

The Cultural Legacy of German Colonial Rule

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This volume was subsidized by a generous fund from Einstein Foundation Berlin.



Einstein Stiftung Berlin
Einstein Foundation Berlin

ISBN 978-3-11-052306-5

e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-052562-5

e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-052572-4

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress.

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at <http://dnb.dnb.de>.

© 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Einbandabbildung: „Gerader Streckenabschnitt der Ugandabahn, Britisch-Ostafrika“,

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Druck und Bindung: CPI books GmbH, Leck

☺ Gedruckt auf säurefreiem Papier

Printed in Germany

www.degruyter.com

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Preface

This volume addresses central questions about the historical memory and cultural heritage of German colonial history. Discussing it from various perspectives are ten scholars from formerly colonized societies in Africa, Asia and Oceania as well as European and American scholars working in the fields of colonial history. For a long period, German colonial history did not receive significant attention in the field of historical studies. While historians in other countries such as France and Great Britain began discussing their colonial legacy during decolonization, in contrast, West German postwar society as a whole, including its leading intellectuals, writers and academics, were more involved in their own history during World War II and the Holocaust. After a few publications in the 1960s and 1970s, West German historians became interested in German colonialism in the 1980s. In the beginning, most studies shared a focus on political history, diplomatic history, the role of the Christian missions, migration, and the economic dimensions of colonialism and imperialism.¹ In addition, some literary scholars began to rediscover the literature of colonialist fiction and non-fiction.² However, East German scholars were more interested in German colonialism and historical research had already begun in the 1950s. Nevertheless, their distinct view was informed by Marxist theory. Therefore, fascism was understood in the larger framework of capitalism, while colonialism as well as imperialism were viewed as manifestations of capitalism.

The hesitation of historians to write about German colonial history has been pronounced because of the German colonial empire's short and fleeting duration. German colonial history lasted only for thirty years from 1884 to 1919. Many historians and the public seemed to believe that such a brief history did

1 See, among other titles, Horst Gründer, *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1985); Klaus J. Bade et al., *Imperialismus und Kolonialmission: Kaiserliches Deutschland und koloniales Imperium* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1982); Jürgen Osterhammel, *China und die Weltgesellschaft: Vom 18. Jahrhundert bis in unsere Zeit* (Munich: Beck, 1989); Francesca Schinzingler, *Die Kolonien und das Deutsche Reich: Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung der deutschen Besitzungen in Übersee* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner 1984).

2 See Joachim Warmbold, "Ein Stückchen neudeutsche Erd'...": *Deutsche Kolonial-Literatur. Aspekte ihrer Geschichte, Eigenart und Wirkung, dargestellt am Beispiel Afrikas* (Frankfurt am Main: Haag + Herchen, 1982); Sibylle Benninghoff-Lühl, *Deutsche Kolonialromane, 1884–1914, in ihrem Entstehungs- und Wirkungszusammenhang* (Bremen: Im Selbstverlag, Übersee-Museum Bremen, 1983); Wolfgang Bader and János Riesz, *Literatur und Kolonialismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1983).

not warrant a deeper and more nuanced historical investigation. Hence, German historians refused to follow their British and French counterparts to rethink their national histories by taking a so-called “imperial turn.” German colonialism was conceived as a marginal and inconsequential phenomenon, amounting at best to the addition of historical anecdotes. These viewpoints were asserted by eminent historians. Jürgen Osterhammel once concluded that, “the social histories above all of Great Britain, Portugal, and the Netherlands, and in some respects of Russia and France, have to remain incomplete or incomprehensible once divorced from their imperial-colonial context,”³ suggesting that in Germany, separation can more easily be made. David Blackbourn concurred: “One could hardly argue that the German colonies possessed the same centrality for domestic political debate as the far larger empires of the British and French.”⁴

After something of a lull in the 1980s, interest among both academics and the wider intellectual public in German colonial history has recently been thriving, largely in response to the fallout from globalization. But while younger historians in Germany have started to produce new and well-researched histories of German colonialism that confront the whole spectrum of the colonial world from everyday culture to racist politics, the main terminology seems to have changed. Most historians now shy away from concepts of imperialism or colonialism, preferring the differently inflected and somewhat cleaned-up language of “empire.”⁵ During the 1960s “imperialism” and “colonialism” were used to highlight the coercive domination and exploitative relations imposed by metropolitan countries on the more vulnerable parts of the world, above all in the period of high-imperialism and intensified expansion between the 1880s and the First World War. The current understanding of empire however often recedes to the sphere of international politics such as foreign policy making, national security concerns, geopolitical strategy, international monetary policy, trade agreements, international policing, and the deployment of military force.

In the wake of the burgeoning interest in cultural history, new scholarship has shown that there was an impressive dissemination of colonial ideas into all possible areas of popular culture and everyday working-class life during the period. The thrust of this new historiography has challenged the idiosyncrasy

3 Jürgen Osterhammel, “Transnationale Gesellschaftsgeschichte: Erweiterung oder Alternative?,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 27, no. 3 (2001): 468.

4 David Blackbourn, “Das Kaiserreich transnational. Eine Skizze,” in *Das Kaiserreich transnational: Deutschland in der Welt 1871–1914*, ed. Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2004), 321–22.

5 Bradley Naranch, introduction to *German Colonialism in a Global Age*, ed. Bradley Naranch and Geoff Eley (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 2014), 1.

or insignificance of empire for ordinary life, but rather highlighted its all-prevailing presence. In other words, research on the topic of popular involvement in imperialism came to opposite conclusions than the research on the thinness of empire in German history. This dichotomy, between an approach stressing the relative shallowness of colonialism's impact inside the home society and one arguing for its cultural impact, marks most of the relevant historical research. Even the recent embrace of "transnational" in German history has only reaffirmed this dichotomy, because the colonies are now seen as an example among many others of Germany's growing interconnectedness in a larger set of global links. It seems, that the transnational perspective has often implicitly downplayed the significance of colonial histories.

All the recent studies have mostly focused on German actors and experiences. Few European scholars have systematically studied colonial subjects and their agency. As Jürgen Zimmerer has reminded us: "Analysing and explaining the dreams of the colonizers is not sufficient for understanding colonialism. It tells us nothing, for example, about the colonized, let alone telling the story from their perspective."⁶ As a result of these factors scholarship on German colonialism lacked, and continues to lack perspectives that pay attention to a wider range of social, economic, and political interactions and entanglements between Europeans and the local people, the intellectual history of formerly colonized areas, the agency of colonized individuals and societies, and the configurations of postcolonial developments.

Building on the book "German Colonialism Revisited African, Asian, and Oceanic Experiences" edited by Nina Berman, Klaus Mühlhahn, and Patrice Nganang (2014), this volume is designed to contribute to and expand the ongoing discussion of German colonialism with a fresh focus on the agency of those affected by German colonialism in Africa, Asia and Oceania. This book is a compilation of the multidisciplinary research that has been presented at the symposium "The Legacy of German Colonial Rule", which was hosted by the German Historical Museum Berlin and the Freie Universität Berlin on May 25 to 27, 2016. By focusing on the history of contact, interaction, exchange and mutual influence, this volume aims to intervene in current debates on transnational and intercultural processes and to highlight the ways in which the colonial period is embedded in larger processes of globalization, in particular the global expansion of capitalism, technology, and the western legal framework, but without ig-

⁶ Jürgen Zimmerer, "Forum: The German Colonial Imagination," *German History* 26, no. 2 (2008): 253.

noring the agency of local people. The following chapters reveal the results of this approach.

In his introduction, *Frederick Cooper* explores the relation of world history and political imaginaries such as colonies, empires and nations in the twentieth century. He suggests that German colonialism can only be fully conceived when thinking about the relationship of different forms of the state in this period. Cooper's general approach shows that the history of empires and the history of nation-states have shaped the political landscape of the world in a more complex relationship and created a more diverse set of alternatives than a dichotomy of colonial empires versus nation-states. His thought-provoking essay pushes readers towards new ways of thinking outside the conventional framework in which they are located and urges them to consider differences among people without objectifying them.

Next, *Britta Schilling* provides a glimpse into colonial traces in Germany after 1918 as well as into material memories of colonial times in Namibia. She raises the question whether there has been a coming to terms with the colonial past in Germany. Schilling's survey points out that family memories of four generations such as ethnographic items, hunting trophies, photographs and diaries have been preserved even beyond 1945, and therefore form an essential part of German colonial memory—although private memories rarely appear at the surface of national narratives. Regarding postcolonial heritage in former colonies, as the case of Namibia displays, German architecture is still one of the most visible traces of memory of the colonial past.

Nina Berman's case study delves deep into German economic activities on the Kenyan coast since the 1960s, which can be seen as long-term continuities of the colonial history in East Africa. Her ethnographic fieldwork—conducted during five years from 2009 to 2014—outlines the exceptional impact of German entrepreneurs and investors on infrastructure and social relations, in particular, on the distribution of landownership. These developments build largely on the inequalities created during the colonial period. Berman unfolds lesser-known dimensions of globalization that include an increasing north-to-south migration and new forms of cross-cultural hierarchies and collaborations.

The literary works of Cameroonian writers during colonial rule are the subject of *Patrice Nganang's* close analysis. His essay focuses on the *Sang'aam*, the memoirs of Ibrahim Njoya (1860–1933), king of the Bamum people, composed between 1911 and 1933. Various examples from the text display the discontent Njoya felt about his position inside the colonial system and the trying situation of his people, namely the transformation of the king into a salaried auxiliary of the French colonial administration and of the population into wage earners, a process already initiated by German colonial masters.

Dotsé Yigbe looks into the origins of Togo's fondness for Germany and the establishment of nostalgic colonial associations such as the Deutsch-Togo-Bund. Considering the hardship Togolese people had to face during the colonial era, his essay asks how Togo developed positive attitudes towards its former colonial power. Yigbe identifies cultural associations and movements which campaign for the reunification of the two parts of East-Togo and West-Togo as an indicator for the German colonial legacy—a legacy that is in this case transnational.

Werner Hillebrecht discusses the far-reaching cultural and economic impacts of German colonialism in Namibia. As an example for the paradoxical memorial culture of Namibia, he examines the touristic value of the Rider Monument in unison with the controversial meaning for indigenous people. Hillebrecht further assesses the irreversible negative effects of land ownership patterns introduced under German colonial rule. He concludes his essay by defining the legacy of German colonial rule in Namibia as destructive and criticizing the absence of visible reminders for indigenous war victims.

Representations of the former German colony Qingdao in Chinese writings are examined by *Lü Yixu*. Her investigation connects the perception of Qingdao in Chinese texts from various genres with German conceptions. This approach reconstructs how the colonized describe Qingdao's past in order to determine whether the split between the colonized and the colonizers is still visible or whether it has changed in any way. Lü reveals that for the Germans, despite all political and social changes in Qingdao, the "ideal colony" remains the most dominant trope. However, Chinese perceptions are more differentiated. On the one hand Chinese writers voice indignation and feelings of national disgrace. On the other hand, visible traces of colonial times are regarded as part of their own identity by present-day Qingdao dwellers.

Malama Meleisea and *Penelope Schoeffel* offer insights about the resonances of the German involvement in Samoa's history which they trace back to the mid-nineteenth century. Their essay points to the visible heritage of German colonial rule: first, the state owns the former German land holdings which is contributing to the modern economic development of Samoa; second, a German colonial style building was in use as headquarters of three administrations and is now being protected with plans to become a museum and cultural center; and third, the German legacy lives on in the names of prominent Samoan families.

Craig Alan Volker's survey, which concludes the volume, concentrates on the visibility of the German language in Papua New Guinea in four historical periods, from 1884 to the present. By using language as a cultural marker and indicator of the legacy of German colonialism, his aim is to provide evidence for the so-called colonial amnesia for the case of Papua New Guinea. Volker demon-

strates that although traces of German colonial rule are ever-present in today's everyday life, the legacy is not part of intellectual reflection—it is rarely systematically discussed. In fact, names of German origin are now conceived of as local names, and Tok Pisin⁷ as well as Chinese, but not German, are the linguistic legacies of the German colonial past.

Together this set of papers demonstrates that the legacy of colonialism continues to define the relations between Europe and the formerly colonized world. This ambivalent legacy continues to play out in subtle but important ways in the international political arena, in mutual images, in invisible hierarchies and social traditions. Hence, the history and consequences of colonialism cannot be neatly categorized. People in Europe may shrug at the heritage connected to the colonial past. The past is unfortunate, and even regrettable, but one that is the past. Nevertheless, for people in the former colonies this is obviously different, and the legacy is still very much alive and relevant. Academics, think-tank people, and policy makers in the post-colonial world still have the colonial past in the back of their minds and in the fabrics of their societies when confronting the West today. At the very least, this is a compelling reason why the history of colonialism still matters today.

7 The creole language Tok Pisin is the official language of Papua New Guinea and spoken throughout the country. It developed from Melanesian Pidgin English and consists of English and Melanesian elements, but also shows influence of German.

Frederick Cooper

Colonies, Empires, Nations: A Twentieth Century History

In the early twentieth century, elites in the most powerful states believed that they were part of a world order—an imperial order based on a hierarchy of civilizations, of superior and inferior peoples. This order did not last. By the 1950s and 1960s, political leaders and scholars believed that they were shaping a new world order based on the rejection of colonial empire, the right of all peoples to live in their own nation-state, and the notion as embodied in the United Nations, that all states should be considered equivalent. Now, in the early twenty-first century, that order is proving itself incapable of providing a stable and generally acceptable mode of governance.

In Syria, a government no longer protects the nation, but destroys cities and citizens to preserve the power of a ruling clique, producing thousands of refugees who leave their country to seek protection elsewhere. A smaller group of young men abandon the country of their citizenship to join the Islamic State that sees itself as returning to a form of polity dating to the seventh century, the Caliphate. Conflict in Iraq, Israel-Palestine, and Libya, as well as Syria and Lebanon, suggest that the dismemberment of the Ottoman empire nearly a century ago has yet to be digested. In many instances, the breakup of colonial empires from the 1950s to the 1970s did not, put in place structures capable of finding a progressive place in the world economy.¹ The most powerful states—the United States, China, the Russian Federation, and the member states of the European Union—remain marked by the experience of empire, not in a distant past but in their twentieth century histories.

The grand narrative of world history that takes us, over the last two centuries in some versions, from a world of empires to a world of nation-states, leaves us with many uncertainties about the world that has emerged, and a misleading understanding of all that happened along the way. Different sorts of political imag-

¹ Social scientists, in the era of decolonization, tried to demonstrate how an order built on nation-states, under the watchful eyes of already great powers, could make for predictable and peaceful international relations. On international relations and the attempts to tame the decolonizing world, see Carl E. Pletsch, "The Three Worlds, or the Division of Social Science Labor, Circa 1950–1975," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 23 (1981): 565–90 and Nicolas Guilhot, "The Realist Gambit: Postwar American Political Science and the Birth of IR Theory," *International Political Sociology*, 2, (2008), 281–304.

inaries have been in play throughout the twentieth century.² The story of German colonialism is a part of this picture, but my goal in this article is more general: to suggest ways of thinking about the relationship of different forms of the state in the twentieth century.

In the early twentieth century, the major actors in European politics—Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Austro-Hungary, and the Ottomans consisted of combinations of territories, colonies, protectorates, dominions, and spheres of interest. Different sorts of empires had to deal with each other.³ Not that national sentiments weren't widespread—and sometimes deep—but whatever sentiments people had they faced the reality of a world dominated by polities that did not limit their reach to “one people.”

The new state of Germany called itself a Reich, termed its ruler Kaiser (Caesar), incorporated French, Danish, and Polish speakers but refrained from incorporating the German speakers of the Austro-Hungarian Empire despite its defeat in the Austro-Prussian War.⁴ Japan, ventured into Korea starting from the 1870s, took over Taiwan in 1894–95, and defeated Russia in 1905. It both followed a European pattern of empire-building and claimed to be doing empire its own way, acting as an Asian big-brother.⁵ Qing China was weakened but remained too big for European powers to swallow. The US had its venture in overseas colonialism in 1898, complicating its continental empire-building that had been going on throughout the nineteenth century.⁶

2 One form of imaginary—but not the only one—is described in Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983). See also Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Geoff Eley and Ronald Suny, eds., *Becoming National: A Reader* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996)

3 These different types of empires are brought together in the studies in Jörn Leonhard and Ulrike von Hirschhausen, eds., *Comparing Empires* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2011). For an interpretation of the place of empires in the long-durée of history—including recent history—see Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

4 Philipp Ther, “Imperial Instead of National History: Positioning Modern German History on the Map of European Empires,” in Alexei Miller and Alfred Rieber, eds., *Imperial Rule* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2004), 47–68.

5 Ryūta Itagaki, Satoshi Mizutani, and Hideaki Tobe, “Japanese Empire,” in Philippa Levine and John Marriott, eds., *The Ashgate Companion to Modern Imperial Histories*. (Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2012), 273–99.

6 Charles Maier, *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

Some scholars have attempted to reconcile the age of empires with the age of nations by positing that colonization was really the work of “big states” that saw colonies as wholly subordinate rather than parts of a composite, unlike the empires of old.⁷ But the structures were more complicated than that and their interactions more complicated still. Power in the early twentieth century was concentrated in a tiny number of states with an imperial reach, some expanding, some hanging on, some with a more “national” conception of themselves than others, all acting in relation to each other and to the diverse populations that they held in a variety of unequal relationships. A few leaders, including Bismarck, thought that an inter-empire order was possible: agreements among the “civilized” on how to regulate competition with each other and carve up the rest of the world. A section of elites in Europe tried to distinguish between a bad colonialism, like that of King Leopold II of Belgium, and a respectable version. Ideologues promoted a vision of masculine authority, bourgeois self-restraint, and stable racial and gender hierarchies in which all peoples of the world would have their place.⁸

The scramble to colonize Africa was an inter-empire story, less a necessity to seize resources or markets than an effort to preempt other imperial powers from monopolizing them. European powers invested little outside of islands of settler plantations or mining operations. Systematically remaking economy and society in Africa in a European image—or systematically exploiting it—was beyond the capacity of colonizing powers. Empire in Africa was power on the cheap.

Colonial empires, like empires of old, needed intermediaries. In most of Africa, outside of areas of white settlement, the very chiefs and kings whose supposed tyranny and backwardness was invoked to justify colonization reappeared as the incarnation of African traditional authority on which colonial regimes depended. African elites were both manipulated by colonial officials and manipulated officials themselves, skewing patriarchal and clientage relations to their interests.⁹ Colonies of the major European powers, even in the most extreme case

7 References to a “second” or even a “third” British empire, to a new imperialism or a new French empire in the late 19th century assume that empires became nation-states and then acquired empires and that history can neatly be divided into epochs—both artificial views of historical processes. In *Empires in World History*, Burbank and I suggest that thinking of shifting repertoires of rule is a better way of understanding change over time.

8 Ann Laura Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Lora Wildenthal, *German Women for Empire, 1884–1945* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001); Ann McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* (Routledge, 1995).

9 John Lonsdale and Bruce Berman, “Coping with the Contradictions: The Development of the Colonial State in Kenya,” *Journal of African History* 20 (1979): 487–506; Sara Berry, “Hegemony

of technological difference and racial prejudice, could not help acting like older empires—through vertical channels of power passing through intermediaries.

And what of the state in Europe itself? The concept of popular sovereignty had been in play since the eighteenth century, but who the people were and where sovereignty lay remained uncertain in 1900. The multi-ethnic empires of Europe survived the nineteenth century. The dual monarchy in Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire's experiment in generalized citizenship and briefly in parliamentary governance, and the Russian Duma were among the innovations in sovereignty regimes within empires.¹⁰ The French state had been ruled by an emperor or king for all but a few years of the period 1789 to 1871, but then it revived the republican vision of 1789. Citizens were all equal with no mediating status groups. Except that women could not vote and most people in the rapidly expanding overseas empire were declared to be "French" but not citizens.

Throughout Europe, activists and intellectuals were questioning the structure of states, sometimes their very existence. Feminism, liberalism, socialism, and anarchism all challenged governments, whether they leaned to the imperial or the national end of the spectrum. Elites were trying both to co-opt and restrict the entry of males of the working and peasant classes into politics. Germany and the Scandinavian states took the lead in making the state "social," although the Bismarckian state was hardly democratic.¹¹

The Tsarist regime had its colonising and Russianizing tendencies in the Siberian, Caucasian, and Central Asian empire, parallel to those of western powers, but it couldn't go too far, for Eurasian sovereignty entailed recognizing the role of Islamic and other religious figures.¹² In early twentieth century

on a Shoestring: Indirect Rule and Access to Agricultural Land," *Africa* 62 (1992): 327–55; A. E. Afigbo, *The Warrant Chiefs: Indirect Rule in Southeastern Nigeria, 1891–1929* (London: Longman, 1972); Charles Ambler, *Kenyan Communities in the Age of Imperialism: the Central Region in the Late Nineteenth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988).

¹⁰ Pieter M. Judson, *Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontier of Imperial Austria* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006); Michelle Campos, *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early-Twentieth Century Palestine* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011); Robert Geraci, *Window on the East: National and Imperial Identities in Late Tsarist Russia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).

¹¹ Peter Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity Class Bases of the European Welfare State, 1875–1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Not only did many of the important political movements of the day cross national lines, but a considerable range of political leaders argued specifically for principles and institutions that were international in scope. Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013)

¹² Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen, and Anatolyi Remnev, eds. *Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007); Robert Crews, *For Prophet and*

China, a national movement was developing, sometimes trying to brand the Manchu elite that had ruled the empire since 1644 as “foreign” and linking their cause with movements in colonial world against the rule of outsiders and also connecting to the Chinese diaspora.¹³ But China’s republicans had to contend with patrimonial elements—warlords and their followers—in different parts of the Republic they established in 1912. States were moving in different directions in 1914—not necessarily toward consolidating themselves as “nations.”

World War I was a war among empires, and its consequences are sometimes seen as a move from empire to a world of self-determining nation-states. But only if one reads history backwards. The empires of the losers—the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and German—and the Tsarist empire as well—did not die natural deaths. “National” self-determination in Europe could only be national because of what a British statesman who advocated such policies, Lord Curzon, called the “unmixing of people” and we, today, call ethnic cleansing. Making states homogenous in eastern and central Europe wasn’t a spontaneous activity of ordinary people. It was carried out by state elites, with the backing of Britain, France, and the US.¹⁴

Self-determination was for white people. Japan’s plea for a statement condemning racism was turned down. To be sure, activists in India, China, Korea, and Africa read Woodrow Wilson’s words as if they applied to them, but they soon found that they did not.¹⁵ The breakup of the Ottoman Empire led to waves of ethnic cleansing: Greeks expelled from Turkey, Turks from Greece. Revolts were repressed with enormous violence by Britain in Iraq in the 1920s and Palestine in the 1930s. The powers were at the time able to stuff the genii of citizenship and self-determination back into imperial bottles. Colonial governments

Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006); Jane Burbank, “Eurasian Sovereignty: The Case of Kazan,” *Problems of Post-Communism* 62 (2015): 1–25.

¹³ Rebecca Karl, *Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002).

¹⁴ This phrase comes from the British statesman Lord Curzon. See Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) and Philipp Ther, *The Dark Side of Nation-States: Ethnic Cleansing in Modern Europe* (London: Berghahn, 2014).

¹⁵ Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-determination and the International Origins of Anti-colonial Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Margaret Macmillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2003).

asserted their capacity to maintain the distinct cultures of their subjects, protecting them from inappropriate European models of citizenship and civilization.¹⁶

Pieces of the losers' empires, particularly in the Middle East and Africa, were distributed to the winners. The League of Nations's mandate system made German and Ottoman territories into yet another part of the imperial repertoires of Britain and France. The League did more to internationalize colonialism than to undermine it.¹⁷

The aftermath of war witnessed not only the continuity of older models of colonial empire, but also the rise of new models of empire—the Soviet and the Nazi. The USSR built on imperial Russia's multinational mode of empire by recognizing national republics each subordinated to an autocratic center. It now termed itself a "union." Each republic was governed by elites from the predominant "national" group, all of whom came up through the Communist Party.¹⁸ The United States did not have a Colonial Ministry, but it had its repertoire of power at a distance, including a few colonies. But it preferred invasions and occupations to colonizations.¹⁹

The spectrum of imperial politics of difference includes the Nazis, but the line from the atrocities of German Africa to the Shoah is not straight.²⁰ Neither

16 Alice Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997). On inter-empire conflict as a framework for history in the first half of the twentieth century, see Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History*.

17 Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). The League's supervision of mandates cut two ways: it made the practice of rulers in the mandates subject to discussion (with some possibilities for subjects to petition the League) but reinforced the position of the dominant powers as arbiters of how their power was exercised.

18 Francine Hirsch, *Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).

19 Paul Kramer implies that politics in the US was too racist to be properly colonial. A powerful faction of its elite did not want to incorporate black or yellow people into an American polity, even as inferiors. *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). Adam Tooze adds another factor: the US was becoming the most powerful power of all, but its elite was preoccupied with maintaining itself in the face of social conflicts—over class and race in particular—that had been building up in previous decades and was reluctant to take an active role in forging a new kind of inter-state order. *The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking of Global Order, 1916–1931* (London: Penguin, 2014).

20 Birthe Kundrus, "Colonialism, Imperialism, National Socialism: How Imperial Was the Third Reich?" in Bradley Naranch and Geoff Eley, eds., *German Colonialism in a Global Age* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 330–46; Sebastian Conrad, *Globalization and the Nation in Impe-*

anti-Semitism nor colonial racism was unique to pre-war Germany. What is singular about German colonial experience was that it lost its colonies without losing its sense of imperial entitlement.²¹ Unimpeded by the limitations of governing actual people in the colonies, resenting the loss of imperial stature, Nazi ideologues developed their conception of a new Reich founded on racial superiority, heaping contempt on international law and norms, rejecting the cosmopolitan culture that was characteristic of pre-war Germany.²² With their conquests, the Nazis developed a repertoire of power different from past empires. Although in France and other countries to the west, Nazis co-opted racially acceptable intermediaries, they did not do so in eastern Europe. Slavs were to be treated as slave laborers or murdered.²³ The Nazis were defeated by other powers with an imperial reach and more capacity to bring diverse material and human resources into the conflict.

The effects of the Second World War were quite different from those of the first. This time, the winners in Europe were almost as devastated—in human losses, destruction of cities, and financial ruin—as the losers. The humiliating defeat that Japan had earlier inflicted on Britain, the Netherlands, the US, and France in southeast Asia shook the confidence elites had in the domination of the white man, while Hitler gave racism a bad name. Labor unrest was challenging colonial regimes in the regions *most* integrated into imperial economies, making clear that colonial control could not be restored by pretending that Afri-

rial Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Pascal Grosse, “What Does German Colonialism Have to Do with National Socialism?” in Eric Ames, Marcia Klotz, and Lora Wildenthal, eds., *Germany’s Colonial Pasts* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), 115–34; Isabelle Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). George Steinmetz points out that German colonial practices differed substantially from colony to colony. *The Devil’s Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in Qingdao, Samoa and Southwest Africa* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

21 Marcia Klotz, “The Weimar Republic: A Postcolonial State in a Still-Colonial World,” in Ames, Klotz, and Wildenthal, 135–47

22 Carl Schmitt’s political theories were less an analysis of states as they actually existed than an imagined inversion of the ways in which rival empires constructed their power, an anti-universalist, anti-individual vision, opposed to international law, presuming the uniformity of a people. For a valuable analysis, see Jan-Werner Müller, *A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).

23 Mark Mazower, *Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe* (London: Allen Lane, 2008); Wendy Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005).

cans could continue to live in their tribes.²⁴ But it would still require hindsight to conclude that the only alternative to the imperial past that was emerging at mid-century was the nation-state.

The national perspective was seized in 1945 in Indonesia and Vietnam, where Japanese conquests had forced the Dutch and the French to try—in vain—to recolonize lost territories. In neither case was a nationalist movement fully united.²⁵ India had the longest history of a nationalist movement, but when Britain ceded power in 1947, the nations that were created—India and Pakistan—were not the single nation that nationalists had previously imagined.²⁶

A different sort of claim emerged in the Pan-African Conference of 1945. African, West Indian, American, and other activists of African origin condemned colonial rule around the world and demanded self-determination. But if the conference agreed that black people throughout the world should govern themselves, they could not decide what institutions would do so. Similarly, movements such as that of the *ulema* in Algeria saw themselves as part of an Islamic world.²⁷ Liberation could be imagined, in mid-twentieth century, outside of the context of a territorial state.

Less familiar is the story of imperial and post-imperial federalism.²⁸ Empire and federation both assemble different people; both can look at sovereign power in layered terms, on an emperor as king of kings, on a federal and federated governments each holding defined powers.²⁹ Imperial rulers thought that federal structures within them—the French in Indochina, the Dutch in the East Indies,

24 Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

25 Pierre Brocheux and Daniel Hémy, *Indochine: la colonisation ambiguë, 1858–1954* (Paris: Editions la Découverte, 1995).

26 See for example Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). For an account of India's relation to empire that emphasizes questions of gender, see Mrinalini Sinha, *Specters of Mother India: The Global Restructuring of an Empire* (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2006).

27 James McDougall, *History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

28 On the concept of federalism, see Jean Cohen, "Federation," *Political Concepts: A Critical Lexicon*, www.politicalconcepts.org/2011/federation. Theorists and activists distinguish federation from confederation; the former organized by a constitution, the latter by treaties, recognizing the national nature of the component parts. As Cohen points out, the distinction is less than neat, since both are relational concepts entailing a sharing of power at different levels.

29 The United States emerged as a federal system largely because most of the leaders of the 13 colonies were convinced (and they were not easy to convince) that only by uniting could they survive in a world dominated by empires. David Hendrickson, *Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003).

the British in Central Africa and Malaya—might give regional elites a stake in empire and allow for economic coordination.³⁰ But imperial federalism looked only to narrow, regional elites.

Federalism also appealed to leaders in Africa, who sought not only political voice in their own affairs, but a chance at economic and social political progress that neither colonial empire nor the independence of small and poor nation-states offered. Political leaders in French Africa laid claim to all the rights of the French citizen, a degree of autonomy for their territories, and an equal voice alongside European France in the politics of the overall unit, now renamed the French Union. Their minimum demand, the extension of citizenship rights to all inhabitants of overseas France, was won in the Constitution of 1946.³¹

Senegalese politician Léopold Senghor argued that Africans should balance “horizontal solidarity” and “vertical solidarity,” horizontal meaning Africans relating to each other, and vertical meaning Africans with France. Horizontal solidarity by itself offered only unity in poverty. Vertical connections by themselves risked reproducing colonialism, but the two together posed a claim on the superior resources from a position of collective strength. The level of control that Paris could retain as well as how far the Africans could get in claiming political and social equality were the burning themes of politics in sub-Saharan French Africa in the 1950s.

When France began talking in the late 1940s about some kind of European Union, it wanted to include its overseas territories; otherwise, France would be splitting itself in half. The roots of Europe today actually lie in what was then called “Eurafrica,” as France sought to combine federal relations with its former colonies with confederal relations with Germany, Italy, and other European states. Eurafrica would open up a large market and spread the burdens of development finance to European partners, despite the risk of diluting French sovereignty.

30 Imperial federalism was related to an earlier movement for a “Greater Britain,” a world-wide movement of white, culturally British elites—from Canada to Australia to South Africa to the British Isles—reaffirming their common membership in a British collectivity. See Duncan Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Daniel Gorman, *Imperial Citizenship: Empire and the Question of Belonging* (Manchester University Press, 2007). On the federal idea and empire during and after World War II, see Michael Collins, “Decolonisation and the ‘Federal Moment’,” *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 24 (2013): 21–40; Jennifer Foray, *Visions of Empire in the Nazi-Occupied Netherlands* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

31 Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945–1960* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Gary Wilder, *Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015).