Rupert Graf Strachwitz (Ed.)
Religious Communities and Civil Society in Europe

Maecenata Schriften

Edited by
Dr. phil. Rupert Graf Strachwitz,
Dr. sc. Eckhard Priller and
Christian Schreier

Volume 15

Religious Communities and Civil Society in Europe

Analyses and Perspectives on a Complex Interplay, Volume I

Edited by Rupert Graf Strachwitz

DE GRUYTER
OLDENBOURG

ISBN 978-3-11-064146-2
e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-064588-0
e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-064171-4
ISSN 1866-122X

Library of Congress Control Number: 2019946050

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de.

Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck

www.degruyter.com

Content

Rupert Graf Strachwitz

Foreword

In 2002, the Maecenata Institute for Third Sector Studies, as it was then called, and the Catholic Academy of Berlin jointly organised a conference titled 'The Church between the State and Civil Society'.[1] It became very clear in the discussions that the position of religious communities in modern society was anything but obvious. Since then, it has been my ambition to examine this important issue more fully. Finally, in 2015, the since renamed Maecenata Institute for Philanthropy and Civil Society obtained a substantial research grant to do so. It merits mentioning with gratitude that this research could not have been undertaken without generous financial support from a private institution that wishes not to be named.

Five associates kindly agreed to collaborate with us in determining details of content, reviewing papers, identifying experts, conducting interviews, and contributing to the final outcome. They are:

- Prof. Dr. Rocco d'Ambrosio (Pontifical Gregorian University, Rome, Italy),
- Prof. Dr. Paul Dekker (University of Tilburg, Netherlands),
- Dr. Anna Domaradzka (University of Warsaw, Poland),
- Prof. Dr. Johan von Essen (Ersta Sköndal University College, Stockholm, Sweden),
- Prof. Dr. Vassilios Makrides (University of Erfurt, Germany).

In addition, a number of other colleagues agreed to act as advisors and contributors. With the associates, we held workshops in Berlin in 2015, 2016, and 2017. A conference to present the findings took place in Rome in November, 2018. Project and findings were discussed at roundtbales in the context of international conferences of the International Society for Third Sector Research, in Stockholm (2016) and Amsterdam (2018) respectively, and on other academic and public occasions. Further efforts to disseminate the findings will be made once the publications are available.

Six work packages were defined and worked on:

1. a legal report, commissioned to Prof. Tymen van der Ploeg;
2. a report on data sources, commissioned to a team of specialists at D-Part;
3. Comprehensive narratives, to include papers written by associates and ourselves, as well as others;
4. a call for contributions;
5. an outreach to connected projects;
6. a comprehensive bibliography.

1 Graf Strachwitz, R., Adloff, F., Schmidt, S., Schneider, M. (eds.) (2002): Kirche zwischen Staat und Zivilgesellschaft. Berlin.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110645880-001

All papers will be published in three printed volumes in 2019. Broadly speaking, this first volume contains work packages (1), (2), and (6), and a number of papers from work packages (3) and (4). Vol. 2 will contain further papers from work packages (3) and (4), and should the need arise, addenda to work package (6). Volume three will contain papers given at the final conference held at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome in November of 2018.

It is more than appropriate to express our most sincere and heart-felt gratitude to many colleagues who have provided expertise, invaluable discussion points, and research papers that together will constitute the findings and results of this project. High-ranking church leaders have made themselves available for interviews, and scholars from all over Europe have assisted in putting a highly complex issue into focus. Special thanks are due to the Pontifical Gregorian University, Rome, and to Rocco d'Ambrosio in particular for hosting the final conference, and to Sarah Albrecht, who for three years has aptly coordinated the project.

Berlin, in November 2018

Rupert Graf Strachwitz

Rupert Graf Strachwitz

Introduction

For the past three years, together with colleagues in or from Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden, we have attempted to analyze the position of religious communities within a framework of society defined by three arenas of societal action outside the immediate private sphere, namely civil society, the state, and the market. In the course of this exercise, academic analysis of a status quo, while preserving academic standards, has to some degree given way to observing and analyzing an increasingly dynamic process of change that is happening both within and outside these communities. The vastly increased interest for anything to do with Islam in Europe, a sensation that religion, albeit not the established Churches, have found their way back into many people's mindsets, the 500th anniversary of Luther's reformation, celebrated in 2017, and accompanied by a flurry of conferences and publications, and last but not least the personality of and approach to Church governance adopted by Pope Francis, form one side of this argument, as does a general feeling that the approach taken by governments and religious leaders in Russia and in some Muslim countries, which sees state and religion as interdependent aspects of political order, may be out of touch with modern thinking. The other side of the argument is dominated by a steadily decreasing membership in established religious communities to the extent that they no longer represent a majority of citizens in most European countries, and a continuing secularization of public bodies, along with a changing perception of how public life should be organised. The separation of Church and State has, in some way or another, become a principle of statehood everywhere in Europe, and all forms of a special relationship between Church and State have become hotly contested, not only by those who do not belong to a religious community themselves. Also, members of diverse religious communities are members of the same political community. All of them enjoy a right to exercise their religion under the respective constitution, while religious minorities enjoy particular protection under the Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations in Paris in 1948[1].

Furthermore however, whereas from the 16th to the 20th century, the nation state became widely accepted and was indeed enforced as the overall prime organiser of public life, today's society is moving away from this pattern at considerable speed. Globalization has internationalized the private (business) sector, and citizens' private lives have transcended the boundaries of the nation state to a degree not envisaged even half a century ago. Citizens today entertain very diverse and more often than not mixed identities and loyalties: to their local community, region, or nation, to Europe, or as world citizens; to their employers ("I'm a Coca-Cola man"), their clubs, their

1 (2018-11-05)

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110645880-002

causes ("my loyalty is with the handicapped"), their movements ("I belong to all those who are fighting for a better world"), and in more cases than meets the eye, to their religious beliefs[2]. Indeed, if forced to choose between nation and religion, many people today would put religion first, and this would apply not only to minorities and citizens on the fringes of society. The civic space has emerged as a separate, visible, forceful, albeit very heterogeneous arena of public discourse and action. Is religion part of this arena?

To ask this question, is not only legitimate but also timely. Religious affiliation and loyalty may not be questioned on grounds of a compulsory first loyalty to the state. But what does this mean for religious communities who, for many centuries, have not only enjoyed a hand-in-glove relationship with the state in most European countries, but also a monopoly on defining collective religious and ethical beliefs? Do religious communities have to reassess their position, as they can no longer aspire to be spiritual rulers? Reinhard Marx, then a young bishop, today a Cardinal and Chairman of the German Conference of Catholic Bishops, put it this way in 2002: "The changes in society, to do with seculariization, pluralism and individualism, can neither be slowed down nor held up by the Church. These changes have made the Church lose its monopoly of endowing life with a meaning. Today's civil society is marked by the fact that no one institution or organisation may aspire to this monopoly. Civil society has become a space in which the Church does not enjoy first place but is seen as one intermediary institution amongst others."[3] Marx went on to remark: "Like other players in civil society, she [the Church] follows her own interests within this context."[4] This acknowledgement of being part of civil society, delivered on the record by a representative of a major religious community, is gaining world-wide assent, but is by no means universal. "Oh no, the Church is Sacred Society!" Pope John Paul II's answer to Ralf Dahrendorf[5], when asked whether the Church was part of civil society, still resonates with many people in- and outside of Church hierarchies.

Against this backdrop, the 'Religious Communities and Civil Society in Europe' project is a large-scale exploratory research aimed at assessing the position of religious communities as potential or active civil society players in Europe, and at looking into differences in their positioning on legal, historical, cultural, and behavioural grounds. It cannot of course attempt to provide all the answers, let alone determine the position of religious communities in society as such. The project was undertaken by the Maecenata Institute, an independent research and policy centre in Berlin that focusses on issues of civil society, philanthropy, and civic engagement, from 2015 to

2 The case of Northern Ireland, where citizens see themselves as Catholics or Protestants first, is a tragic case in point.

3 Marx, R., Message, loc. cit., p. 7

4 Ibid.

5 as related orally to the author by Ralf Dahrendorf

2018. The focus was a new one. For while the seemingly vitalizing impact of religion and religiosity on civic engagement is a research topic that has been extensively looked into, both in the Americas and, increasingly, in a European context[6], and while faith based charities have also been objects of scholarly work in the context of civil society theory and empirical studies, what still seems to be missing is an evaluation of the role of institutionalized religious communities, and of circumstances that facilitate or impede their status as civil society organisations. On the other hand, when lecturing on civil society to a public audience, one can be sure that a question asked will be "And what about political parties, trade unions and churches? Are they part of civil society?" We have attempted to seek an answer in respect to at least one these.

One assumption is that the long tradition of a hand-in-glove relationship with the state and persisting close ties render this more difficult in a European context. Since the days of the ancient Egyptians and before, temporal and spiritual rule had been closely intertwined. Religion was a defining element of society. The creation of national Churches, e.g. in Sweden and England, in the 16th century was but a return to very ancient customs. Even the 19th century Swiss constitution that had to accommodate a high degree of pluralism, regulated on the creation of bishoprics, an entirely ecclesiastical affair. To this day, bishops in the Church of England are appointed by the Monarch on advice by the Prime Minister, and churches are full of national symbols, military memorials among them. In Italy, parish priests, who are supposed to don a red, white, and green sash for the occasion, officiate as state officials in declaring church marriages valid under civil law, while in Greece, notwithstanding a constitutional separation of Church and State, newly appointed government ministers take their oath of office in front of the Archbishop. In Germany, the government tax authorities collect church tax and hand in on to the Churches for a fee, and even in France that in theory practices the strictest form of separation, some exceptions were made in Alsace-Lorraine for political reasons.

Today, in most European countries, legal relations between the state and various religious communities (minorities and majorities alike) play a crucial role in shaping the religious communities' scope for action within the arena of civil society. Also, the comparatively new understanding of what actually constitutes civil society has not permeated to areas of study prominent in assessing religious communities. The "modernization of religious consciousness" (Juergen Habermas)[7] as a response to pluralism, modern sciences, the spread of positive law, and secular morality, has not taken place. Therefore, the purpose of this research project, has been to see if and to

6 See i.a. Dekker, P., Halman, L., Hart, J. (eds.) (2013): Religion and Civil Society in Europe. Dordrecht: Springer.

7 Habermas J. (2013): Im Sog der Technokratie. Kleine politische Schriften XII. Berlin: Suhrkamp: p. 13.

what extent Christian Churches, and Muslim and Jewish religious communities in Europe see themselves, are seen by others, and are possibly on the road as civil society movements.

What we were aiming at in particular, was to see

1. whether and if so, how religious communities are moving away from being part of a system of government, and are becoming part of what is generally termed civil society,
2. what effects this has on these communities,
3. what effects this may have on civil society in general.

Our geographic focus is Europe, with a look at Turkey and a glance at Israel. By its very nature, the project was interdisciplinary, albeit not led by theologians or scholars in religious studies. Most of the researchers involved are social scientists, particularly political scientists. And indeed, our research interest was not theological, and did not touch on dogmatic, moral, and ethical issues that are obviously of extreme importance for the communities proper. We were not concerned with theological arguments; nor were we talking about faith-based charities. Faith-driven volunteerism was but a side-aspect. The academic interest was in civil society as part of a larger society, and was with religious communities ("Churches") within this framework.

The term 'religious community' is seemingly self-explanatory. It is used here to comprise large Christian Churches, e.g. the Roman Catholic Church, the Greek Orthodox Church, the Church of England, etc., smaller Protestant Churches, e.g. the Baptist Church, as well as Muslim and Jewish and indeed other religious communities. A number of differences regarding their legal status, self-assessment, theological background, size, history, and traditions will become apparent in the papers that discuss individual cases. They do not affect the overall definition.

On the other hand the term 'civil society' is comparatively new, although it goes back to Aristoteles, was prominent in the theories put forward by Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson and others in the 18th century, and is sometimes in English used to describe Hegel's model of society. It must therefore be made clear that none of these meanings of the term apply to what is understood as civil society today. Furthermore, while a broad international consensus exists among academics as to what this term implies, dissenting opinions exist, and a plethora of different descriptions persist in public and political discussions. Therefore, for the sake of the arguments presented in this project, it is necessary to explain what how this term is used in the context of this project. Obviously, the model used here cannot and does not wish to provide a comprehensive system, as Hegel did. E.g., man's relationship with God does not enter into this argument; nor does man's relationship with his natural habitat.

The meaning of the term civil society as used here was first developed in the United States from the 1970s. Since the 1990s, the term has been widely recognized both academically and in practice, as describing a large arena of organised – and increasingly of hardly organised – collective activities that follow certain criteria while

retaining wide differences amongst each other. These criteria may apply to organisations large and small, to institutions as well as to movements, and to hierarchical as well as to heterarchical organisms, regardless of their age, their vision and mission, and their actual contribution to society.

Civil society may be described as the citizens' arena[8], the place where citizens engage by their own free will, participate directly in affairs to do with the common good, and voice their concerns, ideas, criticism, and agreement. Lester Salamon's Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project[9] defined a number of principles that may decide whether an activity, a movement, an organisation, an institution should be considered part of this particular arena:

- access should be voluntary,
- the organisation should not be engaged in core government business,
- making a profit should not be a prime objective,
- the governance structure should be autonomous, and
- any profits made may not be distributed to members or owners.

By applying these criteria, collective societal activities may be grouped in three spheres, sectors, or arenas, grouped around a centre, constituted by the human individual. Man's closest affiliation, his immediate family, is considered to be part of this centre.

Interestingly, while acknowledging in principle that religious communities were part of the 'third sector', as was and of course still is customary in the United States, the empirical research undertaken by Salamon and his associates from 1988 did not include them for pragmatic reasons, thus however setting the tone for social scientists ever since. While there was never any doubt that faith-based charities were to be considered part of civil society, the exclusion of religious communities proper, added to the reluctance of religious uthorities to consider their organisations as civil society players, has left a gap to be filled.

8 Viz. Graf Strachwitz, R. (2014): *Achtung vor dem Bürger*. Freiburg: Herder.

9 Salamon, L. M., Anheier, H. K., List, R., Toepler, S., Sokolowski, W. S. and Associates (2004): Global Civil Society Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies, 1999 / Lester M. Salamon and S. Wojciech Sokolowski (eds.), Global Civil Society Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector. Baltimore, vol. 2. Bloomfield CT: The Kumarian Press.



Figure 1: Model of social fields
Source: Maecenata Institut

For some years, the term 'third sector' was widely used to denominate what we today would call civil society. The term 'arena' is preferred here, as it implies movement and activity, plus a choice of entering and leaving it. This choice is indeed crucial and refers to the fundamental normative backdrop of this concept: that individual man (to include, of course, woman) is at the centre and outset of all societal action. Man's existence does not, as totalitarian theories have tended to assume, depend on the existence of a state or any other societal organism. Rather, all societal activities depend on the individual, who is adorned with his or her very own unalienable personality and dignity. Or, to put it in a principal-agent frame, the individual is the principal, and no societal organisation can ever aspire to be more than an agent.[10]

Each of these arenas is a necessary component of 21st century society, and each is dependent on the others in order for its players to be able to meet their obligations towards society. The failure to recognize and accept civil society as one of these arenas, while assuming that the state, or possibly the state and the market together were in a position to meet any societal challenge, is one of the reasons why the state and the market are seen as failing, while it is not, as has been suggested, this failure alone that has generated the emergence of the notion of civil society.

Civil society has existed in one form or another at least since the time of 'The Great Transformation', the 'Axial Age', first described by the German philosopher Karl Jas-

10 See i.a.: Jensen, M. C and Meckling, W. H. (1976): Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 1976 (October), 3(4): 305–360.

pers in 1949[11], and later in more detail by Karen Armstrong[12] and others, to mean a period between the 8th and the 2nd century B.C., when a world-wide near-simultaneous transformation of thought and subsequently of society took place. Over the last two generations or so, a novel concept of civil society has emerged that differs from previous concepts, including the one put forward by Adam Ferguson in 1767.[13] The reasons why this transformation has taken place, are multifold. But they may have more to do with another 'Great Transformation', described by Karl Polanyi in 1944[14], than meets the eye. Polany analyzes the rise of modern capitalism as the driving force of society alongside and eventually crowding out the state. Implicitly, this generates the need of a public sphere not dominated either by the use of force nor by the persistant urge to compete. That religious communities should be part of this public sphere, may be derived from beliefs held by almost any religion. Again, this does not touch upon their fundamental mission, but resonates with providing services to the community at large, building communities, enabling individuals to seek personal fulfilment[15], often termed personal growth. Religious communities encourage giving as a basic instrument of communication with fellow-man, thus matching the concept of an alternative to mandatory enforcement and trading. In 1960, the French political economist Francois Perroux described giving as the attribute of what we call civil society, while force is associated with the state, and trading is associated with the market.[16]

Though civil society organisations (CSOs) command a considerable full-time and part-time workforce, the arena as such is based and relies heavily on volunteerism and philanthropy, described in modern terms as civic engagement, while this in turn takes place in civil society to a much higher degree than either in governmental or in private sector organisations. It is therefore quite clear that individual religious sentiment as a motivation to engage on one hand, and religious communities' affiliation to civil society make a readily explained match. We must recognize, however, that the resources in volunteer work and donations that civil society can command are nothing compared to what governments obtain from the citizens by way of taxes, and what the business community makes by selling goods and services. In this respect, civil society is the smallest of the three arenas. It requires to be cherished and empowered to help meet the challenges the whole of mankind is facing today and will face tomor-

11 Jaspers, K. (1953): The Origin and Goal of History. English: Yale University Press.

12 Armstrong, K. (2006): The Great Transformation: The Beginning of Our Religious Traditions. New York: Knopf.

13 Ferguson, A. (1996) An Essay on the History of Civil Society. Cambridge University Press.

14 The Great Transformation The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. New York: Random House 2001.

15 viz. Foucault, M. (ed.) (1986): english: Care of the Self. New York: Random House.

16 Perroux, F. (1960): *Économie et société : contrainte, échange, don*. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.

row, and this will not change in the foreseeable future. But what is it that civil society can bring to the table?

Though philanthropic giving is by no means the prime source of civil society funding, it is most certainly a major driving force in empowering its agents. Empowered in this way, as Albert Hirschman rightly established in 1970, civil society organisations may engage in tasks that support existing societal systems ("loyal"), may distance themselves from mainstream society ("exit") or become an opposing force ("voice").[17] Under all three of these headings, we may see eight distinct role models for civil society organisms; many organisations are active in more than one:

- service provision,
- advocacy,
- watchdog,
- intermediary,
- self-help,
- community building,
- political discourse, and
- self-fulfilment.

These role models have developed over the past 30 years or so, both in practice and in theory. But since the American economist Richard Cornuelle first spoke of an independent sector beyond the state and the market in 1965[18], the discussion about the overall function of this sector or arena has never stopped. He argued that associations of volunteers could effectively solve social problems without recourse to heavy-handed bureaucracy, while governments in particular would prefer to see these associations and foundations support the government's work in a subservient fashion and neither question government decisions nor adopt any degree of independence. Little wonder that service-providing and intermediary organisations are popular with governments, while the self-help, self-fulfilment and community building roles are habitually overlooked, and advocacy, watchdog and political discourse roles are viewed with suspicion. Responding to pressure from the citizens, advocacy has found its way into tax exemption, and the watchdog role has gained acceptance for watching over excess market behaviour.

The public sector, and, somewhat strangely, the media, tend to belittle the role of civil society and use arguments to do with the rank of representative democracy to enhance their own role, while at the same time accepting the private sector – in other words, business – as a driving and quite regularly decisive force in determining policy.

---

17 Hirshman, A. O. (1970): Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations and States. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.

18 Cornuelle, R. (1965): Reclaiming the American Dream. New York: Random House.

The most obnoxious civil society role model in the eyes of those caught up in the present system of government is civil society's demand to be heard as a contributor to public discourse – with one notable exception: In countries the government of which are seen as undemocratic in the sense that they have not taken on and/or said good-bye to principles Western democracies uphold, civil society that opposes the government is hailed as the expression of the people's will. We have seen this happen in the past, not least in the Central and Eastern Europe transformation process in the late 1980s.

There have been instances, when the growth in coherence, power and strength that civil society has gone through over the past generation or two, its ability to post societal needs and drive the issues, have been decisive. Care for the environment, gender issues, individual liberties, and indeed the fall of the Berlin Wall and the whole process of transition in 1989/1990 were driven by civil society action, by determined activists and philanthropists. And we may presume that this will happen again. The heterogenous, heterarchical and more often than not plainly chaotic structure of a CSO is quite obviously better suited to become a hotbed of new ideas and creative, and potentially disruptive innovation, than an orderly government agency and/or corporation. The way many business start-ups operate is proof of this rather sweeping statement. But this does not answer our question. Neither can the fact that a concept of civil society in its modern sense has by now developed over two generations, and that there is every reason to believe that civil society is here to stay, suffice. Nor will success alone make civil society action legitimate.

Civil Society may be seen today as a coherent group of collective movements, organisations, and institutions, which are in many ways hugely diverse, but do bear some common traits that allow us to distinguish them from organisations and institutions that form part of the state or the private (business) sector. If, contrary to Margaret Thatcher's famous quip, society is something that exists, and is not synonymous with the state or the nation, collective action in the public sphere takes place in one of these three arenas. The term arena implies that we are talking about areas of movement, action and change.

Both the impact and the legitimacy of civil society rest on a normative theory. Civil society is by no means inherently good. Just as there are good and bad governments, and honest traders and crooks in business, there exist, of course, CSOs we do not approve of, be this in a fundamental sense or simply because they have different views to ours. The Ku Klux Klan, the National Rifle Association of America, and, to name a German example, Pegida, are examples of the first, while a plethora of associations and foundations whose goals do not correspond to those of other may be among the second. This explains why there can be no representatives of the whole of civil society, much as governments would like to see predefined and universally accepted leaders when discussing and negotiating issues. This said, civil society players and their leaders may well assume overall leadership roles on grounds of personal

authority and reputation, and there is no reason why this role should not fall to religious leaders.

Clearly, normative principles are needed to decide whether or not an organisation may be considered "good", i.e. acceptable to society. Among them, one may determine some very general ones, such as

- a basic belief in the human being as the principal of worldly society,
- respect for other human beings, their distinct and possibly very different ways of life and convictions,
- adherence to basic societal principles such as human and civil rights, the rule of law, and government by the people for the people, and
- a belief in a pluralist society that allows for each and every individual to lead the life she or he wishes, provided this does not infringe on the life of others.

Furthermore, there are some that are specific to civil society, e.g.

- a strict priority for ideals and ideas rather than for personal material gains,
- a commitment to be accountable to the citizenry at large,
- an acknowledgement of everyone's right to assemble and associate, and
- an endorsement of a political role for civil society.

Some key findings of the project can be mentioned here:

1. The behaviour and attitudes of religious communities and their leaders is changing.
2. There remain wide differences in self-perception, ranging from "of course we are part of civil society" to "of course we are not".
3. The inclusion of religious communities changes the empirical evidence to do with civil society substantially.
4. Perception by others and self-perception show a divide between majority and minority communities. While the former may still cherish a notion of being partners of the state in an overall governance system, the latter have long since come to terms with being players in a pluralist arena.
5. Attempts by minority communities to achieve the same legal status as traditional majority communities are based on a dated concept[19], while majority communities might feel persuaded to reassess the underlying theory of their involvement in public affairs.[20]

---

19 In Germany, where the established Christian Churches and the Jewish community enjoy a specific public status (Koerperschaft des oeffentlichen Rechts) under 1919/1949 constitutions, some Muslim communities have been lobbying to be granted the same status, while a number of smaller Christian communities and others are content in being registered as private civil law charitable organisations.

20 Pope Benedict XVI. was widely misunderstood – and was perhaps not absolutely clear in expressing what we meant to say, when remarking in a public speech in Freiburg in 2011: "In order to accomplish her mission, she [the Church] will need again and again to set herself apart from her surround-

Recent years have seen more recognition of the role of civil society. Yet, in countries like China, Egypt, Hungary, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, and others, civil society is undergoing harassment, legal obstruction, and persecution. In particular, minority religious communities are among the harassed. Furthermore, issues of legitimacy and relevance are still being discussed – by professional politicians who continue to cherish the notion that they are in the drivers' seats, by mainstream academia, by the media who, when mentioning civil society, still prefer to report on the occasional scandal, or on local events rather than offering civil society full participation in the debate on public affairs.

Religious communities, well, albeit more often than not critically observed in the media, are put on the defensive. Arguments that entail their traditional role in society as guardians of public and personal ethics, and that insist on traditional privileges do not go down well.[21] Their position in public life is challenged, with diverse arguments being put forward. Not to be seen as singular institutions, but as part of a larger arena, while not in any way infringing on their mission, might enable them to come to terms with a transformed society. Whether this is a viable proposition and what this would mean for these communities and for civil society, which would, after all, gain a number of important large players, will be examined in the following chapters in this volume and in the second volume to come.

---

ings, to become in a certain sense 'unworldly'." https://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2011/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20110925_catholics-freiburg.html (2018-11-06) His remark may be seen as implying that Church should disassociate itself from the worldly powers, i.e. the State, and not, as he was interpreted as having said, from the world as such.

21 E.g., a bitter battle is being fought in Spain, formerly considered to be one of "the" Catholic countries, between the Catholic hierarchy and the national government over the issue of ownership of real estate. The Church is said to be the largest landowner in the country, and is accused of illegitimately having assumed ownership of buildings and land (including the famous Mezquita-Catedral of Cordoba, built as a Mosque in the 8th century and turned into a Christian church in the 12th, incidentally a profitable business due to the fess charged for entering the building as a visitor.)

Pandora Dimanopoulou

From church diplomacy to civil society activism: the case of Bishop Irineos Galanakis in the framework of Greek German relations during the Cold War

1 Introduction

The current economic recession in Greece has renewed attention to two issues in the European political and economic debate. The first concerns the controversy over German reparations for the Nazi occupation of Greece. The second relates to numerous discussions surrounding the property of the Greek Orthodox Church, its tax-exempt status, and the role it should play in humanitarian and social crises. However, in spite of their topical resurgence, neither of these two issues is new; in fact, they have already been linked together in the past. A progressive former bishop of Kissamos and the Greek Orthodox Church of Germany, Irineos Galanakis (1911–2013),[1] sought throughout his episcopal mandate during the post-war years to establish an ambitious programme of economic and social development. Interestingly, this programme was financed not only by German Protestant churches but also by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

In order to fully understand the nature of these relations and exchanges between Germany and Greece, we propose a study of developments in the religious field by examining the human networks of which they were composed. This chapter will investigate the role and objectives of intermediary actors both ecclesiastic and secular, clergymen and politicians – with common ideas and interests. It will also examine their establishment of the means of communication and understanding needed to make sense of and to facilitate the common action of such different groups.

1 Irineos Galanakis was born in Nerochori, Apokoronas, Chania, on 10 November 1911. He studied at the Teaching School of Crete and then at the Faculty of Theology of the University of Athens, from which he graduated in 1937. He worked as a professor of theology at schools in the prefecture of Chania during the period 1938–1945. In 1945, he was ordained as a monk at the monastery of the Holy Trinity in Chania and, one year later, made deacon and then archimandrite. In December 1957, he was elected Bishop of Kissamos and Selinou, and, on 16 December 1971, he was elected Bishop of the Metropolis of Germany by the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. For its pre-eminence, the Metropolitan of Germany was recognised as the third official Church in the country. He resigned in 1980. On 26 January 1981, Metropolitan Irineos reverted to the bishopric of Kissamos and Selinon, from which he submitted his resignation on 24 August 2005 for health reasons.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110645880-003

From this perspective, this chapter aims to illuminate the role of religious organisations as civil society actors and to discuss what functions they can perform and what this history tells us about the role of religion in Greek civil society. In doing so, it attempts to broaden the field of research in two ways: (1) by casting churches as part of the civil society that operates within a field of interaction between public policies and endogenous local (as well as transnational) dynamics and (2) by integrating churches into broader transnational networks where they actively participated in economic exchanges, the transfer of capital and know-how, and the communication of ideas during the troubled Cold War period.

2 International upheaval, religious ferment: Christian churches after the Second World War

The launch of the European Union political project immediately after the Second World War marked the beginning of the quest of European societies to construct a common past through the shared history of European civilisation. The reference to religion as a criterion of identity and inclusion in this broader, but rather indefinable, concept of European civilisation brought a new approach to the relationship between politics and religion. It reintroduced churches and religious actors as part of civil society at the centre of political, social and international affairs. From the churches' perspective, in spite of the divisions that existed between the various Christian denominations and their different branches, willingness to contribute to the construction of a new world order and a shared dream for unity led to fairly serious collaborative initiatives by Christians throughout the twentieth century. With the moral and, more importantly, economic support of American political, civil, and religious actors, European churches sought to occupy a new place in the public sphere after the war and thus contribute to the rapprochement and reconciliation of a divided continent.

Immediately after the Second World War, the emerging 'communist threat' confronted the nations of Europe with a clear ideological battle. The resulting Cold War fostered transnational Christian democratic solidarity and cohesion in the face of Bolshevism as the common enemy. The president of the United States, Harry Truman, as well as European leaders including Winston Churchill tried to forge a religious, international, anti-communist front and endeavoured to make religion one of the principal arguments against communism.[2] Truman deliberately advanced contacts with

2 While historians in the past ignored or underestimated the role of religion, religious institutions, and religious actors as an important variable during the Cold War period, recent works have begun to emphasise the involvement and the role of religion in this conflict. For example, during the last decade some studies have attempted to examine how religion has influenced foreign policy, interna-

Pius XII, and new relations between the US and the Vatican would serve thereafter as a barrier to communism. For its part, the Catholic Church strongly promoted the idea of a common 'Christian civilisation', constituting the matrix of European culture, in conflict with the materialism and totalitarianism of communism. The Vatican encouraged and supported, materially and morally, the Christian democratic parties that became the hegemonic political force in continental Western Europe instead of democratic socialism.[3]

For their part, the Protestant and Orthodox Churches established the World Council of Churches (WCC) in 1948 in Amsterdam.[4] The formation of this international non-governmental organisation recognised that churches had to play a more central role in moves towards conciliation and unity after the disastrous war. Notwithstanding Karl Barth's admonishment that the function of the WCC was neither to concoct a 'Christian Marshall Plan' nor to pretend to be God's administrative technical experts, henceforward the WCC and its technocratic direction would try to intervene in secular world affairs by offering new, Christian social and political approaches.[5] Pluralistic in its beginnings, given that it had been formed as a fellowship of more than 140 churches, the WCC was wary of the Vatican–American anti-communist agenda. Its

tional relations, and the domestic social policies of the US and Western Europe. See Chadwick, Owen (2002), *The Christian Church In The Cold War*, London: The Penguin Press; Kirby, Dianne (ed.) (2003), *Religion And The Cold War,* Hampshire And New York: Palgrave Macmillan; Krabbendam, Hans, Scott-Smith, Giles (2004), *The Cultural Cold War In Western Europe, 1945-60*, London and New York: Routledge; Leustean, Lucian (ed.), (2010), *Eastern Christianity And The Gold War*, London and New York: Routledge; Muelenbeck, Philip (ed.) (2012), *Religion And The Cold War, A Global Perspective,* Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.

3 For example, in the first elections after the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany on 14 August 1949, the CDU/CSU (the alliance of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria) won 31 per cent of the vote—1.8 per cent more than the Social Democratic Party (SPD). In Italy, Alcide De Gasperi, leader of the Italian Democrazia Cristiana (DC, Christian Democracy), won 48.5 per cent in the national elections of 1948. In Holland, the Dutch Katholieke Volkspartij (KVP, Catholic People's Party) won 30.8 per cent in the elections for the Second Chamber in 1946, against 28.3 per cent for the Social Democrats. In France, the newly founded Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP, Popular Republican Movement) achieved 28.2 per cent of the vote in the national elections of June 1946. In Belgium, the Parti Social Chrétien-Christelijke Volkspartij (PSC-CVP, Christian Social Party) easily became the largest party in 1946, when it obtained 42.5 per cent of the vote in national elections.

4 The WCC is a fellowship of churches. It constitutes the most important initiative for the rapprochement at an inter-ecclesiastical level between the Orthodox and Protestant Churches.

5 Barth, Karl (1948): "No Christian Marshall Plan," *Christian Century*, pp.1330–1333.

first general secretary, Willem Visser 't Hooft,[6] did not hesitate to declare that "the Iron Curtain did not and would not exist for ecumenists."[7]

Two key reasons, among others, lay behind the WCC's attitude. The first was related to the WCC's wish to incorporate the Russian Orthodox Church into the ecumenical movement. As Visser 't Hooft argued, "'The entrance of the Russian Church upon the ecumenical scene would mean the introduction of a definitely political element in our supra-political movement.'"[8] The second motive was dictated by the efforts of the council to support German Protestant leaders who endeavoured to sustain confessional unity and religious freedom in the east of the country. These leaders worried that the division of Germany would leave over 80 per cent of their parishioners under Soviet and East German influence.[9] As a result, the council became increasingly reluctant after 1948 to follow Truman and Pius XII's crusade, despite their deep distaste for communism.[10] Realists rather than anti-communists, the leaders of the WCC did not agree to back President Truman, who met with them personally in June 1950, pleading with them to contribute to promoting 'Christian civilisation' against immoral forces. On the contrary, German church leaders feared that such a policy only strengthened the power of the Soviets and pushed more Germans to embrace communism.[11] But this is not to say that the WCC did not seek engagement on the global political stage. On the contrary, the establishment of the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs dates back to 1946.[12]

---

6 Willem Visser 't Hooft (20 September 1900–4 July 1985) was a Dutch clergyman and theologian who led the WCC as its secretary-general from 1948 to 1966. He emerged as a pivotal figure in the ecumenical movement during the post-war decades. Visser 't Hooft played a major role in the inclusion of churches from communist countries in the WCC, and he also sought to enlarge the role played by African, Asian, and Orthodox churches in the organisation. His efforts to include the Roman Catholic Church as a member proved unsuccessful, however.

7 W. A. Visser 't Hooft, quoted in Kirby, Diane (2010): "Harry S. Truman's International Religious Anti- Communist Front," *Contemporary British History*, 15 (4), pp. 35-70, p.64.

8 W. A. Visser 't Hooft, quoted in Nicole, Jacques and Bitter Jean-Nicolas (1993): "The WCC and the Question of Human Rights in Eastern Europe," *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 21, Iss. 3-4, pp. 257–262.

9 Wyneken, Jon David, "The Western Allies, German Churches, and the Emerging Cold War in Germany, 1948–1952," in Muehlenbeck, Philip (2012), *Religion and the Cold War: A Global perspective,* Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, p. 19.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 The Commission of the Churches on International Affairs is tasked with advising on public policy and advocacy. See: Peiponen, Matti (2012), *Ecumenical Action in World Politics: The Creation of the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, 1945–1949*, doctoral dissertation, Helsinki: University of Helsinki.

2.1 Irineos Galanakis in Europe

Following his studies at the University of Athens, Irineos Galanakis continued his education in theology and sociology in both France and Germany during the early 1950s. As a fellow of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during his residence in France, he had the chance to conceive of a theoretical approach for European churches (Catholic and Protestant) for teachings relevant to the social problems of the time. This theoretical approach was implemented by Christian parties (known today as People's Parties in Europe), which helped in the evolution of European nations (France, Germany, Italy) into post-war European societies.[13]

The historical archives of the Catholic University of Paris show that the curriculum developed by Irineos consisted of four themes. The first included a series of financial and monetary courses that placed special emphasis on political economy, international economic relations, and economic theories of the social economic market immediately after the Second World War, and how they linked with the social doctrine and model of the Catholic Church. The second theme included lessons related to labour law, company law, and business law. The third theme was sociological, with special emphasis on family sociology, demographics, immigration, urbanisation, and the working class. The final theme was intended to be the practical teaching of the programme and was related to the mission of the church in the contemporary world, including visits of students to factories as well as visits to and actions in working, popular, and industrial districts in French cities and provinces.[14] During this period, Irineos was actively involved with the seminar Mission de France, whose course of action had started in 1941 with the goal of counteracting the de-Christianisation of French society via immediate action of clergymen in the social field, in factories, and in rural areas, opposing not only the conservatism and elitism of the urban class but also the progressive Stalinism that aimed to reduce the influence of Christianity.[15]

This quest for a 'third way', which began, in effect, at the end of the Second World War and preoccupied Christian intellectuals, henceforth coincided with Irineos Galanakis's presence in the heart of Europe at a time when discussion concerning

---

13 Galanakis, Irineos (1991): Speech in the Historical and Folklore Society of Crete, Chania, 18 December 1991: Στα έτη 1951-52 πηγαίνοντας για σπουδές στη Γαλλία παρακολούθησα Μαθήματα χριστιανικής Κοινωνιολογίας (Λίλλη - Παρίσι) και είδα πως οι Ευρωπαϊκές Εκκλησίες (Καθολικές - Προτεσταντικές) είχαν μια θεωρητική διδασκαλία στα κοινωνικά προβλήματα της εποχής μας και συγχρόνως παρουσίαζαν μια πρακτική εφαρμογή της με τη δημιουργία των χριστιανικών κομμάτων, (αυτά που ονομάζονται σήμερα στην Ευρώπη Λαϊκά Κόμματα) και βοήθησαν το πέρασμα των Ευρωπαϊκών Λαών (Γαλλία, Γερμανία, Ιταλία) στις μεταπολεμικές Κοινωνίες.

14 Archives de l'Institut Catholique de Paris, Institut des Sciences Sociales, Année scolaire 1951–1952, dossier Organisation des études.

15 Cavalin, Tangi, and Nathalie Viet-Depaule (2007): Une histoire de la Mission de France: la riposte missionnaire, 1941-2002, Karthala, Paris.

these issues was at its peak, thus giving him the chance to accustom himself to different post-war conceptual approaches to growth and production. These preliminary discussions held in Christian democratic circles were related to the restoration of a liberal, democratic, humane society and economy. Relying upon the theory of Thomas Aquinas, who condemned borrowing with interest both in general and in terms of Catholic social doctrine, many economists declared that post-war development should be grounded in a new production model. This model would, presumably, equate with neither the antebellum liberal capitalism nor the equally antisocial doctrinal communism but consist instead of the 'social market economy'.[16]

The German sociologist and economist Alfred Müller-Armack,[17] who first used the term social market economy, introduced a new theory and interpretation of the bonds among society, state, and economy, differentiated from hitherto dominant economic theory. According to the social market economy model, these sectors are considered to be connected entities, which liaise in order to achieve growth and sustainability in their targets. Archives of the Catholic University of Paris reveal that Irineos followed a series of lectures by Alfred Müller-Armack at that institution. It seems likely that the influence of the German economist's ideas subsequently led Irineos to Frankfurt. Irineos thus had the opportunity to play an active role in the ecumenical movement and the WCC, establishing a network with not only the Protestant members of the latter but also French Catholics and German Evangelicals. As soon as Constantinople's new Ecumenical Patriarchate Athenagoras[18] was elected, the two men began

16 Mitchell, Maria (2012): *The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany*, Michigan: Michigan University Press, p. 162; See also: Kalaydjian, Albert, Portelli, Hugues (1988), *Les démocrates-chrétiens et l'économie sociale de marché*, Paris: Economica.

17 Pointing out that economy has to serve humanity, Alfred Müller-Armack introduced the theory of the social market economy in 1946. See: Müller-Armack, Alfred (1965): "The Principles of the Social Market Economy," in Koslowski, Peter, *The social Market Economy, Theory and Ethics of the Economic Order*, Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 255–274; Glossner, Christian, Gregosz, David (2011): *The Formation And Implementation Of The Social Market Economy By Alfred Müller-Armack And Ludwig Erhard*, Sankt Augustin/Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung; Dietzfelbinger Daniel (2000); "Von der Religionssoziologie zur Sozialen Marktwirtschaft: Leben und Werk Alfred Müller-Armacks," *Politische Studien*, 51 (373): pp. 85-99; Peacock Alan, Willgerodt Hans (1989), *Germany's Social Market Economy: Origins and Evolution*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

18 Athenagoras was born on 6 April 1886 and died on 7 July 1972. During the years 1931–1948, when he was Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, Athenagoras cultivated relationships with United States presidents and other officials. He was respected by President Truman, receiving praise at the White House for his leadership in the work of the Greek War Relief Association. When Athenagoras was elected Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople in 1948, the president provided Athenagoras his plane as transport to Istanbul. President Truman viewed Athenagoras and the Ecumenical Patriarchate as influential and crucial partners in the furtherance of US international interests and humanitarian values in the struggle against communism. Athenagoras was Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople from 1 November 1948 until his death. He undoubtedly contributed the

their collaboration. Like Athenagoras, Irineos wished to develop closer relations with the churches of the West in order for the Greek Orthodox Church to participate in and benefit from the international discussions of the Cold War era.

3 A bishop as civil society actor

In 1957, two years after the election of Athenagoras, Irineos was elected Metropolitan by the Synod of the Church of Crete, a semi-autonomous church that fell directly under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople rather than the autocephalous Church of Greece.[19] During this period, the Church of Crete was the only Orthodox church in Europe under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and it was far from bereft of followers. It had an advantage over the Greek Orthodox Church in its independence from the Greek state. Moreover, it was not under the control of the highly conservative mainland religious organisations, also at the service of the state, whose discourse proved to be an obstacle to the Greek Orthodox Church's new relationship with the West. It was within this context that Metropolitan Irineos Galanakis took the initiative to develop a closer relationship with German Protestant churches as well as to secure new financial and technical support for a number of economic development projects.

What was the political, economic, and social context in which Irineos had to work? The Second World War and the Greek Civil War had wrought havoc on the Greek economy and Greek society, resulting in innumerable deaths, the destruction of the basic infrastructure of the state, famine, inflation, and collapse of the currency and of the banking system. Poverty and unemployment were everywhere visible. Moreover, Greece soon became one of the battlefields of the Cold War. Following the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the US offered military and financial aid to the Greek state, contributing to the victory of the government's forces over the Democratic Army in the Greek Civil War. This subsidy also made the reconstruction of the country feasible and secured the re-establishment of a bourgeois regime. Neverthe-

most to the rapprochement between Orthodoxy and other Christian churches during the twentieth century.

19 The status of the semi-autonomous Church of Crete is unique in being under the canonical jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, which nominates the island's presiding bishop from a list of three Cretan bishops prepared by the Greek Ministry of Education, Research and Religious Affairs. The church's affairs are, however, otherwise handled by the Holy Provincial Synod of Crete.

less, despite the development boosted by foreign aid, the economic and social status of the state remained extremely poor.[20]

Improvement began in 1950. The Greek economy displayed remarkable growth potential, and the indicator of gross national product (GDP), which initially hovered at approximately 100 units, reached the 300-unit level in only a decade. This tripling of GDP – considered as absolute as well as relative magnitude – reflects the growth of the Greek economy during this period. However, development between 1950 and 1970 was not homogeneous throughout Greece, and differences between rural and urban districts raised concern. Athens as a capital became, abruptly, the focus of unprecedented economic activity. The influx of labour, combined with savings from the rest of Greece, increased production, which in turn led to further investment. This peculiar development of the Greek economy, following an also peculiar policy of Keynesianism (according to which activation of investing mechanisms was not based on the expansion of public expenditure), along with a continuous influx of labour, small businessmen, and small capital to a single geographic point, led to a huge wave of rural–urban migration (urbanisation).[21]

With Athens as the development model of the country, the provinces that offered human resources and small funds remained inert and, in certain cases, paralysed. Small and medium-sized urban districts went through a stagnation period or suffered visible inflation, and the rural mainland started to confront an intense demographic problem. Large cities progressed at the expense of rural areas, bringing changes to the terms of commercial transactions between the producers in the rural areas, much to the benefit of the urban environment.[22] It was exactly this disproportionality and the lack of support for the provinces from central state mechanisms, in western Crete and more specifically the provinces of Kissamos and Selinos in the prefecture of Chania, that led Irineos Galanakis to take drastic measures to serve the common good. But what functions could Irineos perform as a civil society actor?

Greek civil society is historically weak in comparison with that of most other European countries. This weakness is attributable to multiple complex causes. How-

20 Iordanoglou, Chrysafis (2009): *The Greek economy in the Long Duration Experience 1945–2005*, Athens: Polis; Millward, A. (1984): *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–51*, Berkeley: University of California Press; Hogan, M. (1987): *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

21 Stathakis, George (2002): "Η απρόσμενη οικονομική ανάπτυξη στις δεκαετίες του '50 και '60: η Αθήνα ως αναπτυξιακό υπόδειγμα" (The unexpected economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s: Athens as a development model), in Kaifa, Ourania (ed.) (2002): *Η εκρηκτική εικοσαετία 1949–1967* (The explosive twenty years, 1949–1967), Athens: Society of Modern Greek Civilization and Education, pp.43-65.

22 Stathakis (2002), p. 51.

ever, most scholars agree that church–state relations are among the most important.[23] In Greece, the interdependence of state and church can be traced to the creation of a national autocephalous church at the time of the progressive dissolution of the Orthodox millet of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century and the subordination of the Orthodox Church to the necessities and priorities of the nation-state. As Victor Roudemetof argues, the Church of Greece of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople surrendered its autonomy to the state.[24] Autocephaly was envisaged as an instrument for making the church part of the state mechanism. It is noteworthy that autocephaly was proclaimed with a decree in July 1833 by the king of Greece and not by the council of the church. In the years that followed, the Greek state managed to reduce the church's autonomy by offering the clergy some privileges, including salaries and social and political power that sprang from the state's authority and prestige.

This preferential relation between the state and the church provoked the 'nationalisation' of religion, which in turn partly explains the weakness of Greek civil society. Satisfied with its secured status and clear 'national' role, the Greek Orthodox Church has not advanced a strong social presence and civic engagement by means of parallel institutions such as religious schools, charities, and youth associations. Furthermore, the church has been unwilling put pressure on the state in the interest of other social groups that might jeopardise its privileges.

Nevertheless, even though Irineos, as a bishop, was also a civil servant of the state, he was influenced by his time in Western Europe as well as by the social work of Catholic and Protestant churches, and wished to involve the local church actively in social and economic development in his diocese of Kissamos. He began with a strategy to strengthen the education system by creating new structures such as agricultural and technical schools, including boarding schools, to offer specialist training for the growing labour force. Conversely, by organising and developing cooperative societies – public limited companies with many stakeholders in every sector of the economy (e.g. ANEK-ETANAP[25]) – he was able to pursue a new production model that would create higher incomes and more jobs in the agricultural sector.

---

23 Jennifer Clarke, Asteris Houliaras & Dimitris Sotiropoulos (eds.) (2015): *Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece: Civil Society at the European Frontline*. Ashgate Publishing ; Danopoulos, Constantine, (2004): "Religion, Civil Society, and Democracy in Orthodox Greece", in Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Vol. 6, Iss. 1; Christos A. Frangonikolopoulos (2016): Economic crisis and civil society in Greece new forms of engagement & 'deviations' from the past, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/14683857.2016.1231508 ; Huliaras, Asteris (2014): *The Dynamics of Civil Society in Greece: Creating civic engagement from the top*, The Jean Monnet papers on political economy, available online: https://www.uop.gr/images/files/huliaras.pdf

24 Roudemetof, Victor (2001): Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans, Greenwood Publishing Group, p.106.

25 ETANAP was formed by Irineos Galanakis in 1978 and began operations during 1980. Today, it is a diversified company with important shareholders. Since 2000, its share capital has increased, and

Irineos contributed to the creation of ANEK Lines SA, a cooperative company. The impetus for its creation was the shipwreck of the *Herakleion*, a ferry plying the Chania–Piraeus route, in December of 1966. A few days after the shipwreck, the economist Kostas Archontakis conceived a company with broad public participation in which anyone could buy a share. Archontakis shared his thoughts with his friend and colleague Giannis Tzamarioudakis. Both agreed that the success of the project depended on the establishment of trust. In order to persuade people to invest their life's savings in an unprecedented endeavour with uncertain chances for success, a person with high prestige was needed to lead the effort. Bishop Irineos was the obvious choice. According to Irineos's testimony, "People wanted the church to lead this project and they were looking at me. I replied that my contribution was only to ensure the people's trust. They used to say: 'Irineos is reliable; we shall not lose our money.'" Indeed, Irineos's role was decisive. Even the poorest peasants sold one sheep, or a blanket to buy one share. Moreover, Irineos's personal influence and prestige easily opened the doors of ministries and public offices so that the company's affairs could proceed efficiently.[26] According to Irineos, the role of civil society is not to oppose the state but rather to work with it towards shared goals.[27]

3.1 A religious academy as a hub for exchange, reconciliation, and development

Immediately after the conclusion of the Second World War, German Protestant churches were among the first non-state actors to discuss the subject of German guilt for the crimes of National Socialism. A meeting was convened in Stuttgart in October 1945 by the Council of the Evangelical Church in Germany with representatives of various European and American Protestant churches in attendance, during which German churches made an admission of guilt 'for the suffering which was inflicted on many countries and their peoples'.[28] Some years later, during the Synod of the German Protestant Church in 1958, the jurist and German Evangelical Lothar Kreyssig, member of the governing board of the Evangelical Church in Germany, founded the organisation Action Reconciliation Service for Peace (Aktion Sühnezeichen Friedensdienste) with a group of Protestants who had been active in the resistance against the Nazi regime. In its appeal for peace, the purpose of the organisation was outlined:

ETANAP has become one of the most modern bottling plants in Greece, with production and sales points worldwide.

26 Irineos Papers, File: Anek.

27 Galanakis, Irineos, (1961): "The Christian's Political Responsibility," speech, Chania January 1961.

28 "Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt," in Hockenos, Matthew (2004): *A Church Divided, German Protestant Confront the Nazi Past*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

> We Germans began the Second World War, and by this, more than anyone else, we are responsible for mankind's immeasurable suffering. Germans, in sinful rebellion against God, killed millions of Jews. Those of us alive today who had not wanted this, did not do enough to prevent it [...] We ask the nations who suffered from our violence to permit us, with our hands and resources, to do something good in your land. Let us build a village, a settlement, a church, a hospital, or whatever else that you want for the public welfare as a sign of reconciliation.[29]

Thus, this group aimed to reconcile the peoples and sections of society that had been subjected to the threat of extermination by German National Socialism, and to develop the means to establish long-term peace.[30]

Crete, of course, was one of the places that had suffered under Nazi occupation. After its rapid occupation of the Greek mainland, the German army was attracted by the island's advantages of a good location in the Mediterranean and 'potentially great strategic value'.[31] The German conquest and occupation of Crete, begun on 20 May 1941, subjected its inhabitants to great brutality. Surprised and angered by the resistance of Cretan civilians and alleging that the Hague Convention[32] guaranteed military courtesy only to professional soldiers, the German invaders felt free to punish and exterminate armed and unarmed civilians indiscriminately for opposing the occupation. The commanding general, Kurt Student, issued an order to begin a wave of brutal punishments against the local population, to be carried out rapidly by the same units who had been confronted by the locals. Among the villages destroyed in reprisal was Kandanos, where on 3 June, two days after the fall of Crete, German forces razed its buildings and executed about 180 of its inhabitants. Before leaving, they erected three signs in Greek and German, explaining their reasons for the massacre and promising that Kandanos would never be rebuilt.[33] After the war, Kandanos became the

---

29 Skriver, Ansgar (1961): *Aktion Sühnezeichen. Brücken über Blut und Asche*, Stuttgart: Kreus Verlag, p. 5.

30 Hestermann, Jenny (2014): *Atonement or Self-Experience? On the Motivations of the First Generation of Volunteers of Action Reconciliation for Peace*, Working Paper 129/2014, Berlin: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung; Marom, Lilach (2007): "On Guilt and Atonement. Aktion Sühnezeichen Friedensdienste and Its Activity in Israel," in: *Yad Vashem Studies* 35, pp. 187-220; Wienand, Christiane (2012): "From Atonement to Peace? Aktion Sühnezeichen, German Israeli Relations and the Role of Youth in Reconciliation Discource and Practice," in Schwelling, Birgit, *Reconciliation, Civil Society, and the Politics of Memory: Transnational Initiatives in the 20th and 21st Century*, Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, pp. 201-238.

31 Fleischer, Hagen (June 1992): "Γεωστρατηγικά σχέδια της Ναζιστικής Γερμανίας για τη μεταπολεμική Κρήτη" (German Geostrategic Plans for the postwar Crete), *Ta Historika*, vol. 9, n°.16, pp. 135-158; See also: Harper, Glyn, "Crete," in McGibbon, Ian (ed.), *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, Auckland: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 123.

32 "Laws and Customs of War On Land," (Hague IV), Convention signed at The Hague October 18, 1907, available on: https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000001-0631.pdf.

33 'Hier stand Kandanos. Es wurde zerstört für die Ermordung von 25 deutschen Soldaten'- «Εδώ υπήρχε η Κάνδανος Καταστράφη προς εξιλασμό της δολοφονίας 25 Γερμανών Στρατιωτικών»; 'Zur Vergeltung der bestialischen Ermordung eines Fallschirmjägerzuges u. eines Pionierhalbzuges durch

focus of German efforts at restitution and reconciliation. Immediately after founding Action Reconciliation Service for Peace, Lothar Kreyssig approached Metropolitan Irineos to propose collaboration for the purpose of rebuilding the village.[34] (Kreyssig was connected by friendship with the Greek professor of theology Nikolaos Louvaris,[35] who had been Irineos's professor in the Faculty of Theology at the University of Athens.) After four years of intense preparations and negotiations between the organisation and the Greek side, a team of German students arrived in Crete and began work in 1963.[36] This effort, which had a much broader scope, was the foundation of the Orthodox Academy of Crete. During a period of transformation and reconciliation in Germany and Greece, the project of the Orthodox Academy emerged from different impulses on both sides: pragmatism and altruism.

Even during the war, a group of active theologians and pastors connected with the so-called Confessing Church, the movement that sought to resist the inroads of Nazi ideology into the Protestant community, had engaged in a continuing dialogue about the role of the church after the hoped-for demise of the Nazi regime. These leaders included Harald Poelchau (1903–1975), Eugen Gerstenmaier (1906–1986), Helmut Gollwitzer (1908–1993), and Eberhard Müller (1906–1989). All these men grew up un-

bewaffnete Männer u. Frauen aus dem Hinterhalte wurde Kandanos zerstört' - «ως αντίποινων των από οπλισμένων ανδρών και γυναικών εκ των όπισθεν δολοφονηθέντων Γερμανών στρατιοτόν κατεστράφη η Κάνδανος» ; 'Für die bestiale Ermordung Deutscher Fallschirmjäger, Gebirgsjäger und Pioniere von Männern, Frauen und Kindern, zusammen mit dem Pfarrer, sowie, weil sie gegen das Großdeutsche Reich Widerstand geleistet haben, wurde am 3.6.41 KANDANDOΣ vom Grunde zerstört um niemals wieder aufgebaut zu werden.' - «Δια την κτηνώδη δολοφονίαν Γερμανών αλεξιπτωτιστών, αλπινιστών και του μηχανικού από άνδρας, γυναίκας και παιδιά και παπάδες μαζύ και διότι ετόλμησαν να αντισταθούν κατά του μεγάλου Ράιχ κατεστράφη την 3-6-1941 η Κάνδανος εκ θεμελίων, δια να μην επαναοικοδομηθεί πλέον ποτέ».

34 Some months later, the Germans decided to disassociate Louvaris from their efforts in Greece because of his collaboration with the occupation regime in Greece and his political views. See EZA, 97/562: 'Je länger ich mir das überlege, desto weniger geeignet scheint mir gerade Louvaris zu sein, den Mittelsmann abzugeben. Abgesehen von seiner politischen Belastung ist er in seinem Alter auch ausgesprochen unzuverlässig und vergisst viel.'

35 Nikolas Louvaris was a Greek theologian, university professor, and member of the Academy of Athens. He studied at Rizarios School (1900–1903) and the Theological School of Athens (1904-1908). Between 1911 and 1914, he studied hermeneutics, theology, philosophy, and pedagogy at the University of Leipzig. Louvaris was influenced by the phenomenology of Husserl, was opposed to historical materialism, and remained faithful to his professors' positivism, to Wilhelm Dilthey and Sprangke, and thus to Immanuel Kant. During the occupation of Greece by the Axis, Louvaris maintained close relations with German authorities in Greece, and he served as minister of education during the third occupation government of Ioannis Rallis (7 April 1943–12 October 1944). See: Dardavesis, Theodoros (ed.), *Nikolaos Louvaris: The philosopher, Teacher and Theologian*, Thessaloniki, Filoptoxos adelfotis andron Thessalonikis, 2011; Siotis, Markos, *Nikolaos Louvaris*, Athens, 1965; Spranger, Eduard, "Gedenken an Nikolaos Louvaris", *Universitas* 17, 1962, pp. 457-468.

36 Brot für die Welt Papers, AIII. Diakonisches Werk der EKD, BfdW-P: Vrot für die Welt–Projekte 1959.

der the Weimar Republic, which had shaped their understanding of reality, their personal attitudes to politics and piety, and their position on the role of the church in society. Each represents, in his own way, the new orientation of German Protestantism in different areas of social action after 1945.[37]

Helmut Thielicke, who became an influential theologian after the war, had the idea of founding a new institution as the church's contribution towards preventing tyranny like that of the Third Reich from ever returning to German government. This idea came to fruition with the foundation of the Protestant Academy Bad Boll (Evangelische Akademie Bad Boll), established in 1945. The founding director of the Bad Boll academy, Eberhard Müller,[38] had also been affiliated with the Confessing Church and was a passionate anti-Nazi. The idea of the academy spread rapidly, and similar centres sprang up not only throughout East and West Germany but also all around Europe. The Protestant Academy was to have two goals: to train the laity for service to society and to be a place for free and open discussion about social problems, especially between different groups. Dialogue was one of the main concerns in the academy's conception. Müller summed it up in a phrase describing the academy as 'forum, not factor'.[39]

In October 1958, Irineos sent his pupil and closest associate Alexandros Papaderos to Germany in order to undertake doctoral studies at the University of Mainz. Aside from their shared desire to study, the two men, master and disciple, were above all moved by the aim of making Papaderos a sort of emissary between Crete, its ecclesiastical authorities, and German religious and political authorities, establishing a network through which knowledge and capital could be transferred for the modernisation of Cretan society. While Alexandros Papaderos was residing in Mainz, he developed intense and productive relations with the director of the Bad Boll academy, Eberhard Müller, and, through him, with the political and ecclesiastical authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany. Located in an economically and socially developed industrial region, the post-war Protestant Academy embodied a perfect model upon which a similar project in Crete could be based. Between 1963 and 1964, Alexandros Papaderos participated in intellectual discussions and religious practices in Bad

37 Bolewski, Hans (2009): Die Idee der Akademie: Versuch der Geschichte einer Akademie aus der Sicht eines Beteiligten, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

38 Eberhard Müller was born in 1906 in Stuttgart. He was involved in the German Christian Students' Union and was its general secretary from 1934. In 1946, he co-founded the first Protestant Academy in Germany, which he led until 1972. He died in 1989 in Heidelberg. See: Grünzinger, Gertraud, "Müller Eberhard," in: Betz, Hans Dieter, Browning, Don, Janowski, Bernd and Jüngel, Eberhard, *Religion Past and Present*. Consulted online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1877-5888_rpp_SIM_14553>; Müller, Eberhard (1987), *Widerstand und Verständigung, fünfzig Jahre Erfahrungen in Kirche und Gesellschaft 1933-1983*, Stuttgart: Calwer.

39 Berger, Peter, *The Church as a Forum*, available on: https://www.the-american-interest.com/2011/03/16/the-Church-as-a-forum/.

Boll, developing an understanding of how the academy was organised that he would later put into practice during his directorship of the Orthodox Academy of Crete.[40]

The capacity of Papaderos to assemble different influential personalities in his network led to the creation of the Orthodox Academy of Crete, financed by Germany and organised according to the model of the Protestant Academy in Bad Boll. His reconciliatory work stemmed both from official, pragmatic contacts and from deeply personal relationships that engendered a genuine change of mind and action from both sides, Greek and German. Greece's argument was that German financing for such a project was a way of asking forgiveness for crimes committed by the Nazi regime: in effect, an indirect compensation for part of the cost of post-war reparations. Dedicated on 13 October 1968, the Orthodox Academy represented something of an innovation for Greece, and it became the starting point for the dynamic interventionism of the Orthodox Church in social affairs and the formation of social doctrine. The academy would take the lead in researching the economic and social problems that, according to its members, should become the focal point of intellectual discussion, not only between Greece and Germany but also in the wider ecumenical community.

Like the German academies, the Orthodox Academy of Crete was founded to serve the renewal of the church as well as the social integration and economic development of the country. Legally, the academy is an independent charitable foundation (corporation under private law). It is under the spiritual sponsorship of His Holiness the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople and administrated by a board of nine members. Financially, it is supported through the fees of conference participants, contributions from ecumenical bodies, and gifts from individuals, churches, and organisations.[41]

According to the constitution that was adopted in accordance with the law on 16 January 1970 and confirmed by royal decree on 15 December 1970, the Orthodox Academy pursues the following aims:

1. To nurture and train priests and laymen to enable them to bear, in the context of Greek Orthodox spirituality, a living witness to the Gospel in the modern world;
2. To conduct research into economic, social, and spiritual problems on the basis of the Christian Orthodox point of view and in relation to the traditions and the needs of the Greek people;
3. To contribute to the work of the Orthodox mission, especially in Africa; and
4. To grant technical and material assistance for the development of the country and for charity and community projects.[42]

40 Papaderos, Alexandros (2014): *Με τον Κισάμου και Σελίνου Ειρηναίον Επί τραχείας οδού* (With the Bishop Irineos of Kissamos and Selinon on a Rough Road), Thessaloniki: Methexis.

41 Orthodox Academy of Crete Papers, Folder: Foundation of the Academy, File: Mandate and Work of the Academy.

42 OAC Papers, op. cit.

In order to accomplish these aims, the academy organised short meetings, seminars, courses, and educational events on the local, national, and international levels.[43] According to the academy, the church was called upon to move beyond its conceptual framework and search for new methods and channels through which it could offer the 'bread of life' in a way that was understandable to the modern world. Thus the academy aimed be a place of encounter where, in the context of a concrete situation or the topic of a conference, an attempt was made to illuminate human existence in the light of the gospel by means of 'social dialogue'. The pursuit of social dialogue has been directly influenced and inspired by the model of the Academy of Plato and the Platonic tradition of *symphilosophein* (philosophising together). German Protestant academies have adopted the same model. Helmut Thielicke, in his 1943 memorandum on future Protestant Academy work, had developed the concept of 'common consideration' through discourse. The founder of the Bad Boll academy, Eberhard Müller, also outlined influences from the ancient tradition in his effort to establish the academy as a forum.

Occupying a special place in the work of the Orthodox Academy of Crete, social dialogue refers to discussions, consultations, negotiations, and joint actions involving organisations or persons representing different interests, ideologies, political forces, and professional and economic ties. During a period of transition, Greek society was becoming increasingly pluralistic and thus was being drawn into the confrontation of new questions. In the view of the academy, the church would accomplish its 'ministry of reconciliation' among men and nations only if it authentically proclaimed the gospel of love and peace as the core of social dialogue.[44]

The Orthodox Academy's participation in this dialogue permitted it to assume a broader sociopolitical role than other religious institutions. Some years after the war, when the Greek state faced great economic and political instability, faith in the government was understandably weak. Civil society looked instead to the academy as a vehicle for change. Likewise, the academy sought the participation of civil society in its efforts.

4 From church diplomacy to civil society activism

The Orthodox Academy's role in social dialogue and public affairs within the new political context of the Cold War raises questions surrounding its foundation. It is not clear that Irineos intended to establish an academy. The records suggest that he

43 Ibid. During the first three years of its work (1968–1971), more than 100 encounters of this kind were organised by the Orthodox Academy of Crete, with the participation of more than 11,000 persons from Greece and abroad.

44 Ibid.

wanted to create an institute for the promotion of social cohesion and economic growth, free from state control and directly involved in economic, social, and political activity. His purpose was to allow the church to offer practical solutions to the problems of the 1960s. But an institute could not be financed by the central aid service for development of the Evangelical Church in Germany, which in turn was financed by the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development – a federal body that stipulated financial assistance be strictly reserved for third-world countries. As Greece did not qualify for such aid, the term 'academy' was deemed more suitable.[45] Negotiations between the two parties finally resulted in the founding of an academy that would function as a branch of the Protestant academies.

The symbolism of reconciliation that the foundation of the Orthodox Academy offered should not obscure the fact that in this timeframe, the creation of a Greek–German network was desirable at both the ecclesiastical and political levels. It was part of a plan for new Greek–German relations together with the European orientation of Greek foreign policy. In terms of ecclesiastical politics, the connection of Irineos to German ecclesiastic networks put him in communication with the Evangelical Church in Germany, which enjoyed direct contact with western Germany's political and academic elite.

Moreover, Crete was gaining particular geostrategic significance as the Cold War intensified. Discussions about the creation of an academy coincide with a period of intense public dialogue on how the island could benefit from accelerated growth, mostly thanks to the influx of foreign and private funds after two decades of wars. Pressure brought to bear by local authorities and members of parliament induced Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis to include Crete in the regional development programme in 1961. Prime Minister George Papandreou followed a similar policy in his government statements of 1964. In 1962, the Regional Development Agency of Crete was founded and incorporated into the Ministry of Planning with the aim of facilitating the implementation of projects and the provision of information to the executives of the state development plan.

Crete also became an American military base. The history of US interest in Souda Bay goes back to 1947, when the first Hellenic–American defence cooperation contracts were discussed and signed. The idea of using Souda's port was formulated in 1950, and construction started two years later. The first American Mennonites came to Crete as American soldiers were arriving. The Mennonite Central Committee, created in Washington, DC, at the same time, created a considerable network of influence and cooperation with the American government. As soon as the Marshall Plan was put into action, the Mennonites found themselves in Europe, with a base in Germany.[46]

45 Papaderos (2014): p. 119.

46 Bush, Perry (1998): Two Kingdoms, Two Loyalties, Mennonite Pacifism in Modern America, Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press; Miller, Keith Graber (1996): Wise as Serpents,

Bishop Irineos invited the Mennonites to assist in agricultural development. His first plan for subsidising his planned institute was submitted to the European service of Mennonites in Frankfurt in July 1960. Both parties agreed that the executive Mennonite committee would assist Bishop Irineos for eight years. Their collaboration began in 1965 with the establishment of an agricultural development centre, a showcase for improved methods of agricultural production providing improved seeds, purebred livestock, and agricultural education for farmers in western Crete.[47] The partnership was not always easy. On the one hand, Irineos needed the Mennonites' moral, practical, and financial support; on the other, he questioned their motives and practices, especially their proselytism.[48] Over time, his clear preference for Germany, shared by Alexander Papaderos, who had become the Orthodox Academy's general director, would leave no place for the Mennonites.

Further complications followed the coup d'état of the junta of the colonels. Despite initial embarrassment, Germany maintained diplomatic relations with Greece, adopting a wait-and-see attitude in an attempt not only to avoid isolating the country but also to secure German interests and transnational agreements. The Evangelical Church in Germany was similarly cautions, encouraging its hierarchy to avoid condemnatory statements that could jeopardise the Orthodox Academy's ongoing work. The academy was finally inaugurated in September of 1968, one year after the imposition of dictatorship.

The colonels' political and economic policy caused them to oppose Irineos Galanakis, who was eventually deposed from his metropolitan throne in Kissamos and transferred to the Metropolis of Germany. (The junta appointed Litton Industries, an American company, to plan and implement Crete's development programme, over protests by the Orthodox Academy.[49]) In Germany, Irineos maintained his policy of clear intervention in society. During his primacy (1972–1980), the Greek Orthodox Metropolitan of Germany was recognised as the third official church in the country (in 1974), and immigrant associations were set up along with intensive vocational counselling programmes and student aid funds. He followed the ANEK model of business association during his time in Germany. The Co–op of Greek Workers of Germany is the first example of this model. The target was the foundation of co–ops on a broad popular basis, which could serve and represent all Greek workers in an area, organising them in associations as follows:

Innocent as Doves: American Mennonites Engage, Washington, Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press.

47 Irineos Papers, Folder: Mennonites. See also: Vallianatos, Aggelos (1999): *Από την Ιεραποστολή στην Επικοινωνία, Η Περίπτωση των Μεννονιτών στην Ελλάδα, 1950-1977* (From Mission to communication, The Case of the Mennonites' presence in Greece, 1950-1977), Athens: Artos Zois.

48 Papaderos (2011): p. 87.

49 OAC Papers, File 3,1.

> ... small funds of workers could be added, taking the shape of Companies and Associations, and be invested in productive projects at the place of their origin, meaning people of Macedonia could invest their money in Macedonia, people from Epirus in Epirus, Thessalians in Thessaly. This way our workers' money in Germany, calculated approximately at 3-4 billion marks, could be distributed and invested in productive works (factories, businesses, etc.) in several districts of the country, and the workers themselves could participate in these projects and find a job when they go back home.[50]

This policy of Irineos coincides with the migration policies of the German state during this period, which attempted to relocate migrants, especially Greeks and Turks, by sending them back to their country of origin. The German ministry bearing responsibility for the migration policy addressed the Greek authorities first, but since there was no response, it turned to Irineos.

Furthermore, we should interpret the political and economic involvement of the Greek and German churches as an attempt to confront communism within the ideological context of the Cold War. This policy of playing a greater role in the development of world affairs was, according to Irineos, largely a response to emerging ideologies claiming ownership over scientific truth. The 'secular religion' of communism, to use Marcel Gauchet's expression, promoted a totalitarian regime that would be enthusiastically received by the masses, furthering its ability to rule them. This so-called totalitarian state would progressively become the instrument with which almost total control could be established over society through the application of its ideological programme to all activities.[51] Yet if the alleged discourse of 'truth' within such ideologies could easily be criticised, their grip on power remained successful principally because liberal democracies were, as Irineos observed, often powerless to react quickly to international crises and issues of social justice, thereby offering a strong contrast with the egalitarian principles they sought to promote.[52] Communism, according to Irineos's analysis, went even further and represented a direct threat to the existence of the church, since it had always engaged in open conflict with the old religions and their beliefs. The reason, according to the Marxist–Leninist doctrine inspired by Marx's thesis 'On the Jewish Question',[53] was that man could only truly be free once he had been liberated from religion, which provided the illusion that a better world awaited him when he departed the terrestrial world of enslavement and oppression. For Marx, science and modern progress were conversely capable of guiding mankind towards the one and only paradise, provided that those with nothing to lose and everything to gain seize their destiny, through armed struggle if necessary, against the ruling elite, a class that had hitherto utilised religion as an instrument to

50 OAC Papers, Folder Metropolis of Germany, file: Trans-eurokreta.

51 Arendt, Hannah (2002): *Les origines du totalitarisme; Eichmann à Jérusalem*, Paris: Gallimard, pp. 719-811.

52 Irineos, Galanakis (1991): op. cit.

53 Marx, Carl (1968): *La question juive*, Paris: Union générale d'Éditions.

extend its domination. The masses would subsequently liberate themselves from their chains through the transformation of a capitalist economic system into a communist society, thereby establishing social harmony and ending the domination of one segment of mankind over another. The sole aim of the state, according to Marx, is to protect this capitalist system, which was dependent on the exploitation of one man by another – of the working classes for the profit of the bourgeoisie.[54]

Modernisation in the name of class solidarity promoted by communists, with its promise of emancipation, explains the success of their ideology and their seduction of the masses by making the latter feel less excluded from the society of which they were now to be a part. The working classes ceased to be called upon by communist regimes to reshape society for their own benefit. Furthermore, they would be encouraged to purge, disregard, or reject former religious thinking as an obstacle to modernisation and the inevitable trajectory of human progress. At the same time, this ideology did everything it could to acquire the same power over the hearts and minds of the masses as Christian religious structures had once achieved over the body of society, to use Gauchet's expression.[55] Communism should therefore be regarded as a secular religion. It is secular because it emerged within a context in which political developments, beginning with the privatisation and subsequent relativisation of faith in terms of absolute truth and scientific progress, raised profound doubts about traditional beliefs and ideologies. But it is religious in seeking to respond to the problems of doubt, scepticism, and agnosticism through conceptions of good, the invisibility of power, and the indecisiveness of democracy as promoted by modern liberalism. Communists defended the idea of returning to a religious structuring of society that aimed to suppress all notions of individuality in the name of collective action, but by using secular points of reference, such as class and the nation.[56]

It is therefore understandable why the development of such secular religions, imitating the structure of older religious powers while categorically rejecting their beliefs and traditions, was perceived as a major threat to the church. Hence Irineos' interest in improving the lives of the poor and relieving their suffering: at a time when the welfare state did not exist, the church decided to expand its reach to the poorest of the faithful in order to head off the threat of communism while simultaneously distancing itself from the fascists' political pride and egoism by replicating the humility of Christ.[57] The church would therefore use the arsenal of secularism to maintain their presence in the hearts and minds of the people, while communism sought to distract

54 Marx, Carl, Engels, Friedrich (1999): *anifeste du parti communiste*, Paris: Garnier Flammarion, (1848).

55 Gauchet, Marcel (1998): *La religion dans la démocratie*, Paris: Gallimard, p. 80.

56 Gauchet, Marcel (2011): "Religions séculières: Origine, nature et destin," *Le débat,* 2011/5 - n° 167 pp. 187-192, p.189.

57 Galanakis, Irineos (1967): "Η πολιτική ευθύνη του Χριστιανού" (The Christian's Political Responsibility), *Christos kai Kosmos,* vol. 75.

workers and citizens from the ways of Christianity. The church, according to Greek and German Christian leaders, must not remain indifferent to the fate of its flock, which was at risk of being led astray by idols defacing man's image of God and Christianity. Providing social aid to the poor and to workers in order to divert them from communism while keeping the ruling classes on their side to prevent them from flirting with tyrannical projects were the ultimate missions of Christian actors. Only then could the church still hope to be the patron of true unity and solidarity.[58]

5 Conclusion

How can one assess the significance of Bishop Irineos as a civil society actor and that of the Orthodox Academy of Crete as a civil society organisation? Recent scholarship has pointed out that religion is a significant and diachronic factor in the development and nature of civil society. However, scholars have also shown that religion – more specifically, the interdependence between state and church, as well as the nationalisation of the Greek Orthodox Church – may have contributed to the weakness of Greek civil society. As an institution with protected status, funding, and a sociopolitical role, the Greek Orthodox Church was not obliged to create parallel institutions to secure and reinforce its position.

Could we argue that Irineos constituted an exception to this general paradigm? The answer lies in his attitude towards state–church relations and in his political philosophy. In his political manifesto 'The Christian's Political Responsibility', Irineos agrees with Saint Paul's doctrine as expressed in his letter to the Romans:

> Let everyone be subject to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by God. Consequently, whoever rebels against the authority is rebelling against what God has instituted, and those who do so will bring judgment on themselves. For rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who do wrong. Do you want to be free from fear of the one in authority? Then do what is right and you will be commended. For the one in authority is God's servant for your good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for rulers do not bear the sword for no reason. They are God's servants, agents of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer. Therefore, it is necessary to submit to the authorities, not only because of possible punishment but also as a matter of conscience.[59]

According Irineos, a problem arises when 'Cesar' – the political authority – does not satisfy three conditions: being in God's service, denying or preventing (directly or indirectly) people their welfare and salvation, and claiming everything, even people's

58 Ibid.

59 Romans, 13, 1-7.

souls, as totalitarian regimes did.[60] In these cases, Irineos borrows Saint Peter's words: 'We must obey God rather than human beings,'[61] and 'No one can serve two masters.' As Christians, we must continue the struggle for the prevalence of God's kingdom among men – that is, for an ideal (utopian) society.

This will to establish a utopian society seems to determine Irineos's position regarding the state as well as his role in civil society. His work must be explained in the context of interaction among state policies, some endogenous local dynamics expressed by the local elite and the work force of the area, and the international relations developed around his network. Therefore, his contribution to the post-war growth of this area should not be interpreted univocally as a response, a reaction, or passive consent of the local community and civil society actors to state initiatives or even to their absence, but rather as a forceful two-way process, presupposing pressure and demands on the central state and at the international level. Clearly, local dynamics strengthened by the local church's action do not operate in a vacuum but in interaction with national state policies to promote growth.

Irineos's conception of the role of the church was also informed by his experiences in France and Germany, where Catholicism and Protestantism had developed social doctrines based on the writings of widely recognised political theologians such as Aquinas and Calvin. Catholic and Protestant churches in both countries were aware of their role in civil society. Furthermore, Irineos had studied the economic tendencies of his time and never acted without strategic planning and a development programme. It seems that his financial model was influenced by the social market economy model as applied in post-war Germany, but clearly adjusted to the peculiarities and requirements of Greek financial reality. From his election onwards he tried to make the local church an interlocutor with the state and the local political and economic elite, mediating between the public and private economies in the free market.

Furthermore, the Orthodox Academy and the Greek–German network surrounding Irineos took an active role in the negotiations, planning, and implementation of a Greek–German project for economic growth of the western provinces of Crete. Greece's entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952 undoubtedly had a positive impact on the development of political, economic, and cultural relations between Greece and Germany. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer perceived Greece as the cornerstone of NATO, a bastion against communism. Successive post-war Greek governments (Papagos, Karamanlis, Papandreou, and Stephanopoulos) supported the West German government in all major political issues, including those of war reparations. This Greek–German cooperation coincides with Greek foreign policy planning at the time, which sought to connect with Germany and the European Economic Community. In my opinion, the Greek dictatorship's opposition to Irineos

60 Galanakis, Ireneos (1968): "Christians' Political Responsibility."
61 Acts 5, 29.