

AUFSTIEG UND NIEDERGANG DER RÖMISCHEN WELT
BAND II. 34.3

RISE AND DECLINE OF THE ROMAN WORLD
VOLUME II. 34.3

AUFSTIEG UND NIEDERGANG
DER RÖMISCHEN WELT
(ANRW)

RISE AND DECLINE
OF THE ROMAN WORLD

HERAUSGEGEBEN VON / EDITED BY
WOLFGANG HAASE
UND / AND
HILDEGARD TEMPORINI

TEIL II: PRINCIPAT
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3. TEILBAND:

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ZEIT UND ALLGEMEINES ZUR LITERATUR DES
2. UND 3. JAHRHUNDERTS (FORTS.)

HERAUSGEGEBEN
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WOLFGANG HAASE



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SPRACHE UND LITERATUR

(EINZELNE AUTOREN SEIT DER
HADRIANISCHEN ZEIT UND ALLGEMEINES ZUR
LITERATUR DES 2. UND 3. JAHRHUNDERTS
[FORTS.]

Philosophical Sermons: The 'Dialexeis' of Maximus of Tyre

by MICHAEL B. TRAPP, London

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The forty-one 'Dialexeis' of Maximus of Tyre are of considerable importance for an understanding of the literature and culture of the later second century A. D.¹ Their philosophical content provides, in the words of a recent

¹ Although the 'Dialexeis' can be dated thus with reasonable confidence, preciser details of their genesis and of the career of their composer are hard to come by. They present themselves as the scripts of a set of lectures delivered to an audience of νέοι (1.7ε, 1.8c-d) – conventionally the principal though not the only age-group to which philosophical instruction was addressed. While it might seem excessively cautious to doubt that some such performances took place, the fact remains that we can reconstruct neither the precise circumstances nor any changes that may have taken place in the passage from spoken discourses to written text. A date and a place of performance are given by the title to the principal manuscript, Parisinus graecus 1962 (τῶν ἐν Ῥώμῃ διαλέξεων τῆς πρώτης ἐπιδημίας), and by the entry on Maximus that passed from Hesychius into the Suda (διέτριψε δὲ ἐν Ῥώμῃ ἐπὶ Κομόδου) – two items that are perhaps connected and so constitute only a single strand of evidence between them. In general terms Rome and the reign of Commodus (A. D. 180–192) are entirely plausible, but obscurities remain. The title in Paris. gr. 1962 may have been meant to apply only to a part of the corpus, not to the whole: see H. HOBEIN's Teubner text, Leipzig, 1910, pp. xxi–xxvii; H. MUTSCHMANN, *Das erste Auftreten des Maximus von Tyrus in Rom, Sokrates. Zeitschrift für das Gymnasialwesen* 5 (1917), pp. 185–197; G. L. KONIARIS, *On Maximus of Tyre: Zetemata* (I), *Classical Antiquity* 1.1 (1982), pp. 88–102. If this was indeed the case, then part of the corpus remains without even an alleged time and place of original performance. As for the career of its composer, almost equally little can be said with any certainty. His Tyrian origins, together with the visit to Rome in the time of Commodus, attested by the Suda and Paris. gr. 1962, are the only straightforward data available. An agnoscitur some thirty

study, “useful evidence of what was common currency by way of Platonic philosophy in the latter half of th[at] ... century”.² Their rhetorical form and presentation, impossible to parallel precisely from the works of other authors, add significantly to our knowledge of the range of formal possibilities open to literary composers of the period. They are valuable documents both in the history of epideictic oratory (and of the associated written literature) and in the history of philosophical preaching. Both in their subject-matter and in their rich literary decoration they complement and confirm the picture of second-century Hellenic παιδεία that may be derived from our other surviving sources.

It is on the form and context of the ‘Dialexeis’ rather than their philosophical content that the present essay concentrates: their presentation, their rhetorical structure and style, and their place in ancient literary and cultural tradition. Some work has already been done in this area: most substantially by KARL DÜRR, in his monograph of 1899, but also more recently by G. L. KONIARIS.³ Debts to both of these scholars will be much in evidence in what follows, but the aim is to incorporate their approaches and results into a more rounded presentation of the ‘Dialexeis’ than has yet been attempted. A brief consideration of the philosophical content is, however, necessary by way of introduction.

I. Subject-matter and Philosophical Orientation

The range of subject-matter dealt with in the ‘Dialexeis’ may most quickly be grasped by referring to the list of titles provided on fol. 146 of Parisinus graecus 1962 (the principal manuscript) and reproduced on pages lxxiv ff. of HERMANN HOBEIN’s Teubner text, as also on pages 355–6 of

to forty years earlier (Ol. 232 = 149–152 A.D.) was indeed alleged by Eusebius, but is again open to doubt: the same date is given for Arrian, for whom it is certainly too late, and Eusebius mistakenly makes both Arrian and Maximus tutors to Marcus Aurelius (see G. SOURY, *Aperçus de philosophie religieuse chez Maxime de Tyr, platonicien éclectique*, Paris, 1942, pp. 11–14; and J. PUIGGALI, *Étude sur les Dialexeis de Maxime de Tyr*, Lille [Atelier National de Reproduction des Thèses], 1983, pp. 9–12²). Similarly untrustworthy is the suggested identification with the Claudius Maximus to whom are dedicated Books 1–3 of Artemidorus’s ‘Onirocritica’, for whom see PIR² II, p. 120 (C 509) and the discussions listed by R. PACK, *Artemidori Onirocritica*, Leipzig (Teubner), 1963, pp. xxvf. (adding PUIGGALI, *op. cit.*, pp. 11 f. and M. B. TRAPP, *Maximus of Tyre. The Philosophical Orations*, Oxford, 1997, pp. xi–xii).

² J. DILLON, *The Middle Platonists. A study of Platonism*, London, 1977, p. 400.

³ K. DÜRR, *Sprachliche Untersuchungen zu den Dialexeis des Maximus von Tyrus*, *Philologus Supplementband 8* (Leipzig 1899), pp. 1–156; G. L. KONIARIS, *op. cit.* n. 1 and *Id.*, *On Maximus of Tyre: Zetemata* (II), *Classical Antiquity 2.2* (1983), pp. 212–250.

TRAPP's Teubneriana, or pages LV–LVI of KONIARIS's edition.⁴ It is immediately obvious what the predominant interests of the collection are. No fewer than twenty-seven of the forty-one items are billed as dealing with issues in theoretical or practical ethics. Another six are ethical in a looser sense, in that they raise questions of education and cultural value. To set against this, a mere six confront topics in the subject-area of theology and physics, while only two venture into the territory of psychology and the theory of knowledge.⁵ No interest at all is shown in logic. The forty-one 'Dialexeis' do not therefore seek to provide anything like a complete course in the major issues of philosophy, of the kind envisaged or reflected in such near-contemporary texts as the 'Isagoge' of Albinus or the 'Didascalicus' of Alcinous.^{5a}

Nor indeed do the individual pieces seem to have been arranged in any very systematic way. The oldest surviving ordering, that of the Paris manuscript, is evidently the product of a dislocation, which shifted six *διαλέξεις* to the head of the collection from a position three-quarters of the way through.⁶ But even when the six are restored to what seems to have been their earlier position, no coherent scheme emerges. The sense of a measured progression from area to area, or from less to more demanding material – such as one finds, for instance, in the 'Epistles' of Seneca – is not to be found here. Nor (though this is a more difficult matter to assess) does one detect any calculated effort to produce an elegant *ποικιλία*.⁷

As for the doctrinal allegiances of the 'Dialexeis', their principal constituent has generally been agreed to be a form of Platonism, specifically of

⁴ The titles given in the manuscript are not, however, wholly accurate. A good number conflict not only with the actual content of the *διάλεξις* to which they are attached, but also with the author's own statement of his theme: compare for example 13.2c and 25.2d with the respective titles. The natural inference is that the titles are the work of an editor, not the author himself: so HOBEIN, *op. cit.* n. 1, p. liv, ineffectually contested by KONIARIS, *op. cit.* n. 1, pp. 102–110; cf. also TRAPP, *op. cit.* n. 1, pp. xxxii, lviii.

⁵ Ethics: 2, 3, 7, 12, 14–16, 18–21, 23–25, 27–36, 38–40; plus 1, 4, 17, 22, 26 and 37. Theology and Physics: 5, 8–9, 11, 13 and 41. Theory of knowledge: 6 and 10.

^{5a} Cf. J. WHITTAKER, *Platonic Philosophy in the Early Centuries of the Empire*, ANRW II. 36.1, ed. W. HAASE, Berlin–New York, 1987, pp. 81–123 and L. DEITZ, *Bibliographie du platonisme impérial antérieur à Plotin*; 1926–1986, *ib.* pp. 124–182 (on Albinus and Alcinous pp. 135–137, on Maximus of Tyre p. 154).

⁶ Dialexeis 30–35 HOBEIN, which are items 1 to 6 in Paris. gr. 1962. See HOBEIN's Teubner text, pp. xxi–xxvii; MUTSCHMANN, *op. cit.* n. 1; PUIGGALI, *op. cit.* n. 1, pp. 13–21; KONIARIS, *op. cit.* n. 1, pp. 88–102 and TRAPP, *op. cit.* n. 1, pp. lviii–lx. A still further dislocated ordering, beginning with Dialexis 11 HOBEIN, is first seen in Laurentianus Conv. Sopp. 4 (a late fourteenth century manuscript perhaps made for Nicephorus Gregoras) and may well have originated there. Via a descendant of Conv. Sopp. 4, borrowed by STEPHANUS from ARLENIUS (HOBEIN's α), this became the order of the editio princeps, and of all printed editions up to DAVIES's second of 1740; see further TRAPP, *op. cit.* n. 1, pp. lxiii, lxxxii, lxxxvi.

⁷ The further question of the relationship between the order in the manuscript and any orally delivered 'course' of lectures must remain open.

the Middle Platonism of the first two-and-a-half centuries A.D.⁸ They may indeed indulge in a good deal of simplification, and of vagueness over issues where a distinctive partisan stance might have been expected of a Platonist; there are also some startling omissions (no mention of the theory of Forms; no concern to distinguish the transcendent God from his *Logos* or the World Soul).⁹ However, enough distinctive stances are taken on 'polarizing issues' – divine transcendence; the division of reality into a higher and a lower realm of differing value and ontological status; the partition of the soul – for the whole collection to take on a Platonic, rather than a Stoic or a Peripatetic colouring.¹⁰

Some scholars have found it appropriate to speak of 'eclecticism' in discussing the philosophical orientation of the 'Dialexeis'.¹¹ This is probably a false step. It is true that ideas, formulae and terminology of ultimately Stoic and Peripatetic origins make their appearances at one point or another in the corpus;¹² but it is unrealistic to attribute their presence to any conscious effort to combine Platonism with the doctrines of other schools. Rather, they should be read as symptoms of the way Platonism had grown by assimilation in the first two centuries A.D., and of the extent to which by that period all the schools could share a substantial language of art, irrespective of its origins.¹³ By this light the sources on which the author of the 'Dialexeis' drew for his ideas give every appearance of having been consistently Platonic.

It would therefore be paradoxical – at least to first appearances – if this same author should turn out not to seek to present himself as a Platonist, nor his lectures as an education in a specifically Platonic view of the world and human experience. Yet such is arguably the case. Platonic doctrine may provide the substance of the 'Dialexeis', and Plato himself may indeed be invoked as a figure of authority with a deference not accorded to an Aristotle or a Chrysippus.¹⁴ But it is not clear that this suffices to

⁸ Both the Suda and Paris. gr. 1962 identify Maximus as Πλατωνικός; few scholars since have wished to deny that the label is at least in part correct. A partial exception is KONIARIS, op. cit. n. 3.

⁹ Pace DILLON, op. cit. n. 2, p. 400.

¹⁰ Divine transcendence: 11.6–12; 10.9. A 'two-storey' model of reality: 11.6–12; 10.9; 21.7. The divided and alienated soul: 7.5; 10.9; 16.4; 20.4; 21.7; 27.5. See further TRAPP, op. cit. n. 1, pp. xxvii–xxx.

¹¹ Especially SOURY, op. cit. n. 1.

¹² 'Peripatetic' elements: 6.4 (faculties of the soul); 11.8 (divine Mind); 29.1–5 (εὐδαιμονία); 33.7 (ἔργον); 1.2, 6.5, 27.7, 27.9 (μετρισιπάθεια). 'Stoic' elements: 9.1–4, 33.7–8 (Posidonius?); 5.5, 13.4, 13.8, 13.9 (εἰμαρμένη); 5.4, 41.4 (πρόνοια).

¹³ See DILLON, op. cit. n. 2, pp. 9 and 44–51 for discussion of this tendency in the case of Platonism, with TRAPP, op. cit. n. 1, p. xxvi.

¹⁴ See 10.3, 17.2, 20.4, 24.3, 26.7, 26.9, 27.5 and 41.2, where Plato's authority is appealed to in support of specific doctrines. The same is done for Aristotle only in 27.5, and never for Zeno or Chrysippus. Much has also been made of the declaration in 21.4: ἐγὼ γάρ τοι τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ τῆ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐλευθερίᾳ πείθομαι Πλάτωνι (following an echo of Protagoras 358a6 ff.). But this is primarily a defense of laxity with terminology and cannot be taken as equivalent to 'I am a Platonist'.

establish the author's pose as that of a declared and partisan Platonist. In the first place, the 'Dialexeis' are remarkable for the complete absence of the language of sectarian confrontation and exclusion (either when Plato is involved or at any other point). Plato's ideas are never directly contrasted with those of any other philosophers; the words Πλατωνικός, Στωϊκός, Ἀκαδημαϊκός, Περιπατητικός, ἡμέτεροι and ἐκεῖνοι are never used. Secondly, and equally significantly, Maximus seems to wish to offer a picture of the activity of philosophy and of its history that rules out such narrow sectarian allegiances. The division of philosophy into a multiplicity of competing sects is a fact that he acknowledges, but never presents as a matter for approval.¹⁵ Instead he looks back to a lost but happy past in which philosophical truth and philosophical teaching were unified in the works of the poets, above all the great Homer.¹⁶ To his contemporary audience his advice is to distance themselves from petty sectarian squabbles as far as they may; to profit from the teaching and example of any philosopher who will set them on the road to Virtue, and to reject only the pernicious teachings of the atheist and hedonist Epicurus.¹⁷ Certain individuals stand out as of particular utility: Plato for individual doctrines, Socrates (the most frequently named of all) both for his teachings and for his exemplary life. But the governing principle is that all can be learned from and that philosophy can profitably be divorced from the partisan divisions of the schools.¹⁸

It may further be remarked that the 'Dialexeis' irenic, non-sectarian approach to philosophical doctrine is matched by the notably bland impression they seek to give of the demands of philosophical commitment. An Epictetus may insist on the need for painstaking exercises in logic, and on the possibility of emotional and intellectual trauma inherent in the confrontation with truth.¹⁹ The 'Dialexeis', by contrast, brush aside "nouns and verbs, skill with words, critiques and disputations and sophistries" with an airy wave, as details which can too easily divert attention from the real business in hand.²⁰ The true core of philosophy, the pursuit of Virtue, is held to be available to all, as easy to enter upon as it is for an aviary of songbirds to pick up a tune from a neighbouring flautist.²¹ This attitude seems entirely consistent with the simplifications of doctrine already noted, as also with a number of further features of presentation which will be discussed below.

In their contents, therefore, the 'Dialexeis' can be seen to offer a relatively simple and undemanding form of philosophy: tailored, one would

¹⁵ See especially 29.7; 26.2; 4.3.

¹⁶ Dialexeis 4 and 26, *passim*.

¹⁷ For the equality of all good philosophers, see 1.8–10, 8.8 and 22.6. For the rejection of Epicurus, see above all 30–33, but also 4.9 and 25.4.

¹⁸ For a rather different approach to the question of Maximus's doctrinal allegiances, see KONIARIS, *opp. cit.* nn. 1 and 3.

¹⁹ Arrian Epicteti Diatribae 1.17; 2.25; 3.23.30; etc.

²⁰ 1.8.

²¹ 1.7.

assume, to a context outside formal, scholastic instruction, and to an audience whose desire for philosophy stopped short of any very deep commitment. As befits such an audience, their bias is towards Ethics and Theology, rather than to the remainder of Physics or to Logic. Their doctrine, where it is expounded in sufficient detail to be testable, emerges as consistently Middle Platonic, but it is presented in such a way that issues of Platonism versus the doctrines of other, competing schools are not allowed to arise. We may now move on the main business of presentation and style.

II. The Persona of a Philosophical Preacher

The choice of philosophical themes naturally commits Maximus to a pose of considerable personal authority. Images expressing special status and ability abound in the first, introductory *διάλεξις*, in which the preacher and his discourses are likened successively to an actor on stage, a guide in the darkness, a gentle herdsman, a chorus-master, a trainer of spirited young horses and an athlete in the stadium.²² *Qua* philosopher, Maximus presents himself as a man to whom all eyes turn, in virtue of the knowledge and skill he possesses. He is also the representative of a great tradition, seeking the additional authority that may be reflected onto him from his illustrious forbears. Above all, he is keen to present himself as a latter-day Socrates. Pouring scorn on a popular misconception, he denies that Socrates's poverty sets the rule for the true philosopher. It would be as sensible to suppose that the philosopher must necessarily be snub-nosed and pot-bellied. In fact, Socrates associated with the rich as well as the poor, and indeed reckoned his rich pupils as of more consequence. The message here (1.9a–f) is unmistakable: Maximus stands to his (affluent) young audience as Socrates did to the youth of Athens six centuries before.²³

At the same time, this Socratic preacher does not base his authority on philosophical grounds alone. He seeks also the respect owing to an accomplished and successful sophist. Twice in the opening *διάλεξις*, though affecting to insist on the primacy of philosophical values, he makes it clear that his skills are not confined to that domain alone. In 1.6c–f the advertisement takes the form of a complaint, that his previous efforts have won him applause and a fine reputation — *ἔπαινοι; ἄλλις τούτων ἔχω δόξα, διακορῆς εἶμι τοῦ χρήματος* — but have failed to rouse his audience to practical emulation. What follows in 1.7d–i is still more ostentatious, though softened by its faintly ironic introduction and responsibly philosophical conclusion:

²² 1.1–4.

²³ Compare the use made of the Socratic persona by Dio Chrysostom, Favorinus and Apuleius; see J. L. MOLES, *The Career and Conversion of Dio Chrysostom*, JHS 98 (1978), pp. 96–100.

... νῦν μοι δοκῶ ὑμῶν εἵνεκεν γαυρότατα ἂν καὶ μεγαλαυχότατα εἰπεῖν. παρελήλυθεν εἰς ὑμᾶς, ὧ νεοί, παρασκευὴ λόγων αὐτῆ πολύχους καὶ πολυμερῆς καὶ πάμφορος ... εἴτε τις ῥητορείας ἐρᾷ, οὗτος αὐτῷ δρόμος λόγου πρόχειρος καὶ πολυαρκῆς ... εἴτε τις ποιητικῆς ἐρᾷ, ἡκέτω πορισάμενος ἄλλοθεν τὰ μέτρα μόνον, ... ἀλλὰ πολιτικῆς καὶ τῆς περὶ δήμους καὶ βουλευτήρια παρασκευῆς ἤκεις ἐνδεῆς ὢν; σὺ μὲν καὶ πεφάρακας τὸ ἔργον, ... ἀλλὰ τούτων μὲν τις ὑπερορᾷ, φιλοσοφίαν δὲ ἀσπάζεται καὶ ἀλήθειαν τιμᾷ; ἐνταῦθα ὑφαίρω τῆς μεγαλαυχίας, ὑφίεμαι, οὐχ ὁ αὐτός εἰμι· μέγα τὸ χρῆμα καὶ δεόμενον προστάτου οὐ δημοτικοῦ, ...

"For your sake I am now resolved to speak in a most vain and boastful manner. You have before you, my dear young gentlemen, a veritable treasure-house of words, prolific, manifold and fertile ... Should there be anyone present who loves oratory, here is a fluency ready to hand that will satisfy his every need ... Should there be anyone who loves poetry, all he needs to bring with him from some other source is a knowledge of metre ... Or is it in search of political accomplishment and the resources necessary to deal with People and Council that you have come? You have found what you are looking for ... But what if there should be someone who despises all this, and instead loves philosophy and reveres the truth? For him I moderate my boasting and draw in my sails; I am not the same man. This is a weighty business and calls for a patron out of the common run, ..."

The authoritative posture thus assumed in *Dialexis* 1 is maintained in the discourses that follow: in the confident and knowledgeable tones in which doctrines are expounded; in the scornful vigour with which the past and present misdeeds of non-philosophical mankind are castigated; and in the rhetorical virtuosity with which both doctrinal learning and moralising comment are presented. It is not of course the intention that authority should be paraded for its own sake. As Maximus himself insists in 1.6c-f, the aim is not (not simply) to win applause; it is to win converts to the active pursuit of philosophy and the philosophical life, and to guide their first footsteps on that road. The speaker of the 'Dialexeis' presents himself above all as one seeking to encourage and to make his skills and knowledge available for the enlightenment of others — as Socrates did for the youth of Athens, and as guides, herdsman, chorus-masters and horse-trainers do in their own separate spheres.

So much may perhaps seem unremarkable. That philosophers were in general committed to teaching the young, that imitation of Socrates was next to unavoidable, and that philosophical and oratorical skill were regularly paraded simultaneously by the same individual are familiar facts about the intellectual culture of the Hellenistic and Imperial periods. And yet the authorial persona of the 'Dialexeis' is not identical to those on show in our other surviving examples of philosophical oratory. Apuleius in his 'Apology' and 'Florida', for instance, though resembling Maximus in his claims to

equal respect as learned philosopher and as oratorical virtuoso, quite fails to evince the same didactic impulses. Dio Chrysostom, in his mature works, while presenting himself as an earnest and knowledgeable educator, is far less overt in drawing attention to his oratorical skill. It is worth dwelling further on the persona which Maximus constructs in the 'Dialexeis', particularly on its didactic colouring. Two points would seem to reward special attention: the precise form of philosophical competence that is claimed; and the quality of the relationship the author aims to encourage between himself and the audience. In both cases it will be seen that accessibility is as important to the persona as authority.

According to the vision of the history of philosophy suggested by *Dialexis* 4 and 26, a great tradition – a 'golden chain' – runs through the history of mankind, from the earliest poet-sages to Thales, Pythagoras and Heraclitus, thence to Socrates and his immediate disciples, and on to their heirs in the later fourth and third centuries B.C. Maximus does not seek to portray himself as a direct inheritor and perpetuator of this noble line. He may indeed be a philosopher, and may indeed be ready to see similarities between his own circumstances and those of Socrates, but he makes no attempt to set himself on the same exalted intellectual level. Instead, he chooses the more modest rank of a kind of impresario or middle-man; one who, though well-versed in the doctrines and achievements of the great and the good of the honoured past, and well able to expound them to others not so learned, would still not presume to count himself a being of the same order. This modesty before the philosophical pantheon is perhaps not so evident in *Dialexis* 1, where the comparison between Socrates, Pythagoras, Xenophon and Diogenes on the stage of life and Maximus before his own audience tends to reduce the distance between them; but its effects elsewhere are clear. The most elaborate instance comes in *Dialexis* 11, where Maximus confronts a request to expound Plato's theological doctrines. At first he refuses: to ask him when Plato's own words are there for all to read is to scorn a mighty river in favour of a mere well, or the light of the bright sun for that of a feeble brazier (11.1b–e). Then he relents, admitting that even the brightest and purest gold can need an assayer to certify its worth (11.2); Plato's words were an oracle delivered from God to man, but oracles bear repetition (11.6c–e). For a more concise statement of the same subordinate posture one may look also at *Dialexis* 27, where the topic is doctrines of the soul (5b–c):

ταύτη μοι λέγοντι ἐφέπου. λέξω δὲ οὐκ ἑμαυτοῦ λόγον, ἀλλὰ ἐξ Ἀκαδημίας ὀρμηθέντα, καὶ ἐπιχώριον τῆς Πλάτωνος μούσης τε καὶ ἐστίας· ἀπεδέξατο δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης †αὐτῷ†. ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ πορρωτέρω ἐπανάγω ... ὁ δ' οὖν λόγος ταύτη ἔχει.

"Listen to me as I explain matters to you in the following manner. The account I shall give you is not my own; it springs from the Academy, a native of Plato's Muse and Plato's hearth, adopted from him by Aristotle too. Yet I would trace it still further back ... This account runs as follows."

Again, the words are those of an expounder, a professor, rather than one who wishes to be counted an original thinker. Maximus sets himself midway between the great philosophers and his own contemporary audience, presenting himself as one dedicated to making their thought available afresh to a new generation of enquirers.

The pose of the instructor is not, however, conveyed solely by the means already surveyed. It is constructed and maintained in the texture of his instruction too, in features of his chosen style and phraseology. The tone of the 'Dialexeis' is an insistently personal one; the author's controlling presence is never allowed to slip from view. The first person singular is constantly in use, in verbs and pronouns; statements of fact are as often as possible made as declarations of personal belief. At the same time, the impression is given of a particular attitude on the part of this individual to his audience. Perhaps most obviously, he presents himself as one concerned to engage and to stimulate, in as lively and as immediate a way as he can. Exclamations, rhetorical questions, second-person singular questions and commands, first person plural exhortations, and exchanges with imagined interlocutors abound, alternately challenging the audience individually and urging them on as a group.²⁴ The acerbity of an Epictetus – immediacy carried to the point of truculent confrontation – may be absent, but this is none the less a speaker seeking to convey the sense of a close engagement with his audience (35.5):

ὄρα τίνα καὶ ποῖον τύραννον τῇ ψυχῇ δίδως· ὡς Ἀθηναίοις Κριτίαν, παρωσάμενος τὸν Σόλωνα· ... ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ ἐλευθερίαν ποθῶν νόμου δέομαι, λόγου δέομαι. οὗτός μοι φυλάξει τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὀρθὴν ... καὶ τί τούτων ἔσται μέτρον; τίς τῆς ἐξ ἡδονῶν εὐδαιμονίας ὄρος; ποῦ στησόμεθα; τίνοι δῶμεν τὰ νικητήρια φέροντες;

“Consider what kind of a tyrant this is that you are imposing on the soul! It is as if you were rejecting Solon and imposing Critias on the people of Athens in his stead ... As I long for freedom, I need Law and I need Reason, for it is these that will keep my happiness secure and intact ... And what limits shall we observe in all this? What boundary will be set on the happiness born of Pleasure? Where will we come to rest? On whom shall we bestow the victor's crown?”

Alongside such attempts at stimulation, another quieter characteristic is manifested: a solicitous concern for clarity and accessibility of exposition. Ostentatious care is taken to comment at intervals on the direction a given argument is taking.²⁵ The speaker readily and regularly affects to consult his audience's desires and preferences in polite (if meaningless) formulae.²⁶ He underlines his conscientiousness in seeking out lucid illustrations.²⁷ And

²⁴ Cf. DÜRR, *op. cit.* n. 3, pp. 146 ff.

²⁵ E. g. 3.2a; 4.2a; 9.1a; 11.6a; cf. DÜRR, *op. cit.* n. 3, pp. 145 f.

²⁶ E. g. εἰ δὲ βούλει: 7.7a; 10.2f; 11.9a; etc.

²⁷ E. g. 13.4d; 21.5a.

he is obtrusively eager to avoid giving the impression of being too calculating and formal in his exposition,²⁸ or too pedantically precise in details and in terminology.²⁹ The pose constructed is of one dedicated to the avoidance of stiffness, austerity and perfectionism and to the cultivation of freshness, immediacy and benevolent accessibility. The audience of the 'Dialexeis' are to feel themselves in the hands of an expert, but an expert who will not allow his own sophistication to blind him to their more elementary needs.³⁰

III. *Argument and Structure*

The discourses in which this benevolent philosophical impresario unfolds his instruction range in length from some 870 words (Dial. 28) to some 2620 (Dial. 1). Dialexis 28 is however unusually short, and with the exception of 11 and 18, few are anywhere as long as Dialexis 1; the great majority contain between 1500 and 2000 words. Read aloud, at a suitably declamatory pace, they last on average something around fifteen to twenty minutes each.³¹

More often than not – in 24 out of the 41 cases – each piece tackles its own circumscribed topic; six times, though, a topic is continued over two or more. In three of these cases the continuation takes the familiar form of an opposed pair, each arguing the case the other contests; 23 and 24 debate the relative merits of farmers and soldiers; 39 and 40 the proposition that there are degrees of Goodness. 15 and 16 tackle the question of the active and contemplative lives, but in a slightly more elaborate frame. An imaginary court-case is conjured up, in which Anaxagoras is prosecuted by an unnamed Clazomenian for failure to perform his civic duties: Dial. 15 sets the scene and presents the speech for the prosecution; 16 gives Anaxagoras' reply, followed by an adjudication from Maximus himself. In the remaining cases where a topic is shared between the several *διαλέξεις*,

²⁸ E. g. 28.4b; 30.3a. Such informality has been taken by some as evidence that the 'Dialexeis' began as improvised performances (*αὐτοσχεδιάσματα*), but this would seem an unnecessary conclusion. For the whole issue, see H. HOBEIN, *De Maximo Tyrio quaestiones philologiae selectae*, diss. Göttingen, 1895, pp. 1 ff.; RE XIV.2, coll. 2557 f. (W. KROLL and H. HOBEIN); DÜRR, *op. cit.* n. 3, p. 7; KONIARIS, *op. cit.* n. 1, pp. 111 ff.

²⁹ E. g. 15.4g; 21.4e.

³⁰ Maximus's Socratic persona is again visible here: compare the portrayal of Socrates in Dialexis 19.

³¹ This very restricted length causes problems for anyone trying to reconstruct the circumstances of any original performance. A single *διάλεξις* seems hardly long enough to constitute a session in itself. Would more than one have been delivered at a time? Was each of them only a curtain-raiser to something more substantial? Such problems could be circumvented by the assumption that the surviving texts do not directly report the original performances (or more radically, that they are not reports of performances at all).

the presentation is cumulative rather than antithetical. *Dialexis* 8 and 9 treat of δαίμονες, 8 discussing their functions and utility, 9 their constitution and their place in the scheme of Nature. 18–20 discuss and defend Socratic love: 18 states the problem and begins the defence by assembling comparative evidence from the literary record; 19 and 20 introduce the distinction between hedonistic and altruistic love and defend Socrates as a practitioner of the latter; 21, rising to a higher plane of argument, expounds the true (Platonic) relationship between love, beauty and the structure of reality.³² The longest sequence of all, 29–33, is devoted to the question of Pleasure and the Good. 29 raises the overarching issue of εὐδαιμονία and the competing ends offered by different philosophical sects; 30 narrows the focus to the examination of just one ideal, that of Epicurus, and offers some preliminary considerations against it; 31 continues the assault; in 32 Epicurus is given a temporary respite and allowed to put his side of the argument; in 33 his pretensions are finally and decisively swept away.

Consideration of these six pairs and sequences of lectures suggests that structured exposition is a significant part of the overall purposes of the 'Dialexeis'. The impression is reinforced when one turns to examine the construction of the individual items. To a considerable degree they are composed to a set structural formula: one which seems to reflect the same combination of didactic aims and distaste for formality that has been seen to characterise the speaker's persona.

Care is taken from the outset to introduce each new topic gently. Some few of the 41 pieces do start with a direct statement of theme, but most often the confrontation is softened by the interposition of a story from history or mythology, a quotation, a set of interesting facts or a passage of generalising reflection.³³ By the end of the second paragraph, however (only exceptionally as late as the third or fourth), the topic to be treated has not only emerged from its introduction, but also (in most cases) been stated in a clear and economical form of words.³⁴ A relaxed *accessus ad causam* is not allowed to obscure the aim of the exercise; whatever may be thought of the answers they offer, the 'Dialexeis' are clear about the questions they raise.

³² As is signposted by the reference to Stesichorus's 'Palinode' in 21.1, the whole structure of this exposition of the nature of love is taken over from Plato's 'Phaedrus'.

³³ E. g. 13 (consultation of the Delphic Oracle before Salamis); 17 (Mithaecus in Sparta); 5 (Midas and Satyrus); 12 (quotation of Pindar from 201 Bo = 213 Sn-M); 2 (survey of primitive and foreign images of the gods); 3 (the injustice of asking philosophers alone to account for their profession); 11 (the need for exegesis of classic philosophical doctrines). For more direct statements of theme, see for example, 28.1a, 6.1a and 27.1a.

³⁴ So 3.3a; 4.1c; 5.3h; 7.1f; 8.4a; 10.3c; 11.2c; 12.2a; 13.2a; 14.3a; 17.3a; 18.4a; 22.1c; 25.2d; 26.3c; 29.1b; 34.2a-c; 35.2d-e; 37.2a-b; 38.4i; 39.1g; 41.2a, 3a. *Dialexis* 1 can be ignored for these purposes as a special introductory piece. 9, 16, 19–21, 24, 30–35 and 40 are all second or subsequent elements in sequences and thus also to be discounted. 6, 27 and 28 all state their themes in their opening words. That leaves only 2, 15, 23 and 36 in which there is no concise, πρόβλημα-style statement of theme.

Once introductions have been made and themes safely stated, the argument of any given *διάλεξις* characteristically proceeds in a relatively orderly and methodical way: methodical at least to the extent that a definite movement of thought can be seen and followed through its stages. Analysis of four *διαλέξεις* will demonstrate this point.

(a) Dial. 5, on Prayer:³⁵

- 5.1–2: introductory stories: Midas and Satyrus, Croesus, the duel of Hector and Ajax, Priam, Agamemnon, Chryses.
- 5.3: moral worth, not prayer, determines the bestowal of blessings by the gods.
- 5.4ab: the factors governing the things men pray for are: Providence, Fate, Chance, Skill.
- 5.4c–i: Providence is unaffected by prayer.
- 5.5: Fate is unaffected by prayer.
- 5.6ab: Chance is unaffected by prayer.
- 5.6c: prayer is superfluous to the workings of human skill.
- 5.7: QED: petitionary prayer is superfluous in all circumstances.
- 5.8: true (philosophical) prayer is of a different kind: witness Socrates and Pythagoras.

(b) Dial. 11, on Plato's theology:³⁶

- 11.1–2: to request an exegesis of Plato's doctrines is not unreasonable.
- 11.3–5: all have a conception of Supreme God, though all envisage Him differently.
- 11.6: Plato will be our oracle.
- 11.7: reality is divided into noetic and perceptible realms.
- 11.8: God, Supreme Mind, belongs in the higher of these two (as seen from *διαίρεσις* of *ὄντα*).
- 11.9ab: comparison of divine and human mind.
- 11.9ce: definition of God by negation.
- 11.10ae: ascent of the human mind towards God.
- 11.10fh: exile of the human soul in the perceptible realm.
- 11.11: reflections of the divine in the perceptible.
- 11.12: the place of God in the overall system of the cosmos: the Great King.

³⁵ Manuscript title: *εἰ δεῖ εὐχεσθαι*. The issue is one that goes back to the pseudo-Platonic Alcibiades II.

³⁶ Manuscript title: *τίς ὁ θεὸς κατὰ Πλάτωνα*. Maximus here co-opts a standard scholastic pattern of exposition, found also in Alcinous Didascalicus 10: see A.-J. FESTUGIÈRE, *Le Dieu inconnu et la gnose (La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste, t. 4)*, Paris, 1954, pp. 95–115.

(c) Dial. 12, on returning wrongs:³⁷

- 12.1–2a: Pindar on δίκη (fr. 201 BO = 213 SN–M): will the just man return a wrong?
 12.2–3: a first definition of ἀδικία, leading to unsatisfactory conclusions.
 12.4–5: a revised, satisfactory definition shows the good man neither inflicting nor suffering ἀδικία.
 12.6–8: pernicious effects of reprisal: the Trojan and Persian Wars.
 12.9: summary: retaliation only reduces the retaliator to the level of the aggressor.
 12.10: Socrates as an example of the proper response.

(d) Dial. 25, on beauty of speech:³⁸

- 25.1–2c: introductory exempla: Myson of Chenae – virtue in deed not word; Pythagoras – deeds matching words.
 25.2df: harmony of word and deed is not however equivalent to beauty of speech: (i) beauty must connect with the essential nature of the possessor; and (ii) speech itself reveals the inner nature of the speaker.
 25.4: rational insight, not thoughtless enjoyment must therefore be our guide in the search for beauty of speech.
 25.5: thoughtless enjoyment ignores the crucial question of the fruitfulness of discourse; yet some speakers pander to this pernicious attitude.
 25.6: the best (truly beautiful) form of speech is that which inspires virtue (a kind of fruitfulness satisfactory to reason and connected with the inner nature of speaker and audience).
 25.7: speech that inspires to virtue is still pleasant, as is all that is good and beautiful, but only incidentally so.

A recent discussion of the 'Dialexeis' characterises their structure as "frequently ... an impulsive jumble, which among its other characteristics of disorder presents a drifting of thought far more characteristic of a casual conversationalist than a coherent thinker". Individual sections, it is conceded, may be "per se coherent", but "the transitions from motif to motif are incoherent overall and make the speaker preach as if in a trance; a stream of consciousness, as it were, leads us ...".³⁹ It should be evident from the

³⁷ Manuscript title: εἰ τὸν ἀδικήσαντα ἀνταδικητέον. The issue and some of the treatment are drawn from the 'Gorgias' (496a–481b, 521e), the 'Crito' (49a ff.) and the 'Republic' (335a–e).

³⁸ Manuscript title: ὅτι οἱ σύμφωνοι τοῖς ἔργοις λόγοι ἄριστοι; but see 2d and 4a for Maximus's own statement of theme. For a rather different analysis, see KONIARIS, *op. cit.* n. 1, pp. 114–120.

³⁹ KONIARIS, *op. cit.* n. 1, pp. 102 and 120.

examples just given that this verdict is a considerable overstatement. Of the 'Dialexeis' analysed, number 25 shows the least straightforward sequence of thought, but even there it would seem perverse to deny that a definite plan has been followed, which is not entirely opaque the hearer or reader. In general, the 'Dialexeis' deserve to be approached as exercises in controlled exposition. It is no accident, but rather a confirmation of this judgement, that Maximus himself should so regularly have used the words σκέμμα and σκοπεῖν to describe the activity to which he invites his audience and readers.⁴⁰

At the same time, it would be wrong to exaggerate the logical rigor with which any given διάλεξις is constructed. In particular, the complaint about transitions is not altogether without substance. In a number of cases the sequence of thought can depend on connections not explicitly stated but implicit in the concepts being deployed. This should cause little obscurity to an audience with some prior grounding in philosophy, but it could indeed puzzle the beginner – a fault if it was for beginners that these lectures were primarily intended. Dialexis 25 is one case in point. Dialexis 13 is another, perhaps more bothersome because dealing with what is intrinsically a very complex and difficult issue (μαντική, divine prescience and human reason).⁴¹ The considerations introduced do all have a detectable relevance to the theme, and do add up to a reasonably coherent sequence, but it is left to the reader or hearer to interpret the movement unaided at crucial points.⁴² If there is felt to be a problem here, the most plausible diagnosis would be that Maximus is tackling an issue too philosophically for his determinedly informal and unpedantic presentation.

Other considerations too may be brought against the pretensions of the 'Dialexeis' to more than a fairly modest degree of system. As has already been remarked, they tend to operate at a relatively unsophisticated and untechnical level of thought, avoiding both polarising precision in doctrine

⁴⁰ 3.3a; 4.2a; 11.2c; 13.2c; 14.3a; 17.3a; 18.6c; 24.3d; 31.1a; 31.1c; 31.3a; 33.2a; 38.5f; 39.2a; 40.3f. Note also the use of the words θεᾶσθαι (7.1f; 9.1c; 21.3b; 24.2a) and ἀπορεῖν (13.2c; 28.3b). Other items, besides those analysed above, that show a marked tendency towards controlled and structured exposition include 22 (a series of progressively more creditable answers to the question 'what is most worth listening to?', which begins with a familiar ἀπορία over Odyssey 9.1–11) and 19–21 (a series of progressively more creditable and truthful answers to the question 'what did Socrates think he was at in chasing boys?').

⁴¹ The manuscript title to this piece, εἰ μαντικῆς οὐσης ἐστὶν τι ἐφ' ἡμῖν, is one of the more inadequate; 13.2c gives a better statement of theme.

⁴² 13.1–2: introduction: the Athenians before Salamis and the 'Wooden Walls' oracle. 13.3a–f: the workings of divine prescience, compared to those of human powers of prediction – related and compatible phenomena. 13.3g–4: the cosmos is a grand, harmonious system, of a kind that encompasses both divine prescience and human shrewdness. 13.5: how divine prescience and human shrewdness can even trespass on each other's territory. 13.6–7: return to the theme of the grand system of the cosmos, in which many factors combine and which allows for the operations of μαντική. 13.8–9: moralising conclusion. The largest jumps in all this come at 13.3g and 13.6.

and philosopher's jargon in vocabulary. This already imposes a limit on the detail and formality with which any line of argument or exposition can be developed. There is a marked general tendency, which will be illustrated below, to exemplify and adorn a given point rather than to explore its subtleties and difficulties; short though they are, it is not difficult to see how the 'Dialexeis' could have accommodated a good deal more hard reasoning than they do. What is more, there is a further tendency to turn away from even slightly complicated discussion in the direction of easy (not to say facile) moralising. A particularly blatant example of these last two characteristics can be found in Dialexis 13, from towards the end, where Maximus is dealing with the (admittedly demanding) topic of Fate (8c-9a):

ὥστε ἐγὼ ὑποπτεύω μὲν τὴν ἀνάγκην, ὀνομάσαι δὲ αὐτὴν εὐπόρως οὐκ ἔχω. κἄν γὰρ πεπρωμένην φῶ, ὄνομα λέγω πλανώμενον ἐν ἀνθρώπων δόξαις· τίς γὰρ ἡ πεπρωμένη; ποίας φύσεως; τίνος οὐσίας;

εἰ μὲν τοι θεός ἐσσι, τοὶ οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἔχουσιν,

οὐδὲν τῶν δεινῶν σὸν ἔργον ...

εἰ δέ τις ἐσσι βροτῶν, τοὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ καιεταύουσιν

ψεύδεται μὲν ὁ Ἑλήνωρ λέγων,

ἄσέ με δαίμονος αἴσα κακῆ· ...

ἔοικεν δὲ καὶ ταυτὶ τὰ ὀνόματα εἶναι μοχθηρίας ἀνθρωπίνης εὐφημοὶ ἀποστροφαί, ...

"For these reasons I have my suspicions about necessity, but find it difficult to give the phenomenon a name. If I say 'destiny', I am using a name that has no stable meaning in men's minds. What is 'destiny'? What is its nature? What is its essence?"

'If you are a god, one of those who dwell in the broad heavens', then nothing that is terrible can be your handiwork ...

'But if you are one of the mortal race, who dwell on the earth', then Elpenor is lying when he says,

'It was an evil fate sent by the gods that led me astray' ...

These names too look like evasive euphemisms for human wickedness, ..."

A solid paragraph of denunciation follows, connected with the initial theme of the *διάλεξις* only by the observation that where oracles are really needed is in divining the operations of human malice. The hard question, about the scope and nature of Fate itself, is left quietly to one side.

In structure therefore the 'Dialexeis' are neither the formless rambles of a 'casual conversationalist' nor entirely meticulous investigations of carefully-delimited topics. They are too evidently structured for it to be possible to describe them as the former, but too leisurely, too casual and too ready to

abandon a difficult path to qualify as the latter. What the intentions were that produced this compromise, and which the pre-existing models laid under contribution, are questions that will be confronted below.⁴³

IV. *Elocutio*

A dismissive attitude to literary style is a natural (though not utterly inevitable) part of the philosophical pose. It is duly displayed in Dial. 25.3c:

... οὐ κατὰ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν λογισμοὺς ἀπόχρη πρὸς ἔπαινον λόγου γλῶττα εὐστοχος, ἢ ὀνομάτων δρόμος, ἢ ῥήματα Ἀττικά, ἢ περίοδοι εὐκαμπεῖς, ἢ ἄρμονία ὑγρά. τὰδ' ἐστὶν πάντα, κατὰ τὸν ἐν Διονύσου ποιητὴν,

ἐπιφυλλίδες ... καὶ σταμύλματα,
χελιδόνων μουσεῖα, λωβηταὶ τέχνης.⁴⁴

"... It is a mistake to reckon, as most people do, that a shrewd tongue, or a fluent stream of words, or Attic diction, or well-turned periods, or elegant composition are enough to win praise for a speech. All those things, in the words of the dramatist, are

'grapelets, ... empty chatter,
a chorus of swallows, a disgrace to the art'."

These words come, however, in the context of an argument for the pre-eminence of philosophical discourse over the oratory of entertainment and historical treatises. Dial. 1.7e–h, where Maximus advertises the manifold utility of his lectures to aspiring poets, declaimers and politicians as well as to seekers after virtue, is more in keeping with his own practice. For the 'Dialexeis' throughout show a considerable concern for the very kind of finish scorned in 25.3.⁴⁵

Something has already been said about the impression of liveliness and informality that the 'Dialexeis' seek to create and the stylistic means they use to do so: rhetorical questions, second-person singular and first-person plural addresses to the audience, comments on the progress of the argument, and the avoidance of forbidding technicality and pedantic completeness. This analysis may easily be taken further. Among devices of liveliness may also be listed the frequent exclamations with which the lectures are punctuated, their appeals to and asseverations by the gods and their regular recourse to *prosopopoea* and *apostrophe*.⁴⁶ Enlivening too, but tending at the same time

⁴³ See below, pp. 1971–1975.

⁴⁴ Aristophanes *Frogs* 92 f.

⁴⁵ The major study of this aspect of the 'Dialexeis' is that of DÜRR (op. cit. n. 3), to which the following remarks are heavily indebted.

⁴⁶ DÜRR, pp. 147 ff.

to reinforce the impression of accessibility, are the author's readiness to correct or amplify a statement in mid-course (epidiorthosis), to add personal judgements (epikrisis) and to affect uncertainty (diaporesis).⁴⁷ Calculated informality may also be observed in grammar and syntax. Ellipses of nouns and verbs are frequent (especially but by no means only in such set phrases as τί ἄλλο ἢ and the Platonic τί οὐ μέλλει).⁴⁸ A paratactic tendency replaces not only conditional protases but also concessive and temporal clauses with main clauses.⁴⁹ Constructions *ad sensum* pair singular subjects with plural verbs, neuter nouns with masculine participles and masculine and feminine nouns with neuter pronouns.⁵⁰ A certain freedom in the deployment of tenses may or may not belong under this same rubric: unmotivated alternations between the aorist and the imperfect, and (more rarely) substitutions of the future for the present and the perfect for the future may be the result of deliberate stylistic choice, or they may be symptoms of the general loss of distinctions observable in later Greek.⁵¹ Finally, among signs of calculated informality may be noted a marked tolerance of hiatus: as many as ninety cases, for instance, in the 155 Teubner lines of the TRAPP edition of *Dialexis* 30.⁵²

Informality is not, however, the only stylistic feature to strike the reader of the 'Dialexeis'. Obtrusive too is a highly-developed taste for rhetorical adornment, particularly for the figures that introduce aesthetically satisfying patterns into the structure of sentence, clause and phrase: not only the classic Gorgianic trio of antithesis, homoeoteleuton and parisosis, but also a whole range of further figures of repetition and echo: chiasmus, epanadiplosis, anaphora, antistrophe, symploke, epanodos, kyklos, paranomasia and alliteration.⁵³ This is prose in which the informality of the philosophical teacher blends with the showier tendencies of the epideictic orator.

It is also prose with a marked taste for fulness of expression, not to say redundancy. The figures of repetition and echo just listed would inevitably bring with them a certain fulness even if sparingly applied. In practice, their expansive tendencies are given free rein. Once a series of antitheses, or symmetrical clauses, or even of simple adjectival qualifiers, has been set in train, it is common for it to run to four or more terms. Near synonyms multiply to feed this process, statements double into negative and positive pairs, main verbs develop into pairs and trios. So too in the deployment of imagery and exempla (of which more below), two, three or four items, symmetrically phrased, will be found more frequently than one alone. Quotations (of which, again, more below) are used as often to amplify the phrasing

⁴⁷ E. g. 27.3a; 35.3c; 28.3b; cf. DÜRR, pp. 149 f.

⁴⁸ DÜRR, pp. 58 f.

⁴⁹ E. g. 33.3c; DÜRR, pp. 62 f.

⁵⁰ DÜRR, pp. 56 f.

⁵¹ DÜRR, pp. 33 ff.

⁵² Cf. DÜRR, pp. 121 f.: his figure of circa 110 for this διάλεξις (n. 483) errs by following the principal manuscript's general tendency to *scriptio plena*.

⁵³ DÜRR, pp. 130-140.

as to illustrate or lend authority. A short extract, chosen more or less at random, will convey the general flavour (32.10b–e):

μάστιγες αὐται καὶ πληγαὶ Λακωνικαὶ καὶ θῆραι καὶ δρόμοι καὶ δεῖπνα λιτὰ καὶ στιβάδες εὐτελεῖς· ἀλλ' ὄρω καὶ τούτων τὰ τερπνά. εὖ γε, ὦ Λυκοῦργε, σμικρῶν πόνων μεγάλας ἡδονὰς ἀντεισάγεις· ὀλίγα δούς, μεγάλη ἔλαβες· ἐφημέρους δούς πόνους, ἡδονὰς διηνεκεῖς ἀντέλαβες. τίνες, λέξει, Σπαρτιατικαὶ ἡδοναί; πόλις ἀτειχιστος, ἄφοβος, ἄπειρος πυρός, ἀθέατος πολεμίων, ἀθέατος ξενικῶν ἀσπίδων, ἀνήκοος στόνων, ἀνήκοος ἀπειλῆς. τί δ' ἂν εἶη φόβου λυπηρότερον; τί δὲ δουλείας ἀνιαιρότερον; τί δὲ ἀνάγκης ἐπιπονώτερον; ὅταν δὲ ταῦτα ἀπαλλάξῃς πόλεως, πολλὰς αὐτοῖς ἡδονὰς ἀντεισάγεις.

“Think of the whippings and beatings that took place in Sparta, their hunts and footraces, their frugal meals and simple bedding. Yet I can see that these habits too had their pleasant side. Bravo, Lycurgus! In return for negligible discomforts you have brought great pleasures; by paying a small price you have received a great return. ‘What are these Spartan pleasures?’, someone will ask. A city that has no walls, a city without fear, a city that has never been fired, has never seen an enemy or the shields of a foreign army, has never heard the groaning of the defeated or the threats of an aggressor. What could be more painful than fear? What more grievous than slavery? What more burdensome than the compulsion of others? But when you free a city of these burdens, that very process brings its inhabitants many pleasures.”

A sequence of six nouns and noun-phrases in polysyndeton; three co-ordinated statements in each of which there is an internal symmetry of direct and indirect objects or participle clause and main clause, with the first and third statements balancing in length around the shorter second (19 + 10 + 18 syllables), and chiasmus in the third; a sequence of seven alliterative adjectival qualifiers; three parallel rhetorical questions with homoeoteleuton; a final statement in isocolon (11 + 11). Economy, conciseness and sobriety of expression are definitely not the stylistic aims here.

The density and distribution of these figures, and of the taste for redundancy of expression, it should be noted, is not uniform. They are more at home at some points in the structural patterns to which the ‘Dialexeis’ are built than at others. In particular it can be seen that the tendency diminishes in two circumstances: in passages of anecdote and narrative, such as are most often found in the introductory paragraphs of any given piece; and in passages of close argument. In both cases a sparer, simpler and less repetitive style is felt to be more appropriate.

From the various specimens already quoted, some impression should by now have emerged of the characteristic sentence-structure of the ‘Dialexeis’. The basis throughout is the short – often very short – clause, of which a greater or lesser number are arranged together to make sentences which seldom if ever attain any great degree of complexity. Longer structures are

by no means lacking: witness for example Dial. 1.1 and 3.3, where single sentences run for a little over two hundred words each. But even in these cases the construction remains simple, with the whole breaking down into a multiplicity of short units and little demand made on the reader's or hearer's powers of concentration. At most a subordinate clause may be spun out by parenthesis and qualification, delaying the arrival of the expected main clause to complete the sense and the grammar. More refined techniques of suspension are quite foreign both to the studied informality of the 'Dialexeis' and to their taste for a rapid turnover of rhetorical figures. At the other extreme, concentrations of short sentences are also easy to find, both in passages of lively questioning such as that quoted above from Dial. 32.10, and also (with a different tone) in the simple anecdotal prefaces with which the serious business in so many Dialexeis is introduced. The story of Midas and Satyrus at the beginning of Dial. 5 is told in six sentences of 24, 38, 4, 9, 39 and 9 words respectively.⁵⁴ That of Periander's παιδικά in 18.1e unfolds in four, of 8, 14, 10 and 15.⁵⁵ Most often, when a passage is chosen and tested at random, one finds a preponderance of sentences of between forty and a hundred words, leavened with a sprinkling of shorter units of anything from four or five words upwards.

Much should also be clear by now about the sentence rhythms of the 'Dialexeis'. The taste for figures of symmetry and repetition automatically brings with it a marked rhythmical character, which is further accentuated by the pervasive preference for short over long clauses. The rhythmical effect varies from passage to passage, according to the density with which the relevant figures are present, being relatively weak in passages of narrative and exposition, and relatively strong when more exclamatory and enthusiastic tones take over.⁵⁶ At the same time, it is to be noted that the concern for sentence-rhythm is not always the most meticulous that might be imagined. Even when the rhythmical character of a sentence or a paragraph is marked, little attempt is made to secure variety, and the symmetries sought are more often approximate than exact.

There are signs of a more consistent policy, however, in the choice of clausulae, over which Maximus's tastes are both distinct and idiosyncratic. The overwhelming preference is for closing sequences ending in a cretic. Four patterns dominate: $-u|-uu$, $---|-uu$, $-u-|-uu$ and $-uu-|-uu$. Of these $---|-uu$ also appears in resolved form as $-uu-|-uu$, $uu-|-uu$, $---uu|-uu$, $uu-uu|-uu$ and $-uuuu|-uu$; and $-u-|-uu$ as $-uuu|-uu$ and $uuu-|-uu$.⁵⁷ Of these preferences only

⁵⁴ Punctuating with full stops after δ Σάτυρος and εἶχεν Φρύγας, against HOBEIN and Paris. gr. 1962.

⁵⁵ Again altering the punctuation of Paris. gr. 1962 and HOBEIN by placing full stops after πολιτικόν and ἔρωσ.

⁵⁶ E. g. 9.6e; 10.9c-f; 11.10a-f; 16.6d-e; 41.2 (as well as 32.10b-e, quoted above).

⁵⁷ In a sample of 1000 sentence and colon ends (on pp. 1-268 of HOBEIN's Teubner text) $-u|-uu$ accounted for 11.6% of instances (as against 3.9% and 3.5% in control samples from the unrhythmical Thucydides); $---|-uu$ for 10.1% (as against 2.6% and 4.2%); $-u-|-uu$ for 7.4% (2.7% and 2.4%); $-uu-|-uu$ for 3.2% (1.7%). The

some are generally shared: namely $-\cup-|- \cup \cup$ and $---|- \cup \cup$, both of which are sought by Plato and by a number of later Greek writers.⁵⁸ In his avoidances Maximus is equally distinctive. He shares the general (Platonic and later Greek) distaste for $---\cup$ and $-\cup\cup-\cup$, but joins with this an equal aversion to the otherwise popular $\cup\cup\cup\cup$ and $-\cup\cup\cup-\cup$.⁵⁹

There is no difficulty in finding an appropriate label for the characteristic sentence-structure and rhythmical character of the 'Dialexeis'. In their taste for short clauses, for Gorgianic figures and for the marked rhythms that these choices bring, they exemplify one version of that stylistic tendency known to its detractors, ancient and modern, as Asianism.⁶⁰ It is only a superficial paradox, a trite and familiar accident of terminology, that on another level of analysis – that of their vocabulary, grammar and syntax – they are the compositions of an Atticist. The necessary work in this area was long ago done by KARL DÜRR, following in the footsteps of WILHELM SCHMID. Maximus emerges from his studies as a practitioner of exactly the same brand of moderate Atticism as a Dio, a Lucian or a Philostratus.

In his choice of word-forms he wavers, conventionally, between $-\rho\rho$ - and $-\rho\sigma$ -, $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ and $\acute{\epsilon}\varsigma$, $\xi\acute{\upsilon}\nu$ and $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu$, $\sigma\mu\kappa\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$ and $\mu\kappa\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$, but also affects such more definite Atticisms as comparative forms in $-\omega$, deictic forms of the demonstrative pronoun in $-\acute{\iota}$, $-\tau\tau$ - for $-\sigma\sigma$ -, and $\acute{\alpha}\tau\tau\alpha$ for $\tau\acute{\iota}\nu\acute{\alpha}$ (though never to the complete exclusion of the alternative form).⁶¹ Along with these comes a scattering of deliberate Ionisms, often influenced by an adjacent reference to an Ionic poet or Herodotus,⁶² and a fair number of vulgarisms ($\gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$ and $\gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\omega\sigma\kappa\omega$ [if the manuscript tradition is to be trusted on this point], omission of the syllabic augment in the pluperfect, and of the temporal augment in the aorist of verbs beginning in $\epsilon\upsilon$ -, $\kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\omega$ as the future of $\kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\omega$, $-\omega$ forms of $-\mu\iota$ verbs, third person imperatives in $-\omega\sigma\alpha\nu$, aorist forms of $\delta\acute{\iota}\delta\omega\mu\iota$ and $\eta\eta\mu\iota$ in $-\kappa\alpha$).⁶³ In syntax too, the 'Dialexeis' show many Atticising features: collective use of the singular, use of the dual, adverbial neuter singulars, causal $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$, partitive genitive, relative genitive after verbs, frequent use of modal datives, dative of personal agent after

resolved forms together add another 13.9% (the most frequent being $-\cup\cup-|- \cup \cup$). In all 46.2% of all endings in the sample are accounted for by those listed here (if all the resolved versions are taken into account); otherwise (without the resolutions), 32.3%. (Figures for Thucydides from A. W. DE GROOT, *A Handbook of Antique Prose-Rhythm*, 1, History of Greek prose-metre, Groningen, 1918, pp. 178 f.).

⁵⁸ See DE GROOT, *op. cit.*; OCD² s. v. 'Prose Rhythm'.

⁵⁹ $-\cup\cup-\cup$ 1.6% (Thucydides 8.1% and 7.6%); $\cup\cup\cup\cup$ 5.2% (7.6% and 9.3%); $---\cup$ 13.3% (19.7% and 17.6%); $-\cup---\cup$ 2.8% (9.1% and 9.6%); $-\cup\cup\cup-\cup$ 1.4% (4.7% and 2.2%).

⁶⁰ The loci classici are Cicero Brutus 325 and Orator 24–27 and 230 f.

⁶¹ E. g. 1.8a–10.9d; 1.1b–1.2b; 8.7c; 1.5c–8.6b; 16.2b; 1.6c; 2.1b; 11.3a; cf. DÜRR, *op. cit.* n. 3, pp. 9 ff.

⁶² E. g. ἄξεινος (14.2b); ἔσοι (38.1f); ἀνακίρνημι (9.3d, etc.); Λεωνίδης (19.5c, etc.); cf. DÜRR, p. 9.

⁶³ E. g. 4.8b; 6.6d; 12.7a; 5.5c; 11.11a; 2.6c; 2.10c–d; 29.3a; cf. DÜRR, pp. 9–14.

passives, periphrastic use of neuter article and genitive, relative attraction, ὁποῖον for οἷον, middle in place of active, 'third future', 'gnomic' imperfect, participle as noun, accusative absolute, defining participles, final-consecutive infinitive, absolute infinitive, infinitive plus article, mannered use of the optative, repeated ἄν, pleonastic negatives, ὡς as consecutive particle, παρά and πρὸς with the genitive, compound verbs governing simple cases in preference to simple verbs plus prepositions, constructions *ad sensum*, σχῆμα καθ' ὄλον καὶ μέρος, nominative absolute, prolepsis — all are found.⁶⁴ Where Maximus departs from correct Attic usage, he does so only in ways entirely familiar from other Atticist authors: there are irregularities in specifications of place; prepositional phrases are used in place of simple cases; μᾶλλον appears with the comparative; intensified forms of the superlative are misconstrued; ὅσος is used for the simple relative; the article is capriciously omitted; αὐτοῦ appears in the attributive position; past tenses are jumbled together; the future is used in place of the deliberative subjunctive; καίτοι is followed by a participle; infinitive and participial constructions are interchanged, as are infinitive with ὄτι-constructions; there are irregularities in the use of moods in compound sentences, in the use of ἄν and in negatives.⁶⁵

In vocabulary too Maximus shows a firm but far from fanatical Atticist bent. DÜRR's analysis of some 2350 words and phrases from the 'Dialexeis' reveals only 543 of post-classical provenance: 450 already attested in other authors, 93 found for the first time in the 'Dialexeis'. Of these latter 93, the majority are compounds, including a good number of the double-prepositional compounds so favoured by later Greek writers.⁶⁶ Of the classically-attested items, some 500 come from the poets (a lesser proportion than in, say, Aelian or Philostratus), and some 1300 from the usage of prose authors (about 1100 being shared by a number of authors and 200 traceable to the usage of particular individuals).

Of special interest is the importance clearly accorded to Plato as an object of imitation. Of the circa 200 words traceable to individual usage, well over half are Platonic — some 115, as against about 82 traceable to Xenophon, Thucydides, the Attic orators and Ionian prose. Furthermore, DÜRR counts another hundred or so phrases also copied from the 'Dialogues'. Prominent among these latter are two distinct and distinctive categories: sequences of synonyms or linked terms (nouns, verbs or adjectives) drafted in to amplify and articulate;⁶⁷ and terms of argument and dialogue

⁶⁴ E. g. 9.2a; 15.2f; 1.3c; 10.9f; 4.6d; 5.1f; 19.2g; 16.4a; 6.1c; 8.7i; 7.1d; 31.1a; 8.7a; 35.7d; 1.7e; 3.2d; 5.1e; 6.3d; 7.2k; 10.5g; 28.3a; 11.11a; 10.5a; 8.7f-h; 38.4d; 3.1a; 30.3h; 17.4a; 6.3f; 6.2f; 16.21. See DÜRR, pp. 14-61 and W. SCHMID, *Der Atticismus in seinen Hauptvertretern von Dionysios von Harlikarnass bis auf den zweiten Philostratus*, Stuttgart, 1887-97, IV (1896), pp. 633 f.

⁶⁵ E. g. 10.5k; 12.10e; 26.3a; 30.3d; 18.6c; 2.1g; 26.6b; 30.3o; 33.5d; 35.2b; 12.7a; 15.2g; 14.2a-b; 6.2a; 13.3d. See DÜRR, pp. 25-53 (with summary, 69).

⁶⁶ E. g. 1.4b; 1.5e; 14.4e; 18.5e; 32.10c; 32.9a.

⁶⁷ E. g. 18.5b (Hipp. Mai. 282e); 19.5b (Rep. 534d, 414d); cf. DÜRR, pp. 83 f.

brought in to add Socratic tone.⁶⁸ Plato was of course an unavoidable model for all Atticising authors,⁶⁹ but he had a particular interest for the composer of the 'Dialexeis'. It has emerged above how important Platonic doctrine and the personal authority of Plato are to the content of these lectures, and how in point of clausulae too preference goes to choices which can claim Platonic precedent. Now a Platonising verbal style must be added; and it will be seen below that quotation from and imitation of the 'Dialogues' constitutes a significant element as well. One is surely justified in seeing here the results of a conscious and deliberate attempt to clothe philosophical teaching in the style of the greatest literary philosopher, rather than just the unthinking consequence of following a general literary fashion.

It remains to consider one last respect in which the style of the 'Dialexeis' makes an impression. The reader of even a single *διάλεξις* can hardly fail to be struck by the weight of ornamentation they bear – the frequency and number of the images, mythological and historical references, and quotations with which their arguments are illustrated, amplified and adorned. Every page bears at least one instance from at least one of these three categories of ornament; many bear examples of all three. Collectively, their use goes far beyond the strictly utilitarian purpose of clarifying lines of thought; they are there as much to please for themselves, and to further the claims of the author to literary taste and general culture, as to instruct.

In the matter of imagery, it is to be admitted that there is no great sophistication in the verbal and syntactic techniques with which it is deployed. The dominant form is the simile, with a further marked preference for the explicit (even pedantic) spelling out of the points of comparison: 'just as ..., so also ...' remains in the mind as the characteristic formulation.⁷⁰ Common too is the mode of contrast in which tenor and vehicle can be linked, in an equally plain manner, by ... *δέ* or by *ἀλλά*.⁷¹ As to length and degree of development, one encounters everything from short two- and three-word images (alone or in agglomeration) to passages of several sentences, even pages, that at least begin to deserve the name of allegories.⁷²

⁶⁸ *ἄξιον* ... *εἰπεῖν*: 2.4c; Rep. 517a. *ἀρ' ἠγεῖ ἄλλη πη ἔχειν*: 35.2a; Rep. 459b. *ἀρ' οὐν ἀποδέχη*: 8.6c, Tht. 207c. *ὦ ἄριστε*: 5.3a; Rep. 338d. *ἐάν πρῶτον, ὦ τάν, ἀποκρίνη*: 8.4b; Apol. 25c. *ἐπανάγωμεν* ... *αὐθις ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον*: 30.4a; Laws 949b. *πάλιν αὐ ἐπανιώμεν*: 26.6a; Tht. 177c. *ἔχε δὴ αὐτόθι*: 34.1c; Grg. 490b. *θαυμάσεις εἰ*: 8.1a; Prot. 326e. *μᾶλλον δὲ οὕτως*: 26.4f; Phd. 77e. *νῦν δὲ ἴθι*: 8.7a; Grg. 489e (etc.). *νόμιζε δὴ καί*: 1.10d; Grg. 482a. *ὀρθῶς/ῶρα*: 32.10k (etc.); Prot. 331b, Rep. 327c. *παρακαλῶμεν*: 34.9a (etc.); Grg. 527e (etc.). *σκέψαι*: 7.7a (etc.); Rep. 353d (etc.). *φαίην δ' ἂν ἐγωγε*: 7.5a; Prot. 330d. *φῶμεν*: 34.2c (etc.); Phil. 36a; cf. DÜRR, p. 85.

⁶⁹ See SCHMID, *op. cit.* n. 64, I (1887). pp. 206 f., 209; 141 f.; 299 ff.; II (1889). pp. 171 ff.; III (1893). pp. 162 ff.; IV (1896). pp. 247 ff., 651.

⁷⁰ E. g. 1.2d–f; 1.2g–h; 1.3f; etc.

⁷¹ E. g. 1.1; 1.3c; 1.3d–e; etc. Cf. DÜRR, p. 127.

⁷² E. g. 14.1–2 (The Friend and the Flatterer, based on Prodicus's Heracles); 30.3 (the Hedonist King's pleasure-berge); and the sustained images of the stage and the athletic contest in *Dialexis* 1. In spite of the Platonic colour of the 'Dialexeis' there are no real myths; the

It is however the range of comparisons invoked that impresses. Looking at some of the major themes and topics of the 'Dialexeis' one finds, for instance, that God is presented as the sun, a spring, a father, a king, a law, a lawgiver, the head of a household, a steward, a craftsman, a farmer, a steersman, a doctor, a general, a chorusmaster, a guide and a playwright.⁷³ The material cosmos he rules is a stormy sea, a flowing river, a noisy party, a dark and misty chasm, and a prison.⁷⁴ So too the physical bodies of his human subjects are stormy channels, flooding rivers, rotting prisons, monstrous beasts, menageries, unruly horses, tumultuous cities and armies at war.⁷⁵ Virtue is health, fertility, obedience to legal or military authority, a well-steered ship, sobriety and wakefulness.⁷⁶ Life is a journey along a road, a sea-voyage, a military campaign, an athletic competition, a play.⁷⁷ Further examples could be given, for other comparands, but would not substantially alter the general picture already given of the range and style of comparison.⁷⁸

The ultimate inspiration for many of these images, perhaps the majority, in Platonic dialogue; but traditions of Socratic moral preaching have also made their contribution.⁷⁹ Plato is invoked and imitated, for example, in God the sun, father, craftsman, lawgiver, steersman, doctor and general, and overall in the imagery of matter, soul and body and the virtuous disposition; from the moralists come images for the conduct of good and bad lives.⁸⁰ Given this latter affinity, it is noteworthy, that Maximus seems concerned throughout to maintain a relatively high level of elegance and decorum. Some of his images may be homely (animal behaviour, goldmining) but they are never coarse or shocking. An item like the vomiting vulture of Plutarch *De vitando* 831c would be entirely out of place. In imagery as in vocabulary and syntax, literary urbanity is allowed to win out over the more abrasive tones of popular preaching.

The wide range of Maximus's images is matched by that of his mythological, literary and historical references, which are similarly deployed as

scale of the exercise does not allow it. Note however 10.1–3, where three biographical anecdotes (concerning Epimenides, Pythagoras and Aristeas) are expounded as *αἰνίγματα*.

⁷³ E. g. 41.2d–e; 11.11b; 11.9c; 11.12b–e; 11.12d; 6.5e; 27.8a; 41.2b; 11.12a; 4.9d; 8.7h; 5.4g–h; 13.3g; 8.7e–h; 15.1d.

⁷⁴ E. g. 11.7–11; 1.2d–h; 11.7g; 9.6b–e; 8.7d and 9.6e; 11.12c.

⁷⁵ E. g. 10.5c; 27.5f–h; 7.5a; 33.8; 27.5h; 41.5g–m; 16.4d–l; 22.7b–e.

⁷⁶ E. g. 7.1d–f; 5.8e–f; 6.5d–f; 40.5a; 20.6e; 10.1g; 10.6a–f.

⁷⁷ E. g. 1.3c and 8.7e–h; 3.7b and 30.2–3; 5.3f–h; 1.4–6; 15.1d.

⁷⁸ Cf. DÜRR, *op. cit.* n. 3, pp. 124 ff.

⁷⁹ The word 'diatribe' has been deliberately avoided here: see below, n. 100.

⁸⁰ E. g. (1) *Tim.* 28c, 41a; *Rep.* 508–9; *Laws* 905e–906a; *Phd.* 79c, 90c, 109; *Rep.* 611e; 544d; *Phdr.* 246a ff.; *Grg.* 463 ff. (2) *Ps.-Hippoc. Epist.* 17.41–2; *ps.-Diog. Epist.* 39.2; *Arrian Epicteti Diatribae* 1.18.4; *Tabula Cebetis*, *passim*; *Teles* 2, p. 10 HENSE and 6, p. 53 HENSE; *Arrian Epicteti Diatribae* 1.24.2; *Teles* 2, p. 5 HENSE. The two strands are of course not separate, either in themselves or in the uses Maximus makes of them: take for example the case of the image of the 'party of life', in which a moralists' image (e. g. *Bion fr.* 68 KINDSTRAND) is rephrased to express a Platonic concept (11.7g; 10.1f, 3f, 9b).

much to adorn as to illustrate and explain. Like images, they can differ greatly in scale, from the bare mention of a name (alone, or more likely in a trio or a quartet) up to quite elaborately developed narratives. Of the gods, all twelve Olympians are named (Zeus, Apollo and Athena most frequently), along with Cronos, Oceanus, Helios, Eos, Mnemosyne, the Muses, the Fates, the Erinyes, Hebe, Ganymede, the Graces, Aeolus, Thetis, Leucothea, Proteus, Pan and the Dioscuri; also Prometheus, the Aloidae, Asclepius, Chiron, Gorgons, Cecrops, the Chimaera, Geryon, the Cyclopes, Scylla and Charybdis, the Sirens, Calypso, Circe, Satyrus and Marsyas. The great majority of these references in Homeric in inspiration; an allegorical interpretation in sometimes expounded or assumed, but by no means inevitable or consistent.⁸¹ Among characters from heroic mythology, almost all are again drawn from Homeric epic. From the 'Iliad' come thirty-three names, of which the most frequently repeated are those of Achilles (21 references), Agamemnon (15), Nestor (10), Ajax (9), Paris (7) and Diomedes (7). From the 'Odyssey' the contribution is smaller: seventeen names of individuals and peoples, of which Odysseus's, with twenty-six references, is a long way the most popular. Allegorical interpretation is again a significant factor in the presentation, particularly where Odysseus is concerned.⁸² Other heroes to be invoked are Heracles (11 references), Orpheus, the Argonauts, Palamedes, Telephus, Cadmus, Pentheus, Amphion, Amphilocheus, Laius, Oedipus, Triptolemus, Theseus, Thyestes, Perseus, Neleus, Tlepolemus, Midas, Minos, Daedalus and Salmoneus.

Maximus's references to people, places and events known from political and military history and from ethnographic writing are too numerous to be listed individually. Some 44 passages in the 'Dialexeis' mention people and places, Greek and barbarian, involved in events before the Persian Wars, from colonisation to the tyrants and from Sardanapallus to Darius. Another 22 refer to the Persian Wars themselves, nine to persons and events from the Pentecontaetia, 35 to the period of the Peloponnesian War, 26 to events of the fourth century down to the rise of Macedon, eight to Alexander, and one to the break-up of Alexander's empire after his death. Geographical and ethnographic references range over the familiar territory of the Greek and barbarian worlds of the archaic and classical periods. A moralist's bias (the career of Alcibiades as a sad warning of the dangers of abandoning philosophy, Athenian defeat in 404 as a punishment for blasphemy, and so on) is

⁸¹ For a general discussion of the justification for allegorical readings, see *Dialexeis* 4 and 26. Specific allegorizations are as follows. Zeus: 4.8, 26.7, 11.3, 41.2, 35.1, 4.9, 34.3; Apollo: 4.8 (cf. 22.7); Athena: 4.8, 26.8 (cf. 38.7); Poseidon: 4.8; Hera: 26.8; Aphrodite: 26.8; Hephaestus: 4.8 (cf. 9.6, 26.9); Centaurs, Gorgons, etc.: 33.8. See further J. F. KINDSTRAND, *Homer in der zweiten Sophistik, Studien zu der Homerlektüre und dem Homerbild bei Dion von Prusa, Maximus von Tyros and Ailius Aristeides* (*Acta Universitatis Uppsalensis, Studia Graeca Uppsaliensia* 7), Uppsala, 1973, pp. 172–180.

⁸² Achilles: 26.5; 4.8. Odysseus: 38.7; 26.9; 4.8; 15.6; 14.4; 19.3; 34.7–8; 22.1; 7.5; 10.7; 11.6; 11.10; 21.8. See again KINDSTRAND, *op. cit.*, pp. 178–185.

naturally much in evidence.⁸³ The principal sources, accounting for all but a small handful of these references, are the classic histories of Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon.

Among philosophers mentioned, pride of place goes to Socrates; after him in frequency of appearance come Plato (some 23 references), Diogenes and Pythagoras. Other wise men whose names are invoked are Pherecydes, Solon, Lycurgus, Aristetas, Epimenides, Anacharsis, Thales, Anaximenes, Xenophanes, Empedocles, Parmenides, Leucippus, Democritus, Diogenes of Apollonia, Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, Gorgias, Prodicus, Protagoras, Hippias, Thrasymachus, Aeschines, Antisthenes, Aristippus, Xenophon, Aristotle, Zeno, Epicurus, Strato, Chrysippus, Clitomachus and Carneades. Among literary figures come Homer, Hesiod, Archilochus, Alcaeus, Tyrtaeus, Telesilla, Sappho, Stesichorus, Anacreon, Pindar, Aristophanes, Eupolis and Menander.⁸⁴ Hippocrates, Zopyrus, Theodorus, Connus, Olympus, Ismenias, Phidias, Polycleitus, Zeuxis, Polygnotus, Milo, Polydamas, Titolmus, Lasthenes, Mithaecus and Sarambus complete the list of notables to whose skills and experiences the 'Dialexeis' appeal to point their morals and adorn their tales.

This list of Great Names is a long one and testifies to the assiduity with which Maximus has woven the honoured past into his discourses. It is also highly conventional, differing little if at all from what almost any cultivated individual of the period could have compiled from his reading of the approved classics of Greek literature. There are no signs of out-of-the-way learning or of unusual acquaintances. The presence of many of the names is several times 'over-determined', in that they feature not in one classic work or category of works but in several. A very similar list could be compiled from the works of Lucian, a much more ample one from the 'Moralia' of Plutarch.

The final ingredient in the decorative mix is the evocation of classical literature. HOBEIN's index lists over three hundred direct quotations of and overt allusions to passages from the classics, but that is a conservative estimate; a figure of anything up to four hundred could reasonably be given. By far the most frequently exploited source is Homer, argued in *Dialexeis* 4 and 26 to be not only the greatest Greek poet but also the first and greatest of philosophers, who accounts on his own for well over half the entire haul.⁸⁵ Next after him comes Plato, whose writings are quoted, alluded to and imitated almost seventy times (though only eight of these are

⁸³ Alcibiades: 6.6c–g, etc. Athenian defeat: 3.8h–m.

⁸⁴ Aeschylus, Euripides, Ariphron and Aratus are quoted but not named.

⁸⁵ See KINDSTRAND, *op. cit.* n. 81, pp. 45–71, for a detailed discussion. KINDSTRAND counts 298 quotations and allusions: 141 verbatim, 157 involving some degree of paraphrase. Of these 153 draw on the *Iliad* and 145 on the *Odyssey* (83 : 58 verbatim). 70% of the *Iliadic* quotations and 80% of the *Odyssean* come from the first 12 books of their respective epics.

cases of verbatim transcription).⁸⁶ Other poets to be quoted are Hesiod, Stesichorus, Sappho, Anacreon, Pindar, Aeschylus, Euripides, Aristophanes, Ariphron, Menander, Aratus and Epicharmus.⁸⁷ The remaining prose works to be quoted or alluded to are those of Heraclitus, Aeschines of Sphettus, Xenophon, Epicurus, Herodotus, Thucydides and Demosthenes.⁸⁸ In contrast to the range of images and mythological-historical references, this set looks small and conventional even at first glance: standard authors only, and not all of those either. Moreover, many of the quotations are not made at first hand, but conditioned by some intermediate source: for example, the quotation of Stesichorus's 'Palinode' draws on the 'Phaedrus', while the use of Herodotus 1.6.1 and Thucydides 1.24.1 follows a precedent set by grammarians. It is only with the use of Homeric and Platonic material that one encounters a less perfunctory and preconditioned approach; and only with the Platonic material that one can properly speak of literary μίμησις, as opposed to mere citation.

Only the briefest of concluding summaries is needed for this survey of the style of the 'Dialexeis'. It has been observed how both in their Atticising vocabulary and syntax and in their Asianist rhythms they follow well-worn trends in Greek literature of the Imperial period: the former next to inevitable for an author wishing to gain the approval of a cultivated audience; the latter, though not an inevitable choice, at least one of the main stylistic options open in a relatively limited range. It remains only to point out how well they conform to a third major stylistic trend of their era. In their lively informality of tone, syntax and structure, and in their lavish use of the decorative resources of imagery and quotation, they are perfect examples of λόγος ἀφελής – that register of cultivated diction proper to such forms as letters, novels, dialogues and informal addresses, which found its main stylistic exemplars in such figures as Plato, Xenophon and Dio and which stood in contrast to the Demosthenic splendours of λόγος πολιτικός.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Platonic quotations: Rep. 393d in 35.1; 617e in 41.5; Phdr. 246e in 26.7 and 247a in 41.3; Laws 709b–c in 13.7; Charm. 154b in 18.4; Alc. I 132a in 35.6; Ion 530a in 18.9. The less direct allusions and adaptations are far too numerous to be listed here (and by no means all noted by HOBEIN).

⁸⁷ Hesiod: seven quotations, five allusions (adding Catal. fr. 1.16 M/W, in 35.1, to HOBEIN's list: see R. RENEHAN, A new Hesiodic fragment, *Classical Philology* 81 [1986], pp. 221–222). Stesichorus: one quotation. Sappho: nine brief quotations embedded in a σύγκρισις of her life with that of Socrates. Anacreon: two quotations, four allusions. Pindar: one quotation. Aeschylus: one quotation, one allusion. Euripides: two quotations. Aristophanes, Ariphron, Menander, Epicharmus, Aratus: one quotation each. For details see the indexes to HOBEIN's or TRAPP's Teubner editions, or TRAPP's translation.

⁸⁸ Heraclitus: four quotations, one allusion. Aeschines: three quotations or paraphrases (38.4: fr. 11.2 f. DITTMAR; 6.6: fr. 8.42 ff.; 18.4: fr. 11.11 f.); up to four allusions (6.6e; 7.7c; 18.9; 38.4). Xenophon: five allusions. Epicurus: one quotation. Herodotus: three quotations, three allusions or paraphrases. Thucydides: two quotations. Demosthenes: one quotation (41.3, cf. Dem. 8.26). For details see again HOBEIN's or TRAPP's Teubner indexes.

⁸⁹ See [Aristides] *Ars Rhetorica*, Books I (λόγος πολιτικός) and II (λόγος ἀφελής).

V. Form, Tradition and Context

It should now be possible to assess the place of the 'Dialexeis', thus described and analysed, in the wider landscape of the culture of their day. This may usefully be done both in terms of the broad traditions of thought and activity in which they participate, and in terms of the specific forms of discourse which they imitate or are otherwise indebted to.

On the level of broad tradition it is not difficult to fit the 'Dialexeis' comfortably into a number of well-attested and familiar currents. As philosophy in elegant literary (rhetorical) dress, they reflect the esteem which philosophical interests and philosophical instruction enjoyed beyond the narrow confines of the formal schools, as an important element both in the moral education of the young and in the world-view of the cultivated adult. A long and varied tradition of literary endeavour dedicated to bringing philosophical matter before a wider audience stretched back from the second century A. D., providing an immensely rich set of precedents on which to draw. Ultimately this tradition runs back – at least as far as prose presentation is concerned – to Plato, to the other fourth-century Socratics, and to the fifth-century sophists. More immediately, there were the widely-respected figures of Dio Chrysostom and Favorinus, famously cited by Philostratus as honorary forebears of the Second Sophistic, and very likely to have had a direct influence on the composer of the 'Dialexeis' himself.⁹⁰

Nor is there any difficulty in accounting for the choice of specifically Platonic philosophical doctrine as the basic matter of the 'Dialexeis'. This may be related both to the unbroken popularity of Plato's dialogues as literary and stylistic models and to that revival of dogmatic Platonism whose first stirrings can be seen as much as two centuries before the lifetime of Maximus. Sceptical Platonism, initiated by Arcesilaus in the 260's B. C., had come to an end with the disruptions to Athenian intellectual life caused by the Mithridatic Wars. A revival of interest in positive Platonic doctrine is first seen in the diverse activities of Antiochus of Ascalon and Eudorus of

⁹⁰ Philostratus *Vitae Sophistarum* 1.486–492. The case for supposing Maximus to have been directly influenced or inspired by these two rests partly on shared topics and the suspicion of borrowings in at least one instance, partly on more general considerations. Dio and Maximus share an interest in Diogenes (Dio Or. 6; Dial. 36), in Homer and Plato (Dio 'Υπὲρ Ὁμήρου [Suda]; Dial. 17) and in the life and activities of Socrates (Dio Orr. 53–55; Diall. 3, 8, 18–21); and it is likely that *Dialexis* 36.5c–g borrows from Dio Or. 6 (1–7, 10–14, 23–4 and 60). Favorinus and Maximus share an interest in Socratic ἐρωτική (Favorinus *fr.* 18–21 BARIGAZZI; Diall. 18–21), in Homer as a philosopher (Favorinus *fr.* 22 BARIGAZZI; Dial. 26) and in prayer (Favorinus *fr.* 8 BARIGAZZI; Dial. 5). But even if the extent of the possible debts is reduced (as by J. PUIGGALI, *Maxime de Tyr et Favorinos*, *Annales de la Fac. des Lettres et Sci. hum. de l'Univ. de Dakar* 10 [1980], pp. 47–62; and *Id.*, *Dion Chrysostome et Maxime de Tyr*, *ibid.* 12 [1982], pp. 9–24) it is hard to believe that Maximus could have composed as he did and not have been aware that he was following in the footsteps of two such famous predecessors as these.

Alexandria, and gives every appearance of having strengthened steadily through the first and early second centuries A.D.⁹¹ By the end of this period, when Maximus himself will have been receiving his education, attestations of Platonist interests are numerous, especially in Asia Minor and Syria; in 176 A.D. – the decade before his alleged visit to Rome – the status of Platonism as one of the four main philosophical αἰρέσεις was ratified in the foundation of the Imperial chairs at Athens.⁹² One may also point to the significant parallel of Apuleius, closely comparable to Maximus as a philosophising sophist and his senior by at most a couple of decades. He too took Platonism as his sect and his material.⁹³

But it is not only in their philosophical aspect that the 'Dialexeis' betray the intellectual fashions of their age; they may also be seen to share tastes and prejudices of a more general cultural kind (quite apart from the stylistic affinities already discussed). Analysis of the use made in the 'Dialexeis' of references to Greek history, of the kind offered above, reveals some interesting restrictions of scope. In the field of political and military history, there is no clear reference to any event later than the disintegration of the empire of Alexander the Great after 323 B.C.; in philosophical history, there is no reference to any figure later than Clitomachus, who died in 110/109 B.C. That is to say, Maximus confines his references exclusively to the great days of Hellenic history and culture: before the Hellenistic monarchies and the coming of Rome; before the demise of Athens as the philosophical capital of the world. Similarly, he quotes from few authors later than Plato and none later than Aratus; and in his imagery he scrupulously avoids details of the contemporary, as distinct from the classical world. This selective and classicising attitude to tradition and history is again entirely characteristic of an age that preferred to live its imaginative life in the words and the world of a great but vanished past.⁹⁴

Thus a number of contemporary fashions, philosophical and other, combine to provide a comfortable and illuminating background against which to view the content, style and attitudes of the 'Dialexeis'. The question of form, however, remains to be confronted. It was seen above that the forty-one items in the collection were composed, by and large, to a formula: one which dictated not only their informal and ornate style, their short length and their concentration on single topics, but also the range of techniques by which those topics were to be introduced and developed. Can

⁹¹ See in general DILLON, *op. cit.* n. 2. Cf. also J. WHITTAKER, *Platonic Philosophy in the Early Centuries of the Empire*, ANRW II. 36.1, ed. W. HAASE, Berlin–New York, 1987, pp. 81–123.

⁹² See J. GLUCKER, *Antiochus and the Late Academy (Hypomnemata 56)*, Göttingen, 1978, pp. 134–138.

⁹³ See GLUCKER, pp. 139 ff.

⁹⁴ See R. KOHL, *De scholasticorum argumentis ex historia petitis (Rhetorische Studien 4)*, Paderborn, 1915 and E. L. BOWIE, *The Greeks and their Past in the Second Sophistic, Past and Present* 46 (1970), pp. 3–41 (repr. M. I. FINLEY [ed.], *Studies in Ancient Society*, London, 1974, pp. 166–209). Maximus's complete avoidance of reference to the post-classical past is however extreme even by the standards of his day.

this formula too be related to other modes and procedures in second-century culture? It seems likely that it can, in a way that involves connections both with philosophical and with rhetorical activity.

On the rhetorical side, the affinity of the 'Dialexeis' is with the sophistic (προ)λαλιά: the kind of short, informal talk that could either precede the performer's request for themes and the declamation proper in a sophistic 'concert', or stand on its own as a self-contained performance. It is often observed that an alternative name for this form is διάλεξις – a coincidence that would seem to provide a cast-iron link with Maximus's compositions. But the word διάλεξις in the second century (and later) could also bear the sense of 'philosophical discourse',⁹⁵ and there can be no guarantee that the two applications were thought to be closely linked. The case for a connection with sophistic λαλιά must rest on shared style and scale rather than on terminology; but it is none the weaker for that. As described by Philostratus and Menander Rhetor, sophistic λαλιά had a friendly informality, a brevity and a taste for imagery and poetic quotation that all make it sound interestingly similar to what has been found in Maximus's 'Dialexeis'.⁹⁶

Yet the match is not perfect. Sophistic λαλιά, unlike a διάλεξις of Maximus, was not a didactic or an expository form; it unfolded no arguments and explained no doctrines. To find parallels to this further aspect of the formula of the 'Dialexeis' one must look instead to the procedures of the classroom. Both from surviving philosophical commentaries and from texts like Arrian's 'Discourses of Epictetus', Gellius's 'Noctes Atticae' and Plutarch's 'De audiendo', it is known that great use was made in philosophical and other schools of two related forms of activity: the exposition of texts as a series of separate discussions of points of interest and controversy, and (as a separate exercise) the invitation of miscellaneous questions for immediate answer from pupils to master.⁹⁷ These exercises, both encouraging the economical exposition of circumscribed topics, have left their written 'precipitate' in commentaries and in collections of miscellaneous προβλήματα and ζητήματα.⁹⁸ From their different angle they provide a second set of suggestive parallels to the 'Dialexeis' to set beside those in sophistic λαλιά:

⁹⁵ See SCHMID, *op. cit.* n. 64, IV (1896), pp. 346–9 and PUIGGALI, *op. cit.* n. 1, pp. 23–31.

⁹⁶ For all this see further D. A. RUSSELL, *Greek Declamation*, Cambridge, 1983, pp. 77 ff., referring to Philostratus *Vitae Sophistarum* I. 519 and 528, II. 569 and Menander Rhetor 388–394 SPENGLER; and H. G. NESSELRATH, *Lucian's Introductions*, in D. A. RUSSELL (ed.), *Antonine Literature*, Oxford, 1990, pp. 111–140.

⁹⁷ Arrian *Epicteti Diatribae* 1.26.13; 3.21.7; Gellius *Noctes Atticae* 17.20.1 f.; 19.6.1 ff.; 1.26.1 ff.; 2.2.1 f.; Plutarch *De audiendo* 42f–43d; 47c–d.

⁹⁸ Full commentaries survive only from a later date, but were certainly a familiar form already in the second century. See for example the fragments of Harpocration, discussed by J. DILLON, *Harpocration's Commentary on Plato*, *California Studies in Classical Antiquity* 4 (1971), pp. 125–146. A convenient example of the other form is Plutarch's *Πλατωνικά Ζητήματα*. It may be observed that the technique of answering a question by means of a series of progressively more satisfactory solutions (cf. p. 1958, n. 40 above) is one shared between such collections of προβλήματα and the 'Dialexeis' (e. g. 12, 22, 25).

not only in scale, but also in their systematic discussion of limited topics, and in their suggestions, preserved from oral to written form, of a dialogue between pupils and a teacher.

It would seem unlikely that these resemblances, to sophistic *λαλιά* on the one hand, and to classroom procedure on the other, are entirely coincidental. On the contrary, it is very tempting to conclude that they provide a means not only of categorizing the 'Dialexeis' relative to other contemporary forms of *λόγος*, but also of accounting for the origins of the formula to which they are composed – as a conscious and deliberate blend of two previously separate modes of presentation. It would perhaps be an unreal question to ask whether the starting-point was sophistic *λαλιά*, which was then stiffened with an infusion of scholasticism, or whether the process of combination worked the other way round. There can also be no way of telling whether the innovator responsible was Maximus himself, or some other nameless predecessor.⁹⁹ But some such general story as this does seem to be the most satisfactory way of accounting for the particular combination of formal and stylistic features to be found in the 'Dialexeis': far better, for instance, than appeal to the supposed precedent of 'diatribe'.¹⁰⁰ On this level too they turn out to be an interesting blend of a tradition of entertainment and play with one of study and instruction.

The culture for which the 'Dialexeis' were produced was one in which great respect attached both to philosophical and to literary accomplishments. They represent one attempt among many to cater for the resulting demand for philosophy of an accessible kind, in an acceptably cultivated literary dress. It may in the end be felt that the blend they offer is not entirely successful: perhaps the intellectual content is too thin and too casually

⁹⁹ The name of the first-century declaimer-philosopher Papirius Fabianus deserves to be mentioned in this connection as a possible forebear. See the Elder Seneca's *Controversiae*, II praef. 1–5; and the Younger Seneca's *Dialogi* 10.10 and 10.39, *Epistulae Morales* 40.12, 52.11, 58.6 and 100 *passim*.

¹⁰⁰ For the theory that all forms of *διάλεξις* were influenced by Cynic 'diatribe' see SCHMID, *op. cit.* n. 64, IV. p. 348 and DÜRR, *op. cit.* n. 3, p. 5 (and, more generally, P. WENDLAND, *Philo und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe* in: P. WENDLAND und O. KERN, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie und Religion*, Berlin 1895, pp. 3–75 and W. CAPPELLE's article *Diatribe. A: Nichtchristlich* in *RAC* III, Stuttgart, 1957, coll. 990–7). But the modern word 'diatribe' picks out no ancient literary form; and the Greek word *διὰ τριβή*, when applied to forms of discourse, refers either (a) to classes given in a formal school-room setting, or (b) to collections of biographical anecdotes about philosophers: see in general O. HALBAUER, *De diatribis Epicteti*, diss. Leipzig, 1911, pp. 3–18; GLUCKER, *op. cit.* n. 92, pp. 162–6; H. JOCELYN, *Diatribes and Sermons*, *Liverpool Classical Monthly* 7.1 (1982), pp. 3–7 and *Id.*, 'Diatribes' and the Greek book-title *Διατριβαί*, *ibid.* 8.6 (1983), pp. 89 ff. (and, for a classic account of philosophical popularizing that makes no use of the disputed term, U. VON WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORFF, *Antigonos von Karystos* [*Philologische Untersuchungen* 4], Berlin, 1881, *Excurs* 3, pp. 292–319). Popular moral preaching certainly does count as one of the traditions on which the 'Dialexeis' drew, but not as a model for their distinctive structural formula.

handled, even for a general audience, and one of relative beginners; perhaps the tricks of cultivated style are deployed with too little tact and too little variety; austerer tastes may indeed find the combination of such stylistic frivolity with such weighty intellectual issues repugnant in itself. But value-judgements of this kind should not be allowed to obscure the historical interest of this corpus of second-century philosophical sermons. The attitudes and beliefs they reveal (philosophical and other) may not be unparalleled; but that increases rather than detracts from their value as indicators of the shared commonplaces of their age. The blend of forms of presentation they employ, on the other hand, is unique in the surviving record. All the more, then, do they claim the attention of anyone wishing to form a proper picture of the modes and manners of second-century culture.¹⁰¹

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W. KROLL, *Maximus (37) von Tyrus*, *RE 14,2*, 1930, coll. 2555–2562

¹⁰¹ This essay was originally completed and submitted for publication in 1989, with some minor additions in 1990. In revising it again in February 1997, I have made only small changes to take account of recent publications. By a nice irony, references to the text of Maximus will be easier to follow up in KONIARIS than in TRAPP.

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Hermogenes of Tarsus

by GERTRUD LINDBERG, Lund

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Introduction

Hermogenes of Tarsus was a rhetorician of the second half of the second century A.D. His works of technical rhetoric codify practices and theories de-

The manuscript of this article was first submitted in 1982. In 1990 and 1996 I had the opportunity to make changes and additions, taking recent literature into account. I wish to express my gratitude to Dr INGRID PETERSSON, University of Lund, for reading the manuscript, suggesting improvements, and correcting my English.

Abbreviations:

HUNGER I/II	H. HUNGER, Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner, I–II (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft XII 5.1–2), München 1978.
LAUSBERG	H. LAUSBERG, Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik. Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft, 2 vols, München 1960.
MARTIN	J. MARTIN, Antike Rhetorik. Technik und Methode (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft II 3), München 1974.
RE	PAULYS Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, ed. by G. WISSOWA, Stuttgart 1894 ff.
SCHMID-STÄHLIN	W. VON CHRIST, Geschichte der griechischen Literatur, ed. W. SCHMID and O. STÄHLIN, 2.2 (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft VII 2.2), 6th ed., München 1924.
SPENGLER	Rhetores Graeci, ed. L. SPENGLER, 3 vols, Leipzig 1853–56.
SPENGLER-HAMMER	Rhetores Graeci, ed. L. SPENGLER, vol. 1:2 reed. by C. HAMMER, Leipzig 1894.
WALZ	Rhetores Graeci, ed. C. WALZ, 9 vols, Stuttgart and Tübingen 1832–36.
VOLKMANN	R. VOLKMANN, Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer in systematischer Übersicht, 2nd ed., Leipzig 1885.

veloped during the movement known as the Second Sophistic.¹ The Neoplatonists of late antiquity adopted his writings as the authoritative texts of rhetorical theory, and the Byzantines constantly wrote introductions, scholia, and commentaries to them.

In this article I will try to bring out what I consider to be the most important traits of the Hermogenic writings and theories. For questions concerning the manuscript tradition and the constitution of the text, as well as for the work on the ancient scholia and commentaries to the text only short references are needed, considering the solid ground-work done in this field and duly accounted for in the large handbooks. The influence on posterity and the later developments of Hermogenes' theories I will touch upon rather superficially as lying slightly outside the scope of this article.

Of the treatises belonging to the Hermogenic corpus three are of doubtful or disputed genuineness, namely the 'Progymnasmata', 'On Invention', and 'On the Method of Deinotes'. These three spurious works I will treat rather summarily in my article, giving references to some noted scholars' opinions and some special studies. The two remaining, genuine works, 'On Staseis' and 'On Ideas', need a full presentation and interpretation. In order to comprehend and value Hermogenes' version of the stasis theory one has to get acquainted with his new method of arriving at the 'stasis' of a case by a technique of division and exclusion, as well as with his definitions of the single 'stasis' and the distribution of the 'heads of argument' and their meaning and function in the imagined confrontation belonging to each stasis. For an understanding and appreciation of the Hermogenic theory of ideas, the 'types of style', there is needed – besides a clear picture of each single 'idea', compared to its counterpart in the 'Aristides Rhetoric' and to concepts of earlier rhetorical theories, from which it has developed – a grasp of the principal features and concepts of the system as a whole, as well as of the definitions of genres and of individual authors' personal styles in terms of combinations of ideas.

I. Review of Scholarship

1. Establishment of the Text

The first important work on Hermogenes in modern times concerned the text and the body of scholia and commentaries. In 1832–36 C.

¹ The most comprehensive survey of the literary tendencies and theories of this movement and age is, I think, found in B. P. REARDON, *Courants littéraires grecs des II^e et III^e siècles après J.-C.* (Annales litt. Univ. de Nantes 3), Paris 1971. In the chapter «La rhétorique pure, 1», 99 ff., REARDON treats also technical writers on rhetoric such as Hermogenes, especially his analysis of style. Cf. in addition the recent book by D. A. RUSSELL, *Greek Declamation*, Cambridge 1983, especially the chapter "Teachers and theories", as well as ID., *Greek Criticism of the Empire*, in: *The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism*, I. Classical Criticism, Cambridge, New York, etc. 1989, 297–329.

WALZ² edited a collection of rhetorical treatises and scholia in nine volumes, a considerable part of which consists of the treatises of Hermogenes and the commentaries to them. L. SPENGLER³ presented a new edition of the text in 1854. During the first decades of this century H. RABE⁴ in a series of articles gave the result of his work on the many intricacies of the manuscript tradition of the texts and the scholia. His new edition of the text, which he himself describes as an *editio minor*,⁵ comprising 'Progymnasmata', 'On Staseis', 'On Ideas', 'On Invention', and 'On the Method of Deinotes', came in 1913. Many other German scholars participated in the work on the body of scholia and commentaries, among whom may be mentioned S. GLOECKNER, L. SCHILLING, and B. KEIL.⁶ In the forties this type of work, taken up by Polish scholars, resulted in an edition by G. KOWALSKI⁷ of 'On Staseis', appearing in 1947.

2. Translations of the Text into Modern Languages

The work on *progymnasmata* was translated into English by C. S. BALDWIN.⁸ R. NADEAU⁹ has given an English translation of 'On Staseis', C. WOOTEN¹⁰ one of 'On Ideas'. M. PATILLON has in his unpublished doctoral thesis¹¹ given a French translation of the whole Hermogenic corpus.

² In vol. I of 'Rhetores Graeci' is found the treatise 'Progymnasmata' attributed to Hermogenes, while vols III–VII comprise the rest of the Hermogenic texts as well as commentaries and scholia to the Hermogenic corpus.

³ In vol. II of his *Rhetores Graeci*, 1–18, 131–456.

⁴ The articles, entitled 'Hermogenes-Handschriften', 'Aus Rhetoren-Handschriften', and 'Rhetoren-Corpora', appeared in *Rheinisches Museum* 58 (1903), 209–17; 62 (1907), 247–64, 559–90; 63 (1908), 127–51, 512–30; 64 (1909), 284–309, 539–90; 67 (1912), 321–57.

⁵ *Hermogenis Opera*, ed. H. RABE, Leipzig 1913. (Rev. E. DRERUP, *Literarisches Zentralblatt für Deutschland* 65 [1914], 66–68.)

⁶ Especially informative are S. GLOECKNER, *Quaestiones rhetoricae. Historiae artis rhetoricae qualis fuerit aevo imperatorio capita selecta*, *Breslauer philologische Abhandlungen* 8.2, Breslau 1901, L. SCHILLING, *Questiones rhetoricae selectae*, *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*, Supplementband 28 (1903), 663–778, and B. KEIL, *Pro Hermogene*, *Nachrichten von der kgl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, phil.-hist. Kl., 1907, 176–222. For the work in this field by these and other scholars, mainly German and Polish, see the comprehensive survey in HUNGER I, 77–91.

⁷ *Hermogenes, De Statibus*, ed. G. KOWALSKI, *Travaux de la société des sciences et des lettres de Wrocław*, Sér. A, no. 1, Wrocław 1947.

⁸ *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic*, New York 1928, 23–38.

⁹ *Hermogenes' On Stases: A Translation with an Introduction and Notes*, *Speech Monographs* 31 (1964), 361–424.

¹⁰ *Hermogenes' On Types of Style*, Translated by C. W. WOOTEN, Chapel Hill and London 1987. An English translation of some passages in 'On Ideas' was given by D. A. RUSSELL in *Ancient Literary Criticism. The Principal Texts in New Translations*, ed. D. A. RUSSELL and M. WINTERBOTTOM, Oxford 1972, 561–79.

¹¹ *Le corpus d'Hermogène. Essais critiques sur les structures linguistiques de la rhétorique ancienne*, thèse, Paris 1985, vol. I, 35–330 and vol. III, 834–74.

3. Modern Studies of Hermogenic Concepts and Theories

A rather special type of study of the Hermogenic work as a whole was made by M. PROVOT¹² in an attempt to describe the author's personal style.

In more recent times greater interest has been taken in the contents of the treatises, i. e., their terms, concepts, and theories. W. KROLL¹³ in his survey article on rhetoric in RE placed Hermogenes' two major theories, the stasis theory and the theory of ideas, in their wider theoretical and rhetorical contexts. The authors of rhetorical handbooks, R. VOLKMANN, J. MARTIN, and G. A. KENNEDY,¹⁴ take note of the Hermogenic concepts in their surveys of rhetorical theory. In a corresponding way F. BLASS¹⁵ and R. C. JEBB¹⁶ utilize in their works Hermogenes' characterization of orators, given in his 'On Ideas'. In his book on ancient literary criticism¹⁷ D. A. RUSSELL remarks on the Hermogenic theory of ideas, and in his study of the exercises of declamation¹⁸ he extensively uses and comments on the contents of 'On Staseis'.

In the following I give a short summary of scholarly work done on the individual treatises:

The small treatise on *progymnasmata*, attributed to Hermogenes, is treated in studies of this kind of primary rhetorical instruction by O. P. HOPFICHLER,¹⁹ G. REICHEL,²⁰ and H. HUNGER.²¹ Part of the text is commented upon also in a volume on *progymnasmata*²² published within a recent American project on the *chreia* in ancient rhetoric.

The earliest individual study of the stasis theory of Hermogenes was made by W. JAENEKE.²³ D. MATTHES²⁴ remarks on Hermogenes' theory in his extensive treatment of Hermagoras, and R. NADEAU²⁵ has discussed it in a series of

¹² De Hermogenis Tarsensis dicendi genere, Diss. Leipzig 1910.

¹³ S. v. Rhetorik, RE, Suppl. VII (1940), 1039–1138. He treats the theory of ideas in 1126–28, Hermogenes' stasis theory in 1135–37.

¹⁴ Especially in *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World 300 B. C.—A. D. 300* (History of Rhetoric 2), Princeton 1972 and *Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors* (History of Rhetoric 3), Princeton 1983.

¹⁵ *Die attische Beredsamkeit*, 3 vols, 2nd ed., Leipzig 1887–98.

¹⁶ *The Attic Orators*, 2 vols, 2nd ed., London 1893.

¹⁷ *Criticism in Antiquity*, Berkeley—Los Angeles 1981.

¹⁸ *Greek Declamation*, Cambridge 1983.

¹⁹ *De Theone, Hermogene Aphthonioque progymnasmatum scriptoribus*, Diss. Würzburg 1884.

²⁰ *Questiones progymnasmaticae*, Diss. Leipzig 1909.

²¹ HUNGER I, 92–120.

²² R. F. HOCK and E. N. O'NEIL, *The Chreia in Ancient Rhetoric*. Vol. I. *The Progymnasmata* (Text and Translations 27), (Graeco-Roman Religion Series 9), Atlanta, Georgia 1986.

²³ *De statuum doctrina ab Hermogene tradita*, Diss. Leipzig 1904.

²⁴ *Hermagoras von Temnos, 1904–1955*, *Lustrum* 3 (1958), 58–214, 262–278.

²⁵ The introduction to his translation (cf. note 9) in *Speech Monographs* 31 (1964) comprises pp. 363–388. His earlier articles on the subject are: *Analysis of Issues by a Writer of the Second Century A. D.*, *Journal of Legal Education* 2 (1958), 213–22; *Classical Systems of Stases in Greek: Hermagoras to Hermogenes*, *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 2 (1959), 51–71; *Hermogenes on "Stock Issues" in Deliberative Speaking*, *Speech Mono-*

articles as well as in the introduction to his translation of the text. In a recent book on Hermogenes M. PATILLON²⁶ treats Hermogenes' stasis theory as well as his theory of ideas in the light of modern linguistic theories. Also A. BRAET²⁷ has recently applied a modern perspective to the classical stasis theories.

L. RADERMACHER²⁸ makes some remarks on the structure of the treatise 'On Invention' in his RE-article on Hermogenes, and G. A. KENNEDY²⁹ gives a survey of its contents when he treats later Greek rhetorical theory in his history of rhetoric. The first extensive study published by a modern scholar will be the one by M. PATILLON, now submitted to ANRW as part of the treatment of Hermogenes (below in this volume [II 34.3], pp. 2064–2171).

The last treatise of the corpus, entitled 'On the Method of Deinotes', was examined by E. BÜRGI³⁰ in a discussion of its authenticity. In this he marshalled many good reasons for rejecting it as a genuine work by Hermogenes. B. P. WALLACH³¹ has recently written about some terms and definitions contained in it.

Most interest and effort has been given by modern scholars to Hermogenes' major work 'On Ideas', in which he develops his theory of the ideas of style. Individual important concepts or thoughts in it are dealt with in studies by H. BECKER,³² C. BRANDSTAETTER,³³ L. VOIT,³⁴ and H. M. HAGEN.³⁵ J. SYKUTRIS³⁶ and W. MADYDA³⁷ have touched upon some of its basic elements and principles. In my own dissertation³⁸ I tried to lay bare the net of relations between the ideas as well as the general principles of the system. M. PATILLON in his aforementioned book gives an interesting structure to the first part of his

graphs 25 (1958), 59–66; Some Aristotelian and Stoic Influences on the Theory of Stases, *Speech Monographs* 26 (1959), 248–54.

²⁶ *La théorie du discours chez Hermogène le rhéteur. Essai sur les structures linguistiques de la rhétorique ancienne* (Collection d'études anciennes 117), Paris 1988.

²⁷ *De klassieke statusleer in modern perspectief. Een historisch-systematische bijdrage tot de argumentatieleer*, Diss. Leiden 1984.

²⁸ S. v. Hermogenes (No. 22), RE VIII, 1 (1912), 865–77. His remarks on 'On Invention' are found in 873–877.

²⁹ *Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors*, 86–96.

³⁰ Ist die dem Hermogenes zugeschriebene Schrift *Περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος* echt? *Wiener Studien* 48 (1930), 187–97, and 49 (1931), 40–69.

³¹ *Epimone and Diatribe: Dwelling on the Point in Ps.-Hermogenes*, *Rheinisches Museum* 123 (1981), 272–322 and *Ps.-Hermogenes and the characterizing oath*, *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 22 (1981), 257–267.

³² *Hermogenis Tarsensis de rhythmo oratorio doctrina*, Diss. Münster 1896.

³³ *De notionum πολιτικός et σοφιστής usu rhetorico*, *Leipziger Studien zur classischen Philologie* 15 (1894), 129–274.

³⁴ *Δεινότης. Ein antiker Stilbegriff*, Leipzig 1934.

³⁵ *Ἠθοποιία. Zur Geschichte eines rhetorischen Begriffs*, Diss. Erlangen 1966.

³⁶ Rec. F. WALSDORFF, *Die antiken Urteile über Platons Stil*, *Gnomon* 6 (1930), 527–39.

³⁷ *Die Voraussetzungen der hermogenischen Stillehre*, in: *Aus der altertumswissenschaftlichen Arbeit Volkspolens*, *Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Schriften der Sektion für Altertumswissenschaften* 13 (1959), 44–51.

³⁸ *Studies in Hermogenes and Eustathios. The Theory of Ideas and Its Application in the Commentaries of Eustathios on the Epics of Homer*, Diss. Lund 1977.

investigation of the style and linguistic aspects of the Hermogenic theory of ideas by treating the constituents of the *idea/ideas species* by species.

W. SCHMID³⁹ and C. AUGUSTYNIAK⁴⁰ have treated the theory of ideas together with other theories of style, and P. GEIGENMÜLLER⁴¹ included the Hermogenic terms in his systematic collection of the terms of critical vocabulary. H. LIERS⁴² suggested that the ideas had their origin in the Dionysian virtues of style, a thought taken up and developed in full by D. HAGEDORN.⁴³

Quite a few studies of comparative character have been made. As early as 1874 H. BAUMGART⁴⁴ tried to determine the relation between the 'Aristides Rhetoric' and Hermogenes' 'On Ideas'. W. SCHMID⁴⁵ further discussed this relation. In another early study G. LEHNERT⁴⁶ showed how and to what extent the prominent Byzantine scholar Eustathius of Thessalonike used the Hermogenic concepts of style in his commentary on Homer. In my own previously mentioned book (above n. 38) I have used the example of Eustathius to test the practical use of the Hermogenic ideas as tools in the hand of a critic.

Also the eventual impact of Hermogenes on the Western world has in later years been investigated. J. MONFASANI⁴⁷ shows in his study of George of Trebizond, the famous Greek emigrant and humanist of the fifteenth century, how this author, through his authoritative work of rhetorical theory, imparted the knowledge of Hermogenes to the Western society of scholars. A. M. PATTERSON⁴⁸ on her part discusses the role played by the Hermogenic ideas of style in defining the standards of Renaissance literature in Europe.

Lately the study of Hermogenes has been integrated into an attempt to analyse and understand the whole of Neoplatonic and Byzantine rhetorical theory in its historical development. Important contributions here have been made by G. L. KUSTAS⁴⁹ and G. A. KENNEDY.⁵⁰

³⁹ Zur antiken Stillehre aus Anlass von Proklos' Chrestomathie, *Rheinisches Museum* 49 (1894), 133–61.

⁴⁰ De tribus et quattuor dicendi generibus quid docuerint antiqui (*Auctarium Maeandrum* 6), Warschau 1957.

⁴¹ *Quaestiones Dionysianae de vocabulis artis criticae*, Diss. Leipzig 1908.

⁴² Zur Geschichte der rhetorischen Ideenlehre, *Fleckeis. Jahrbücher* 131,9 (1885), 577–89.

⁴³ Zur Ideenlehre des Hermogenes (*Hypomnemata* 8), Göttingen 1964.

⁴⁴ *Aelius Aristides als Repräsentant der sophistischen Rhetorik des zweiten Jahrhunderts der Kaiserzeit*, Leipzig 1874.

⁴⁵ Die sogenannte Aristidesrhetorik, *Rheinisches Museum* 72 (1917/18), 113–49 and 238–57.

⁴⁶ *De scholiis ad Homerum rhetoricis*, Diss. Leipzig 1896.

⁴⁷ *George of Trebizond. A Biography and a Study of His Rhetoric and Logic* (*Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition* 1), Leiden 1976.

⁴⁸ *Hermogenes and the Renaissance: Seven Ideas of Style*, Princeton 1970.

⁴⁹ The Literary Criticism of Photius: A Christian Definition of Style, *Hellenika* 17 (1962), 132–69; The Function and Evolution of Byzantine Rhetoric, *Viator* 1 (1970), 55–73; *Studies in Byzantine Rhetoric* (*Analecta Vlatadon* 17), Thessaloniki 1973. An early forerunner in tracing the influence of Hermogenic ideas on Neoplatonic thought is A. BRINKMANN in his article *Die Protheorie zur Biographie eines Neuplatonikers*, *Rheinisches Museum* 65 (1910), 617–26.

⁵⁰ *Later Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric*, *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 13 (1980), 181–97.

II. Life, Writings, Influence

Very little is known about Hermogenes' life.⁵¹ Philostratus⁵² mentions his place of birth, Tarsus, and his early fame as a declaimer. At the age of fifteen he was heard and praised by Marcus Aurelius.⁵³ On reaching manhood he lost his powers of declamation, was despised by his fellow sophists,⁵⁴ and ended his life at a ripe old age in oblivion.

These biographical notices are repeated by Syrianus and form one part of the 'Suda' article on Hermogenes. Other biographical material of doubtful trustworthiness⁵⁵ is to be found in the scholia and in the 'Suda'. Here dates are provided for his three main works, all in his early youth. His father's name is mentioned, Kallippos, and Scopelianus is said to have been his teacher. As the last item in the 'Suda' the legend is told of how his heart, taken out of his dead body, was found to be overgrown with hair.

In his two main works, which are of undisputed authenticity, Hermogenes treats such aspects of rhetorical theory as had developed during the last few centuries before his time, the 'stasis' theory and the theory of 'ideas' of style. His versions of these theories were to become the canonical texts, preserved and commented upon during late antiquity and the whole Byzantine era.

They did not, however, attain this position at once. From the scholia on Hermogenes we get the impression of a hot dispute concerning the details of the stasis theory.⁵⁶ The main contemporary rival of Hermogenes was Minucianus,⁵⁷ who lived and worked in influential circles in Athens. The Neoplatonists who incorporated rhetoric into their overall system of knowledge seem at first

⁵¹ RABE gives an account of all the relevant material in his article *Aus Rhetoren-Handschriften 1. Nachrichten über das Leben des Hermogenes*, *Rheinisches Museum* 62 (1907), 247–62.

⁵² *Vitae Sophistarum* II, 7.

⁵³ If this can be taken to mean that the emperor visited his home town, the visit would have occurred when Marcus Aurelius was in the East in A.D. 176 (cf. Cassius Dio 71,1). This would lead to a date for Hermogenes' birth of around 160.

⁵⁴ Hermogenes on his part occasionally offers quite severe criticism of the sophists. Cf. 'On Ideas' 249,1 ff.; 377,12 f., and E. NORDEN, *Die antike Kunstprosa*, I, Leipzig 1898, 382–85.

⁵⁵ RADERMACHER, s. v. Hermogenes (No. 22), *RE* VIII, 1 (1912), 865–69, examines these notices critically and suggests that Hermogenes' writing activities rather took place in his mature years, when he had given up declamatory practice. NORDEN, *op. cit.*, 382, is of the same opinion. M. PATILLON, *op. cit.* 13–16, argues for making a distinction between two persons, the sophist, noted by Philostratus, and the rhetorician, author of theoretical rhetorical works. The rhetorician Hermogenes, then, is for him solely the author of 'On Staseis' and 'On Ideas'.

⁵⁶ See L. SCHILLING, *op. cit.*, chapters II–IV.

⁵⁷ See S. GLOECKNER, *op. cit.*, 22–25 (on his life and writings), 26–50 (on his doctrine, compared to that of Hermogenes). Cf. also W. STEGEMANN, s. v. Minucianus (No. 1), *RE* 15 (1932), 1975–86.

to have adopted Minucianus as their authority. Later on, however, he was replaced by Hermogenes.⁵⁸

Among the earliest surviving and most important commentaries⁵⁹ on the works of Hermogenes are those written by Syrianus,⁶⁰ who was the head of the Neoplatonic school in Athens in the second quarter of the fifth century. Up to his time there did not exist any complete and authoritative collection of Hermogenes' works. But in the late fifth or early sixth century a canon was established,⁶¹ consisting of the four Hermogenic works 'On Staseis', 'On Invention', 'On Ideas', and 'On the Method of Deinotes', preceded by the 'Progymnasmata' of Aphthonius. From then onwards this corpus represented the school instruction in rhetoric in the Byzantine world.

The student began with preliminary exercises in composition. In 'On Staseis' he learned how to find out the main issue of a case, and how to plan the presentation of arguments of the case in question. In 'On Invention' he was taught the arrangement of the parts of speech, how to argue and how to elaborate arguments and other topics. In the last two works he learned how to use stylistic means in order to give to his speech various aesthetic, moral, and emotional qualities, as well as the effect of persuasiveness.⁶²

⁵⁸ See B. KEIL, *op. cit.*, especially 202–04, 219–21. Hermogenes' text seems to have been the more satisfactory one to use in teaching rhetoric. He himself criticizes other rhetoricians for being obscure and muddled (cf. 133,15 ff.; 216,17 ff.) The ancient commentators praise his work for its usefulness, clarity, and comprehensiveness. Cf. *Prolegomenon Sylloge*, ed. H. RABE, Leipzig 1931, 60,15–17; 203,14; 317,13 ff., and Anonymus, *Περὶ ῥητορικῆς*, SPENGL-HAMMER, 208,1 f. As is clear from Syrianus' commentary on the stasis theory, neither Hermogenes' nor Minucianus' definitions were entirely satisfactory according to Neoplatonic standards. But this fact served as a challenge to the Neoplatonists who gladly wrote introductions and commentaries in a philosophical vein to the rhetorical treatises. Cf. P. H. RICHTER, *Byzantinischer Kommentar zu Hermogenes*, *Byzantion* 3 (1926), 164 f.

⁵⁹ For a full description of commentaries and scholia see SCHMID-STÄHLIN, 935–36, and HUNGER I, 77–91. For the texts see WALZ, IV–VII and Syriani in *Hermogenem Commentaria*, ed. H. RABE, 2 vols, Leipzig 1892–93.

⁶⁰ According to his own words Syrianus was the first to pay attention to Hermogenes' theory of ideas. In his work on the stasis theory he had quite a few predecessors, one of them probably Sopatros, whose commentary is published in WALZ V, 1–211. (For a recent appreciation of what we know of his date and work see RUSSELL, *op. cit.*, 7, note 23.) In his *Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors*, 104–116, KENNEDY treats Hermogenes' commentators Sopatros, Syrianus, Marcellinus, and George of Alexandria (Georgios Monos).

⁶¹ See H. RABE, *Hermogenis Opera*, xiii, and *Prolegomenon Sylloge*, xix–xxi. The work of Aphthonius is prefixed to the two main classes of manuscripts containing Hermogenes. At the time of the establishment of the corpus Aphthonius was the recognized leader in the field of *progymnasmata*. The treatise on *progymnasmata* which is attributed to Hermogenes has an independent manuscript tradition.

⁶² In his article *Later Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric*, *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 13 (1980), 181–197, KENNEDY points out (185–86) that the parts of this corpus differ from the traditional parts of rhetoric: invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery. The later rhetorical theory is instead, after the preliminary exercises, divided into three parts. As the first of these parts is found the stasis theory, which represents a new unit called

Besides thus being a part of the curriculum of higher education Hermogenes' works attracted the interest of the prominent scholars and intellectuals of the Byzantine age.⁶³ Photius⁶⁴ may be said to rely on Hermogenic concepts although he does not cite the name of the rhetorician. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries Michael Psellus and John Tzetzes composed versified summaries of Hermogenes, and Eustathius,⁶⁵ who was for many years the master of the rhetors at the patriarchal school of Constantinople, used Hermogenic concepts as a basis for his rhetorical and stylistic interpretations of Homer. We have a lengthy commentary by John Siceliotes on the treatise 'On Ideas' with some applications to Christian texts. John Doxapatres wrote introductions to and comments on the three major works. In the Palaeologan period Maximus Planudes edited the whole corpus with introductions and scholia.

As one of the last of the Byzantines GEORGE OF TREBIZOND⁶⁶ brought the knowledge of Hermogenes to the West. In his own great rhetorical treatise, 'Rhetoricorum Libri V', he sought to combine the precepts of Cicero and Hermogenes. Among the manuscripts brought to Italy by the Greek emigrants were many containing the works of Hermogenes.⁶⁷ His writings were included in the first volume of the 'Rhetorum Graecorum Collectio', published by the Aldine Press at Venice in 1508. All through the sixteenth century there appeared new editions as well as translations into Latin.⁶⁸ Hermogenes once again, now in the West, formed part of the curriculum of higher education, as can be seen from the lists of works of rhetoric recommended by educators, school-masters, and university statutes.⁶⁹ Also rhetoricians and literary critics such as A. LUL-

νόησις, or conception. This arrangement "reflects the Neoplatonic view of rhetoric as primarily logical training for students". That the works of the Hermogenic corpus form a unity is indicated by the occurring cross-references (cf. RABE, *Hermogenis Opera*, 466-67). Still, the genuineness and interpretation of these references may be disputed (cf. note 404).

⁶³ The extent of this interest is expressed in brief by the statement of the *Suda* (s. v. Hermogenes): τέχνην ῥητορικὴν ἦν μετὰ χειρᾶς ἔχουσιν ἅπαντες. See, besides the works mentioned in note 59, G. L. KUSTAS, *Studies in Byzantine Rhetoric*, Thessalonike 1973, 5-26 and *IDEM*, *The Function and Evolution of Byzantine Rhetoric*, *Viator* 1 (1970), 55-73. KENNEDY devotes two chapters of his *Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors to Byzantine rhetoric*, chapter 5 "Rhetoric in Byzantium, 600-900", and chapter 6 "Some Features of Rhetoric in Byzantium, 900-1300". Here he treats, among others, Photius, Michael Psellus, John Siceliotes, John Doxapatres, John Tzetzes, and Maximus Planudes.

⁶⁴ See G. L. KUSTAS, *The Literary Criticism of Photius: A Christian Definition of Style*, *Hellenika* 17 (1962), 132-169.

⁶⁵ See HUNGER II, 63-66, G. LEHNERT, *op. cit.*, and G. LINDBERG, *op. cit.*

⁶⁶ See J. MONFASANI, *op. cit.*

⁶⁷ See R. R. BOLGAR, *The Classical Heritage and Its Beneficiaries*, Cambridge 1954, 475.

⁶⁸ See H. RABE, *Hermogenis Opera*, xxiii-xxv, A. M. PATTERSON, *op. cit.*, 219-20 "Some Renaissance Editions and Translations of Hermogenes, 1500-1650", and R. NADEAU, *Hermogenes' On Stases*, *Speech Monographs* 31 (1964), 421 "Bibliography".

⁶⁹ See T. W. BALDWIN, *William Shakspeare's Small Latine & Lesse Greeke*, 2 vols, Urbana 1944, vol. I, 106-07 (on the Oxford and Cambridge statutes), vol. II, 17 (on the recommendations of Sir Thomas Elyot), 30, 62, 64.

LIUS and J. C. SCALIGER took note of him. In this way Hermogenic concepts, especially the 'ideas', became influential in defining the standards of Renaissance literature both in England and on the continent.⁷⁰ The Strassburg scholar J. STURM in 1570–71 produced his own edition⁷¹ of the four treatises with a Latin translation and an extensive commentary. He may be said to be the last of an unbroken line of commentators on Hermogenes.⁷²

III. 'On Staseis'⁷³

1. The Stasis Theory

The stasis theory was an old and well established theory at the time when Hermogenes made his contribution to it. The first known rhetorician to develop a formal system of 'staseis' was Hermagoras of Temnos (fl. c. 100 B. C.).⁷⁴ The concept of stasis, when occurring in a rhetorical context, is well explained by NADEAU as "a point in controversy which acts as a focus or centre for opposing contentions".⁷⁵ From this conflict of views there arises a question which may be said to express the stasis. In the system of Hermagoras there are four staseis: the stasis of 'conjecture', that of 'definition', that of 'quality', and that of 'objection'.⁷⁶ In the first stasis the question centers on whether or not an act has taken place, in the second on what its essential qualities are, in the third on what nonessential attributes belong to it, and in the fourth on whether the proposal, motion or charge in relation to it is in order, i. e., legally appropriate.

⁷⁰ See PATTERSON, *op. cit.*, 18–21.

⁷¹ Hermogenis [ars rhetorica] ... Latinitate donati et scholis explicati atque illustrati, Strassburg. My subsequent references to STURM, Scholae, will indicate his Scholae in libros duos Hermogenis de formis orationum seu dicendi generibus, bound with Hermogenis ... de dicendi generibus sive formis orationum libri II ..., 1571, but with separate pagination.

⁷² So B. KEIL, *op. cit.*, 221.

⁷³ For the Greek text see RABE's edition, 28–92, or *De Statibus*, ed. G. KOWALSKI, Wrocław 1947. A translation by R. NADEAU is found in *Speech Monographs* 31 (1964), 389–420. All my subsequent references to the text will be to RABE's edition.

⁷⁴ The system of Hermagoras has been reconstructed from secondary Greek and Latin sources. See C. W. PIDERIT, *Commentatio de Hermagora rhetore*, Diss. Hersfeld 1839, G. THIELE, *Hermagoras*, Strassburg 1893, *Hermagorae Temnitae testimonia et fragmenta*, ed. D. MATTHES, Leipzig 1962, D. MATTHES, *Hermagoras von Temnos* 1904–1955, *Lustrum* 3 (1958), 58–214, 262–78 and A. BRAET, *op. cit.*, Chapter 4 "De statusleer van Hermagoras van Temnos".

⁷⁵ Hermogenes on "Stock Issues" in *Deliberative Speaking*, *Speech Monographs* 25 (1958), 59. See also O. A. L. DIETER, who in his article *Stasis*, *Speech Monographs* 17 (1950), 369 describes the original physical denotation of the concept as "the rest, pause, halt, or standing still which inevitably occurs between opposite as well as between contrary 'moves', or motions."

⁷⁶ The Greek terms are: στοιχασμός, ὄρος, ποιότης/κατὰ συμβεβηκός, μετάληψις.

This system of rhetorical staseis shows a remarkable resemblance to the traditional Peripatetic and Stoic analyses of things.⁷⁷ To the philosophical concept of substance or state of being there corresponds the rhetorical and more inexact concept of inference by 'conjecture' as to the existence of an act. The philosophical determinations of essential and nonessential qualities are faithfully mirrored in the staseis of 'definition' and of 'quality', respectively. The fourth philosophical concept of the coincidental, accidental, or relational quality of a thing may be considered to have a counterpart in the more specifically rhetorical concept of 'objection', i. e., of procedural action of a coincidental, accidental, or relational kind.

The system of Hermagoras comprised, as far as it can be reconstructed with certainty, besides the above-mentioned four major staseis, which were probably seen as independent and coordinated, a pattern of sub-staseis for 'forensic pleading' within the major stasis of quality.⁷⁸ He further treated the four legal questions of 'letter and intent', 'contrary law', 'ambiguous law', and 'inference'. He also discussed the basic theory of stasis, listing four questions incapable of stasis, which he defined as respectively 'deficient', 'in balance', 'one-sided', and 'inconclusive'.⁷⁹

Quintilian⁸⁰ comments on later Greek theories of stasis, which are previous to that of Hermogenes. But of those theories, as well as of the theory of Hermogenes' contemporary rival Minucianus,⁸¹ only fragments remain, a result of the subsequent dominance of the Hermogenic theory.

The system of Hermogenes shows many similarities to that of Hermagoras, both in terminology and in elements of construction, as, e. g., the names and concepts of the four major staseis and of the sub-staseis under 'forensic

⁷⁷ See W. JAENEKE, *De statuum doctrina ab Hermogene tradita*, Diss. Leipzig 1904, 27–78 and R. NADEAU, *Some Aristotelian and Stoic Influences on the Theory of Stases*, *Speech Monographs* 26 (1959), 248–54. The Greek names of the corresponding Stoic categories are: ὑποκείμενον, ποιόν, πῶς ἔχον, πρὸς τι πῶς ἔχον.

⁷⁸ See MATTHES, *op. cit.*, 138–65. Cf. A. BRAET, *op. cit.*, the fold-out called "*Reconstructie van het stofschema voor retorische stof bij Hermagoras.*"

⁷⁹ See MATTHES, *op. cit.*, 166–78. He sums up the conceptual contents of the terms involved as follows (178): „*Er muß sich klarmachen, worauf die Anklage hinaus will (κατάφασις), was der Angeklagte dem entgegensustellen hat (ἀπόφασις), und welche grundsätzliche Streitfrage (ζήτημα) sich aus beiden ergibt. Der Rechtsfall hat ... nur dann 'Bestand', wenn die Anklage einen Sinn hat, weil dafür ausreichende Gründe vorliegen, wenn ferner die Gegenbehauptung des Angeklagten sinnvoll ist und genügend begründet werden kann ... und wenn es dem Richter möglich ist, ausgehend vom 'κρινόμενον', d. h. der spezifizierten Fragestellung, die sich aus der Begründung von κατάφασις und ἀπόφασις (αἴτιον und συνέχον) ergibt, zu einer Entscheidung zu gelangen. Ist nämlich eine dieser Bedingungen nicht erfüllt, so liegt ein 'ἄσυστατον' vor.*"

⁸⁰ *Institutio oratoria* III, 6,1 ff. See PATILLON, *op. cit.*, 64–70.

⁸¹ For a reconstruction of the system of Minucianus with a commentary and a comparison of his system with that of Hermogenes see S. GLOECKNER, *Questiones rhetoricae*, Breslau 1901, especially Chapter II "*De Minuciani doctrina*".

pleading'.⁸² Hermogenes adds four more 'asystatic' questions and three 'near-asystatic' ones.⁸³ Legal questions in Hermagoras become legal staseis in Hermogenes.⁸⁴ This last feature is shared by Hermogenes with Minucianus. Both these authors present a system of thirteen staseis. They have divergent views on some minor questions, as, e. g., from how many kinds of personal descriptions interpretations can be drawn that are useful for argumentation.⁸⁵ Interesting is that they use different points of view – that of the defendant and of the prosecutor, respectively – when they define the single stasis (see below). Minucianus apparently gave some etymological interpretation of the term 'stasis'. Hermogenes treats the term as a generally accepted basic one that needs no explanation.⁸⁶

⁸² For a comparative diagram see JAENEKE, op. cit., 120–121, and NADEAU, Hermogenes' On Stases, 386. (The Hermogenic system of staseis will be discussed in detail below.) Not all writers on stasis theory, subsequent to Hermagoras, have treated 'objection' as a fourth and separate type of stasis. See R. NADEAU, Analysis of Issues by a Writer of the Second Century A. D., *Journal of Legal Education* 2 (1958), 215, note 12 for a listing of authors with four and with three major staseis respectively. Of the Latin authors the author of 'Ad Herennium', the mature Cicero, and Quintilian found three staseis sufficient.

⁸³ 32,10–33,16. The questions incapable of stasis are described as 'one-sided', 'completely balanced', 'reversible', 'inconclusive', 'incredible', 'impossible', 'despicable', and 'deficient in evidence', the questions close to being incapable of stasis as 'preponderate', 'ill-conceived', and 'prejudged'.

⁸⁴ Subsequent writers differ also in this respect. See NADEAU, Analysis of Issues, 215, note 13 for a listing of the two groups of authors, those who have treated legal questions separately, and those who have included legal staseis among the standard staseis. This time 'Ad Herennium', the mature Cicero, and Quintilian side with Hermogenes.

⁸⁵ Hermogenes (29,14–30,3) lists the following seven descriptions (against Minucianus' six) in order of usefulness: proper names, terms indicating a relation (as 'father'), terms carrying a connotation of blame (as 'spendthrift'), terms suggesting a character (as 'farmer'), a combination of two descriptive terms (as 'rich youth'), a combination of terms for a person and for an act, and, lastly, simple descriptive terms (as 'general').

⁸⁶ 35,17–20. While Hermogenes thus avoids discussing the etymology of the term 'stasis', he, on the other hand, states his own basic theory of stasis by enumerating four requirements for a question to be "capable of stasis" (32.2 ff.): it should contain either both a person and an act to be judged, or at least one of the two, as well as arguments from both parties, which are plausible, differing from each other, and strong in proofs; further, the judgment should not be decided beforehand, and it should be possible to reach.

GLOECKNER finds a difference between the two authors in respect of the question whether stasis can come into being with only one of the two components, person involved and act done, present. He writes (op. cit., 28): „*Hst 133,21 in omni quaestione et de persona et de facto constare debere docet. Contra Minucianus quaestionem fieri affirmaverat deficiente aut persona aut facto, ita ut iudicium possit constitui aut de facto solo aut de suspitionibus quibusdam ortis ex rei moribus.*“ Hermogenes' position here is, however, not quite clear. When discussing what questions are capable of stasis he states as a requirement (32,2 f.): "when they either have both a person and an act to be judged, or at least one of these." Cf. the comment by the scholiast, WALZ IV, 140,20 ff. The remark by Hermogenes (in 29,7 f. R) to which GLOECKNER is referring might possibly be seen as a generally introducing remark, in which Hermogenes brings the concepts of 'persons involved' and 'acts done' into the discussion for the first time.

2. Hermogenes' Method of Division

The really new feature of Hermogenes' system is his method of division.⁸⁷ By this method he unfolds through a series of dichotomies the whole system of staseis.⁸⁸ He also divides each single stasis into heads of argument,⁸⁹ pro and con, mirroring the conflict between defence and prosecution. The procedure of division by which Hermogenes moves downwards from level to level of possible staseis in order to find out on which stasis (or staseis) to base the speech in the case in question, has some similarity to Stoic logical divisions.⁹⁰ But above all it represents a practical approach,⁹¹ useful for the student who has just chosen a case on which to produce a declamation.

The method may be described as follows: First ask whether there is a thing, act, or fact in the case which is uncertain and disputed by the opposed parties. Then the stasis is that of 'conjecture'. If the thing is certain, go a step

⁸⁷ μέθοδος τῶν στάσεων, 36,6. Cf. Syrianus II, 53,24 R: μέθοδος τῆς διαιρέσεως τῶν στάσεων.

⁸⁸ 36,1–39,19. This kind of division is not found in Hermagoras. See MATTHES, op. cit., 165. For its appearance in later Latin writers cf. KENNEDY's remark: "It should be noted that the dependence is limited to terminology. Hermogenes' distinctive system of relating the types of stasis is not adopted", in his review in *Gnomon* 53 (1981), 395–97 of *Consulti Fortunatiani Ars Rhetorica ... a cura di L. CALBOLI MONTEFUSCO. MONFASANI*, op. cit., 251–52, notes 32 and 33 points out that "only Sulpicius Victor echoed Hermogenes' conception of the status doctrine as *diairesis*". — NADEAU in his *Hermogenes' On Stases*, 364–65, comments on the development of the concept of μέθοδος from meaning, in Aristotle's time, a philosophical system of inquiry to being used here as referring to a procedure in the teaching of an art.

⁸⁹ 43,16–92,11. The term κεφάλαιον is supposed to be a heritage from Theodorus. See JAENEKE, 130–32. In my translation of it as "head" I follow NADEAU. In some of the later Latin writers on stasis theory the division of each single stasis into heads of argument is similar to that of Hermogenes. For a comparison in this respect between Hermogenes and Sulpicius Victor see JAENEKE, 133–53 and PATILLON, 73–76. Cf. also A. REUTER, *Untersuchungen zu den römischen Technographen Fortunatian, Julius Victor, Capella und Sulpitius Victor*, *Hermes* 27 (1893), 73–134.

⁹⁰ Cf. JAENEKE, 67–73 and R. NADEAU, *Classical Systems of Stases in Greek: Hermagoras to Hermogenes*, *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 2 (1959), 67: "this approach is typically Stoic in its consideration of the different categories in which a single entity might be studied from the successive subordinate standpoints of its being, definition, quality, and relation to other persons and things. The plan is also in direct parallel to the four basic judgments which Aristotle, in his 'Topica', considers appropriate in upholding dialectical propositions: genus (γένος), definition (ὄρος), non-essential quality (ἴδιον), and coincidental quality (τὸ συμβεβηκός)."

⁹¹ Cf. G. LEHNERT in his review of W. JAENEKE, *De statuum doctrina ab Hermogene tradita*, *Berliner philologische Wochenschrift* 37 (1905), 1173: „Die Bedeutung des Mannes liegt auch gar nicht in dem Was das er bringt, sondern in dem Wie, dem er es ja auch verdankt, daß er für die Späteren zur Autorität geworden ist. Er ist durchaus Praktiker und Schulmann, dessen Bedeutung darin besteht, das bereits Gefundene den Bedürfnissen der Praxis angepaßt zu haben“, and W. KROLL, s. v. *Rhetorik*, *RE*, Suppl. VII (1940) 1136: „Dabei kommt es trotz eines gewissen Einflusses der stoischen Logik ... nicht auf logische Konsequenz, sondern auf praktische Brauchbarkeit an“.

further and ask whether the name of the thing is in dispute. Then the stasis is that of 'definition'. If the name fits perfectly with the act and no one questions it, the next step is to consider the quality of the thing or act. Thus far, a simple forensic situation has been prevalent in the pattern of division. But at the stage of 'quality' also legal and deliberative questions are considered. The dichotomy continues: Is the inquiry about something done or about something stated in writing? If about something done, was it done in the past, or is it to be done in the future? With things done in the past we return to the forensic situation and arrive at 'forensic pleading'.

Now the defendant's possible moves are explored. He may assert that the thing done was not forbidden. This is 'plea of justification'. If he admits to having done a wrong and forbidden thing, there are different ways of disposing of the blame. He may take the blame upon himself but state that he has by the same act also rendered a benefit. This is 'counterplea'. He may transfer blame to the wronged person and state that that person deserved to suffer. This is 'countercharge'. He may transfer blame to someone else, someone who can be held responsible for the matter. This is 'shifting of blame'. In the last resort he transfers blame to someone or something that cannot be held responsible. This is 'plea for leniency'.

The described progressive motion and the corresponding dichotomies may be more clearly shown in a diagram:⁹²

the thing/act to be judged is:	
certain	uncertain "conjecture", στοχασμός
complete	incomplete "definition", όρος
the thing's quality is in question:	
the inquiry is about:	
something done	[something stated in writing:
the issue is "rational", λογική	the issue is "legal", νομική]
the rational issue is about:	
something done in the past	[something to be done in the future: the issue is "deliberative", πραγμα- τική]
when the quality of the thing done in the past is in question:	
"forensic pleading", δικαιολογία	
the defendant is:	
admitting to having done wrong	asserting that the act is not forbidden "plea of justification", αντίληψις

⁹² For other similar diagrams see JAENEKE, 66, KENNEDY, *Christian Rhetoric under Christian Emperors*, 83, and PATILLON, who gives a fourfold chart in 49–51, and a comprehensive one in 70.

making “counterpropositions”, ἀντιθετικάι:

taking blame upon oneself but making “counterplea”, ἀντίστασις

blaming the one who was wronged: making “countercharge”, ἀντέγκλημα

blaming something or someone capable of being held responsible:

“shifting of blame”, μετάστασις

blaming something or someone incapable of being held responsible:

“plea for leniency”, συγγνώμη

[the legal issue is about:

one written thing

several written things

“conflict of laws”, ἀντινομία

“letter and intent”, ῥητὸν καὶ διάνοια

“inference”, συλλογισμός

“ambiguity”, ἀμφιβολία]

As is seen from the diagram, one major stasis, that of “objection”, μετάληψις, is not included in this presentation by the method of division.⁹³ The nature and position of this stasis will be discussed in chapter III.3.D. (p. 2000 below).

3. The Definitions and Divisions of the Staseis

A. The Stasis of Conjecture

The stasis of ‘conjecture’ comes into being when the thing to be judged is uncertain. Hermogenes defines this stasis as “the proof from some manifest

⁹³ The question of how to fit this stasis into the system seems to have puzzled also the ancient commentators of Hermogenes. Cf. Syrianus II, 151,2–152,10. George of Trebizond deviates from Hermogenes by placing the *constitutio translativa* under *quaestio perfecta*. See MONFASANI, op. cit., 274, note 133. JAENEKE gives the stasis different positions in his diagrams in 66 (on a level with conjecture) and in 121 (on a level with quality). In some modern paraphrases of Hermogenes’ method of division it is subordinate to the stasis of quality. Cf. NADEAU, *Classical Systems of Stases in Greek, Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 2* (1959), 67: “the existence of a thing is doubtful or obvious; if obvious, the thing is undefined or defined; if defined, it is unqualified or qualified; if qualified, it is not, or it is, subject to formal action”. KENNEDY gives a similar presentation in *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World 300 B.C.–A.D. 300*, 623. There, however, the last-mentioned dichotomy is placed under the heading ‘not qualified’. In the Hermogenic text no counterparts can be found neither to the two dichotomies ‘unqualified’–‘qualified’, ‘not subject to formal action’–‘subject to formal action’, nor to the relating of the stasis of objection to the stasis of quality. See K. BARWICK, *Zur Erklärung und Geschichte der Staseislehre des Hermagoras von Temnos*, *Philologus* 108 (1964), 98. In *Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors*, 83–84, KENNEDY places *metalepsis* outside the system. For similar remarks on the position of this stasis see A. BRAET, op. cit., 135: “*niet opgenomen en het stroomschema en eigenlijk preliminair*”, and M. PATILLON, op. cit., 70, commenting on his comprehensive chart: «*La métalepse est en droit antérieure à tout autre état de cause ...*».

sign of the existence of an uncertain thing”.⁹⁴ He illustrates the points of the definition by an example: A man is discovered burying a newly slain body in a deserted place and is accused of murder. From the burying, which is manifest, we start an inquiry into an uncertain thing, concerning its existence, namely, who the killer was. In this definition Hermogenes takes the standpoint of the prosecutor, a fact pointed out by Syrianus,⁹⁵ who contrasts his definition with that of his rival, Minucianus, who defines the stasis from the standpoint of the defendant as “the complete denial of the charge brought (against him)”.

In the ensuing speeches by prosecutor and defendant the main topics are those of the presentation and the interpretation of the ‘manifest signs’, i. e., the facts of the case. Surrounding these topics are lesser ones, which will be of more or less importance according to the particulars of the special case. At the outset there may be an attempt from the defendant to avoid the suit altogether by objecting to the indictment (cf. below the chapter on ‘stasis of objection’ [pp. 2000–2003]). Preceding the presentation of the case there will be some preliminary fencing over ‘demand for evidence’ (i. e., witnesses, or lack of witnesses, their being trusted or not trusted, conflicting evidence from witnesses, and so on). Further the ‘will’ and the ‘capability of acting’ could be tried. This means probing into the background of the person accused (or of other persons involved in the case)⁹⁶ with the help of the usual topics of praise and blame, the topic of ‘fortune’ being the most appropriate to the ‘capability of acting’, the topic of ‘time of life’ to the ‘will’. In the ‘particulars from beginning to end’ the prosecutor treats the available facts in answering the questions of who, what, where, how, when, and for what reason. To some of these points the defendant may raise a ‘plea of justification’, contending that the thing in question is permitted and not prohibited. This head of argument is followed, as always, by the opposing party contending by ‘counterargument’ either that the thing is not permitted or that it is not permitted in the way it happened. But the defendant’s real opposition to the charge – unless he is able to give some other presentation of the facts of the case than that of the prosecutor – comes in the ‘alternate motive’ and ‘plausible defence’. Under the first head he puts

⁹⁴ 36,10: ἀδήλου πράγματος ἔλεγχος οὐσιώδης ἀπό τινος φανεροῦ σημείου.

⁹⁵ II, 61,25: ἀπό τοῦ διώκοντος ὀρισάμενος οὐδεμίαν ἐν τῷ ὄρω τοῦ φεύγοντος ἐποιήσατο μνήμην – ὁ γὰρ οὐσιώδης ἔλεγχος μόνω τῷ κατηγορῶν πρεπώδης, κτλ. In view of this comment I prefer to interpret ἔλεγχος as “proof” rather than “dispute”. (Cf. NADEAU’s translation, 393: “For when a thing is done by an unknown hand, a dispute about the existence of it from some apparent sign is conjecture.”) Syrianus finds fault with both definitions and proposes his own as more logically sufficient and neutral, 62,20: στοχασμός ἐστι στάσις πολιτικοῦ πράγματος τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους περὶ τοῦ εἶ ἐστι τὸ κρινόμενον τὴν ζήτησιν ἔχουσα.

⁹⁶ I prefer to interpret the text in 46,24: Βούλησιν δὲ καὶ δύναμιν ἐξετάζειν οὐχὶ τῶν κρινομένων μόνον προσώπων δεῖ, ἀλλ’ ὅσαπερ ἂν ἔχη τὸ πρόβλημα: as “we have to examine the ‘will’ and ‘capability of acting’ not only of the persons brought to trial but of all persons involved in the case”. This statement is partly repeated in 47,5 ff. (Cf. NADEAU’s translation, 398: “... the will and capability-of-acting of the persons brought to trial as well as the whole range of (such) arguments implicit in the topic at hand.”)

a different interpretation of the facts than that made by the prosecutor.⁹⁷ Under the other head he contends that the facts which have been used as signs that corroborate the charge are in fact signs that show the opposite (“If I were really about to ... I would not ...”).⁹⁸ Closing⁹⁹ head is ‘common quality’, which means that both the prosecutor and the defendant will sum up their arguments and try to arouse emotions, using the so-called ‘headings of purpose’, i. e., the topics of the just, the expedient, the possible and the honourable.

B. The Stasis of Definition

The stasis of ‘definition’ comes into being if the thing or act to be judged is incomplete, i. e., if by the addition of something missing a name can be put to the thing or act and thereby the inquiry can come to an end. Hermogenes defines the stasis as “an inquiry as to the name of a thing, of which part is done and part is missing for the completeness of the name”.¹⁰⁰ An illustrative example is that of a man who has stolen private money from a temple. For him to be declared a temple-robber – and not an ordinary thief – it should be shown or admitted that the stolen money is sacred money. In the first example used to illustrate the division into heads of argument, Hermogenes presents a case not of charging a person with a wrongful act, but of disputing the claim of a person who has done a useful thing: A philosopher has persuaded a tyrant to put aside his despotism. Then he asks for the gift of honour, due to those who put down tyrants.

Also in this stasis there will be a ‘presentation of the case’,¹⁰¹ but the real battle will take place around ‘definition’, ‘counterdefinition’, and ‘inference’. The party using the ‘definition’ seizes upon what is missing in the particulars of the case and contends that this is the decisive factor of the definition of the

⁹⁷ He may, e. g., in the case of the burying of the corpse maintain that it is a noble thing to bury the unburied.

⁹⁸ This standpoint is, of course, impossible to take in a case where the signs presented are such that they follow necessarily from the act which the defendant is charged with, e. g., the preparing of arms in relation to the plotting to become a tyrant (51,5 ff.). The defendant then has to contend simply that the relation is not reciprocal, i. e., that plotting to become a tyrant does not necessarily follow from the preparation of arms.

⁹⁹ The Greek names for all these heads of argument belonging to the stasis of conjecture are as follows: παραγραφικόν, ἐλέγχων ἀπαίτησις, βούλησις, δύναμις, τὰ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους, ἀντίληψις, μετάληψις, μετάθεσις αἰτίας, πιθανὴ ἀπολογία, ποιότης κοινή.

¹⁰⁰ 37,6: ὀνόματος ζήτησις περὶ πράγματος, οὐ τὸ μὲν πέπρακται, τὸ δὲ λείπει πρὸς αὐτοτέλειαν τοῦ ὀνόματος. Minucianus defines, according to Syrianus (II, 99,2 ff.), as follows: “when the defendant admits of the thing done, but the inquiry is about the peculiar nature or the specific character of the thing done”.

¹⁰¹ This head is here and in the following stases called προβολή. But it is said to be identical with the head of ‘the particulars from beginning to end’ of the conjectural stasis (59,16: ἡ προβολή ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τὰ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους). According to GLOECKNER, 27, this head was not employed by Minucianus: „Hermogenes uniuscuiusque status primum locum esse docet propositionem, quam Minucianus omnino non induxerat.“

act. The other party clings in the 'counterdefinition' to what is actually brought about, points out the importance of it, and uses the 'inference' to contend that there is no difference between what is stated in the 'definition' and what is presented in the 'counterdefinition', i. e., in the case of the philosopher, between slaying the tyrant and putting an end to despotism. These main topics will be supported by the heads of 'intention of the lawmaker', 'gravity' (of the thing done), and 'comparison', e. g., as to how much better it is to be able to avoid bloodshed and chaos. Considerations of the person and of his intention are concluding¹⁰² heads of argument, here as in the following staseis. They combine with the 'common quality'.

C. The Stasis of Quality

This stasis is in fact a class of staseis,¹⁰³ in which the inquiry concerns the 'quality' of the thing or act to be judged. The class is divided into 'rational' and 'legal' staseis, i. e., into staseis concerning the interpretation of facts and staseis concerning the interpretation of the letter of the law. The rational staseis are further divided into those concerning future action and those concerning things done in the past. A common name for this last mentioned group is 'forensic pleading'.¹⁰⁴

a) Forensic Pleading

Within 'forensic pleading' are found 'plea of justification' and four different 'counterpropositions', namely, the 'counterplea', the 'countercharge', the 'shifting of blame', and the 'plea for leniency'.

In the stasis of 'plea of justification' the defendant contends that the thing done is permitted and by no means forbidden. An illustrative example is that of a farmer publicly renouncing his son for pursuing philosophy. Hermogenes defines the stasis as "the denunciation of an act as actionable, which is usually considered not actionable".¹⁰⁵ Syrianus remarks on this definition as showing a unique bias towards the accuser's point of view.¹⁰⁶ The strength of the de-

¹⁰² The Greek names of all the heads of the stasis of definition are: προβολή, ὄρος, ἀνθορισμός, συλλογισμός, γνώμη νομοθέτου, πηλικότης, πρὸς τι, (μία τῶν ἀντιθετικῶν, μετάληψις, ἀντίληψις), ποιότης, γνώμη.

¹⁰³ 37,17: καὶ ὄνομα μὲν γενικὸν τούτῳ ποιότης.

¹⁰⁴ 38,9: κοινὸν μὲν ὄνομα τούτῳ δικαιολογία.

¹⁰⁵ 38,13: ἔστι γὰρ ἀντίληψις ἀνευθύνου πράγματος εἶναι δοκοῦντος ὡς ὑπευθύνου κατηγορία. My translation in the text explains the comment of Syrianus on this definition (see next note). In NADEAU's translation, 393, the specific point of view of the prosecutor is obscured: "This plea is a rejection of personal responsibility by one who treats as accountable an act which is not usually considered accountable".

¹⁰⁶ II, 128,13: Ἐρμογένης δὲ φησιν ... οὗτος δὲ ὁ ὄρος ... ἀπὸ τοῦ κατηγοροῦ γνωρίζει τὴν ἀντίληψιν καίτοι γε πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν τεχνογράφων ἀπὸ τοῦ φεύγοντος αὐτὴν χαρακτηρίζοντων. A definition from the defendant's point of view we find in Minucianus: "when the defendant admits of the thing done but brings forward the fact that the act is permitted" (Syrianus II, 127,23 f.).

fence lies in the contention that the thing in question is not forbidden.¹⁰⁷ This point is made already at the beginning of the suit, after the 'presentation of the case', as some sort of exception to indictment (cf. below the chapter on the 'stasis of objection' [pp. 2000–2003]). After a preliminary discussion of matters of 'definition', in which the particulars of the case are brought in again, the 'plea of justification' is brought forward, to be countered by the prosecutor by refutation, directly as 'not permitted', or indirectly as 'not permitted in the way it was done'. Also other heads of argument for the defence may be employed in this stasis, but these, the so-called 'counterpropositions', will also, when fully elaborated, form each its own stasis.

The counterpropositions are all described and defined from the defendant's point of view. He admits to having done a wrongful act. When he takes the blame upon himself but contends that by this act he has actually rendered a benefit, he makes a 'counterplea'. When he transfers the responsibility to the person who suffered the wrong and contends that he or she deserved to suffer he makes a 'countercharge'. When he transfers the blame to some other thing or person, capable of being held responsible, he makes a 'shifting of blame'. In the last resort he transfers the blame to something or someone incapable of being held responsible and makes a 'plea for leniency'.¹⁰⁸

In these staseis the prosecutor has his strong point in the particulars of the case. Against them the defendant pleads 'intent', coupled to the relevant counterproposition. Two or more counterpropositions may be combined in one case. The prosecutor naturally counters these two heads of argument by alleging some other intent and by protesting that the defendant should have acted otherwise and not in the way he did. Both parties may seek further support from the 'comparison' and the 'strained definition'.¹⁰⁹ Common to the staseis of 'forensic pleading'¹¹⁰ is also the 'thesis', i. e., general considerations, which can be used by both parties alike in order to strengthen their positions.

¹⁰⁷ In the chapter on 'plea of justification' Hermogenes gives the example of the artist who has painted a shipwreck and placed the picture in front of the harbour and who, when no ships put into port, is charged with treason.

¹⁰⁸ This defence was the only one left for the unfortunate generals of the battle of Arginusae, who were reduced to blaming the storm for their failure to recover the bodies of the fallen.

¹⁰⁹ By 'strained definition' is meant a wilfully twisted description of the act by either party in its own interest. An example: At a time of famine and siege a general in council proposes to take the offensive, but he fails to bring the proposal through. However, he secretly cuts through a part of the wall and launching an attack wins a victory. The general is charged with treason. In the 'strained definition' the one party will contend that what he did was not winning a victory but causing a destruction of the state, the other party that this was not at all to break down the walls but to raise them from ruin and make them stand firm.

¹¹⁰ The Greek names of the heads of the staseis of forensic pleading are, for the 'plea of justification': προβολή, μόρια δικαίου, πρόσωπον, ὄρος και τὰ ἐπόμενα τῷ ὄρῳ μέχρι τοῦ πρὸς τι, αὐτὴ ἢ ἀντίληψις, μετάληψις, ἀντίθεσις, ἕτερα μετάληψις, θέσις, ποιότης, γνώμη; for the antithetical staseis: προβολή, (ὄρος και τὰ ἐπόμενα τῷ ὄρῳ), διάνοια, αὐτὴ ἢ ἀντίθεσις, ἕτερα διάνοια, μετάληψις, πρὸς τι, ὄρος βίαιος, θέσις, ἕτερα μετάληψις, ἀντίληψις, ποιότης, γνώμη.

Hermogenes professes to give only a summary account of the topics of argument in order to show the nature of the staseis treated. But by varying his examples he succeeds in bringing out the characteristics of the different heads of argument. To the treatment of the staseis of 'conjecture', 'definition', and 'plea of justification' he also subjoins discussions of other, more complicated forms of these staseis.

b) The Deliberative Stasis

The 'deliberative'¹¹¹ stasis is presented as belonging to the qualitative rational staseis. The debate carried on in it concerns the quality and outcome of present or future actions. This debate may or may not be based on some kind of written document. It centers around a number of stock issues, in Hermogenes listed as the 'lawful', the 'just', the 'expedient', the 'possible', the 'honourable', and the 'anticipated effect'.¹¹²

The way of handling these issues varies. The 'lawful' can bear upon some written law. Then the issue should be treated and divided as one of the legal staseis (cf. below). Or it can concern general custom. The parties then will use the method of direct or indirect refutation. The 'just' will fall under 'forensic pleading' and be divided according to one of the staseis belonging to this (cf. above). The 'expedient' may be presented as 'useful', or even as 'necessary', and it should be examined according to a fourfold scheme of what benefits will remain or will arise, and what present evils will disappear or not befall, if the proposed action is taken, and reversely, what evils will stay or arise, and what benefits will disappear or not turn up, if the action is not taken. The same scheme is applied to the 'honourable', but then in respect of 'glory' and 'disgrace'. The 'possible' is subdivided according to the method of direct and indirect refutation into 'not difficult' and 'even if difficult, nevertheless necessary'. It may be successfully elaborated by an examination of the attributes of the persons involved in the issue. Under the 'anticipated effect'¹¹³ there is room for a consideration of how the current decisions may be judged in the light of different possible outcomes of the proposed actions.

When illustrating the division and handling of these issues, Hermogenes, as NADEAU¹¹⁴ points out, makes a constant use of paraphrases from Demosthenes' speeches against Philip.

¹¹¹ On the Greek term used here, *πραγματική*, cf. W. KROLL, *Rhetorica VI. Die πραγματική στάσις des Hermagoras*, *Philologus* 91 (1936), 197–205, especially 199.

¹¹² The Greek terms are: τὸ νόμιμον, τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ συμφέρον, τὸ δυνατόν, τὸ ἔνδοξον, τὸ ἐκβησόμενον.

¹¹³ This head does not occur in other writers' treatment of deliberative speaking, except in the commentators on Hermogenes. See NADEAU, *Hermogenes on "Stock Issues" in Deliberative Speaking*, 63 (diagram).

¹¹⁴ *Hermogenes' On Stases*, 412–13.

c) The Legal Staseis

The legal staseis are included among the qualitative staseis. The inquiry in them deals with something stated in writing. In the stasis of 'letter and intent' the opposed parties take sides on the 'letter' or on the 'intent', respectively, of one written document. In the stasis of 'conflict of laws' the opposed parties seek support in different documents which clash with one another because of some accidental circumstance. In 'inference' a thing or an act which is not specifically regulated by law is compared and likened to a thing or an act which is so regulated, and the law is thus brought to bear also on the first thing or act. In 'ambiguity' there is a dispute about the letter arising from matters of accent or separation of syllables.

In the stasis of 'letter and intent' the speech may begin by the 'presentation of the case based on the letter', i. e., by a statement describing the act that is related to the letter of the law.¹¹⁵ Then follows the head of 'intent', comprising both the intent of the lawmaker and the perpetrator's intent with his action. Whoever uses the 'presentation of the case' will then use the head of 'no further definition', i. e., the fact that the lawmaker did not further define his law. His intent in so doing will be explained by both parties to their own advantage. In the head of 'inference' it is contended that it makes no difference at all if a further definition was made or not made. The written law, as it is, is quite clear. Against this again it is contended in the 'definition' that it makes a great deal of difference. In a counterproposition the perpetrator of the act will emphasize the benefit of his action, and the opposing party will protest that the beneficial action could be done within the law and should not be done against it. Thereafter both sides will compare whether the service or the wrong done is the greater. For the rest¹¹⁶ the heads of the counterpropositions may be used.

The stasis of 'conflict of laws' is a kind of dual 'letter and intent'. Some heads will be doubled, some others left out, as being equal in force. Doubled are, naturally, the 'presentation of the case' and the 'intent', as well as the 'counterproposition' and the 'counterargument'. The discussion around the question of 'further definition' may be left out but the second 'intent' of the lawmaker can be exploited further by both parties. The 'comparison' in this case concerns which of the two laws it would be better to keep in force. A head peculiar to this stasis and to be employed after the comparison is the question which of the laws might be said to include the other.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ An illustrative case is that of a man, an alien, who during the siege of the city in which he lived, mounted the wall and won highest honour in battle but by so doing offended against the law which states: if an alien should mount the wall of the city, let him be put to death.

¹¹⁶ The Greek names of the heads of the stasis of 'letter and intent' are: προβολή ρητοῦ, διάνοια, τὸ μὴ προσδιωρισθαι, πάλιν διάνοια τοῦ νομοθέτου, συλλογισμός, ὄρος, ἀντίθεσις, μετάληψις, πρὸς τι, ὄρος βίαιος, θέσις, ἑτέρα μετάληψις, ἀντίληψις, ποιότης, γνώμη.

¹¹⁷ 84,17: ἡ περὶ τοῦ πότερον περιέχει καὶ πότερον περιέχεται τῶν ῥητῶν ζήτησις.

The stasis of 'inference' is divided in much the same way as the stasis of 'definition', but the order of the heads is different. Against the 'presentation of the case', i. e., the description of the thing done, the letter of the law is cited. In the 'inference' it is contended that there is no difference between the two things described, in the 'definition' that there is a great deal of difference. The 'intent of the lawmaker' is explored by both parties and then the usual heads of 'gravity', 'strained definition', 'comparison', and so on are employed.¹¹⁸ The things placed together by the 'presentation of the case' and the 'letter of the law' in this stasis need not be equal. One may also argue from the greater or from the opposite or even from the lesser.

'Ambiguity' will hardly form a whole independent issue, but may be part of another issue, in which one has to deal with, e. g., oracles. The heads used are the usual ones for the legal staseis: two 'presentations of the case based on the letter', the 'intent of the lawmaker', the 'law including and law included', and so on.

D. The Stasis of Objection

The stasis of 'objection' has a special position in the system of staseis. It is not attained by the dichotomic method of division. When this division is brought to an end with 'plea for leniency' (cf. above, p. 1992), Hermogenes turns back for a moment to the legal staseis and defines and explains the different types of them.¹¹⁹ But after that he makes a clean break with his step by step exploration of the thing to be judged, stating:

"This is the way we shall learn to recognize these staseis, but not so with the stasis of 'objection'. Here the inquiry concerns whether it is proper to bring a case to trial".¹²⁰

Hermogenes sets this situation clearly apart from the situations described before: the main inquiry is not into whether a thing exists, neither into what it is, nor into what quality it is of, but "into just this, whether there should be an inquiry into anyone of these things".¹²¹ Another name for the stasis is 'formal exception'.¹²²

¹¹⁸ The Greek names of the heads of the stasis of 'inference' are: προβολή πράγματος, τὸ ῥητόν, συλλογισμός, ὄρος, γνώμη νομοθέτου, πηλικότης, ὄρος βίαιος, πρὸς τι, (ἀντίθεσις, μετάληψις, ἀντίληψις,) ποιότης, γνώμη.

¹¹⁹ 39,20–42,4.

¹²⁰ 42,5: ταύτας μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἐπιγνωσόμεθα, τὴν δὲ μετάληψιν οὐκέθ' ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἡ ζήτησις ἢ περὶ τοῦ εἰ δεῖ τὸν ἀγῶνα εἰσελθεῖν.

¹²¹ 42,10: ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο, εἰ δεῖ ζητῆσαι τι τούτων.

¹²² 42,11: παραγραφή.

There are two forms of 'objection', the one "concerned with a document", the other "not concerned with documents". They are defined as follows: The first kind is

"a motion against immediate trial in the manner of exception to indictment on the basis of a letter, about which there is an inquiry",

the second kind is

"also a motion against immediate trial in the manner of exception to indictment on the basis of a letter; the inquiry, however, is not about the letter, but about one of the circumstances connected with the act, e.g., place, time, person, cause, or manner, namely, when we do not dispute the act itself but, in objecting, criticize one of these circumstances".¹²³

The illustrative examples help to show up the difference. A man once tried for murder and acquitted is called "murderer" by an oracle and is again indicted. He objects to indictment, citing the letter "no one should be tried twice for the same crime". In this case there will be an inquiry according to 'letter and intent', one of the legal staseis. (If this inquiry should turn out to the defendant's disadvantage, there follows an inquiry in accordance with the stasis of 'conjecture'.) In another case a man has – in accordance with the law – killed an adulterer; when he afterwards finds his wife mourning on the killed

¹²³ 42,13: και ἡ μὲν ἔγγραφός ἐστιν ἀπαγωγή τῆς εὐθυδικίας κατὰ παραγραφὴν ἀπὸ ῥητοῦ τινος, περὶ οὗ ἡ ζήτησις ... ἡ δὲ ἄγραφος ἐστὶ μὲν ἀπαγωγή τῆς εὐθυδικίας καὶ αὐτὴ κατὰ παραγραφὴν ἀπὸ ῥητοῦ, τὴν ζήτησιν δὲ οὐ περὶ τὸ ῥητὸν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ περὶ τι τῶν περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, τόπον ... ἢ τρόπον, ὅταν τὸ μὲν πρᾶγμα συγχωρῶμεν, ἐν δὲ τι τούτων αἰτιώμεθα μεταλαμβάνοντες. As is seen from the Greek text the definitions run exactly parallel up to the clauses – a relative and a coordinated clause, respectively – which describe the different spheres of inquiry. This parallelism is destroyed in NADEAU's translation, 396: "The written form is a motion against immediate trial because of exception (to indictment) on the basis of the letter about which there is inquiry ... The unwritten exception is also a motion against immediate trial; it is the same as exception on the basis of the letter, except that it brings into question not the letter but any of the circumstances connected with the act, namely place, time, person, cause, or manner. (These are invoked) whenever we concede the thing done but, in objecting, lay the blame to one of these circumstances." NADEAU's interpretation may also give the wrong impression, firstly, that there is no letter of the law involved in the second "unwritten" kind of objection, secondly, that the "objecting" person in the second case should be the same person as brings the motion against trial, i.e., the defendant of the illustrative example. The head of 'letter of the law' is, however, found both in the example which is used as illustration, and in the enumeration of heads belonging to this second kind of objection (cf. below). (Cf. VOLKMANN, 85: „*Man unterschied nun in der Theorie eine παραγραφὴ ἔγγραφος ἀπὸ ῥητοῦ τινος λαμβάνουσα τὴν ζήτησιν, – hier bildet das ῥητὸν den Ausgangspunkt und zugleich den Gegenstand der ζήτησις, Rh. Gr. IV, 785 – und eine παραγραφὴ ἄγραφος, Hermog. I. I., bei welcher ein ῥητὸν den Ausgangspunkt, niemals aber den Gegenstand der ζήτησις bilden kann, eine Unterscheidung, die bis auf Hermagoras zurückgeht.*") From Hermogenes' text and examples it is also quite clear that it is the prosecutor who in this case is "objecting" and that his aim in so doing is to remove the exception to indictment (cf. next note).

man's grave he kills her too and is indicted. As a motion against trial he cites the letter permitting the killing of adulterer and adulteress. The prosecutor, however, objects to the time and the place of the killing. The objection of the prosecutor here is, of course, to the effect that the cited letter is not applicable to the man's act of killing his wife, i. e., his act does not conform to the letter of the law he is citing, and therefore it is right to bring him to trial.¹²⁴

Hermogenes divides into heads of argument the kind of 'objection' which is "not concerned with documents".¹²⁵ We get 'presentation of the case', 'exception based on the letter', 'counterargument', in which the prosecutor objects to some circumstance connected with the act,¹²⁶ 'inference', in which the defendant contends that this circumstance makes no difference, and 'definition', in which the prosecutor protests that it matters very much. The rest of the heads, 'counterproposition', second 'counterargument',¹²⁷ 'plea of justification', 'thesis', 'quality', and 'intention', correspond to the heads of the staseis of 'forensic pleading'.¹²⁸

The kind of 'objection' which is "concerned with a document" is not furnished with any heads of argument of its own. It signifies an initial inquiry in accordance with one of the legal staseis, or, possibly, with the stasis of 'defi-

¹²⁴ It is worth noting that the one and only objection in the first case comes from the defendant, who makes a motion against immediate trial by citing a letter of the law, while in the other case the objection under discussion comes from the prosecutor, who objects to one or more of the circumstances connected with the act performed, in order to remove the exception to indictment, which is made, in this case too, by the defendant by citing a letter of the law. NADEAU, when describing the two kinds of objection in the following way, Hermogenes' On Stases, 381: "stasis of objection with a subdivision into written or unwritten forms – e. g., one may object to indictment on the basis of law or on the basis of circumstances surrounding an act", ignores this difference between them and thus oversimplifies the situation. The ancient commentators, as well as GLOECKNER (to whom NADEAU refers), do appreciate this difference and the consequences thereof. Cf. GLOECKNER 47: „*Hermagoras maior translationem esse et accusatoris et rei censuerat, sed nondum nominibus haec genera distinxerat ... Hermogenes duo statuit genera ... 1) translationis legalis (ἔγγραφος: 142,7): cum reus aliqua lege nisus actionem excludere studet, 2) translationis rationalis (ἄγραφος) cum accusator in universum reo contra se agi non debere contendenti assentitur, sed una ex circumstantiis utitur ... ex qua iure se inducere quaestionem colligit.*" Cf. also Syrianus II, 152,11 ff. See also below note 129.

¹²⁵ The illustrative example is the case of a man who as a gift of honour has demanded and received the death sentence of another citizen. When he is discovered to have previously killed the other man he is charged with murder.

¹²⁶ This circumstance, of course, being the time of the killing. The prosecutor also strengthens this point by contending that the popular assembly would not even have given the death sentence, had the killed man been alive and present and spoken against it.

¹²⁷ It may be noted that this counterargument (of direct or indirect refutation) is fashioned here as a protest against the manner of asking for the gift of honour: you ought to have said just this thing, that you had killed him and that he deserved to die, and then asked for acquittal. The reply from the defendant is: it was possible for me to ask whatever I wished, and it is not your business to dictate my words to me.

¹²⁸ The Greek names of all the heads of this kind of objection are: προβολή, παραγραφικόν τὸ ἀπὸ ῥητοῦ, μετάληψις, συλλογισμός, ὄρος, ἀντίθεσις, ἔτερα μετάληψις, ἀντίληψις, θέσις, ποιότης, γνώμη.

nitition', which might be followed by a second inquiry in accordance with either one of the rational staseis, or, as was shown above, with the stasis of 'conjecture'.

'Exception to indictment' occurs also as a possible minor head of argument within two other staseis, 'conjecture', and 'plea of justification'. In 'conjecture' it represents an initial move by the defendant who objects to some circumstance in connection with the charge.¹²⁹ In 'plea of justification' the defendant uses the head of 'bases of right' just after the 'presentation of the case' in order to object to indictment on the basis of the plea itself: "One ought not to be tried for such things which no law has forbidden".

In what way, then, can the Hermogenic stasis of 'objection' be said to correspond to the philosophical category of coincidental, accidental, or relational quality? In the kind of 'objection' which is "concerned with a document" there is an initial motion by which the act performed is compared to and brought into contact with a letter of the law. The inquiry starts within the appropriate legal stasis but is initiated in order to get an answer to the main question of the stasis: Should there be a trial or not? In the kind of 'objection' which is "not concerned with documents" the discussion centers to a great extent around circumstances relative to the act performed. But also this discussion aims at answering the main question: Should there be a trial or not? Is the act really performed in accordance with the letter cited by the one party as a basis for exception to indictment, or is the objection from the other party, concerning circumstances relative to the act performed, sufficient to remove the exception and so justify a trial? That the central question, trial or no trial, is the same in both kinds of 'objection' may be a sufficient reason for Hermogenes (and Minucianus) to treat them as one stasis with a common name. But the focusing on this same question, expressed clearly by Hermogenes in his primary definition of the stasis, also prevents him from considering it as on a level with those staseis which are to be discovered when there is a "thing to be judged", and consequently it is given no place in the dichotomic pattern of the system.

¹²⁹ Hermogenes, 44,1–14, mentions four grounds for such an objection: something missing, e. g., the body in a charge of murder; excess, when the charge includes too much; the fact that the relevant actions are performed by other persons than the accused; the time. He adds, however, that such an attempt from the defendant to avoid trial is not of much use, unless he can base it on a letter of the law. If the motion against trial is based on a letter of the law it constitutes a perfect "exception to indictment", *τελεία παραγραφή*. As an instance of such a 'perfect exception' Hermogenes refers to the case of the man who has already once been tried for murder. In this case, though, there is no objection to any circumstances connected with the charge or the actual act. Cf. MARTIN, 43: „Bei der παραγραφή unterscheidet man wieder eine *τελεία* und eine *ἀτελής*. Bei dieser wird nur eine der *Peristasen* bestritten, bei jener die *Rechtmäßigkeit* des ganzen Verfahrens.“ In both these 'exceptions to indictment' the objection arises from the defendant and has as its aim to avoid trial. Actually, in the two 'exceptions to indictment' compared here, the perfect and the non-perfect one, we have the counterparts to the two components in NADEAU's translation and interpretation of the subdivision of the stasis of objection (into written and unwritten forms). Cf. note 124.

4. A Manual of Instruction for Students in School Declamation

Hermogenes' treatise was written as a text-book for use in the schools of rhetoric.¹³⁰ Students at more advanced levels trained themselves in two types of declamation, the deliberative *suasoria* and the forensic *controversia*.¹³¹ The themes or cases set for the students were of historical, pseudo-historical, or purely fictitious character, just like the illustrative examples in 'On Staseis'.¹³² By this training the students were meant to get able to acquit themselves with credit in their later public life.¹³³

As a textbook, 'On Staseis' has its decided merits. Its style is simple and clear. Every precept or definition is well and fully illustrated. By the method of division the student is shown an easy and sure way of analysing the case set before him, so as to arrive at the stasis or issue on which he can base his speech. By the division of every single stasis into heads of argument he learns about the real nature of each stasis, perceiving where its main point lies. Also he learns the very technique of argumentation, how to counter one point of argument with another, and what points help to strengthen each other. The definitions of Hermogenes have the advantage of being always specific and of clearly

¹³⁰ PATILLON, 71, remarks on its systematic treatment of all available points of argument for both parties of the controverse and concludes: "... *les développements proposés dans notre traité ... ne peuvent convenir qu'au discours d'école.*"

¹³¹ On this ancient educational practice see S. F. BONNER, *Roman Declamation in the Late Republic and Early Empire*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1949, 1–26 and 51–70; D. L. CLARK, *Rhetoric in Graeco-Roman Education*, New York 1957, 59–66; M. L. CLARKE, *Rhetoric at Rome. A Historical Survey*, London 1953, 85–99 and IDEM, *Higher Education in the Ancient World*, London 1971, 39–45. Cf. also J. FAIRWEATHER, *The Elder Seneca on Declamation*, ANRW II 32.1, ed. W. HAASE, Berlin–New York 1984, 514–556.

¹³² That the Hermogenic examples are of traditional stock is shown clearly by JAENEKE, 7–13. D. A. RUSSELL in the second chapter of his book on Greek Declamation gives a very amusing picture of "Sophistopolis", the imaginary city, where all the persons and events of these examples come into being.

¹³³ Cf. Hermogenes' own introductory words, 28,5–7: "They [i. e., the elements of rhetoric] plainly offer advantages to one's welfare in general deliberation as well as in courts of law and everywhere else." CLARKE, in referring to Quintilian, questions both whether practical use was really the primary aim of the declamation and whether, if so, it did attain this aim (*Rhetoric at Rome*, 97): "Under the Empire there appear to have been two schools of thought about declamation. Some regarded it as having nothing to do with pleading in the courts and being designed solely for display; others saw it as a preparation for practice in the courts ... But if it was to be judged by its utility as practical training it was a failure." NADEAU, however, is not quite prepared to share this severe criticism (Hermogenes' *On Stases*, 368): "The techniques required, nevertheless, were those appropriate to the court procedures of the time", and CLARKE himself adds some modifying remarks (98): "It should however be observed that declamation can hardly have been wholly useless or wholly bad in its influence. Quintilian, in spite of his many severe criticisms, made use of it himself and was convinced of its value ... the sensible teacher could make use of declamation to give a serious training in thought and expression. In any case in spite of all criticism declamation continued; the old themes were debated until the end of Roman civilization."

showing what makes the debate start in the first place. His analysis of the illustrative examples also often shows much acuteness, and by using more examples to illustrate each stasis he demonstrates how different heads of argument gain more or less importance in different situations. A text-book in its general outline and expressed purpose, the treatise still may be considered to own also some scientific merit through its attempt to bring into one coherent system all the different elements of rhetorical argumentation.¹³⁴

IV. 'On Ideas'¹³⁵

1. Basic Concepts, Elements, and Principles¹³⁶

The development of the theory of ideas may be seen as a natural result of the study of the classical models for imitation. The ideal orator to admire and imitate was for Hermogenes as for his contemporaries Demosthenes.¹³⁷ Hermogenes sees in Demosthenes not only the great model of practical oratory but also the creator of the most 'varied' discourse, in which all or nearly all qualities of style may be found.¹³⁸ These qualities he picks out and turns into abstract, independent entities, named 'ideas'.¹³⁹ The system into which these

¹³⁴ This is the opinion also of J. MONFASANI who makes this comment (op. cit., 251): "The great attraction of the *On Status* was not any specific argument, although they were plentiful and acute, but its magnificent presentation of all rhetorical argumentation as a unified, interlocking system running from the most general to the most specific by a necessary order through the 'method' of division."

¹³⁵ For the Greek text see Hermogenis Opera, ed. H. RABE, 213–413.

¹³⁶ In my dissertation, *Studies in Hermogenes and Eustathios* (henceforth referred to as *Studies*), 8–39, I have discussed these basic terms and concepts with references to other scholars' comments and opinions.

¹³⁷ See E. DRERUP, *Demosthenes im Urteile des Altertums*, *Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums* 12, 1/2, Würzburg 1923, 146.

¹³⁸ 215,8: ἀνάγκη προχειρισμένων ἡμᾶς τὸν μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ποικίλως χρησάμενον τῷ λόγῳ καὶ σχεδὸν ἐξ ἀπάσης ἰδέας συμμιγεί διὰ τούτου περὶ ἀπασῶν εἰπεῖν τῶν ἰδεῶν. (Cf. 215,19 ff.)

¹³⁹ Several commentators have noted the Platonic flavour of this concept of 'idea' and the way of arriving at it. See J. STURM, *Scholae*, 6, H. LIERS, op. cit. in note 42, 885–86, W. MADYDA, op. cit. in note 37, 48, G. KENNEDY, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World*, 628. PH. DE LACY writes in his article *Plato and the Intellectual Life of the Second Century A. D.* in: *Approaches to the Second Sophistic*, ed. by G. W. BOWERSOCK, University Park, Pennsylvania 1974, 9: "The passage from particulars to forms, the identification of the components of a mixture, the very phrase *auto kath' hauto*, all have good Platonic pedigrees." Modern translations of ἰδέα into English are, besides "idea", "category of style", "form of discourse", "form of style", "type of style". The Greek terms used alternately for 'idea' are ἰδέα and εἶδος. Ἀρετή, "virtue" of style, which is used by Pseudo-Aristides, does not occur as an alternative in Hermogenes, but τύπος, "type of style", is used in the final part of the treatise. In a few cases ἰδέα and εἶδος are used to signify the "style" of a particular author, and in the final part of the treatise εἶδος may also mean "genre".

ideas are fitted is in a corresponding way the outcome of an attempt to abstract and systematize from the observations of the effects of stylistic elements, when they are intermingled with and mutually influenced by each other in the admired passages of oratory.

In his general introduction Hermogenes presents the basic elements and the general principles of his system. He establishes seven main ideas, Clarity, Grandeur, Beauty, Vigour, Ethos, Sincerity, and Force/Skill.¹⁴⁰ He also constitutes eight categories under which he will describe each idea, namely (the content of) thought, method, diction, figures, cola, word-connection, cadence, and rhythm. With the help of these two classifying concepts, idea and category, the mass of basic stylistic elements, the individual descriptions of thoughts, methods, figures, and so on, can be organized.¹⁴¹ The builder of the system is thus able to give to the critic tools by which he can describe, categorize, and judge the aesthetic effect of each passage or part of passage he is analysing,

¹⁴⁰ 217,23: σαφήνεια, μέγεθος, κάλλος, γοργότης, ἦθος, ἀλήθεια, δεινότης. I intend to use the given translations with initial capital letters when referring to the Hermogenic ideas. For discussion about translation and interpretation of the Greek terms see the ensuing chapters on the individual ideas.

¹⁴¹ 220,5: Πάντα μὲν οὖν εἶδη λόγων ἐν τούτοις τεθεώρηται καὶ διὰ τούτων γίνεται, ἐννοίας, μεθόδου, λέξεως, σχήματος, κάλου, συνθήκης, ἀναπαύσεως, ῥυθμοῦ. Treated in this same order the categories determine the structure of the individual chapters of the systematic part. Under the heading of each category are collected the definitions belonging to it and to the idea treated in the chapter. In 218,18 ff., where Hermogenes applies the same categories to λόγος, he indicates some of their internal relations: "Ἄπας τοίνυν λόγος ἐννοϊὰν τε ἔχει πάντως τινὰ ... καὶ μέθοδον περὶ τὴν ἐννοϊαν καὶ λέξιν, ἢ τούτοις ἐφήρμοσται. τῆς δ' αὖ λέξεως ἐχούσης πάντως τινὰ καὶ αὐτῆς ἰδιότητα πάλιν αὖ σχήματά τε ἐστὶ τινὰ καὶ κῶλα συνθέσεις τε καὶ ἀναπαύσεις καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἄμφοιν τούτοις συνιστάμενον ὁ ῥυθμός." Ἐννοία is in modern commentary and translation rendered as "thought", "sentence", «pensée». Μέθοδος is more difficult to translate. Hermogenes himself once defines it as "figure of thought" (220,20–22), but in the systematic part it is used in the more general sense of a principle of organizing or a way of selecting and presenting the subject-matter. Besides "figure of thought" modern interpreters have used expressions such as "mode" or "approach" to catch the meaning of the term. I have chosen simply to use "method". Λέξις may denote an individual category, "diction" or "choice of words", or be used more generally of the whole formal aspect. Under σύνθεσις or συνθήκη Hermogenes considers hiatus as well as metrical feet and patterns. Cf. BECKER, op. cit., 11. For the rhythm as created by word-connection and cadence but still an independent unit see 219,23 ff., where it is compared to the shape of a house or a ship.

In a later remark on the categories Hermogenes grades them according to their importance: the most impact has content of thought, next comes diction, third figure of speech, and fourth figure of thought, i. e., method. Last come word-connection and cadence (222,6 ff., 19 ff.). He hastens however to modify his remarks pointing to situations in which the one or the other category may win increased importance. Cf. 411,21 ff. where he partly repeats, partly modifies this general statement. In his aforementioned book on Hermogenes' two major treatises M. PATILLON structures the contents of the systematic part of 'On Ideas' according to «*les composants des catégories stylistiques*» («*catégorie stylistique*» is his interpretation of ἰδέα). Here he gives an inventory, i. e., a grouping of all the definitions belonging to each class of components, 'thought', 'method', and so on, as well as an analysis wherein he applies some modern linguistic aspects.

and, at the same time, to teach the would-be orator by what means – such and such thoughts, methods, and so on – he may achieve a certain effect and impress his audience in a certain way.¹⁴²

In the systematic part of his treatise Hermogenes presents each idea in full, such as it may be expressed through all applicable categories.¹⁴³ Some of the main ideas of the introduction are subdivided, and all in all the following ideas are described: (Clarity:) Purity, Distinctness; (Grandeur:) Solemnity, Asperity, Vehemence, Brilliance, Strength, Amplitude; Beauty; Vigour; (Ethos:) Simplicity, Sweetness, Sharpness/Wit, Moderation, Sincerity, Weight; Force/Skill.¹⁴⁴

In the systematic part as well as in the introduction Hermogenes also indicates the relations between the ideas. These mirror the interplay observed by the analysing critic between the elements of style in a passage or even in a whole oration. The Hermogenic ideas 'share' elements, they are 'opposed' or 'contrasted' to each other in one or more aspects, and they 'mix' with one another. Demosthenes can be seen to use both the single ideas and the mixtures of them with remarkable skill so as to produce the most persuasive effect. This is done mainly by adaptation to circumstances, audience, and matter at hand. Also this skill or persuasive force is in the system given the name of idea.

The different mixtures or combinations of ideas are used in the last part of the treatise as formulas for describing genres of speech and personal styles of orators and authors.

In the following survey I shall give a picture of each single idea,¹⁴⁵ compared in brief to its counterpart in the 'Aristides Rhetoric',¹⁴⁶ and set against

¹⁴² Both these aims of the treatise are clearly stated in its first lines (cf. 213,6 ff., 10 ff.). Hermogenes repeats that he will provide means to judge all kinds of writings (215,13 ff., 217,6 ff.). He avails himself of these means in the capacity of a critic in the last part of the treatise. But all through the systematic part and also in the last part he keeps in view the needs of the orator by discussing how and to what extent an individual idea may be used in practical oratory, what ideas are needed to complement each other, and what combination of ideas will make the best 'political discourse'.

¹⁴³ In this part the idea functions as an isolated entity set free from literary reality. In real oratory and real literature an idea is never found all by itself or expressed through all its categories. See 220,24 ff., 222,1 ff., 224,9 ff., 305,1 ff., 410,22 ff. The need felt by the systematizer to identify each idea in full has, however, as consequence that Demosthenes is no longer sufficient as a source of illustrating passages. He functions as a startingpoint because he shows the richest variety of stylistic qualities, and his oratory is still the ideal as far as 'political discourse' is concerned, but some of the qualities that occur sparingly or modified in his prose are found expressed much better in other types of writing.

¹⁴⁴ The Greek names are: (σαφήνεια:) καθαρότης, εὐκρίνεια; (μέγεθος:) σεμνότης, τραχύτης, σφοδρότης, λαμπρότης, ἀκμή, περιβολή; κάλλος; γοργότης; (ἥθος:) ἀφέλεια, γλυκύτης, δριμύτης, ἐπιείκεια, ἀληθινὸς λόγος, βαρύτης; δεινότης. As is seen from this enumeration of the ideas treated in the systematic part, the idea of Sincerity is there included in Ethos. (See my chapter on Ethos, below pp. 2023–2034.)

¹⁴⁵ Summary expositions of the Hermogenic ideas are given in the large handbooks; the most correct version, in my opinion, is that given by VOLKMANN (op. cit., 557–564). A fuller treatment of the ideas is now to be found in PATILLON, op. cit., 219–278.

¹⁴⁶ In his introduction Hermogenes in a general way refers to his predecessors. He criticizes on the one hand their lack of order and method (216,17 ff.), on the other hand their

its background in earlier theories of style,¹⁴⁷ furthermore a presentation of the principles of ‘sharing’, ‘opposition’ or ‘contrast’, and ‘mixture’, and of the idea of Force/Skill. Finally, under the heading of Political Discourse and Panegyric Writing (sect. IV. 11, pp. 2047–2052), I shall make some remarks on the structure and content of the concluding part of the treatise.

2. Clarity¹⁴⁸

Clarity is presented as the first idea of the system. Its subdivisions are Purity and Distinctness. Clarity is the basis of all discourse.¹⁴⁹ Its opposite is “obscurity”. This quality is, however, not really a vice of style, as it can be put

inability to generalize from the observations of details of the Demosthenic style (217,1 ff.). The commentators of Demosthenes do not, he says, consider each quality, each idea, by itself. Syrianus names two targets of this criticism, Basilicus and Zenon. (I, 13,9).

It may be assumed from Hermogenes’ utterances that some theorizing and systematizing already had taken place in this field. One surviving specimen of this somewhat earlier activity may be the treatise ‘On Political Discourse’, which forms the first part of a work attributed to the sophist Aelius Aristides. (For the text see *Aristidis qui feruntur libri rhetorici II*, ed. W. SCHMID, Leipzig 1926.) BAUMGART did not doubt its genuinity, but SCHMID has demonstrated the falseness of the attribution and shown that the work is a conflation of several parts, probably written by different authors at different times. (See *Die sogenannte Aristidesrhetorik*, *Rheinisches Museum* 72 [1917/18], 113–49 and 238–57). SCHMID followed BAUMGART in assuming that the first part of the work was known, utilized, and criticized by Hermogenes when writing his treatise ‘On Ideas’. He furthermore accepted WALSDORFF’s suggestion that the second part of the work is inspired by and written after Hermogenes’ ‘On Ideas’, thereby acknowledging the criticism by WALSDORFF and correcting his own originally proposed order between the parts of the ‘Aristides Rhetoric’ and ‘On Ideas’. (See F. WALSDORFF, *Die antiken Urteile über Platons Stil*, *Klassisch-Philologische Studien* 1, Leipzig 1927, 119, note 1, and the review by SCHMID in *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen* 191 [1929], 240, note 3.) In the first book of Pseudo-Aristides, which is the one I use as a counterpart to Hermogenes’ treatise, twelve ideas or virtues of style are described under the categories of γνώμη, “content of thought”, σχῆμα, “figure”, and ἀπαγγελία, “expression”. There are next to no traces of a system into which these ideas are fitted. The treatise as we have it now is badly curtailed and mutilated. (In a dissertation from 1972, *The Pseudo-Aristides Treatise on Public Address: A Study of the Second Sophistic*, T. E. CORTS describes and discusses the contents of the treatise. He takes very little note of Hermogenes or other Greek theories of style but tries to connect the concepts and theories of the treatise to those of the Latin authors. My interpretations below of Pseudo-Aristides’ text often diverge considerably from those of CORTS.)

¹⁴⁷ A discussion of the relation between the theory of ideas and these earlier theories is found in HAGEDORN’s study *Zur Ideenlehre des Hermogenes (Hypomnemata 8)*, Göttingen 1964, 9–18. In his following treatment of each single idea concept he tries to trace its roots. In my notes on the background of the idea concepts I will constantly refer to HAGEDORN.

¹⁴⁸ σαφήνεια, 226,8–22; 240,18–241,9.

¹⁴⁹ 226,8: περί σαφηνείας ... ἦν δὴ καὶ πρώτην ἐθέμεθα, διότι καὶ παντὶ λόγῳ τούτου δεῖ μάλιστα, τῆς σαφηνείας, κτλ.

to effective use in, e. g., allusive speech or 'figured questions'.¹⁵⁰ The excess of Clarity may produce a vice which neighbours the idea, namely "triviality" or "meanness".¹⁵¹ An opposite to this vice and also a remedy for it is Grandeur, the major idea treated next in the treatise.

A. Purity¹⁵²

Pure are the common and easily comprehensible thoughts, which contain nothing deep or complicated. Pure method is to start immediately with the relevant facts and to relate them bare and stripped of all extraneous matter. Another Pure method is the narrative technique. The words used should be common and understandable to all. Pure diction does not admit tropes or words which are "harsh in themselves".¹⁵³ Direct constructions using the nominative and short cola give a straight, simple sentence structure. Avoided are the genitive absolute, transposition of words, apostrophes, and insertions.¹⁵⁴ Collision of vowels is not especially shunned. The rhythm is that of everyday speech: the feet are mostly iambics or trochaics and the cadence occurs on anyone of them.

B. Distinctness¹⁵⁵

This idea implies the organization – for the sake of Clarity – of more complex material. Its thoughts have the mediating function of summing up and introducing. Distinct method is to give an outline of the proposed discussion. Besides, Distinctness is produced by keeping to the natural order of events and generally by putting first things first, also, e. g., in arguing. By Distinct figures the speaker assembles, divides, and enumerates. He breaks off from his narra-

¹⁵⁰ 226,11: ἀσάφεια. 240,24–241,5. Cf. KUSTAS, *Studies in Byzantine Rhetoric*, 83, on how these remarks could form the basis for the development of 'obscurity' into a virtue of style in Byzantine times.

¹⁵¹ 241,7: δεῖ γὰρ τῷ σαφεῖ μεγέθους τινὸς καὶ ὄγκου· παράκειται γὰρ τῷ σφόδρα σαφεῖ τὸ εὐτελὲς καὶ ταπεινόν, κτλ. Cf. *sim.* 241,12–15.

¹⁵² καθαρότης, 227,1–234,23.

¹⁵³ 229,8: Λέξις δὲ καθαρὰ ... καὶ μὴ τετραμμένη μὴδ' ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς οὐσα σκληρά, κτλ. In the chapter on *Asperity* Hermogenes distinguishes between such expressions as are metaphorical and such as are "harsh in themselves" through harsh combinations of consonants, 258,13: αὐταὶ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ τετράφθαι εἰσὶ τραχεῖαι· ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν δὲ σκληραὶ αἰ τοιαῦται, οἷον 'ἀταρπός', 'ἔμαρπτεν', 'ἔγναψε' καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται.

¹⁵⁴ 230,8: πλαγιασμός; 232,1: ὑπερβατόν; 250,23: ἀποστροφαί, ὑποστροφαί. All examples given in Hermogenes of the figure *πλαγιασμός* contain a genitive absolute. Cf. 230,6 ff., 267,19 ff., 288,13 ff., 317,11 ff. In *Pseudo-Aristides* it seems to have a more general sense of "participial constructions". Cf. KUSTAS, *op. cit.*, 136, note 5, PATILLON, *op. cit.*, 166–167.

¹⁵⁵ εὐκρίνεια, 235,1–240,17.

tive to question and answer himself as to his intent, and he repeats and resumes his point after a digression. These are the distinctive features of the idea. In all other respects, diction, cola, etc., it shares the characteristics of Purity.

Distinctness is introduced as the helpmate of Purity. Whenever Purity suffers some setback, Distinctness has to step in and restore Clarity to the discourse.¹⁵⁶ The illustrative examples which show the idea in this function have a structure which is far from Pure. The subdivision of Clarity into the two ideas means that one can achieve Clarity of speech either by using Purity throughout or by using Distinctness to correct and clarify whatever confusion is caused by a more complicated mode of discourse.

Pseudo-Aristides¹⁵⁷ has a very short chapter on σαφήνεια and καθαρότης. Most of his definitions are similar to the precepts in the two chapters on Purity and Distinctness.

HAGEDORN¹⁵⁸ traces some of the characteristics of Purity, common words and the avoidance of tropes, back to traits of the stylistic virtue of σαφήνεια

¹⁵⁶ 235,4: ἡ μὲν γὰρ βούλεται σαφῆ ποιεῖν τὸν λόγον, ἡ καθαρότης, ἡ δέ, εἴ τι πάσχοι ὑπεναντίον αὐτῆ κατ' ἀνάγκην τινά, αἱ δὲ πολλὰ περὶ τοῦς λόγους εἰσὶ διαμαρτίαι, διορθοῦται, ἡ εὐκρίνεια. Cf. 315,9–12.

¹⁵⁷ §§ 133–35. His definitions of 'content' are: not to invert but to relate in due order; not to insert any thoughts from without; to present known facts as known and facts in dispute as disputed. In the section on 'figure' are listed: 'epistrophes' (returns?); to give a summing up and a preparation when passing from one thing to another. 'Diction' comprises: common and truly significant expressions; 'narrative figures'; avoidance of synonyms; 'mild' instead of 'harsh' expressions.

¹⁵⁸ Op. cit., 25–29. The concept of καθαρότης in Dionysius refers to the use of standard grammatical forms and vocabulary (cf. On Lysias, 22,16–17 U–R). To this concept there is no counterpart in Hermogenes, which might be explained by the fact that this was a virtue treated by the grammarians rather than by the rhetoricians. (See LAUSBERG, §§ 459, 460, 528, and cf. Cicero, De Orat. III, 10,38.)

The stylistic virtue of σαφήνεια is characterized by the use of common, proper words and the avoidance of tropes (cf. On Lysias, 10,14–21; 12,21–24 U–R). In his characterization of the plain style, which "above all should be lucid", Demetrius gives the same precepts (§§ 190–192). In the 'Rhetorica ad Alexandrum' the author describes the virtues of the narration in 1438 a. For σαφήνεια ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων he recommends appropriate words and words in common use; besides, transposition of words should be avoided. For σαφήνεια ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων he recommends relating things in their natural order. This precept is, as HAGEDORN points out, one of the characteristics of Distinctness. In the Latin authors, too, the clarity of the narration is attained by keeping to the right order (cf. Ad Herennium I, 9,15; Cicero, De Inv. I, 20,29; De Orat. II, 80,329).

HAGEDORN does not make any attempt to trace one of the chief characteristics of Purity, the avoidance of unnecessary matters and the clean start from the relevant facts. But the precepts for another virtue of the narration, *brevitas*, show an obvious similarity to the Hermogenic precepts. Cf. Ad Herennium I, 9,14: *rem breviter narrare poterimus si inde incipiemus narrare unde necesse erit*; Cicero, De Inv. I, 20,28: *Brevis erit, si unde necesse est inde initium sumetur et non ab ultimo repetetur*; Quintilian, IV, 2,40: *Brevis erit narratio ante omnia, si inde coeperimus rem exponere, unde ad iudicem pertinet; deinde, si nihil extra causam dixerimus*. In Ad Herennium I, 9,15 and Cicero, De Inv. I, 20,29 a combination of the two virtues, clarity and brevity, is recommended. In Dionysius Lysias is represented as combining the virtues of βραχύτης and σαφήνεια (On Lysias, 12,24 ff. U–R). But the discussion here concerns the purely stylistic virtues and βραχύτης means

in Dionysius, while the Distinct method of keeping to the natural order is found to have its origin in σαφήνεια (or *perspicuitas*) as a *virtus narrationis*. It might be possible to find an origin also to the Pure method of starting immediately from the necessary facts and avoiding additions to them in another *virtus narrationis*, that of βραχύτης (or *brevitas*).

3. Grandeur¹⁵⁹

Grandeur is a primary idea with six subdivisions, Solemnity, Asperity, Vehemence, Brilliance, Strength, and Amplitude. Brilliance is introduced as a complement to Solemnity, Asperity, and Vehemence. These ideas need some “gaiety”. The gaiety suitable in this context is produced by Brilliance and is called “the dignified gaiety” as distinguished from the gaiety produced by Pleasantness or by Elegance.¹⁶⁰

Hermogenes is at first inclined to subordinate Asperity, Vehemence, and Brilliance to Strength. He then tries to explain the relations of the ideas by the concept of ‘sharing of elements’, but he finally decides that Strength is to be considered a fixed combination of thoughts and methods from Asperity and Vehemence, diction common to all three ideas, figures belonging to Vehemence and Brilliance, and cola, word-connection, and rhythm from Brilliance. As illustrations in his long and meticulous discussion of the interplay of the category-contents of the three ideas he uses famous passages from Demosthenes’ speech ‘On the Crown’. The concept of Strength might thus be the result of an attempt to catch in a formula the peaks and the frenzy of Demosthenic oratory.¹⁶¹

Grandeur combines through its subideas the concepts of elevation, intensity, and amplification.¹⁶² Parallel designations of the primary idea are Bulk

merely brevity of expression. In the following chapter, however, Dionysius describes the virtue of βραχύτης applied to subject-matter, and there we find a counterpart to the Hermogenic precept for Purity: the avoidance of nonessential material (On Lysias, 13,12–15 U–R).

¹⁵⁹ μέγεθος, 241,10–242,20.

¹⁶⁰ 264,11: καὶ ὅτι δεῖ τῶ σεμνῷ τε καὶ τραχεῖ καὶ σφοδρῷ προσεῖναι τι πάντως καὶ φαιδρότητος, ἵνα μὴ πάντῃ αὐστηρὸς ἢ φαιδρότητος δὲ οὐ τῆς ἐν ὥραϊσμῷ, ἢ δὴ γλυκύτητος τε καὶ ἀφελείας ἔστί, οὐδὲ τῆς κατ’ ἐπιμέλειαν συνθήκης κάλλος ἐχούσης τι ... οὐκ οὖν ταύτης δεῖ τῆς φαιδρότητος τῷ μεγέθει ὡς καθ’ αὐτό, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀξιοματικῆς· ταύτην δὲ ποιεῖ ἢ λαμπρότης, κτλ.

¹⁶¹ 255,4 ff.; 270,1–272,14; 273,20–25; 274,9–11. For a fuller discussion see my *Studies*, 64–67.

¹⁶² HAGEDORN, *op. cit.*, 36, compares the combination of ideas within Grandeur to the division of the χαρακτήρ ὑψηλός into μεγαλοπρέπεια, καλλιλογία and δεινότης (cf. On Demosthenes, 135,10 ff. U–R, and On composition, 37,12 ff. U–R): μεγαλοπρέπεια would be equivalent to Solemnity, καλλιλογία to Brilliance and Strength, and δεινότης to Asperity and Vehemence. KUSTAS, *op. cit.*, 57, note 2, compares the relation of Solemnity and Amplitude within Grandeur to the distinction between ὕψος and αὔξησης in On the Sublime 12,1–2.

and Dignity.¹⁶³ Dignity is associated especially with Solemnity and Brilliance. Grandeur is opposite to and combats triviality and meanness.¹⁶⁴ As Amplitude is suited to all kinds of practical oratory, Demosthenes uses this idea most of all to add Grandeur to his discourse.¹⁶⁵

A. Solemnity and Brilliance¹⁶⁶

The thoughts of Solemnity are graded as to their Solemn effect, from a) thoughts of gods as gods, b) thoughts of divine things, discussed with respect to their causes, e. g., the seasons, the nature of the universe, the movements of earth and sea, and c) thoughts of matters which are divine in nature but appear in human life, as the immortality of the soul, justice, temperance, or life in general and the meaning of 'law' and of 'nature', to d) thoughts of human things of an outstanding nature, e. g., famous deeds like the battles of Marathon and Plataiai and Salamis.

The principal Solemn method is to narrate assertively, without hesitation. One should speak "with dignity", and as if being quite sure, expressing no doubt. Other methods are the allegorical ones which should be consistently sustained and use a noble imagery,¹⁶⁷ and allusive speech, which when used in a Solemn context hints at something in a mystical way.

To Solemn diction belong words with vowels which distend the mouth, as is the case with long alpha and omega. To give the best effect these vowels

¹⁶³ 241,7: ὄγκος (cf. 241,13; 242,3,16; 254,23; 269,13; 277,23; 296,8; 312,3; 402,2); 241,10: ἀξίωμα (cf. 226,21; 241,14; 242,3; 250,16; 264,8; 269,13; 277,23; 289,14; 296,5,8; 312,3; 377,1).

¹⁶⁴ 241,14: παράκειται γὰρ τῷ σφόδρα σαφεῖ τὸ εὐτελές, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐναντίον ἐστὶ τῷ μεγέθει. ... ὁ ῥήτωρ ... ἐχρηται τοῖς ποιούσι τὴν σαφήνειαν, διὰ δὲ τὸ κινδυνεύειν ἔνεκα ταύτης ἐκπίπτειν αὐτῷ τὸν λόγον εἰς τὸ εὐζώνωτερον κατέμιξεν αὐτῇ τὰ ποιούντα τὸ μέγεθος καὶ διαφερόντως πεπλεόνακε τῇ περιβολῇ.

¹⁶⁵ 289,12 ff.

¹⁶⁶ σεμνότης, 242,21–254,21; λαμπρότης, 264,5–269,9.

¹⁶⁷ 246,17: αἱ ἀλληγορικαὶ μέθοδοι, ὅτε διαρκοῖεν, σεμνὸν ποιούσι τὸν λόγον, ὡς ἐν τῷ "ὁ μὲν δὴ μέγας ἡγεμὼν ἐν οὐρανῷ Ζεὺς πτηνὸν ἄρμα ἐλαύνων φέρεται" καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς: λέγω δὲ τοῦτο, εἰ μὴ ἐκὼν τις διὰ τῶν εὐζώνων καὶ εὐτελῶν τινος ἀλληγοροῖη· τότε γὰρ οὐκέτι σεμνόν, κτλ. ERNESTI, *Lexicon technologiae Graecorum rhetoricae*, Leipzig 1795, s. v. ἀλληγορικός, interprets the term here as 'alluding' rather than 'allegorical' and assumes that Hermogenes consciously departs from normal usage: „Ergo ἀλληγορία *Hermogeni est allusio quaedam, et provocatio ad alienum testimonium, fortasse etymon vocis secuto illi magis, quam communem Rhetorum consuetudinem.*“ The illustrative passage, from Plato's Phaedrus, 246 E, seems, however, to deserve the name of allegory. Hermogenes is using ἀλληγορεῖν also in 334,2, in a discussion of metaphorical language. Here he tries to distinguish the use of a single, outstanding, trope, a matter of diction, from a more complete transference of, e. g., plants and animals into the human sphere of will and thought, a matter rather of method and thought, i. e., of allegory. Syrianus, I, 38,15 ff., and John Siceliotes, WALZ VI, 222,6 ff., when commenting on Hermogenes' demand for noble images both give as examples of ignoble imagery and allegory the flight of the beetle in Aristophanes' Peace and Aristophanes' tale of the origin of love in Plato's Symposium.

should occur in last syllables. The iota should be avoided. Metaphors also give a Solemn effect, if they are moderate and not strained, as well as nouns and 'nominal' words, i. e., participles, pronouns, and nouns abstracted from verbs.

Solemn figures are the Pure ones, i. e., direct constructions. Apostrophes and parenthetical insertions interrupt the speech and destroy its Pure or Solemn character.¹⁶⁸ Solemn and dignified is also to affirm or pass judgement on something or to express one's personal opinion in respect of what one is going to say.

Cola are the same as in Pure speech, i. e., the shorter ones, rather like aphorisms. Collision of vowels should not be especially avoided. The rhythm may contain dactyls, anapaests, paeonics, and occasionally iambics and spondees, but not trochaics or ionics. It is important that the sentence should end in a foot appropriate to Solemnity, without catalexis. Thus the rhythm is given a steady movement and a firmly based ending. Further it is recommended that the ending word should be a word of at least three syllables, that most of the syllables of the cadence should be long, and that the last or the next to last syllable should contain a vowel which distends the mouth.

Recurring in the discussion of the idea is the question how far and in what way the category-contents can be adapted to and used in practical oratory. The thoughts concerning gods have no place in oratory, but those on the forces of nature can be adapted to it, if they are used purely descriptively in an ecphrasis.¹⁶⁹ General statements, e. g., about life and death, are Solemn only. But if a specific point of view is added the result instead will be 'political' as well as Amplified.¹⁷⁰ (One of the devices of Amplitude is adding genus to species and vice versa.) The political orator will also choose not to be strictly assertive. He can be more persuasive and give a personal touch to his speech by using some small modifying or hesitating phrase.¹⁷¹ Again, the Solemn aphorism, if interrupted by an insertion, ceases to be purely Solemn but is given the added quality of Vigour and is thus better adapted to practical oratory.¹⁷²

Brilliant thoughts are those which inspire the speaker with confidence, e. g., the telling of glorious deeds or events which the audience likes to hear about. The speaker may even take the opportunity to enlarge on his own exploits. The method that gives Brilliance is to make every thought into a main topic, to speak boldly with dignity and without hesitation, and to narrate without interruption. Brilliant is also to represent glorious things more gloriously, as when Demosthenes makes a glorious example, that of the forefathers' fight at Marathon, into an even more glorious oath.¹⁷³ Diction is the same as in

¹⁶⁸ 250,23–251,3.

¹⁶⁹ 244,17: εἰ μέντοι κατὰ ἔκφρασιν αὐτῶν τῶν γενομένων λέγοι τις αὐτά, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰς αἰτίας ζητῶν, καθ' ἃς γίνεται, κτλ.

¹⁷⁰ 245,15–246,1.

¹⁷¹ 246,14–16.

¹⁷² 251,3–11.

¹⁷³ 266,23: Ἔτι μεθόδου λαμπρᾶς καὶ τὸ τὰ ἐνδοξα ἐνδοξοτέρως λέγειν, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνο εἴρηται τὸ “οὐ, μὰ τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνεύσαντας τῶν προγόνων” καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς· τοῦτο γὰρ παράδειγμα μὲν ἐνδοξον, οἶον ὀρθῶς συνεβούλευσα ὑπὲρ ἐλευθερίας τῶν Ἑλλήνων κινδυνεύειν· οὗτω γὰρ ἐποίουν καὶ οἱ ἐν Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνεύσαντες· ὃ δὲ εἰς ὄρκον

Solemnity. Brilliant figures are ‘successive negations’ and ‘detached sentences’.¹⁷⁴ A sentence begun without connection is Brilliant, provided that its cola are long. Brilliance needs long cola. In word connection, cadence, and rhythm the idea agrees with Solemnity.

As is seen from the listing of category-contents, Solemnity and Brilliance have many similar traits. Hermogenes gives an indication of their relation when he once refers to Brilliance by the name of “solemn beauty”.¹⁷⁵

Pseudo-Aristides¹⁷⁶ treats only one corresponding virtue, the virtue of σεμνότης. Some of his definitions correspond rather closely to the precepts of Solemnity, some others to the precepts of Brilliance.

HAGEDORN¹⁷⁷ traces the concept of σεμνότης as far back as Aristotle. In Dionysius the term is frequent and attached to μεγαλοπρέπεια. This in turn is

αὐτὸ ἀναγαγὼν ἐνδοξότερον αὐτὸ ἐποίησε καὶ λαμπρὸν ‘οὐχ ἥμαρτον ταῦτα συμβουλευ-
σας, οὐ, μὰ τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνεύσαντας’ καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς. Cf. 327,8–21. This famous passage, Dem. 18,208, is quoted and analysed in a similar way by the author of *On the Sublime*, 16,2–3, by Pseudo-Aristides (see below) and by Tiberius, SPENGLER III, 69. For a fuller treatment see W. BÜHLER, *Beiträge zur Erklärung der Schrift vom Erhabenen*, Göttingen 1964, 116–119.

¹⁷⁴ 267,8: ἀναιρέσεις; 267,11: ἀποστάσεις.

¹⁷⁵ σεμνὸν κάλλος, cf. 309,21.

¹⁷⁶ §§ 2–34. His definitions of ‘content’ are: thoughts invested with esteem and honour, as thoughts about things that are noble or rare and old, e.g., about the gods, or about freedom, wisdom, and justice; thoughts about life and death; important and outstanding thoughts and deeds within the human sphere (In § 7 the author quotes Dem. 18,208 and points out that this is a case of an argument proper turned into an oath for the sake of greater solemnity. He adds that this swearing by the ancestors as though they were gods gives an excess of solemnity to the passage); legendary matters. In the section on ‘figure’ are listed: assertive statements; detached sentences; ‘breaks’ in the form of thrown-in questions (Questions of the same type are found in the chapter on Distinctness in Hermogenes, cf. 239,8 ff. Pseudo-Aristides remarks to his illustrative passage that it may seem muddled without this figure, and he adds that the figure always has an elucidating effect); participial constructions (§ 19: πλαγιασμός. The figure is exemplified by the genitive absolute but also by other types of participial constructions); similes; famous sayings; ‘replacing the less noble with the more noble’ (§ 23. Part of the illustrative passage here, Dem. 18,299, is used in Hermogenes to illustrate the Brilliant figure of ‘successive negations’); keeping in suspense by mentioning the properties of a thing before the thing itself (this may entail using resumptions); aphorisms; referring to practice of old or to famous authority; ‘asyndeton’ between thoughts, piled on one another. To ‘diction’ belong: nominal words; figurative expressions; heaping up of words (as in ‘polysyndeton’); using the names of cities for the people in them, referring to a person by describing his actions instead of naming him outright, or using abstract and collective words instead of concrete and individual ones.

¹⁷⁷ Op. cit., 31–33. The most conspicuous similar trait of the Aristotelian, Dionysian, and Hermogenic concepts of σεμνότης is the figurative diction (Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1458a 22; Dionysius, *On Demosthenes*, 137,14 U–R). In Demetrius σεμνότης is a quality of the χαρακτήρ μεγαλοπρεπής and the author of ‘*On the Sublime*’ uses the term occasionally in characterizing his concept of sublimity. In both Demetrius and ‘*On the Sublime*’ figurative and allegorical expressions as well as dactylic and paeonic rhythms are characteristics of elevated style (Demetrius §§ 38, 42, 78, 99; *On the Sublime*, 32; 39,4; 41,1).

synonymous to μέγεθος and ἀξίωμα. To the concept of λαμπρότης HAGEDORN¹⁷⁸ finds a counterpart in the Dionysian καλλιλογία. This is included in the group of virtues which are connected with μεγαλοπρέπεια.

B. Asperity and Vehemence¹⁷⁹

Asperity and Vehemence are both used in situations of attack.¹⁸⁰ The two ideas share many characteristics but Hermogenes takes pains to establish a distinction between them. This distinction is based on a difference in the direction and intensity of the attack.

Unveiled blame directed against a person of higher rank than the speaker, e.g., the judges or the assembly, gives Asperity. To Vehemence belong blame and reproof directed against a person of lower rank or against someone whom the audience is happy to hear blamed. The accusations may in this case amount to plain abuse. The method of both ideas is the unveiled and naked blaming.

The diction comprises figurative expressions, also quite bold ones, and words that are “harsh in themselves”. Vehemence may even use new-coined invectives.¹⁸¹ Figures specific to Asperity are commands and convincing questions. Figures specific to Vehemence are ‘turning to’ the adversary, apostrophe, especially in the form of putting questions to him, questions which admit of no answer, and ‘pointing to’ him, e.g., by a demonstrative pronoun. The cola should be short, in Vehemence even limited to phrases of one word. Collision of vowels should be sought for and the rhythm should be composed of feet that are ill suited to each other. The result will be offending to the ear. All the traits of Asperity and Vehemence may be said to work together to reinforce each other’s effect. But to fit into practical oratory Asperity should not be carried through completely. Instead the harsh elements should be softened.¹⁸²

Hermogenes does not in these two chapters remark on the emotions expressed or aroused by Vehement or Harsh speech. But in the general introduction he implies that the aim of Vehement and accusing speech is to “stir up

¹⁷⁸ Op. cit., 34, 36, 42–43. He quotes On Thucydides, 360,8 f. U–R: ὕψος λέγω και καλλιρημοσύνην και σεμνολογίαν και μεγαλοπρέπεια and On Demosthenes, 135,11 f., 15 f. U–R. See also GEIGENMÜLLER, op. cit., 52–53. HAGEDORN points out that we find these concepts combined also in On the Sublime, 30,1: μέγεθος ἅμα κάλλος, εὐπίνεια, βάρος, ισχύς, κράτος.

¹⁷⁹ τραχύτης, 254,22–260,15; σφοδρότης, 260,16–264,4.

¹⁸⁰ The expressions ἐπιφορά, ἐπιφορικός are often found connected with Asperity or Vehemence (cf. 350,5 f.; 359,16 ff., 22 ff.; 360,13 f.; 371,2 ff.; 385,13 ff.)

¹⁸¹ 262,10: ἐνταῦθα δὲ και ποιεῖν ὀνόματα ἴσως ἐγχωρεῖ τραχέα, ὥσπερ ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐποίησε τὸ ἱαμβειοφάγος’ και τὸ ἑγραμματοκύφων’ και εἰ τι τοιοῦτο, κτλ.

¹⁸² The following means of softening Asperity are recommended in the chapter on the idea: blaming generally and vaguely instead of specifically and decidedly (256,16 ff.; cf. 350,2–5); alluding to some censure concerning other people, uttered by another person on another occasion (259,4 ff.); surrounding the blame with some softer contents (256,25 ff.), seeming to be irresolute or hesitating (257,12 f.; cf. 350,1).