as the aim to be pursued, though many difficulties would have to be overcome.[1] Later, in 1948, he advocated a union of Western Europe, including West Germany, as the only answer to the danger of Soviet domination.[2]

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(...) The fact remains that, within the narrow framework of existing economic units, none of the nation states of Western Europe has been able to use the resources of modern technology to the full, as the continental state of the USA has been able to do thanks to its undeveloped spaces. The old states of Europe which do not have the advantage of a large population or unexploited resources like those of the Soviet Union must rest their hopes on brain-power and the quality of their equipment and organization. Must they not also extend their frontiers so as to broaden their mental outlook?

To put it differently, the French crisis tends to merge into the crisis of our continent as a whole. For various reasons France's expansion in the nineteenth century, on the human and individual level, lagged behind that of other great countries. But now that Germany has been overthrown and mutilated, and Britain brought closer to the continent by the development of aviation, the V1's and V2's and other inventions yet to come, we can see that France's backwardness is only an extreme form of the backwardness of all nation states. The arrival on the scene of multinational, continental states has in a sense aggravated the backwardness of our country, but it has also given us a better chance of recovery provided we link our fate to that of others.

1 Cf. Lipgens, 'Innerfranzösische Kritik', pp. 168 f. and 182 f.

2 Raymond Aron, *Le grand schisme*, Paris, 1948, pp. 50, 66–8; id., 'L'idée de l'Europe', in *La Fédération*, No. 39, Apr. 1948, pp. 6–9.

If we despair of France, therefore, we must also despair of Europe. If France does not recover, what other country would play the part that history offers us? If France is done for, what hope is there for Europe, drenched in blood and covered by ruins? To anyone who tries to see into the future there are in fact three main possibilities.

The first is that Europe, torn by rival influences, will be divided into spheres of influence by the non-European empires in the same way as the European states once partitioned the world. In that case France will be torn more savagely than any other country, because French people will pursue their ideas to the uttermost and fight tooth and nail for their conflicting aspirations.

Or it may be that Europe is ready to be unified by the arms and laws of a conqueror. The worst threat – that of a conqueror seeking to establish racial inequality as a principle for all time – has been overcome. The Soviet Union, though at present it resorts to methods that arouse our repugnance, at least professes a universal ideal. When it has solved the problem of poverty it may perhaps give up the forms of coercion and violence on which its economy has been based. But even if we believe that the USSR is bound to triumph, or at least likely to do so in the more or less distant future, how can we imagine Anglo-American influence being excluded from the old continent in the space of a generation, or in the next fifteen to twenty years? It is in this initial phase of reconstruction that the fate of Europe will be decided. For, assuming that unification is bound to come, its meaning will be different according to whether it is more or less freely welcomed by a restored, vigorous Western Europe, or shamefully endured by a group of exhausted countries.

Or again, it may be that Western Europe will exist in and for itself – not in opposition to the Soviet Union and the other Slav countries, indeed cooperating with them, but firmly resisting external pressure. And independence does not only mean the strength to take one's own decisions but also the power to conceive an original solution to the problems of our time, that is to offer an original synthesis of the two basic principles of freedom and planning, or, if you prefer, plurality and organization.

Most Frenchmen wish to play their part in a European future, but at present everything is uncertain. Neither political nor economic reconstruction is under way: the future is dark and confused, in France as in the rest of Europe, and it would be presumptuous and fruitless to offer any dogmatic solution.

There is an essential ambiguity in the situation. The governing principle is to enlarge economic and political units without abolishing the nation state or superseding the patriotism by which our historical groups are knit together. But it is utopian to envisage a union of the whole of Western Europe, including Germany and Italy as well as France, Spain and Britain. One can imagine a system combining respect for nationalities with the economic and military advantages of empire; but for the time being such an idea is no less vague than attractive. (...)

At one time the present writer believed that the solution lay in a Western federation,[3] and we still regard this as the ultimate aim; but for the moment it is beset by obstacles which we must not shrink from recognizing.

Britain is much stronger than France. A union between such unequal partners is bound to appear to the weaker one as a disguised form of abdication. In any case, Britain will never be wholly linked to the old continent, even in an age when the shores of the Channel are liable to be covered with launching-pads. The most elaborate weapons of destruction have not overcome the insularity of the United Kingdom, which remains the metropolis of a world-wide empire.

At the same time we must not forget that Britain's position has undergone a profound transformation, since command of the seas has passed from her to the US. Certainly any conflict between these two powers, with their common language and civilization, is unthinkable. Nevertheless, Britain's freedom of action is definitely limited by the fact that, as a maritime nation, she is bound to remain on friendly terms with the US. If a Western union were created as a third world power, its orientation would be westward from the outset. To put it more clearly, if France were to unite with Britain she would not be turning herself into a third world power, but would only become part of the Anglo-American system.

One can also imagine a Latin Union, though the idea has been discredited in France by the use that right-wingers have made of it. The total population of Italy, Spain and France would establish a Latin union on the level of the great political units of our century. The three countries today have a similar political structure and are, if one may so put it, in a similar state of mind. Soviet opposition to any form of Western federation would not apply to the same degree, since under this scheme the Latin countries would enjoy a certain autonomy *vis-à-vis* the British and Americans. Does this mean that the latter would object? In the age of air-power France will never separate herself from Britain, any more than Britain could live with a France that was potentially hostile or subject to hostile influence. The chief result would be some degree of equalization of resources as between the two chief members of the Western union. It would also be rather more likely that Europe could remain outside the conflicts that are possible in the present age.

Unfortunately, however, Latin union is no more an immediate objective than Western union. The latter is suspect to the Russians and the former is bound to be viewed askance by the British empire, which is more than ever concerned for its Mediterranean bases. At present France is too weak for either type of union. There is no general enthusiasm for throwing in our lot with Spain and Italy, and we must consolidate ourselves before we can think of helping our distracted neighbours to do the same.

Our first and most urgent task is internal reform. A country influences the world by what it is, not by the flattering picture that propagandists seek to

3 As editor of *France libre*, the organ of French exiles in London, Aron had at first been sceptical of the idea of supranational union. However, at the beginning of 1944 he emphasized the necessity of permanent links between the countries of Western Europe, especially France and Britain; cf. Guillen, 'Plans by Exiles from France', in *Doc. Eur. Integr.*, vol. 2, doc. 115.

present to outsiders. Unless France puts her house in order there will be no hope for her, either in alliances or in a Western bloc, because she will have lost the ability to exist by herself as a political community. If, on the other hand, she recovers her strength and will-power, her efforts and sacrifices will be fitly rewarded. She will be able to take part, and a major part, in the work which Germany tried to accomplish by inhuman means and which the defeat of the Third Reich has bequeathed to us: that of restoring to Europe a sense of unity without sacrificing its heritage of rich and fruitful diversity.

France, the first model of the nation state, is now sharing in the decline of Europe and of nationalities. Is it not her mission to save the nation states and to save Europe, by helping the states to transcend themselves and by helping Europe to recover a sense of unity?

To the west of those lands that are governed by Soviet force and prestige there is a population of between 200 and 250 millions of the most civilized inhabitants of the globe, with huge industrial possibilities. They belong, as we know, to different states, some of which are divided by traditional prejudice or deep-seated hostility. No miracle is going to substitute order for chaos all at once; but to transcend national states without obliterating them is a historic task to which France can and should make a unique contribution.

How, and to what extent, this task can be accomplished is a matter for another study, to which the present essay may be regarded as a mere introduction. Let us only conclude by saying that constant and trusting cooperation between Britain and France will be an indispensable condition. The less we speak of a Western bloc, the better: it is an idea that arouses too much passion and opposition. But if our two countries can find a means, in practical day-to-day terms, of speaking with one voice and acting in unison, then there will be a hope of resurrection for our war-torn continent.[4] (...)

5. Léon Blum: 'The Western family' Aug.–Sept. 1945

(A) Léon Blum, ' "L'Étoile rouge" fait fausse route', *Le Populaire*, 28. 8. 45, repr. in *L'œuvre de Léon Blum*, vol. VI, Paris, 1958, pp. 175–7 (passage below from p. 177), German tr. in Léon Blum, *Auswahl aus dem Werk*, ed. by Grete Helfgott, Vienna/Frankfurt/Zurich, 1970, pp. 294–6; (B) id., 'The "Western bloc" ', *Daily Herald*, London, 15. 9. 1945 (slightly abridged); original French version in *Le Populaire*, 16–17. 9. 1945.

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In the summer of 1945, after the Axis powers had been finally overthrown, the negotiations for the establishment of the United Nations organization resulted in a defeat for the supranational principle. Members of the SFIO and like-minded publicists, in search of ways to organize peace-keeping on a supranational basis and to combat the tendency towards

4 However, it was part of Aron's plan for European recovery that 'France should be permanently strengthened *vis-à-vis* Germany' (p. 349) by military guarantees, the economic integration of the Saar, and deliveries of coal from the Ruhr.

East-West confrontation, developed the idea of a 'famille occidentale' *of West European states which would stop short of federation and would, it was hoped, remove Soviet suspicions of federalist tendencies.*[1] *Léon Blum, the inter-war Socialist leader, who had been enthusiastically welcomed on his return from a concentration camp, warmly supported the plan; he also had great hopes of a lead from Britain, where the Labour Party had won a sweeping victory in the postwar general election and for the first time had an absolute majority in Parliament.*[2]

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(A)

(...) For my part, and I have held this view for many years, I consider an understanding with the Soviets and one with Britain as the two complementary features of French policy, and I regard the understanding between Britain and the Soviet Union as the cornerstone of European politics. Today more than ever, the peaceful organization of Europe and the world depends in the highest degree on harmony between the British Labour government and the government of Soviet Russia, and I would wish that France, as the ally of both parties, might help to preserve that indispensable accord. It follows that nothing is further from my mind than any idea of a 'Western bloc' directed against Russia.[3] An Anglo-French alliance would certainly exert an attraction on the other Western democracies, present and future: it would help them to revert to old ways of friendship, and this could only benefit the cause of peace in general. But I would be against creating an organic bloc of Western powers, because I do not want to divide and mutilate Europe but to restore its unity and self-confidence.

In other words, *Krasnaya Zvezda* is on the wrong track. I would like to think I have assuaged its fears, but I am not certain. I sense in its article an undercurrent of mistrust towards the British Labour Party even more than towards ourselves. But why must there always be mistrust and suspicion? Soviet Russia has come triumphantly through the terrible ordeal of its early years and is now one of the two great world powers. It is feared and flattered, and its friendship is sought. This is no longer a time for the suspicion and touchiness of former days. I hope the Soviet Union may become conscious of its greatness and show confidence accordingly.

1 E.g. Louis Lévy, 'Sainte alliance ou révolution?', *Gavroche,* 12. 7. 1945; Charles Dumas, 'L'Angleterre vire de bord', *Gavroche,* 2. 8. 1945; id., 'L'entente régionale occidentale indispensable', *Le Populaire,* 10. 8. 1945; Hubert Beuve-Méry, 'France-Angleterre', *Le Monde,* 31. 7. 1945 and 8. 9. 1945.

2 Cf. Loth, *Sozialismus,* pp. 79–83.

3 The Soviet army journal *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Red Star) had accused the French Socialists on 24 Aug. of blocking their party's union with the Communists in order to join with the British Labour Party to form an anti-Soviet 'Western bloc'; cf. Loth, *Sozialismus,* pp. 82 and 321.

(B)

I am all in favour of the closest possible cooperation between Great Britain and France. There are many reasons which make us desire it. The most important is that Great Britain and France would be able through their union to wield an increased influence on the organization of world peace. This is eminently the view of our comrades in the Labour Party. When Mr. Attlee said, on the day after the first atom bomb was dropped, that nations must henceforth unite or perish, this was not mere oratory but expressed a profound conviction which has become a rule of life for our Labour comrades. They believe with all their heart and soul, and so does the rest of Britain, that a new era has dawned in the history of the world in which the organization of peace has become, in the true sense of the words, a question of life and death.

Joint action by the two great Western democracies is not longer, as it was after the last war, the paramount and almost sufficient condition for an organized peace. Yet it remains one of its necessary conditions.[4]

Such action will inevitably result in attracting to a united Britain and France all the democratic states of Northern and Western Europe, as well as the future Republics of Italy and Spain. More: it will give greater depth and efficiency to the affinities of all kinds that exist among nations formed by centuries of shared history and civilization. The attraction, the merging of which I spoke conform to the natural order of things. They will be facilitated by similar material interests and the complementary nature of the various economies.

No nation in the north or south of Europe is self-sufficient from the point of view of raw materials. Not one of them, not even Great Britain, has a home market big enough to absorb the huge production made possible by modern standards or to reduce to the minimum the production costs of its exportable surplus.

That is how, for my part, I conceive the 'Western bloc'. I do not conceive it as an organic grouping of states. Rather than speak of a 'Western bloc', I should prefer to call it a 'Western family' – a family of nations particularly well suited to developing and spreading the international spirit, because the original traits that they would preserve within the future international community make them specially qualified for this mission.

Lest this idea should be misinterpreted, I want to make it clear that there should be no misapprehension on the three following points:

It must be clearly understood that closer ties within the Western family should in no sense whatever have an anti-Soviet character. There is no hope of constructing peace in the world without the hearty and trustful cooperation of Russia, and more particularly without a sincere understanding between the British and Russian governments. The obvious duty of French democracy is to contribute to that understanding as much as it can.

4 Blum stayed in London from 5 to 18 Sept. 1945, on the instructions of Prime Minister de Gaulle, to establish contact with the new Labour government: op. cit., p. 90.

From the economic point of view it must be well understood that this drawing together should in no sense whatever take the character of a self-sufficient combination against the US. There is not the slightest hope of organizing world peace in a system of closed and prohibitive economies. Extension of the Western European inner market must be conceived as a means of developing and not hindering the flow of trade between the US and Europe.

From a more general point of view it must be well understood that this 'family pact' does not mean in any way an attempt to replace the international organization, still less an attempt to contract out of it. On the contrary, it must be conceived and practised in an international spirit and an international perspective. The international organization must remain the supreme aim – to be achieved soon, I hope – and an inexorable necessity.

6. Comité international pour la Fédération européenne: pamphlet Nov. 1945

In the collection of Francis Gérard, Paris;[1] here unabridged.

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The 'Comité français pour la Fédération européenne', of which Francis Gérard was the moving spirit, was an organizational centre for the forces of the Left which continued after the war to concentrate their efforts on European federation. At the Paris conference of federalists in March 1945 it appeared in enlarged forms as the 'Comité international pour la Fédération européenne', and at a general congress in January 1947 it took the name of 'Comité pour une Fédération européenne et mondiale'. The pamphlet distributed in November 1945 described its aims and methods and appealed for the support of left-wing parties and governments. However, the Committee soon lost its original impetus, as prominent members including Robert Verdier and André Ferrat of the SFIO, Maurice Guérin of the MRP and Albert Camus (then editor of Combat, *which originated as a journal of the Resistance) withdrew from its activities owing to the difficulty, in the immediate postwar period, of finding a basis for a realistic pro-federalist strategy.*[2]

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Federation: the Only Hope for Europe

How and Why

Most of the great wars that the world has known arose from conflicts among European states. In future such conflicts may be the occasion of another war which would mean the end of human civilization. This danger can only be

1 Copy in the possession of the late Prof. Walter Lipgens, Saarbrücken.

2 Cf. Lipgens, *History*, pp. 124–31 and 347–9. For the Committee's original manifesto see Lipgens, 'Ideas of the French Resistance', *Doc. Eur. Integr.*, vol. 1, doc. 108; for the conference of socialists in Paris see id., The 'Union Européenne des Fédéralistes', *Doc. Eur. Integr.*, vol. 4, ch. I.

avoided by a federation of European states which is itself part of a world system of collective security. Moreover, such a unification of Europe is essential if the reconstruction of our ravaged continent is to take place in an effective and coordinated manner.

European federation means the consolidation of peace and the rebirth of Europe.

But federation can only be desirable and effective if it is based on the following principles:

Economic unity:

The progressive abolition of customs duties on raw materials and manufactures throughout the continent. The economic legislation of European countries must be identical in its broad lines, and there must be a single European currency.

Political unity:

Replacement of national armies by a federal police force. National diplomatic services must be abolished and replaced by a federal ministry of foreign affairs. Election of a European people's assembly.[3]

Spiritual unity:

Intellectual and artistic cooperation; creation of a European spirit by means of academic and professional exchanges, European congresses etc.

But this unification must not be subservient to capitalism.

Consequently the natural wealth of the continent, and all *de facto* monopolies, must be restored to society as a whole.

The federal government will, in the public interest, control major industries and national credit institutions.

All European citizens except active supporters of Nazism and Fascism shall enjoy the right to vote, press freedom and the right of assembly.

The Committee for European Federation is opposed to the division of Europe into spheres of influence and the formation of hostile blocs. It stands for a federation of free and democratic peoples, open to all , and it hopes that those nations which are already prepared to join a European federation will take the initiative of bringing it about at once.

To achieve a European federation in the near future, the progressive forces of Europe must act at once, either through left-wing governments now in power or by exerting pressure on governments in which they are only partially represented.

The International Committee for European Federation has set itself the task of eliciting and aiding such initiatives.

Do your best to ensure that the organizations you belong to are affiliated to the Committee.

3 A 'basic declaration' approved by the congress in Jan. 1947 called in still stronger terms for a 'restriction of the functions of national governments to matters that do not transcend the national sphere, i.e. those of a purely administrative character'. Text in *Le Document Fédéraliste,* No. 4, Paris, 1. 7. 1947, pp. 1 f.

7. Ernest Pezet: Federalist solutions 15 Jan. 1946

Journal Officiel de la République française, Assemblée constituante, Débats, 15. 1. 1946, pp. 5–8 (extracts)

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The movement for a federal organization of Europe enjoyed support not only in the SFIO but also in the new Christian Democratic party (Mouvement Républicain Populaire - MRP) which came into existence in 1944. The party's initial manifesto of 3 September 1944 already declared the creation of an effective 'international organization' to be a principal aim of its foreign policy;[1] *while the second party congress on 16 December 1945 emphasized that 'there can be no real peace settlement until the dogma of national sovereignty is abolished', and called for an immediate alliance with Britain as the key to international organization.*[2] *None the less, the party leadership at the outset was dominated by advocates of a traditional security policy, with ideas similar to de Gaulle's as regards the need to destroy the unity of the German state: this was true of Maurice Schumann, the party chairman, and Georges Bidault, who was foreign minister almost continuously from September 1944 to July 1948.*[3] *Among the MRP politicians who nevertheless consistently called for federal solutions of the postwar problems of Europe was Ernest Pezet, whose views are quoted here from his speech in the foreign policy debate of the Constituent Assembly in January 1946. One of the MRP's leading federalists and the author of pro-federal studies,*[4] *he had for many years been a collaborator of Marc Sangnier, the founder of* Le Sillon, *and was chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the Senate from 1946 to 1954.*

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(...) Do we envisage the organization of Europe and of European peace on the lines of the treaty of Vienna of 1815, or the Berlin treaty of 1878? Is Europe to be built on a system of regional hegemony, the balance of power, spheres of influence and intervention – the system that prevailed for a century, till 1919 or a little longer, and which Hitler applied with such cold-blooded realism?

If this is what we contemplate, then we must no longer speak of a new spirit,

1 Mouvement Républicain Populaire, *Lignes d'action pour la Libération,* Paris, n.d.; cf. Lipgens, 'French Resistance', *Doc. Eur. Integr.,* vol. 1, doc. 109.

2 II[e] Congrès national du M.R.P., 13–16. 12. 1945, Compte rendu sténographique (in Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, Paris), pp. 1338 f. The word translated 'abolished' reads *instauré,* but this is clearly wrong.

3 On shifts of influence within the party cf. Michel Brun, *La politique du Mouvement Républicain Populaire à l'égard de l'Europe de 1945 à 1950,* thesis for master's degree, Geneva, 1974, pp. 21–8; W. Lipgens, 'Innerfranzösische Kritik an der Aussenpolitik de Gaulles 1944–1946', in *VfZG* 24 (1976), pp. 136–98, esp. pp. 155, 163 f., 175, 184 f.; R. Schreiner, *Bidault, der MRP und die französische Deutschlandpolitik 1944–1948* (thesis), Trier, 1981, pp. 52 f. and 139–50.

4 *Les relations entre les peuples après la guerre et la politique extérieure de la France. Défense du principe fédératif* (with Robert Buron), s.l.n.d. (Lille, 1943; clandestine pamphlet, cf. Lipgens, 'French Resistance', *Doc. Eur. Integr.,* vol. 1, doc. 99); *Allemagne-Europe,* Paris, 1946.

a new world, or the organization of a peace which respects the equal rights of all nations, large and small.

I hope the Europe of the future will not be organized on the same lines as the first League of Nations. We all remember the main causes of the League's failure – its theoretical universality and real anarchy, the determination of frontiers by inappropriate or outdated criteria such as 'historic' rights, the ignoring of the economic realities by which nations live and which are the true substance of international relations, and finally the paralysing unanimity rule.

In the face of all this experience, are we going to see the new Security Council frustrated by the great power veto as the League was by the unanimity rule? It was that rule which prevented the application of Article 19 of the Covenant so that it was impossible to remedy in good time the difficulties caused by new situations brought about by the march of events and the evolution of life itself; thus there was no way of resolving conflicts before they could lead to war.

I am not one of those who think that the Soviet Union's opposition to regional arrangements necessarily reflects some kind of all-embracing ideological ambition, or a policy such that European federation must one day take the form of a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics extending to the Atlantic and the English Channel. But this is what might happen if we abandon the idea of Europe organizing herself, starting with the United Nations as a basis and working resolutely towards a Europe based essentially on federalism, first on a regional and then on a continental scale. (...)

There are *de facto* associations in Eastern Europe, but we are forbidden[5] to talk of such associations in the West. It behoves us to argue this matter out frankly because, as I shall emphasize in a moment, the best way to create a viable organization of United Nations founded on reality is to proceed from the simple to the complex, from what is near to what is far away, in other words to begin with our own region and end up with continental and intercontinental structures. (...)

The whole problem is whether the victors of 1945 can succeed in putting a final end to Nazi and Pan-German domination in Europe, which has been the main theme of my speech. Can they destroy not only the military power but also the system of thought on which it was based? and will they be able to replace Hitler's 'New Order' by a genuinely new national and transnational order?

I believe that the victors will fail in this essential task, this indispensable work, unless they can agree on the principles of a system of thought accepted by all, and the ways and means of applying those principles to the political, economic and territorial reconstruction of Europe.

Yet only if the United Nations can achieve this double success – a new order and a new system of thought – can we avoid the calamity of exchanging one

5 Sc. by the Russians: cf. doc. 5 above.

hegemony by another. Only by that success can the long task of resisting Prussian and Pan-German hegemony be finally brought to accomplishment.[6] (. . .)

8. La Fédération: policy statement on foreign affairs Feb. 1947

Unsigned leading article (here unabridged) in *La Fédération*, No. 25, Feb. 1947, p. 1.

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La Fédération, the most dynamic of the French federalist associations, was founded in Oct. 1944, most of its original members belonging to Catholic social organizations. The membership grew to several thousands, and it published a monthly journal of high quality. Representing a corporalist-syndicalist tradition and influenced by the Catholic doctrine of natural law, it had as its objective the transformation of all fields of life in a federalist sense; a federal Europe would, it believed, perform a reconciling function in world politics. Moving spirits of the group were André Voisin, Jean Bareth and Max Richard, while among its authors

6 Pezet also argued (in *Allemagne-Europe*, op. cit., p. 175) for a federal solution of the German problem:

'If this internal reorganization were carried out, one could envisage three states at least: (1) the Rhineland and Westphalia, (2) Hanover and Schleswig-Holstein, and (3) the provinces east of the Elbe. The ancient kingdom of Saxony could recover the parts of its territory annexed by Prussia, and also Thuringia. In South Germany one could distinguish three natural elements: Bavaria, Swabia (Baden and Württemberg), and Franconia (the last consisting of Hesse, the Prussian province of Hesse-Nassau, the Palatinate and the northern part of Baden).

'If Germany were thus reorganized as a federation of seven or eight *Länder*, these should possess full sovereignty in matters of art, culture, education etc., also local police and national defence (the size and equipment of military forces being restricted to the needs of a police force). A joint foreign policy, economic union and a common code of social benefits would ensure that the federation did not act in a way contrary to public welfare.

'In the view of those for whom I speak here, contrary to that of the German group as expressed above, Austria should not be part of Germany but should belong to a Danubian federation which would include Hungary, Czechoslovakia and perhaps Poland, and would thus counterbalance the German federation in central Europe.

Thus there would be a double safeguard against a revival of German imperialism. In Germany itself, a complete reorganization in the political, social and spiritual sphere; and, outside it, a Danubian bloc of 50 million inhabitants if Poland were included.

'This solution would make it possible to avoid the artificial dismemberment of Germany, which is a national entity based on historical tradition, economic unity, intellectual and artistic life and its own language. It would have the same effect as dismemberment, but Europe would be preserved from the revolutionary danger of a movement to restore German national unity.

'Such an organization of central Europe would greatly facilitate its cooperation with other European countries and its entry into a European union.'

were Robert Aron, Alexandre Marc, Bernard Voyenne, Gabriel Marcel and Bertrand de Jouvenel.[1]

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It is said that a problem correctly stated is half solved. The year 1947 should be a decisive one for the peace settlement. Two recent events indicate that our representatives in this weary world are, by degrees and in spite of themselves, discovering the path of common sense. One of these events is the Franco-British alliance, and the other is the organization of federal Germany.

We must distinguish, however, between ends and means. Is the purpose merely to protect us against renewed aggression? In that case let us remember the tragic farce of disarmament. If a dismembered Germany is surrounded by nations jealously preserving an intact sovereignty, she is bound to seek once again to recover a brutal unity under Prussian rule. Occupation and coercion do not last for ever.

If we set up a federal Germany without preparing to create a federal Europe we may gain a precarious insurance against a German war, but we are not really building peace. A man like Winston Churchill understands this: he has been campaigning vigorously for a United States of Europe,[2] though he does not always see clearly what kind of institutions will be necessary to further this great design.

The very existence of the European peninsula is threatened by the possibility of a conflict between the two superpowers, which would turn it into a heap of ruins. Moreover, its civilization is threatened by two materialistic cultures which are both equally alien to its spiritual traditions – though the one which comes from the West would at least not prevent us from endeavouring to 'humanize' it.

If Europe is not to disappear, it must unite; and this victory over itself is also the greatest favour it could do to the rival imperialisms. The federation of our continent is a duty we owe to the peoples of Europe, and still more to the world as a whole, because it alone can ensure peace.

Only Europe can bridge the gap between the two empires, and restore balance to a world in which today only strength prevails. Only Europe can save the sum of things by recalling to mankind the moral laws which are superior to economic or strategic conflicts.

France, which has been invaded and laid waste three times in seventy years, is entitled to aspire to security. But our patriotic fellow-citizens who are afraid of a recrudescence of pan-Germanism must consider whether, given the present state of military technology, a nation of 40 millions can ensure its security by its own means. What effect would the 'guarantees' they call for – territorial pledges, glacis, industrial bastions – have on the balance of forces?

1 Cf. Alain Greilsammer, *Les mouvements fédéralistes en France de 1945 à 1974*, Paris, 1975, pp. 117–23, 130; Lipgens, *History*, pp. 349–55 and 625 f.

2 This refers to Churchill's Zurich speech of 19 Sept. 1946 and subsequent activity: cf. Lipgens, *History*, pp. 317–22.

We reject narrow-minded nationalism as we reject bleating pacifism. The solution we offer is profoundly realistic; it is the only way of establishing order and peace with liberty. In the atomic age, the notion of collective security comes down from the clouds and becomes sober reality. It must not remain simply a sterile leitmotiv of chatter around the conference table, but must be embodied in international structures.

If nations cannot bring themselves to obey this imperative, we must revise the archaic bases on which their power is founded. Otherwise poor simple human beings will impose it on them regardless of frontiers.

Already men are acting. And we ourselves have taken part in the fight and often shown the way, because we believe in France's mission and wish that her eternal values may shine forth as they did in bygone days.

Our friends were with us at Luxemburg[3] and Hertenstein,[4] and we have largely them to thank for the creation of the Union Européenne des Fédéralistes,[5] which includes delegates from seven nations, with Alexandre Marc as its secretary-general. They will be assembled at The Hague next spring to broaden the scope of their campaign, give it concrete reality and oblige governments to take account of their life-giving views.

It is France's historic role to take the lead in this movement, thanks to all that is best in her universal genius and her respect for national characteristics. And it is the role of all of us to unite those in France who wish to work freely for European order – that order of which Hitler and his predecessors or imitators presented us with a hideous totalitarian caricature in order that we might be turned against it for ever, to the delight of all the powers of evil.

9. Cercles Socialistes, Fédéralistes et Communautaires pour une République Moderne: basic declarations Feb./Dec. 1947

(A) 'Ce que nous sommes, ce que nous voulons': unsigned leading article in *La République moderne*, Suppl. aux Nos. 23–24 (beginning of 1947), p. 2; repr. in *Le Document Fédéraliste*, No. 4, Paris, 1. 7. 1947, pp. 2 f.; (B) 'Le fédéralisme européen', unsigned leading article in *La République moderne*, No. 41, 15. 12. 1947, p. 2; both here unabridged.

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Next to La Fédération, the second mass movement in France for integral federalism was the Cercles Socialistes, Fédéralistes et Communautaires pour une République Moderne (CSFC), which upheld a libertarian socialist tradition and was founded by Claude-Marcel Hytte as a continuation of the Resistance group Mouvement national révolutionnaire (MNR). With nearly 5,000 members and many links with La Fédération – e.g. Robert Aron, Alexandre Marc and Bernard Voyenne wrote for both groups – the Cercles played a major

3 Conference of European and world federalists, 13–16 Oct. 1946; Lipgens, op. cit., pp. 310–14.

4 Conference of world federalists, 15–22 Sept. 1946; op. cit., pp. 303–10.

5 At Basle on 9 Dec. 1946: op. cit., pp. 314–16.

part in setting up the Union Européenne des Fédéralistes (UEF) and its French section, the Union Française des Fédéralistes (UFF). Their principles were anti-capitalist, anti-parliamentarian and opposed to etatism; their general strategy was pragmatic and gradualistic, and they placed their hopes in a popular movement for federalism, over and above existing political forces and institutions.[1]

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(A)

The Cercles Socialistes, Fédéralistes et Communautaires pour une République Moderne are independent of any political party, and declare themselves firmly opposed to etatism in politics as in economic and social affairs.

Their purpose is to work, by means of thought and deed, in favour of a free, humane form of socialism based on the communities within which men carry on their civic, economic and social activities: the home, the local unit, the place of work, trade unions, cultural and intellectual groups and so on.

To the economic centralism whereby the state controls the whole apparatus of production and finally becomes the sole employer of the entire population, the Cercles oppose the formula of communal enterprise based on the association of all producers, owning the means of production and working for their own benefit as well as that of society as a whole.

Instead of parliament with its bogus form of popular representation, the Cercles stand for direct representation in specialized bodies according to interests: a parliament of local authorities, an economic parliament, a labour council, a consumers' council and so forth.

The Cercles would like to see this structure extended to the international sphere. They therefore call for a federal organization of the continent of Europe, sovereignty being ceded to the European Federation as far as necessary to enable it to perform functions of concern to all Europeans. This united federal Europe should in turn be part of a world-wide organization comprising all states or federations of states and thus constituting the United States of the World.

(B)

The present state of the world appears disappointing from the federalist point of view, as it presents not only material obstacles but others which derive from the power ideologies by which the world is divided. The opposition of capitalism and communism, the democratic left and the autocratic right, is secondary: these are effects, not causes. The one fundamental opposition is that between imperialism and federalism: between a tiny minority of men and forces which govern the world by police methods or financial coercion, and the great majority which is subject to them and whose only hope lies in federalism.

This is a typical description of Europe, whose peoples, prostrated in a common defeat, have lost faith in their destiny. In each country some have

1 Cf. Lipgens, *History*, pp. 355–8 and 626 f.

joined the Communist party, while those who fear Communism look towards America. In between is a formless mass, already resigned to catastrophe; all have so far degenerated that they no longer have an inner light to direct them or strength to pursue their aims. Yet the salvation of Europe is a matter for Europeans alone: against the division imposed by foreign forces they alone can unify Europe by liberating it from American control and Soviet dependence.[2] Europeans alone must defend and recover their patrimony; they alone can re-create and exalt the European spirit, make a stand against disintegration and free themselves from bondage.

In most countries national unity is in shreds, and we seek in vain to make up for the loss by joining an alien union in the east or the west. The only unity that counts is to be had by transcending, yet at the same time restoring, our endangered national unity and the territorial unity of Europe. Europe itself is the natural and normal unit, that of a single race, a common cast of mind, a composite, polyvalent civilization, from north to south and east to west of the continent – such is the unity that is essentially ours!

We must proclaim Europe to the Europeans, awaken their benumbed consciousness, bring into action their unused potential. Both inside and outside our borders, all that is not specifically European is working to dismember Europe, to disperse its inhabitants and destroy its ancient civilization. All European men and women should oppose this destructive work, become conscious of their common destiny and combine to offer staunch resistance. We want no Communist or American parties, but only the party of Europe. Europe can and should be the cradle of an original federation that will awaken enslaved peoples throughout the world and will inspire the founders of supranational communities everywhere.

10. Léon Blum: 'European unity' 25–6 May 1947

'L'unité européenne', *Le Populaire*, 25–6. 5. 1947; repr. in *L'œuvre de Léon Blum*, vol. VII, Paris, 1963, pp. 20–2 (here slightly abridged).

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In May 1947, after the failure of the Moscow conference of foreign ministers, it was gradually becoming clear that hopes of persuading the Soviet Union to accept the idea of a federal organization of peace were illusory. Meanwhile public discussions were going forward in the USA concerning the need for a new programme of aid to European states.[1] In these circumstances Léon Blum set out to persuade his party and the French public that they should no longer be deterred from initiatives towards unity by the Soviet veto, and that advantage should be taken of the leverage afforded to federalism, in Western Europe at least, by the new course of American policy expressed in Secretary of State Marshall's speech of 5 June 1947.

2 The original reads 'independence', which is clearly a misprint.

1 For the international background cf. Wilfried Loth, *Die Teilung der Welt. Geschichte des Kalten Krieges 1941–1955*, Munich, 1980, 1987[7], pp. 150 ff.

However, Blum still shrank from exacerbating the rift between East and West: he wanted the promised aid to be administered by a UN body, the Economic Commission for Europe, so as to ensure that the door was left open for Soviet participation.[2]

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Wartime Lend-Lease was an arrangement between allies. A peacetime version must be essentially international. It must reflect the general and permanent interest of an international order based on the equality of nations, great and small – the interest of peace based on freedom and justice.

From this point of view and many others it is desirable that relief action should be based on overall plans formulated as far as possible in advance, rather than bilateral negotiations between the state offering aid and each separate recipient. It is clear that the yield and efficiency of a number of separate plans will never equal that of a single plan. Moreover, separate agreements are most liable to encourage suspicion of aggressive designs or plans to acquire undue influence, which it is important to exclude. Furthermore, they are apt to arouse a spirit of jealousy and competition among the beneficiaries, who ought to stand together in their common interest.

A world plan would no doubt be too ambitious, but it is not too difficult to imagine a European plan. The interlocking interests and especially the community of needs among European nations is sufficient for Europe to be regarded as a unit *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world. It would not be impossible to draw up a general inventory of Europe's needs and resources and a general plan of European reconstruction, an order of priority and a timetable for supplies, works and credits. Such ideas are to a large extent envisaged in the plans for federation and for a United States of Europe which have been developed in recent months. Mr Winston Churchill, who has made himself the great champion of a United States of Europe,[3] advocates both political and economic unity; M. Paul Van Zeeland, the Belgian ex-premier, confines himself to the economic side and prefers a kind of federal harmonization rather than unification.[4] Either way, a general plan for Europe could well serve as a basis for the international relief operation.

The first great difficulty is to define what we mean by Europe. Where does

2 At the beginning of his series of articles Léon Blum took issue with the charge of imperialism levelled against the US and described the latter's initiative as a move towards the organization of world peace in the spirit of the UN, which was itself blocked from acting. The requirement that the participating states should cooperate closely together was, in his view, an essential condition of the success of the Marshall aid programme. (*Le Populaire*, 19–23. 5. 1947, repr. in *L'œuvre de Léon Blum*, vol. VII, pp. 12–22; cf. analysis in Loth, *Sozialismus*, pp. 144–7).

3 Churchill's Zurich speech of 19. 9. 1946 had led to the foundation of the United Europe Movement: cf. Lipgens, *History*, pp. 317 ff., and Ch. of the present volume.,

4 Van Zeeland was a leading figure in the European League for Economic Cooperation, which first came into public view with a 'Preliminary Memorandum' on 7 March 1947; Lipgens, op. cit., pp. 334–41.

it begin and end? Where are its frontiers? Does it include Britain or not? Does it include the USSR and its vassal states? Does it include Germany? When these questions are put, one sometimes gets the answer: 'The USSR is no more part of Europe than the USA.' Others would reply: 'The union or federation excludes nobody: it is open to any state that belongs to ancient historical Europe and that wishes to join it.' Those who take the first view exclude the Soviet Union *a priori;* in the second case, it is supposed that the Russians would stay out of their own accord. But then what of their client states? Again, a Europe which included Germany but not the USSR would be paradoxical, to say the least. But if Germany too were excluded, would not Europe be reduced to what has been called the 'Western bloc'? I mention all these objections here, but shall not attempt to answer them.

Let me be frank: it is not entirely impossible that one day or another, in the field of international organization or the organization of Europe, we may have to put up with the absence or aloofness of the USSR, just as in French internal affairs we have had to accept the voluntary withdrawal of our Communist comrades. But that is a last resort and one which, in my view, we should do everything possible to avoid. It would only be a conceivable solution if it were demanded by circumstances, that is if there were absolutely no other way to cope with urgent and manifest necessity, as was the case in France a few weeks ago. In the case of European planning there is no such dilemma. There exists a body naturally qualified for the task, one of which the USSR and the USA are an integral part and to which all European members of the UN belong, since it is itself a UN agency. I refer to the Economic Commission for Europe which has just met at Geneva[5] (...).

The ECE is the expression of a great idea, and may itself do great things, as it should. If the relief operation were carried out by the international community itself, embodied today in the UN organization, the ECE would certainly be the obvious agency to research, advise and execute the plan. As the US in this case have adopted the role of the UN, why should they not proceed in the same manner and make use of the same agency? Would not that be the way to smooth over most of the difficulties and get round the suspicions and fears of every kind that threaten to impede the US initiative? It will be seen that all my remarks tend in the same direction. We have here a national initiative which should be internationalized. It should be animated by the international spirit, subject itself to international principles, and as far as possible make use of international institutions. This will ensure its full efficacy and complete its greatness.[6]

5 On 3 May 1947.

6 In conclusion Blum appealed to the socialist parties of Europe to agree on a common strategy to further the success of the project:
'I now turn to my socialist comrades, and especially to the great European parties, calling their attention to the urgent necessity of adopting a common attitude towards these great problems, so that international socialism may speak with one voice. On the question of a new American Lend-Lease offer, of the United States of Europe,

11. Charles de Gaulle: Europe against the Communist danger
29 June/9 July 1947

(A). Speech delivered at Lille, 29 June 1947; Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et messages*, vol. 2, Paris, 1970, pp. 80–9 (extract below from pp. 86–8); (B) Address to members of Anglo-American Press Association, Paris, 9 July 1947, ibid., pp. 89–94 (extract below from pp. 91 f.).

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General de Gaulle exercised a profound influence on French political thinking as president of the Provisional Government from 1944 to January 1946 and, from April 1947, as leader of the oppositionist RPF (Rassemblement du peuple français). At all stages of his political career he showed an ambivalent attitude towards the problem of European union. On the one hand 'une certain idée de la France' was the ultimate reference-point of all his actions, and he was basically unable to conceive of an integration of the French nation state into a larger whole; but on the other hand he had an instinctive perception of political developments which pointed towards a closer association among European states.[1] *Thus in the liberation period, on economic grounds and in order that Europe might hold its own* vis-à-vis *the new world powers, he envisaged a West European association which he did not define more closely, but in which France would play a leading part assisted by the economic potential of defeated Germany.*[2] *From the spring of 1947 onwards, influenced by fear of Soviet expansion and Communist subversion, he appealed to Western Europe to unite against the Communist danger; but it was still not very clear what form of unity he desired, though he spoke*

of European federation and the ECE, it would be deplorable if our respective parties in Europe took up different positions in the press, in parliament or in government. The Zurich conference that is to meet soon shold give this matter very serious consideration.' (*Le Populaire*, 27. 5. 1947, repr. in *L'œuvre de Léon Blum*, vol. VII, pp. 22–4 (this extract, p. 23)).

1 Cf. documentation in Edmond Jouve, *Le Général de Gaulle et la construction de l'Europe 1940–1966*, 2 vols., Paris, 1967; interpretations, with varying emphasis, in Stanley Hoffmann, 'The Hero as History: De Gaulle's War Memoirs' in *World Politics* 13 (1960–1), repr. in Stanley and Inge Hoffmann, *Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930's*, New York, 1974, pp. 187–201; W. Lipgens, 'Bedingungen und Etappen der Aussenpolitik de Gaulles 1944–1946', *VfZG* 21 (1973), pp. 52–102, esp. pp. 64–70 and 78–82; Wilfried Loth, 'Die Franzosen und die deutsche Frage 1945–1949' in Claus Scharf and Hans-Jürgen Schröder (eds.), *Die Deutschlandpolitik Frankreichs und die Französische Zone 1945–1949*, Wiesbaden, 1983, pp. 23–44.

2 In reply to a question by Pierre Mendès France about European unity the General declared in the spring of 1944: 'Europe? Certainly we must "make Europe". With Belgium, Holland and Italy to begin with. Spain will come later, when she has got rid of Franco. Germany? There won't be one Germany, but several. We can see what to do with her when she is partitioned and the Ruhr handed over to the victorious powers. Britain? No, I don't see her joining in an European enterprise. In any case, to have a federation you must have a federator. That federator will be France, and the group thus formed will enable us to preserve our independence of the American-Russian condominium.' Cited in Jean Lacouture, *Mendès France*, Paris, 1981, p. 159.

in rather more positive terms than previously about the integration of the defeated enemy into Western Europe.[3]

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(A)

(...) In today's world everything forms a single whole. We cannot imagine our own affairs being considered and handled in the abstract, without regard to the world as it really is. In fact there are no economic, social, financial or imperial questions, there are not even, I assure you, any problems of production, prices, taxes, loans, strikes in our homeland or unrest overseas, which do not to a large extent have their causes and repercussions beyond our frontiers. If we have such difficulty in restoring our internal situation, the chief reason is that it is linked with a dangerous international situation which, to say the least, is not getting any better.

The fact is that the exhaustion and dislocation into which Europe has been plunged by the terrible upheaval of war has upset the balance of our old continent. Russia, which was already highly powerful by reason of her natural resources, the number of her inhabitants and the valour of her people, is now much more so on account of the enfeeblement of other states and in spite of the losses she has undergone for the common cause. As a result of victory she occupies half of Germany, Hungary, Rumania and part of Austria; she has annexed the Baltic States and large areas of Poland, Rumania, Finland and Prussia; she controls Warsaw, Belgrade, Sofia and Tirana by dint of external pressure and some devoted aid from inside those countries, and by the same means she exerts influence over Czechoslovakia. Altogether at the present time Russia dominates two-thirds of our continent. In addition, her materialistic ideology of general mechanization and suffocation of the individual – that ideology which has so far been the psychological mainspring of those who govern Russia, and, according to its first champions, was supposed eventually to conquer the world – finds faithful adherents everywhere, and certainly not least among our own people. It is these devotees who seek by every convenient means to establish a public or camouflaged dictatorship over the body and soul of their own country in order to harness it to the gigantic enterprise which attracts them and governs their actions.

I am certainly not saying that the present masters of that huge agglomeration intend in the near future to conquer the world by violence. In the government of nations there are internal and external conditions that often defeat the appeal of the most ambitious ideologies. One may even hope that in the last resort the supreme interest of mankind, namely cooperation, will prevail in everbyody's mind and therefore in the policies of all nations. But the fact

3 On the RPF in general see Jean Touchard, *Le Gaullisme 1940–1969*, Paris, 1978, pp. 96–133; for the statements of early summer 1947, ibid., p. 113. For the development of de Gaulle's ideas and those of the RPF on Europe in 1949–50 cf. docs. 26, 32 and 35 below.

remains that at present we detect in Europe the latent elements of a hegemony which, if it were to take definite shape, would be as dangerous a threat to the independence of nations as any there has been since the dawn of history. For France in particular – the Atlantic headland of the old continent, the gateway to Africa, the centre of intellectual and moral influence – the future is, from this point of view, beset by the darkest anxiety.

The other great world power, that is the USA, naturally draws the appropriate conclusions from this state of affairs in Europe. The US, with their abundant resources and capabilities, inspired by a burning ideal of freedom and democracy, having discovered in the recent war the basis and advantages of military strength, and being now in possession of fearful means of destruction, are alarmed by the nature of Russian expansionism as they perceive it. This growing rivalry between the two great masses threatens to lead sooner or later to a colossal conflict from which, this time, no nation and no human being would be safe.

No one can master fate, but each of us helps to bring it about. Although France's power may be momentarily weakened, she can and must play a major part in this formidable situation. She can and must do so, first of all, by standing forth in her own character as she is and always has been, that is to say a Western power. That means that she will not on any account allow herself to be subjected, by weariness or deceit, to a regime or influences which, leading from one upheaval to another, would enslave her soul, destroy her features and sooner or later engulf her in a system that would be alien in every respect. Once she has obtained the reparations and guarantees that she requires after so many trials – that is to say the addition of the Saarland to her territory, the international control of the Ruhr, coal deliveries of at least a million tons a month from that area, the abolition of the Reich and a French presence on the Rhine – she can and must assist the recovery of Europe by every means in her power. I am speaking of a Europe of free men and independent states, organized as a single system which can withstand any possible claim to hegemony and provide what is essential to peace, namely an element of a balance between the two rival masses. It is for France to take the necessary initiatives in this all-important sphere. And it goes without saying that she must take part in every form of international cooperation – political, economic, social and intellectual – by which our poor, strife-torn world may seek to build up its future unity. (...)

(B)

(...) It seemed to me, as it still does, that it is necessary above all to re-create the old Europe and to do so on a basis of solidarity, especially as regards its reconstruction and economic recovery, on which all else depends, with the aid of all those who are able and willing to help and who remain loyal to the conception of the rights of peoples and individuals from which our civilization derives and on which it rests. In this way and in no other can we establish a system capable of restraining on its own ground a hegemony that is urgently tempted to expand westward in response to the disorder and disunity that it

finds there. In this way and in no other can there be created, alongside the two great powers, an element of balance without which the hope of peace would be frustrated in advance.

The reestablishment of such a Europe, united by the spirit of liberty and true democracy, forming a unit for economic, social and cultural progress in its own lands and its overseas dependencies, and so organized as to ensure the observance of the treaties governing its existence – all this is a task requiring several conditions.

In the first place, this Europe must be large and prosperous enough not only to survive but to be a force of attraction. This means that it must not be closed to any nation that adheres loyally to the ideal of Europe and the organization on which it is based. It means, too, that this Europe must constantly appeal to those continental countries that leave it of their own accord or are forced to do so, to return to the fold. Even the conquered nations may find a place there when they have discharged the obligations and furnished the reparations and guarantees that must be required of them. As regards those states that take the place of the former German Reich, justice, prudence and the lessons of history demand that measures be taken to prevent their committing aggression ever again; but I am not one who would exclude them for ever from that Europe of which they are the children. Italy today must pay for the misdeeds of those who led her into a disastrous adventure, but I for my part will never conceive of a Europe without Rome. Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria are today feeling the cruel consequences of their unfortunate alliance with the Axis, but I am not one to recommend that free Europe should exclude them from its embrace if they should ever seek it.

The second condition of the restoration of Europe is that it should be helped out of its destitution and division by those who can afford to do so, in other words by the Americans first and foremost. (...)[4]

12. Maurice Duverger: 'No Europe without Germany'

9 Sept. 1947

'Pas d'Europe sans l'Allemagne', *Le Monde,* 9 Sept. 1947 (slightly abridged).

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After the US decision to press on with the reconstruction of the Western zones of Germany, the political writer Maurice Duverger in a leading article in Le Monde *urged the necessity of integrating Western Germany in a federal community of Western Europe. He was at pains to combat the widespread illusion that a 'renaissance allemande' with equality of rights for Germany could in the long run be prevented.*[1]

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4 As further conditions de Gaulle listed cooperation with Britain and the internal strengthening of France.

1 On the prevailing tendency to envisage the integration of Western Germany on unequal terms cf. Loth, 'Die Franzosen und die deutsche Frage', p. 43f.; also docs. 7, 11 and 14 below. On Maurice Duverger see also doc. 33.

When Europe is being reconstructed under the Marshall Plan, Germany is not represented at the sixteen-nation conference; when Germany is being reconstructed under the aegis of General Clay, the Sixteen are not consulted and there is no representation of Europe. Can it be that the French are not the only nation to be 'ignorant of geography' and that the Americans are no better in this respect than we, in spite of the progress made of late by their geopoliticians? Germany is part of Europe, and one cannot be rebuilt without the other. Without German industry, Europe can only be an American colony; without the hope of belonging to Europe, Germany can only dream of revenge or fall into a nihilistic mood that would throw her, and Europe along with her, into the arms of Russia. The destinies of Germany and Europe are irrevocably linked, and Europe cannot be reborn without Germany.

'The rebirth of Germany' – I pondered over this word and hesitated for a long time before writing it, knowing as I do what distress and indignation it will arouse in many minds. The name of Germany is associated, for us in France, with so many deaths, so much suffering, humiliation and grief. Is it not a supreme act of madness on the victim's part to enable the would-be murderer to grow strong again?

But I would ask my readers to stifle their resentment, justified though it may be, and consider the question without any kind of passion: for it is too serious to be approached in any but the calmest spirit.

Germany exists. Seventy million human beings live in a narrow space between the Elbe and the Rhine. They are hard-working, brave and prolific. One solution, of course, would be to destroy them: no doubt this could be done with a few well-placed atom bombs. But it may be doubted not only whether this is a moral policy, but also whether it is realistic: for it would be hard to know who should take over German territory, or how it should be repeopled. A third world war might well be the price of solving this question. Therefore Germany must continue to exist, whether we like it or not.

One may also think of an ostrich-like solution: to let the seventy million Germans stagnate in ruin and despair under the indifferent eye of the occupation forces, and try to rebuild devastated Europe without them. As I have already said, I do not think Europe can be rebuilt without the aid of German industry. But supposing for a moment that it can, would the Germans put up with being kept in a state of quarantine and chaos when they could see a light shining through the dark night – that of the red star in the Kremlin sky?

If Germany is deprived of any other kind of future, she can always turn to Communism; and what European nation is better fitted to endure the iron discipline, and profit by the meticulous organization, of Stalinist neo-Bolshevism? You need only change the colour of the shirts, the design of badges and the form of salute, and the Nuremberg stadium will echo to the cheers of the very same delirious crowds.

Let there be no illusion as to the present state of German opinion, and in particular its fear and hatred of the Soviet Union: that fear and hatred is purely irrational and is due only to the memory of the first weeks of Soviet occupation and its atrocities. But nations are quick to forget, especially when their interest

commands it. And if Germany had nowhere else to turn, it would be in her interest to turn towards Russia. (...)

But a Communist Germany would very soon mean a Communist Europe, and that would soon mean a third world war, since the Americans would judge – whether rightly or wrongly does not matter – that their own security was threatened.

The solution that the Americans seem to be adopting today, and that Europe is passively accepting, is no better. To reconstruct German industry in the Western zones so that their inhabitants can make a living and the British and Americans can trade with them, without paying any heed to the political reorganization of Germany, is really showing an excess of the spirit of trial and error and disregard of consequences. Once economic power is restored, political power must be restored also. Willingly or not – and more probably not, which makes things worse – the result would be a central government of Western Germany, which would eventually secure the withdrawal of the occupation troops and the progressive weakening of Allied controls.

Germany's neighbours and victims – France, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland and the rest – would protest in vain. Germany reconstructed in a nationalist spirit would raise more loudly than ever the outcry against an arbitrary frontier: she would resort to any means of abolishing that frontier and recovering her eastern territory. And would not her leaders judge that the only certain way of achieving that result would be to provoke a conflict between the US and the Soviet Union? In the face of the von Paulus solution, it was on this reversal of alliances that the Nazi generals pinned their hopes during the death-throes of Hitler's regime. Even if, in the present instance, Germany did not at once achieve her ends, what a fearful threat it would be to peace if we left a nation with no alternative to war as its supreme hope!

There is only one true solution to the problem. Instead of rebuilding Europe without Germany, or rebuilding Germany and the other European nations separately, all in their old rigid attitudes of national egotism, we must rebuild Germany and Europe together, within a framework of progressive federalism. German industry will then not be controlled by the Allies, that is to say the conquerors, in such a way as to perpetuate the rivalry and hatred born of war: it will be controlled, like the rest of European industry, by a European technical commission in which Germany will take part on the same footing as the other associated nations, in accordance with federalist principles. Germany's coal output will not be disposed of arbitrarily by the occupying powers but similarly by a European federal commision, in the same way as Belgian, English and French coal and that of the other European nations; and so on for all other raw materials. No doubt some priority must be given to the reparation of damage caused by the aggressor armies. But the peoples of Europe will also be entitled to expect American aid in rebuilding towns that the US air force had to destroy for the sake of world freedom.

Thanks to this collective organization in economic and technical matters, the European nations will come to realize their profound solidarity and will acquire the habit of collaboration: slowly but surely, the federal spirit will be

born. Then Germany will not have to choose between Communism and nationalism, but will share the same hope as other European countries: the construction of Europe itself, a Europe independent of Soviet ideology and of American products, and thus able to ensure peace between the two empires in the same way as she maintains it on her own territory.

We must make our own choice. We can have peace of a traditional kind, with a dictat by the conqueror causing the vanquished to thirst for revenge and thus sowing the seeds of another war – a peace which is no more than a truce, the kind of peace which has given us centuries of war. The alternative is peace of a new kind which, while duly providing for reparations, would replace the ideas of 'conqueror' and 'conquered' by that of a common effort to enable mankind to live properly once more – a peace which would put an end to interminable national rivalries and establish true collaboration among nations, a peace which would at last shut up the gates of war.

This is the choice we must make, knowing that on it depends not only the future of civilization – a large term, and also a somewhat vague one — but also the future of each one of us.

13. August Pinton: in favour of a 'Marshall Plan' Europe

18 Sept. 1947

Radical Republican and Radical Socialist Party, 39th national congress, 18–21 Sept. 1947, stenographic record (in Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, Paris), pp. 81–6; extract from 'Report on foreign policy' by August Pinton.

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Once the Marshall Plan was launched, if not earlier, the opposition of Radicals to a closer association of European nations gave way to enthusiasm for the integration of western Europe in harmony with US policy. Édouard Herriot became honorary president of the Conseil français pour l'Europe unie, and Paul Bastid one of its vice-presidents. Pierre de Félice, Félix Gaillard and other Radical deputies joined the European Parliamentary Union, inspired by Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, and the federalist group in the French Assembly.[1] *At the 1947 party congress Senator Auguste Pinton, the* rapporteur *for foreign affairs, gave reasons for the change of attitude and urged that the Marshall Plan should be used as a means of putting federalist principles into action.*

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There remains this last condition, and I do not underrate the immense difficulties to which it gives rise. We must 'make Europe', that is to say a European federal system which, while preserving necessary differences and respecting

1 O'Neill, *French Radical Party*, pp. 17, 22, 27–9. On the parliamentary group of federalists cf. below, introduction to doc. 16; on the European Parliamentary Union see Lipgens, *Doc. Eur. Integr.*, vol. 4, ch. II.

the independence and spirituality of all its members, will enable us to create a single unit no less rich in economic potential than either of the two others, and probably superior in intellectual and moral influence. I know only too well what anxieties may be aroused in each of you by the sweeping statement I have just made. I feel them myself; I well know what sacrifices the new policy may involve, what changes in the structure of human society, what mental revolution on the part of those who accept it. But, alas, we must either overcome our feelings or perish.

And I wish to rebut the accusation, of which we hear so much, that this is some kind of plot to create a western anti-Soviet bloc. It is pointless to talk of being against the formation of blocs, for they already exist and confront each other, to the peril of our lives and civilization. This being so, may it not be our best course to prevent Europe being, as hitherto, a stake in somebody's game or, before long, a prey to be disputed? We have no intention of being the stalking horse of either antagonistic group, still less a battleground between them.

I will go further. If this European federation could be brought about, would it not be an element of equilibrium and peace between the two rival forces? – and assuredly each of its members has paid a dear enough price for the right to aspire to peace and uphold it with all its might.

Let no one think the task is easy. The difficulties are innumerable and at first sight almost insurmountable – this I know too well. In saying this I may be offending your deepest and most creditable feelings, but in our situation we must do or die – and our nation cannot die. (...)

The Radical Party gratefully welcomes General Marshall's speech of 5 June. It believes that the offer contained therein is of vital interest to European nations, especially France, and also that it is perfectly compatible with the independence of the countries which would benefit from it. While regretting that Soviet intransigence has led to some European nations standing aside, the Party is ready to cooperate to make the plan a success and will not be deflected from its task by what it hopes is no more than a temporary rupture. But it believes that success depends on two main conditions:

1. Each of the beneficiaries must make an intense effort towards recovery. This will require of France a policy of courage, hard work and authority, which the Radical Party believes to be compatible with respect for republican interests and democracy, and with which it wishes to be associated, but which, to its regret, no government of this country has really displayed since the Liberation.

2. The plan will only succeed if each European nation is prepared to make the necessary sacrifice of sovereignty and to take the first steps towards a European federation. This does not mean that France intends to join one or other of the antagonistic 'blocs', but on the contrary that she desires, in a world that is more and more merciless to the small and weak, to help in the creation of a great political reality, equal to the others in economic strength and superior in its spiritual resources, and capable of providing the element of stability that is so essential to the maintenance of peace. (...)

14. Gaston Palewski: organs of European federation 17 Feb. 1948

Speech at the Vélodrome d'Hiver, Paris; the following extract published in *Le Rassemblement*, 28 Feb. 1948.

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Although de Gaulle at no time committed himself unequivocally to the federalist principle, he accepted as members of the Rassemblement du Peuple français (RPF) politicians who, while in exile in London and Algiers, had already been convinced of the need for supranational solutions and who, in the days of the cold war, joined the campaign for a large measure of federalism in Europe. Among them were René Capitant, Michel Debré, Louis Joxe, Gaston Palewski and Jacques Soustelle.[1] *This enabled de Gaulle to enlist as much as possible of the opposition on to his side and also to force a breach with Great Britain, which he was confident would not accept any form of federalist integration. Early in 1948 Palewski proposed to the RPF the outline of a union which presented clearly federalist features and indicated more closely how Germany might be integrated in Europe, in terms that were acceptable also to de Gaulle.*

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Europe will not be created by means of privileged powers offering bilateral pacts, but on a basis of international democracy – that is to say, by a multilateral pact ensuring the political independence and strategic security of Europe.

How Europe will be federated

Representatives of all the countries concerned – and all European countries are still invited – could meet in Paris to set up a regional organization of the kind envisaged in Article 52 of the UN Charter, to be known as the European Federation.

The Congress of the Federation will appoint a governing body, an Economic Council and a Court of Arbitration.

Extent of powers

The member states will guarantee one another's territorial integrity and political independence. The powers of the federation, involving the limitation of the sovereign rights of states, will be confined to defending member states against external aggression and to necessary measures of economic cooperation and the harmonizing of legislation.

Economic cooperation

Two sets of negotiations which involve much detailed work may be started at once:

1 For the war period cf. Pierre Guillen, 'Plans by Exiles from France', *Doc. Eur. Integr.*, vol. 2, pp. 279–352, and also the work by Michel Debré and Emmanuel Monick, published under a pseudonym: Jacquier-Bruyère, *Demain la paix*, Paris, 1945. For 1948–50 see Philippe Manin, *Le Rassemblement du peuple français (R.P.F.) et les problèmes européens*, Paris, 1966, pp. 102–6.

1. For the establishment of a single customs tariff.
2. For the subsequent reduction and ultimate abolition of customs duties.

For this purpose a joint tariff will first be agreed upon for a certain number of key products that play the major part in West European trade.

The question of Germany

To organize the future of Germany it is important to determine without delay the frontiers of the new German states on former Reich territory in the West: the Rhineland, Bavaria, the Palatinate, Baden-Württemberg, Lower Saxony, Hesse-Nassau, Schleswig-Holstein and – under a special regime – the state of Westphalia, including the Ruhr district.

These states shall determine their own institutions and leaders by referendum. They should, without delay, be linked with other West European states by economic agreements.

The state of Westphalia shall be directly administered by the Directorate of the European federation.

Clearly the organs of this federation must function under Allied control. The German states must for a time continue to be protected by the occupying powers till they gradually attain independent status. But they will achieve that status if they act in a European spirit.

Why must France be the centre of the federation?

Because France is disinterested, and has neither the power nor the desire to exercise hegemony, openly or otherwise. In addition she is better able than any other European power to help supply Western Europe with iron ore, bauxite and phosphates, and above all with food products from metropolitan France and Africa. Thus under the leadership of France – united to Britain by sisterly ties but not, like her, distracted by the needs of a world-wide empire – we may hope to see the creation of Europe, the second strongest economic power in the world, and a necessary stabilizing factor if the threat to peace is to be averted.

15. Michel Mouskhely and Gaston Stefani: 'Draft of a European federal constitution' 5 March 1948

MS in the Archives of the European Movement in Bruges, UEF Documents;[1] hectograph copy in Andrea Chiti-Batelli, *Progetti di costituzione per una Unione europea*, Rome, 1978, pp. 139–45; German tr. in Walter Lipgens (ed.), *45 Jahre Kampf um europäische Verfassung*, Bonn, 1986, pp. 229–235. The translation below is unabridged.

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This outline of a European federal constitution was drawn up in the spring of 1948 by Michel Mouskhely and Gaston Stafani, two professors of jurisprudence at Strasburg

1 I am indebted to the late Prof. Walter Lipgens for providing me with this MS.

university who were members of the UEF and at that time held visiting professorships in Cairo. In the second half of the year the draft was submitted to the International Coordinating Committee of the Movements for European Unity, but had no direct effect on the latter's work. François de Menthon, leader of the MRP parliamentary group, used it as the basis for a text which was presented in September 1948 to the EPU congress at Interlaken, and thus became part of the general discussion within the unification movement.[2]

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Preliminary Consideration

The authors of this draft have been obliged to take account of certain political, economic and social realities, the neglect of which would in their opinion be prejudicial to the formation of European union.

1. The first of these is the existence of national sentiment and the national particularism of all European peoples, which accounts for their stubborn determination to maintain their sovereign independence at all costs. There is no doubt that this sovereign independence becomes more illusory every day, as the history of the last thirty years has shown, while economic independence is already no more than a myth. Although the peoples of Europe are more or less aware that there cannot be true political independence without economic independence, they none the less continue to think and act in 'national' terms. No plan for European unity can succeed if it ignores this basic fact.

2. It is also a fact that many European states are and have long been linked to non-European communities by legal or political ties which they will not willingly renounce in favour of a European federation. Therefore such a federation must not interfere with existing ties and must respect these particular solidarities – the maintenance of which can, moreover, only facilitate the geographical extension of a federal union of nations. Care must be taken that existing relationships are fitted into the framework of a European association in a federalist spirit.

3. Attention must be paid to the diversity of the economic and social structure of the European countries which it is sought to unite, and the divergent theoretical conceptions that they express. Given this reality, it would be premature and imprudent to seek to impose on all European states a uniform economic and social system inspired by an *a priori* doctrine, or to apply such a doctrine from the outset against the certain opposition of many states. At the same time it may be necessary here and now to envisage the harmonization of economic and social regimes in accordance with federalist principles.

4. At a time when the peoples of Europe, exhausted by two wars and concerned above all with their material existence, seem to have lost faith in a national renaissance and in the future of their continent, only the federalist doctrine can restore their confidence and revive their energies, by making

2 Cf. W. Lipgens (ed.), *45 Jahre Kampf*, op. cit., pp. 243–262. A year later the authors developed their ideas in book form: Michel Mouskhely and Gaston Stefani, *L'Europe face au fédéralisme*, Strasburg and Paris, 1949.

them understand that their countries cannot recover without the rebirth of Europe and the adaptation of their institutions to federalist principles.

Such are the real factors that must always be borne in mind if a European federation is to be created and maintained. Hence the present draft, without proposing too severe restrictions on national sovereignty, does contain provisions that would strengthen the federal bond and so increase the power of the federal state.

I. Preamble

In the light of these general considerations, the authors believe that the objectives of a European federal constitution should be as follows.

1. Political

(a) To guarantee the political independence and territorial integrity of each member state.

(b) To provide each state with aid and assistance for the purpose of maintaining internal peace and order.

(c) To ensure that individuals are permitted to exercise the political rights and freedoms provided for by the constitution of their respective states.

2. Economic and social

(a) To promote economic development, ensure the prosperity of states and promote the general welfare of all inhabitants of the federation.

(b) To guarantee that individuals and groups are permitted to exercise the economic and social rights provided for by the constitution of their respective states.

(c) To ensure peace and social security and provide conditions of life for individuals and families, consonant with human dignity and respect for the human person.

Note: For the reasons indicated in 'Preliminary Considerations' the authors think it preferable not to formulate in more detail the federalist principles on which this draft constitution is based.

II. Charter of Federal Rights

For the same reasons it seems better for the present not to embody a 'Charter of the rights of man' in the federal Constitution. Undue haste on this point is not desirable: it is preferable to allow each state to maintain its own system, in the hope that a single system will one day result from the closer association of peoples and the reinforcement of their solidarity within the federation.

On the other hand, the federal Constitution should contain a 'Charter of federal rights'. As opposed to national rights, which derive from the constitution of each state, federal rights are those that are conferred or recognized by the federal Constitution and may only be exercised within the limits fixed by it.

The federal state being an association of individuals and states, federal rights must be accorded to individuals and states.

1. Federal rights of individuals

(a) The right of suffrage for the purpose of electing certain organs of the federal state.

(b) The right to federal nationality

(c) The right of direct access to organs of the federal government

(d) The right to move freely within the territory of the federal state

(e) Equal treatment in respect of civil rights (as opposed to political rights) in each member state, as compared with the latter's citizens: freedom to work and trade, freedom of civil, commercial and professional establishment etc.

2. Federal rights of states

(a) The right of sovereignty within the limits of the federal Constitution.

(b) The right, under the supervision of the federal state, to exercise powers of administration in non-European territories already under their authority and to maintain their political or juridical unions with foreign communities in so far as they do not tend to prejudice the federal link or jeopardize the interests of the federation.

(c) The right to participate in international unions or organizations whose purposes are not contrary to the principles of the federal Constitution, provided they respect the interests of other members of the federation and do nothing that may directly or indirectly compromise the federal link.

(d) The right to maintain independent diplomatic relations in so far as the federal Constitution allows them to conclude treaties with foreign states.

(e) The right to conclude treaties:

(i) With foreign states. Any member of the federation may conclude treaties with non-member states concerning neighbourly relations and frontier police, saving the rights of the federation and other member states.

Those states which already belong to the political or juridical unions referred to in (b) above, and they alone, may conclude treaties with foreign states for the preservation of such unions, subject to the approval of the federal government.

(ii) With other member states. Any member state may conclude conventions with another member state for purposes of legislation, administration and justice, with the approval and under the supervision of the federal government.

(f) The right of a member state to defend itself by force against aggression by a foreign state, provided the federal government is at once informed.

(g) The right to participate in the organization and functioning of the federal state.

(h) The right of direct recourse to federal organs for the settlement of disputes with another member state or its nationals.

Note: It may appear surprising that this Charter speaks of the sovereignty of member states. It is important to note that they no longer enjoy sovereignty as of right: the federal Constitution does not 'recognize' it but confers it upon them, within the limits fixed by itself.

It may also appear surprising that so large a measure of international competence is left to member states. This, however, is not contrary to the essence of federalism, which is capable of respecting particular solidarities and

adapting itself fully to the complexity of real situations. In present circumstances it is evident that a European federation is only possible if states are allowed a certain international competence and are allowed to go on administering territories already subject to their authority. Moreover, if states are allowed to remain members of certain unions or join new organizations, this can only be favourable to the geographical extension of the federal link.

III. Fundamental Constitutional Provisions

Believing that it is premature to go into details of constitutional organization, we only indicate here certain basic principles.

1. Organization of the federal state

Three organs: legislature, executive and judiciary

A. The legislative organ

Legislative power resides in a federal Assembly consisting of a Federal Chamber and a Chamber of States

(a) The Federal Chamber or House of Representatives

The Federal Chamber is intended to represent the people of the federation, in the same manner as the lower house in unitary states. It must therefore be elected by direct and universal suffrage, each state having a number of representatives proportionate to its population. The Constitution must determine the electoral quota, the duration of the mandate, the method of re-election, the conditions of election and eligibility. The application of these provisions will be governed by a federal electoral law.

(b) The Chamber of States

Whereas the Federal Chamber represents the people of the federation, the Chamber of States represents member states directly. Each should have the same number of members, to be laid down in the Constitution, and should be free to choose its own representatives.

The Chamber of States should play the same part in federal government as the Upper House in a unitary state. This should be the criterion for determining the duration of the mandate of members of this Chamber (longer than for the Federal Chamber) and the method of its renewal (by a half or one-third at a time).

(c) Provisions concerning both Chambers

1. Competence. (i) To pass federal laws on matters of federal concern; (ii) To approve certain treaties concluded by the federal government; (iii) To pass the federal budget; (iv) To elect members of the federal government.

2. No law or measure may be adopted except with the consent of both Chambers, debating separately and by absolute majority of members present.

3. There might be provision for a plenary session of both Chambers for certain questions such as the election of members of the federal government etc.

4. Legal status of members of the two Chambers: incompatibility of functions, immunities, salaries etc.; the application of these provisions to be laid down by federal law.

B. The executive organ: the Federal Council

(a) Composition: 10 members at most, elected by the Federal Assembly for the same term as members of the House of Representatives, by a procedure to be determined.

Not more than one representative per state. At least three Council members should belong to countries with a population of over 20 million.

The Council should elect its own President for a term of one year, and should decide the allocation of ministerial duties.

(b) Powers of the Council:

1. To execute federal laws and decisions of the Supreme Court
2. To negotiate and conclude treaties
3. Control of the federal armed forces
4. To maintain order and security within the federal state
5. To organize and coordinate the technical bodies set up by the Federal Assembly
6. To appoint all civil servants of the federation. However, appointments of judges of the Supreme Court and federal diplomatic representatives must be approved by the Chamber of States.

C. Judiciary organ: the Federal Supreme Court

(a) Organization

1. Number of members: 11 to 15
2. President appointed by the Federal Council or elected by the other members of the Court
3. Judges' tenure: until retirement age (65 or 70)

(b) Competence

The Court is competent to pronounce on all disputes arising from the application, interpretation and execution of the Constitution and federal laws.

Note: This formula is intentionally couched in very broad terms. The authors are aware of the importance of the Supreme Court's role in a federation, but prefer that the Court should itself determine the limits of its competence, having regard to the degree of strength of the federal bond.

The Court might also be empowered to judge crimes and misdemeanours committed by senior officials of the Federal government in the exercise of their duties.

2. Powers of the federal state

A. The federal state shall have power to:

(a) Maintain diplomatic relations with member states

(b) Ensure the defence of the federal territory, and for this purpose to organize a federal army, possess armaments factories and supervise the arms factories of member states

(c) Establish trade relations with member states and regulate trade within the federation

(d) Establish a single system of weights and measures

(e) Institute a federal monetary system and federal banks

(f) Contract loans

(g) Fix customs duties

(h) Make use of the revenue contributed by member states in proportion to

their national income, also customs receipts and all other assets produced by enterprises or economic institutions created or managed by the federal state.

(i) Take part in the organization of international transport and regulate transport within the federation

(j) Regulate communication by post, telegraph, telephone and radio with foreign states and among member states of the federation

(k) Regulate immigration and emigration

(l) Enact legislation concerning nationality and passports

(m) Regulate the production and use of atomic energy, and control or supervise the use of hydraulic energy and mineral wealth.

B. All powers that are not delegated to the federal state by the Constitution, or expressly withdrawn from member states, shall be exercised by those states.

3. Relations between the federal state and its members

(1) Federal law shall take precedence over the national law of member states.

(2) Principle of mediate administration: decisions by all organs of the federal state shall be carried out under its supervision in each member state by agents or officials of that state.

(3) Citizens of the federal state shall have dual nationality: that of the federation and that of the member state to which they belong. As federal citizens they shall enjoy the rights granted by the Constitution in all parts of federal territory. In no case may they claim the political rights that a member state grants to its own nationals.

Acquisition of the nationality of a member state shall confer full entitlement to national citizenship.

4. General provisions

A. Admission of new members

(a) Any European state may become a member of the federation provided its form of government is democratic and representative and that its constitution contains nothing contrary to the federal Constitution.

(b) States shall be admitted by a decision of the Federal Assembly taken by an absolute majority after separate deliberation by the two Chambers.

B. Revision of the Federal Constitution

(a) A total or partial revision of the Constitution may be requested either by the Federal Council or by a two-thirds vote of either Chamber, or by two thirds of the member states.

(b) Revision must be approved by an absolute majority of both Houses and ratified by two thirds of member states.

C. Participation of the federal state in international unions and organizations

The federal state may join with other states or groups of states to form international unions or a world federation.

Note: The above statement of basic principles is neither definitive nor complete. It will no doubt provoke discussion and criticism, in the light of which the authors will develop and modify the substance and/or form of their proposals. Only after this can they usefully draft the preamble and interim mea-

sures necessary for the entry into force and operation of the federal Constitution.

16. National Assembly: motion for the convening of a European Constituent Assembly 19 March 1948

A. National Assembly, Annex to record of the session of 19 March 1948, No. 3889, repr. in Edouard Bonnefous, *L'Idée européenne et sa réalisation*, Paris, 1950, p. 190; B. ibid., pp. 190–2; both texts here unabridged.

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A. Motion by 169 deputies

In June 1947 there was formed a 'groupe parlementaire fédéraliste français' including Deputies of all parties except the Communists. Besides convinced federalists its members included some sceptics and pragmatists who leant towards unionist or functionalist solutions; all, however, thought it desirable for the French government to take bolder initiatives to bring about a measure of West European unity. The chairman was Paul Rivet (SFIO); the vice-chairman included Edmond Michelet (MRP), Edgar Faure (Radical), Edouard Bonnefous (UDSR: Union Démocratique et Socialiste de la Résistance); and René Coty (Indépendants).[1] *On 19 March 1948, by which time the Marshall Plan had taken concrete shape, while the dramatic events in Czechoslovakia had greatly increased fears of Soviet expansionism, the group moved a resolution drafted by Bonnefous, Rivet and the two MRP representatives François de Menthon and André Noël, calling on the government to 'work for the early convening of a European Constituent Assembly'. The motion, which was concerted with similar initiatives in the British and Dutch parliaments,*[2] *was signed by 169 deputies including: for the SFIO, Gérard Jaquet, Pierre-Olivier Lapie, André Philip, André Le Troquer and Paul Ramadier; for the MRP, Alfred Coste-Floret, Jean-Paul Palewski, Marc Sangnier, Marc Scherer, Maurice Schumann and Louis Terrenoire; for the Radicals, Jean-Paul David, Yvon Delbos and Edgar Faure; for the Indépendants, André Mutter.*[3]

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Preamble

The need for an economic and political association of the countries of Europe is no longer questioned by anyone in France. In many other European countries opinion is moving in the same direction.

The fate of Europe as a whole will depend on the success or failure in the next few months of the work of unification that has already begun. Considerable obstacles remain to be surmounted. No one disputes that there must be transitional arrangements to reconcile national interests and that a

1 Cf. Lipgens, *History*, pp. 601–5, with a list of all members up to July 1947. For the fact that many members were less than fully attached to federalism cf. doc. 18 below and O'Neill, *French Radical Party*, pp. 27 f.

2 Cf. below, doc. 113 (Netherlands) and doc. 206 (Great Britain).

3 For a full list of signatories see Bonnefous, *L'Idée européenne*, p. 189; and, for the general context, Loth, *Sozialismus*, pp. 206 f.

permanent association of European countries can only be achieved by degrees. In view of these difficulties and delays, it seems to us that the efficacy and prudence of diplomatic action must be reinforced by direct intervention and organized collaboration by the democratic representatives of the respective nations. The dramatic urgency of the task calls for exceptional procedures and for a decisive manifestation of popular support.

It is essential for such an initiative to be taken by the French parliament, and we therefore move the following

RESOLUTION

The National Assembly calls for the early convening of a European Constituent Assembly to establish the permanent institutions of a democratic European federation.

The Constituent Assembly shall be composed of representatives of the parliaments of all nations prepared to join together in a European federation.

The National Assembly invites the French Government to approach European governments urgently for the purpose of negotiating an agreement on the composition and convening of the European Constituent Assembly.

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B. Report of the foreign affairs committee

The motion was referred in the first instance to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly. The Committee was for the most part doubtful of the possibility of achieving unity by convening a constituent assembly, and this proposal failed to gain a majority. However, on 28 July 1948 the Committee adopted by 21 votes to 6 (Communists) a report drawn up by Marc Scherer (MRP) recommending that the plenary body pass a resolution in favour of a consultative assembly.[4] It proved unnecessary for the assembly to debate this report, as on 20 July Bidault, the foreign minister (who was manoeuvring to maintain his position in the current governmental crisis) proposed to the Council of the Brussels Pact countries that a 'European parliamentary assembly' be convened to 'exchange views' on the problems of European union. On 18 August the new government under André Marie repeated the proposal that members of the Pact should discuss the creation of such an assembly.[5]

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Although the draft resolution speaks of a constituent assembly, your Committee considers it preferable not to use this specific term. Desirable as the idea of a European constitution may seem to everyone, it is not clear to all that it is likely to be realized in the near future. In Europe as it still is, the old prejudice of the absolute sovereignty of states is far from having lost all its virulence, despite repeated proofs of how harmful it can be. In consequence it is at least doubtful that a European assembly, however noble its intentions, could

4 *L'Année politique* 1948, p. 126; Bonnefous, *L'Idée européenne*, p. 190.

5 Cf. Loth, *Sozialismus*, pp. 211 f., and Geoffrey Warner, 'Die britische Labour-Regierung und die Einheit Westeuropas 1949–1951', *VfZG* 28 (1980), pp. 310–30, esp. pp. 317 f.

succeed in drawing up a political charter to which all countries and governments would subscribe.

[*The report went on to specify the object of the future assembly:*]

What should be the tasks of an assembly of this kind, which should not be regarded by anyone as a mere academy of parliamentarians? In the first place your Committee suggests that, in addition to economic and cultural coordination, the European assembly should draw up an international declaration of the rights of men and nations. This is not a new idea: it has already been the subject of a motion in our own Assembly proposed by MM. François de Menthon and Edgar Faure, and reported on by M. Alfred Coste-Floret on behalf of this Committee. But no agency would seem better qualified to draw up and proclaim such a declaration than an assembly of delegates of all the democratic nations of Europe.

[*The Assembly should be, first and foremost, a means of coordinating all existing agreements among Western nations.*]

It would be one of the ambitions and tasks of the European assembly to coordinate all these elements by studying and proposing a general plan of economic organization, and perhaps political and military as well, which would enable Europe to take a great step forward towards union, prosperity and peace.

The essential role of the assembly would thus be to work out and propose overall plans in all fields so as to reinforce the union of European nations.

In the economic sphere, scarcely any objection is now raised to the coordination of customs systems so as to minimize restrictions on trade. It would be for the European assembly to proceed further on these lines by putting forward, if required, a plan for the rationalization of European production and the coherent organization of markets in Europe and elsewhere.

In the social and cultural sphere – and it is here that tangible results can no doubt be attained most speedily – the authority of the European assembly will be of importance in ensuring that social progress continues equally in all countries and that the free movement of persons and ideas is facilitated to the utmost, this being the only way to consolidate the essential values and defence of our civilization.

In the political sphere – which is, as we have said, a more distant objective – it will certainly be necessary in due course to draw up a federal constitution for a European federation of nations, defining the powers, institutions, organs and arbitration procedures of a European union. Only a European assembly is competent to draw up and propose such a constitution.

[*Finally the Committee proposed the following resolution:*]

The National Assembly invites the Government to take urgent steps to negotiate with the governments of nations prepared to join together to form a European union, for the purpose of convening a European Assembly of parliamentary representatives, whose tasks should be:

1. To draw up and proclaim an international declaration of the rights of man.

2. To coordinate measures for European recovery.