The Persecution and Murder of the Jews, 1933–1945

The Persecution and Murder of the
European Jews by Nazi Germany,
1933–1945

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The Persecution and Murder of the
European Jews by Nazi Germany,
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Volume 12

Western and Northern Europe
June 1942–1945

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Foreword to the English Edition

The Persecution and Murder of the European Jews by Nazi Germany, 1933–1945 presents a broad range of primary sources in a scholarly edition. A total of sixteen English-language volumes will be published in this series, organized chronologically and according to region. The series places particular focus on the countries which had the highest Jewish populations before the outbreak of the Second World War, above all Poland and the occupied territories of the Soviet Union. The English-language edition reproduces all the materials in the German edition and has been adapted for an English-speaking readership. Apart from those originally written in English, all documents presented here have been translated from the language of the original source.

This volume, the twelfth in the series, covers the persecution of Jews in Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France from summer 1942 onwards. At that time deportations from Luxembourg and France had already begun, and they were imminent in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Norway. The preceding developments in these countries between 1940 and 1942 are covered in volume 5 of the series (published in 2021). The present volume additionally records the situation of the Jews in Denmark after June 1939, and documents the onset of persecution by the German occupiers in that country around August 1943. It covers developments across all these countries up until the end of the war, also including responses to liberation as it occurred in different parts of Western and Northern Europe.

The foreword to the first volume of the series details the criteria for the selection of the documents. These criteria can be summarized as follows. First, the sources used are written documents and, occasionally, transcribed audio recordings, dating from the period of Nazi rule between 1933 and 1945. The decision was taken not to include memoirs, reports, and judicial documents produced after 1945; however, the footnotes make extensive reference to such retrospective testimonies and historical accounts. Second, the documents shed light on the actions and reactions of people with differing backgrounds and convictions and in different places, and indicate their intentions, as well as the frequently limited options available to them. The volumes include a variety of document types such as official correspondence, private letters, diary entries, legal texts, newspaper articles, and the reports of foreign observers.

Key themes of this twelfth volume are the mass roundups of Jews, the seizure of Jewish property, confinement and conditions in internment and transit camps, forced labour, and the deportations to the East. The documents provide detailed insights into the role and collaboration of local administrations and police forces in the implementation of antisemitic measures. They illustrate the reactions of the Jewish and non-Jewish population to the escalating persecution, as well as actions taken by the resistance and attempts to flee or go into hiding. The sources included range from a letter from a female Nasjonal Samling activist to Vidkun Quisling calling for tougher antisemitic measures, the report by Werner Best on the roundup of Danish Jews in October 1943, a French Protestant pastor's description of conditions in the internment camp in Gurs, and diary entries by Jews imprisoned in Westerbork and facing deportation, to a report by a Jewish resistance organization in Belgium on actions taken to hide Jewish children. Events and developments are therefore presented from multiple perspectives. The arrangement of

the documents by country highlights regional similarities and differences regarding the situation of the Jews at the time. A detailed index makes it possible to locate documents by theme.

The editors wish to thank the German Research Foundation (DFG) for its generous funding of the German and English-language projects. The English-language volumes are produced in cooperation with the Yad Vashem International Institute for Holocaust Research. The editors are also grateful to the large number of specialists and private individuals who provided the editors with advice and comments on sources and with information for the annotations, including biographical details for the people featured in the documents.

Kathleen Luft, Todd Brown, Simon Garnett, David Hill, Martin Pearce, and Allen G. Blunden translated the German documents for this twelfth volume in the series. Cathy Mulder translated the documents from Danish and Swedish, and the Norwegian translations were completed by John Kingmann. Rasmus Rønn and Christian Schmittwilken also worked on the translations from Scandinavian languages. The Dutch and Flemish documents were translated by Hilde ten Hacken. Rick Tazelaar provided additional assistance with these translations. Christine Baycroft, Daria Chernysheva, and Karine Zbinden translated the French documents. Yad Vashem provided translations from Yiddish and Hebrew: Rebecca Wolpe translated the Yiddish document and Naftali Greenwood translated the Hebrew documents. David Hill revised and adapted the texts of poems translated from German and Dutch. Rona Johnston Gordon, Alissa Jones Nelson, and Merle Read provided proofreading and copy-editing services. Peter Palm created and Giles Bennett advised on the maps, and Frank Ortmann designed the book jacket. Nora Huberty, Lea von der Hude, Ashley Kirspel, Priska Komaromi, Benedict Oldfield, Charlie Perris, Aliena Stürzer, Barbara Uchdorf, Lena Werner, and Max Zeterberg contributed to this volume as student assistants. The following people contributed to the original German volume as student assistants: Olav Bogen, Florian Brandenburg, Johannes Breit, Bjarte Bruland, Florian Danecke, Stefanie Haupt, Anne-Christin Klotz, Bernhard Lück, Anselm Meyer, Carolin Raabe, Miriam Schelp, Sarah Scherzer, Remigius Stachowiak and Barbara Wünnenberg. Romina Becker, Sarah Berger, Jean-Marc Dreyfus, Johannes Gamm, Ingo Loose, Andrea Löw, Sonja Schilcher, Gudrun Schroeter, and Maria Wilke worked on the original German volume in their capacity as research fellows and associates.

Despite all the care taken, occasional inaccuracies cannot be entirely avoided in a document collection on this scale. We would be grateful for any notifications to this effect. The address of the editorial board is: Leibniz Institute for Contemporary History, Edition 'The Persecution and Murder of the European Jews by Nazi Germany, 1933–1945', Finckensteinallee 85/87, 12205 Berlin, Germany.

Berlin/Munich/Freiburg/Klagenfurt/Jerusalem, May 2022

Editorial Preface

This document collection on the persecution and murder of the European Jews should be cited using the abbreviation PMJ. This citation style is also used in the work itself where there are cross references between the individual volumes. The documents are consecutively numbered, beginning anew with each volume. Accordingly, 'PMJ 1/200' refers to document number 200 in the first volume of this edition. The individual documents are presented as follows: title (in bold type), header, document, footnotes.

The titles have been formulated by the editor(s) of the respective volume and provide information on the date of origin of the document, its core message, author, and recipient(s). The header, placed underneath the title, is part of the document itself. It specifies the type of source (letter, draft law, minutes, and so on), the name of the author, the place of origin, the file reference (where applicable), remarks indicating confidential or classified status, and other special features of the document. The location of the ministries or other central agencies in Berlin at the time, for instance the Reich Security Main Office or the Chancellery of the Führer, is not cited. The header also contains details about the addressee and, where applicable, the date of the receipt stamp, and it concludes with the date of origin and reference to the stage of processing of the source, for instance 'draft', 'carbon copy', or 'copy'.

The header is followed by the document text. Salutations and valedictions are printed, though signatures are only included once, in the header. Instances of emphasis by the author in the original document are retained. Irrespective of the type of emphasis used in the original source (for example, underlined, spaced, bold, capitalized, or italicized), they always appear in italics in the printed version. Where necessary, additional particulars on the document are to be found in the footnotes. In order to enhance readability, letters and words are added in square brackets where they are missing in the original due to obvious mistakes, or where the meaning would otherwise be unclear in the translation.

Abbreviations are explained in the List of Abbreviations. Uncommon abbreviations, primarily from private correspondence, are explained in a footnote at the first mention in a given document.

Handwritten additions in typewritten originals have been adopted by the editors without further indication insofar as they are formal corrections and most probably inserted by the author. If the additions significantly alter the content – either by mitigating or radicalizing it – this is mentioned in the footnotes, and, if known, the author of the addition(s) is given.

As a rule, the documents are reproduced here in full. Documents are only abridged in exceptional cases where the original source was overly long, or where, in the case of the written records of meetings, Nazi policies relating to the persecution of Jews, or reactions to these policies, were only addressed within a single part of the proceedings. Any such abridgements are indicated by an ellipsis in square brackets; the contents of the omitted text are outlined in a footnote.

Documents within each section are presented in chronological order, except for a few cases where they are presented after the date of the event described. A number of descriptive texts written soon after the period covered, but nonetheless retrospectively, are classified according to the date of the events portrayed rather than the date of origin.

Where there is any uncertainty regarding the date of the documents or whether they constitute originals or copies, reference is made in the footnotes. The first footnote for each document, which is linked to the title, contains the location of the source and, insofar as it denotes an archive, the reference number, as well as the folio number(s) if available. Reference to copies of archival documents in research institutions and in the German Federal Archives in Berlin is always made if the original held at the location first mentioned was not consulted there. In the case of printed sources, for instance newspaper articles or legislative texts, this footnote contains standard bibliographical information. The documents in this series have been translated from the original source. If the source has already been published in a document collection on National Socialism or on the persecution of the Jews, reference is made to its first publication, alongside the original location of the source. The next footnote places the document into context and, where appropriate, mentions related discussions, the specific role of authors and recipients, and activities accompanying or immediately following its genesis. Subsequent footnotes provide additional information related to the theme of the document and the persons relevant to the content. They refer to other – published or unpublished – sources that contribute to historical contextualization.

The footnotes also point out individual features of the documents, for instance handwritten notes in the margin, underlining, or deletions, whether by the author or the recipient(s). Annotations and instructions for submission are referred to in the footnotes where the editors consider them to contain significant information. Where possible, the locations of the treaties, laws, and decrees cited in the source text are provided in the footnotes, while other documents are given with their archival reference number. If these details could not be ascertained, this is also noted.

Where biographical information is available on the senders and recipients of the documents, this is provided in the footnotes. The same applies to persons mentioned in the text if they play an active role in the events described. As a general rule, this information is given in the footnote inserted after the first mention of the name in question in the volume. Biographical information on a particular person can thus be retrieved easily via the index.

The short biographies draw on data found in reference works, scholarly literature, or the Central Database of Shoah Victims' Names established and run by Yad Vashem. In many cases additional information was retrieved by consulting personnel files and indexes, municipal and company archives, registry offices, restitution and denazification files, or specialists in the field. Indexes and files on persons from the Nazi era held in archives were also used, primarily those of the former Berlin Document Center and the Central Office of the Judicial Authorities of the Federal States for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes (Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärung nationalsozialistischer Verbrechen) in Ludwigsburg, the latter now stored in the German Federal Archives. National archives and special archives on the Second World War and the persecution of the Jews in the respective countries were also consulted. Despite every effort, it has not always been possible to obtain complete biographical information. In such cases, the footnote in question contains only verified facts such as the year of birth. Where a person could not be identified, there is no footnote reference.

As a rule, in the titles, footnotes, and introduction inverted commas are not placed around terms that were commonplace in Nazi Germany, such as Führer, Jewish Council,

or Aryanization, but German-language terms expressing ideological concepts of race, such as *Mischling*, are placed in italics. In line with the circumstances of the time, the terms 'Jew' and 'Jewish' are used for people who did not regard themselves as Jewish but were defined as such on the basis of racial legislation and thus subjected to persecution. References in the documents to the 'Gestapo', an acronym of the German GEheime STAatsPOlizei, and to the 'State Police' denote one and the same institution: the Secret State Police.

The glossary contains concise descriptions of key terms and concepts that are repeated on multiple occasions or are related to the events and developments described in the volume. All primary and secondary sources consulted are listed in the footnotes and bibliography. Where English-language versions of these sources are available, these are included. If a document has already been published in English translation but has been newly translated for this volume, this is indicated in a footnote.

In this volume, following the re-dating of document 184, the numbering of documents in the sequence from document 184 to document 188 has been changed from the original numbering in the German edition.

Note on the translation

British English is used in all translations into English. Where a document was originally written in British or American English, the spelling, grammar, and punctuation of the original have been retained, with silent correction of minor typographical or grammatical errors and insertions in square brackets to clarify the meaning if necessary.

The spelling, grammar, and punctuation of the translated documents broadly conform to the guidelines in *New Hart's Rules: The Oxford Style Guide* (2014). Accordingly, the ending -ize rather than -ise is preferred throughout.

SS, Wehrmacht, and certain other ranks are given in the original German, as are titles where there is no standard equivalent in English or where there may be confusion with contemporary usage. A table of military and police ranks is included as an appendix, along with English-language equivalents of these terms and an indication of their position in the National Socialist hierarchy. Administrative ranks and other terms have been left in the original language where there is no satisfactory equivalent in English. These terms are either explained in a footnote or, if they appear on multiple occasions, in the glossary.

After the Second World War, the Dutch language underwent a spelling reform to make orthography closer to actual pronunciation. The names of Dutch organizations and periodicals in this volume are spelt as they were prior to the spelling reform, for example Joodsche Raad rather than Joodse Raad for Jewish Council.

In the Netherlands, qualified lawyers use the title 'mr' (*meester der rechten*). To avoid confusion with the English word 'Mr', this term has not been included in the translated documents or footnotes, but the individual's status as a lawyer is noted. In Belgium, physicians and lawyers are awarded the title 'Dr' upon qualifying, but the title is not generally used for those holding a doctorate in another discipline. For this reason, 'Dr' is only used in the biographical footnotes if this is standard practice in the respective country.

All laws and institutions are translated into English in the documents. In the introduction and footnotes, foreign-language terms and expressions are added in brackets

after the translation where this is considered important for understanding or context. The original spelling of foreign organizations is retained in the footnotes. The titles of published works not in the English language are not translated unless the work in question is of contextual or substantial relevance. If a foreign-language word or phrase appears in a document, this is retained in the translated text and its meaning explained in a footnote or, if necessary, the glossary.

Where the documents contain quotations from the Bible, the King James Version has been preferred, especially where the context is religious or ecclesiastical.

In order to avoid confusion between British and American English, dates are spelt out in the order day, month, and year. Foreign proper names are not italicized. Thus, names of institutions, organizations, and places are written in roman type in the footnotes, but legislation and conceptual terms are in italics.

In the titles, footnotes, and translated documents, place names are generally written according to the contemporary (English) name or the variant commonly used in scholarly literature on the period. This also applies to places that have since been renamed. The seat of government of the Netherlands is known both as The Hague and 's-Gravenhage. The translated documents follow usage in the original document, while the individual document titles and footnotes refer to The Hague. Belgian place names are given according to the language divisions within the country or standard usage in English (for example Brussels or Liège). The footnotes give place names in Flanders in Flemish with French in brackets, and places in Wallonia are presented in French with the Flemish name in brackets. Many places in Luxembourg have German, French, and/or Luxemburgish equivalents – for example, Esch a. d. Alzette (German); Esch-sur-Alzette (French); Esch-Uelzecht (Luxemburgish). The translated documents follow usage in the original. Alternative place names within each country are given in the index.

Diacritical marks in languages such as Czech and Polish are retained, with the exception of the names of the extermination camps in Eastern Europe, where they have been removed in order to emphasize that these camps were established by the German National Socialist regime. Language-specific characters such as the German ß (Eszett) for ss have also been retained.

Hebrew and Yiddish terms are described in the footnotes or glossary, along with any other words requiring explanation.

The term 'Israélite' (in French) as a designation for 'Jew' originated in 1808 in Napoleonic France and spread from there to German- and Dutch-speaking countries ('Israelit' and 'Israëliet' respectively), based on the notion that Jews should be defined as belonging to a faith – 'Mosaic' – rather than an ethnic entity, and intended as a means of integrating Jews into West European societies. In contemporary discourse the term 'Jew' often had a negative overtone. In France the term 'Jew' was reintroduced in official discourse after 1940, though the term 'Israélite' was not entirely abandoned – for instance, in the case of the Union générale des Israélites de France (UGIF). In Belgium, usage of the term 'Israélite'/'Israëliet' ceased with the establishment of the Association of Jews in Belgium (AJB/VJB) in 1941. In the Netherlands too, official usage of the term 'Israëliet' ceased shortly after the occupation but remained in the titles of Jewish organizations. The translated documents use the term 'Israelite' if this is in the original document. The exception is the Union générale des Israélites de France, which has been translated as the General Union of French Jews, as this has become the customary translation in scholarly literature.

Introduction

The yellow star worn to identify the Jewish population was introduced in Luxembourg in the summer of 1941 and in the rest of occupied Western Europe in the spring of 1942.[1] It not only made Jews immediately recognizable in public but also prepared the rest of the population for further anti-Jewish measures and was intended to deter them from approaching or assisting those who were marginalized in this way. From this perspective, the yellow star was both a mark of shame and a token of warning and intimidation. Moreover, for the German occupiers it served as a means of registering Jews and preparing for their deportation.

During the first eighteen months of the German occupation, policy towards the Jews in Western and Northern Europe was mostly decided upon by the German occupation administration in each country, which introduced the main elements of the policy that had already been tried out in the preceding years in Germany, annexed Austria, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and Poland. The implementation of the policy differed depending on circumstances in each country. This situation began to change only as the Final Solution began to take shape as a European-wide objective. At the so-called Wannsee Conference on 20 January 1942, which was convened by Reinhard Heydrich, Chief of the Security Police and the SS Security Service (SD), the relevant departments were informed about the new direction adopted by the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) with respect to the European Jews. Forced emigration of the Jews had come to an end, Heydrich explained in his introductory remarks, and was to be replaced by 'evacuation to the East', which had the Führer's approval. The written record of the meeting (the so-called Protocol) stated that 'In the course of the practical execution of the final solution, Europe will be combed through from west to east'.[2] The systematic murder of the Jews in occupied Eastern Europe had, however, already begun in the summer of 1941.

In the months following the Wannsee Conference, the German authorities in all the occupied countries of Western Europe began to prepare for the deportation of the Jews. An order issued in October 1941 had already banned Jews from emigrating from these countries.[3] The German occupying forces set up several extermination camps in occupied Poland from the end of 1941: after Kulmhof and Belzec followed Auschwitz, Sobibor, and Treblinka. The representatives of the Security Police and the SD in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands coordinated their actions at several meetings presided over by Adolf Eichmann, and on 11 June 1942 the decision was taken to begin the systematic deportation of

1 See PMJ 5/130, 193, 323, and 212.

2 The Protocol of the Wannsee Conference is published in Mark Roseman, *The Villa, the Lake, the Meeting: Wannsee and the Final Solution* (London: Penguin Books, 2003); the quotation here is on p. 129. See also Norbert Kampe and Peter Klein (eds.), *Die "Wannsee-Konferenz" am 20. Januar 1942: Eine Einführung* (Berlin: Metropol, 2017); Elke Gryglewski, Hans-Christian Rasch, and David Zolldan (eds.), *The Meeting at Wannsee and the Murder of the European Jews: Exhibition Catalogue*, trans. Caroline Pearce (Berlin: House of the Wannsee Conference, 2020 [German edn, 2020]); Hans-Christian Jasch and Christoph Kreutzmüller, *The Participants: The Men of the Wannsee Conference*, trans. Charlotte Kreutzmüller and Jane Paulick (New York: Berghahn, 2017 [German edn, 2017]); and Peter Longerich, *Wannseekonferenz: Der Weg zur 'Endlösung'* (Munich: Pantheon, 2016).

3 Letter from the Reich Security Main Office (Müller) on 23 Oct. 1941 to the representative of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD for Belgium and France: see PMJ 5/286.

Jews from these countries. Some 15,000 Jews were to be deported from the Netherlands, 10,000 from Belgium, and 100,000 from France. Due to local factors the number was subsequently reduced to 90,000: the number for France decreased to 40,000, the total for the Netherlands increased to 40,000, and the number for Belgium remained the same. The change in the number of deportations originally envisaged for France was a result of problems with transportation, which meant that fewer Jews could be deported within the intended time frame.

The Jews living in these three countries were successively concentrated in several cities, called up for labour or rounded up, and afterwards interned in transit camps: Drancy near Paris in France, the Dossin Barracks in the town of Mechelen in Belgium, and Westerbork in the east of the Netherlands. The majority of those initially affected were either stateless Jews or foreign nationals, including many who had fled from Germany, Austria, or Czechoslovakia. In the following months, however, the German authorities prevailed against the administrations in the Netherlands, Belgium, and France, and Jewish nationals of these countries were gradually included in the deportations. From the end of June 1942, transport trains ran regularly to the extermination camps.

The introduction to this volume provides separate accounts of developments in Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France for the period from the summer of 1942 to the weeks during which these countries were liberated. The phase from the outbreak of the war up until June 1942 is covered in the introduction to volume five of this series, although as Denmark is touched on only briefly in that earlier volume, the account below starts with a brief summary of the history of Jews in Denmark and an account of German occupation policy following the invasion of Denmark in the spring of 1940.

Denmark

The history of the Jews in Denmark began with the first writ of protection issued in 1619 by King Christian IV for Samuel Jachia, a Sephardic Jew. The king encouraged additional Sephardic Jews from Amsterdam and Hamburg to settle in Glückstadt, a Danish town at the time, and promised them freedom to practise their religion. For the time being, however, this dispensation applied solely to Glückstadt; permission to stay elsewhere in the country was given only to Jews who were in possession of a letter of safe conduct or had been granted individual privileges by the monarch. It was not until 1673 that Christian V gave a Jew from Hamburg the general entitlement to live in his kingdom,[4] with several Jewish communities established subsequently. The Jewish community in Copenhagen grew particularly rapidly and in the first half of the eighteenth century had some 2,500 members.

4 Per Katz, *Jøderne i Danmark i det 17. århundrede* (Copenhagen: Reitzel, 1981), pp. 16 and 70. On the history of the Jews in Denmark in general: Harald Jørgensen (ed.), *Indenfor murene*: *Jødisk liv i Danmark 1684–1984* (Copenhagen: Reitzel, 1984); Martin Schwarz Lausten, *Jews and Christians in Denmark: From the Middle Ages to Recent Times, ca. 1100–1948*, trans. Margaret Ryan Hellman (Boston: Brill, 2015 [Danish edn, 2007]); on their persecution and wartime experiences: Leni Yahil, *The Rescue of Danish Jewry: Test of a Democracy* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1969); Leo Goldberger (ed.), *The Rescue of the Danish Jews: Moral Courage under Stress* (New York: New York University Press, 1987); Sofie Lene Bak, *Nothing to Speak of: Wartime Experiences of the Danish Jews, 1943–1945* (Copenhagen: Danish Jewish Museum, 2013).

In 1814 Jews obtained the same civil rights as other Danes in most respects, although full equality came only with the changes to the constitution made in 1849. For the Danish population, and especially among the influential Lutheran clergy, the question of whether non-Christians could be part of the Danish people remained contentious for many years. Not least as a result of this controversy, Danish Jews felt significant pressure to acculturate. However, in Denmark too, assimilation and acculturation provided no protection from the so-called Hep-Hep riots, which spread from Germany in 1819. In Copenhagen the rioting led to the destruction of Jewish shops.[5] Despite such violent attacks, for a long time Denmark remained a relatively safe, if not particularly attractive, country for Jews. Between 1881 and the beginning of the First World War, some 12,000 East European Jews fleeing pogroms in the Russian Empire sought shelter in Denmark. Approximately 3,000 of them remained in Denmark permanently.[6] These new immigrants contributed significantly to the invigoration of Jewish religious and cultural life and to the upsurge in Jewish institutions.

A restrictive Danish refugee policy after 1933 had ensured that only few Jewish refugees from Germany and Austria found sanctuary in Denmark. An addendum made in 1934 to the Aliens Act of 1875 allowed the police to refuse entry to so-called undesirable foreigners. After the 'J-stamp' was introduced for the passports of German Jews in 1938, Denmark, like many other countries, adopted a policy of denying entry to those who could be assumed to have no intention of returning to their homeland. Despite the palpable mistrust and fear of a possible mass immigration, some German Jews were able to use Denmark as a stop on their journey into permanent exile.[7] There were 5,513 Jews living in Copenhagen on 1 January 1938.[8] At the time of the German invasion in the spring of 1940, approximately 1,000 German Jews were still in Denmark. In addition, approximately 380 young Jews were in Denmark undertaking agricultural training in preparation for emigration to Palestine, as well as approximately 250 children who were to travel on to Palestine as part of the Youth Aliyah programme (Doc. 1).[9]

On 9 April 1940 German troops crossed into Denmark and Norway. The primary aim of this invasion, known as Operation Weserübung, was to occupy the Norwegian ports. Additionally, the Germans hoped to secure the supply of iron ore from the Swedish town of Kiruna, which was shipped through the port of Narvik in Norway.

5 Yahil, *The Rescue of Danish Jewry*, pp. 7–9. For a detailed account of the individual riots, see Martin Schwarz Lausten, *Folkekirken og jøderne: Forholdet mellem kristne og jøder i Danmark fra 1849 til begyndelsen af det 20. århundrede* (Copenhagen: Anis, 2007).

6 Morten Thing, *De russiske jøder i København 1882–1943* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2008), p. 33.

7 Sofie Lene Bak, *Dansk antisemitisme 1930–1945* (Copenhagen: Aschehoug, 2004), pp. 310–322; Hans Kirchhoff and Lone Rünitz, *Udsendt til Tyskland: Dansk flygtningepolitik under besættelsen* (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2007), pp. 41–43.

8 Lone Rünitz, *Danmark og de jødiske flygtninge 1933–1940: En bog om flygtninge og menneskerettigheder* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum, 2000), p. 115.

9 Peretz Leshem, *Strasse zur Rettung: 1933–1939 aus Deutschland vertrieben – bereitet sich jüdische Jugend auf Palästina vor* (Tel Aviv: Verband der Freunde der Histadrut, 1973), pp. 28–29, 31–32; Hans Kirchhoff, *Et menneske uden pas er ikke noget menneske: Danmark i den internationale flygtningepolitik 1933–1939* (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2005), p. 157; Kirchhoff and Rünitz, *Udsendt til Tyskland*, p. 35.

Denmark's principal significance for the German Reich was as a supply base for operations in Norway, which had greater strategic importance for the war against Britain.[10]

Danish troops were powerless against the vastly superior Wehrmacht units. Military resistance ceased after only a few hours, and the Danish government conceded defeat on the day of the invasion. The so-called peaceful occupation meant that although Denmark was occupied, it was not officially at war with Germany.[11] The country retained its political institutions and a large degree of sovereignty. The Danish constitution remained in force; the king, the government, and the administration stayed in office. Denmark was intended to become a showcase for the Reich, demonstrating that loyal cooperation with the German occupiers could be beneficial for a country. In the spring of 1943, elections were even held to the national parliament, from which the Social Democrats emerged victorious. It was envisaged that, after the expected total victory of the German forces, Denmark might become part of the planned Greater Germanic Reich, although at the time the Nazi leadership only had very vague notions about such an entity.

The Reich Foreign Office handled Germany's relations with Denmark through diplomatic channels. Germany's interests were represented by the German envoy and career diplomat Cécil von Renthe-Fink, who served as the Reich plenipotentiary in negotiations with the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The four larger parties represented in the Danish parliament had banded together at the beginning of the occupation to form a national unity government, the political approach of which has been variously characterized as one of 'negotiation', 'adaptation, 'cooperation', or even 'collaboration'.[12] For most Danes, however, little changed in their daily life, which explains why the majority of the Danish people supported their government's policy over the next three years.[13]

Anti-Jewish sentiments and outright antisemitism were not widespread. They remained limited even after the National Socialists seized power in Germany and spread antisemitic propaganda via the Danish media. Most Jews living in Denmark initially experienced no new restrictions after the German invasion. Fearing persecution, some German émigrés fled from Denmark to Sweden before, during, or shortly after the German invasion. Among them was the playwright Bertolt Brecht, who had been living with

10 Richard Petrow, *The Bitter Years: The Invasion and Occupation of Denmark and Norway, April 1940–May 1945* (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1974), p. 33; Hans-Martin Ottmer, *'Weserübung': Der deutsche Angriff auf Dänemark und Norwegen im April 1940* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1994); Jill Stephenson and John Gilmour (eds.), *Hitler's Scandinavian Legacy* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).

11 Claus Bundgård Christensen et al., *Danmark besat: Krig og hverdag 1940–45* (Copenhagen: Høst, 2005), p. 111. For a summary of occupation policy in Denmark, see Therkel Stræde, 'Deutsche Besatzungspolitik in Dänemark 1940–1945', in Oliver von Wrochem (ed.), *Skandinavien im Zweiten Weltkrieg und die Rettungsaktion Weiße Busse: Ereignisse und Erinnerung* (Berlin: Metropol, 2012), pp. 21–30; and Ethan J. Hollander, *Hegemony and the Holocaust: State Power and Jewish Survival in Occupied Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), p. 46.

12 Erich Thomsen, *Deutsche Besatzungspolitik in Dänemark, 1940–1945* (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann, 1971), pp. 11–12; Søren Helstrup, 'Besættelsen 9. April 1940', in Hans Kirchhoff, John T. Lauridsen, and Aage Trommer (eds.), *Gads leksikon om dansk besættelsestid 1940–1945* (Copenhagen: GAD, 2002), pp. 42–47.

13 On Danish reactions to occupation and Jewish persecution, see Carsten Holbraad, *Danish Reactions to German Occupation: History and Historiography* (London: UCL Press, 2017).

his family in Svendborg, on the Danish coast, since 1933 and, despite the demands of the Danish National Socialists, had not been extradited to Germany. For its part, the German government demanded the extradition of a number of political refugees, some of whom were Jewish. However, in the period up until the autumn of 1942, when he was dismissed as plenipotentiary of the German Reich, Renthe-Fink did nothing that would have extended persecution to Danish Jews. Officially, he had no instructions to do so, although in January 1942 he had been advised verbally by Franz Rademacher, head of the Reich Foreign Office's section for Jewish affairs, that the German government wished to see the introduction of laws pertaining to Jews in Denmark (Doc. 3). Shortly afterwards Renthe-Fink expressed his disagreement, insisting that to do so would run counter to German interests in Denmark.[14] Unlike in Norway, where registration of the Jews had begun as early as the spring of 1940 with the order that they hand in their radios, in Denmark neither the occupiers nor the Danish authorities sought to register the Jews. The leaders of Copenhagen's Jewish Community were aware that the Danish policy of cooperation was their most important protection against persecution by the Germans. They therefore warned the members of the community against resistance or flight and urged them to do nothing to provoke the occupying power.[15] The Jewish Community continued to pursue this policy until the end of September 1943.

From the summer of 1942, discontent with the German occupation and the policy of cooperation adopted by the Danish government intensified noticeably. As a result of the entry of the United States into the war, Denmark's forced accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact, and the escalating activities of British intelligence in Denmark, individual groups, both left-wing and right-wing, began to engage in active resistance against the Germans. They distributed illegal newspapers and carried out the first acts of sabotage. As a result, Renthe-Fink was recalled and on 5 November 1942 replaced by SS-Obergruppenführer Werner Best. Best had earlier made his mark as Reinhard Heydrich's deputy during the setting up of the Security Police and the Reich Security Main Office, and as a member of the Military Commander in France's administrative staff during the establishment of the German occupation regime. He could be expected to adopt an iron fist in the model protectorate of Denmark as well. At the same time, Vilhelm Buhl, the unpopular prime minister, was replaced with Erik Scavenius, former minister of foreign affairs, from whom the Germans expected much smoother cooperation.[16]

14 Kirchhoff and Rünitz, *Udsendt til Tyskland*, pp. 73–81; Lone Rünitz, 'Danish Refugee Policy, 1933–1939', in Marc Dujardin (ed.), *Refugees from Nazi-Germany in West-European Border States, 1933–1939/1940: Similarities and Differences in Granting Asylum between European Liberal States and Societies. Causes and Consequences of the Distinct Refugee Politics in Europe in the 1930s* (Brussels: Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten, 2004), pp. 55–60; Eckart Conze et al., *Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik* (Munich: Pantheon, 2010), p. 246.

15 Bent Blüdnikow, 'Stille diplomati og flygtningehjælp: Den jødiske menigheds ledelse 1933–1943', in Hans Sode-Madsen, *'Føreren har befalet!' Jødeaktionen oktober 1943* (Copenhagen: Samleren, 1993), pp. 137–173 and 155–156; Rasmus Jørgensen, *Deporteret: Beretningen om de danske kz-fanger* (Copenhagen: Jyllands-Postens Forlag, 2005), pp. 40–41.

16 Hans Kirchhoff, *Augustoprøret 1943: Samarbejdspolitikkens fald – Forudsætninger og forløb: En studie i kollaboration og modstand,* vol. 1 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1979), pp. 48–72; Ulrich Herbert, *Best: Biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunft 1903–1989* (Bonn: Dietz, 1996), pp. 323–342.

In practice, however, Best continued the policy of his predecessor, Renthe-Fink. At first, he too remained restrained in his approach to the Jews. Even as late as the beginning of 1943, he responded to a query from the Reich Foreign Office by proposing that the deportation of Jews from Denmark be ruled out for as long as its implementation would jeopardize the 'Danish model' of occupation. However, should the policy of cooperation come to an end for other reasons, Best noted, then one could also proceed with the deportation of the Jews. Three months later, Best reasserted this position, pointing to the Jews' limited influence in Denmark (Doc. 5). Both the Reich Foreign Office and Heinrich Himmler concurred. Mindful of Best's policy, at the end of June 1943 Himmler decided that 'measures concerning Jews' in Denmark should be avoided for the time being.[17]

However, the situation changed as a result of German military setbacks in the Soviet Union and southern Italy in 1943. Supported by the British Secret Service, communist resistance groups in particular intensified their activities in Denmark. Acts of sabotage and bomb attacks became more frequent. When the occupying authorities responded to a wave of strikes in August 1943[18] with calls for special courts and the death penalty, the Danish government resigned. As a result, in the same month the German occupiers declared a state of emergency and assumed complete control. Strikes were prohibited and summary courts martial introduced. To avoid losing all influence over the running of the country, the state secretaries in the various Danish ministries formed a provisional leadership, under the direction of Nils Svenningsen, state secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although they continued to be informally advised by members of the government that had resigned,[19] essentially the policy of cooperation, with its fiction of Danish sovereignty, had failed.

As a result, the main rationale for the earlier restraint towards the Jews also ceased to apply. On 8 September 1943 Best proposed to the Reich Foreign Office that the state of emergency be used as an opportunity to consider 'a solution to the Jewish question and Freemason question in Denmark', for which the German police forces in Denmark would need to be reinforced (Doc. 7). On 17 September, Hitler approved Best's proposal. The latter therefore requested that both Security Police and Order Police receive reinforcements, and also that ships be made available for the deportation of the Jews.[20]

The deportation did not proceed as planned. Rumours that anti-Jewish measures by the Germans were imminent had been circulating for some time, especially in Copenhagen. They were fuelled by the arrest of prominent members of the Jewish Community in late August 1943 (Doc. 6) and by the seizure of the community's files on 17 September 1943 (Doc. 8). When the additional German police units arrived in Copenhagen and made known the reason for their transfer from Norway, little doubt remained that the

17 Best to the Reich Foreign Office, 13 Jan. 1943, PA AA, R 100 864, fols. 45–47. Himmler's decision was communicated to Kaltenbrunner in Wagner's letter dated 30 June 1943, PA AA, R 100 864, fol. 87: see Herbert, *Best*, p. 362.

18 In August 1943 strikes took place in Odense and Esbjerg, which then spread to many other towns. The staff of large workplaces led the way, and soon there was large-scale unrest involving demonstrations and street battles with the German and Danish authorities.

19 Jørgen Hæstrup, *… til landets bedste: Hovedtræk af departementschefsstyrets virke 1943–1945,* vol. 1 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1966), pp. 70–78.

20 Best to the Reich Foreign Office, no. 1094, 18 Sept. 1943, PA AA, R 100 864, fols. 101–102.

long-feared deportation of the Danish Jews was looming. As early as mid September some Jews began to prepare to flee and hid in the homes of non-Jewish friends, even though it was still unclear just when the deportation would begin.[21]

On his arrival in Copenhagen from Katowice on 20 September 1943, Rudolf Mildner, the new Senior Commander of the Security Police and the SD in Denmark, realized that word of the impending anti-Jewish measures had already spread throughout Denmark and that those who would be affected were prepared. Furthermore, the newly deployed German police forces lacked any local knowledge, while the Wehrmacht sought to avoid being involved in the unpopular measures and left the deportation of Danish Jews to the police and the SS (Doc. 9).

As a result, on 23 September the issue of the deportation was submitted to Hitler again, along with an indication of the possible consequences: rioting or general strikes could take place; a new constitutional government might not be viable; and the abdication of the king was a possibility. Hitler brushed aside these concerns and decided that, despite all objections, the deportation as proposed by Best was to be carried out.[22]

On 28 September, Best notified one of his associates, maritime expert Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz, of the date (1 October 1943) and time (10 p.m.) the arrests were to be carried out. Duckwitz conveyed this information to several leading Danish politicians with whom he was in contact. Hans Hedtoft Hansen, former chairman of the Social Democratic Party, took the details to Carl Henriques, chairman of the Jewish Community, who immediately spread the news to its members. In his sermon the next morning, Rabbi Marcus Melchior openly alerted those attending the service and urged them to go home and go into hiding.[23] Herbert Pundik, a schoolboy at the time, reported that he had been warned at school too: his headmaster had said to him and to several of his classmates, 'You had better hurry home. The Germans may be here at any moment.'[24] Pundik and his family escaped to Sweden. As rumours of impending arrests and the first escape attempts spread, a willingness to provide help also grew, extending throughout Danish society and into hospitals, municipal administrations, trade unions, and schools.

Already by this point the success of the planned mass arrests was uncertain, indeed unlikely. Best alerted the Reich Foreign Office by telegram and referred specifically to the 'rumours concerning the impending anti-Jewish operation', noting that these had 'arisen here immediately after the imposition of the state of emergency and have escalated to the point of panic'. He had tried to conceal the plan, he insisted, but without

21 Best to the Reich Foreign Office, no. 1162, 29 Sept. 1943, ibid., fols. 125–126; Yahil, *The Rescue of Danish Jewry*, pp. 216–217.

22 Ribbentrop memorandum, 23 Sept. 1943, *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945 [ADAP]*, series E: *1941–1945*, vol. 6: *1. Mai bis 30. September 1943* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1974), no. 344.

23 Duckwitz was already aware of Best's plan but only now learned of the actual date: Hans Kirchhoff, *Den gode tysker: G. F. Duckwitz – De danske jøders redningsmand* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2013), p. 171; Hans Kirchhoff, 'Endlösung over Danmark', in Hans Sode-Madsen (ed.), *I Hitler-Tysklands skygge: Dramaet om de danske jøder 1933–1945* (Copenhagen: Aschehoug, 2003), pp. 136–181, here p. 173.

24 Herbert Pundik, *In Denmark It Could Not Happen: The Flight of the Jews to Sweden* (Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing, 1998), p. 12.

success. Many Jews were no longer living in their homes, and, he warned, it was to be expected that the plan would be at least a partial failure.[25]

By the morning of 1 October, the preparations made by the occupiers were complete. After the SS had cut the telephone lines, the arrests began at 9 p.m. In an act of desperation, that same evening Svenningsen asked Best to at least refrain from deporting the Jews and to intern them in Denmark instead. This approach had proved successful when Danish communists were arrested – they had been taken to a Danish internment camp rather than to a German concentration camp. The chairman of the Jewish Community had acceded to this proposal, but Best refused. At the same time, the German Security Police ordered that apartment doors were not to be forced should the inhabitants fail to respond to ringing and knocking.[26] This directive was not always obeyed. According to their own records, the Germans arrested 284 persons in total (Doc. 18), although the actual number of deportees was 281; they were deported the following morning on two transports to Theresienstadt, where they arrived on 5 and 6 October 1943.[27] With additional Danish Jews deported on 13 October and 23 November, 470 persons in all were taken to Theresienstadt.[28]

Following the arrests, broad sections of the Danish population proved no longer willing to cooperate with the occupiers – protests ensued from all social and political circles. Trade unions and industrial associations wrote to Best, as did the student body of the University of Copenhagen, which declared that the persecution of the Danish Jews was 'utterly irreconcilable with the Danish way of thinking' (Doc. 17).

Following the temporary detention of the leaders of the Jewish Community in late August, a pastoral letter signed by the Bishop of Copenhagen on behalf of all bishops of Denmark was read out from pulpits everywhere on 3 October 1943. The letter stated that it was the 'duty of the Christian Church to protest wherever the Jews are persecuted on account of their race or religion'. It stated that Christians should not forget that Jesus was a Jew, and referred to the Old Testament as a sign of common ground between Christians and Jews. Moreover, it asserted that the persecution of the Jews was counter to the concept of loving one's neighbour and violated 'the Danish people's sense of justice' (Doc. 11). The pastoral letter was of great importance, because with this statement the church, the sole Danish authority still functioning nationwide, legitimated support for the Jews. The Freedom Council, formed after the August strikes and ensuing riots as a kind of coordinating committee for various resistance groups, also called upon Danes to help those who had gone into hiding.[29]

25 Best to the Reich Foreign Office, no. 1187, 1 Oct. 1943, PA AA, R 100 864, fol. 145. On the course of the operation and the organization of the mass escape, see Yahil, *The Rescue of Danish Jewry*, pp. 147–195 and 223–282, and Rasmus Kreth and Michael Mogensen, *Flugten til Sverige: Aktionen mod de danske jøder oktober 1943* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1995).

26 Jørgensen, *Deporteret*, p. 42; Henrik Lundtofte, 'Den store undtagelse – Gestapo og jødeaktionen', in Sode-Madsen (ed.), *I Hitler-Tysklands skygge*, pp. 182–201, here p. 192.

27 For clarification of the figures, see Silvia Goldbaum Tarabini Fracapane, *The Jews of Denmark in the Holocaust: Life and Death in Theresienstadt Ghetto* (London: Routledge, 2021), pp. 364–365.

28 Ibid., p. 81.

29 Palle Andersen, *Det moralske dilemma: Den illegale presse og den tyske jødeaktion oktober 1943* (Esbjerg: Historisk Samling fra Besættelsestiden 1940–1945, 2003), p. 12; Martin Schwarz Lausten, *Jødesympati og jødehad i Folkekirken: Forholdet mellem kristne og jøder i Danmark fra begyndelsen af det 20. århundrede til 1948* (Copenhagen: Anis, 2007), pp. 382–386.

Many Danes now became involved in organizing a mass escape across the Sound to Sweden. The arrests and also the end of the policy of cooperation in August had triggered considerable disquiet in neighbouring Sweden. On 31 August 1943 Gösta Engzell, department head in the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had authorized Gustaf von Dardel, the Swedish representative in Copenhagen, to issue Swedish passports to Danish Jews born in Sweden and to their families. A strategy already tested in Norway was thereby extended to Denmark. Believing the arrest of Jews in Denmark to be imminent, on 29 September the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed the Swedish ambassador in Berlin to inform the Germans of Sweden's disapproval. In Copenhagen, von Dardel informed Henriques, the chairman of the Jewish Community, that Jewish refugees would be able to enter Sweden. On 2 October 1943 the Swedish government made known via the news agency Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå that Sweden would accept all Danish Jews.[30] Word spread quickly, not only in Denmark but also worldwide, passed on by news correspondents (Doc. 16).

The first Jewish refugees had approached fishermen and organized their own escape, but now groups offering assistance formed spontaneously at the ports and increasingly banded together to manage the numbers seeking to flee. In Copenhagen many Jews were initially hidden in hospitals. Before the wave of arrests began, approximately 500 refugees had already reached Sweden. Between 1 and 10 October, more than 5,000 persons were saved. The flood of refugees then abated.[31]

Every trip across the Sound had to be paid for by the refugees or by those who helped them. Money was received by drivers who brought people to the coast and by Danish coastguard officials as protection money. Most of the money, however, went to fishermen, compensating them for their loss of earnings and their fuel costs and offsetting the risk that they might be arrested or have their ships confiscated. Some refugees found themselves required to pay the equivalent of a year's salary for their rescue, a sum that not everyone could afford. The first crossings therefore likely saved wealthier Jews, while others had to wait. When the pressure of numbers was greatest, a crossing cost 2,000 kroner; as the flood of refugees diminished, with more fishermen and helpers available and fewer Jews waiting to flee, the cost fell to just 500 kroner.[32]

The costs faced by poorer Jews were often borne by more prosperous refugees. In addition, many Danes contributed to collections in support of the refugees (Doc. 19). This fundraising took place both within rescue groups that were formed spontaneously and

30 Paul A. Levine, *From Indifference to Activism: Swedish Diplomacy and the Holocaust, 1938–1944* (Uppsala: Ubsaliensis S. Academiae, 1996), pp. 229 and 232–236; Kirchhoff, 'Endlösung over Danmark', p. 174.

31 Kreth and Mogensen, *Flugten til Sverige*, p. 46.

32 Michael Mogensen, 'October 1943 – The Rescue of the Danish Jews', in Mette Bastholm Jensen and Steven L. B. Jensen (eds.), *Denmark and the Holocaust* (Copenhagen: Danish Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 2003), pp. 33–61, here p. 48; Kreth and Mogensen, *Flugten til Sverige*, p. 91; for an introduction to the various organizations, see Hermann Weiss, 'Die Rettung der Juden in Dänemark während der deutschen Besetzung 1940–1945', in Wolfgang Benz and Juliane Wetzel (eds.), *Solidarität und Hilfe für Juden während der NS-Zeit*, vol. 3: *Dänemark, Niederlande, Spanien, Portugal, Ungarn, Albanien, Weißrußland* (Berlin: Metropol, 1996), pp. 11–86, here pp. 56–63 and 69–78.

within the organized resistance movement. Belongings and assets that the refugees left behind were quickly safeguarded by the Danish authorities and protected from looting. A new service provided by the City of Copenhagen cooperated with the guarantors to whom fleeing owners had managed to entrust their assets and possessions (Docs. 12 and 24). In Sweden the refugees were looked after by the Danish embassy, state institutions, and, not least, local Jews.[33]

The vast majority of the Danish Jews were carried to safety across the Sound in small boats and ships; sometimes even rowing boats were put to use. In total some 600 to 700 crossings likely took place. The Swedish navy patrolled the coast in order to be able to come to the aid of the refugees if necessary. The German navy and the Danish coast-guard remained passive and did not obstruct the mass escape. On shore the Wehrmacht and the Order Police took only limited action against those fleeing. Wehrmacht units carried out only a few roundups, and only in response to demands by the Gestapo. The German Security Police had to rely on their own personnel, who were in short supply and whose enthusiasm for the pursuit varied. Much depended on the zeal of individual Gestapo commanders. A disproportionately large number of Jews were arrested in the area around Helsingør that was supervised by SS-Hauptscharführer Hans Juhl, also known as 'Gestapo-Juhl'. Juhl was responsible for the largest single roundup after the wave of arrests on 1/2 October: during the night of 6/7 October, the Gestapo and Wehrmacht soldiers who had received orders to participate arrested eighty-six Jews who had hidden in a church in Gilleleje, north of Copenhagen.[34]

A combination of factors ensured that 95 per cent of the Jews living in Denmark were rescued. First, because they had been warned, most Jews managed to go into hiding before the arrests even began. Their numbers were not large, and as most of the Jews in Denmark lived in Copenhagen, word of the impending arrests reached them in time. Second, the moment was right for a mass flight. Part of the population had already been mobilized by the strikes, and Sweden was willing to accept those who fled. Many Danes viewed support for the rescue initiative as a way of demonstrating their hostility towards the German occupation. The nature of the occupation regime, more lenient in Denmark than in other occupied countries, also played a role, because the risk for those who provided help seemed smaller, and up to that point no member of the resistance movement in Denmark had been executed. In addition, organizational and communication structures within Danish society were still largely intact.

By contrast, the motivation for the actions taken by the Germans, and by the Reich plenipotentiary in particular, remains harder to construe. Since Mildner's arrival, he and Best had been convinced that the German police would only be able to catch a small number of Jews. That failure would make it necessary to keep combing the country to round up Jews and to patrol the Danish coast for weeks, if not months. It would thus be impossible to defuse the situation and to put an end to the state of emergency,

33 Per Møller and Knud Secher, *De danske flygtninge i Sverige* (Stockholm: Gyldendal, 1945), pp. 194–196; Mogensen, 'October 1943 – The Rescue of the Danish Jews', p. 41; Svante Hansson, *Flykt och överlevnad: Flyktingverksamhet i Mosaiska församlingen i Stockholm 1933–1950* (Stockholm: Hillelförlaget, 2004), pp. 254–262.

34 Mogensen, 'October 1943 – The Rescue of the Danish Jews', pp. 53–57.

even in the longer term, which would run counter not only to Best's own interests but also to Hitler's instructions. When Duckwitz (with or without Best's knowledge) informed the Danish resistance of the scheduled date for the arrests, the advance notice heightened panic among Danish Jews and accelerated the flight from Denmark that was already under way. As a result, the Jews left the country as soon as they possibly could. This, Best said later, had been his intention. During a confidential discussion on 2 October 1943, Best explained his actions to Franz-Alfred Six, a former department head at the Reich Security Main Office. Knowledge of the upcoming 'anti-Jewish operation' had led to outright panic in September, and therefore, he suggested, simply giving notice of the deportation had caused the Jews to leave the country.[35] In his report to the Reich Foreign Office, Best also presented the nocturnal raid as a success: 'Because the actual aim of the Jew operation in Denmark was to de-Jewify the country and not to carry out a headhunt that was as successful as possible, it must be noted that the Jew operation did achieve its aim' (Doc. 18). This assessment explains why, with the exception of the Gestapo chief in Helsingør mentioned above, the German occupying forces demonstrated little readiness to continue the pursuit of Jews after 2 October. The single operation was intended to be sufficient, with calm expected to return quickly thereafter.

Best continued to pursue this approach after the deportation. In a conversation with Adolf Eichmann in early November 1943, he was able to insist that the Jews deported from Denmark would remain in Theresienstadt and not be transported further, for instance to Auschwitz. The prisoners themselves were unaware of this decision. Johan Grün, 22 years old at the time, later reported: 'We had no idea that we were privileged and would not be put on a transport. We were perpetually nervous, especially when a new transport was being put together.'[36] In Theresienstadt the Jews were separated according to gender, and families were thus torn apart. For the Danish Jews, who had previously experienced few restrictions, the dreadful living conditions in the ghetto came as a shock. From February 1944 parcels were sent to the inmates through a private network working in close cooperation with the Danish Ministry for Social Affairs and the friends and relatives of the deportees. However, the German authorities had not granted permission for these shipments and rejected all requests for authorization from the Danish administration. The organizers of the shipments repeatedly wrote to sponsors stating that there was no guarantee that the parcels would arrive. It was only during the visit by the delegation of the International Red Cross and the Danish civil administration to Theresienstadt in June 1944 that the German authorities authorized the shipment of parcels to the Danish inmates. Even if they did receive parcels, the Danish prisoners still suffered from hunger, as Meier Munitz, one of the Danish Jews in Theresienstadt, covertly informed his relatives in Sweden. On 17 July 1944 Munitz signed a postcard, which had to pass censorship, with the words 'Your

35 Notes by Six for the state secretary, 25 Oct. 1943, PA AA, R 29 567, fols. 386–388.

36 Johan Grün, cited in Jørgensen, *Deporteret*, p. 53; Sode-Madsen, '"Her er livets lov egoisme": De danske jøder i Theresienstadt', in Sode-Madsen, *'Føreren har befalet!'*, pp. 174–219, here p. 192; corresponding telegram 1353 to the Reich Foreign Office, dated 3 Nov. 1943, with Best's report on the conversation the previous day, PA AA, R 100 865, fol. 26.

son, brother and brother-in-law Madsult'.[37] *Mads* is a common given name for Danish men, but *mad* is the Danish word for food, and *sult* means 'hunger'.

In February 1945 the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Germans that Sweden was willing to admit Jewish prisoners from Germany.[38] This gave rise to the largest single relief effort for prisoners in German camps during the war, the Danish-Swedish rescue operation known as 'White Buses'. Approximately 15,000 people, including Danish prisoners held in the Theresienstadt ghetto, were evacuated to Sweden on buses during the final stages of the war and were thus saved from the death marches and killing operations carried out by the SS. The buses were manned by Swedish and Danish volunteers and operated under the auspices of the Red Cross (Doc. 27). Max Friediger, chief rabbi of Copenhagen, who had been forced to join the Council of Elders (Ältestenrat) in Theresienstadt, a body created by the SS, reported that at around 11 a.m. on 13 April a Czech office worker had rushed excitedly into his office to tell him that a Danish motor car was parked in front of the commandant's office. Friediger thought it was a joke until he was brought to the commandant shortly afterwards: 'He was sitting in his office with some higher SS ranks and an unknown gentleman. It was Dr Holm from Copenhagen! It was he who was the main speaker, and he informed me that the Danes were to come to Sweden.' Friediger was then sent to let all the Danish Jews know that they would be leaving that evening.[39]

On 15 April 1945 the Danish prisoners, more than 400 in total, began their journey from Theresienstadt through Denmark to Malmö. Of the Danish Jews who had been deported, fifty-three adults died, along with two infants born in Theresienstadt. At the end of May 1945, the first of the approximately 7,000 Jews who had been saved by fleeing to Sweden returned to Denmark.

Norway

For the German troops the occupation of Norway proved considerably more complex and involved much heavier losses than the occupation of Denmark. Attacks by the British navy sank many German warships, and in the first days after the German invasion, which took place on 9 April 1940, Norwegian and Allied infantry forces drove the German units into a substantial retreat. After the advance of the Wehrmacht into France, however, the Allies were forced to withdraw their troops from Norway and redeploy them to Western Europe. As a result the Norwegian armed forces capitulated, and Norway was occupied. The German number of casualties was substantial: approximately 3,000 men were killed in action and 1,500 were wounded; almost one third of the entire German navy was destroyed during the combat.

37 Postcards from Mendel Meier Munitz to Isak Notkin, dated 12 June 1944, and to Elieser Munitz, dated 17 July 1944, YVA, O.27/22. On the food shortages faced by Danish prisoners, see Hans Sode-Madsen, 'The Perfect Deception: The Danish Jews and Theresienstadt, 1940–1945', *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book*, 38 (1993), pp. 263–290, here pp. 275–280.

38 Sune Persson, *'Vi åker till Sverige': De vita bussarna 1945* (Rimbo: Fischer & Co, 2002), p. 123.

39 Max Friediger, *Theresienstadt* (Copenhagen: Clausen, 1946), pp. 135–137. For details of the negotiations and the rescue operation, see Hans Sode-Madsen, *Reddet fra Hitlers helvede: Danmark og de Hvide Busser 1941–45* (Copenhagen: Aschehoug, 2005).

After the Norwegian government and the king fled to Britain following the capitulation, Josef Terboven, Gauleiter of Essen, was appointed Reich commissioner for the occupied Norwegian territories. Like Denmark, Norway was intended to remain an independent state, with a view to its eventual inclusion in the Greater Germanic Reich. Terboven began by banning all democratic parties and by designating the fascist Nasjonal Samling party as representative of the interests of the state.[40]

For the approximately 2,100 Jewish Norwegians and Jewish refugees from Central Europe living in the country, little changed at first. That said, some Jews were prohibited from practising their profession, as was the case for psychiatrist Leo Eitinger, who had fled from Czechoslovakia to Norway in 1939 through Nansen Relief and now lost his position at the hospital in Bodø, in northern Norway (Doc. 51). With the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, however, the overall situation began to change noticeably. In northern Norway the Germans arrested all Jewish men, but in southern Norway only those who were stateless. In March 1942 Leo Eitinger, who was now living in hiding on Norway's western coast, was also arrested. Individual Jews fled across the Norwegian–Swedish border, but their number remained small, as most hoped that no additional persecution would follow or feared retaliatory measures against family members.[41] In addition, Norwegian Jewish refugees had occasionally been turned back at the border by Swedish officials (PMJ 5/17). From February 1942, on the orders of Heinrich Fehlis, Senior Commander of the Security Police and the SD in Norway, the passports and identity cards of Jews were marked with the word 'Jew'. In addition, Nasjonal Samling's Office for Statistics required all Jews to complete a questionnaire disclosing their financial circumstances, in preparation for their dispossession. In total, 1,417 persons provided the information requested; children were listed on their parents' questionnaires. On 12 March 1942 the puppet government under Vidkun Quisling that had been installed by Terboven restored the Norwegian Constitution's 'Jew clause', a passage that had been eliminated in 1851, forbidding Jews to enter the kingdom.[42]

At the Wannsee Conference in January 1942, the representative of the Reich Foreign Office, Martin Luther, had spoken out against including the Scandinavian countries in the policy of extermination. Over the course of the next few months, however, the attitude of the German decision makers changed. Count Helmuth James von Moltke, who

40 On the German occupation of Norway, see Hans-Dietrich Loock, *Quisling, Rosenberg und Terboven: Zur Vorgeschichte und Geschichte der nationalsozialistischen Revolution in Norwegen* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1970); Ole Kristian Grimnes, *Norge under okkupasjonen* (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1983); Robert Bohn, *Reichskommissariat Norwegen: 'Nationalsozialistische Neuordnung' und Kriegswirtschaft* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000); Johannes Andenaes, Olav Riste, and Magne Skodvin, *Norway and the Second World War* (Oslo: Tanum, 1966); Erik J. Friis, 'The Norwegian Government-in-Exile, 1940–45', in Carl F. Bayerschmidt and Erik J. Friis (eds.), *Scandinavian Studies: Essays Presented to Dr. Henry Goddard Leach on the Occasion of His Eighty-fifth Birthday* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1965), pp. 422–444; Hans Fredrik Dahl, *Quisling: A Study in Treachery* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Petrow, *The Bitter Years*.

41 Karin Kvist Geverts, 'Ett främmande element i nationen: Svensk flyktingpolitik och de judiska flyktingarna 1938–1944', *Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Historica Upsaliensa*, 233 (Uppsala: Universitetsbiblioteket, 2008), pp. 184–194.

42 See PMJ 5/14, 20, 21, and 23; Oskar Mendelsohn, *Jødenes historie i Norge gjennom 300 år* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1987), p. 56; and Oskar Mendelsohn, *The Persecution of the Norwegian Jews in WW II* (Oslo: Norges Hjemmefrontmuseum, 2000).

visited Norway in September 1942 on behalf of the Amt Ausland/Abwehr, the military intelligence agency of the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW), is said to have warned the resistance movement during his stay about the forthcoming deportations of Jews, although he could not give a specific date.[43] Statements made by Gestapo official Wilhelm Wagner after the war indicate that in the summer of 1942 the Reich Security Main Office suggested that the 'Jewish problem' in Norway also be addressed and resolved in accordance with the wishes of the Norwegian government.[44] For its part, the government was keen to show the Reich Commissioner that it was radically antisemitic. As a result of its dwindling popularity among Norwegians, the Quisling government had increasingly lost the confidence of the German authorities, and now it evidently sought to regain favour by taking a tough approach to the Jews.[45] From the beginning, the Norwegian authorities and the population were involved in the disenfranchisement and persecution of the Jews.

From late September 1942 there was an increase in the number of acts of sabotage and attacks on German institutions in northern Norway. In reprisal, on 6 October 1942 the occupying forces had ten people shot, one of whom was a Norwegian Jew. Simultaneously, a state of emergency was declared in Trondheim and the surrounding area, and by order of the Reich Commissioner the Norwegian police arrested thirty Jewish men, who were taken, along with non-Jewish hostages, to the camp at Falstad, north-east of Trondheim. While some Jews recognized that they were no longer safe and fled across the border to Sweden, others expected that the state of emergency would soon be lifted and hoped they would then cease to be in any immediate danger.[46] Among Nasjonal Samling supporters, however, the call for the 'final settlement' of the so-called Jewish question, which was to be 'radical and unsentimental', became louder (Doc. 29).

On 22 October 1942 a group of fleeing Norwegian Jews, accompanied by a member of the resistance who was helping with the escape, was travelling by train from Oslo to Halden. At the Swedish border, while the Norwegian Border Police was conducting a passenger check, shots were exchanged and a policeman was killed. The helper and two Jewish refugees managed to get away, but the other members of the group were arrested and taken to the prison camp at Grini. The Norwegian press, which had been brought under Nazi control, reported at length on the events because a harsh reaction by the Germans was anticipated. The *New York Times* also surmised as much (Doc. 30). On 25 October 1942 Gestapo official Wilhelm Wagner gave the order to have all male Jews aged fifteen and over arrested the following day; the head of the Norwegian State Police

43 Christhard Hoffmann, 'Fluchthilfe als Widerstand: Verfolgung und Rettung der Juden in Norwegen', in Wolfgang Benz and Juliane Wetzel (eds.), *Solidarität und Hilfe für Juden während der NS-Zeit,* vol. 1: *Polen, Rumänien, Griechenland, Luxemburg, Norwegen, Schweiz* (Berlin: Metropol, 1999), pp. 205–232, here p. 216; Klaus Alberts, *Theodor Steltzer: Szenarien seines Lebens. Eine Biographie* (Heide: Boyens, 2009), pp. 100–101.

44 Bjarte Bruland, *Forsøket på å tilintetgjøre jødene i Norge* (Bergen: B. Bruland, 1995), p. 58.

45 Hoffmann, 'Fluchthilfe als Widerstand', p. 209.

46 Mendelsohn, *Jødenes historie i Norge*, p. 74; Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Beatrice Sandberg and Volker Dahm, *Meldungen aus Norwegen 1940–1945: Die geheimen Lageberichte des Befehlshabers der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in Norwegen*, vol. 1 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008), p. 846; Frode Sæland, *Herman Beckers krig: Historien om familien Becker og jødene i Rogaland under andre verdenskrig* (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2009), p. 139.

communicated the order to all police stations (Doc. 31). The Quisling government had created a legal basis for this operation by passing the Law on Preventive Detention on 24 October 1942. Jews were not specifically mentioned in this law, but it regulated the detention of persons accused of subversive activities. On the day the arrests were carried out, the Norwegian government issued an additional law under which all the assets of Norwegian and stateless Jews were expropriated and handed over to the public purse. Gold and silver jewellery items were immediately confiscated by Norwegian officials and placed at the disposal of the Reich Commissioner as a 'voluntary contribution for war-related expenditure'. Confiscated watches were handed over to the Wehrmacht.[47] The police delivered the confiscation orders to those they were arresting and their families. The eldest remaining member of each family had to report daily to the relevant police station. Any attempt to withhold property or to circumvent the obligation to report was subject to the severest penalties. The male Jews were first incarcerated in Bredtveit prison, and then in the internment camp at Berg, near Tønsberg.[48] Samuel Steinmann, nineteen years old at the time, described the camp, which was guarded by Norwegians and known as 'Quisling's chicken yard': 'The Berg internment camp was a brand new camp, which had not previously been used. We were housed in barracks that had only floors, walls and ceilings, no furnishings, no beds, no mattresses.'[49]

Reactions among Norwegians and the resistance movement to the actions taken against the Jews were not unequivocal. Two weeks after the arrests, the Norwegian bishops and the leaders of the sizeable Norwegian Free Church societies and organizations wrote a letter of protest to Quisling stating their opposition to the collaborationist government's law on the confiscation of property and to the discriminatory treatment of Jews under the law. 'By virtue of our calling', they had written, 'we thus exhort the secular authorities and declare in the name of Jesus Christ: stop the persecution of Jews and put a stop to the racial hatred which is being spread by the press in our country' (Doc. 34). The Norwegian National Socialists were unmoved by this exhortation. Members of the Nasjonal Samling party profited from the seizure of assets (Doc. 44). On 17 November 1942 the government issued the Law on the Compulsory Registration of Jews (Doc. 35), which determined who in Norway was regarded as a Jew. The term 'Jew' was defined more broadly than in the Nuremberg Laws, for it included *Mischlinge* of the second degree who belonged to a Jewish community.[50]

In retrospect, the relative inaction on the part of Norwegian resistance groups is surprising. Since the end of 1940 they had been organizing civil disobedience against the German occupying forces and their Norwegian henchmen. Increasingly large sections of the population had taken part in this struggle for hearts and minds, for example in the protests against the Nazification of the state church and of schoolteachers. However,

47 'Inndragning av jødisk eiendom i Norge under den 2. verdenskrig', *Norges offentlige utredninger* [NOU] 1997: 22 (Oslo: Statens forvaltningstjeneste statens trykning, 1997) [hereafter NOU, 1997], pp. 67–124, here p. 76.

48 Seizure order published in NOU, 1997, p. 171; Bjarte Bruland, *Det norske Holocaust: Forsøket på å tilintetgjøre de norske jødene* (Oslo: HL-senteret, 2008), p. 19.

49 Samuel Steinmann, cited in Jakob Lothe and Anette Storeide (eds.), *Tidsvitner: Fortellinger fra Auschwitz og Sachsenhausen* (Oslo: Gyldendal, 2006), p. 124.

50 Oskar Mendelsohn, 'Norwegen', in Wolfgang Benz (ed.), *Dimension des Völkermords: Die Zahl der jüdischen Opfer des Nationalsozialismus* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1991), pp. 187–197, here p. 192.

the leaders of the resistance movement passively acquiesced in the registration of Jews in the spring of 1942 and in the arrests carried out that autumn.

On 25 November 1942 the Germans ordered the arrest of women and children as well as hospital patients, who had all been spared thus far. The next day, members of the Norwegian State Police, Criminal Police and riot police, together with Hird (the paramilitary troops of Nasjonal Samling), and the Germanic SS removed people, who were completely unprepared, from homes and hospitals and took them to the landing pier for the troopship *Donau* at the port of Oslo. Fehlis reported that evening that the *Donau* had put to sea, bound for Stettin, at 2.55 p.m. with 532 persons on board. Yet the perpetrators were still not content. Karl Marthinsen, head of the Norwegian State Police, complained in a report to Quisling that there had been too little time to arrest all the Jews. And, he noted, the order from Germany that partners in so-called mixed marriages be spared had meant extra effort and expense (Doc. 38).

The reason for the over-hasty nature of the operation may have been that shipping space had unexpectedly become available, a possibility supported by the fact that the Reich Security Main Office in Berlin was not informed of the deportations in advance. Like the head office of the Stettin Gestapo, the Reich Security Main Office received notice of the sudden availability of transport only a day before the *Donau* set sail (Doc. 36). Eichmann's section for Jewish affairs had very limited time to establish the rules for the deportation. In contrast to the Norwegian government, however, Berlin insisted that only Norwegian and stateless Jews be deported. Holders of British or American passports and citizens of countries that were neutral or allied with Germany were excluded, as were Jews living in mixed marriages (Doc. 37).

The fact that Norwegian personnel had carried out the arrests and the deportation gave hope to some of the prisoners, who, segregated by gender, were forced below deck on the *Donau*. According to Samuel Steinmann, some of those on board thought that things would turn out for them as they had for the Norwegian academics who had been arrested after the large waves of protest in March and April 1942: 'We sailed into the fjord and hoped in our hearts that we would be sent to northern Norway, to the Finnmark. That was where the teachers and clerics who were arrested previously had been sent, to labour camps.'[51] The next day, however, this hope foundered when the deportees realized that the transport was heading for Germany. On 30 November the *Donau* arrived in port at Stettin, from where the prisoners were taken by train directly to Auschwitz extermination camp. On 1 December 1942 the camp commandant, Rudolf Höss, confirmed the arrival of 532 Jews who had been deported from Norway on 25 November (Docs. 36 and 37). Most of them, including all the women and children, were murdered immediately.

Because the deportation was handled with unexpected speed, some deportees from more remote regions did not reach Oslo in time. Employees of the Norwegian Red Cross and railway staff may have deliberately delayed the transport. The detainees concerned were initially confined in Bredtveit prison, north-east of Oslo, until the second deportation of Norwegian Jews, which took 158 prisoners on the *Gotenland* to Stettin, departing on 25 February 1943. From there, they were taken first to Berlin and after a brief stay in

51 Samuel Steinmann, cited in Lothe and Storeide (eds.), *Tidsvitner: Fortellinger fra Auschwitz og Sachsenhausen*, p. 125.

Levetzowstraße assembly camp they were added to a transport to Auschwitz, which reached the extermination camp on the night of 2/3 March 1943.[52] Twenty-eight men deemed fit for work were taken to Monowitz camp; all the others were murdered straight away.[53] The psychiatrist Leo Eitinger was among the few survivors (Doc. 51). He returned to Norway after the war, undertook psychiatric work with concentration camp prisoners, and gained an international reputation in the field of trauma research.

After the deportation of the Norwegian Jews, the distribution of their property began, on the basis of the aforementioned law of 26 October 1942. Because the anti-Jewish regulations could be traced back to the Quisling government rather than the occupiers and because Norwegian officials had carried out the arrests, many Norwegians viewed the confiscations as legal. The Norwegian government set up a separate authority, the Liquidations Office, to administer the assets. The office appointed administrators for the homes that had had to be abandoned.[54] Household items and movable belongings were either sold at public auction or offered for sale to Norwegian volunteers in the Waffen SS (Doc. 44). Real estate, by contrast, was generally not sold, but instead managed by the Ministry of Finance.

Those Jews who had avoided arrest were clearly in mortal danger. A few non-Jewish Norwegians endeavoured to persuade the Norwegian authorities to defer action against their Jewish friends and acquaintances, but usually without success (Doc. 48). As had been the case during the first wave of arrests, in October 1942 a number of Norwegian policemen succeeded in warning a few individuals, who with the help of fellow Norwegians now went into hiding. Hospitals in particular came to the aid of many of those fleeing and in the first few days also provided a place to hide.[55] Aiding an escape in this way was dangerous, for on 12 October 1942 Reich Commissioner Terboven had threatened to impose the death penalty on those who were fleeing and their helpers. Nonetheless, after the arrests in October 1942 and the deportation the following month, more and more non-Jewish Norwegians attempted to save the remaining Jews and take them to neighbouring Sweden. Most Jews came from the area in and around Oslo. The Swedish border was only around 100 kilometres away, but it was guarded extremely closely. Until an opportunity to smuggle people across the border arose it was necessary to find safe places to hide and to procure food. However, the unexpected rush risked exposing the escape routes which had been set up earlier by the resistance movement. Moreover, in recent months roundups by the German authorities had markedly weakened the organized Norwegian resistance movement.[56]

52 Vera Komissar and Sverre M. Nyrønning, *På tross av alt. Julius Paltiel, norsk jøde i Auschwitz* (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1995), pp. 39 and 48. This was the so-called Osttransport 32 from Berlin, the second deportation transport after the so-called Factory Action (*Fabrikaktion*) in Berlin. Besides the 158 Norwegian Jews, there were 1,654 Jews from Berlin and elsewhere on this transport.

53 Sæland, *Herman Beckers krig*, p. 221.

54 NOU, 1997, p. 78.

55 Ragnar Ulstein, *Svensketrafikken*, vol. 1, *Flyktningar til Sverige 1940–43* (Oslo: Samlaget, 1974), p. 210; Berit Nøkleby, *Holdningskamp* (*Norge i krig: Fremmedåk og frihetskamp 1940–1945*, ed. Magne Skodvin, vol. 4) (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1986), p. 213.

56 On the escape routes and helpers, see Ragnar Ulstein, *Jødar på flukt* (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 1995). On the Norwegian resistance movement in general, see Olav Riste and Berit Nøkleby, *Norway, 1940–45: The Resistance Movement* (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1994 [Norwegian edn, 1970]).

The most extensive rescue operation in Norway during the war was organized by a married couple, Alf and Gerd Pettersen. Together with their friends Rolf Syversen and Reidar Larsen, they took two truckloads of Jews to the border almost daily between December 1942 and February 1943, thereby saving the lives of several hundred people. The code name of this resistance group, Carl Fredriksens Transport, was an allusion to King Haakon VII of Norway, whose first names included 'Carl' and 'Fredrik'. Among those saved were fourteen children who had come to Norway from Czechoslovakia through Nansen Relief and had been accommodated in a home in Holbergsgate in Oslo.[57] On the evening of 25 November 1942, Sigrid Helliesen Lund, who was involved in Nansen Relief and refugee work, received a tip from an anonymous caller that there was to be another 'party' and 'the small parcels' were now also going to be picked up. Lund realized that this had to be a reference to the arrest of the children. Together with Nina Hasvold, the home's director, Caroline 'Nic' Waal, who was a child psychiatrist, and a number of others, she rescued the children by taking them to Sweden (Docs. 41 and 46).[58]

Most of those fleeing were first driven to the area near the border by helpers. Then, in groups led by guides, they had to undertake lengthy treks through the snow-covered mountain ranges and forests along the Swedish border, constantly at risk of falling into the hands of German patrols. Those who were less robust, who were often not equal to the exertions, were a particular hazard on these journeys, as were small children, whose cries could put the entire group at risk. Anna Rothschild and her 18-month-old daughter, Inger Lise, had remained in Norway after her husband managed to flee to Sweden during the first arrests of Jewish men. The person helping her to escape demanded that she leave her child behind. Looking back, she described her debilitation, fear, and weariness and, above all, the difficult decision as to what was to become of Inger Lise: 'Should I rip out my heart and leave her behind in Norway? Should I wait with her? Wait to be caught, deported, and possibly killed?'[59] On 4 December 1942 she finally managed to escape. Inger Lise was placed with a foster mother and smuggled into Sweden on 16 May 1943. In total, more than 1,000 Jews were saved by escape to neighbouring Sweden.

In Sweden, the 'anti-Jewish operation' in Norway had attracted great attention. The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been quickly and thoroughly briefed about the events by its consul general in Oslo. Efforts were made in Stockholm to at least do something for Jews who had family connections with Sweden. At the same time, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which thus far had maintained a certain distance from Jewish refugees from Germany and Eastern Europe, came under public pressure as a result of the large number of enquiries made by Swedish relatives of the persecuted (Doc. 39). In early December 1942 Sweden offered to accept all Jews who had not yet been deported from Norway, but the German government rejected this proposal. Claes Westring, the Swedish consul general in Norway, attempted to save the remaining Jews there by issuing

57 Mendelsohn, *Jødenes historie i Norge*, p. 226; Mats Tangestuen, *Carl Fredriksens Transport: Krigens største redningsbragd* (Oslo: URO/KORO, 2012); Irene Levin, 'Det jødiske barnehjemmet og Nic Waal', *Tidsskrift for Norsk psykologforening*, vol. 46, no. 1 (2009), pp. 76–80.

58 In 2006 Yad Vashem honoured Hasvold, Waal, Lund, and other rescuers as Righteous Among the Nations.

59 Anna Rothschild, cited in Vera Komissar, *Nådetid: Norske Jøder på flukt* (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1992), p. 70.

Swedish identity papers liberally.[60] This course of action was supported by leading officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and also by the minister of foreign affairs himself. However, by declining to recognize any citizenship acquired after 26 November 1942, the Germans effectively rejected the intervention by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for those who had already been deported.[61] In October 1944, shortly before the end of the war, the fear that the Germans might still deport approximately sixty Jews in so-called mixed marriages who had been arrested but not yet deported led the Swedish consul general in Oslo to begin efforts to get these individuals to Sweden. After lengthy negotiations, the individuals concerned were allowed to leave Norway for Sweden as of 21 April 1945, prior to Germany's capitulation.[62]

In all, at least 772 Jews were deported from Norway, of whom just 34 survived. Together with those who were murdered in Norway or took their own lives, 764 Jews from Norway – almost half of the Jewish population – lost their lives.[63]

Netherlands

At the Wannsee Conference on 20 January 1942, Heydrich and his expert on Jewish affairs Adolf Eichmann estimated the number of Jews living in the Netherlands at 160,800. This number, based on the 1941 census of Jews in the Netherlands, also included *Mischlinge* of the first and second degree.[64] Initial figures for deportation that were agreed at meetings held up to 11 June 1942 set a total of 15,000, with deportations to start in July 1942. That figure was then revised dramatically upwards: in a letter dated 22 June 1942 to the Reich Foreign Office, Eichmann was already writing of deporting 40,000 Jews from the Netherlands.[65]

A few days later, on 26 June, SS-Hauptsturmführer Ferdinand aus der Fünten, head of the Central Office for Jewish Emigration in Amsterdam, informed the Jewish Council

60 Levine, *From Indifference to Activism*, pp. 136–138 and 145–146; Mendelsohn, 'Norwegen', p. 195; Steven Koblik, *The Stones Cry Out: Sweden's Response to the Persecution of the Jews, 1933–1945* (New York: Holocaust Library, 1988), p. 60.

61 Klas Åmark, *Att bo granne med ondskan: Sveriges förhållande till nazismen, Nazitykland og Förintelsen* (Stockholm: Albert Bonniers, 2011), pp. 536–554; Kvist Geverts, 'Ett främmande element i nationen', pp. 188–189.

62 Correspondence in Tôviyyā Friedman, *Dokumentensammlung über 'Die Deportierung der Juden aus Norwegen nach Auschwitz'* (Ramat Gan: City Council, 1963). Also see Hoffmann, 'Fluchthilfe als Widerstand', p. 230.

63 Bruland, *Det norske Holocaust*, p. 29.

64 See PMJ 5/90.

65 See PMJ 5/145. On the history of the occupation period in the Netherlands, see Werner Warmbrunn, *The Dutch under German Occupation, 1940–1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963); L. de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog*, 12 vols. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969–1986); Gerhard Hirschfeld, *Nazi Rule and Dutch Collaboration: The Netherlands under German Occupation, 1940–1945* (Oxford and New York: Berg, 1988); Hans Blom, *In de ban van goed en fout: Geschiedschrijving over de bezettingstijd in Nederland* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2007); Jennifer L. Foray, *Visions of Empire in the Nazi-Occupied Netherland*s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Chris van der Heijden, *Grijs verleden: Nederland en de Tweede Wereldoorlog* (Amsterdam: Contact, 2001). On the deportation figures, see Christoph Kreutzmüller, 'Eichmanns Zahlen für die Niederlande', in Norbert Kampe und Peter Klein (eds.), *Die Wannsee-Konferenz am 20. Januar 1942 – Dokumente, Forschungsstand, Kontroversen* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2013), pp. 357–378.

(Joodsche Raad) that Jewish workers were to be called up for 'labour deployment in Germany'. The Central Office was to be in charge of the call-ups, while the Jewish Council was required to handle transport documentation and the declarations of assets submitted by those affected. After some hesitation and with grave reservations, the two chairmen of the Jewish Council, David Cohen and Abraham Asscher, declared themselves willing to cooperate. They were given various promises, supposedly as concessions: families would not be split up; only adults between eighteen and forty would be affected; postal traffic would be possible; and members of certain professions as well as employees of the Jewish Council would be exempt from labour deployment.[66]

On 5 July 1942 and in the days that followed, 4,000 persons summoned for labour deployment were told to report to the police-run transit camp at Westerbork, where they were to undergo medical examination. Enclosed with the summons was a list of the items of clothing allowed and a travel permit for the journey to Westerbork. Only a few people actually turned up after receiving a summons. The fear was too great, not least as rumours of a deportation to Poland had begun to circulate. When numbers at the assembly points failed to increase even after the Amsterdam police delivered written summons, on 14 July the German Order Police carried out raids in Amsterdam, taking more than 500 Jews hostage and threatening to send them to Mauthausen concentration camp if those who had been summoned continued to refuse to report. In the Netherlands, 'Mauthausen' had become synonymous with death ever since, in retaliation for the February Strike in 1941, Jewish men had been deported there and death notices for many of them were received just a few months later. This threat and a renewed appeal by the Jewish Council had an effect, and in the coming days many Amsterdam Jews obeyed the summons and were taken to Westerbork. On 15 July 1942 the first deportation train left from there, bringing 1,135 Jews to Auschwitz.[67] After a three-day train journey, several hundred deportees were immediately led into the gas chambers and murdered; the others were placed in the concentration camp. From then until the end of November 1942, deportation trains departed approximately twice a week and took a total of 36,084 Jews from Westerbork to Auschwitz.

66 NIOD, 182/1d. Minutes of the discussion between Ferdinand aus der Fünten and representatives of the Jewish Council, dated 26 June 1942. On the history of the persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands, see Jacques Presser, *Ondergang: De vervolging en verdelging van het Nederlandse Jodendom 1940–1945* (The Hague: Staatsuitgeverij, 1965) (abridged English edn: *Ashes in the Wind: The Destruction of Dutch Jewry*, trans. Arnold Pomerans [London: Souvenir Press, 2010]); Abel Herzberg, *Kroniek der Jodenvervolging, 1940–1945* (Amsterdam: Querido, 1985); Loe de Jong, *Jodenvervolging in Nederland 1940–1945*, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: Verbum and NIOD, 2018); de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk*, vols. 5–8; Bob Moore, *Victims and Survivors: The Nazi Persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands, 1940–1945* (London: Arnold, 1997); Jozeph Michman, Hartog Beem, and Dan Michman, *Pinkas: Geschiedenis van de joodse gemeenschap in Nederland* (Amsterdam: Contact, 1999); Peter Romijn et al., *The Persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands, 1940–1945: New Perspectives* (Amsterdam: Vossiuspers UvA, 2012); Frits Boterman, *Duitse daders: De Jodenvervolging en de nazificatie van Nederland (1940–1945)* (Amsterdam and Antwerp: Arbeiderspers, 2015); Katja Happe, *Viele falsche Hoffnungen: Judenverfolgung in den Niederlanden 1940–1945* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2017). For comparison with France and Belgium, see Pim Griffioen and Ron Zeller, *Jodenvervolging in Nederland, Frankrijk en België: Overeenkomsten, verschillen, oorzaken* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2010), and Pim Griffioen and Ron Zeller, 'Comparing the persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands, France and Belgium, 1940–1945: Similarities, Differences, Causes', in Romijn et al., *The Persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands, 1940–1945: New Perspectives*, pp. 55–92.

67 NIOD, 182/1c. Minutes of the Jewish Council, 14 July 1942. The information on the deportation numbers is based on Gerhard Hirschfeld, 'Niederlande', in Benz (ed.), *Dimension des Völkermords*, pp. 137–165. List of deportees' names: *In Memoriam* (The Hague: Sdu Publishers, 1995).

Some of the Jews (among them Christian Jews) deported from Westerbork had been transferred here from Amersfoort police transit camp. Of the approximately 42,000 Jews deported to Auschwitz by February 1943, only a few dozen survived. However, some 3,400 Dutch (along with 1,200 Belgian and 5,000 French) Jews were taken off a few of the transports in Koźle (Upper Silesia) to undertake forced labour in local camps; of these, 875 survived, 185 of them Dutch Jews.[68]

Otto Bene, Reich Foreign Office representative in The Hague, noted the start of the deportations in his report to Berlin on 17 July 1942, in which he stated 'that the first two trains have set off without difficulties of any kind' (Doc. 60). Only a few weeks later, however, he was forced to concede that since learning what 'is implied by transport or labour deployment in the East', large numbers of Jews were evading deportation. 'Of the 2,000 summoned for this week', he reported, 'only around 400 turned up. Those who were summoned are no longer to be found in their apartments. There are therefore difficulties in filling the two trains' (Doc. 71).[69]

To ensure full use was made of the trains' capacity, the German authorities changed their approach. After written summonses had failed to yield the desired result, units of the German Order Police and Dutch police arrested Jews who had received these notifications at their homes and brought them, along with their luggage, to assembly points from where they were to travel to Westerbork.[70] This measure was facilitated by a regulation issued in late June 1942 by Hanns Albin Rauter, commissioner general for security, requiring Jews to remain in their homes between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m. (Doc. 53). The collection of people from their homes marked the beginning of a time of mounting anxiety for the Jews. The Jewish writer Sam Goudsmit described such evenings in his diary:

> So this evening again, thousands of Jews in Amsterdam, sitting together with narrowed eyes and the blood drained from their faces, waiting to find out if they will be allowed to sleep at home tonight or will be pounced upon at any moment, when the sound of the bell will cut straight through their heart, and they will have to leave their home behind forever. (Doc. 75)

68 The exact numbers have only recently been ascertained: see Herman van Rens and Annelies Wilms, *Tussenstation Cosel: Joodse mannen uit West-Europa naar dwangarbeiderskampen in Silezië, 1942–1945* (Hilversum: Verloren, 2020). For earlier studies, see L. Landsberger, A. de Haas, and K. Selowsky, *Auschwitz*, vol. 2: *De deportatietransporten van 15 juli tot en met 24 augustus 1942* (The Hague: Nederlandsche Roode Kruis, 1948); Danuta Czech, *Kalendarium der Ereignisse im Konzentrationslager Auschwitz-Birkenau, 1939–1945* (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1989); de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk*, vol. 8/2: *Gevangenen en gedeporteerden*, p. 833.

69 For an attempt to assess the extent of the population's awareness of the persecution of the Jews, see Bart van der Boom, *'We weten niets van hun lot': Gewone Nederlanders en de Holocaust* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2012), and 'Ordinary Dutchmen and the Holocaust: A Summary of Findings', in Peter Romijn et al., *The Persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands, 1940–1945: New Perspectives*, pp. 29–55. Van der Boom's study and its methodology have been sharply criticized: see a summarizing overview in Christina Morina, 'The "bystander" in recent Dutch historiography', *German History*, 32:1 (2014), pp. 101–111.

70 Guus Meershoek, *Dienaren van het gezag: De Amsterdamse politie tijdens de bezetting* (Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 1999); Ad van Liempt and Jan H. Kompagnie (eds.), *Jodenjacht: De onthutsende rol van de Nederlandse politie in de Tweede Wereldoorlog* (Amsterdam: Balans, 2011); Marnix Croes, 'The Dutch Police Force and the Persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands during the German Occupation, 1940–1945', in Bruno De Wever, Herman Van Goethem, and Nico Wouters (eds,), *Local Government in Occupied Europe (1939–1945)* (Ghent: Academia Press, 2006), pp. 67–82.

After months of fear, German refugee Gerhard Durlacher ultimately perceived his arrest like 'a menacing but inevitable natural disaster'.[71]

The German authorities did not keep any of the promises they had made to the Jewish Council. Young children and the elderly were summoned, and letters or cards from Auschwitz forcibly written by the deportees upon arrival reached the Jewish Council only after several weeks, if at all. Only exemptions – or 'exemption stamps' (*Sperrstempel*) as they were termed in reference to the number stamped in the passport of the person exempted – promised relative protection from deportation. Employees of the Jewish Council and their families were exempt, as were members of certain occupational groups, such as diamond merchants or metal dealers, who were considered important to Germany's wartime economy.[72] In view of the opportunity for exemption, as well as the increasing workload, the number of employees at the Jewish Council rose rapidly, at times reaching 10,000. The council thus increasingly became a kind of 'state within the state',[73] responsible for every sphere of Jewish life, from social welfare and hospitals and schools to the cultural programme and efforts on behalf of those who had been selected for labour deployment. David Cohen adopted the maxim 'at least to retain the most important people for as long as possible' (Doc. 79). The scope for action by the Jewish Council was restricted, however, by German directives and orders. The council therefore no longer tended to lodge overarching protests and instead limited them to isolated cases. Its role as an instrument or compliant helper of the occupying forces was the cause of fierce controversy even during the occupation.[74] Employees who survived for some time under the protection of the Jewish Council, such as the writer Grete Weil, recalled its role with ambivalence:

> Today I feel guilt for having been part of the Jewish Council. No one knows what would have happened if it had not existed. […] But for me, it is not a guilt that casts a cloud over my life. I can only say that I would feel easier in my mind if I had not been a part of it.[75]

71 Gerhard Durlacher, *Stripes in the Sky* (London: Serpent's Tail, 1991), p. 28.

72 On the economic interests of the German occupiers in connection with the persecution of the Jews, see Martin Dean, *Robbing the Jews: The Confiscation of Jewish Property in the Holocaust, 1933–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Gerard Aalders, *Nazi Looting: The Plunder of Dutch Jewry during the Second World War* (Oxford: Berg, 2004); Christoph Kreutzmüller, *Händler und Handlungsgehilfen: Der Finanzplatz Amsterdam und die deutschen Großbanken (1918–1945)* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2005); Christoph Kreutzmüller, 'Contested Dispossession: The Netherlands', in Christoph Kreutzmüller and Jonathan R. Zatlin (eds.), *Dispossession: Plundering German Jewry, 1933–1953* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2020), pp. 216–235.

73 The 'state within the state' was Presser's heading for his chapter on the Jewish Council: see Presser, *Ondergang*, vol. 1, p. 214. On the number of employees, see ibid., p. 290.

74 Hans Knoop, *De Joodsche Raad: Het drama van Abraham Asscher en David Cohen* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1983); Willy Lindwer, *Het fatale dilemma: De Joodsche Raad voor Amsterdam 1941–1943* (The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij Koninginnegracht, 1995); Johannes Houwink ten Cate, 'Die moralische Debatte über den Amsterdamer Judenrat', in Norbert Fasse, Johannes Houwink ten Cate, and Horst Lademacher (eds.), *Nationalsozialistische Herrschaft und Besatzungszeit: Historische Erfahrung und Verarbeitung aus niederländischer und deutscher Sicht* (Münster: Waxmann, 2000), pp. 211–216; Bernard Wasserstein, *The Ambiguity of Virtue: Gertrude van Tijn and the Fate of the Dutch Jews* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).

75 Grete Weil, cited in Dorlies Pollmann and Edith Laudowicz (eds.), *Weil ich das Leben liebe: Persönliches und Politisches aus dem Leben engagierter Frauen* (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1981), p. 176.

The deportation of Jewish citizens, now a regular occurrence, provoked protest from various quarters. On 11 July 1942 the Christian churches of the Netherlands appealed to Reich Commissioner Arthur Seyss-Inquart in a telegram, requesting that the measure be cancelled. In particular, the churches intervened on behalf of those who had been baptized but were considered Jews according to National Socialist racial principles (Doc. 65). The churches obtained an exemption from the Reich Commissioner for those who had converted to Christianity and been baptized before January 1941. The telegram of protest was to have been read aloud in every church in the Netherlands on 26 July 1942, but Seyss-Inquart made the exemption for those who had been baptized conditional on the telegram not being read out. The Dutch Reformed Church complied, but the majority of the other churches did not. The Reich Commissioner now sought to undermine the solidarity of the Dutch churches by exempting Jews who had converted to Protestantism, while those baptized in the Catholic Church were deported as punishment for the reading out of the telegram. His attempts to play off the churches against each other proved unsuccessful, but overall Catholics of Jewish origin still had a much slighter chance of survival than non-Aryan Protestants (Doc. 69).

The illegal newspapers published in the Netherlands also took a stand against the deportations. *Het Parool* and other newspapers repeatedly addressed the horrific fate of the Jews and called upon the Dutch population to provide active help.[76] In August 1942 they even published a joint 'Manifesto on the Reintroduction of Slavery', in which they demanded: 'Protect the Jews wherever you can. Hide them, give them shelter and food, however hard it may be for you!' (Doc. 68). A two-page leaflet titled 'Netherlands, Wake Up' (*Nederland Ontwaakt*), dated 24 July 1942, reacted to the first transport from Amsterdam, stating that at Westerbork 'Jewish men were separated from their wives and deported in German livestock wagons with an unknown destination to their mass grave far beyond the German border … It must never be allowed for 120,000 Dutch Jews to be driven like animals to the slaughter.'[77]

Nonetheless, many Jews felt helpless and exposed. Jules Schelvis, one of the few survivors, described this sentiment retrospectively:

> What was most painful for us was the humiliation to which we were subjected. To be completely defenceless and unable to do anything to end this degrading state of affairs. Why was no one able to stop what happened to us? How could the world allow us, upright Dutch citizens, to be treated like dirt?[78]

The Dutch government in exile in London spoke out when the deportations began. On 25 July 1942 Prime Minister Gerbrandy declared on Radio Oranje, the Dutch-language programme of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), that the implementation of these measures was 'in breach of the Dutch constitution, according to which all

76 See, for example, *Het Parool*, 14 July 1942, p. 1; no. 4, 25 July 1942, p. 3; and no. 42, 21 August 1942, p. 5; Madelon de Keizer, *Het Parool 1940–1945: Verzetsblad in oorlogstijd* (Amsterdam: Otto Cramwinckel, 1991).

77 NIOD, collection 556, box no. 40; Jewish Historical Museum, Amsterdam.

78 Jules Schelvis, *Er reed een trein naar Sobibor* (Hooghalen: Herinneringscentrum Kamp Westerbork, 2012), p. 36.

citizens are equal before the law' (Doc. 64). Overall, however, the Dutch government in exile did relatively little for the persecuted Jews in the Netherlands during the first few months. When David Cohen was asked by his acquaintance Meyer Sluijser what the government in exile had done for the Jews, he replied: 'My answer to that is short: Nothing.'[79]

By the beginning of 1942 the Germans had already interned more than 5,000 Jews in Dutch labour camps,[80] a measure that had originally been intended for the Dutch unemployed. In so doing, the occupation authorities had brought a section of the Dutch Jews under their control. At the end of September 1942 Rauter reported to Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler on his further plans: 'We hope to reach a total of 8,000 Jews by 1 October. These 8,000 Jews have around 22,000 relatives throughout Holland. On 1 October the Werkverruiming [labour] camps will be occupied by me at a stroke, and on the same day the relatives outside the camps will be arrested' (Doc. 81).

Westerbork transit camp had been established as a central refugee camp back in the autumn of 1939. For this reason, Jewish refugees from Germany who had been interned there since the creation of the camp were at the top of the Jewish prisoner hierarchy even after Westerbork was taken over by the German occupation authorities in the summer of 1942. Konrad Gemmeker, a former policeman and employee of the Security Police, was in charge of the camp, which was guarded jointly by members of the German SS and the Dutch military police. The internal organization, however, was largely in Jewish hands. The 'long-term' camp inmates, as they were known, often held key positions and were able to make similarly favourable positions available to friends and acquaintances. Sometimes they were even able to influence who was included on transport lists. That ability fostered conflict within the camp between the German Jews and the Dutch Jews. According to Aad van As, a non-Jewish administrative official from the Westerbork municipality who dealt with both groups: 'The Jewish population in the camp resisted the idea that they should follow orders given by German Jewish émigrés on Dutch soil. For that is how it was seen. They were regarded as Germans, not as fellow Jews who suffered under the occupying forces in the same way.'[81]

The constant fear of deportation dominated life in Westerbork more than such internal conflict and all the hardships in the camp. Advantageous positions in the camp administration, at the hospital, or with the 'Westerbork Revue', the camp cabaret featuring well-known Jewish performers and musicians, provided only a temporary reprieve. Inmates repeatedly had to bid farewell to friends and relatives who were deported. As a nurse in Westerbork, Jeanne van den Berg-van Cleeff witnessed many transports: 'I had to take the people to the train, all the way to the railway wagon. Adults, children, and babies. The wagons were simply loaded up with those who were there.'[82]

79 David Cohen, *Voorzitter van de Joodse Raad: De herinneringen van David Cohen (1941–1943)*, ed. Erik Sommers (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2010), p. 205. On the role of the government in exile, see also Jord Schaap, *Het recht om te waarschuwen: Jodenvervolging en vernieuwing in de Radio Oranjetoespraken van Wilhelmina* (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 2005), and Onno Sinke, *Verzet vanuit de verte: De behoedzame koers van Radio Oranje* (Amsterdam: Augustus, 2009).

80 PMJ 5, p. 45.

81 Aad van As, *In het hol van de leeuw* (Hooghalen: Herinneringscentrum Kamp Westerbork, 2004), p. 67.

82 Anna Hájková, 'Das Polizeiliche Durchgangslager Westerbork', in Wolfgang Benz and Barbara Distel (eds.), *Terror im Westen: Nationalsozialistische Lager in den Niederlanden, Belgien und Lux-*

Besides Westerbork there were two other camps in the Netherlands in which Jews were interned over a lengthy period. In January 1943 the SS established Vught concentration camp, officially named KL Herzogenbusch due to its proximity to the town of 's-Hertogenbosch. In addition to non-Jews in protective custody, university students, and hostages, thousands of Jews were temporarily interned here. Many of them were forced to undertake hard physical labour as members of work squads and were mistreated (Doc. 108). Both Jews and non-Jews detailed to the Philips electrical company were lucky to start with. The work there was relatively tolerable, and both the company's management and its employees sought to alleviate the situation of the Jews (Doc. 144). However, the firm could prevent neither the departure of a transport with more than 1,000 Jews that travelled from Vught directly to Auschwitz in November 1943, nor the eventual deportation of the remaining Jewish inmates of the camp to Westerbork.[83] Those deported from Vught to Auschwitz survived there until January 1944, when approximately 300 men and 5 women were distributed among various labour camps and all the others were murdered. Only 53 persons from this deportation survived and returned to the Netherlands after their liberation.[84]

In what became the third transit camp in the Netherlands, at Barneveld, a small town in the province of Gelderland, several hundred intellectuals, artists, and otherwise well-known persons were interned in two small castles from December 1942. Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart had allowed Dutch secretaries general Karel Frederiks and Jan van Dam, who as the most senior ministry officials were in charge of the Dutch administration, to name around 500 Jews who were to be considered 'privileged' and thus exempted from deportation (Doc. 102). This status protected the inmates for less than a year. In September 1943 the camp was closed, and the internees were first sent to Westerbork and later deported to Theresienstadt. Henny Bing-Rudelsheim, a member of the so-called Barneveld Group, recalled the shock of learning that they would be deported from Westerbork to the East.[85] Bing-Rudelsheim survived, but many of her fellow sufferers were deported from Theresienstadt to Auschwitz and other camps, where they perished. Although the secretaries general had repeatedly protested against the treatment of the Jews during the first years of the occupation, barely anything was done to protect the Jews after the start of the deportations, with the exception of the granting of protected

emburg 1940–1945 (Berlin: Metropol, 2004), pp. 217–248; Nanda van der Zee, *Westerbork: Het doorgangskamp en zijn commandant* (Soesterberg: Aspekt, 2006); Jeanne van den Berg-van Cleeff, 'Verpleegster uit nood', in Guido Abuys and Dirk Mulder (eds.), *Genezen verklaard voor … Een ziekenhuis in kamp Westerbork, 1939–1945* (Hooghalen: Herinneringscentrum Kamp Westerbork, 2006), p. 36.

83 P. W. Klein and Justus van de Kamp, *Het Philips-Kommando in Kamp* Vught (Amsterdam: Contact, 2003); Hans de Vries, 'Konzentrationslager Herzogenbusch (Vught)', in Wolfgang Benz and Barbara Distel (eds.), *Der Ort des Terrors*, vol. 7: *Niederhagen/Wewelsburg, Lublin-Majdanek, Arbeitsdorf, Herzogenbusch (Vught), Bergen-Belsen, Mittelbau-Dora* (Munich: Beck, 2008), pp. 153–184.

84 An early post-war study by L. Landsberger, A. de Haas, and K. Selowsky, *Auschwitz*, vol. 4: *De deportatietransporten in 1943* (The Hague: Nederlandsche Roode Kruis, 1953), pp. 44 and 57–59, mentions 38 survivors (32 males and 6 females). However, new research indicates that the number of survivors was higher – 53: see Aline Pennewaard, 'Lists and Human Beings: The Deportation of Dutch Jewry, Viewed from Within and Without, 1942–1943,' PhD dissertation, University of Haifa (2021).

85 'Waar is zuster Henny?', in Abuys and Mulder, *Genezen verklaard voor …*, p. 61.

status to the Barneveld group. The 'exemptions' which many Jews hoped would protect them from deportation thus became increasingly important. At the same time, these exemptions provided the German authorities with a means of categorizing Jews and of treating particular groups in different ways and playing them off against each other. New exemption lists appeared repeatedly, along with new categories that promised exclusion from deportation. From the autumn of 1942 the Central Office for Jewish Emigration issued exemption stamps for 'foreign Jews' and for 'Portuguese Jews', whose status as Jews was hard to determine because of queries over their ancestry.[86] 'Jews by ancestry' (*Abstammungsjuden*) were spared for the time being because their 'racial' origin had yet to be clarified. Jews 'offered for exchange' (*Angebotsjuden*) too were temporarily spared, because they might be exchanged for Germans interned abroad. In addition, there were lists for the Jewish Council, for Protestants of Jewish descent, for 'armaments Jews' and 'diamond Jews', as well as for Jewish men and women with non-Jewish spouses, who were deemed to be part of mixed marriages (Doc. 112). Many Jews used all means available to them to get onto a list that seemed to offer them protection, with more than 30,000 persons thus listed by the end of December 1942. Coen Rood, a survivor of various camps, described in retrospect the attitude to life adopted by many Jews at that time: 'Every opportunity to stay is taken, and every transport that leaves without you on it is a step closer to liberation.'[87] At the same time, many assessed their situation very realistically, including the author and journalist Salomon de Vries: 'My wife and I had a few good chances [of being deported]. I had a couple of "exemptions", but these were on paper, and under very specific circumstances the Germans have traditionally shown a truly German disdain for everything that is written on paper and has had a seal put on it' (Doc. 76). Mirjam Bolle, an employee of the Jewish Council, described the situation in a letter written in February 1943: 'this Sperre [exemption] affair is a dark chapter indeed. The Germans tossed us a bone and watched with glee as the Jews fought for it.'[88] In practice, lists suddenly expired, depending on the needs and wishes of the Central Office for Jewish Emigration, while the number on the lists might be arbitrarily decreased or all those on the list deported as a group, as in the case of the 'privileged' Jews from Barneveld. For these reasons, an exemption stamp offered protection that was at most temporary.

To hide or 'go underground' was the only other way to avoid deportation. The family of Edith Samuel-Jakobs, for example, reacted immediately to their summons: 'When Rose and Martin, at the age of sixteen, were notified of their selection to report for "labour deployment", it was high time to disappear.'[89] There were various possibilities. One could try to lead a life as normal as possible in a new location with a false passport

86 A considerable number of Portuguese Jews applied to the German official in charge of 'racially ambiguous' cases, Hans Georg Calmeyer, seeking to be recognized as non-racially Jewish and thus to be exempted from anti-Jewish measures in general and deportation in particular. See Geraldien von Frijtag Drabbe Künzel, *Het geval Calmeyer* (Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt, 2008), and Jaap Cohen, *De onontkoombare afkomst van Eli d'Oliveira: Een Portugees-Joodse familiegeschiedenis* (Amsterdam and Antwerp: Querido, 2015), pp. 349–455.

87 Coen Rood, *Onze dagen: Herinneringen aan de jodenvervolging* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2011), p. 37.

88 Letter dated 2 February 1943, in Mirjam Bolle, *Letters Never Sent: Amsterdam, Westerbork, Bergen-Belsen* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2014), p. 57.

89 Rose Jakobs, *De roos die nooit bloeide: Dagboek van een onderduikster, 1942–1944* (Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers, 1999), p. 18.

that lacked the tell-tale 'J', for example helping with the harvest in the countryside. Many Jews sought shelter in the homes of friends and acquaintances as ostensibly distant relatives of their hosts. Parents tried to get their children to safety by lodging them under false names with the families of strangers; resistance groups provided many of them with food ration cards.[90] Anyone unable to obtain a false passport was left with no alternative to life in hiding. Not everyone managed to find relatively comfortable accommodation with the same success as the family of Anne Frank (Doc. 147), who lived in several rooms in a house that were accessible only through a secret entrance and who were provided for by employees of her father Otto Frank's former firm. In many cases, tiny rooms, cellars, or attic partitions served as hiding places which those who were being concealed sometimes could not leave for months on end. Approximately 25,000–28,000 Dutch Jews went into hiding.[91]

A considerable number of Dutch people were ready to help and took Jews who were in danger, even complete strangers, into their homes. In so doing they were taking a great risk. Some took payment for their help. Not infrequently people in hiding had to move to another hiding place because there was a threat of a roundup or because they had been betrayed. Every change of location brought fresh dangers and the challenges of adapting to a new environment. Albert Heymans, who went into hiding, recounted in his memoirs how difficult it had been to keep in touch with family members and to find new places to hide.[92] Conflicts between hosts and their illegal guests were common, the result of their living together in an extremely tight space and of the perilousness of the situation. 'I am aware of the fact that I am homeless, but that does not mean that I have to take insults from you,' said Toni Ringel, a Jewish woman in hiding, when she felt harassed by her 'landlady' (Doc. 106).

The attempt to escape to neutral Switzerland was no less risky. From the summer of 1942, members of the resistance movement in the occupied Netherlands were secretly in

90 Bert-Jan Flim, *Saving the Children: History of the Organized Effort to Rescue Jewish Children in the Netherlands, 1942–1945*, trans. Jeanette Ringold (Bethesda, MD: CDL Press, 2005 [Dutch edn, 1996]); Mark Klempner, *The Heart Has Reasons: Dutch Rescuers of Jewish Children During the Holocaust* (Amsterdam/New York: Night Stand Books, 2012).

91 Jozeph Michman and Bert-Jan Flim, *The Encyclopedia of the Righteous Among the Nations – Rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust: The Netherlands* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2004), p. xxxix. Scholars differ on the numbers of those who went into hiding. See de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk*, vols. 6/1, *Juli '42–mei '43*, pp. 356–360, and 7/1, *Mei '43–juni '44*, p. 441; and Marnix Croes and Peter Tammes, *'Gif laten wij niet voortbestaan': Een onderzoek naar de overlevingskansen van joden in Nederlandse gemeenten 1940–1945* (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2004), pp. 174–196. See also Marnix Croes, 'The Netherlands, 1942–1945: Survival in Hiding and the Hunt for Hidden Jews,' in Beate Kosmala and Feliks Tych (eds.), *Facing the Nazi Genocide: Non-Jews and Jews in Europe, 1941–1945* (Berlin: Metropol, 2004), pp. 41–72; Pinchas Bar-Efrat, *Denunciation and Rescue: Dutch Society and the Holocaust* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2017), pp. 25–27; and de Jong, *Jodenvervolging in Nederland 1940–1945*, pp. 1321–1322.

92 Albert Heymans, *Jood zonder ster* (Westervoort: Van Gruting, 1999), p. 81. On life in hiding, see Ad van Liempt, *Hitler's Bounty Hunters: The Betrayal of the Jews*, trans. S.J. Leinbach (Oxford: Berg, 2005 [Dutch edn, 2002]); Bob Moore, *Survivors: Jewish Self-Help and Rescue in Nazi-Occupied Western Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Marnix Croes and Beate Kosmala, 'Facing Deportation in Germany and the Netherlands: Survival in Hiding', in Beate Kosmala and Georgi Verbeeck (eds.), *Facing the Catastrophe: Jews and non-Jews in Europe during World War II* (Oxford: Berg, 2011), pp. 97–158.

contact with Switzerland. The so-called Swiss route was also used to convey information to the Dutch government in exile in London, and information about the persecution of the Jews made its way out of the Netherlands through this channel. Only a few hundred Jews, however, entered Switzerland via Belgium and France.[93] Another escape route, from the Netherlands via Belgium and France to Spain, was initiated by the Zionist Palestine Pioneers (Halutzim). They managed to rescue between 150 and 200 youngsters. Similarly, the 'Nanno' and 'Dutch-Paris' networks rescued hundreds of Jews by channelling them via the escape route to Spain.[94]

By the end of February 1943, a total of 46,455 persons – almost one third of all the Jews living in the Netherlands – had already been deported to Auschwitz, and the transports continued to depart from Westerbork regularly, at least once a week. Of the Jews deported by that date, usually no more than ten persons per transport survived the war. In a speech to the Germanic SS on 22 March 1943, Commissioner General Rauter affirmed the Germans' goal once again: 'We hope that in the foreseeable future there will no longer be a single Jew in the Netherlands walking around freely in the streets' (Doc. 113). Meanwhile, in January 1943 Het Apeldoornsche Bosch, a psychiatric institution for Jews, was emptied and all the patients deported, along with many of the nursing staff (Docs. 103 and 104). Not one of them survived. When making arrests, the German and Dutch police no longer spared the infirm, the elderly, or children. The destination of the deportation trains that left between March and the end of July 1943 was not Auschwitz, but rather Sobibor extermination camp. Of the 31,313 persons taken there on nineteen transports, only 18 survived the war. One of the survivors, Jules Schelvis, described the end of the train journey: 'Early Friday morning, after travelling for seventy hours, the last little grain of our endurance was used up. We could not bear any more. Extreme fatigue had rendered us so apathetic that we no longer took an interest in where we were going and what work we were to do.'[95] Almost all of the others who were deported to Sobibor were murdered in the gas chambers upon arrival. Selma Wijnberg-Engel was the only Dutch person to survive the uprising there in October 1943. She returned to the Netherlands after the war.

For the Jews who were still living legally in the Netherlands, the spring of 1943 brought a further restriction. In March, by order of Rauter, those living in the provinces of Friesland, Groningen, Drente, Overijssel, Gelderland, Limburg, North Brabant, and Seeland were forced to move to Vught camp. Only one month later the Jewish inhabitants of the remaining provinces – Utrecht, North Holland, and South Holland – suffered the same fate (Doc. 117). All the Jews still at liberty were thus concentrated in

93 Jenny Gans Premsela, *Vluchtweg: Aan de bezetter ontsnapt* (Baarn: Bosch en Keuning, 1990).

94 Moore, *Victims and Survivors*, pp. 168–170; Moore, *Survivors*, pp. 58–70; Igal Benjamin, *Faithful to Their Destiny and to Themselves: The Zionist Pioneers' Underground in the Netherlands in War and Holocaust* (Jerusalem: Yad Tabenkin and Ghetto Fighters' House, 1988) (in Hebrew).

95 Schelvis, *Er reed een trein*, p. 37. On the deportations to Sobibor, see also Elie Aron Cohen and Aad Nuis, *De negentien treinen naar Sobibor* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1979); Jules Schelvis, *Sobibor: A History of a Nazi Death Camp* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014); Saartje Wijnberg-Engel, *Dancing through Darkness: When Love and Dreams Survived a Nazi Death Camp* (Nashville: Dunham Books, 2012); Jules Schelvis, *Inside the Gates: An Authentic Story of Two Years in German Concentration Camps, 1943–1945*, trans. Senta Kushkulei-Engelstein and Gerda Baardman (Tricht: Elzenhorst, 1990 [Dutch edn, 1982]).

Amsterdam, which made it easier for the occupying forces to carry out roundups and arrests.[96]

In the spring of 1943 the mood shifted among the Dutch population, which had already increasingly turned against the occupiers over the course of 1942, as more and more Dutch men were required to perform forced labour in Germany. In late April 1943 more than 250,000 army personnel who had been quickly released from detention following Dutch capitulation in 1940 were required by the German occupiers to resume their status as prisoners of war, so that they could be deployed for forced labour in Germany. Strikes broke out in nearly every part of the country. Factory workers refused to work, as did employees of department stores and shops. Farmers stopped delivering grain. Only in Amsterdam, after the experiences of the strike of February 1941, did the situation remain calm. The German occupiers reacted with force and crushed the strikes within a week, with almost 200 persons losing their lives in the process.[97] Increasing numbers of Dutch non-Jews subsequently also went underground in order to avoid forced labour in Germany. The strikes in April and May 1943 marked a turning point in the occupation, with an increase in both organized resistance, which had previously remained slight, and support for those who were in hiding. Jews could now count on receiving greater help while living illicitly. For many, however, the shift in public opinion came too late – almost half of the 140,000 Jews living in the Netherlands had already been deported, and most of them murdered.

During this period, the Central Office for Jewish Emigration reduced the number of exemptions. In addition to the so-called armaments Jews and other groups, this cutback now affected the Jewish Council itself. On 21 May 1943 aus der Fünten notified the chairmen of the Jewish Council that half of its employees, around 7,000 persons, would be deported. The Jewish Council was to make the selection of employees. Despite grave reservations, both chairmen took on the task assigned to them. David Cohen justified that decision in his memoirs: 'It was no longer just the lives of those who had been selected and summoned that were at stake, but the lives of those whom the Jewish Council needed in order to obtain exemptions.' For this reason, the council tried to identify those who were essential to 'ensure the progress of the work'.[98] Harrowing scenes ensued in the days and nights that followed (Doc. 123). Although the Jewish Council had scraped together the prescribed number of employees for deportation, the number of people who turned up at the specified assembly point on 25 May was far too low to meet the Germans' requirement. As a result 3,000 people were arrested in a major roundup carried out by the German Order Police in Amsterdam's Jewish quarter. They were deported to Westerbork. Over the following weeks and months, several thousand additional Jews were arrested during several large-scale raids in Amsterdam and then deported. Ed van Thijn, who was later mayor of Amsterdam, described his impressions in retrospect:

96 Croes and Tammes, *'Gif laten wij niet voortbestaan'*.

97 B. A. Sijes, *De Arbeidsinzet: De gedwongen arbeid van Nederlanders in Duitsland 1940–1945* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966); Bart van der Boom, *Wij leven nog: De stemming in bezet Nederland* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2003); Barbara Beuys, *Leben mit dem Feind: Amsterdam unter deutscher Besatzung, Mai 1940 – Mai 1945* (Munich: DTV, 2012); de Jong, *Koninkrijk*, vol. 6/2: *Juli '42–mei '43*, pp. 799–862.

98 Cohen, *Voorzitter van de Joodse Raad*, p. 166.

'What still sticks in my memory is the tremendous noise that accompanied such a roundup. The stomp of boots as they marched along the street. The squeal of brakes bringing the trucks to a halt. The loud bellow of commands that left no doubt: "All Jews are to come with us!!!"'[99]

In addition, the German police intensified the search for Jews in hiding in the provinces. In the final large roundup, which took place on 29 September 1943, the last remaining employees of the Jewish Council, including both of its chairmen, were arrested and taken to Westerbork, as were all the other Jews still in Amsterdam. Cohen described his final moments in Amsterdam:

> So, during the night, I went to Amstel Station, where I met aus der Fünten, who told me that this was the total liquidation. […] I was overcome by an enormous sense of relief because now, at last, I no longer had to keep saying goodbye to those who were leaving. Instead, I was myself part of a transport.[100]

Only a few individuals and Jews living in mixed marriages remained behind. The Jews from Barneveld camp and 300 Jews from Vught were also taken to Westerbork at this time. The Philips 'work squad', with more than 1,000 Jews, remained in Vught for the time being. Thus, at the end of September 1943, with the exception of the members of this work detail, those in hiding, and those in mixed marriages, all Jews remaining in the Netherlands, more than 30,000 in all, were imprisoned in Westerbork camp. From there, they were deported to either Sobibor or Auschwitz, to which transports had resumed in August 1943. There were between 1,000 and 3,000 persons on each transport. Although allowed to remain in the Netherlands for the time being, Jews living in mixed marriages were not left undisturbed, however. In May 1943 Wilhelm Harster, Senior Commander of the Security Police, stated that the Germans planned to allow Jewish women in mixed marriages over the age of 45, who could be assumed to be past childbearing age, to remove the yellow star from their clothing. He continued: 'For the rest of the Jewish men and women, voluntary sterilization is to be sought, and it is to be carried out in Amsterdam' (Doc. 118). The Christian churches lodged protests with Seyss-Inquart against these plans, arguing: 'Sterilization represents a desecration both of divine commandments and of human law' (Doc. 122). More than 8,910 Jews living in mixed marriages were affected by the plans for sterilization. Of the persons concerned, 2,562 either provided (often fake) proof of their inability to reproduce in light of their age or underwent sterilization. The remainder used various strategies to avoid sterilization and the deportation with which they were threatened if they refused, or they escaped the attention of the German authorities as time passed. The number of forced sterilizations performed cannot be accurately determined, but it seems likely that slightly fewer than 500 men and around 20 women were affected. The Netherlands was the only occupied country where sterilizations of Jews were carried out.

Those who refused to undergo sterilization initially remained with their families in the Netherlands. A directive from Berlin put paid to plans made by the Security Police's section for Jewish affairs to deport Jews in mixed marriages to the extermination camps

99 Ed van Thijn, *Achttien adressen* (Amsterdam: Augustus, 2004), p. 14.
100 Cohen, *Voorzitter van de Joodse Raad*, pp. 183–184.

in the near future.[101] For this reason, on 30 October 1943 Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart stated: 'The elimination of Jewish blood from the Dutch Volksgemeinschaft has, generally speaking, reached the level stipulated by the Reich' (Doc. 146). By this date, 87,351 Jews had been deported from the Netherlands.

The Reich Commissioner's statement did not mean that the deportations from the Netherlands were to be regarded as complete. The Jews in Westerbork were granted only a brief respite, with no deportation trains running between mid November 1943 and mid January 1944. Epidemics had broken out at Westerbork camp, which was placed under quarantine, and at the same time the trains were needed for military purposes (Doc. 152). On 11 January 1944, however, the transports were resumed, and 1,037 Jews were deported to Bergen-Belsen. Although the intervals were greater in the period that followed, nineteen more trains had left Westerbork by the end of September 1944. In addition to departing for Auschwitz, the trains now also ran to Theresienstadt and Bergen-Belsen.

The Theresienstadt ghetto in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, publicized by the National Socialists as a ghetto for the elderly and even presented to foreign visitors as a model Jewish settlement, had been established in November 1941. From 1942 onwards Jews who either were over the age of sixty-five or had acquired special merit in the view of the German authorities were deported to Theresienstadt.[102] From the Netherlands, the Security Police's section for Jewish affairs sent to Theresienstadt many Jews who until then had been regarded as privileged, that is, those who had been interned in Barneveld. It also sent the 'Portuguese Jews', whose applications to be classified as not being members of the 'Jewish race' had been rejected, as well as many Protestants of Jewish origin. In addition, numerous leading members of the Jewish Council and individuals who had 'made an outstanding contribution to the de-Jewification of the Netherlands and to the Westerbork camp' were deported to Theresienstadt.[103] In 1944 five transport trains carrying a total of 4,270 persons made the journey there.

As a result of German propaganda, the inmates of Westerbork considered Theresienstadt to be less dreadful than Auschwitz or Sobibor. Accordingly, being placed on the transport lists for Theresienstadt appeared to be the lesser evil. Gertrud Slottke, a German employee of the Security Police's section for Jewish affairs who was involved in organizing the deportations, recorded: 'While a fairly elevated mood prevailed among the Jews in the case of the first two transports to Bergen-Belsen and Theresienstadt, this mood plummeted again in the case of the transport to Auschwitz' (Doc. 152). But even Theresienstadt was no guarantee of survival. More than 3,000 Jews from the Netherlands were deported from there to Auschwitz, where most of them were murdered. David Cohen, the former co-chairman of the Jewish Council, was among the survivors of Theresienstadt; 433 other fortunate Dutch Jews were evacuated from Theresienstadt

101 Michman et al., *Pinkas*, pp. 191–192; Boterman, *Duitse daders*, p. 462, note 638; Coen Stuldreher, *De legale rest: Gemengd gehuwde Joden onder de Duitse bezetting* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2007), pp. 277–317 and pp. 328–337.

102 H. G. Adler, *Theresienstadt, 1941–1945: The Face of a Coerced Community*, trans. Belinda Cooper (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017 [German edn, 1955]).

103 Letter from the Jewish Council to the commandant's office at Theresienstadt, dated 24 Jan. 1944: NIOD, 077/1290.

to Switzerland in February 1945, following negotiations between Himmler and Jean-Marie Musy, the former president of the Swiss Confederation.[104]

In April 1943 a 'holding camp' (*Aufenthaltslager*) was established within the Bergen-Belsen camp complex.[105] By July 1944 there were around 4,000 prisoners in the so-called Star Camp (*Sternlager*), which was designated for those Jews from Western Europe who were scheduled to be part of an exchange for German nationals interned in countries not under German control who were to be brought 'back to the Reich'. The largest group, some 3,500 in total, was made up of Jews from the Netherlands, who were deported to Bergen-Belsen from Westerbork.[106] The Central Office for Jewish Emigration, in co-operation with the Security Police's section for Jewish affairs, decided who was to be deported to Bergen-Belsen. Jews who held dual citizenship or citizenship of a Latin American country or who were in possession of a 'Palestine certificate', an entry permit for Palestine, or even an application for an entry permit, were eligible for exchange.[107] Diamond cutters, including Abraham Asscher, co-chairman of the Jewish Council, were also sent to Bergen-Belsen, as well as persons who had used their sizeable assets in an attempt to improve their chances of survival. Of the Jews with Palestine certificates, a total of 222 were selected in June 1944 for emigration to Palestine. In her diary, Mirjam Bolle described the horrendous scenes during the selection of those who were to make the journey and the unease of everyone when the departure was delayed. A few days later, she found out that she was one of the lucky ones: 'I'm on the train and I can't believe it,' she recorded.[108] A harsh fate awaited those who had to stay behind in Bergen-Belsen. From March 1944 prisoners from other camps, usually those located in Poland, had begun to be transferred to Bergen-Belsen, which became a site of horror, with devastating epidemics and completely inadequate food supplies. The so-called exchange Jews, until then among the privileged, had to fight for their survival along with everyone else in the camp.[109] The sisters Margot and Anne Frank were among those transported from Auschwitz to Bergen-Belsen. In the chaotic months of spring 1945, they perished at Bergen-Belsen, as did more than 17,000 others.

In October 1943 Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart had expressed satisfaction with the progress of the persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands. In July of the following year Otto Bene, representative of the Reich Foreign Office, went one step further:

104 See Adler, *Theresienstadt*, pp. 161–162.

105 Jo Reilly, David Cesarani, Tony Kushner, and Colin Richmond (eds.), *Belsen in History and Memory* (London: Frank Cass, 1997); Alexandra Wenck, *Zwischen Menschenhandel und 'Endlösung': Das Konzentrationslager Bergen-Belsen* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2000); Eberhard Kolb, *Bergen-Belsen: Vom 'Aufenthaltslager' zum Konzentrationslager 1943–1945* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002).

106 Reilly et al. (eds.), *Belsen in History and Memory*, p. 46.

107 Chaya Brasz, 'Rescue Attempts by the Dutch Jewish Community in Palestine 1940–1945', in Jozeph Michman (ed.), *Dutch Jewish History: Proceedings of the Fifth Symposium on the History of the Jews in the Netherlands* (Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Institute for Research on Dutch Jewry, 1993), pp. 339–352.

108 Letter dated 30 June 1943 in Bolle, *Letters Never Sent*, p. 270.

109 Abel Jacob Herzberg, *Amor Fati: Seven Essays on Bergen-Belsen*, trans. Jack Santcross (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2016 [Dutch edn, 1980]), pp. 23–24 and 63–64; Fré Melkman-de Paauw, *Hoe het verder gaat, weet niemand: Naoorlogse brieven uit Amsterdam naar Palestina* (Amsterdam: Contact, 2002), pp. 37–38.

> For the Netherlands, the Jewish question can be considered solved, now that the majority of the Jews have been removed from the country. The Jews still here are in camps or under constant supervision. Of the Jews who have gone to ground, several are picked up almost every day and taken to camps.[110]

By this date 99,216 persons had been deported from the Netherlands. By the time of the last transport, which left Westerbork on 13 September 1944, that number increased by 3,776 and included the last Jews from Vught camp, where the section designated for Jews had been permanently closed in early June 1944. The Jews in the Philips 'work squad' were deported from Vught directly to Auschwitz in November 1943.

Of the 28,000 Jews who had gone into hiding, close to 12,000 were tracked down in their hiding places by the police or by special 'Jew-hunters', mostly as a result of betrayal or denunciation.[111] One Dutchwoman described in a letter the arrest of a girl who had been hidden in her family's home (Doc. 163).

With the Allied invasion of Normandy, launched on 6 June 1944, and the advance of the Allied forces, the Dutch population hoped the occupation would soon end. Resistance intensified and the Jews still living in the Netherlands, whether in hiding, in Westerbork or in limited freedom, mobilized all their strength in an effort to hold out until the anticipated liberation.

When it was rumoured on 5 September 1944 that the first Dutch town in the south-western part of the country had been liberated, panic arose among the Germans and their Dutch collaborators, many of whom hastily departed the western region of the country and sometimes even the Netherlands itself. The rest of the Dutch population, on the other hand, made ready for an end to occupation rule and prepared to welcome the Allied troops. But the rumour turned out to be false. In fact, Maastricht, in the far south-east of the country, was the first Dutch town to be liberated, and not until ten days later. The Allies continued their advance and liberated a wide swathe of land in the southern Netherlands, but the attempt to cross the Rhine at Arnhem failed and the capture of the regions north of the Rhine was delayed until the spring of 1945. Until then most of the Netherlands, including the large cities in the western part of the country, remained under German control.

The Allied advance once again brought many of the Jews living in hiding into great danger. Edith Samuel-Jakobs recalled this time with mixed feelings: 'We sat in the cellar for four days. Our hosts had been evacuated with all their neighbours, but we could not go with them because we had no fake identity documents.'[112]

The Jews in the northern and western regions of the country therefore still had to get through the winter of 1944/45. To support the advance of the Allies and thwart the German troops, in September 1944 the government in exile had called for Dutch railway workers to strike. The Reich Commissariat for the Occupied Dutch Territories responded by halting all food deliveries and fuel transports to the western part of the country for six weeks. Particularly in the densely populated region that included Utrecht,

110 Letter from Otto Bene to the Reich Foreign Office, dated 20 July 1944, PA AA, R 99 429.

111 Marnix Croes, 'The Holocaust in the Netherlands and the Rate of Jewish Survival', *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, vol. 20, no. 3 (2006), pp. 474–499; van Liempt and Kompagnie, *Jodenjacht*, especially pp. 11–31 and 53–117; Pinchas Bar-Efrat, *Denunciation and Rescue*, pp. 90–95.

112 Jakobs, *De roos die nooit bloeide*, p. 127.

Amsterdam, and Rotterdam, this measure led to a catastrophic famine. The long, harsh winter exacerbated the situation, and more than 20,000 Dutch people died of hunger and cold.[113] The situation for the Jews in hiding was particularly dire. They were dependent on the help of their hosts, who themselves often did not have enough to eat. Foraging trips into the surrounding countryside were particularly dangerous because the German occupiers and their helpers were continuing to search for them. Even if the Jews who were in hiding still had any articles of value left after all the years that had passed, most of them had no opportunity to exchange them for food or fuel.

With the beginning of spring the Allies continued their offensive. After capturing the bridge across the Rhine at Remagen in Germany, some forces proceeded to the north-west and liberated the northern part of the Netherlands from German control. On 12 April 1945 Canadian troops reached Westerbork camp, which the German guards had abandoned shortly before, and 850 Jewish prisoners enthusiastically welcomed the soldiers (Doc. 171). On 5 May, after almost exactly five years of occupation, the German troops in the Netherlands capitulated. In Amsterdam, however, it was three more days before Allied forces entered the city. On 7 May 1945 German naval personnel shot into the celebrating crowds. Not until the day after this incident, which claimed 20 lives and injured more than 100, was the occupation also definitely over in Amsterdam.[114]

Of the 140,000 'full Jews' living in the Netherlands at the onset of the war, around 107,000 were deported during the years of the German occupation. Only just over 5,000 of them survived, most of whom returned to the Netherlands after the war. Approximately 500 Jews were killed in the Netherlands and around 750 took their own lives. The high mortality rate is explained in part by the success of the German occupiers in enforcing anti-Jewish measures in the Netherlands with exceptional speed and in carrying out an uninterrupted series of deportations in quick succession from July 1942 onwards. Additionally, for a long time the Jewish victims had considered themselves safe, because Dutch neutrality prior to occupation and the high level of Jewish integration into Dutch society had led the Jews to believe that they could count on the support of the Gentiles, the authorities, and their neighbours. Although many Dutch people did indeed help to hide and rescue Jews, the efficient state apparatus collaborated with the occupying forces in many ways and many ordinary Dutch people turned a blind eye. Moreover, the organized Dutch underground resistance did not take shape until 1943, a long time after the deportation of the Jews had begun. The Jewish Council established by the German occupiers in February 1941, which was under the direct control of and pressure from the Central Office for Jewish Emigration, an outpost of Eichmann's network, opted to cooperate with the Germans in the hope of thereby preventing something worse. Ultimately, the solidarity of the non-Jewish Dutch population came too late: 75 per cent of the Dutch Jews were murdered. This was the highest death rate in Western Europe and one of the highest in all the countries within the German sphere of control.[115]

113 Henri van der Zee, *De Hongerwinter: Van Dolle Dinsdag tot Bevrijding* (The Hague: BZZTôH, 1989).

114 Guus Meershoek, 'Onder nationaalsocialistisch bewind', in Doeko Bosscher, Augustinus J. J. Meershoek, and Piet de Rooy (eds.), *Geschiedenis van Amsterdam. Tweestrijd om de hoofdstad 1900–2000* (Amsterdam: Sun, 2007), pp. 235–335.

115 On this, see J. C. H. Blom, 'The Persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands in a Comparative International Perspective', in Michman (ed.), *Dutch Jewish History*, pp. 273–290; Bob Moore, 'Warum fielen dem Holocaust so viele niederländische Juden zum Opfer? Ein Erklärungsversuch', in Fasse et al. (eds.), *Nationalsozialistische Herrschaft und Besatzungszeit*, pp. 191–210.

Belgium

Belgium was under German military administration until shortly before its liberation in 1944. Two départements in northern France, Nord and Pas-de-Calais, were also put under the control of the military government in Brussels. General Alexander von Falkenhausen was the military commander in Belgium and northern France, with Eggert Reeder chief of the military administration. While the Belgian government in exile established itself in London, King Leopold III remained in Belgium as a prisoner of war held by the Germans. The secretaries general (the most senior ministry officials) cooperated with the occupiers in the attempt to preserve the provisions of the Belgian constitution and to pursue a policy of the 'lesser evil'.[116]

The Jewish population was registered by the Belgian administration in accordance with a German decree issued on 28 October 1940. The registration figures indicated that more than 50,000 Jews were living in Belgium at this time. In reality, however, that number may well have been greater than 70,000, because many Jews ignored the call to register; 93 per cent of the Jewish population were not Belgian citizens and most had only been in the country since emigrating from Central and Eastern Europe sometime between 1927 and 1932. The number of Jews who had fled to Belgium from Germany and Austria by May 1940 is estimated at 25,000. Less than half held either German or Austrian citizenship; more than 30 per cent were Polish.[117] Approximately 3,500 of them were deported to southern France by the Belgian authorities – in some cases voluntarily; many of them joined forces with the large numbers of Belgians fleeing to France, including Belgian Jews. The total number of Jews fleeing Belgium for France is estimated at 10,000–15,000.[118] Even among the 7 per cent of Jews in the country with Belgian citizenship, a considerable number originated elsewhere and had been naturalized before the mid 1920s.

In November 1941 the German military administration created the Association of Jews in Belgium (Association des Juifs en Belgique/Vereniging van Joden in België,

116 Werner Warmbrunn, *The German Occupation of Belgium, 1940–1944* (New York: Peter Lang, 1993); Mark van den Wijngaert, *Het beleid van het comité van de secretarissen-generaal in België tijdens de Duitse bezetting 1940–1944* (Brussels: K.A.W.L.S.K., 1975).

117 Insa Meinen and Ahlrich Meyer, *Verfolgt von Land zu Land: Jüdische Flüchtlinge in Westeuropa 1938–1944* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2013), pp. 115–116.

118 Frank Caestecker, *Ongewenste gasten: Joodse vluchtelingen en migranten in de dertiger jaren in België* (Brussels: VUBPRESS, 1993), pp. 251–252; Rudi van Doorslaer, 'Les enfants du ghetto: L'immigration juive communiste en Belgique et la quête de la modernité (1925–1940)', in Rudi van Doorslaer (ed.), *Les Juifs de Belgique: De l'immigration au génocide, 1925–1945* (Brussels: Centre de recherches et d'études historiques de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, 1994), p. 61; Rudi van Doorslaer, 'Jewish Immigration and Communism in Belgium, 1925–1939', in Dan Michman (ed.), *Belgium and the Holocaust: Jews, Belgians, Germans* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1998), pp. 63–82, here p. 63; Maxime Steinberg, *La Persécution des Juifs de Belgique (1940–1945)* (Brussels: Vie ouvrière, 2004), p. 132; Lieven Saerens, 'De Jodenvervolging in België in cijfers', *Bijdragen tot de Eigentijdse Geschiedenis/ Cahiers d'histoire du temps présent*, 17 (2006), pp. 199–235; Meinen and Meyer, *Verfolgt von Land zu Land*, p. 89; Frank Seberechts, 'Les Juifs en Belgique durant l'entre-deux-guerres', in Rudi van Doorslaer et al. (eds.), *La Belgique docile: Les autorités belges et la persécution des Juifs en Belgique durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale* (Brussels: CEGES, 2007), pp. 45–53 (published in Dutch in *Gewillig België: Overheid en jodenvervolging tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog* [Brussels: SOMA, 2007], pp. 44–52). Subsequent references to this source will be from *La Belgique docile* with the page numbers from *Gewillig België* given in brackets.

AJB/VJB), with Chief Rabbi Salomon Ullmann as its chairman, to serve as the central representative body of the Jewish population.[119] The association was in constant contact with Kurt Asche, the official in charge of Jewish affairs at the Office of the Security Police and the SD in Brussels. A decree of 27 May 1942 made it compulsory for Jews to wear the yellow star from June 1942. This led to the first conflicts between the German occupiers and the Belgian authorities. In Brussels and Liège the relevant municipal administrations refused to distribute the badges.[120] In Antwerp, however, the Germans had already reshaped the municipal administration the previous year, strengthening the influence of the Flemish collaborationist party, Vlaams Nationaal Verbond (VNV). The new mayor, Leo Delwaide, was an advocate of unconditional collaboration, and he ordered the municipal officials to implement the decree without delay.[121]

Under German pressure, in September 1940 the Council of Secretaries General had already agreed in principle to the introduction of voluntary labour service in Belgium and in Germany.[122] On 6 March 1942 the military government issued a decree introducing labour conscription for adult Belgians for deployment within Belgium. This was followed on 11 March 1942 by a special decree on the compulsory labour deployment of adult Jews, which was subsequently amended on 8 May. Forced labour deployment for Jews was implemented predominantly in the labour camps of the Organization Todt along the Atlantic Wall in northern France, where manpower was urgently needed. This forced labour deployment was organized by the Belgian employment offices under the supervision of the National Employment Office, which the military administration had established the previous year. From mid June to mid September 1942, around 2,000 Jews were taken to the labour camps of the Organization Todt located between Calais and Abbeville.[123] The creation of this first forced labour detail aroused great anxiety among

119 Dan Michman, 'La fondation de l'AJB dans une perspective internationale', in Jean-Philippe Schreiber and Rudi van Doorslaer (eds.), *Les Curateurs du ghetto: L'Association des Juifs en Belgique sous l'occupation nazie* (Brussels: Labor, 2004), pp. 29–56, published in Dutch in Rudi van Doorslaer and Jean-Philippe Schreiber (eds.), *De curatoren van het ghetto: De vereniging van de joden in België tijdens de nazi-bezetting* (Tielt: Lannoo, 2004), pp. 25–45. Subsequent references to this source will be from *Les Curateurs du ghetto* with the page numbers from *De curatoren van het ghetto* given in brackets.

120 See PMJ 5/193. The mayor of Brussels, Jules Coelst, had already expressed his solidarity with the Jewish population in the spring of 1942 by making space in the city's schools available to the Association of Jews in Belgium for teaching Jewish children: see PMJ 5/195, and Rudi van Doorslaer, 'Conclusion finale', in van Doorslaer et al. (eds.), *La Belgique docile*, p. 1136 (*Gewillig België*, p. 1102).

121 Lieven Saerens, *Vreemdelingen in een wereldstad: Een geschiedenis van Antwerpen en zijn joodse bevolking (1880–1944)* (Tielt: Lannoo, 2000); Lieven Saerens, *Étrangers dans la cité: Anvers et ses Juifs (1880–1944)* (Brussels: Labor, 2005); Nico Wouters, 'La chasse aux Juifs, 1942–1944', in van Doorslaer et al. (eds.), *La Belgique docile*, pp. 547–662 (*Gewillig België*, pp. 555–557).

122 Referred to in *VOBl-BNF* (68), no. 2, 7 March 1942, pp. 844–845.

123 On labour deployment, see Sophie Vandepontseele, 'Le travail obligatoire des Juifs en Belgique et dans le nord de la France', in Schreiber and van Doorslaer (eds.) *Les Curateurs du ghetto*, pp. 189–231 (*De curatoren van het ghetto*, pp. 149–212); Frank Seberechts, 'Spoliation et travail obligatoire', in van Doorslaer et al. (eds.), *La Belgique docile*, p. 449 (*Gewillig België*, p. 439); Danielle Delmaire, 'The Fate of the Jewish Communities in the North of France during World War II,' in Michman (ed.), *Belgium and the Holocaust*, pp. 337–338.

the Jewish population in Belgium (Doc. 174). In October 1942 Jews from these camps were sent directly to Mechelen transit camp, and from there to the death camps.

The second call for the 'labour deployment' of Jews followed in July 1942. It was a product of the arrangements made at the Wannsee Conference in January 1942, and the concrete plans of the German officials in charge of Jewish affairs in Western Europe (Doc. 235). As a first step, 10,000 Jews were to be deported from Belgium to the East, ostensibly to be deployed as labour. An intervention by Reeder ensured that Jews who were Belgian citizens were not to be included initially because, as Werner von Bargen, representative of the Reich Foreign Office, noted in a report to Berlin, they were regarded as Belgians by the rest of the population (Doc. 175).

The German military administration was able to organize deportations on such a scale only with the support of the Belgian authorities. However, such support was not a foregone conclusion. Even when the first summons for labour deployment was issued, the individual municipal administrations reacted very differently. Two thirds of the Jews who had been taken to northern France to construct the Atlantic Wall came from the Greater Antwerp area. In Brussels, by contrast, in early July, Mayor Coelst had refused to have the city police arrest Jews who had not complied with the summons.[124] The German Oberfeldkommandantur turned to the governor of Brabant, who passed on the problem to Gerard Romsée, secretary general of the Ministry of the Interior. The latter, though a member of Vlaams Nationaal Verbond, supported the position of the mayor of Brussels in an official letter to von Falkenhausen. The arrest of Jews who refused to perform labour, he said, was 'undoubtedly one of the tasks' which must 'quite logically [elicit] psychological resistance on the part of the Belgian police.[125]

On 15 July 1942 Maurice Benedictus, the secretary of the Association of Jews in Belgium, received orders from Asche to make preparations for labour deployment in Germany. A register with the names of able-bodied Jews was to be created within ten days, and these Jews were ordered to appear at the Dossin Barracks in Mechelen when so ordered. The barracks at the town of Mechelen, located halfway between Brussels and Antwerp, became the assembly camp for transports to the East, similar to Westerbork in the Netherlands and Drancy in France.[126]

In the following weeks, 13,000 persons received notifications sent out by the newly established Labour Deployment Office of the Association of Jews in Belgium, but only slightly more than 4,000 of them reported as ordered. Marcel Liebman was thirteen years old when he was informed by letter that he and his brother were to report to the barracks at Mechelen within twelve hours:

124 Coelst, who had spoken out as late as 1939 in favour of restricting opportunities for immigration into Belgium, was dismissed from the municipal administration in September 1942 upon the creation of 'Greater Brussels'.

125 Letter from Coelst to the Oberfeldkommandantur in Brussels, 6 July 1942, and letter from Romsée to Falkenhausen, 29 August 1942, both cited in Wouters, 'La chasse aux Juifs', pp. 433, 532 (*Gewillig België*, pp. 436, 534). Only 86 of the 200 summoned for labour deployment had in fact left Brussels for forced labour in northern France on 26 June 1942: Vandepontseele, 'Le travail obligatoire des Juifs en Belgique et dans le nord de la France', p. 217.

126 Laurence Schram, 'La Caserne Dossin à Malines, 1942–1944', *Les Cahiers de la Mémoire Contemporaine / Bijdragen tot de Eigentijdse Herinnering*, no. 12 (2016), pp. 99–117.

> I remember those hectic hours well. We were in a state of excitement that was also bound up with a bit of fear and a kind of pride. […] When my brother and I visited a few friends that afternoon to bid them farewell, we behaved – without any coercion, without difficulty – in a resolute, unwavering manner, as if we were obeying a mobilization order that made us into soldiers of a noble cause.[127]

The first deportation train left Belgium on 4 August 1942, bound for Auschwitz. Of the 999 deportees – 426 women and 573 men, including 51 children under the age of 15 and 5 persons over the age of 61 – 254 were murdered immediately upon arrival. Of the 744 persons selected for forced labour, 7 survived the war.[128] The following transport left on 11 August with 999 deportees, of whom 3 survived the war. Salomon van den Berg, the chairman of the Brussels committee of the Association of Jews in Belgium, noted in his diary a few days later: 'Summer in Mechelen, where one only talks about the Jews who arrive by train or lorry and depart like livestock. When people talk about it, they have tears in their eyes, but it can't be helped; we are helpless in the face of this misfortune.'[129] Dreadful scenes unfolded over the course of these weeks in the offices of the association, which had to centralize the requests for exemption from forced labour. The father of Marcel Liebman observed 'mothers whose children had been summoned to report to Mechelen and who wanted to be reassured about their fate', as well as

> men and women who begged the heads of the AJB [Association of Jews in Belgium] to grant them an exemption because they would otherwise have to leave small children behind. An indescribable, confused mass of people was formed wherever these parents, all in tears, encountered the couriers going in and out of the AJB office, the bearers of the fateful calls.[130]

By 15 August three trains carrying 2,997 people in total had left Belgium for Auschwitz. This approach evidently would not enable the German Security Police to meet the quota that had been set: originally, 10,000 Jews were to be deported by the end of October, but in August the target had been increased to 20,000 persons by the end of the year.[131] As a result the German authorities turned to a method already tested in the Netherlands and in France: the mass arrest of Jews by means of roundups. They started with a large roundup in Antwerp during the night of 15/16 August 1942. With the support of the Belgian police, the German Security Police arrested between 998 and 1067 Jews and transported them to Mechelen.[132] Before the end of September, four more roundups

127 Marcel Liebman, *Né Juif: Une enfance juive pendant la guerre* (Paris: Duculot, 1977).

128 Wouters, 'La chasse aux Juifs', p. 537 (*Gewillig België*, p. 539); Ward Adriaens et al., *Mecheln – Auschwitz 1942–1944: De vernietiging van de Joden en zigeuners van België / La destruction des Juifs et des Tsiganes de Belgique / The Destruction of the Jews and Gypsies from Belgium*, vol. 1 (Brussels: VUBPRESS, 2009), pp. 281–282. This four-volume work provides a detailed overview of all the transports.

129 Diary of Salomon van den Berg, Wiener Library, PIII i/275, p. 67, entry for 18 August 1942.

130 Liebman, *Né Juif*, p. 54.

131 Adriaens et al., *Mecheln – Auschwitz*, vol. 1, p. 73.

132 Wouters, 'La chasse aux Juifs', p. 544 (*Gewillig België*, p. 546). Insa Meinen, *Die Shoah in Belgien* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2009), gives the number of Jews arrested during the night of 15/16 August in Antwerp as 845 (p. 44).

followed at short intervals. They took place in Brussels, where the arrests were largely carried out by German forces (Security Police and SD, Feldgendarmerie (uniformed military police), Geheime Feldpolizei (secret military police), and members of the Wehrmacht); in the French regions that were part of the area controlled by the German military administration in Belgium and northern France (Doc. 270); and in Antwerp. During each of these roundups between 500 and 1,000 Jews were detained. The roundup in Brussels, carried out during the night of 3/4 September, concluded with 660 arrests and had to be chalked up as a failure by the German authorities, not least because the capital had the largest share of Belgium's Jewish population.

Salomon van den Berg described the arrests in the Belgian capital in his diary: 'The streets are blocked and the Germans haul the Jews out of their houses. Men, women, children of every age, in ill health or not, they have to leave everything behind and are carried off like livestock in trucks and sent who knows where, surely to Mechelen.' Because the raids always took place at night, van den Berg continued, foreign Jews tried not to stay overnight in their homes. Belgian Jews, by contrast, had not thus far been troubled, he noted. This immunity had been a concession to the king and the government, he wrote, 'so that they can say, after all, that they have done something for the Jews. I will admit that they can't change much and are doing everything possible, but it is insufficient.'[133]

What was the situation like for the refugees from Germany and Austria? On 6 June 1941 the Austrian writer Jean Améry, then still known as Hans Mayer, had successfully escaped to Belgium from the internment camp at Gurs in France. Almost forty years after the event, he gave an account of the situation for Jewish refugees in Antwerp:

> The inhabitants of Antwerp were truly mistrustful of the émigrés, who indeed brought about a foreign infiltration of certain parts of the city. Some of them were really well dressed and, because they were not allowed to pursue any work, sat around for hours in the cafés in the main street and engaged in animated discussions.

The refugees were, in turn, 'quite simply afraid of the locals: the ponderous, stocky, thoroughly Germanic type intimidated them, as did the language, which was related to the Low German dialect.' The relationship between 'native' Jews and foreign Jews, too, was perceived by Améry as problematic:

> The émigrés thus [lived] in a double ghetto: the local Jews did indeed provide for them, but had scarcely any personal contact with them, as their Yiddish culture, with its Flemish varnish, drew a clear line between them and the Germans and Austrians; the Belgians were altogether unwilling to get involved with the alien crowds of uprooted people that surged through the streets as an unfamiliar element.[134]

133 Diary of Salomon van den Berg, pp. 70–71, entry dated 3 Sept. 1942. On the experiences of Jews in Brussels during this period, see Lieven Saerens, *Onwillig Brussel: Een verhaal over Jodenvervolging en verzet* (Leuven: Davidsfonds, 2014).

134 Jean Améry, 'Verfemt und verbannt: Vor dreißig Jahren – Erinnerungen an die Emigration. Manuskript für den Deutschlandfunk 1968/69', in *Werke*, vol. 2 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2002), pp. 804–805.

In Antwerp the roundups for the deportations to Poland took place concurrently with the call-up of workers for the Organization Todt in the départements of northern France governed by Brussels. The last transport to northern France left the city on 12 September 1942, one day after a large roundup in which 1,422 Jews had been taken into custody. To avoid mingling the two transports, the persons scheduled for the transport to Auschwitz were assembled at the railway station, while those recruited for forced labour in northern France were to gather in front of the employment office, although only 40 of the 500 who had been called up actually appeared, as word of the roundup the previous day had spread.[135]

For various reasons the number of Jews arrested in roundups in Antwerp was quite high, but the number for Brussels far lower. In Antwerp, Mayor Leo Delwaide had never prevented Belgian police from assisting with the arrests. The Belgian police were far more familiar with the local context than the German police forces. The roundup on 28/29 August was carried out predominantly by Belgian police, under significant German pressure (Doc. 180). After the war Delwaide declared that after this roundup he protested to the Germans and was promised that Belgian police would not be involved in any further arrests; however, they continued to participate in roundups. By contrast, in Brussels Mayor Jules Coelst, referring to the legal definition of the police's tasks, refused to permit his officials to cooperate and so the roundups were carried out exclusively by German forces, though including members of the Flemish SS.[136] In addition, the Jewish population in Brussels lived scattered throughout the city, whereas the relatively compact Jewish residential neighbourhoods in Antwerp made arrests easier.[137] In order to fill the planned transports to Auschwitz, from mid September 1942 the Security Police and the SD launched several manhunts, mainly in Brussels and Antwerp.

A total of 4,468 Jews were arrested in the various raids and deported to the East. During the last major roundup, which took place from 22 to 24 September 1942 in Antwerp, Jews with Belgian citizenship were also arrested and transported to Mechelen. That led the Belgian government to lodge fierce protests once more with Reeder, who in turn instructed Ernst Ehlers, representative of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, to order that no more roundups of Belgian Jews were to take place.[138]

As a result, the German police switched to arresting individual Jews and entire families using the registration lists from 1941 as a basis. The number of Jews arrested in this way was remarkably high. Between August and October 1942 such arrests accounted for more than 40 per cent of the Jews deported to Auschwitz. Seeking to save their own lives, Jewish informants also assisted the Germans, with denunciations regularly leading to the arrest of Jews in hiding and creating a climate of general uncertainty (Doc. 209).[139]

135 Vandepontseele, 'Le travail obligatoire des Juifs en Belgique et dans le nord de la France', pp. 214–216.

136 Griffioen and Zeller, *Jodenvervolging in Nederland, Frankrijk en België*, pp. 529–530.

137 Saerens, *Vreemdelingen in een wereldstad*, pp. 592–649.

138 Meinen, *Die Shoah in Belgien*, p. 49.

139 Adriaens et al., *Mecheln – Auschwitz*, vol. 1, p. 104. A description of this manhunt is found in Maxime Steinberg, *L'Etoile et le fusil*, vol. 3: *La Traque des Juifs, 1942–1944* (Brussels: Vie Ouvrière, 1986), pp. 208–209; also see Insa Meinen, 'Facing Deportation: How Jews Were Arrested in Belgium,' *Yad Vashem Studies*, 36:1 (2008), p. 71. For detailed descriptions of several Jewish informants in Brussels, see Saerens, *Onwillig Brussel*, pp. 84–86.

The employees of the German Customs Service in Belgium also participated in the arrests. The Foreign Exchange Protection Commando (Devisenschutzkommando, DSK), which had operated in Western Europe since the beginning of the occupation in 1940, had a particular part to play. It took action on behalf of Göring's Office of the Four-Year Plan and cooperated closely with the military administration and the Security Police in order to pursue violations of the obligation to register foreign currency, gold, diamonds, securities and the like, a requirement which had been introduced by the military administration. Consequently, the DSK had quickly acquired an important role in the systematic expropriation of the Jewish population in Brussels and Antwerp. Its employees, who were not usually uniformed, were authorized to conduct house searches, make arrests, and carry out interrogations, and because they were not immediately recognized, they were able to apprehend many Jews who were keeping a low profile – such as the German refugee Rudolf Samson and his mother, who had risked escape from the Netherlands in August 1942 in the hope of reaching unoccupied France. They were captured in Brussels by the DSK and deported to Auschwitz eight days later (Doc. 179).[140]

To reach the targets established by the Nazi leadership in Berlin, 1,300 Jews who had been deployed in the summer as forced labourers along the Atlantic Wall were ordered back to Mechelen in October 1942 and included in the last two convoys of the year, which went to Auschwitz. Thus from July to the end of October 1942 a total of 16,624 persons were deported from Belgium on seventeen transports – almost two thirds of all the Jews deported by the Germans from Belgium during the entire occupation period.[141]

Immediately after Jews were arrested and transferred to Mechelen, the employees of the Western Office (Dienststelle Westen) of the Rosenberg Task Force, directed by its head of operations, Franz Mader, began confiscating household furnishings that had been left behind. By the time the occupation ended, under the supervision of the military administration's department for economic affairs more than 100,000 cubic metres of household effects had been taken to Germany or to German offices in Belgium.[142]

In mid September 1942 the military administration declared itself satisfied with the progress of the persecution thus far. The arrests, it stated, had taken place largely unnoticed by the Belgian public, and in any case the Belgian authorities were concerned solely about the Jews who held Belgian citizenship (Doc. 185). The illegal newspapers, however, insistently drew attention to the crimes and to the solidly united stance of the population (Doc. 181). And in his report 'on public opinion in Belgium' dated 1 December 1942, Paul Struye, a Brussels lawyer, also noted the outrage that the deportation of the Jews by the German occupiers had unleashed among local residents, despite the 'moderate antisemitism' prevailing most notably in Brussels and Antwerp. While the first coercive measures against Jews had met with indifference, Struye remarked, the

140 Meinen, 'Facing Deportation,' pp. 51–72.

141 In this connection, Belgian historian Maxime Steinberg refers to the 'hundred days' in which the majority of the deportations of Jews took place: Steinberg, *L'Etoile et le fusil*, vol. 2: *1942: Les cent jours de la déportation des Juifs de Belgique* (Brussels: Vie Ouvrière, 1984); see also Maxime Steinberg, 'The *Judenpolitik* in Belgium within the West European Context: Comparative Observations', in Michman (ed.), *Belgium and the Holocaust,* pp. 199–221, here p. 113; Thierry Rozenblum, *Une cité si ardente: Les Juifs de Liège sous l'Occupation (1940–1944)* (Brussels: Pire, 2010), pp. 158–159.

142 Johanna Pezechkian, 'La "Möbelaktion" en Belgique', *Bijdragen tot de Eigentijdse Geschiedenis / Cahiers d'histoire du temps présent*, 10 (2002), pp. 153–180.

forcible separation of parents and children in particular had engendered universal sympathy and a willingness to help.[143]

However, official protests, whether from the royal family, the Belgian administrative apparatus or the Catholic Church, failed to materialize. In contrast to the approach taken in France and in the Netherlands, in Belgium the Catholic Church confined itself to presenting exceptional cases to the occupiers in order to obtain a release. In the summer and autumn of 1942, the Belgian government in exile in London also displayed only limited interest in the fate of Jews in Belgium, although it was informed, at least to some extent, about what was happening in the extermination camps in the East. At an international protest meeting held in London on 29 October 1942, Prime Minister Hubert Pierlot, in a speech given at the Royal Albert Hall and broadcast one week later on Radio Belgique, continued to talk only very generally of 'persecutions' (Doc. 191). This reticence is all the more striking as the same radio station reported in detail on the crimes committed against the Jews in German-occupied Poland, about which the Allies had been informed by the Polish government in exile. Yet, right up until liberation in 1944, the transports of Jews from Belgium to the East were not clearly linked in the public pronouncements of the Belgian government in exile with the mass murder. The government in exile did participate financially in the aid provided to Jewish refugees who managed to escape from Belgium to neutral countries such as Switzerland, Spain or Portugal. In addition, at the request of the Jewish Defence Committee, it released substantial funds for the rescue of Jewish children in Belgium. However, the Belgian minister of colonies, Albert de Vleeschauwer, attempted from London to prevent Jewish refugees from settling in the Belgian Congo, although in September 1942 the minister of foreign affairs, Paul-Henri Spaak, had declared his willingness to supply the necessary visas (Doc. 185).[144]

In contrast to the Netherlands, in Belgium the participation of the Association of Jews in Belgium (AJB/VJB) in the preparations for the deportations met with criticism and resistance after just a few weeks. At the end of July, Maurice Benedictus was replaced as 'labour deployment' liaison between the military administration and the association by Robert Holzinger, a German refugee. On 29 August a group of Jewish communists made an attempt on the life of Holzinger, who died of his injuries a few hours later. The hope that the deportations might thus be stopped was not fulfilled. Nonetheless, during the period that followed, the Germans made less recourse to the services of the AJB/VJB. By the time of the large roundups, the association's assistance in organizing forced labour and in calming the Jewish population was no longer important. In September 1942 Kurt Asche had the chairman, Salomon Ullmann, along with Maurice Benedictus and other leading members of the organization, arrested and temporarily placed in the notorious Breendonk camp. From July to November 1943 Jean Améry was also at Breendonk, in detention cell thirteen, and he later wrote about the torture he experienced

143 The report is published in Paul Struye and Guillaume Jacquemyns, *La Belgique sous l'Occupation allemande (1940–1944)* (Brussels: Édition Complexe, 2002), pp. 157–194, here p. 167. On the relief efforts, see also Steinberg, *L'Etoile et le fusil*, vol. 3, pp. 27–28.

144 Mark Van Den Wijngaert, 'The Belgian Catholics and the Jews during the German Occupation, 1940–1944', in Michman (ed.) *Belgium and the Holocaust*, pp. 228–233; Emmanuel Debruyne, 'The Belgian Government-in-Exile facing the Persecution and Extermination of the Jews', in Jan Láníček and James Jordan (eds.), *Governments-in-Exile and the Jews during the Second World War* (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2013), pp. 197–212.

there.[145] After his successful escape from Belgium in February 1943, Benedictus wrote a report for the Belgian government in exile about his experiences while in detention. Shortly after protests by various prominent Belgians, the leading members of the AJB/VJB were released: 'Upon our return home, each one of us received so many professions of sympathy and interest from the good Belgians, both known and unknown to us,' Benedictus wrote, 'that we were all proud to have paid this price' (Doc. 205). Rabbi Ullmann, who had been subjected to significant physical abuse during his imprisonment, announced his resignation as chairman of the AJB/VJB in early October 1942 (Doc. 188). He was succeeded by Marcel Blum.

On 25 September 1942 Reeder informed the Feldkommandanturen in Belgium and northern France that now 'the complete evacuation of the Jews from the area of command [would be] carried out', with Belgian Jews continuing to be exempted.[146] The chief of the military administration was evidently keen to avoid any disruption to German-Belgian collaboration: 'The office of the German Security Police is instructed to carry out the operation in such a way that it attracts as little public attention as possible and wins no sympathy for the Jews among the population' (Doc. 186). However, as elderly people, women, and children had also been arrested in the roundups, the pretence of 'labour deployment' could no longer be maintained.

In his message to the Feldkommandanturen, Reeder also pointed out that increasing numbers of Jews were attempting to leave the country to avoid arrest. Most of them, probably numbering several thousand, tried to make their way through France to Switzerland or to Spain and Portugal (Doc. 195) and got at least as far as France. In the attempt, they had to cross several borders and usually availed themselves of the expensive services of agents to help them escape. Many refugees were captured while still in France and were then deported via camps on French soil to the death camps in occupied Poland. Numerous records from the DSK and the offices of the German Customs Service prove that many attempts to escape failed even before the individual could leave Belgium, with those who were arrested sent to Mechelen camp (see Doc. 179).[147]

145 Markus Meckl, 'Unter zweifacher Hoheit: Das Auffanglager Breendonk zwischen Militärverwaltung und SD', in Wolfgang Benz and Barbara Distel (eds.), *Terror im Westen: Nationalsozialistische Lager in den Niederlanden, Belgien und Luxemburg 1940–1945* (Berlin: Metropol, 2004), pp. 25–38; Patrick Nefors, *Breendonk, 1940–1945: De geschiedenis* (Antwerp: Standaard, 2004) (French edition: *Breendonk, 1940–1945* [Brussels: Racine, 2006]); Jean Améry, 'Die Tortur', in *Merkur*, 208, no. 2 (July 1965), pp. 623–638; James M. Deen, *The Prisoners of Breendonk: Personal Histories from a World War II Concentration* Camp (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015).

146 Jews with Belgian citizenship were to remain exempt in Belgium but not in northern France, while Jews with French citizenship were to be among those affected in Belgium, but not in northern France.

147 Meinen and Meyer, *Verfolgt von Land zu Land*, pp. 183–222; Ahlrich Meyer and Insa Meinen, 'Transitland Belgien: Jüdische Flüchtlinge in Westeuropa während der Zeit der Deportationen 1942', in *Theresienstädter Studien und Dokumente*, 14 (2007), pp. 378–431; Steinberg, *L'Etoile et le fusil*, vol. 3, pp. 30–32; Heini Bornstein, *Insel Schweiz: Hilfs- und Rettungsaktionen sozialistisch-zionistischer Jugendorganisationen 1939–1945* (Zurich: Chronos, 2000); Insa Meinen, 'Die Deportation der Juden aus Belgien und das Devisenschutzkommando', in Johannes Hürter and Jürgen Zarusky (eds.), *Besatzung, Kollaboration, Holocaust: Neue Studien zur Verfolgung und Ermordung der europäischen Juden* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008), pp. 45–79; Ruth Fivaz-Silbermann, 'Une migration urgente et transitoire: La fuite des Juifs de France en Suisse au temps de la "solution finale,"' *Diasporas*, 20 (2013), pp. 103–108.

Among them was Joseph Hakker who, in an account dated 1944, railed against the large number of fraudulent agents:

> Alleged patriots appeared, who, for a sum of 15,000 to 20,000 francs payable in advance, promised a safe escape to France. In addition, some – for greater safety – took the travellers' money and jewellery in trust. Then they quite simply handed their victims over to the Boche [Germans] at the French border or delivered the lorries in which they had locked their victims directly to the Gestapo. […] In their offices, the unfortunates were forced to write to their families to say that they had arrived safely. It goes without saying that the Jewish families who received such a letter in Belgium or Holland had full confidence in these journeys to Switzerland.[148]

Many Jews for whom an escape from Belgium was out of the question for financial or other reasons sought to keep a low profile when the roundups began in August 1942. They stopped spending the night at home or they changed their place of residence. But in the daytime too the risk of being caught up in an inspection of identity documents and then arrested was omnipresent, and people therefore wore the yellow star increasingly rarely.[149] On 6 October 1942, when Military Commander von Falkenhausen made forced labour in Germany compulsory for all Belgians – hence also for non-Jewish Belgians – outrage at the German occupiers escalated sharply (Docs. 191, 193) and there were increased expressions of solidarity with the Jews. The introduction of universal forced labour ultimately led to a rift between the occupiers and the population, and also between the occupiers and the Belgian authorities, which, up to that point, had been willing to collaborate, for now almost every Belgian family was affected. Resistance increased markedly, also encouraged by the weakening of the occupying forces after the Allied landings in North Africa and military setbacks in the East.[150] Within a few months thousands of Belgians had joined the underground movements, reinforcing the ranks of those who opposed German-Belgian collaboration. The relevant German local military authorities (Kommandanturen) tasked the German police with the arrest of thousands of fellow Belgians who had gone into hiding.[151] The Jews living in Belgium also profited from the increased willingness to resist, as they now encountered fewer difficulties in their search for hiding places, places to stay overnight, and food. The Independence Front (Front de l'Indépendance–Onafhankelijkheidsfront), a resistance movement established in March 1941 and closely allied with the Communist Party, mobilized non-Jewish locals: '*Now the Gestapo wants to deport the entire Jewish population of Belgium*. Tens of thousands of people are facing a horrible death. Time is running out. We must do everything to save them' (Doc. 193).[152]

148 Joseph Hakker, *La Mystérieuse Caserne Dossin à Malines: Le camp de déportation des Juifs* (Anvers: Editions 'Ontwikkeling', 1944), pp. 7–8.

149 Steinberg, *L'Etoile et le fusil*, vol. 3, pp. 28–29.

150 An overview can be found in José Gotovitch, 'Résistances et question juive', in van Doorslaer (ed.), *Les Juifs de Belgique*, pp. 129–136. The Military Commander's regulation is published in *VOBl-BNF*, 7 Oct. 1942, pp. 1050–1051.

151 Wouters, 'La chasse auf Juifs', p. 579 (*Gewillig België*, p. 582).

152 On the Independence Front, see José Gotovitch, *Du rouge au tricolore. Les communistes belges de 1939 à 1944: Un aspect de l'histoire de la Résistance* (Brussels: Labor, 1992).

As Belgium was a predominantly Catholic country, the attitude of the church authorities was of great importance. Several church leaders and church organizations, including seminaries and religious orders, were now more willing to help.[153] In September 1942 the Bishop of Liège, Monseigneur Louis-Joseph Kerkhofs, called on the priests in his diocese to help the persecuted Jews. Numerous children and adults found shelter in Banneux, a place of pilgrimage. They were supplied with food ration stamps and false identity documents that had been obtained by employees of the municipal administration in Liège.[154]

The Jewish resistance also began to establish itself. After the roundup in Brussels at the beginning of September 1942, engineer Hertz Jospa and others in the Independence Front had formed the Jewish Defence Committee (CDJ/JVC),[155] which became the most important Jewish resistance organization in Belgium. It supported Jews who had gone into hiding, looked after Jewish refugees from the Netherlands, and, via the Swiss route, made contact with international Jewish relief organizations such as the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), which provided money to support Jews in Belgium (Doc. 219). A report by the Jewish Defence Committee from the end of 1943 estimated the number of Jews receiving support at 6,500. The committee's main function, however, was to protect Jewish children from deportation. In this endeavour it could count on the support of the National Children's Welfare Society (Œuvre nationale de l'enfance) headed by Yvonne Nèvejean. Most of the children could be placed in various Catholic institutions or with non-Jewish foster families (Doc. 204). More than 3,000 Jewish children were saved this way.[156] Pinkus 'Pierre' Broder, a leading member of the communist resistance in Charleroi, emphasized in his memoirs how important it had been to separate parents in hiding from their children: 'The vast majority of these children spoke French or Flemish without any accent. They could thus easily pose as non-Jews, live freely, either in a family or in an institution, and go to school; in short, lead an almost normal life.'[157]

On 15 January 1943, after a pause of almost three months, the German occupiers resumed the deportation of Jews to occupied Poland, albeit on a more limited scale. By the summer of 1943 three trains, carrying 2,956 Jews in total, had left Mechelen for Auschwitz. During this period a relatively large number of Jews managed to escape from the trains.[158] More than 10 per cent of the deportees, 539 persons, succeeded in escaping

153 Dan Michman (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of the Righteous Among the Nations – Rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust: Belgium* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2005), pp. xix–xxvii.

154 Rozenblum, *Une cité si ardente*, p. 152.

155 Jean-Philippe Schreiber (ed.), *Hertz Jospa: Juif, résistant, communiste* (Brussels: Labor, 1997).

156 Steinberg, *L'Etoile et le fusil*, vol. 3, p. 32; Sylvain Brachfeld, *Ze hebben het overleefd* (Brussels: VUBPRESS, 1997), pp. 64–68 (French edition: *Ils ont survécu: Le sauvetage des Juifs en Belgique occupée* [Brussels: Racine, 2001], pp. 55–64); Lieven Saerens, 'Die Hilfe für Juden in Belgien', in Wolfgang Benz and Juliane Wetzel (eds.), *Solidarität und Hilfe für Juden während der NS-Zeit*, vol. 4: *Slowakei, Bulgarien, Serbien, Kroatien mit Bosnien und Herzegowina, Belgien, Italien* (Berlin: Metropol, 2004), pp. 193–280.

157 Pierre Broder, *Des Juifs debout contre le nazisme* (Brussels: EPO, 1994), p. 147. Pierre was the author's cover name in the resistance movement, and he kept it after the liberation of Belgium.

158 Tanja von Fransecky, *Flucht von Juden aus Deportationszügen in Frankreich, Belgien und den Niederlanden* (Berlin: Metropol, 2014); Rozenblum, *Une cité si ardente,* p. 159; Marion Schreiber, *Stille Rebellen: Der Überfall auf den 20. Deportationszug nach Auschwitz* (Berlin: Aufbau, 2001); Simon Gronowski, *L'Enfant du 20e convoi* (Brussels: Pire, 2005); Maxime Steinberg and Laurence Schram, *Transport XX Malines – Auschwitz* (Brussels: VUBPRESS, 2008).

from the five deportation trains that left between October 1942 and April 1943. Only seven persons had managed to escape from the fifteen previous transports, and only twenty-five persons managed to get away from the final seven trains that left Belgium between April 1943 and the end of July 1944. On two days the number of escapees was particularly high: on 30 October 1942, 240 people managed to escape from Transports XVI and XVII, and on 19 April 1943, more than 200 people escaped from Transport XX. Many of the escapees were later recaptured and deported again. The Jews had previously been taken to Auschwitz in third-class passenger coaches, which were more difficult to make escape-proof, but the transport of 19 April 1943 was the first to be made up of goods wagons and guarded more closely by members of the Order Police drafted in specially from Germany. This transport, which travelled at dusk, was particularly large, with 1,404 people on board. Members of the Jewish resistance had succeeded in staying together upon departure. Using tools they had smuggled in, they managed to set themselves free and jump from the moving train. In addition, three young resistance fighters, Youra (Georges) Livschitz, Robert Maistriau, and Jean Franklemon, launched an attack on the train from outside and freed more prisoners. This raid on a deportation train was the only occurrence of its kind during the entire period of the deportations of Jews in Europe. During this journey German guards shot and killed 26 people (Doc. 208) and 87 others were subsequently recaptured and sent to another transport, but 119 deportees managed to go into hiding until the end of the occupation and survived. Among them was Samuel Perl (Doc. 196), who had escaped for a second time, and 12-year-old Simon Gronowski, who later recalled:

> Suddenly my mother woke me up, I felt a fresh draught of air, the coldness of the night […]. The train was rolling, and the door was wide open. A cluster of people on the left side jumped from the moving train. […] My mother held my right hand in her right hand, and with her left she took hold of my left shoulder and led me to the door as if she were leading me into freedom and into life. […] My mother sat me down on the edge, so that my legs were dangling in the air.[159]

When the train slowed down, the 12-year-old jumped out. His mother had to stay behind in the train, which came to a stop after the discovery of the escapes. Simon Gronowski succeeded in escaping, and he was able to hide until the end of the occupation in the home of acquaintances in a Brussels suburb (Doc. 211); his mother was deported and did not return.

Early in 1943 the Reich Security Main Office planned to resume the deportations from Belgium and closely monitored the course of events. In early December 1942 the head of the Germany Department (Abteilung Deutschland, responsible for anti-Jewish policy), Martin Luther, had tried to put pressure on the German agencies in Belgium to include Jews with Belgian citizenship, particularly members of the Belgian resistance, in the next deportations. He asserted that 'Belgium will have to be thoroughly cleansed of Jews sooner or later, without fail' (Doc. 197). In response to the evasive answer given by Werner von Bargen, the representative in Brussels of the Reich Foreign Office, Luther

159 Gronowski, *L'Enfant du 20e convoi*, p. 97.

insisted that 'Belgian Jews also be gathered' in the assembly camps, and had the correspondence passed on to the Reich Security Main Office.[160] His petitions did not initially yield any concrete results. In 1942 Jews with Belgian citizenship had already been arrested on occasion and imprisoned in Mechelen camp for a lengthy period. After months of interventions by Rabbi Salomon Ullmann, the former chairman of the Association of Jews in Belgium, and other prominent advocates – as rumour had it, even the Dowager Queen Elisabeth of Belgium[161] – they were to be released in two phases. A first group was indeed allowed to leave the camp at the end of June 1943.

One of those concerned, Lucien Hirsch, reported in detail to the Belgian government in exile about the mistreatment and lack of provisioning in Mechelen, and about the preparations for the deportations (Doc. 217). The plans for releasing the other Belgian Jews from Mechelen were thwarted by Himmler's order that Jews with Belgian citizenship henceforth be included in the deportations.[162] Simon Gronowski's sister Ita had obtained Belgian citizenship when she was sixteen. Together with her mother and her younger brother, she had been arrested in March 1943 and that summer she was waiting for the release that had been announced. In mid August she wrote to her father:

> Physically, I'm fine, but psychologically I'm quite ill, I think I'm suffering from neurasthenia. You will laugh, but it's true nonetheless. Not long ago I had a high temperature, I'm certain that it was a result of the transport. For things such as these, one needs to have a heart like a horse to endure the sight.[163]

Ita Gronowski was deported to Auschwitz on 20 September 1943. The German military administration had at first made an effort to delay the deportation of the Belgian Jews, concerned that 'once the intention to arrest Belgian Jews became known, the latter would go underground and the army of illegals and terrorist forces would thereby be reinforced' (Doc. 212). On 20 July 1943, however, General von Falkenhausen gave his consent. With that, the military administration's conciliatory approach towards the Belgian secretaries general was at an end. Yet cooperation had in reality already ceased: since autumn 1942 the policy of the secretaries general of pursuing the 'lesser evil' had given way in practice to perpetual crisis management.[164]

Jews with Belgian citizenship therefore became the target of the last large roundup in Belgium, which took place on 3 and 4 September 1943 (Doc. 214). The German Security Police and their auxiliaries arrested 750 Jews in Brussels and brought them to Mechelen. The majority of the 225 persons arrested in Antwerp had recently been released

160 Luther to Bargen, 25 Jan. 1943, published in Serge Klarsfeld and Maxime Steinberg (eds.), *Die Endlösung der Judenfrage in Belgien: Dokumente* (New York: Klarsfeld Foundation, 1980), pp. 61–62.

161 Adriaens et al., *Mecheln – Auschwitz*, vol. 1, pp. 84–85.

162 The original of Himmler's order has not come to light, but it is referred to in a telex from Department IV B of the Security Police in Brussels to all branch offices, dated 29 June 1943: see Ceges/Soma, AA 556, published in Klarsfeld and Steinberg (eds.), *Die Endlösung der Judenfrage in Belgien*, p. 70.

163 Letter from Ita Gronowski, dated 14 August 1943, in Gronowski, *L'Enfant du 20e convoi*, pp. 138–139.

164 Steinberg, 'The *Judenpolitik* in Belgium within the West European Context', p. 114; Wouters, 'La chasse aux Juifs', p. 586 *(Gewillig België*, p. 588).

from Mechelen, and they now returned to the camp under terrible conditions. During the journey nine persons suffocated in the completely overloaded and tightly sealed wagons. In Brussels, police officials also turned up at the residence of Salomon van den Berg, who had been warned a few hours before but believed that his prominent role as representative of the Belgian Jews would save him. He was able to avoid arrest by citing his position (Doc. 215). He informed Salomon Ullmann, who in turn notified the secretaries general. They asked the military administration – in vain – to release all those who had been arrested. For safety van den Berg and his family henceforth stayed in a different apartment each night. The people arrested in this raid, together with the Belgian citizens still detained in Mechelen, were deported to Auschwitz on 20 September 1943.[165]

The actions of the Germans aroused the indignation of the Belgian secretaries general, who now were able to bring themselves to write a letter of protest to von Falkenhausen in which, for the first and last time during the entire period of occupation, they condemned the persecution of the Jews unequivocally. Only now did they feel compelled to point out the violation of Article 43 of the Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, according to which an occupying power must observe the laws of the occupied country wherever possible. In the letter they also protested against the seizure of homes and the theft of Jewish possessions. These measures, they emphasized, ran counter to the Belgian constitution.[166] Their remonstrations went unheard and the arrest and deportation of Jewish citizens continued. The German police authorities acted alone or relied on assistance from the collaborationist parties and paramilitary militias. The Belgian police now received direct instructions only for minor and local arrest operations, which they generally carried out.

In Antwerp a legal existence for Jews was now impossible. In Brussels, by contrast, employees of the textile industry or members of the Association of Jews in Belgium could still be afforded protection through certificates of exemption issued by the military administration. In addition, Jews who were married to non-Jews, as well as children and elderly people who were housed in the homes of the association, were spared (Doc. 219). All others were in hiding somewhere in the country or had attempted to escape to another country. But in 1944, between January and July, 2,702 additional persons were deported to the East in five transport trains.

The Belgian population welcomed the Allied landings in Normandy in June 1944 with tremendous joy and optimism. Three weeks later Salomon van den Berg began a new diary, in which he expressed his happiness at the fall of Cherbourg: 'It's time to get ready for faster operations; everyone is full of hope.'[167] In July 1944, in a move that revived earlier German plans to convert the military administration into a civil administration affiliated to the Reich, the military commander was replaced by a Reich commissioner (the Gauleiter of Cologne-Aachen, Josef Grohé). However, in the new Reich Commissariat of Belgium, there was little opportunity to intensify the pursuit of the Jews who were in hiding. Plans to continue the roundups with a view to resuming the deportations could no longer be implemented because of the rapid advance of the Allies.

165 Meinen, *Die Shoah in Belgien,* pp. 56–57; diary of Salomon van den Berg, pp. 130 and 132, entries for 6 Sept. and 8 Sept. 1943.

166 Wouters, 'La chasse aux Juifs', p. 587 (*Gewillig België*, pp. 611–612).

167 Diary of Salomon van den Berg, p. 175, entry for 26 June 1944.

The only exception was in Liège, where the German police carried out another arrest operation in early July 1944, targeting Jews with Belgian citizenship.

On 3 September 1944 American troops liberated Brussels, followed by Antwerp one day later. On 31 July 1944 the last deportation train had left Mechelen camp. By that time 24,906 Jews, including 4,082 children, had been deported in twenty-seven transports from Belgium to the extermination camps in Poland.[168] Around 45 per cent of the country's Jewish population had been included in the deportations.[169] Only 1,207 of the deported Jews survived the end of the war.[170]

Luxembourg

On 15 October 1941 the last train carrying Jewish emigrants bound for Portugal departed from the railway station in Luxembourg City. One day later, the first deportation train left from the same station. It brought 331 Jews from Luxembourg to the Lodz ghetto in the Warthegau – the first Jews to be deported to Eastern Europe from a Western European country occupied by Germany.[171] Although 4,000 Jews had still been living in Luxembourg when the Germans invaded on 10 May 1940, only around 700 remained in 1942, most of whom were elderly and in poor health and unable or unwilling to emigrate. In the summer of 1941 the German civil administration had already made it compulsory for Jews to wear the yellow star. The measure had the desired effect: one Luxembourger later recalled that whenever one encountered a Jew with this star, one was 'unbelievably ashamed, but also no longer had the courage to approach him and do something'.[172]

In the summer of 1941 the former abbey at Cinqfontaines (Fünfbrünnen) in Troisvierges (Ulflingen) was repurposed as an assembly camp for approximately 300 inmates and officially named a 'Jewish home for the elderly'. Initially all sick and frail Jews housed in homes for the elderly run by Luxembourg City were required to relocate there. Later the occupiers forced all Jewish families to move to Troisvierges, with the result that the home soon became overcrowded. Only a few of those sent to the home, likely no more than ten, risked escape. The danger of being caught was too great.[173]

In the civil administration, which was under the authority of the Gauleiter of Koblenz-Trier, Gustav Simon, Department IV A was responsible for the registration and expropriation of Jewish property. By the autumn of 1943 it had concluded this bureaucratically organized theft. The value of the confiscated assets – bank accounts, real estate,

168 A total of twenty-eight trains were used for the transports: on 20 Sept. 1943 the same number was assigned to two trains (XXIIa and XXIIb).

169 Meinen, *Die Shoah in Belgien*, p. 184.

170 Ibid., p. 83.

171 Pascale Eberhard (ed.), *Der Überlebenskampf jüdischer Deportierter aus Luxemburg und der Trierer Region im Getto Litzmannstadt: Briefe Mai 1942* (Saarbrücken: Blattlausverlag, 2012).

172 Recollections of Ann Marie F., cited in Mathias Wallerang, *Luxemburg unter nationalsozialistischer Besatzung: Luxemburger berichten* (Mainz: Gesellschaft für Volkskunde in Rheinland-Pfalz, 1997), p. 189.

173 See Marc Schoentgen, 'Das "Jüdische Altersheim" in Fünfbrunnen', in Benz and Distel (eds.), *Terror im Westen*, pp. 49–70; and Paul Cerf, *Longtemps j'aurai mémoire: Documents et témoignages sur les Juifs du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale* (Luxembourg: Editions du Letzeburger Land, 1974), pp. 87 and 92.

and household effects – is estimated at a minimum of 30 million Reichsmarks, of which a portion (exact data are not available) found its way into German hands. A report on the 'transfer of assets' of a Luxembourg firm in October 1941 recorded that Simon had 'initially proceeded on the assumption that, with regard to the "Aryanizations", Luxembourg would be first in line to be considered'. But, the report continued,

> various political considerations had led the Luxembourgers to exercise restraint in this respect, as the involvement in such dealings seemed too risky to them. For this reason, many plots of land, shops, and the few industrial companies had gone to Germans from the Old Reich, albeit with preference being shown to interested parties from the Gau of Koblenz.[174]

The Jews of Luxembourg were deported to the death camps in the East together with Jews from south-western Germany. The Einsatzkommando of the Luxembourg Security Police, under the command of SS-Obersturmbannführer Fritz Hartmann, prepared the transports. The Consistory of the Israelite Religious Community in Luxembourg, known after April 1942 as the Council of Elders of the Jews, was forced to notify those who had been selected for deportation, organize their transport to the railway station, and make arrangements for their provisioning.[175] At the end of April 1942, the second deportation train left Luxembourg, taking twenty-four Jews from Cinqfontaines via Stuttgart to either Lublin-Majdanek or Belzec.[176] In July 1942, when systematic deportations began in the rest of occupied Western Europe, trains ran in quick succession. 'Yet again the spectre of Poland hangs over us,' noted Alfred Oppenheimer, head of the Council of Elders in the Troisvierges home, on 7 July (Doc. 223). On 12 July 1942 a train took 24 Jews from Luxembourg to Chemnitz, where they were combined with a group of 300 Jews from the Reich and taken to Auschwitz. None of them survived.

On 26 July, 24 Luxembourg Jews were deported to Theresienstadt. Two days later another 157 were deported. A few days earlier, they had been required by the German Security Police to report to the railway station in Luxembourg City 'for the purpose of relocation to the Theresienstadt home for the elderly' (Doc. 227). Ester Galler, who had emigrated from Poland to Luxembourg in 1901, was seventy-four years old and living in Cinqfontaines when, in a letter to her cousin, she reported despairingly that all the residents of the home were now to be 'evacuated': 'I do not yet know when my turn will come; however, it will be within approximately 4–5 weeks. You can imagine how agitated I am. I am old, blind, and have problems with my legs' (Doc. 226).

The last sizeable transport, containing 99 persons, left Luxembourg for Theresienstadt on 6 April 1943. It was coupled to a freight train that travelled via Trier, Koblenz,

174 'Bericht vom 29.10.1941 bzgl. Interbank Luxemburg/Ideal-Lederfabrik Wiltz', copy in Mémorial de la Shoah, CLIV-78 (NI 2870).

175 Commission spéciale pour l'étude des spoliations des biens juifs au Luxembourg pendant les années de guerre, 1940–1945, *La Spoliation des biens juifs au Luxembourg 1940–1945: Rapport final* (Luxembourg: La Commission, 2009), pp. 39, 73, and 110.

176 Paul Dostert, 'La déportation des Juifs à partir du territoire luxembourgeois (1941–1943)', in Thorsten Fuchshuber and Renée Wagner (eds.), *Émancipation, éclosion, persécution: Le développement de la communauté juive luxembourgeoise de la Révolution française à la Seconde Guerre mondiale* (Brussels: EME, 2014), pp. 210–211.

Frankfurt, Eisenach, and Dresden, meaning that the journey took more than three days and four nights. 'Everybody is fine and everybody wishes this journey would never end, despite the cold and discomfort, for fear of what lies ahead,' wrote Selma Heumann, one of the deportees, in a letter to Alfred Oppenheimer (Doc. 232). Ester Galler was included in this transport. She died in Theresienstadt the following month.

Shortly afterwards the German police authorities closed Cinqfontaines camp. In May the Reich Security Main Office ordered the deportation of all Jews remaining in Luxembourg, including the members of the Council of Elders. As a result, on 17 June 1943 eight persons, including Alfred Oppenheimer and his family, were deported to Theresienstadt.[177]

For the first deportations the Jews had been taken by bus from their place of residence to the railway station in Luxembourg City, which explains why the non-Jewish population were largely unaware of these events. There were a few professions of solidarity, but overall the deportation of Luxembourg's Jews attracted little attention. They had scarcely any contact with the local population.[178] Moreover, Jews were only one of the groups that were persecuted. In the context of Germanization policy, in 1942 the German civil administration established a so-called ethnicity register (Volkstumskartei). This contained a precise breakdown of the 'ethnically alien' portion of the population, including Italians, French, Belgians, and Poles, and was intended to serve as a basis for resettlements or expulsions. These, however, were to be postponed for political and economic reasons until after the end of the war. At the end of August 1942, the announcement of general military conscription for male Luxembourgers born between 1920 and 1927 set off a wave of strikes, which was brutally quelled by the occupiers. Twenty-one strikers were shot, and many were put in concentration camps. Furthermore, from September 1942 to August 1944 more than 4,000 Luxembourgers were deported for 're-education' purposes, primarily to Silesia and the Sudetenland.[179] Around 40 per cent of those who were conscripted into the Wehrmacht went into hiding – around half of them in Luxembourg itself. Many of those who managed to reach England joined forces with the Allies and subsequently participated in the Normandy landings as members of a Luxembourg battalion within the Belgian Piron Brigade.[180]

In view of the rigid Germanization policy pursued by the civil administration and the measures taken against the strikers, the persecution of the Jews was of lesser interest to the general population. One woman from Luxembourg later summed up the situation by noting that while the Luxembourgers had indeed not been involved in the persecution, they had not helped the Jews a great deal either. While many hundreds of non-Jewish

177 Ibid., p. 215.

178 Marc Schoentgen, 'Luxemburger und Juden im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Zwischen Solidarität und Schweigen', in Marie-Paule Jungblut (ed.), *Et wor alles net esou einfach: Questions sur le Luxembourg et la Deuxième Guerre mondiale: Contributions historiques accompagnant l'exposition* (Luxembourg: Musée d'Histoire de la Ville, 2002), p. 159; Paul Dostert, *Luxemburg zwischen Selbstbehauptung und nationaler Selbstaufgabe: Die deutsche Besatzungspolitik und die Volksdeutsche Bewegung, 1940–1945* (Luxembourg: Imprimerie Saint-Paul, 1985), pp. 165–166.

179 Wallerang, *Luxemburg unter nationalsozialistischer Besatzung*, pp. 86–89.

180 Military units formed in 1940 and comprising Belgian and Luxembourg soldiers who had escaped to Britain. The units were named after their commanding officer, Jean-Baptiste Piron, and fought in Western Europe, for example at the battle of Normandy, in the Netherlands, and in the operation to liberate Belgium.

young men found people who helped them elude the clutches of the occupiers, she said, Jews had been given places to hide only on occasion. At first people had not really believed the Jews were in mortal danger, she maintained, 'then one saw how, little by little, some of them managed to get away; the rest were isolated, and everybody was preoccupied with themselves and ultimately concerned with the young men'.[181]

A number of antisemitic groups already existed in Luxembourg before the war, and even in some resistance circles it was said that Jewish influence must be curbed after the war. At the onset of the occupation, Luxembourgish collaborators, especially the members of the Ethnic German Movement (Volksdeutsche Bewegung, VdB) had been actively involved in anti-Jewish rallies and riots. Overall, however, they remained a small minority in Luxembourg.[182]

Until the summer of 1942 the prevailing impression among exiles was that the Jews who remained in Luxembourg were getting off relatively lightly. For example, in its August–September 1942 issue the English-language *Luxembourg Bulletin*, which was published in Montreal and New York by the government in exile, reported under the headline 'Religious Persecution':

> The Jews of Luxembourg suffered the same cruel fate as their co-religionists in other occupied countries. After the confiscation of their assets, they were expelled; most of them were forced to leave the country without any resources at all and faced a highly uncertain future. Nonetheless, they willingly concede that the situation for Roman Catholics is even worse.[183]

The authors were drawing on a report about the situation for the Jews in Luxembourg that Rabbi Serebrenik had prepared in March 1941 for the government in exile. Serebrenik had argued that the Catholic population had to suffer more, both mentally and physically, than the Jews. The latter, he said, were admittedly driven out of the country with terrible methods, but the Catholics were the objects of a 'mission' to turn them into Germans.[184]

During the second half of 1942, the fate of the remaining Jews in Luxembourg was brought into clearer focus. A leaflet produced in December 1942 by the Inter-Allied Information Committee, chaired by Georges Schommer, a Luxembourger, mentioned the deportation of Jews from Luxembourg to Poland and even assumed – prematurely – that all Jews remaining in Luxembourg had been deported to Theresienstadt (Doc. 230).

After July 1943 the only Jews still living in Luxembourg were either in mixed marriages or among the very few who were able to survive the period of occupation in

181 See Cerf, *Longtemps j'aurai mémoire*, p. 111; quote: recollections of Julie K., cited in Wallerang, *Luxemburg unter nationalsozialistischer Besatzung*, pp. 188–189.

182 Schoentgen, 'Luxemburger und Juden im Zweiten Weltkrieg', p. 160; Marc Schoentgen, 'Luxembourg', in Wolf Gruner and Jörg Osterloh (eds.), *The Greater German Reich and the Jews: Nazi Persecution Policies in the Annexed Territories, 1935–1945*, trans. Bernhard Heise (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015 [German edn, 2010]), pp. 290–315; on the Ethnic German Movement, see Dostert, *Luxemburg zwischen Selbstbehauptung und nationaler Selbstaufgabe*, pp. 217–241.

183 *Luxembourg Bulletin* (Montréal-New York), 2, August–September 1942.

184 Robert Serebrenik, 'Die Lage in Luxemburg, 6. März 1941, ANLux, Gvt exil 380', cited in Dostert, *Luxemburg zwischen Selbstbehauptung und nationaler Selbstaufgabe*, p. 166.

hiding. They lived in constant fear. As one Luxembourger later related: 'If somebody passed by somewhere in the street in the morning, then they thought they were about to be taken away.'[185]

Between 1941 and 1943 approximately 660 Jews were deported from Luxembourg, of whom around 50 were still alive at the end of the war. At least 565 persons managed to leave the country, mostly for France, but were later captured and sent to the extermination camps. In total around 1,400 Jews died as a result of the persecution in Luxembourg, a figure that represents one third of the Jews living in the country at the beginning of 1940.[186]

France

From the start of the occupation France was divided into zones. The Wehrmacht had occupied the northern part of the country as well as the coastal region all the way to the Spanish border, while southern France at first remained unoccupied and was administered by the collaborationist government of the French State (État Français), with its seat at Vichy, under Marshal Philippe Pétain. In the occupied zone, French administrative officials received their instructions from the Vichy government but additionally had to cooperate with the local representatives of the occupiers, these being the Feldkommandanturen and the commanders of the Security Police. In northern France, the two départements of Nord and Pas-de-Calais were assigned to the German military administration in Brussels. From 1940 Alsace and Lorraine, like Luxembourg, were under German civil administration and were de facto annexed. In addition, a narrow strip of territory extending from the Atlantic across the Ardennes to the Jura mountains was considered a restricted area. In the south-eastern part of the country, some communes in the départements of Savoie, Hautes-Alpes, Basses-Alpes, and Alpes-Maritimes were occupied by the Italian army; a strip 50 kilometres wide located west of that area was demilitarized. In November 1942 the Italian zone of occupation was extended to the Rhône and to cover the island of Corsica.[187]

Most Jews were located in the occupied northern zone and in the unoccupied southern zone. In the very first months of the war, the majority of the Jewish population in the annexed territories in eastern France, as well as a portion of the non-Jewish French population, had been evacuated or had fled. A noticeable change in the structure of the German occupation had begun in May 1942 with the appointment of Carl-Albrecht Oberg to the newly created function of Higher SS and Police Leader. The German police's position in relation to the military administration as well as to Military Commander Carl Heinrich von Stülpnagel, appointed in February 1942, had been enhanced as a

185 Recollections of Jean S., cited in Wallerang, *Luxemburg unter nationalsozialistischer Besatzung*, p. 188.

186 Commission spéciale, *La Spoliation des biens juifs au Luxembourg 1940–1945*, p. 10; Schoentgen, 'Luxemburg und Juden im Zweiten Weltkrieg', pp. 360–361; slightly different figures given in Ino Arndt, 'Luxemburg: Deutsche Besetzung und Ausgrenzung der Juden', in Benz (ed.), *Dimension des Völkermords*, pp. 103–104.

187 Eric Alary, *La Ligne de démarcation* (Paris: Perrin, 2003), pp. 25–32.

result.[188] In late 1941, at the urging of the Germans, the Vichy government had created the General Union of French Jews (Union générale des Israélites de France, UGIF), a representative body for all the Jews in the occupied zone and the unoccupied zone. The partition of France was reflected in the fact that the organization's two sections, 'North' and 'South', headed by André Baur and Raymond-Raoul Lambert respectively, worked largely independently of one another.

When the yellow star was introduced in the occupied zone on 7 June 1942, many of the French were outraged and declared their solidarity with the stigmatized Jews. Henri Plard was one of the non-Jews who sewed the star to their clothing: 'I was profoundly indignant at the humiliations that were imposed on our Jewish brothers.'[189] One month later, the occupation authorities denied Jews access to public events and amenities; they were allowed to enter non-Jewish shops and businesses only between 3 p.m. and 4 p.m. (Doc. 242). Such measures separated the Jews from the rest of the French population and prepared the general public for the deportations. The Vichy government refused to extend these measures to the unoccupied zone.

On 11 June 1942 the officials in charge of Jewish affairs from Brussels, The Hague, and Paris agreed that 100,000 Jews, drawn from both occupied and unoccupied France, were to be 'transferred to Auschwitz concentration camp to work' (Doc. 235).[190] Men and women between the ages of sixteen and forty were to be deported in three trains per week, provided they were required to wear the Jewish star and were not living in mixed marriages. It was stipulated that 10 per cent of the deportees could be 'Jews who are not fit for work'. However, in Paris it quickly became apparent over the following days and weeks that so many people could not be deported in such a short time. On 22 June, in an official letter both informing the Reich Foreign Office and ensuring 'that there are no objections to these measures on the part of the Reich Foreign Office either', Eichmann mentioned the deportation of only 40,000 persons.[191]

On the eve of the Second World War, some 300,000 to 330,000 Jews were living in France, approximately half of whom were French citizens. In June 1940, as the German

188 On the structure of the German occupation, see Hans Umbreit, *Der Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich* (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt, 1968); Herbert, *Best*, pp. 251–254; Barbara Lambauer, *Otto Abetz et les Français ou l'envers de la Collaboration* (Paris: Fayard, 2001), pp. 181–182; Gaël Eismann, *Hôtel Majestic: Ordre et sécurité en France occupée (1940–1944)* (Paris: Tallandier, 2010), pp. 97–109; and Gaël Eismann, 'The "Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich" and Order and Security at the Local Level in Occupied France', in De Wever, Van Goethem, and Wouters (eds.), *Local Government in Occupied Europe (1939–1945)*, pp. 147–177.

189 Henri Plard, 'J'ai porté l'étoile en solidarité avec les Juifs', in Brigitte Leblanc and Christelle Chevallier (eds.), *Mémoires de la Shoah, 1933 à 1946: Photographies et témoignages* (Paris: Editions du Chêne, 2005), p. 66.

190 On the 11 June 1942 conference, see Serge Klarsfeld, *Vichy–Auschwitz: Die 'Endlösung der Judenfrage' in Frankreich*, trans. Ahlrich Meyer (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2007), pp. 78–81. The crucial document (RF 1517) was first published in 1947 in French translation in Henri Monneray, *La Persécution des Juifs en France et dans les autres pays de l'Ouest, présentée par la France à Nuremberg* (Paris: Éditions du centre, 1947), pp. 126–127.

191 Reich Security Main Office (Eichmann) to the Reich Foreign Office, 22 June 1942, published in *ADAP*, series E: *1941–1945*, vol. 3: *16. Juni bis 30. September 1942* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1974), doc. 26; Klarsfeld, *Vichy–Auschwitz*, pp. 88–89; Ahlrich Meyer, *Täter im Verhör: Die 'Endlösung der Judenfrage' in Frankreich 1940–1944* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005), pp. 138–140.

troops advanced, many of them had fled to southern France. A French law of 4 October 1940 made it possible to intern foreign Jews, and by winter 1940/41 approximately 50,000 people were in the internment camps in Vichy France, mostly refugees or persons expelled by the National Socialist regime.[192] In 1941 this number decreased rapidly as a result of emigration, escape, and also release. In 1942 there were 10,000 to 12,000 persons in these camps.

In the occupied zone an estimated 7,000 to 8,000 Jews were held in internment camps. Most of them had been arrested during the three roundups in May, August, and December 1941. On 27 March 1942, in retaliation for assassinations carried out by the resistance movement, the Military Commander had ordered the deportation of 1,112 of these internees to Auschwitz. During talks in Paris in early May 1942, René Bousquet, the secretary general of the French police, informed Reinhard Heydrich of the Vichy government's desire to rid itself of the foreign Jews in the southern zone.[193]

After the meeting of the officials in charge of Jewish affairs held in Berlin on 11 June 1942, Eichmann had travelled to the French capital to assist Theodor Dannecker, who was in charge of Jewish affairs for the Security Police and the SD in Paris, in setting the deportations in motion. On 30 June 1942 Dannecker summoned all the Security Police's regional officials dealing with Jewish affairs in the occupied zone to come to Paris, where he gave them precise instructions for the arrest of the Jews in their areas of responsibility (Doc. 238). At the same time he demanded that Jean Leguay, Bousquet's deputy in Paris, instigate the proposed handover of 10,000 Jews from the occupied zone. In addition, he insisted upon the arrest of 22,000 Jews from the Paris metropolitan area, at least 40 per cent of whom were to be French citizens.[194]

In Vichy these demands caused a stir. The French government decided to make a clear distinction in the future between foreign and French Jews and to protect the latter from arrest. Dannecker's demands were then addressed on 2 July 1942 at a meeting between Higher SS and Police Leader Carl Oberg, Helmut Knochen, who was the Senior Commander of the Security Police and the SD, and Bousquet (Doc. 239). The priority of the French chief of police was to protect the local French police authorities from interference by German police and to preserve the independence of the French police as far as possible. Bousquet succeeded to a certain extent in this objective.[195] In return,

192 See PMJ 5/242 and 262, and Denis Peschanski, *La France des camps: L'internement 1938–1946* (Paris: Gallimard, 2002), p. 256.

193 There were four internment camps in the occupied zone: Compiègne, Drancy, Pithiviers, and Beaune-la-Rolande, of which the last three were under German administration. On the roundups in 1941, see PMJ 5, pp. 68–72. On the deportations on 27 March 1942, see PMJ 5/318; on the conversation between Heydrich and Bousquet, see Klarsfeld, *Vichy–Auschwitz*, p. 70.

194 Meyer, *Täter im Verhör*, pp. 146–147. Notes by Dannecker, dated 26 June 1942, Mémorial de la Shoah, Paris XXVI-33, published in Serge Klarsfeld, *Le Calendrier de la persécution des Juifs de France*, vol. 1: *Juillet 1940–août 1942* (Paris: Fayard, 2001), pp. 423–424. As Klarsfeld states, the goal of arresting 22,000 persons between the ages of sixteen and forty-five would not have been attainable in the Paris metropolitan area by detaining foreign Jews alone: Klarsfeld, *Vichy–Auschwitz*, p. 91.

195 Laurent Joly, *Vichy dans la 'solution finale': Histoire du Commissariat général aux questions juives, 1941–1944* (Paris: Grasset, 2006), pp. 340–341. A detailed description of the 'Oberg-Bousquet agreement' and its significance can be found in Bernd Kasten, *'Gute Franzosen': Die französische Polizei und die deutsche Besatzungsmacht im besetzten Frankreich, 1940–1944* (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1993), pp. 71–73.

the German police authorities demanded that the French police undertake the arrest or handover of Jews. Jews with French citizenship could be excluded; the operation was to concentrate on stateless Jews. Bousquet agreed. Two days later Pierre Laval, the head of government, went one step further by suggesting that children who were under sixteen, and were therefore supposedly exempt from deportation, should be transported to the East along with their parents (Doc. 240). Most of these children had been born in France and held French citizenship. From this point on the Vichy regime played a central role in the deportation of Jews from France.

Two weeks later, on 16 and 17 July 1942, the French municipal police in Paris, under German instruction, carried out a large-scale roundup in which 12,884 stateless Jews were arrested. Dannecker had met representatives of the French police on 7 July 1942 to plan the mass arrest (Doc. 241). Evidently, a great many people received advance warning and managed to take shelter, for the number arrested was substantially smaller than the target of 22,000. Most of those arrested in the raid were women and children, who had believed themselves safe because they had been spared during the previous roundups (Doc. 245). Rachel Jedinak, a child at the time, recalled the divided reaction of the non-Jewish French:

> We went across the courtyard to get to the street and to the multitude of families, women and children, all likewise arrested. We were like a herd, and the inhabitants of the neighbourhood looked out from their windows or watched from the pavement as we passed. Some made the sign of the cross and wept; others, by contrast, laughed very openly and maliciously.[196]

Hélène Berr, a university student, noticed that the streets were blocked at Montmartre owing to the numerous arrests. In her diary she recorded:

> In Mlle Monsaingeon's neighbourhood, a whole family, the father, the mother, and five children, gassed themselves to escape the roundup. One woman threw herself out of a window […] Who is going to feed the internees at Drancy now that their wives have been arrested? The kids will never find their parents again.[197]

Families with children were initially housed in the Vélodrome d'Hiver, a sports stadium in Paris, and then transferred to the camps at Pithiviers and Beaune-la-Rolande. Rachel Polakiewicz reported on her first night in the stadium: 'We have hardly anything left to eat, we lack pretty much everything, how much longer are we to stay here like this? […] From time to time one hears the screams of women, it makes us shiver to hear them.'[198] Antonina Pechtner, a native of Lwów, appealed to friends on the second day of her captivity:

196 Recollections of Rachel Jedinak, in Leblanc and Chevallier, *Mémoires de la Shoah*, p. 72.

197 *The Journal of Hélène Berr*, trans. David Bellos (London: MacLehose Press, 2008), pp. 98–99, entry for 18 July 1942.

198 Letter from Rachel Polakiewicz, dated 17 July 1942, published in Karen Taieb (ed.), *Je vous écris du Vél' d'Hiv: Les lettres retrouvées* (Paris: Laffont, 2011), p. 98.

> I'm imprisoned, I think I'm going to be sent to Poland. I beg you, look after my child, ask the concierge for our things and take as many of them as you can. I don't want my child to die somewhere in Poland, I want to die without him. I trust you, take pity on my child, I entrust him to you, I am in the Vélodrome d'Hiver.[199]

Unmarried adults and families with children over the age of sixteen were taken to the camp at Drancy following the roundups on 16/17 July in Paris. A series of five deportation trains subsequently left Drancy for Auschwitz, the first of these departing three days after the roundups. Within 10 days, 5,000 people had been deported from Drancy to Auschwitz. In a 'special operation' (*Sonderaktion*) several days before the Paris roundups, stateless Jews in the rest of the occupied zone had also been arrested by German and French police; approximately 1,500 were detained in total and subsequently deported to Auschwitz.[200] Among them were the daughter and grandchildren of Ida Kahn from the Saarland. They had previously emigrated to Palestine but returned to France. They were arrested in Alençon on 13 July 1942 and detained in Pithiviers, from where they were deported to Auschwitz on 31 July and 3 August (Doc. 244).

During the week from 6 to 12 August 1942, the handover of 10,000 stateless Jews from the internment camps in the southern zone began (Doc. 248). In accordance with instructions from the French police headquarters at Vichy, those affected were not told of their actual destination. The prefect in charge of Gurs camp reported that there had been no problems with the first transport, but by the time of the second one, many Jews tried to avoid deportation, 'as if they had been tipped off by foreign radio broadcasts' (Doc. 256).

Karl Heinz Reinsberg wrote to his brother Ernst from Les Milles camp near Marseilles a few days before he himself was taken to Drancy: 'What has happened here is unprecedented in world history, but it must not go unpunished, the punishment will have to come one day. Children, women, and men locked up together, and a gendarme with a rifle every ten metres' (Doc. 254). Also gathered in the camp at Les Milles were all the refugees who already had French exit visas and were waiting to emigrate to a country overseas. They too were included in the lists.[201]

After mid August 1942, in accordance with Laval's suggestion, children under the age of sixteen who had been left behind by their parents were also taken to Auschwitz, where, in most cases, they were murdered upon arrival. Karl Heinz Reinsberg and his wife accompanied the first of these 'children's trains'. One eyewitness described the departure of the first group of children: 'The most terrifying moment was the morning of their deportation […]. As they left, a cry went up: Maman, Maman' (Doc. 259).

In mid August the Jewish labourers in 'Foreign Labourer Groups' (Groupements de travailleurs étrangers, GTE) made up the second large group transferred from the unoccupied zone into the occupied zone. These work squads had been formed by the Vichy government in the autumn of 1940 to employ foreign labourers, of whom there was a

199 Letter from Antonina Pechtner, dated 17 July 1942, ibid., p. 112.

200 Annette Wieviorka and Michel Laffitte, *À l'intérieur du camp de Drancy* (Paris: Perrin, 2012), p. 151; Meyer, *Täter im Verhör*, p. 162.

201 Doris Obschernitzki, *Letzte Hoffnung – Ausreise: die Ziegelei von Les Milles 1939–1942. Vom Lager für unerwünschte Ausländer zum Deportationszentrum* (Berlin: Hentrich & Hentrich, 1999).

'surplus' in the French economy. Even with the addition of this second group, the target figure of 10,000 had evidently not been reached. The French police therefore planned a mass arrest in the larger cities of the unoccupied zone for 26 August 1942, targeting all Jewish refugees aged between eighteen and sixty who had come to France since 1936. The only people to be spared in this roundup were those who were not fit for transport, 'visibly' pregnant women, the parents of children under the age of two, and spouses or parents of French citizens. The 6,584 people arrested, however, were still too few for the Germans, and consequently the operation was repeated in the following weeks.[202]

On 28 August 1942 the officials in charge of Jewish affairs from the countries of Western Europe, or their deputies, came together once again at the Reich Security Main Office for a meeting with Eichmann (Doc. 263). Eichmann insisted that the ongoing deportation programme targeting stateless Jews be concluded by the end of the year. The deportation of other foreign Jews would follow and was to be completed by June 1943; the details were still being negotiated with the Reich Foreign Office. The frequency of the transports was to be increased from mid September 1942 because the Reich Railways would probably not be able to provide transport between November 1942 and January 1943 (Doc. 263).

The French police arrested Jews and handed them over, with the exception of adults with French citizenship. Although the Vichy government had adopted its own discriminatory measures against all Jews in early 1940, it was not willing to participate in the deportation of French Jews.[203] The French police did, however, hand over to the German occupiers a large number of French citizens who had violated German regulations, for example Jews who had failed to wear the yellow star or had disregarded the curfew. This practice triggered a protest from the representative in Paris of the Vichy government's Interior Ministry to the chief of the French police (Doc. 316).

At the beginning of September 1942, the French authorities informed Heinz Röthke, the new head of the Security Police and the SD's section for Jewish affairs, that the number of handovers agreed upon could not be reached. In an attempt to meet the target set by Eichmann nonetheless, Röthke included in the deportations French Jews who were in German custody.[204] Among them was 22-year-old Anna Goldberg, who had been arrested in early August while attempting to enter the unoccupied zone illegally and detained in the camp at Poitiers and then at Drancy (Docs. 255 and 274). She was subsequently deported on Transport XXXIV to Auschwitz, where she perished.

The deportation of French Jews was a clear violation of the German-French agreements of July 1942. Nevertheless, René Bousquet instructed his local representatives not to interfere with the deportations, but rather to ensure that they took place without

202 Anne Grynberg, *Les Camps de la honte: Les internés juifs des camps français 1939–1944* (Paris: La Découverte, 1991), pp. 301 and 327; Klarsfeld, *Calendrier*, p. 950; Klarsfeld, *Vichy–Auschwitz*, pp. 183 and 193–195; Peter Gaida, *Camps de travail sous Vichy: Les 'groupes de travailleurs étrangers' (GTE) en France et en Afrique du Nord 1940–1944* (Morrisville, NC: Lulu Press, 2015).

203 During the arrest of French Jews by the German police, 'the French authorities were in the habit of expressing their disapproval mostly in protests that were as clear as they were ineffective'; Kasten, *'Gute Franzosen'*, p. 97. See also Klarsfeld, *Vichy–Auschwitz*, p. 110.

204 At this time, 4,000 French Jews were interned in the camps at Drancy, Beaune-la-Rolande, and Pithiviers: Klarsfeld, *Vichy–Auschwitz*, p. 201.

incident.[205] The French authorities subsequently intensified the roundups of foreign Jews in order to save French Jews from deportation. The circle of affected groups was gradually expanded, and the elderly, the sick, and others who had been exempted from the arrests were now included. From mid September 1942 the German authorities also arrested Jews who held citizenship of other European countries and had previously been spared. This course of action increasingly brought the German and French police authorities into conflict with the diplomatic representatives of Hungary, Romania, Italy, and Turkey, who initially prevailed in their insistence that their citizens be protected (Doc. 266). A few weeks later, however, the governments in Budapest and Bucharest abandoned their opposition.

Meanwhile, the number of handovers from the southern zone lagged far behind the Germans' expectations. At the beginning of September Röthke had notified the French authorities of an expansion of the programme of deportations from France, with 50,000 additional Jews to be deported to the East (Doc. 264). Instead, however, the pace of the deportations slowed down. Nonetheless, the original German targets set in July 1942 were ultimately achieved. Between 7 August and 22 October 1942, the Vichy authorities handed over more than 10,000 persons from the southern zone to the German occupiers. Between 27 March and 11 November, deportation trains took 41,951 Jews from France to Auschwitz. Upon arrival more than one third were assigned as forced labour; all the others were murdered immediately. Of these people deported to Auschwitz, only 785 of the men and 25 of the women survived the war.[206]

The mass arrests that began in July 1942 sparked panic in Paris and in the occupied zone in general. The number of attempted escapes to the unoccupied zone soared – as did the risk of being caught by German customs officials or the German police, who greatly intensified their surveillance (Doc. 250). The family of historian Jean-Jacques Becker were among those who left the place where they had been residing a few days after the Paris roundup: 'Theoretically, it was not a journey of no return, […] but even for optimists the German defeat lay so far in the future that it nevertheless resembled a journey of no return.'[207] The family crossed the demarcation line south of Nevers by wading across the Allier river, and then ensconced themselves in Grenoble.[208]

The intense persecution also led to a lasting change in the work of both Jewish and non-Jewish relief organizations. In addition to their legal and official work, which continued in the internment camps in cooperation with the Vichy authorities, they now also organized illegal rescue operations. Because the relief organizations were involved in the commissions that decided on exemptions, by arguing the case for exemptions they were able to prevent a few of those affected from being handed over to the occupiers. However, that only meant that others would take their place, an awareness that added to the sense of despair among the helpers (Doc. 257). It was nonetheless thanks to their tenacity that, for example, more than 1,400 of those arrested in the large roundup on 26 August

205 Ibid., p. 203; Klarsfeld, *Calendrier*, pp. 1141–1142.

206 Numbers based on Klarsfeld, *Calendrier*, pp. 1908 and 1916.

207 Jean-Jacques Becker, *Un soir de l'été 1942 … Souvenirs d'un historien* (Paris: Larousse, 2009), p. 80.

208 According to the report by the senior police official in Limoges for the month of July, in the département of Charente alone, 750 foreign Jews had crossed the demarcation line within a two-month period: Kasten, '*Gute Franzosen*', p. 95.

were not handed over. As of the end of August 1942 parents could no longer leave their children behind in the care of a relief organization. Both the relief organizations and the resistance organizations endeavoured to save the children and adolescents involved. In Lyons the Christian group Amitié chrétienne managed to smuggle around 100 children out of Vénissieux camp (Doc. 271) and place them with non-Jewish families or in children's homes, most of which were run by the Œuvre de secours aux enfants (Children's Aid Society, OSE).[209]

The Secours suisse aux enfants, a children's aid organization founded in 1937 during the Spanish Civil War and affiliated with the Swiss Red Cross since the end of 1941, looked after unaccompanied stateless children and adolescents. Depending on their age, adolescents entrusted to its care were also among those whom the French authorities planned to hand over. The residents of the children's home at Château de la Hille in the département of Ariège were saved at the last minute by the tenacity of the director and her immediate superior. Over the following months, the children were smuggled into Switzerland via secret escape routes. The relief organization Comité Amelot, which was established in June 1940 in rue Amelot in Paris and was later financed by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), succeeded in bringing around 1,350 children and adolescents from France to safety in Switzerland in the autumn of 1943. Working for the Zionist youth movement, Sasha Racine Maidenberg brought children from the Italian zone across the Swiss border in October 1943:

> We had been walking for several hours when we saw the barbed wire that indicated the border. We came closer and suddenly panicked when we saw soldiers in uniform standing in front of us. It took a moment before we realized that they were Swiss, rather than Germans. It had instilled such fear and terror in the children that they ran away screaming. When things calmed down again, we gathered them back together and were able to cross the border without any problems.[210]

By contrast, Cécile Klein-Hechel, her husband and their four-year-old son, Claude, managed to cross the border only after an exhausting ordeal fleeing via Alsace, Vichy, and Grenoble (Doc. 324).[211]

With the beginning of the systematic deportations from Western Europe, the flow of refugees from the Netherlands, Belgium, and France into the countries bordering France that were not under German control, namely Spain and Switzerland, had increased substantially. At the same time, opportunities for escape declined abruptly. On 4 August 1942 the Swiss government issued a presidential decree in an effort to stem the 'influx of alien civilian refugees': this influx, it was stated, had been 'found to be increasingly

209 Sabine Zeitoun, *L'Œuvre de secours aux enfants (OSE) sous l'Occupation en France* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2012); Grynberg, *Les Camps de la honte*, pp. 303–306; Renée Poznanski, *Jews in France during World War II*, trans. Nathan Bracher (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2001 [French edn, 1997]), pp. 282–283; Patrick Cabanel, *Histoire des Justes en France* (Paris: A. Colin, 2012), pp. 157–159.

210 Recollections of Sasha Racine Maidenberg, in Leblanc and Chevallier, *Mémoires de la Shoah*, p. 105.

211 Arno Lustiger, *Rettungswiderstand: Über die Judenretter in Europa während der NS-Zeit* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2011), pp. 209–210.

organized' and facilitated 'by professional "passeurs" [smugglers]'. The cantons were now required to expel foreigners who had entered the country illegally, 'even if serious disadvantages (danger to life and limb) might arise from this for the foreigners affected'.[212] At that point the Swiss authorities already had information about the fate of Jews who had been deported to Poland, even though they were not yet aware of the Germans' policy of systematic murder. Not only Jews but also communist refugees now had little chance of being admitted to Switzerland. The elderly and the sick, adolescents travelling alone, families with children under sixteen, and pregnant women were considered hardship cases and exempted from deportation. Part of the Swiss population reacted with outrage to the expulsions, whereupon the Swiss authorities relaxed the measures temporarily. During the months that followed, several thousand refugees successfully crossed the border, which was only guarded fairly lightly, into Switzerland. However, the decree was not definitively rescinded until July 1944.

The escape routes from France mostly ran via Geneva, Lake Geneva, and the difficult terrain of the Jura Mountains. The focus was on the border at Geneva, where approximately 200 border crossings were recorded in August 1942, a further 2,000 in September 1942, and 1,300 in October 1942. Of the 9,860 Jewish refugees who by August 1944 had attempted to reach Switzerland, 9,000 did indeed find asylum there.[213] The number of border crossings increased again when the Germans occupied the southern zone in November 1942, and then the Italian zone in September 1943. Crossing the Pyrenees into Spain involved ever greater obstacles. Since November 1942, in addition to the French gendarmerie, German mountain troops had been guarding this border (Doc. 282). In February 1943 the area along the border was declared a restricted zone, with access to non-residents prohibited.[214]

Elli and Hans Friedländer were among those who sought to cross the border illegally in the late summer of 1942. In their despair they had entrusted their 9-year-old son to a Catholic boarding school in Montluçon, in the Auvergne, and agreed to his baptism. Elli Friedländer wrote at the end of August: 'If we must perish, we have one piece of great good fortune: the knowledge that our beloved child has been saved' (Doc. 261). A few weeks later, the couple's attempt to find safety in Switzerland failed (Doc. 278). The Swiss authorities handed over Elli and Hans Friedländer to the French gendarmerie, who transferred them to the assembly camp at Rivesaltes, from which Jews were taken to Drancy (Doc. 279). Just three days later, on 1 October 1942, refugees caught at the border ceased to be automatically handed over to the French authorities. Instead, they

212 Nationale Kommission für die Veröffentlichung Diplomatischer Dokumente der Schweiz, *Diplomatische Dokumente der Schweiz*, vol. 14 (Bern: Benteli, 1997), p. 720; see also Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz – Zweiter Weltkrieg, *Die Schweiz und die Flüchtlinge zur Zeit des Nationalsozialismus* (Bern: Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz – Zweiter Weltkrieg, 1999), pp. 93–94, 135, and 138; Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz – Zweiter Weltkrieg, *Die Schweiz, der Nationalsozialismus und der Zweite Weltkrieg: Schlussbericht* (Zurich: Pendo, 2002), p. 116; and Georg Kreis (ed.), *Switzerland and the Second World War* (London: Routledge, 2014).

213 Fivaz-Silbermann, 'Une migration urgente', p. 109; Ruth Fivaz-Silbermann, 'Refoulement, accueil, filières: Les fugitifs juifs à la frontière franco-genevoise entre 1942 et 1944', in *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte*, 51 (2001), pp. 296–317, here p. 298.

214 Robert Belot, *Aux frontières de la liberté: Vichy-Madrid-Alger-Londres. S'évader de France sous l'Occupation* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), pp. 76–80; Lustiger, *Rettungswiderstand*, p. 214.

were sent back – covertly – across the unmanned section of the land border. One month later the Friedländers were deported to Auschwitz, where they both perished. Their son survived, later took the name 'Saul' and became one of the most distinguished historians of the Holocaust.[215]

Police operations against Jews and the handover of Jews to the German occupiers frequently elicited outrage and sympathy among the French population. The press in both zones ignored the arrests for the most part, but the negative reactions filtered through in the reports on public sentiment compiled by the prefectures. The outrage intensified when leading representatives of the Catholic and Protestant churches repeatedly lodged protests with Pétain and also publicly protested against the deportation of the Jews (Doc. 246). On 23 August 1942, three days before the large roundup in the southern zone, the archbishop of Toulouse, Monseigneur Jules-Gérard Saliège, ordered that a letter be read aloud in the churches of his diocese. In this much-heeded text he publicly condemned the action being taken against the Jews. On 30 August the bishop of Montauban, Pierre-Marie Théas, followed suit with a similar initiative, and on 22 September Marc Boegner, head of the Protestant Association, also had a letter read out.[216]

During the night of 7/8 November 1942, Allied troops landed in Morocco and Algeria and opened the way for the Gaullist Free French Forces to enter these two regions. The strategic location of North Africa, which made an Allied landing on the coast of Western Europe substantially easier, meant Germany's supremacy in this part of Europe was directly threatened. In reaction, the Wehrmacht occupied the previously unoccupied southern zone of France.[217] Approximately 120,000 Jews were living in Algeria at the time of liberation in November 1942, but they had to wait until mid March 1943 for the repeal of the Vichy regime's antisemitic laws and regulations (Doc. 284). The Crémieux Decree that in 1870 had granted French citizenship to the Jews of Algeria and had been revoked by the Vichy government in the autumn of 1940 was reinstated in October 1943 following a declaration by the French National Liberation Committee.[218]

In Tunisia, by contrast, the situation for the estimated 66,000 Jews worsened dramatically in the same period. One third of the country, including Tunis, the capital, lay between two military fronts and was occupied by German and Italian troops in November 1942. During the six months of the German-Italian occupation, the Jewish popula-

215 See Saul Friedländer's own account in Saul Friedländer, *When Memory Comes* (New York: Avon Books, 1980), pp. 88–90. See also Ruth Fivaz-Silbermann, *Le Refoulement de réfugiés civils juifs à la frontière franco-genevoise durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, suivi du mémorial de ceux parmi eux qui ont été déportés ou fusillés* (Paris: Klarsfeld Foundation, 2000), pp. 9–10.

216 Grynberg, *Les Camps de la honte*, pp. 323–326; Cabanel, *Histoire des Justes en France*, pp. 165–168; Klarsfeld, *Calendrier*, p. 632; Klarsfeld, *Vichy–Auschwitz*, pp. 176–179, 209; Poznanski, *Jews in France during World War II*, pp. 292–302.

217 What had hitherto been known as the *zone libre* or 'free zone' was now referred to as the southern zone.

218 Michel Abitbol, *The Jews of North Africa during the Second World War* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), pp. 159–165; André Kaspi, *Les Juifs pendant l'Occupation* (Paris: Seuil, 1997), p. 206; Daniel J. Schroeter, 'Between Metropole and French North Africa: Vichy's Anti-Semitic Legislation and Colonialism's Racial Hierarchies', in Aomar Boum and Sarah Abrevaya Stein (eds.), *The Holocaust and North Africa* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019), pp. 19–49. On the stance of the French churches, see Sylvie Bernay, *L'Église de France face à la persécution des Juifs, 1940–1944* (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2012).

tion – with the exception of Italian citizens – was subject to persecution by the Tunis Einsatzkommando, which was led by Walther Rauff.[219] Indiscriminate and organized theft, forced labour and terror characterized the everyday life of the Jews (Doc. 303). Moïse Borgel, chairman of Tunisia's Jewish community, later recounted the arrest of the men, for the most part teachers, found in the school run by the Alliance israélite universelle in Tunis. German soldiers beat them with whips and forced them on a march of 65 kilometres. To put an end to the excesses committed against individuals during the first days of the occupation, senior figures in the Jewish community complied with German orders. They provided several thousand workers to develop the German-Italian line of defence, and they collected money and took out a bank loan to pay the 'fine' of 20 million francs that had been imposed on the community. This penalty had been levied as compensation for the damages inflicted by Allied bombing. Owing to the difficult transport situation, systematic deportations to Germany never took place, although Rauff had approximately twenty Tunisian Jews taken to German concentration camps, where most of them perished. Among them were Joseph Scemla, a textile dealer in Tunis, and his two sons, Gilbert and Jean, both students. In March 1943 they had tried to cross the border to Algeria and seek refuge with the Free French forces, but had been betrayed in the process. Following their arrest by German soldiers, they were taken to Germany by plane and placed in Dachau concentration camp, where, in May 1944, they were sentenced to death for espionage. They were executed two months later. During the six-month period of occupation, approximately 5,000 labourers were forcibly recruited. The number of Jewish victims during the German occupation in Tunisia is probably between 50 and 100.[220]

After the occupation of the southern zone of France by the Wehrmacht – whereupon the Italian army ordered its occupying troops to advance to the banks of the Rhône – the Office of the Higher SS and Police Leader was the only German authority in Paris that managed to extend its activities to include the newly occupied territory. Berlin declared this area an 'Operational Zone' and placed it under the control of the Commander-in-Chief West. The newly established Einsatzkommandos of the German police in the regional prefectures now had access to areas where Jews had thus far largely escaped persecution. According to German instructions, every assassination attempt by the French resistance movement was to be followed by arrests of Jews – they were to be tracked down in trains, at railway stations, and in other public spaces, and taken into custody. For this operation the German police were still able to count on the help of the French. On 9 November 1942

219 In dealing with the Reich Foreign Office, the Italian embassy in Berlin emphatically insisted that Jews who were Italian citizens be exempt from all anti-Jewish measures in Tunisia: Abitbol, *The Jews of North Africa during the Second World War*, pp. 120–121; Martin Cüppers, *Walther Rauff – in deutschen Diensten: Vom Naziverbrecher zum BND-Spion* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2013).

220 Account by Moïse Borgel, 15 May 1943, published in Claude Nataf (ed.), *Les Juifs de Tunisie sous le joug nazi, 9 novembre 1942–8 mai 1943* (Paris: Manuscrit, 2012), pp. 25–38, quote: p. 30; Frédéric Gasquet, *La Lettre de mon père: Une famille de Tunis dans l'enfer nazi* (Paris: Le Félin, 2006); Abitbol, *The Jews of North Africa during the Second World War*, pp. 119–121 and 130; Kaspi, *Les Juifs pendant l'Occupation*, pp. 204–206; Cüppers, *Walther Rauff*, p. 176; Filippo Petrucci, *Gli ebrei in Algeria e in Tunisia 1940–1943* (Florence: Giuntina, 2011), pp. 150–214.

the French government issued a law prohibiting foreign Jews from moving freely from place to place or leaving their location of residence without explicit permission from the police. Although the Jews in the newly occupied zone remained exempt from the requirement to wear the yellow star, the law of 11 December 1942 made it obligatory for all identity documents and food ration cards to be stamped with the word 'Jew'. The Italian occupation authorities refused to implement such measures in their zone.[221]

In a meeting with Heinrich Himmler on 10 December 1942, Hitler – doubtless in anticipation of a future Allied landing – ordered the 'removal' (*Abschaffung*) of all Jews and 'other enemies' from France. This order led to the second major wave of deportations from France, in the course of which around 8,000 persons were transported to Auschwitz, Lublin-Majdanek, and Sobibor between 9 February and 25 March 1943.[222] To this end the German police authorities called for the remaining Jews in the internment camps of the southern zone to be handed over, while the commanders of the Security Police in the 'old' occupied zone received instructions to arrest and transfer to Drancy everyone who was eligible for deportation. The German authorities were determined no longer to permit any distinctions to be made between French and foreign Jews.[223]

In January 1943 roundups of Jews took place in Rouen and Marseilles, in both cases in the aftermath of assassination attempts by the French resistance movement. Following a German directive, on 12 January 1943 the French police arrested 222 Jews in Rouen, most of whom were French citizens.[224] For Marseilles, Reichsführer-SS Himmler had designed a 'radical and perfect solution […] for clearing up the situation'. With the assistance of the French police and the Gardes mobiles, this involved carrying out mass arrests, which also affected Jews, and blowing up the port area which, with its large number of winding alleys and even subterranean passageways, offered an ideal hiding place (and not just for members of the resistance).[225] On 22 and 23 January 1943 French police arrested almost 6,000 people in Marseilles, 1,642 of whom were handed over to the occupation authorities and taken to Compiègne camp, north of Paris, the next day. Among them were many French Jews, who were transferred one month later to Drancy and shortly afterwards deported to Sobibor and Lublin-Majdanek (Docs. 287 and 298).

221 Michael R. Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 304–305. In the 'old' occupied zone such a stamp had been mandatory since the autumn of 1940.

222 Heinrich Himmler, *Der Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers 1941/42*, ed. Peter Witte, Michael Wildt, and Martina Voigt (Hamburg: Christians, 1999), p. 637. 'Other enemies' referred to Gaullists, the British, Americans (they were to be arrested), 'Red Spaniards' ('to be fed into the labour process' – presumably a reference to Organization Todt), and 'antifascist Italians', with 'truly dangerous figures' to be put in a German concentration camp. Deportation numbers from Klarsfeld, *Vichy–Auschwitz*, p. 370.

223 Knochen had raised this topic in discussion with the Reich Security Main Office on 21 Jan. 1943 and made reference to the 2,159 French Jews who were in Drancy camp in mid January. Eichmann's deputy, Günther, stated in his reply dated 25 Jan. 1943 that French Jews could also be deported: Klarsfeld, *Calendrier*, pp. 1318–1319 and 1331–1332.

224 Klarsfeld, *Vichy–Auschwitz*, pp. 230–231.

225 Himmler to the Higher SS and Police Leader in France, Oberg, 18 Jan. 1943, BArch, NS 19/2799 and NS 19/3402, published in Ahlrich Meyer (ed.), *Der Blick des Besatzers: Propagandaphotographie der Wehrmacht aus Marseille 1942–1944. Le regard de l'occupant* (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1999), p. 171.

Simultaneously, SS Police Regiment Griese sealed off the northern part of the port neighbourhood and had its 20,000 inhabitants deported and temporarily interned in Fréjus, where German police selected persons for transport on to Compiègne (Doc. 306). In the first two weeks of February 1943, the Wehrmacht blew up the now-vacated port area.[226]

The roundups in Marseilles and Rouen, which were carried out primarily by French police, were 'special operations' insofar as they had been ordered by the German occupiers as reprisals for operations carried out by the resistance movement. With these exceptions, the French authorities continued to refuse to arrest French Jews. However, the French and German police cooperated effectively in tracking down foreign Jews, as was the case during the night of 10/11 February 1943, when 1,549 Jews were arrested in Paris. They included children who were living in the homes of the UGIF, as well as patients at the Rothschild Hospital, but it was primarily elderly people who were arrested; the average age of those detained was sixty-four.[227] Rachel Jedinak, who in July 1942 had managed to escape with her sister from internment in the Vélodrome d'Hiver, was now arrested for a second time, along with her grandmother. Jedinak recalled:

> They command us, my grandmother, my sister and me, to pack our things. Luckily, my uncle and aunt spent this night elsewhere. The concierge let them into one of the sealed apartments in the building. My grandfather can't be transported, so the police, without any qualms, decide to leave him behind, entirely alone. How could one ever forget the heart-wrenching parting of my grandparents?[228]

Rachel Jedinak, together with her sister and mother, succeeded in escaping her pursuers once again, but most of those detained were deported to Poland at the beginning of March.

After the French resistance movement assassinated two German officers in Paris, the order was issued to deport an additional 2,000 Jews. To prevent the inclusion of French citizens, the French police initiated an arrest operation in the southern zone on 20 February 1943 that targeted foreign male Jews between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five. The 1,778 men affected were deported on 4 and 6 March to Sobibor, where they were murdered.[229]

The second wave of deportations, which began early in 1943, again raised the question of French police collaboration. The deportations initially targeted many French Jews who had already been interned in Drancy camp for months or had been arrested in Rouen and Marseilles (Doc. 286). The continuation of the transports, however, depended on the renewed cooperation of the French police (Doc. 292). To expand the category of Jews who were 'able to be deported' (Jews without French citizenship), the German occupiers had already contemplated a collective denaturalization procedure as early as July 1942, and Prime Minister Laval had agreed to this in principle in August 1942 (Doc. 252). By

226 Ibid., pp. 26–29; Poznanski, *Jews in France during World War II,* pp. 371–373.
227 Wieviorka and Laffitte, *À l'intérieur du camp de Drancy*, p. 211; Klarsfeld, *Vichy–Auschwitz*, pp. 234–235.
228 Recollections of Rachel Jedinak, in Leblanc and Chevallier, *Mémoires de la Shoah*, p. 114.
229 Poznanski, *Jews in France during World War II*, p. 375; Klarsfeld, *Vichy–Auschwitz*, pp. 243–244.

December 1942 France's Commissariat General for Jewish Affairs had prepared a draft law on the deprivation of French citizenship for Jews naturalized after 1927. In addition, foreign Jews were as a rule to be denied naturalization in the future. The French government suggested moving the cut-off year from 1927 to 1932, which would still have meant around 20,000 people being deprived of French citizenship, but not the 50,000 envisaged in the draft by the Commissariat General, which was based on the German proposals. Röthke – the German official in charge of Jewish affairs – and Commissioner General for Jewish Affairs Darquier de Pellepoix forced through the original version.[230]

On this basis the German authorities prepared for the mass arrest of all Jews whose citizenship was to be revoked if granted later than 1927. At dawn on 24 June 1943, a few hours before the text of the regulation was made public, several thousand Jews were to be arrested by the French police, under German supervision. A special commando (Sonderkommando) led by SS-Hauptsturmführer Alois Brunner had been summoned to Paris especially for this purpose, the same unit that had previously set in motion the deportation of 43,000 Jews from Thessaloniki.[231] The date for the operation was postponed several times, and in the end the plan could not be carried out because Laval, with reference to the planned arrests that he had explicitly rejected, prevented the text of the regulation from being released. When Marshal Pétain officially confirmed this decision at the end of August 1943, it was clear that in this instance the French authorities would not cooperate. Röthke reacted by announcing that in future the German authorities would no longer distinguish between French Jews and foreign Jews. As early as July 1943, in a report on the 'present status of the Jewish question in France', he had made it known that if the denaturalization plan were to fall through, the German police and military forces would arrest every Jew they could get their hands on.[232]

During the first half of 1943, tensions also developed between the German and Italian occupying forces as a result of the German operations against the Jews. Immediately after the occupation of the southern zone in November 1942, German police authorities had ordered the resettlement of the Jews living in départements along the border and on the coast – including the area under Italian jurisdiction – to specific départements that were under German control. Jews who were potentially liable to deportation were to be taken straight to Drancy. The Italians put a stop to the plan for their area of influence, and open conflict broke out between the Italian and French authorities. The latter complained to the German Security Police. The Italian Armistice Commission in Turin forbade the French government to intern persons 'of the Jewish race' in the Italian zone.[233] Word

230 Joly, *Vichy dans la 'solution finale'*, pp. 716–723, text of the law reproduced on p. 717.

231 Hans Safrian, *Eichmann's Men*, trans. Ute Stargardt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010 [German edn, 1993]), pp. 157–167. Klarsfeld, *Vichy–Auschwitz*, p. 274. Brunner's official position with respect to the Senior Commander of the Security Police (BdS) and his Dept. IV B4 seems unclear; presumably Brunner was directly subordinate to the Reich Security Main Office, as suggested in Meyer, *Täter im Verhör*, p. 192.

232 Report by Röthke, dated 21 July 1943, published in Klarsfeld, *Calendrier*, pp. 1583–1584.

233 Eberhard Jäckel, *Frankreich in Hitlers Europa: Die deutsche Frankreichpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1966), p. 257; Marrus and Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews*, pp. 315–321; Poznanski, *Jews in France during World War II*, pp. 386–390; Klarsfeld, *Vichy–Auschwitz*, p. 225.

spread very quickly, and tens of thousands of Jewish refugees sought shelter in the Italian zone of occupation.[234] In a report dated April 1943, Joseph Weill described the resultant onset of an 'out-and-out migration' (Doc. 299).

In mid February 1943 Helmut Knochen, Senior Commander of the Security Police, emphasized in a letter to the Reich Security Main Office that the inclusion of the Italian zone was a precondition for the planned deportations from 'France as a whole', noting that 'the migration of Jews into the Italian-occupied territory, which has already begun, would otherwise assume vast proportions' (Doc. 292). The Italian occupation authorities also vehemently opposed the French roundup on 20 February 1943, and anyone who had been arrested in the Italian zone had to be released. French protests at Italy's policy of obstruction were channelled from Paris to Berlin. The Reich Foreign Office already faced a similar situation in Croatia, which was partly occupied by the Italian army, alongside the German Wehrmacht. On 25 February 1943 Reich Foreign Minister Ribbentrop discussed this issue with Mussolini for the first time. One month later, on Ribbentrop's instructions, the German ambassador in Rome was supposed to increase the pressure on Mussolini (Doc. 296). But it became clear that Rome was continuing its placatory approach and delaying tactics, especially where Berlin was concerned.[235]

For the Jews the situation had deteriorated dramatically since the Wehrmacht had taken control of the southern zone. Many employees of the relief organizations that were part of the UGIF were arrested in 1943, and as a result the organizations had to discontinue their activities in the second half of the year.[236] In February 1943 a roundup spearheaded by Klaus Barbie, head of Department IV in the Office of the Commander of the Security Police and the SD in Lyons, heralded the end of the protection that the UGIF's employees had largely enjoyed (Doc. 291). At the end of November 1942 Darquier de Pellepoix had already ordered lists to be submitted of all UGIF employees in both zones. The lists were to record their address, citizenship, and date of naturalization, if any. Shortly afterwards Darquier de Pellepoix demanded the dismissal of non-French personnel by the end of February 1943, obviously again with the aim of enlarging the set of 'Jews able to be deported'. The heads of the two sections of the UGIF obtained an extension of the deadline to the end of March 1943 and a slight reduction in the number of dismissals. However, on 5 March the Commissariat General for Jewish Affairs provided the German Security Police with a list of the UGIF's foreign employees. It contained the names of 297 persons in total, 129 men and 168 women, listed by nationality. Although both the Commissariat General and the German authorities had been assured that those

234 See Meyer, *Täter im Verhör*, p. 187. Serge Klarsfeld estimates at 25,000 the number of (primarily foreign) Jews who were already present in the Italian zone on 1 Jan. 1943. The number increased rapidly after the roundups in Marseilles: Klarsfeld, *Vichy–Auschwitz*, p. 223. Renée Poznanski estimates at 30,000 the number of Jews who had been able to live fairly protected for several months owing to the attitude of the Italian authorities: Poznanski, *Jews in France during World War II*, p. 393. On the Italian zone of occupation, see Jean-Louis Panicacci, *L'Occupation italienne: Sud-Est de la France, juin 1940 – septembre 1943* (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2010).

235 Klarsfeld, *Vichy–Auschwitz*, pp. 246–247; Saul Friedländer, *The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1933–1945* (London: HarperCollins, 2007), pp. 452–454; Daniel Carpi, *Between Mussolini and Hitler: The Jews and the Italian Authorities in France and Tunisia* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1994), pp. 102–135.

236 Poznanski, *Jews in France during World War II*, pp. 373–377.

affected would continue to be protected until the end of the month, Röthke ordered their arrest (Doc. 295), and approximately sixty of them were detained. Presumably some of the individuals involved had realized the danger or received advance warning. In addition, most of the addresses given to the Commissariat General were incorrect.[237]

The number of persons who opted to live in hiding increased rapidly in 1943. Not all of them were Jews; they included many non-Jewish Frenchmen, who since February 1943 could be called up for mandatory labour service (*service du travail obligatoire*, STO) in Germany.[238] The members of the Jewish-communist resistance movement already had experience of life underground, owing to the banning of the Communist Party in 1939, and therefore had the most efficient organization. Their output included numerous publications addressed to the Jewish population in French or Yiddish, as in the case of the newspaper *Unzer Wort*. Most of the material published illegally by the movement was, however, aimed at the French population as a whole and intended as a call for solidarity. From February 1943 the National Movement Against Racism (MNCR) encouraged solidarity through resistance newspapers such as *Notre voix*, *J'accuse* and *Fraternité* (Doc. 308). The papers provided detailed reports of roundups and the crimes against Jews in France or in the East, which the authorized press failed to mention at all.[239]

The armed Jewish resistance was largely communist-organized at first, particularly in the immigrant sections of the partisan organization Francs-tireurs et partisans – Main-d'œuvre immigrée (FTP-MOI). Its activities were directed against the German occupiers and their institutions and against French collaborators. Additionally, acts of sabotage targeted major infrastructure facilities such as railway lines and telephone lines. A group of young men in Toulouse founded the Zionist resistance group known as the Armée juive (Jewish Army), which was subsequently joined by the Jewish scouting movement in France (Éclaireurs israélites de France), which had gone underground in 1943, and the Zionist youth organization.[240] The Armée juive had branches in several large cities in the southern zone such as Lyons, Grenoble, and Nice. Jacques Lazarus wrote about the Armée juive in Nice, which had around fifteen members, both boys and girls. At its 'meetings [or] in the street, they exchanged the latest news and compared the lists of "those lost and those saved". The leaders handed out the money that was to be distributed, but also, in particular, envelopes that were full of false papers of all sorts'[241] (see also Doc. 319). In addition to helping people escape across the Swiss or Spanish border, the groups that made up the Armée juive sought to acquire information and to combat informers and collaborating French authorities. The cover of its Paris branch was blown in July 1944 by a double agent who claimed to be employed by the British intelligence

237 Michel Laffitte, *Juif dans la France allemande: Institutions, dirigeants et communautés au temps de la Shoah* (Paris: Tallandier, 2006), pp. 179–187.

238 On the history of the STO, see Patrice Arnaud, *Les STO: Histoire des Français requis en Allemagne nazie, 1942–1945* (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2010); and Raphaël Spina, *Histoire du STO* (Paris: Perrin, 2017).

239 Poznanski, *Jews in France during World War II*, pp. 346–351; see also Adam Rayski, *Nos illusions perdues* (Paris: Balland, 1985).

240 Daniel Lee, *Pétain's Jewish Children: French Jewish Youth and the Vichy Regime, 1940–1942* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 181–184.

241 Jacques Lazarus, 'Juifs au combat', in Marek Halter (ed.), *Les Révoltés de la Shoah: Témoignages et récits* (Paris: Omnibus, 2010), pp. 40–41.

service and was simultaneously working for the Abwehr, the German military intelligence office. Also exposed through betrayal was the Westerweel Group, which had worked with the Armée juive to smuggle hundreds of young people out of the Netherlands to Spain, via Belgium and France (Doc. 335).

Allied forces landed in southern Italy in early July 1943. Consequently, that summer the Wehrmacht began to prepare to take over the Italian zones of occupation, including those in France. In early September Röthke and Brunner devised a plan for the arrest of the Jewish refugees in the Italian zone, who had been largely spared thus far (Doc. 310). After the proclamation of the armistice between Italy and the Allies on 8 September 1943, German troops promptly occupied this zone. A relentless manhunt was launched the same day. An anonymous account describes the arrests that began on 10 September in Nice, where there were more than 20,000 Jews: 'Without wasting any time, the Germans began persecuting the Jews 48 hours after their arrival [in the city].' Residential neighbourhoods were sealed off; 'physiognomists', who claimed to be able to recognize Jews by their facial characteristics, drove through the streets, and 'an army of informers got down to work'. Checks conducted at railway stations thwarted numerous escape attempts.[242] As the yellow star had never been introduced in the unoccupied zone, and as identity documents and food ration cards had thus far only rarely been stamped and were frequently counterfeit, Brunner resorted to his own methods. He ordered individuals who had been arrested as the result of (paid) reports, submitted openly or anonymously, to be taken to his headquarters in the Hotel Excelsior in Nice, where 'experts' were to examine them for physical similarities to Jews. For men circumcision was the decisive criterion. Under torture, those arrested were also interrogated about the whereabouts of relatives, and they were subsequently transferred to Drancy. From mid September to mid December 1943 Brunner's staff arrested more than 1,800 Jews in Nice and the surrounding area by this method alone.[243] Among those placed under arrest was the father of lawyer and Holocaust historian Serge Klarsfeld, who had taken the precaution of setting up a hiding place for his family behind a wardrobe:

> We heard the soldiers beating the Jewish neighbours and the children to make them disclose their brothers' hiding places. My mother, my sister and I went to the hiding place, and my father stayed. He opened the front door and claimed that we were out in the countryside. The Germans searched, they pushed the clothes in the wardrobe in all directions, but did not touch the interior wall.[244]

In the autumn of 1943 the Security Police and mobile Einsatzkommandos also intensified the persecution of Jews in other places in the southern zone, detaining Jews regardless of nationality, gender, or age, in line with Röthke's announcement. Jean-Jacques Becker observed the new methods in Grenoble:

242 Anonymous account, 'Nizza', dated 20 Dec. 1943, Mémorial de la Shoah, Paris, CCCLXVI-64.

243 Wieviorka and Laffitte, *À l'intérieur du camp de Drancy*, p. 261; Poznanski, *Jews in France during World War II*, pp. 390–391; Meyer, *Täter im Verhör*, pp. 194–198.

244 Reminiscences of Serge Klarsfeld, in Murielle Allouche and Jean-Yves Masson, *Ce qu'il reste de nous: Les déportés et leurs familles témoignent* (Paris: Michel Lafon, 2005), p. 194.

> German soldiers, who had arrived unobtrusively, suddenly blocked a square, a crossroads, frequented by many people. Everyone who was there was subsequently searched, interrogated and – if suspicious for one reason or another – placed under arrest.[245]

After Brunner's Sonderkommando took over Drancy camp, now called an 'emigration camp', or an 'assembly camp', the situation for the camp inmates deteriorated dramatically. The French officials from the prefecture of the Seine département were forced to leave the camp; only the French gendarmerie remained behind, as the outer guard. Inside the camp, Brunner had a separate security force established, made up of Jewish prisoners. The buildings were renovated and workshops set up. Brunner also introduced new punishments, such as beatings, torture, and detention in the cellars. His task was to arrange for the quick resumption of deportations to the extermination camps in the East, which had been suspended since the end of March 1943. Shortly before the first convoys left, Brunner personally interrogated the prisoners in order to assign them to groups, labelled 'A' to 'F', that were deemed either 'able to be deported' or 'not able to be deported'.[246] The internees who were earmarked for deportation were informed: 'We are sending you to labour camps, where you will live with your families and be paid for the work you do' (Doc. 334). Their heads were not shaved again before their departure. To increase the number of persons being deported, prisoners at the camp were forced to travel as so-called *missionnaires* (envoys) to Paris and the various regions of France to track down other Jews in hiding. Their family members stayed behind in the camp as hostages for the next deportation. By early September 1943 most of those found 'able to be deported' had left Drancy on four transport trains; one month later the deportations of those apprehended on the Côte d'Azur began. The leaders of the UGIF were now also affected. Raymond-Raoul Lambert and André Baur, together with their families, were deported to Auschwitz on 7 and 17 December 1943. Lambert was murdered upon arrival; Baur perished at Auschwitz in April 1944.

During this new phase, which was heavily influenced by Brunner and ran from the resumption of the deportations in June 1943 until their discontinuation in August 1944, Reich Railways trains transported almost 24,000 persons from France to the extermination camps in the East.[247]

Under the French chief of police, Bousquet, French Jews had been included in roundups only in exceptional cases. In late 1943, under German pressure, he had to vacate his position. He was replaced by Joseph Darnand, commander of the Milice française, the Vichy regime's paramilitary police force, who became secretary general for public order. Darnand was prepared to collaborate unconditionally with the Germans. As French police were proving less and less willing to take part in mass arrests, the Milice now played

245 Becker, *Un soir de l'été 1942* …, p. 102.

246 Wieviorka and Laffitte, *À l'intérieur du camp de Drancy*, p. 219. From the end of June 1943, these interrogations were carried out by his assistants, Ernst Brückler and Josef Weiszl: ibid., pp. 222 and 226.

247 Meyer, *Täter im Verhör*, pp. 191–193; Wieviorka and Laffitte, *À l'intérieur du camp de Drancy*, pp. 249 and 255. The number of those additionally arrested in this way by September 1943 – mostly children and older relatives of Jews who were already interned – is estimated at 200 to 300.

an increasingly significant role in the persecution of Jews, members of the resistance movement, and those who were evading conscription for forced labour.[248] In addition, during the last months of the occupation many French Jews in the provinces were arrested and deported, for example in Bordeaux in late December 1943 and in Laon, Saint-Quentin, and Amiens in January 1944. Some prefects were troubled by these events. In Amiens, Charles Daupeyroux appealed to several higher-level French authorities, urgently requesting that they intervene (Doc. 320). Shortly thereafter he was relieved of his duties.

In Paris the municipal police focused on persecuting foreign Jews, while the Criminal Police continued to deliver to Drancy French Jews who had violated anti-Jewish regulations. The efforts by the German police to step up the deportations in the final months of the occupation are evident in the 'Information Leaflet on Increasing the Number of Jews Arrested', signed by Helmut Knochen, Senior Commander of the Security Police, and edited by Alois Brunner. Dated mid April 1944, the leaflet records, among other things, that nationality played no role in the arrests and that the 'entire network of relatives' was to be included (Doc. 329). Aline Vidal-Naquet almost fell victim to this new zeal. When the 11-year-old came out of school in Marseilles on 15 May 1944, a friend was waiting to warn her that she should not go home, because her parents had been arrested.[249] Soon afterwards the couple were deported via Drancy to Auschwitz, where they both perished. Their four children, one of whom, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, later became a historian of classical antiquity, managed to hide in the homes of acquaintances and thereby survived the war.

The Allied landings in Normandy on 6 June 1944 led to a sharp reduction in the number of detainees being transferred from the provinces to Drancy, so Brunner decided to concentrate on the Jews in Paris. In mid June Knochen briefed Military Commander Carl Heinrich von Stülpnagel, but von Stülpnagel opposed the plan because 'it [would] only bring turmoil to the thus far tranquil population of Paris'.[250] In any case Brunner was not in a position to execute his plan. Since the end of February 1944, the German police had been demanding the handover of the lists kept in the police prefecture that contained the names and addresses of the French Jews in Paris. The lists were not submitted to the Germans until early August, after several requests had been made to senior authorities, and the large-scale roundup sought by Brunner never took place. On 20 July 1944, however, he did manage to initiate the arrest of the children who had been taken in at the eleven homes of the UGIF in the Paris area following the deportation of their parents. Among them was Charlotte Schapira, who described in her memoirs the moment of terror when the police raided the home at 2 a.m. Between 21 and 25 July, 233 children were taken to Drancy, and most of them were deported to Auschwitz on 31 July.[251] The last transport, accompanied by Alois Brunner, left Drancy on 17 August 1944 with fifty-one deportees,

248 Kasten, *'Gute Franzosen'*, pp. 120–123 and 172.

249 Diary of Aline Vidal-Naquet, 15 May 1944, reproduced in facsimile in Pierre Vidal-Naquet, *Mémoires*, vol. 1: *La Brisure et l'attente, 1930–1955* (Paris: Seuil, 2007 [1995]), p. 135.

250 BA-MA, RH 19 IV, OB West, Ic, war journal (brief daily notes), fol. 134, records of the phone calls taken on 12 and 13 June 1944. We are grateful to Peter Lieb for bringing this document to our attention.

251 Charlotte Schapira, *Il faudra que je me souvienne: La déportation des enfants de l'Union générale des Israélites de France* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1994), p. 48; Klarsfeld, *Vichy–Auschwitz*, pp. 343–344.

bound for Buchenwald. One week later, on 24 August, Allied and Gaullist armed forces under General Leclerc marched into Paris. At the end of November 1944 they liberated Strasbourg, and in February 1945 all of eastern France. A few harbour towns in western France that had been fortified held out until April 1945.

By Serge Klarsfeld's reckoning, between 1942 and 1944 a total of 73,853 Jews were deported from France to the extermination camps in the East, including 11,000 children – approximately 25 per cent of France's Jewish population prior to the occupation. Two thirds of them, or 56,500, did not hold French citizenship.[252] In addition, 3,000 Jews died in the French internment camps.

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A comparison of the countries of Western Europe reveals a number of parallels in the persecution of the Jewish population, along with features specific to each country. In three of the countries – in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands – the timing of the introduction of discriminatory and exclusionary measures against Jews was virtually identical. And everywhere the German occupiers sought to take advantage of xenophobic and antisemitic tendencies already present before the war, and to reinforce them through targeted propaganda. The German officials in charge of Jewish affairs in these three countries also made joint decisions about mass deportation, and they coordinated the logistical preparations. Nonetheless, the percentage of deportees and murder victims among the Jews in each of these countries and in the other countries of Western and Northern Europe varied significantly. While more than 75 per cent of the Jews in the Netherlands lost their lives, the figures for the other countries were lower: approximately 50 per cent in Norway, 45 per cent in Belgium, 34 per cent in Luxembourg, 25 per cent in France, and 2 per cent in Denmark.

The reasons for this disparity are manifold. One variable that needs to be taken into account is the number of foreign or stateless Jews in the individual countries. That figure was small for the Netherlands, but relatively large for France and Belgium. In the latter two countries, foreigners and stateless persons were the first to be deported. This group had had little opportunity to integrate itself into Belgian or French society prior to the occupation. The German authorities declared foreign Jews to be enemies of the German Reich and invoked the laws governing warfare under which an occupying power was allowed to take action against such enemies or to adopt preventive security measures. The domestic authorities offered scant opposition to that line of action, but insisted that Jews who were citizens of the relevant country be exempt from deportation. For their part, the German Security Police made no secret of the fact that Jews who were local nationals would not be spared for long. In early 1943 the second phase of the deportations began, and both native and foreign Jews were targeted for persecution and deportation, without exception. For all Jews in the countries of Western Europe, it was now simply a question of trying to stay alive.

252 From March to November 1942 a total of 41,951 persons were taken to Auschwitz in 43 transports; 810 of these deportees survived the end of the war. Between 1943 and 1944, a total of 31,902 Jews were deported to Auschwitz, Lublin-Majdanek, Sobibor, and Buchenwald, with 1,759 of them surviving. In addition, there were several groups that were deported in separate procedures: Klarsfeld, *Vichy–Auschwitz*, pp. 368–371.

By contrast, most Jews in the Netherlands held Dutch citizenship. They were largely integrated into Dutch society and relied on the protection of the national authorities. Unlike in France and Belgium, in the Netherlands the Germans could not meet their deportation quotas by first rounding up mainly foreign Jews. From the outset, therefore, they were determined to target Jews with Dutch citizenship, and the government departments in The Hague were unable to resist this pressure. Unexpectedly and abruptly exposed to the violence of the German occupation regime, Dutch Jews were left entirely at the Germans' mercy. The vulnerability of the native Dutch Jews was increased by the fact that they had not experienced life as refugees or in hiding.[253] The result was paradoxical: Jews who were not citizens of the country in which they were living were persecuted early on and particularly severely in every country except the Netherlands, where no explicit distinction was made with respect to citizenship. But the number of victims was highest precisely in the Netherlands, where relatively few foreign Jews had lived. Participation in the raids by local police, who were familiar with the local geography, also appears to have played a significant role in the number of Jews seized, a conclusion suggested by the difference in the arrest figures for Brussels and Antwerp in summer 1942.

Another factor to consider is that in each country there was a correlation between the proportion of deportees and the extent to which state structures and institutions had been dismantled by the German occupiers. Prior to the collapse of Nazi rule in 1944–1945, the Danish and French governments had managed over the course of the war to exert some influence on the progress of the persecution of Jews; by contrast, the Netherlands had been placed under German civil administration at the onset of the occupation. The survival of at least 200,000 Jews in France until the retreat of the German occupation troops in the late summer or autumn of 1944 can be attributed not least to the differing circumstances in the various zones of occupation, and in particular to the opportunities for refuge, albeit only temporary, in the unoccupied southern zone. Moreover, it was easier to avoid persecution in a relatively large country like France than in smaller and more densely populated countries such as the Netherlands and Belgium.[254]

Finally, the structural differences between the various German occupation regimes were also of significance for the extent and pace of persecution. Only in the Netherlands was the local police force directly under the control of the German authorities. Here, the occupiers succeeded in enforcing anti-Jewish measures within a short time and, from July 1942, in carrying out deportations steadily and in quick succession. In Norway, command over the police formally resided with the Norwegian collaborationist government, which followed the instructions of the German occupiers without resistance. By contrast, the occupiers in Denmark were dependent on their own forces and could not count on the cooperation of the Danish police. Danish SS volunteers were the only potential auxiliaries who had local knowledge. In Belgium and France, political and economic

253 Griffioen and Zeller, 'Comparing the Persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands, France and Belgium', p. 78.

254 A systematic comparison of the conditions for survival in France is attempted by Jacques Semelin in *Persécution et entraides dans la France occupée: Comment 75% des Juifs en France ont échappé à la mort* (Paris: Les Arènes, 2013), pp. 799–855.

considerations also stood in the way of the relentless persecution of Jews. Here the Germans had to take care to avoid unsettling the local population unduly. They had also to ensure that the national authorities retained the inclination to collaborate, particularly in the case of the police, on whose cooperation they were dependent, not least because local officials had a far better record of success with roundups than the Germans did.

The attitude of the local population was also significant. In Denmark in October 1943 the deportations evidently came to a halt because they met with disapproval among the population. This was also the case for a temporary period in France and Belgium in late autumn 1942. Public opinion was also particularly influenced by the introduction of the conscription of non-Jews for forced labour in Germany – in the Netherlands in April 1942, in Belgium in October 1942, and in France in February 1943. From that point onwards, the Jews could increasingly count on support from segments of the non-Jewish population that had abandoned their previous wait-and-see attitude and turned against the occupiers. In France the conduct of the churches and relief organizations also played a part, as did the impressions left by the mass arrests in July and August 1942, and the deportation of Jewish children. As a result, in the autumn of 1942 the Vichy regime abandoned its policy of negotiation through collaboration and seemingly became more reluctant to be involved in open acts of persecution, though the precise extent of this reluctance remains subject to debate.[255]

When examining the persecution and murder of the Jews in Northern and Western Europe, an additional aspect of local collaboration with Nazi Germany should be considered, namely, volunteering for the Waffen SS and participation in the crimes committed by the Nazi regime in Eastern Europe. Nearly 50,000 so-called Germanic volunteers joined the Waffen SS. The largest group comprised between 23,000 and 25,000 Dutchmen, followed by some 10,000 Flemings, around 6,000 Danes, and approximately 5,000 Norwegians. Smaller numbers came from Wallonia and France and other countries outside Western Europe. There is no information on the involvement of SS volunteers from Wallonia and France who were sent to the Eastern Front from 1943 as part of anti-Jewish operations. However, more evidence is available about Dutch involvement in the practices of antisemitic persecution in Nazi-occupied Eastern Europe. Additionally, between 5,000 and 6,000 Dutch people – farmers, fishermen, construction workers, secretaries, artisans, and entrepreneurs – settled as colonists in the German-occupied Baltics, Belorussia, and Ukraine. They used Jews as forced labourers and were involved in atrocities. Some of these volunteers wrote about their actions and experiences in letters to their families that reveal their identification with German goals in general and towards the Jews.

It is clearly important to highlight the role played by local collaboration and cooperation in the persecution and the murder of the Jews of Western and Northern Europe. However, the overall picture of local responses remains complex. Obvious paradoxes remain: there is no direct correlation to be observed between the extent of antisemitism in individual countries during the decades preceding occupation and the subsequent proportion of Jews deported from each country. In the Netherlands antisemitism was

255 The exact reasons for the relatively high survival rate in France have been the subject of intense debate in recent years. See Jacques Semelin, *The Survival of the Jews in France, 1940–1944*, trans. Cynthia Schoch and Natasha Lehrer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

far less pronounced than in France, where at the turn of the century the widespread condemnation of the Jews in the Dreyfus affair had caused a national crisis. And yet the proportion of victims among the Jews living in the Netherlands was three times that among the Jews living in France.

For all the importance of collaboration, complicity, passivity, and indifference on the part of the non-Jewish population – alongside the manifestations of solidarity, resistance, and help – ultimately the real driving force for persecution came from the German side. Reasons for the divergent death rates are to be sought primarily in the differing characters of the German occupation authorities, evident in their institutional structures and their personnel, and also in their access to suitable executive forces and the extent to which the specific circumstances within each occupied country were taken into account. The Germans' overarching objective, explicitly formulated at the Wannsee Conference and pursued with enormous energy, was to deport and kill all the Jews in the countries of Western Europe. The scale of their success, despite all resistance, is horrifying.

List of Documents

Denmark

Norway

Netherlands