Gaze, Vision, and Visuality in Ancient Greek Literature

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Gaze, Vision, and Visuality in Ancient Greek Literature

Edited by
Alexandros Kampakoglou and Anna Novokhatko

with the cooperation of
E. Bakola, A. Lamari, F. Maier, C. Michel,
C. Orth, and M. Tamiolaki

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Foreword

The present volume brings together papers that were originally presented at the conference "Gaze, Vision, and Visuality in Greek literature: Concepts, Contexts, and Reception" held in Freiburg on December 4–6, 2014. Beyond these presented contributions, additional papers were added at a later stage, expanding the areas of Greek culture covered. We would like to thank the speakers at the Freiburg conference and the authors of the commissioned papers for honouring us with their contributions. We hope that this volume will not be read as a gathering of independent texts, but as a collective work created through mutual influence and dialogue.

The Freiburg conference was organised by a group of scholars from Germany and Greece. Emmanuela Bakola (University of Warwick), Stelios Chronopoulos (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg), Alexandros Kampakoglou (Trinity College, Oxford), Anna Lamari (Aristotle University, Thessaloniki), Felix Maier (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg), Claudia Michel (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg), Nikos Miltsios (Aristotle University, Thessaloniki), Anna Novokhatko (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg), Christian Orth (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg), and Melina Tamiolaki (University of Crete) were the members of the original team that oversaw the organization of the conference and the preparation of this volume.

We would like to thank the Academy of Athens and the Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, particularly Antonios Rengakos and Bernhard Zimmermann, for their encouragement and support. We would also like to thank DeGruyter and the editors of the series *Trends in Classics*, Supplementary Volumes, Antonios Rengakos and Franco Montanari, for accepting the present volume in their series. Florence Low and Aristi Tegou offered valuable assistance with copy-editing some of the chapters and the production of a number of images, respectively. The Freiburg conference was sponsored by the Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften. We would like to take this opportunity to thank this institution for covering the expenses of both the original event and the present volume.

Oxford, July 2017   Alexandros Kampakoglou
Freiburg, July 2017   Anna Novokhatko

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Introduction

Visual culture is a key feature of ancient Greek life. Performance and spectacle lay at the heart of all aspects of daily routine, such as court and assembly, cult and ritual, and art and culture. Gazing and visuality in the ancient Greek world have had a central place in scholarship for some time now, enjoying an abundance of pertinent discussions and bibliography.[1]

Let us consider one example from a contemporary standard introduction to visual culture: "Visual culture does not depend on pictures themselves but the modern tendency to picture or visualize existence. This visualizing makes the modern period radically different from the ancient and medieval worlds".[2] This provocative statement challenges us to explore the meanings accorded to visualising in the ancient world (how "radically different" is the modern period from the ancient Greek one in this respect?), and the ways in which different cultures understand the act of looking.

Classical sources present us with a range of ideas about seeing for any given period, ideas which are liable to change over time, sometimes quite dramatically. Ocularcentrism, as Martin Jay termed the supremacy of sight in his intellectual history of the gaze,[3] is evident from the earliest surviving Greek texts. This concept of sight was to frame ancient thinkers' approaches to philosophy and a whole range of epistemological questions, the act of seeing encapsulating both sensory and cognitive perception.

Ocularcentrism is presented as a three-fold concept in the title of our volume which aims to explore the concepts of "gaze", "vision", and "visuality" in ancient Greek literature and art. Let us comment briefly on each of them, starting with the last one. "Visuality" has been discussed as a cultural and social phenomenon in many studies on the topic.[4] It refers both to the cognitive processes through which the individual comes to view the world and to the cultural patterns in which the viewer exists.

Opposing "vision" (our second term) to "visuality", the art critic and historian Hal Foster argues in the preface to his book on the topic that "vision suggests sight as a physical operation".[5] However, the distinction of "vision" as a physical act and "visuality" as a cultural state or quality is not so simple; Fos-

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1 See the most recent and thorough discussion of bibliography in Squire 2016b, 1–2, esp. n. 2.

2 Mirzoeff 1999, 5–6.

3 Jay 1993, 3 and *passim*.

4 Mirzoeff 2002. See also bibliography and the overview of contemporary trends in visual studies in Dikovitskaya 2005 and Heywood/Sandywell 2012.

5 Foster 1988, ix.

ter further argues that vision and visuality "are not opposed as nature is to culture: vision is social and historical too, and visuality involves the body and the psyche".[6]

The first term of our title, "gaze", has been accorded prominence by the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, "gaze" being the standard English translation of the much broader Lacanian term *regard*. For Lacan, it means not the mere act of looking, but a socially-determined, complex interactive relationship of agents and viewers, which is characteristic of a particular set of social circumstances. "What determines me, at the most profound level, in the visible, is the gaze that is outside. It is through the gaze that I enter light and it is from the gaze that I receive its effects", wrote Lacan.[7] This Lacanian determination of gaze has been studied extensively over the last fifty years, especially by Mulvey in her seminal 1975 article about the active masculine gaze in narrative cinema.[8]

Whilst the last fifty years have indeed produced a large number of studies on the dominance of the visual dimension, we can consider this period to be even longer if we recall the ideas of two Freiburgers from the first half of the 20th century (thus acknowledging the fact that the idea for this volume was also born in Freiburg im Breisgau!): the ocularcentric theories of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger.[9] The process of learning to see what lies before our eyes is transformed by Husserl into a programme for training the mental eye (geistiges Auge), phenomenology.[10] Heidegger posed similar questions in his essay of 1938 on the "world picture" (Weltbild), which means "not a picture of the world, but the world conceived as a picture" ("nicht ein Bild von der Welt, sondern die Welt als Bild begriffen"), and analysed the metaphysics of vision and visibility.[11]

These notions, as well as other ideas of vision, have been applied to ancient literature over the past few decades and have brought new perspectives to the interpretation of classical texts.[12] Responding to this process, various anci-

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6 *Ibid.* In Lacanian terms, physical vision and social visuality would perhaps be explained in terms of "the eye and the gaze"; see Lacan 1979, 67–78.

7 Lacan 1979, 106.

8 Mulvey 1975. On the concept of gaze as it passes from Sartre to Lacan, see the stimulating article by Bryson 1988. See also work on theories of representation, Bryson *et.al* 1991.

9 On the visual turn in the 20th century, see, for example, the very good overviews in Evans/ Hall 1999, Sturken/Cartwright 2001, and Jones 2012; on the vision-centred paradigm of perception in European thought, see e.g. Levin 1993a and Jay 1993.

10 On Husserl in the context of sight theories, see Rawlinson 1999 and Levin 1999, 60–93.

11 On Heidegger's views on seeing, see Levin 1999, 170–215; on Heidegger's interpretation of Greek metaphysics of vision and visibility, see Levin 1993b and McNeill 1999, 17–54.

12 On approaches to vision and theories of the gaze applied to classics, with a broader bibliography discussion, see Lovatt 2013, 7–11.

ent works on the concept and theory of vision have been "rediscovered" in order to re-evaluate ancient ocularcentrism "rather than simply impose modern ideas back onto ancient models".[13]

Apart from the standard monograph of Simon (1988) and collective works such as Villard (2002) and Villard (2005), it is only in the last four years that we have seen a surge of interest in sight and vision in the ancient world, with the publication of three important volumes of collected papers on the subject. Many of the authors who appear in these works have also contributed chapters to this volume. Two of these publications, Courtray (2013) and Squire (2016a), extend their focus from Archaic Greece (in one contribution even from Ancient Egypt) to the rise of Christianity in Late Antiquity; the third volume, Blundell *et al.* (2013) focuses on the consideration of vision in the Ancient Greek world. All three volumes are conceived thematically, considering topics such as how looking is represented, ways of looking, light and vision, the interface between the written text and the material object, theorising vision, and ideas about sight.

So why is another volume on the topic necessary? If our volume differs from these previous publications, it is in its emphasis on diverse genres: the concepts "gaze", "vision" and "visuality" are considered across different Greek genres and media. By setting a broad time span, we seek to track the evolution of visual culture in Greece, while also addressing broader topics such as theories of vision and the prominence of visuality in specific periods, and the position of visuality in the hierarchisation of the senses. Literary genres host acts of viewing or describe other visual experiences, and thus debate the notion and function of seeing. Seeing was considered the most secure means of obtaining knowledge, with many scholars citing the etymological connection between "seeing" and "knowing" in ancient Greek as evidence for this. However, seeing was also associated with mere appearances, false perception and deception. Genres repeatedly employ sight-related language, exploring multiple interconnections between viewing, understanding and knowing. The recipients of ancient Greek literature (both oral and written) are thus encouraged to perceive the narrated scenes as spectacles and to "follow the gaze" of the characters in the narrative.

Alongside the general progression from literature to artistic and material evidence, the discussions featured in this volume are organised according to a generic and roughly chronological scheme, proceeding from epic through drama to prose, and concluding with visual arts. The choice of authors and genres

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13 Squire 2016b, 9.

is necessarily subjective as it is impossible to reflect all genres within the framework of one book. The editorial team set itself the task of emphasizing those genres which have received less coverage in other discussions on this topic. The first five chapters consider the epic genre, with three papers on Homer (Létoublon, Grethlein and Michel) and two on Apollonius of Rhodes (Lovatt and Kampakoglou), followed by an article on the lyric poet Stesichorus (Finglass). Four further chapters deal with Classical drama, two on tragedy (Bakola and Lamari) and two on comedy (Novokhatko and Orth). After a contribution on rhetoric (Haskins), the next two chapters focus on historiography, of the classical times (Harman) and of the late sixth century CE (Maier). The following two chapters deal with the political and philosophical thought of the fourth century BCE; one studies Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* (Tamiolaki) whilst the other considers Plato (Nightingale). The last three chapters represent the transition from literary genres to other media: two are interdisciplinary in their approach (Squire and Petsalis-Diomidis), while the third deals primarily with the visual arts (Dietrich). The order of the chapters emphasises genre over chronological considerations. Therefore, for example, Hellenistic epic poetry is discussed within the epic section at the beginning (Lovatt and Kampakoglou), Procopius (Maier) is discussed alongside papers on fifth- and fourth-century BCE historiography, and Archaic and Early Classical sculpture and vase-painting conclude the volume (Dietrich). Along similar lines, the placement of Lamari's chapter emphasizes its interdisciplinarity since it considers tragic plots along reflections on vases.

What can be gained by looking at the same questions simultaneously across different genres? First of all, this focused approach distinguishes generic stereotypes and conventions and allows a better understanding of vision and visuality. Of course, there are no rigid rules; the famous "crossing" of genres is inevitable, with many elements of one genre repeated, borrowed, imitated and parodied by another. Nevertheless, the focus on genre-specific themes, context, performance, content, structure and style determines the subject of this volume in a specific manner. As Charles Segal notes, "Genre is the mediating term between the literary work and the various cultural discourses and social functions within which literature operates".[14] This approach is enhanced by the inclusion of an art historical perspective, which supplements literary scholarship with approaches concerned primarily with artistic and material media such as sculpture and vase-painting. The focus on "vision" is thus mediated between the act of creation and the various cultural and social discourses supporting

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14 Segal 1994, ix.

this act. Literary texts and artefacts appear as complex and multi-layered entities analysed from the perspective of vision and visuality. By virtue of being explored in different epochs and genres, ancient Greek vision provides a particularly enriching case for such a hermeneutics. By gathering these new complex pictures together, the editors' challenge has been to map out the generic and chronological expanse from Homer to Procopius. In analysing the manner in which such a central concept as "seeing" is employed and explored in various genres, our objective has been to inspire fresh discussions of "vision" and the "visual". Discussions which will be informed by the recognition that genres are sets "of readerly competences – codes, conventions, levels of style, situations, stereotypes, vocabulary".[15]

As already mentioned, the volume opens with five chapters that consider epic poetry. Françoise Létoublon looks at the *Iliad* as theatre: in the setting of a large-scale spectacle, the poet puts on stage the struggle for power played out through the battles around the walls of Troy. The internal viewers of these events act as mediators for the epic audience. Létoublon explores the main devices that the *Iliad* employs to allow us to "watch" this theatre. In so doing, Létoublon traces an increasing tension from Achilles' anger in Book 1 to his encounter with Priam in Book 24, which she parallels to the development of plot in Athenian tragedy. Among the devices used for dramatising the action, Létoublon analyses how the poet sometimes creates imaginary spectators or directly addresses the characters, especially Patroclus. In this theatre, some objects, like Achilles' spear, intervene with the status of a quasi-character. An increasing tension reaches its climax at the meeting between Priam and Achilles and the exceptional simile in Book 24, in which the elderly Priam is viewed by Achilles with a mixture of admiration and stupor (θάμβος). Létoublon analyses this simile and compares it to another, that of the nightmare in Book 22. Both similes are positioned at the highest points of the dramatised narrative.

Jonas Grethlein teases out the significance of gaze for the narrative dynamic of the *Odyssey*, exploring it as an expression of desire and aggression. The nexus between gaze and desire that can be observed elsewhere in Homer is disrupted on Ogygia and Scheria, where instead of desiring beautiful women and marvelling at wonders, Odysseus desires "to see the day of his homecoming". Through the visual semantics of *nostos*, vision does not provoke desire, but has instead become its object. Besides underscoring Odysseus' iron will to return home, gaze also highlights an increase in Odysseus' active heroism over the course of the narrative. In the *Apologoi*, Odysseus is exposed to the controlling eyes of monstrous opponents, whilst on Ithaca his own assaultive gaze

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15 *Ibid.*

anticipates and accompanies his revenge. Grethlein finally turns to vase-painting to show that the *Odyssey's* clever use of gaze for narrative purposes forms part of a broader interest in vision in Archaic Greece.

In her chapter, Claudia Michel focuses on blindness. The motif of blindness is shown to be Ariadne's thread running through the narrative structure of the *Odyssey*. Michel's chapter first analyses both Odysseus' quasi-anatomical account of the blinding of Polyphemus, which features parallels with fragment 84 of Empedocles, and the representation of the monster's behavioural anomalies after the blinding (1). The next section is concerned with the disturbance that emotional excess brings upon visual perception. Penelope's tears and grief prevent the visual recognition of her husband (2.1), whilst the suitors and Odysseus' companions, "blinded" by ὕβρις or ἀτασθαλίαι, fail to perceive their own limits and are haunted by visions (2.2). Finally, Michel examines the association between blindness and the Muses (3): the blind singer Demodocus plays an important role as internal narrator, a character who has perhaps inspired the legend of the blind poet.

The following two chapters are dedicated to Apollonius. Helen Lovatt's contribution discusses the visuality of Apollonius' *Argonautica* through a detailed examination of Book 4. Building on aspects already discussed in her 2013 book *The Epic Gaze* (such as the Talos episode), Lovatt aims to delineate the ways in which Book 4 is similar to yet differs from earlier books of the poem in its use of gaze and vision, examining the explorers' gaze and the colonial gaze, the Argonauts as subjects and objects, order and chaos, epiphanies, the poetics of darkness, narrative control, levels of knowledge, and the association between knowledge, power, gaze and senses other than vision. She argues that the powerful cartographic gaze of Books 1 and 2 is much attenuated in Book 4, that the gaze of the Argonauts fails frequently and darkness is more dominant. The narrative oscillates disturbingly between power, control, success and light on the one hand, and disempowerment, helplessness, confusion and darkness on the other.

Alexandros Kampakoglou poses the question central to almost every reading of Apollonius' *Argonautica*, "What is a hero?", and tries to establish whether Jason is in fact a hero. His chapter approaches this time-honoured question from the point of view of gaze. Gaze, he argues, is central to the construction of heroic identity and status. Time and again, blinding brilliance, star imagery and the colour red are associated with the impression that Jason makes on internal audiences. A closer examination of selected passages indicates that the language used in these scenes imitates that of manifestations of divine beings (epiphanies) in other texts. Apollonius follows a venerable tradition that reaches back to Homer and creates an association between Jason and

the Homeric heroes such as Achilles and Odysseus. However, unlike Homer, Apollonius emphasises the role that such heroic manifestations, or "epiphanies" as Kampakoglou calls them, play in thwarting the potential threat of female characters who could compromise the success of the expedition. The erotic overtones that permeate such encounters suggest affinities between the language of Apollonius and that of lyric poets such as Sappho. Ultimately, Apollonius' representation of Jason and the Argonauts confirms the epic definition of the hero as an exceptional being that combines divine and feral aspects. It is through gaze that these aspects are foregrounded.

Transitioning from epic to lyric, Patrick Finglass examines the presentation of Helen of Troy as the recipient of the male gaze, first (briefly) in Homer, then in Stesichorus. He argues that this presentation relates closely to the moral evaluation of Helen found in both poets. He examines the extend to which she can be fairly characterised as a passive recipient of the male gaze, as opposed to a more active participant in the act of viewing, even when she is its target.

The following two chapters analyse tragedy. Emmanuela Bakola argues that a cognitive approach to the ancient viewing experience of the *Oresteia* is crucial to understanding the Erinyes' role in the trilogy as a whole. She demonstrates that the Erinyes' invisible nature and its depiction in performance are key to recognising that they are present on stage across the trilogy far more than previously imagined. Bakola argues that by engaging ingeniously with the visible and the invisible in relation to the interior of the skene-building, and by positioning bodies, props and machinery in highly suggestive ways, Aeschylean dramaturgy makes the viewer "see" the Erinyes at key points of the trilogy and confirms these daemonic entities' near-ubiquitous role. The appearances of the Erinyes to the viewer, which are mostly confirmed retrospectively as the trilogy unfolds and as patterns are repeated and reasserted, are always connected with the skene interior, ancient theatre's space of the "unseen" par excellence.

Anna Lamari's focus is Euripides. She examines the system of visual allusions shared by Euripidean tragedy and fifth-century material media. Using the *Bacchae* as her main case-study, she discusses the manner in which Euripides manipulates his audience's visual literacy to construct a multi-layered text, imbued with visual puns that work as hyperlinks to mental images stored in the spectators' visual memory. The first part of the paper offers the theoretical basis for the discussion. The second focuses on specific visual connections between the *Bacchae* and other visual (theatrical or pictorial) representations of Dionysus-induced madness, showing how first-level target images work as "windows" allowing the audience to look through them to other plays. Pictorial representations are thus used as mediators to channel a visual allusion from a later to an earlier

play. In this light, Lamari discusses the visual connections between the *Bacchae* and Aeschylus' *Lycurgeia* trilogy, but also between the *Bacchae* and Aeschylus' *Xantriae* and *Toxotides*. By means of visual allusion, Lamari maintains, Euripides constructs a heavily layered narrative, loaded with encrypted connections to earlier plays.

The following two chapters deal with Old Comedy. Anna Novokhatko argues that concepts of sight, gaze and vision develop over time in Sicilian and Old Attic comedy. She discusses five aspects of seeing in comedy: staging, mapping, narrating, representing characters through the way they look, and sight theories incorporated into the plot. In this categorisation, she discusses the intersection of vision with the comic as well as the complex relationship between the author, the character, the actor and the spectator. Examining the comic representation of sight and vision contributes both to the better understanding of contemporary sight theories and to self-referential concepts of spectacle and vision in comedy itself.

Adapting terminology developed for the analysis of modern languages, Christian Orth's chapter proposes a classification of different uses (exophoric, endophoric and recognitional) of demonstratives with the deictic -ί in Greek Comedy, with particular attention to cases where these demonstratives do not refer to something visible on stage at the moment of use. Perhaps the most interesting of these uses is the rare recognitional use, which so far has received very little (if any) attention in discussions of the deictic -ί. The endophoric and recognitional demonstratives with deictic -ί may be explained as "metaphorical" uses of a visual element, through which things not visible are presented as if they were.

Exploring the genre of rhetoric, which was contemporary to Old Comedy, Ekaterina Haskins contests the narrow and depoliticised notion of epideictic inherited from Aristotle by rereading the encomia of Helen composed by the recognised masters of rhetorical display, Gorgias of Leontini and Isocrates. These display speeches not only model the art of showing through words but also illuminate the culture of spectacle and spectatorship in which rhetoric emerged as a public practice and a distinct branch of learning. Under the guise of praise for Helen, Gorgias and Isocrates show their contemporaries how to appreciate spectacles critically on the one hand, and how to balance the pursuit of honour with the needs of the political community on the other. In their hands, the artfully written encomium becomes a means for appraising the psychological and political dimensions of seeing and being seen.

Following on from this, the next two chapters concentrate on historiography. In her contribution, Rosie Harman examines the metahistorical implications of the representation of the visual in Herodotus and Thucydides, both of

whom present their accounts as available, ready to be seen by the reader, as well as presenting spectators within the text as viewing and responding to events. Their scenes of spectatorship are therefore a reflection on the reading of history. Frequently, however, the spectators of these texts are misled by deceptive displays or won over by impressive sights, leading to misguided judgements. Previous readings of these scenes have seen them as showing how not to read history, offering a foil for the authoritative voice of the historical narrator who provides a more secure means of accurately assessing events. In contrast, Harman suggests some ways in which the reader remains implicated in the problems faced by internal spectators. It suggests that while these writers' scenes of spectatorship do reflect on the problems of reading history, they actively involve the reader in these problems, forcing the reader to consider his or her own response and to confront the political implications of that response for the present.

Focusing his discussion on a later representative of the same genre, Felix Maier argues that in his *Wars of Justinian* the late antique scholar and historian Procopius does not narrate history from a neutral vantage point, but lets the reader share the perspectives of his protagonists. This method of reporting action not only leads to a thrilling narrative but also enables the reader to experience history from the agents' points of view. Maier presents some examples of Procopius' narrative skills, exploring how and why the historian confronts the reader with certain perspectives in specific situations.

Returning to the fourth century BCE, we focus on two disciples of Socrates. Melina Tamiolaki studies Xenophon and analyses the distinction between "appearing" and "being" in the *Cyropaedia*. The starting point for Tamiolaki's article is a passage of the *Cyropaedia*, in which Cyrus' father, Cambyses, advises his son that the best way for the leader to appear wise is to be truly wise. Scholars tend to interpret Cambyses' advice as privileging "being" over "appearing". However, through a detailed examination of references to the verbs δοκῶ and φαίνομαι in the *Cyropaedia* (and related expressions such as φανερός εἰμί, ἀναφαίνομαι, etc.), Tamiolaki argues that perceptions and impressions, in other words the φαίνεσθαι in a broader sense, are crucial for a leader, ultimately much more so than the εἶναι. Therefore, the most critical element is how the leader appears, what impression he gives to those around him, how he becomes a model to emulate, and how this enables him to impose his authority.

Andrea Nightingale examines Plato's "aesthetics of extravagance" in his accounts of the beautiful "variegation" of natural phenomena in the *Phaedo* eschatology and in the movements of the stars in the *Timaeus*. In the former, Plato focuses on the beauty of the variegated interaction of colours in the "ae-

thereal" realm, whilst in the latter, he describes the collective movements of the stars as a variegated "dance". Here, Plato borrows and deviates from the language of choral dances at religious festivals. In festival choral dances, the music, poetic words and dance motions conjure up multiple referents even as they invite the viewer to "unite" with the god. For the viewer of the star-dance in Plato, the philosopher "unites" with a rational god by seeing the "star dance" as pointing to a single referent: the nous of the divine world-soul that moves the stars. Nightingale contrasts these accounts of Plato's "extravagant aesthetics" to the "minimalist aesthetics" set forth in the *Philebus*.

The final three chapters effect the transition to other media. Michael Squire's chapter explores the idea of "viewing" Homeric poetry. More specifically, Squire turns to Homer's most famous feat of poetic visualisation: the description of the shield of Achilles, created by Hephaestus in the eighteenth book of the *Iliad* (*Il.* 18.478–608). The Homeric passage prompted all manner of literary engagements and critical discussions in antiquity. After briefly sketching the reception of the passage, Squire concerns himself with one literary response in particular, dating from the early fourth century CE: a passage from the *Imagines* of the Younger Philostratus, which set out to describe a purported gallery of paintings. Squire focuses on a single tableau within the work (*Imag.* 10), centred around a literary description of a purported painting drawn from the Homeric evocation of the shield crafted by Hephaestus. That knowing recession of representational registers – from text to image to text (and back again) – is fundamental. If the Younger Philostratus transforms the Homeric verbal description into an imaginary painting, he simultaneously mediates that image through his spoken address before it (now represented, of course, through the written text in hand). The intellectual brilliance lies in the questions that the Younger Philostratus poses about words as images and images as words: the passage interrogates what it means to view a picture, no less than the hermeneutics of seeing through reading.

Alexia Petsalis-Diomidis' opening section focuses on viewing dedications of clothes first through close readings of Hellenistic dedicatory epigrams, then through an analysis of the effect of the embodied experience of reading these poems in private domestic spaces, and finally through an exploration of the broader cultural meanings of disembodied clothes using the evidence of red figure vase-paintings. In her second section, Petsalis-Diomidis takes a closer look at a very different type of text about clothes dedications, the Late Classical inventories of clothing dedications to Artemis Brauronia. To a degree, these are read in the context of dedicatory epigrams, both in terms of discourse and content, and in terms of the differences in the embodied experience of reading these stone texts. The inventories are also used as evidence for the display of

actual clothe dedications in the sanctuary. Finally, her third section considers votive sculptural depictions of clothes in the light of broader cultural meanings and the specific associations of the sanctuary of Artemis at Brauron. While differences emerge in the embodied and sensory experience of engaging with literary, inscriptional, "real" and sculptural clothes in their different contexts of reception, Petsalis-Diomidis argues that in each case a key feature is the evocation of the absent body of the dedicant and the triangulation of deity, dedicant and viewer through the medium of the votive garment.

Finally, Nikolaus Dietrich studies ancient modes of viewing "art" through certain examples of Archaic and Early Classical Greek images. He focuses on the widespread phenomenon of (what could be termed) "iconographic under-determination" in sculpture and vase-painting. In such images, the task of identifying the figures is, as Dietrich claims, mostly left to the viewer. Through the combined analysis of iconography and accompanying inscriptions, the extensive agency assigned to the viewer in Archaic and Early Classical Greek visual culture is made evident.

The visual has often been called "a place where meanings are created and contested".[16] As Maurice Merleau-Ponty put it in his 1945 *Phénoménologie de la perception*: "My gaze can only be compared with previous acts of seeing or with acts of seeing accomplished by others through the intermediary of time and language".[17] Through the wide-ranging generic perspectives serving here as "the intermediary of time and language", we want to explore Greek "acts of seeing". We hope that our volume offers new interpretations of classical ideas about vision and visuality and helps to explain how these came about in ancient Greek thought as represented in various media and genres.

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16 Merzoeff 1999, 6.

17 Merleau-Ponty 2012, 72.

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Section I: **Epic and Lyric Poetry**

Françoise Létoublon
War as a spectacle

"Gaze, vision and visuality": the subject of this volume indicates a major interest in visual perception in Greek literature. As none of these terms corresponds to a Greek proper word, at least in the archaic period I am concerned with, it seems difficult to approach this very wide field. For a general overview, I will therefore use the notions developed by Alex Purves in her recent book, *Space and Time in Greek Literature* (Cambridge, 2010), and in Michael Squire's introduction of the recent volume *Sight and the Ancient Senses* (Abingdon, 2016). Since neither book deals with Greek language concerning sight, I will rely on some lexical remarks, starting with the lexical entries regarding Homer's attempt to understand what "to see" means for the Archaic period. I will thereafter follow the gazes of the characters and the narrator in the *Iliad*, intending to show how the dramatic tension increases until the meeting between Priam and Achilles in Book 24, where I analyse the reciprocity of the gaze through the ambiguity of a famous simile. The dramatic tension of the passage owes much to this mirror effect,[1] and shows that Homeric language concerning gaze does not reflect a merely physical process, but also induces a high level of emotion.

The central role that sight plays in Homer is well proven by the number of links between seeing and living; as several Homeric formulas indicate, to see means to live, and conversely to lose sight means to die.[2] Taking Aristotelian terminology as her point of departure, Purves (2010, 1–64) shows that Homer, the "perfect surveyor",[3] aims for an "Eusynoptic *Iliad*". In my own course, following the *Iliad* from Achilles' anger to Hector's *lusis*, I will try to adopt a "bird's-eye view", borrowing the expression from de Jong and Nünlist 2004b,

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1 See Squire's introduction for the insistence on both the reciprocity of the gaze and the mirror effect, with the splendid epigram he quotes as an epigraph, where the mirror is speaking in the first person.
2 Létoublon 2010, Michel in this volume. See, for instance, *Il.* 5.10 (οὐδέ μέ φησι | δηρὸν ἔτ' ὄψεσθαι λαμπρὸν φάος ἠελίοιο), 18.61 = 442 (ὄφρα δέ μοι ζώει καὶ ὁρᾷ φάος ἠελίοιο), 24.558 (αὐτόν τε ζώειν καὶ ὁρᾶν φάος ἠελίοιο). See also the formulas with δερκ– below in n. 16.
3 The expression comes from George Puttenham's *The Arte of English Poesie*, quoted as an epigraph (Purves 2010, 1).

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meaning I will focus on certain episodes and "fly over" the rest.[4] I share Purves' nuanced position: "throughout the *Iliad*, human vision is complicated by the fantasy of what or how these immortals see. There is a tendency [...] for the audience of the poem to take their own visual cues from these divine superwitnesses. Homeric scholarship has also emphasised, however, that the *Iliad* is difficult to visualise as a single, coherent entity. Not only do we run into problems connected with sequence and simultaneity when attempting to "see" the plot as if it were a picture, but we are also given very few examples of clear-sighted human vision within the poem. Despite scholars' observations about the occasional panoramic standpoint of the Homeric narrator, we are rarely afforded a sustained bird's-eye view. [...] We are faced with the paradox of Aristotle's interpretation of a poem that adheres in form to the principles of what is *eusynoptic*, and that, even in the surface area of its plot, fills an area that could be of approximately the right size to be seen in one view, if one could attain the right vantage point. Yet within the poem itself, the account of the war takes place only frame by frame, moving from one point of view to the next."[5]

Homeric language of sight and semantic features

There are actually very few nouns signifying "gaze" in Homer. I may cite in the *Iliad* two appearances of the accusative ὄψιν, one of the dative ὄψει; the first may mean "sight" as one of the senses, the others rather mean "appearance".[6] Therefore we may suppose that there was at this time no abstract notion of "sight", at least linguistically speaking.[7] The verbal forms are numerous; ὁράω, εἶδον, ὄψομαι and ὄπωπα already form the same heteroclitic paradigm, as the phrases with the instrumental dative of the name of sight

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4 For instance, though aware of its importance in the question of text and image, I will deliberately leave aside the famous description of Achilles' shield in Book 18; in my view, this description occurs in an intense dramatic context (Létoublon 1999a), but is not part of my vision of "war as a spectacle".

5 Purves 2010, 34–35.

6 *Il.* 6.468 (... πατρὸς φίλου ὄψιν ἀτυχθείς), 24.632 (εἰσορόων ὄψιν τ᾽ ἀγαθὴν καὶ μῦθον ἀκούων), 20.205 (ὄψει δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἄρ πω σὺ ἐμοὺς ἴδες οὔτ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἐγὼ σούς).

7 I do not share Bruno Snell's (1975) opinion that if there is no word in Homer meaning, for instance, "mind", there was no contemporary notion of mind and person. I think that several features, like the deliberative monologues, clearly show that Homeric characters do have a sense of self-consciousness, as the use of μερμηρίζειν proves.

organ, ὀφθαλμός, show.[8] Homeric Greek also knows a more archaic term, formed on *ok^w– like the future and perfect already mentioned, and most often used in the dual form ὄσσε, but ὀφθαλμός appears to be the living form in the language of Homer, as shown by its use when the eyes encounter an injury in course of fighting.[9] As shown by other cases, verbs that describe common or basic ideas tend to form their tenses using several lexical roots, which are linked to fine semantic nuances.[10] By leaning on Indo-European etymology and the meanings of certain compounds like φρουρά, "watch, guard", we may discern that in some occurrences ὁράω, probably in connection with the dura-tive aspect of the present, implies a notion of attention or intention in sight that the aorist aspect does not.[11] One could relate these remarks on Greek usage to contemporary theories of sight, for instance to the "extramissionist" vs. "in-tromissionist" explanations.[12] Unfortunately this study would require a long time and a long text. It could instead be possible to speak of an "objective"

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8 *Il.* 1.587, 3.28, 3.169, 3.306, 5.212, 10.275, 13.99 = 15.286 = 20.344 = 21.54, 14.436, 15.488, 15.600, 16.182, 17.466, 17.646, 18.190, 19.174, 20.342, 22.25, 22.169, 22.236, 23.202, 24.246, 24.392, 24.555. I have listed here all the instances in the *Iliad*, in order to show that the phrase occurs with all the tenses of the verb (ἴδ–, ὀρ–, are relatively frequent, but see also ὄψομαι and ὄπωπα). I further note that the dative without a preposition occurs much more frequently than the dative with ἐν; the instrumental value of the dative is clear. Snell probably looked only at the four items with ἐν, emphasising the locative value (Snell 1975, 23). There are numerous parallel expressions in several modern languages (French *voir de ses yeux*). In Greek, I notice a parallel phrase with the organ used for moving in the dative, βαίνω with ποσί.
9 For instance *Il.* 14.499 (… ἔτι δ᾽ ὄβριμον ἔγχος | ἦεν ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ), *Il.* 16.741 (… ὀφθαλμοὶ δὲ χαμαὶ πέσον ἐν κονίῃσι).
10 I also mention λέγω (Hom. ἀγοράω), εἶπον, and εἴρηκα for the concept of "to say, to speak": for the aorist and perfect, Homer uses ancient verbal roots, which have approximately the same meaning. However, Homer uses ἀγοράω for the present, a verb meaning "publicly speak", while λέγω means "to pick up, to choose". For the still more complicated case of verbs of movement verb (e.g. ἔρχομαι, εἶμι, ἦλθον), see Létoublon 1985. See also "to eat", ἔδω, ἐσθίω, ἔφαγον: even when we cannot recognise the specific semantic features of each stem, we may suppose that there are some. As an argument for justifying this feature, a German specialist once quoted the following proverb: "Liebe Kinder haben viele Name".
11 Chantraine 2009, 784–5, s. v. ὁράω: "ὁρά- signifie 'tenir les yeux sur' et se rapporte au sujet, non à l'objet et à la perception comme εἶδον."
12 See the chapters on sight in Greek philosophy by Rudolph and Nightingale in Squire (2016), and Squire's introduction (2016, 16): "As for the mechanics of sight, different Greek and Roman schools of thought championed divergent conceptual models. Crucial here are two generic theo-ries about how vision operates, which modern scholars have labelled 'extramissionist' and 'in-tromissionist' respectively. According to the first 'extramissive' [...] theory, the sense of sight was understood to emanate from fiery rays actively cast out from the eye, travelling to the thing seen. At the other extreme [...] the atomists [...] understood visible objects as emanating atom-thick replicas (*eidōla*) that moved through space and impacted upon the eye."

meaning versus a "subjective" one, with the terms "objective" and "subjective" referring to the grammatical, rather than psychological, object or subject of the verb respectively.[13] As Snell remarked in the opening essay of *Die Entdeckung des Geistes*, "Die Auffassung des Menschen bei Homer", Homeric language actually knows other verbal roots for the notion of sight: he notes that λεύσσω keeps, from its etymological link with λευκός, a positive nuance, "etwas Helles schauen. Ausserdem heisst es: in die Weite schauen. [...] λεύσσειν bezeichnet offenbar bestimmte Gefühl mit, die man beim Sehen, vor allem beim Sehen bestimmter Gegenstände hat.[...] nie wird λεύσσειν beim kummervollem oder ängstlichem Sehen gebraucht".[14] Δέρκομαι, with a complete paradigm in Homer, seems more complicated; for the first semantic approach, Snell is probably right in saying "Dementsprechend bezeichnet bei Homer δέρκεσθαι nicht so sehr die Funktion des Auges, sondern das Strahlen des Auges, das ein anderer warnimmt".[15] But this verb also shows uses with the instrumental dative ὀφθαλμοῖσι as an equivalent of "to live", which seems to argue for a kind of synonymy with the suppletive paradigm.[16] Another question arises that I cannot answer here: why the I.-E. root *ok^w−, which could represent a fundamental verb for the notion of sight, occurs in Greek only in the future and perfect, both usages apparently archaic.[17] Before we leave the language of sight, let us remark that βλέπω, which is not used in Homer but is very frequent in classical Greek, seems to cover more or less the meanings of δέρκεσθαι and ὁρῶ.

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13 The subjective meaning seems also prevalent for the verbal family of σκεπτ−, σκοπ−. See LSJ[9] s. v. σκέπτομαι, "to look about carefully, spy", σκοπέω "to behold, contemplate [...], examine, inspect".

14 Snell 1975, 15. But see Chantraine (2009, 608): "'diriger son regard vers, voir' [...]; ce verbe exprime l'idée d'un flux visuel rayonnant des yeux, non de l'objet, malgré Treu, *Von Homer zur Lyrik*, 64."

15 Snell 1975, 15.

16 See *Il.* 14.436 (ὃ δ' ἀμπνύνθη καὶ ἀνέδρακεν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν),*Od.* 19.446 (πῦρ δ' ὀφθαλμοῖσι δεδορκώς); for the equivalence with "live", see *Il.* 1.88 (οὔ τις ἐμεῦ ζῶντος καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ δερκομένοιο) and *Od.* 16.439 (ζώοντός γ' ἐμέθεν καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ δερκομένοιο).

17 Regarding ὄψομαι and ὄπωπα, I call attention to the fact that the Greek future tense stems from the I.-E. desiderative mood. This is especially clear in the middle voice. As far as the perfect ὄπωπα is concerned, this appears to be an archaic form on account of the vowel *o*, reduplication and lengthening. Snell's view that the present tense ὄσσομαι seems frequent is negligible since it occurs only once at *Il.* 22.356 (ἦ σ' εὖ γιγνώσκων προτιόσσομαι).

The theatre of the Iliad

I propose to look at the *Iliad* as theatre, a theatre created before the term was even coined.[18] The poet puts on stage in a large-scale spectacle the struggle for power through the battles for Troy. He shows us a spectacle viewed by people who act as mediators for the epic audience. Our position is paradoxical since theatre is generally defined by characters shown as both acting and speaking for themselves. Epic narrative, on the other hand, describes characters in the third person. Although Homer often uses direct discourse, the war does not primarily proceed through these discourses, but rather through the ways that the narrative makes us "see" a spectacle with eyes other than our real, physical ones. Laura Slatkin's analysis of "Tragic Visualizing in the *Iliad*" starts from the verbal form ἐνόησε, "he noticed", showing how the narrative incorporates visual perception into the whole mental process. It is this process of seeing that creates the dynamics of battle and gives the *Iliad* a tragic tone.[19]

A Jenny S. Clay's 2011 book demonstrates this well, first on a general plane in the chapter called "The sighted Muse", and then more specifically in her analysis of "Envisioning Troy" from *Iliad* 12 to 17. In the third and last chapter, "Homer's Trojan Theater", Clay studies *spatial forms and paths* and *memory* in a very interesting manner, showing the *hodological* nature, that is the specific pathways, of cognitive mapping in Homer.[20] For my part, I shall develop an understanding of the main devices that the narrative of the *Iliad* uses to enable us to *see* this theatre, from Achilles' anger in Book 1 to Achilles and Priam seeing each other in Book 24, feeling an increasing tension close to that of tragedy as the plot develops. I do not wish to ignore the ongoing discussions on the unity of the *Iliad* and the stratification of the text,[21] however I consider it a legitimate method to study the Homeric text as it was transmitted through centuries, from a literary point of view.[22]

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18 On the link between θέατρον, the verb θεάομαι and the noun θαῦμα, see Chantraine 2009, 408–9, s. v. θέα "vue, spectacle, contemplation". Θέατρον does not actually appear in Greek before the Classical period (LSJ[9] referring to Hdt., Th., Lys.).

19 Slatkin 2007, 19–20, esp. 19: "[I] hope to suggest how the characters' lines of vision, in the various directions they take, may offer additional perspective on the *Iliad*'s stringent and subtle intimations of tragedy"; and 20: "An elaborated instance of this, decisive for the poem's plot, is Achilles' sighting – *enoēse* – of the wounded Machaon, which prompts him to send Patroclus to the ships of the Achaeans". See also Hesk 2013.

20 Clay 2011, 96–119.

21 See particularly West 2011 and the general problematics of Andersen and Haug 2012.

22 See, for instance, de Jong 2004.

It is well known that in the *Republic* Plato rejects the dialogue between Chryses and Agamemnon in the beginning of the *Iliad* because of its quality of *mimesis*, which might let the audience believe they are in the presence of Chryses and Agamemnon themselves rather than being in the presence of a narrator.[23]

However, I intend to show that *enargeia*, "the process of bringing the subject matter vividly before the eyes" (Webb 1997), does not rely on dialogue alone in the *Iliad*.[24] The Homeric narrator lets us *see* a spectacle, and especially war as a spectacle, through means other than dialogue, beginning with Achilles' *mēnis*, which the proem states is the very subject of the *epos*.[25] The whole of the *Iliad* depicts different conflict situations through the use of various devices. The war between Achaeans and Trojans is the backdrop to this theatre, but the internal conflict in the camp of the Achaeans between Achilles and Agamemnon is the actual departure point of the narrative.[26] I will follow the thread of the various scenes the narrator allows us to "see", referring to Purves 2010 and Allen-Hornblower 2016 to analyse the general notions of vision, watching, and the spectacular more accurately.

Achilles' Anger

The word *mēnis*, used in the proem, expresses an unusual kind of anger, with a sacred, religious aspect, linking it to Apollo's anger at verses 9–12. It might also call attention to the fact that Apollo and Achilles are ritual antagonists.[27] Let us note some visual details of the narrative. Achilles' anger is characterised by his gestures, his eyes, and the insults he hurls towards Agamemnon:

> Τὸν δ' ἄρ' ὑπόδρα ἰδὼν προσέφη πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς·
> ὤ μοι ἀναιδείην ἐπιειμένε κερδαλεόφρον (*Il.* 1.148–49)
> Then looking darkly at him Achilleus of the swift feet spoke
> O wrapped in shamelessness, with your mind always on profit.[28]

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23 Plat. *Rsp.* 392e–393b. On Plato and *Mimesis*, see Halliwell 2002 who analyses in depth the evolution of Plato on this question from Book 3 to 10 of the *Republic*.
24 On the concept of *enargeia* in Greek theoretical thought see mainly Webb 1997, 2009, Lévy and Pernot 1997, Dubel 1997, Plett 2012. On *enargeia* in Homer, see Clay 2011.
25 Homeric Greek distinguishes several kinds of anger; the ordinary one is referred to most often with the words χόλος and κότος, whereas the word μῆνις refers to a divine anger (see Muellner 1996). On anger among Greek expressions of emotions, see Cairns 2003, Most 2003, Konstan 2006. On anger and language, see Walsh 2005, with an analysis of χόλος and κότος.
26 Allan and Cairns 2011 show the importance of the clash of individual interests with those of the community.
27 See Nagy 1979, 289–95, and on the mirror-effect between Achilles and Apollo, Austin 1999.
28 All translations of the *Iliad* are taken from Lattimore 1951 except where specified.

οἰνοβαρές, κυνὸς ὄμματ᾽ ἔχων, κραδίην δ᾽ ἐλάφοιο (*Il.* 1.225)

You wine sack, with a dog's eyes, with a deer's heart.

δημοβόρος βασιλεὺς ἐπεὶ οὐτιδανοῖσιν ἀνάσσεις· (*Il.* 1.231)

King who feed on your people, since you rule nonentities.

ἕλκετο δ᾽ ἐκ κολεοῖο μέγα ξίφος, [...] (*Il.* 1.194)

and was drawing from its scabbard the great sword [...]

ἂψ δ᾽ ἐς κουλεὸν ὦσε μέγα ξίφος, [...] (*Il.* 1.220)

and thrust the great blade back into the scabbard [...]

As Erving Goffman defines it, referring to Georg Simmel's "ideal sphere", insulting somebody aims to destroy their *face*, which means both their self-confidence and the image presented by that self to other people.[29] I do not consider it an exaggeration to apply this concept to Achilles trying to verbally destroy Agamemnon's *honour*, which seems to be equivalent to the Homeric word αἰδώς. Despite the differences between the approaches of Goffman and Cairns, I think that the repetition of *honour* in the extract from Simmel's text that Goffman quotes is indicative of similarities.[30] In the short list of Achilles' insults in this passage, it may be noted how often the insulted person is assimilated to an animal.[31] Other passages likening a male warrior to a woman could lead one to conclude that the insults aim to diminish the human individual further down in an imaginary anthropological scale that ascends from animal at the bottom to male hero at the top. Language appears as a method of fighting, as the narrator says at *Il.* 1.304 and as Diomedes states at *Il.* 9.32–33.[32]

Furthermore, I suggest that insulting the adversary (be it the enemy or a rival from the same side) might, in Homeric battle, be part of a ritualistic sequence consisting of a challenge, an act of fighting, and a solemn proclamation of victory.[33] In the case of Achilles and Agamemnon, there will be no physical

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29 "[This] sphere cannot be penetrated, unless the personality value of the individual is thereby destroyed. A sphere of this sort is placed around man by his honor. Language poignantly designates an insult to one's honor as 'coming too close;' the radius of this sphere marks, as it were, the distance whose trespassing by another person insults one's honor." (Goffman 2005, 62–63).

30 On αἰδώς in Homer and thereafter, see Cairns 1993.

31 Here particularly dog and deer / fawn.

32 Both passages quoted by Barker 2009, 61–2. The quasi-formula of 1.304 μαχεσσαμένω ἐπέεσσιν is particularly striking. Diomedes' maxim invoking θέμις gives Barker his subtitle: "It's the custom to fight with words". On insults in Homer, see also Slatkin 1988.

33 Létoublon 1983, 1986. On the importance of insult rituals in general anthropology, see the frequency of the word *insult* in Philipsen & Carbaugh's bibliography (1986). On "fighting words" in Homer, see Walsh 2005, Hesk 2006 with reference to some parallel rituals in Anglo–Saxon and Old Norse, known as *flyting*.

fighting, but the defeat of the adversary achieved by words is just as impressive as the effect of ritualised fighting among the Achaean camp.

In verse 245, Achilles violently throws away the sceptre that he holds (ποτὶ δὲ σκῆπτρον βάλε γαίῃ). This is a strong contrast to his lengthy solemn oath in v. 232–39, in which the symbolic value of the sceptre implies that, although not expressly stated in the text, he must brandish it before taking an oath: the gesture of throwing it away holds even more power in the text on account of the fact that the verses do not mention his taking up and brandishing the sceptre.[34]

> ἀλλ᾽ ἔκ τοι ἐρέω καὶ ἐπὶ μέγαν ὅρκον ὀμοῦμαι·
> ναὶ μὰ τόδε σκῆπτρον, τὸ μὲν οὔ ποτε φύλλα καὶ ὄζους
> φύσει, ἐπεὶ δὴ πρῶτα τομὴν ἐν ὄρεσσι λέλοιπεν,
> οὐδ᾽ ἀναθηλήσει· περὶ γάρ ῥά ἑ χαλκὸς ἔλεψε
> φύλλά τε καὶ φλοιόν· νῦν αὖτέ μιν υἷες Ἀχαιῶν
> ἐν παλάμῃς φορέουσι δικασπόλοι, οἵ τε θέμιστας
> πρὸς Διὸς εἰρύαται· ὃ δέ τοι μέγας ἔσσεται ὅρκος. (Il. 1.233–39)

> But I will tell you this and swear a great oath upon it:
> in the name of this sceptre, which never again will bear leaf nor
> branch, now that it has left behind the cut stump in the mountains,
> nor shall it ever blossom again, since the bronze blade stripped
> back and leafage, and now at last the sons of the Achaians
> carry it in their hands in state when they administer
> the justice of Zeus. And this shall be a great oath before you.

This contrast strongly dramatises the narrative. The tension induces old Nestor to enter the *agon*, intervening with his famous "sweeter than honey" words (1.249).[35]

The narrator of the *Iliad* may be considered the first spectator of this "theatre": he *sees* a spectacle as enacted before the eyes of his mind, and he transposes it as narrative. It is difficult for us now, living in a time of literacy, to understand this visual aspect of the narrative since we usually read the *Iliad*, instead of hearing it as the original form required.[36]

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34 I am thinking of Alan Boegehold's title 1999: "When a gesture was expected". On the sceptre as a symbol of Zeus' *themis* and power, see Hammer 2008, 117–18, with references to previous bibliography.

35 Kirk 1985, 78–79. On Nestor's mediation in this passage, on its failure and on Athena's intervention, see Barker 2009, 47–50, esp. 48: "The fact that the *skeptron* – the symbol of the right to speak in public – lies on the ground, moreover, suggests that Nestor's intervention comes too late. Divine intervention has already moved the conflict on and beyond."

36 Létoublon 2014a (*EAGLL*), with bibliographical references.

It has often been remarked since Antiquity how artificial, sometimes even unbelievable, this spectacle appears, if juxtaposed with the chronology of the war;[37] for instance, the Catalogue of Ships in Book 2 would find its right place at the beginning of the war, but seems incongruous in the last year of the war, the chronological frame of the *Iliad*.[38] The same holds true for the episode of Book 3 called the *Teichoscopia*, where Helen *is seen* first through the critical eyes of Trojan old men, then depicted as describing for King Priam the main leaders of the Achaeans whom she herself sees at the bottom of the walls.[39] At the end of her speech, Helen expresses astonishment for not seeing her brothers Castor and Polydeuces. The absence of the Dioscouroi might be explained as a clumsy attempt to make this episode agree with the chosen moment of the war. Nevertheless, the Homeric *enargeia*, by holding the audience spellbound by the spectacle, often makes us forget this artificiality.

Even though Achilles' anger begins in Book 1, the audience must wait a long time before seeing him, the Best of the Achaeans, fighting. After his captive Briseis is taken away from him, Achilles stays in isolation, so that we see him still locked up in his loneliness during the visit of the embassy (Book 9). He will not take part in the fighting before Book 19. In this way, the first theatre of war in the West puts on stage a hero who is usually either absent or concealed from sight, a hero for whom the audience must wait for almost 18 books out of the 24. Achilles' anger provokes his absence from the scene, and thus generates frustration in the imaginary spectator whom the narrative creates.

For someone who is awaiting dramatic scenes of epic fighting, Books 2 and 3 of the *Iliad* appear very disappointing; in Book 2, we hear first of Agamemnon's torment and his misleading dream, then of an assembly of the Achaeans and the famous catalogue of Achaean ships, followed by a shorter catalogue of Achaean horses, which allows a brief remark on Achilles' sulking (763–79), and eventually the catalogue of the Trojans and their allies. In Book 3, the poet offers the audience a fight between Paris-Alexander and Menelaus. Although we are far from the violence which will afterwards rage in the *Iliad*, the theatrical effect is nevertheless very strong. The meeting of the two fighters on the battlefield consists first of a verbal exchange, which turns into a proposal for a pact.[40] Thereupon the gods draw Helen onto the walls and the *Teichoscopia*

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37 For the chronology of the *Iliad* compared to that of the myth of Trojan War, see Létoublon 2011.

38 See Kullmann 2012, with bibliographical references.

39 Kirk 1985, 286–301. See further Tsagalis 2003, who emphasises the process of seeing in the whole sequence.

40 Elmer 2012.

takes place (discussed above), which could perhaps be seen as a diversion from the combat. The link with the following sequence, the conclusion of the pact, intervenes at line 245. We then have a glance at a sacrifice with prayers. Individual action alternates with collective action, with the vivid juridico-religious vocabulary (3.245 φέρον ὅρκια πιστά, 252 ἵν᾽ ὅρκια πιστὰ τάμητε, 256 φιλότητα καὶ ὅρκια πιστὰ ταμόντες, 269 ὅρκια πιστὰ σύναγον, 286 τιμὴν δ᾽ … ἀποτινέμεν ἥν τιν᾽ ἔοικεν, 288–89 τιμήν … τίνειν, 290 εἵνεκα ποινῆς) insisting on faithfulness to the oaths and on the proper payment to be returned.

A collective prayer echoes Agamemnon's prayer, simultaneously uttered by both armies sitting in circle around their leaders.[41] This passage shows an exceptional moment of balance in the war, where the warriors delegate their destiny to their representatives, under the sacred guarantee of the gods. Collective speech, religiously sanctified by prayer and sacrifice, unites both camps, "building community" as Elmer's title excellently says. This is the moment where the poet of the *Iliad* shows most clearly the key political theme of the epic: the balance between enemies, symbolised by common prayer and sacrifice, cannot resolve the war situation, but, in a common and solemn decision, the issue is entrusted to single combat, provided that one warrior dies and the other is victorious.[42] However, this human solution established by human society cannot be a true solution since it does not please the gods. In a single verse, it is implied that Zeus is not pleased at this prayer,[43] but it is Aphrodite who will take Paris away from the battlefield. Book 3 shows a kind of contradiction between a balance in the human theatre of war, which is almost close to peace, and the invisible theatre of the gods, where war and the fall of Troy are the inescapable agenda. The feature that my present discussion is interested in is that of the warriors and their leaders, sitting around the fray like theatre spectators, observing the single combat between Paris and Menelaus. The narrative thus establishes a mediation by "real" spectators between the actual show and the imaginary spectators that we are.

In this way, in Book 3 the narrator seems to circumvent the spectacle of war, first by the solemn pact, then by Aphrodite seizing Paris away from the scene. Subsequently, however, we actually meet with many of the fighting scenes that we were expecting.[44] Though a superficial impression may be felt

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41 For a closer study of this prayer, see Létoublon 2011 b, 293–4 and bibliographical references.

42 Létoublon 1983, Wilson 2002, Elmer 2012.

43 *Il.* 3.302 Ὣς ἔφαν, οὐδ᾽ ἄρα πώ σφιν ἐπεκραίαινε Κρονίων.

44 King Priam's departure after the sacrifice has a symbolic resonance: he does not want to *see* his son fighting against Menelaus (3.306–7 … ἐπεὶ οὔ πω τλήσομ᾽ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὁρᾶσθαι | μαρνάμενον φίλον υἱόν …).

by some members of the audience, dullness is avoided by alternation between contest and scramble on one side, and the great number of deaths[45] and *aristeia* scenes on the other, combined in typical scenes.[46] In this way, some purple passages, consisting in *aristeiai* and single combats, stand out against the general backcloth of isolated fighting.[47] These clashes imply a very large number of deaths, and generally the narrator, far from leaving the dead in anonymity, gives their identity (name and patronym), sometimes even providing a short biography. In the case of Simoeisios, Anthemion's son (*Il.* 5.478–489), one could almost speak of a funeral elegy.[48] Although there are some inconsistencies,[49] the catalogues of deaths involve a larger number of individuals than modern human memory can easily master, indicating that oral memory had mastered specific methods of memorising, nowadays forgotten.[50]

The conquest of the Gate and the space of the fighting

It is important to note that, in the war episodes that occupy Books 5 to 15, apart from the Embassy in Book 9 and the spy mission called the *Doloneia* in Book 10,[51] the battlefront moves quickly from the Trojan plain to the inner lines of the Achaean camp at the wall they had built, to the point that the Achaean ships are endangered, threatening their ability to return home. This movement seems to me to be symbolic of the dramatisation of the terrain, just as happens in modern games, for instance in football, when one team is playing primarily on the opponent's half of the field, it is very likely to win. In our case, the Trojans are about to penetrate the opposing camp. The conquest of their gate then takes on huge strategic importance, which the narrative emphasises in this passage, chosen because of its visual interest, especially in both similes,

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45 Variety in this kind of death scene is brought about in particular by the different types of wounds (see Friedrich 2005 with the appendix by Saunders).
46 See Arend 1933, Fenik 1968, Létoublon 1983 and 2003.
47 Diomedes in Book 5 and 6, Hector in Book 11, Idomeneus in Book 13, Sarpedon and Patroclus in Book 16.
48 Létoublon 1999b, 2003.
49 Wilson 2000.
50 Yates 1966, Carruthers 1990, Clay 2011.
51 The *Doloneia* occurs in the night, which is of course a highly *visual* element. See Dué and Ebbott 2010, Danek 2012, Bierl 2012, Hesk 2013.

although good commentators sometimes leave it aside, for example Hainsworth:[52]

> [...] οἳ δ᾽ οὔασι πάντες ἄκουον,
> ἴθυσαν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τεῖχος ἀολλέες· οἳ μὲν ἔπειτα
> κροσσάων ἐπέβαινον ἀκαχμένα δούρατ᾽ ἔχοντες,
> Ἕκτωρ δ᾽ ἁρπάξας λᾶαν φέρεν, ὅς ῥα πυλάων
> ἑστήκει πρόσθε πρυμνὸς παχύς, αὐτὰρ ὕπερθεν
> ὀξὺς ἔην· τὸν δ᾽ οὔ κε δύ᾽ ἀνέρε δήμου ἀρίστω
> ῥηϊδίως ἐπ᾽ ἄμαξαν ἀπ᾽ οὔδεος ὀχλίσσειαν,
> οἷοι νῦν βροτοί εἰσ᾽· ὃ δέ μιν ῥέα πάλλε καὶ οἶος. [...]
> ὣς Ἕκτωρ ἰθὺς σανίδων φέρε λᾶαν ἀείρας,
> αἵ ῥα πύλας εἴρυντο πύκα στιβαρῶς ἀραρυίας
> δικλίδας ὑψηλάς· [...]
> ῥῆξε δ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρους θαιρούς· πέσε δὲ λίθος εἴσω
> βριθοσύνῃ, μέγα δ᾽ ἀμφὶ πύλαι μύκον, οὐδ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ὀχῆες
> ἐσχεθέτην, σανίδες δὲ διέτμαγεν ἄλλυδις ἄλλη
> λᾶος ὑπὸ ῥιπῆς· ὃ δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἔσθορε φαίδιμος Ἕκτωρ
> νυκτὶ θοῇ ἀτάλαντος ὑπώπια· λάμπε δὲ χαλκῷ
> σμερδαλέῳ, τὸν ἕεστο περὶ χροΐ, δοιὰ δὲ χερσὶ
> δοῦρ᾽ ἔχεν· οὔ κέν τίς μιν ἐρύκακεν ἀντιβολήσας
> νόσφι θεῶν ὅτ᾽ ἐσᾶλτο πύλας· πυρὶ δ᾽ ὄσσε δεδήει. (*Il.*12.443–66)

> [...] and they all gave ear to him
> and steered against the wall in a pack, and at once gripping
> still their edged spears caught and swarmed up the wall's projections.
> Meanwhile Hektor snatched up a stone and stood before the gates
> and carried it along; it was blunt-massed at the base, but the upper
> end was sharp; two men, the best in all a community,
> could not easily hoist it up from the ground to a wagon,
> of men such as men as now, but he alone lifted and shook it. [...]
> So Hektor lifting the stone carried it straight for the door leaves
> which filled the gateway ponderously close-fitted together.
> These were high and twofold [...]
> [...] and smashed the hinges at either side, and the stone crashed
> ponderously in, and the gates groaned deep, and door-bars
> could not hold, but the leaves were smashed to a wreckage of spliners
> under the stone's impact. The glorious Hektor burst in
> with dark face like sudden night, but he shone with the ghastly
> glitter of bronze that girded his skin, and carried two spears
> in his hands. No one could have stood up against him, and stopped him,
> except the gods, when he burst in the gates; and his eyes flashed fire.

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52 On this passage, I disagree with Hainsworth (1993, 363) who thinks that "the thread of the narrative is not easily followed".

The role of Homeric similes in this passage is striking: far from moving the narrative away from us, they play a large part in its dramatisation. While the first simile emphasises the weight of the huge stone Hector lifts without trouble, since for him it is as light as a fleece,[53] the next simile assimilates Hector to the speed of night (νυκτὶ θοῇ ἀτάλαντος ὑπώπια· λάμπε δὲ χαλκῷ), showing him in a *chiaroscuro à la* Rembrandt which also seems very spectacular. The similes strongly contribute to making us spectators of this conquest of the Achaean camp by the best of the Trojans.

Figuring the spectators

"Real" Spectators

The narrator sometimes visually notes the interest of the audience in the spectacle through the eyes of "real" spectators,[54] as we have seen above in Book 3. I quote a passage from Book 7 where Athena and Apollo are depicted as spectators in the appearance of birds observing the fight from a high oak tree:[55]

> κὰδ δ' ἄρ' Ἀθηναίη τε καὶ ἀργυρότοξος Ἀπόλλων
> ἑζέσθην ὄρνισιν ἐοικότες αἰγυπιοῖσι
> φηγῷ ἐφ' ὑψηλῇ πατρὸς Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο
> ἀνδράσι τερπόμενοι· (*Il.* 7.58–62)

> and Athene and the lord of the silver bow, Apollo,
> assuming the likenesses of birds, of vultures, settled
> aloft the great oak tree of their father, Zeus of the aegis,
> taking their ease [and watching] these men

They are not just any kind of birds, but birds of prey (αἰγυπιοί) who rejoice (τερπόμενοι) seeing men fighting. I note that Athena and Apollo are not usually on the same side in the war, but, exceptionally, they sit together here for the same pleasant spectacle.[56] Of course, the Games organised by Achilles in hon-

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53 On the extended simile comparing the huge stone to a light fleece, see Scott 1974, 49 and 112.

54 On spectators in the *Iliad*, see particularly Purves 2010, Myers 2011, 59–90 "Epic Experienced as Spectacle", Lovatt 2013, Allen-Hornblower 2016.

55 "Presumably that [oak tree] of 22," says Kirk (1990, 239), who asks whether the gods are compared to vultures or have taken their form. He does not remark that Athene and Apollo do not appear friendly sitting together elsewhere in the *Iliad*, since they support enemy camps. On Apollo and Athena as an "internal audience" in this passage, see Myers 2011, 95.

56 Johansson 2012, 83–88 and 246.

our of Patroclus in Book 23 are a lengthy example of real spectators put on stage.

Imaginary Spectators

The poet sometimes creates imaginary spectators by using such linguistic features addressing them in the second person and using the optative mood with the particle κε:

> φαίης κ' ἀκμῆτας καὶ ἀτειρέας ἀλλήλοισιν
> ἄντεσθ' ἐν πολέμῳ, ὡς ἐσσυμένως ἐμάχοντο. (*Il.* 15.697–98)

> You would say that they faced each other unbruised, unwearied
> in the fighting, from the speed in which they went for each other.

As Jenny S. Clay (2011, 25) points out, [Longinus] comments on this passage, stating that this linguistic use fuels the imagination of the audience and their implication in the spectacle.[57] She also notes that "most often the spectator's powers of careful observation, especially vision, are emphasized", quoting *Il.* 16.638–40 and 4.539–44 and concluding, "indeed, like Athena here, the poet leads his hearers safely by the hand. Thus the passage reveals the intimate link between Muse, poet, and audience." A similar effect is found at *Il.* 13.343–44 (μάλα κεν θρασυκάρδιος εἴη | ὃς τότε γηθήσειεν ἰδὼν πόνον οὐδ' ἀκάχοιτο). Long before narratology dealt with Homer, Leaf's commentary created the term *imaginary spectator* for this situation.[58]

Zeus' Scales

Zeus' scales, mentioned in two passages of the *Iliad*, may also symbolise the dramatisation of a spectacle. In a passage from Book 8, which is less known than the weighing of Hector's fate in Book 22, the formula of the scale pan leaning on one side (ῥέπε δ' αἴσιμον ἦμαρ ...) shows who is the loser:[59]

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57 [Longinus] 26.1, see Clay 2011, 24: "[...] the direct address 'makes the hearer seem to find himself in the middle of dangers' (ἐν μέσσοις τοῖς κινδύνοις ποιοῦσα τὸν ἀκροατὴν δοκεῖν στρέφεσθαι)".
58 Allen-Hornblower 2016, 23.
59 On the golden scales of Zeus, Kirk 1990, 303–4, Dietrich 1964.

καὶ τότε δὴ χρύσεια πατὴρ ἐτίταινε τάλαντα·
ἐν δ' ἐτίθει δύο κῆρε τανηλεγέος θανάτοιο
Τρώων θ' ἱπποδάμων καὶ Ἀχαιῶν χαλκοχιτώνων,
ἕλκε δὲ μέσσα λαβών· ῥέπε δ' αἴσιμον ἦμαρ Ἀχαιῶν. (*Il.* 8.69–72)

Then the father balanced his golden scales, and in them
he set two fateful portion of death, which lays men prostrate,
for Trojans, breakers of horses, and bronze-armoured Achaians,
and balanced it by the middle. The Achaians' death-day was heaviest.

The spectacular aspect of the passage lies in the dynamics of the scale pan expressed by the verb ῥέπε, which is clearly adapted from the same parallel formula used for Hector's fate at *Il.* 22.212:

ἕλκε δὲ μέσσα λαβών· ῥέπε δ' Ἕκτορος αἴσιμον ἦμαρ.

and balanced it by the middle; and Hektor's death-day was heavier.

Without entering into a technical linguistic analysis, I underline the use of the imperfect here, for ἕλκε as well as ῥέπε, in both passages: Zeus' movement and the scale's leaning are described in terms of duration rather than as sudden moves (as they would be if expressed by aorists).[60]

The Poet Addressing the Character

The poet sometimes uses the second person to directly address his character. This disruption in the usual pragmatic conventions of a neutral narrative which refers to the characters in the third person[61] is particularly striking in Book 16: introducing a list of his recent exploits, the address to Patroclus occurs when this character is about to be fatally injured:[62]

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60 The fact that the object does not exist except in our imagination, as is the case for many other mythological objects, does not impel the imagination to play with it.

61 See the articles republished together under the general title "L'homme dans la langue" ("Man in language") in Benveniste 1966, 225–257.

62 This device was studied specifically by Yamagata 1989 and by Allen-Hornblower (2012, 3), who recalls the discussion on the point of a purely metrical value defended by Milman Parry, as opposed to the emotional value defended by his son, Adam Parry. The subset of the three apostrophes included with speech formulas (16.20, 16.744 and 16.843), and their comparison with the apostrophes addressed to Menelaus are especially interesting. Allen-Hornblower 2016 develops her earlier study further by trying to show that Achilles is the hidden character who addresses Patroclus. De Jong 2009 links those apostrophes to the figure called *metalepsis*. See also the accurate studies by Dubel 2011, Peigney 2011 and Perceau 2011 in the wake of a collective study of the poet's voice.

Ἔνθα τίνα πρῶτον τίνα δ' ὕστατον ἐξενάριξας
Πατρόκλεις, ὅτε δή σε θεοὶ θάνατον δὲ κάλεσσαν; (*Il.* 16.692–94)

Then who was it you slaughtered first, who was the last one
Patroklos, as the gods called you to your death?

In a recent paper, Emily Allen–Hornblower (2012, 3) demonstrates that the series of addresses to Patroclus by the poet corresponds to "new heights in his destructive *aristeia* that seem at first glance to be incongruous, even at odds with the blatantly pathetic contexts in which the others occur. [...] This apostrophe marks a juncture at which a significant step is taken by Patroclus away from the boundaries set by Achilles, and closer to his doom. Each new apostrophe contributes to generate a sense of apprehension in the audience and to gradually build up the tension underlying the entire episode of Patroclus' glory on the battlefield that will culminate in his death."

The third and last apostrophe to Patroclus introduces his final words and leaves us with the tragic image of the vanquished dying hero and the triumphant victor, whose death we also know is imminent:

ὥς πού σε προσέφη, σοὶ δὲ φρένας ἄφρονι πεῖθε.
Τὸν δ' ὀλιγοδρανέων προσέφης Πατρόκλεες ἱππεῦ· (*Il.* 16.842–43)

In some such
manner he spoke to you, and persuaded the fool's heart in you.
And now, dying, you answered him, o rider Patroklos.

Note that the use of the second person verb προσέφης, remarked upon by Allen-Hornblower, is indicated by the accusative pronoun σε, σοὶ, in the former verse, emphasising the tragic face-to-face dialogue.[63] In those passages, the poet's audience is strikingly confronted with the character who is addressed in the second person, which is a powerful device for dramatising the narrative. Once again, this device is not visual, strictly speaking, but it strongly contributes to retaining the interest of the audience. It could perhaps be compared to the film device through which a character detaches himself from the screen to enter a place as part of the audience.[64]

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63 The same formula occurs for Patroclus' and Hector's death, but never anywhere else: ψυχὴ δ' ἐκ ῥεθέων πταμένη Ἄϊδος δὲ βεβήκει | ὃν πότμον γοόωσα λιποῦσ' ἀνδροτῆτα καὶ ἥβην (*Il.* 16.856–57 = 22.362–63); cf. Létoublon 2001.
64 See, for instance, *The Purple Rose of Cairo* by Woody Allen (1985). The comparison is explicitly developed in de Jong 2009.

Duel and challenge

The large-scale composition of the *Iliad* [65] necessitates that the major heroes be kept away from death in preparation for the major clashes in the last part. The single combats do not always lead to an actual victory with a dead or dying enemy until the combat between Hector and Patroclus in Book 16. The death of Patroclus is followed by those of several Trojans, which Achilles kills in revenge, and eventually by the great duel between Achilles and Hector in Book 22, the tragic node of the *Iliad*, as we shall see later. The dramatisation of these individual combats is characterised by several speeches, often very long, which seem unrealistic in the situation. However, these are typical scenes with common features. These typical scenes generally entail a genealogical report,[66] which aims to justify a pretention to victory, and a challenge sometimes combined with insults. Certain challenges are not expressed through direct discourse, but through indirect discourse, using the verb *prokalizeto*, *prokalissato*. In both cases, as I have shown elsewhere, this is a verbal ritual, through which the fighters aim to ensure their supremacy.[67] The combat will thereafter prove the masculine values indicated in the oral challenge, and the narrative shows this succession of events and speeches as a dramatised spectacle:

> Αἰνείας δ' ἀπόρουσε σὺν ἀσπίδι δουρί τε μακρῷ
> δείσας μή πώς οἱ ἐρυσαίατο νεκρὸν Ἀχαιοί.
> ἀμφὶ δ' ἄρ' αὐτῷ βαῖνε λέων ὣς ἀλκὶ πεποιθώς,
> πρόσθε δέ οἱ δόρυ τ' ἔσχε καὶ ἀσπίδα πάντοσ' ἐΐσην,
> τὸν κτάμεναι μεμαὼς ὅς τις τοῦ γ' ἀντίος ἔλθοι
> σμερδαλέα ἰάχων· ὃ δὲ χερμάδιον λάβε χειρὶ
> Τυδεΐδης μέγα ἔργον ὃ οὐ δύο γ' ἄνδρε φέροιεν,
> οἷοι νῦν βροτοί εἰσ'· ὃ δέ μιν ῥέα πάλλε καὶ οἶος.
> τῷ βάλεν Αἰνείαο κατ' ἰσχίον ἔνθά τε μηρὸς
> ἰσχίῳ ἐνστρέφεται, κοτύλην δέ τέ μιν καλέουσι·
> θλάσσε δέ οἱ κοτύλην, πρὸς δ' ἄμφω ῥῆξε τένοντε. (*Il.* 5.297–307)

> But Aineias sprang to the ground with shield and with long spear,
> for fear that somehow the Achaians might haul off the body,
> and like a lion in the pride of his strength stood over him
> holding before him the perfect circle of his shield and the spear
> and raging to cut down any man who might come to face him,
> crying a terrible cry. But Tydeus' son in his hand caught

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65 Sheppard 1922, Reinhardt 1961, Taplin 1992, Stanley 1993, Létoublon 2001.
66 The longest genealogical report is given by Aeneas in combat with Achilles (*Iliad* 20.213–241).
67 See Létoublon 1983. Cf. Camerotto 2010.

up a stone, a huge thing which no two men could carry
such as men are now, but by himself he lightly hefted it.
He threw, and caught AIneias in the hip, in the place where the hip-bone
turns inside the thigh, the place men call the cup-socket.
It smashed the cup-socket and broke the tendons both sides of it.

Note in this episode of the fight between Aeneas and Diomedes several visual details: the movements (ἀπόρουσε, βαῖνε etc.), the specific details of Aeneas' arms, shield and spear (σὺν ἀσπίδι δουρί τε μακρῷ), the lion simile of 298–301, and the noisy manifestations of anger (σμερδαλέα ἰάχων). The brutal rhythmic interruption at *Il.* 5.301 may express the spectators' (and Aeneas') surprise at seeing Diomedes' gesture of taking a huge stone and throwing it against his adversary. Although Kirk, after others, points out several similarities to Book 17,[68] this passage can also be considered original on account of the weapon used by Diomedes, the wound it inflicts,[69] and the interest that the anatomical word κοτύλη invites.

Let us also notice some visual details of the single fight between Ajax and Hector in Book 7. After the description of Ajax's extraordinary shield made by Tychios (220–23) and the usual exchange of speeches (225–43), we eventually watch the fight itself (244–72):[70] Hector throws his spear and pierces six of Ajax's seven shield layers[71] without wounding him. Ajax then throws his spear, which only brushes Hector's shield and breastplate since he has bent aside to avoid a mortal blow. Each of them recovers his spear and runs against the other. Using a simile, the narrative depicts them as two lions or two boars. Hector's spear touches Ajax's shield, but its bronze peak twists, so Ajax uses his own spear to touch Hector's *aspis* and wound him at the neck. Hector steps backwards, picks up a stone and throws it against Ajax's *sakos*. Ajax throws a still larger stone, which causes Hector to tumble. Apollo lifts him up, and the heralds Talthybios and Idaios come to interrupt the fight because night is falling; this seems to be a way of proclaiming that they are fighters of equal value, instead of one combatant making the usual victorious discourse already mentioned.[72]

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68 Kirk 1990, 91.

69 The formula ἀμφὶ δὲ ὄσσε κελαινὴ νὺξ ἐκάλυψε at line 310 implies that death is imminent for Aeneas, but the fatal outcome is prevented by his mother, the goddess Aphrodite, who takes him away from the location of the combat.

70 However, the narrative does not allow us to see whether Hector is fighting from a chariot or on foot (Kirk 1990, 267–68).

71 Here we understand the usefulness of the former shield description.

72 See however Kirk 1990, 271: "The surprise is the greater since Ajax is apparently winning, having suffered no real damage from his opponent".

Achilles' spear as a character

The terms of our theme "theatre of war" suggest that individual characters stand out, be they heroes or not, depicted as such on an ongoing basis or not. In the last part of the *Iliad* however, in addition to the strongly dramatised presence of the heroes, a remarkable object intervenes with the status of a quasi-character: Achilles' spear, called by the common name ἔγχος (*egkhos*) but also several times by the derived adjective *Pēlias*, which then becomes a kind of proper name through the fact that it is used only for this object.[73] In the four verses about Patroclus (who does not take the spear) in Book 16, and again in Book 19 when Achilles does take it, I note a word play on the stem *pel-*. This may be interpreted as an allusion to the name of Peleus, Achilles' father, who etymologically could be "the man of mood",[74] which could refer in myth to the first human being.[75] In a paper published for a conference on "Arms in Antiquity" I tried to follow the route taken by this spear,[76] showing its supernatural, if not magical, nature and its individualised status. In this way, Achilles and his spear form a terrifying pair, which may explain why the end of the *Iliad* does not require dragons and monsters, such as Apollonius of Rhodes uses in the *Argonautica*, to draw a kind of fascination over the audience.

In *Iliad* 21, Achilles' spear plays a dramatic role in Lycaon's episode, remaining thrust into the ground and "eager to satiate with human flesh", an astonishingly anthropomorphic expression.[77] Several words appear here as *hapaxes* or near *hapaxes* in Homer: the present infinitive ἄμεναι occurs only in this passage, the adjective ἀνδρομέος four times in the *Iliad*, twice in the *Odyssey*, and the association χροὸς … ἀνδρομέοιο in these lines also occurs only once elsewhere (χροὸς ἀνδρομέοιο *Il.* 17.571). If this phrase is a formula meaning "human flesh", let us remark that it never occurs elsewhere with a verb meaning "to eat," even

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73 Wathelet 1969, Létoublon 2007, 224. For a proper name applied to a weapon, recall several well-known cases in the mythological tradition (Gungnir, Excalibur, Durandal, *etc.*)

74 *Il.* 19.387–91 ἐκ δ' ἄρα σύριγγος πατρώϊον ἐσπάσατ' ἔγχος | βριθὺ μέγα στιβαρόν· τὸ μὲν οὐ δύνατ' ἄλλος Ἀχαιῶν |πάλλειν, ἀλλὰ μιν οἶος ἐπίστατο πῆλαι Ἀχιλλεύς· | Πηλιάδα μελίην, τὴν πατρὶ φίλῳ πόρε Χείρων |Πηλίου ἐκ κορυφῆς φόνον ἔμμεναι ἡρώεσσιν· (the same set of four verses occurs in Book 16 in Patroclus' arming-scene, but with a negative verb: 16.140 ἔγχος δ' οὐχ ἕλετ' οἶον ἀμύμονος Αἰακίδαο (thereafter, lines 141–44 are word-for-word identical to 19.388–91).

75 In the *Bible* and in the *Koran*, God creates man out of clay. See Canteins 1986.

76 Létoublon 2007.

77 *Il.* 21.69–70 …. ἐγχείη δ' ἄρ' ὑπὲρ νώτου ἐνὶ γαίῃ | ἔστη ἱεμένη χροὸς ἄμεναι ἀνδρομέοιο. Compare to 21.167–68 … Ἡ δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ | γαίῃ ἐνεστήρικτο λιλαιομένη χροὸς ἆσαι (where Asteropaios' spear is eager for flesh, in his fight against Achilleus).

less with this rare verb ἄμεναι, ἆσαι (respectively, present and aorist infinitive), meaning more or less "to eat one's fill of something", which is much stronger than the usual verbs for eating.[78] From this analysis, it appears that the words used for the spear appear as quasi-formulas.[79]

The Chariot race

After the climax of Hector's death in Book 22, one might be surprised to meet in Book 23 a new kind of spectacle, described with great meticulousness: that of the Games offered by Achilles in honour of Patroclus after the relatively short narration of his funeral.[80] The important point is, once again, that this episode deals with the verbal representation of a dramatised spectacle, with a sequence of various events intended to fascinate the audience, especially in the case of the chariot race (*Il.* 23.352–523). This includes the accident Apollo causes to befall Diomedes, the compensation granted by Athena, the loss of a chariot wheel by Eumelos and his fall, and, in particular, the treachery that allows Antilochos to get ahead of Menelaus by causing Menelaus' chariot to suffer a collision at a very critical turning post. Once more, "real" spectators play the role of mediators between narrative and the audience:

> Ἀργεῖοι δ' ἐν ἀγῶνι καθήμενοι εἰσορόωντο
> ἵππους· τοὶ δὲ πέτοντο κονίοντες πεδίοιο. (*Il.* 23.448–49)
>
> Now the Argives who sat in their assembly were watching
> the horses, and the horses flew through the dust of the flat land.

Though such changes of tone in the epics may be surprising for our modern minds, they perhaps correspond to a principle of alternation; if we take a unitarian stance on the *Iliad*, a kind of release of tension is now offered, for the characters as well as the audience, before the gravity of Book 24.

Hector's Lusis

To evoke the climactic feeling of the last book of the *Iliad*, I shall speak of a *dénouement* as if we were in a tragedy; the Greek word *lusis* used by Aristotle acquires a literal meaning in the *Iliad* (i.e. "release, freeing") when the Trojan

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78 Chantraine 2009, 116–17 (s. v. ἆσαι) and *CEG*, 1274. See also Létoublon 2015.
79 See also Létoublon 2014b.
80 On the Chariot Race, see Clay 2007, and for a more general account on Greek athletics, Kyle 2007. On this episode of the race as a spectacle, see Myers 2011, 138–141.

king comes to Achilles' hut for the purpose of ransoming his son's corpse. The same word has already occurred in Book 1, when the priest Chryses asks for the release of his daughter Chryseis. When Aristotle chose this word to denote the solution of the crisis at the end of tragedy, opposing it to *desis*, "tie, knot", he may well have had the conclusion of the *Iliad* in mind.[81] This implies that the *Iliad* is constructed as a large-scale tragedy, and that tragic theatre imitated this construction for aesthetic reasons.

Dramatic authors are compelled to show characters doing things and uttering words before a more-or-less realistic decor, whereas the Homeric *aoidos* puts on stage not only diverse settings, from the Achaean camp to the city of Troy with the plain in between, but also the space of the gods, Mount Olympus and sometimes Mount Ida. The poet lets us see invisible and even impossible things such as Achilles' shield, the work of the artist god Hephaistos.[82] Homer also suggests that after Achilles has lent his arms and horses to his friend, the Trojans believe it is Achilles himself who has come back to fight. Further, when Hector is wearing the arms he had removed from Patroclus' corpse, the suggested dramatic effect is that Achilles, with his new arms, faces an image of himself: the spectacle of another wearing his own arms increases his fury.[83] This is the first instance of the mirror we will meet again in the last part of our study.

Seeing each other in a mirror

An exceptional simile in Book 24 lets the audience see how the elderly Priam is viewed by Achilles,[84] who is struck by a mix of admiration and stupor (θάμβος):[85]

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81 Halliwell 1998, 2002.

82 Vergil will say more explicitly that such a shield made by a god is impossible to describe, *inenarrabile dictu*; cf. Létoublon 1999a. See also Purves 2010, 46–55 on Achilles' shield in the perspective of the *Eusynoptic Iliad*.

83 Whitman 1965, 200–2 (Patroclus plays Achilles' role, whereas Hector, wearing the same armour, does not).

84 This simile was studied by Fränkel 1921, 95–96, who probably did not find it very interesting and put it aside as a later addition ("Zu den seltsamen, und wie der Inhalt des Gedichts von allem Gewöhnlichen abweichenden Gleichnisse, die für die jüngere Epik bezeichnend sind, gehört auch das von Ω 480. Das plötzliche Auftreten des Priamos im Unterstands Achills wirkt auf die behaglich an abgegessener Tafel Sitzenden ganz gewaltig – Achilleus staunt, es staunen auch die anderen: so ist es, wenn ein rätselhafter Fremder in eines reichen Mannes Haus erscheint, ein Fremder den ἄτη πυκινὴ ergrifft. Was heisst das?"). Then, to answer the question of ἄτη, Fränkel recurs to another passage (16.805) without further explanation.

85 On θάμβος, linked to the aorist participle ταφών and the perfect τέθηπα, see Chantraine 2009, 405–6. –μβ– seems to have an "expressive" origin (cf. θρόμβος, στρόμβος). With these

τοὺς δ' ἔλαθ' εἰσελθὼν Πρίαμος μέγας, ἄγχι δ' ἄρα στὰς
χερσὶν Ἀχιλλῆος λάβε γούνατα καὶ κύσε χεῖρας
δεινὰς ἀνδροφόνους, αἵ οἱ πολέας κτάνον υἷας.
ὡς δ' ὅτ' ἂν ἄνδρ' ἄτη πυκινὴ λάβῃ, ὅς τ' ἐνὶ πάτρῃ
φῶτα κατακτείνας ἄλλων ἐξίκετο δῆμον
ἀνδρὸς ἐς ἀφνειοῦ, θάμβος δ' ἔχει εἰσορόωντας,
ὣς Ἀχιλεὺς θάμβησεν ἰδὼν Πρίαμον θεοειδέα·
θάμβησαν δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι, ἐς ἀλλήλους δὲ ἴδοντο. (*Il.* 24.477–84)

<div align="center">Tall Priam</div>

came in unseen by the other men and stood close beside him
and caught the knees of Achilles in his arms, and kissed the hands
that were dangerous and manslaughtering and had killed so many
of his sons. As when dense disaster closes on one who has murdered
a man of his own land, and he comes to the country of others,
to a man of substance, and wonder seizes on those who behold him,
so Achilleus wondered as he looked on Priam, a godlike
man, and the rest of them wondered also, and looked at each other.

Let us use Fränkel's method of simile analysis, remarking that the notion of θάμβος appears to be central to the simile; first met at line 480 in the image of the "fugitive homicide" (using Heiden's terms),[86] it is found again, twice, in the following verses (θάμβησεν, 481; θάμβησαν 482) concerning the real world. The very strong emotion of θάμβος is thus the element that links the image to reality. In addition, forms of the verb of seeing also connect the image and the real world, although in a less visible way because of the suppletive verbal system of Greek (εἰσορόωντας 481 / ἰδὼν 482, ἴδοντο 483).

After this formal remark, I will depend on Heiden's (1998) brilliant and deep synthesis of the different treatments of this simile,[87] an analysis explicating the simile's different aspects as "analogy, foiling, and allusion". He critiques certain former scholars who see "dissimilarity as a functional element

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expressive sounds, the aspirated consonant and the group –μβ–, it is remarkable that the word occurs three times in three successive verses, each time linked to the idea of seeing: θάμβος ... εἰσορόωντας, θάμβησεν ἰδών, θάμβησαν ... ἴδοντο.

86 Heiden 1998 has seen the significance of Fränkel's analysis but complains that he did not apply it consistently: "Fränkel perceived that an interplay of polar (absolute or extreme) opposites is a basic constituent of early Greek (especially archaic) thought and feeling ... as a consequence thought constantly operated with contrasting foils. But he scarcely applied this insight to Homeric similes, despite his extensive study of them." See also the "Despised Migrant" in Alden 2012.

87 See his note 1 and his rich bibliography. I call attention specifically to the beginning of Richardson's comment (1993, 323): "This must be the most dramatic moment of the *Iliad*, and its character is marked by a simile which is extremely individual".

of the simile", stating that "they do not explore the effects, or potential effects, of an emotional intensification achieved through the particular contrast presented by this simile alone".[88] A first analogy between Priam and the fugitive "could suggest that Priam's relative innocence makes him equally deserving of the sanctuary that a murderer might expect to receive, or even more so".[89] But there is also an implicit "analogy between the fugitive murderer and the 'murderous hands of Achilles'" (*ibid.*): "Here the abjection of a person who has killed only one man, and that in error (ἄτη πυκινὴ, 480), serves as a foil for the power and pride of Achilles" (*ibid.*). Heiden then mentions the role of allusion to "heroic mythology" in two aspects. First, there is a reference to Peleus as a kindly host of exiles,[90] since Priam portrays himself in the image of Achilles' father, and reminds Achilles of the instructions Peleus gave Achilles at his departure. Secondly, Peleus was also known in mythology as a murderer himself.[91] Although this story is not told in Homer, Heiden is right to remark that the simile in the Homeric text may allude to this mythological episode and to other murders attributed to Peleus in [Apollodorus'] narrative.[92] Furthermore, Heiden refers to Stanley's proposal that the simile "be viewed in the context of Priam's symbolic *katabasis*",[93] which seems to me less important than the analogies, foils and allusions mentioned above.

Among the characters on stage when Priam enters Achilles' dwelling, the murderer is, of course, Achilles, not the weak old man who suddenly appears before him. However, in the simile it is Priam who is seen (482) as a murderer, so that the real scene strongly contrasts with the imaginary one.[94] How could it be said in a more concise manner than this that Achilles sees himself in a mirror? That this is a fantastical vision, which Laura Slatkin calls "Tragic Visualization"? Let us however note that other persons around Achilles apparently see the same vision, since they feel the same stupor (θάμβησαν δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι). This mirroring effect is perhaps the origin of the passage's "sublimi-

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88 Heiden 1998, 2.

89 Heiden 1998, 4.

90 In the *Iliad* for Phoinix, Epeigeus and Patroclus, the latter two being homicides.

91 Heiden 1998, 5–6 with bibliographical references; the lost epic *Alkmaionis* told how Peleus and his brother Telamon killed their half-brother Phocos and were sent into exile by their father Aiakos.

92 Heiden 1998, 6, with reference to Slatkin 1991 for the notion of allusion.

93 Heiden 1998, 7.

94 As Heiden also notes, this contrast recalls the similes studied by Porter 1972, with more complexity.

ty":[95] Priam sees Achilles both as a murderer and as an image of himself, a poor old man grieving for his son and seeking assistance, and Achilles views Priam both as a fugitive homicide and as an image of himself in reference to his own father.[96] The density of the simile and its multiple meanings, as Heiden remarks,[97] are made possible only through a detour by way of a multi-layered image. A somewhat similar effect is found in the pursuit and flight simile of *Iliad* 22, which unwinds in two successive stages, first as an animal comparison showing a fawn flying before a dog (*Il.* 22.189–93), then as a nightmare where the flyer cannot escape the pursuer, but nor can the latter reach the former (*Il.* 22.199–201):[98]

> ὡς δ' ἐν ὀνείρῳ οὐ δύναται φεύγοντα διώκειν·
> οὔτ' ἄρ' ὃ τὸν δύναται ὑποφεύγειν οὔθ' ὃ διώκειν·
> ὣς ὃ τὸν οὐ δύνατο μάρψαι ποσίν, οὐδ' ὃς ἀλύξαι. (*Il.* 22.199–201)

> As in a dream a man is not able to follow one who runs
> from him, nor can the runner escape, nor the other pursue him,
> so he could not run him down in his speed, nor the other get clear.

Both similes seek to describe complex psychological phenomena. The comparison of the flight arises from Hector being unable to distance himself from Achilles, but at the same time it also shows that Achilles is likewise not able

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95 [Longinus] quotes another Homeric simile, describing a tempest, rather than this one: "And far as a man with his eyes through the sea-line haze may discern, | on a cliff as he sits and gazes away over the wine-dark deep, | so far at a bound do the loud-neighing steeds of the Deathless leap." (*Iliad* 5. 770, trans. A. S. Way [adapted]). [Longinus] comments on the quality of a spectacle seen only in the imagination: "He makes the vastness of the world the measure of their leap. The sublimity is so overpowering as naturally to prompt the exclamation that if the divine steeds were to leap thus twice in succession they would pass beyond the confines of the world". See the thematic markers of the sublime in Porter 2016, 51–54, and the great ocean, *ibid.*, 360.

96 Alden 2012 studies this passage as an example of the theme of the "Despised Migrant".

97 "It is hardly to be imagined that these associations could have been accurately recognized, much less interpreted, on a single hearing. Indeed, less acute listeners might not even have been troubled by the simile, while the more acute would have registered different disturbing subtleties and pondered them differently. Discussion here, therefore, does not aim at reproducing a single ideal reading of the passage, or at imputing to the poet techniques for eliciting such a reading. Instead it exposes a range of provocations which the simile offers to its audiences and suggests a range of interpretive responses." (Heiden 1998, 2)

98 On the whole passage, see the excellent commentary by Richardson 1993, 127. In his famous *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Dodds quotes this passage as an example of anxiety-dream: "The poet does not ascribe such nightmares to his heroes, but he knows well what they are like, and makes brilliant use of the experience to express frustration." (Dodds 2004, 106).

to reach Hector. If it is a dream (ἐν ὀνείρῳ), one cannot know if the poet means that the dream is appearing in Hector's mind alone or in those of both warriors, a confusion which highly dramatises the situation, making the pursuit indefinite.[99]

To return to Book 24, the major points are that Homer depicts the terrified surprise of the characters seeing each other through a simile of the imaginary sighting of a fugitive homicide, and that Achilles' vision of Priam finds a strong echo in Priam's vision of Achilles. The common point between both comparisons is precisely that through the device of the simile, the poet may describe a mental process without defining the individual whom it specifically concerns. Both similes stand at the highest points of the Iliadic dramatised narrative. Each of them makes us visualise a spectacle that arises in the poet's mind. He lets us see the world that his characters inhabit as the general backdrop of his theatre, and in some purple passages, especially by means of a simile, he gives us access to another kind of reality, the very mind, or, if Snell's ideas do not allow us to use this word, the interiority of the characters, their mental world. We do not actually enter Achilles', Hector's and Priam's minds, but the similes give us an analogic image of them.

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99 See also the excellent analysis of this simile by Purves 2010, 55–59, esp. 57: "In such a context, the speed of the racers becomes irrelevant, for the two never change their place in relation to one another. The runners, like the scene, are stuck in time. The movement of one cancels out the movement of the other, an effect that is also played out in the structure of the lines through the doubling and redoubling of negatives. As with the ekphrastic scene, the synoptic view of the two warriors circling the walls of Troy, especially when it is telescoped out into the vision of figures whirling around in a circle, is marked by the idea of stillness and the deferment of an endpoint."

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