

Averroes
On Aristotle's "Metaphysics"

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Marwan Rashed

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Averroes

On Aristotle's "Metaphysics"

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of the So-called "Epitome"

edited by

Rüdiger Arnzen

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Epitome

in Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libros

In linguam anglicam vertit
prolegomenis commentariis indicibusque instruxit
Rüdiger Arnzen

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PREFACE

The Arab philosopher Abū l-Walīd Muḥammad Ibn Rushd (1126–98), among western historians of philosophy better known by his Latinized name Averroes, composed more than thirty commentaries and studies on the works of Aristotle. Although these commentaries had an enormous influence on medieval Latin and Hebrew philosophy in general as well as on the reception and transformation of Aristotelian doctrines in particular, a lot of them are still in need of reliable critical editions, and an even greater number still await complete modern translations in order to be readily accessible to students and scholars of medieval philosophy unable to read the original Arabic texts.

This applies also to the work presented here for the first time in a complete English translation for which there is no definitive critical edition of the Arabic text available. As a matter of fact, the translation was originally supposed to be accompanied by a critical edition of the Arabic text itself—a plan that had to be postponed for the time being because it was impossible to obtain copies of all extant medieval and early modern manuscripts of the work. However, the translation is based not only on the previous editions of the text, but also on a number of thoroughly collated Arabic manuscripts not taken into consideration in these editions. Thus, the present translation is not only of interest to those engaged in medieval philosophy yet unable to examine the Arabic documents, but it might also be helpful for exploring the Arabic manuscripts and assaying Averroes' intentions more comprehensively and accurately than this has been possible on the basis of the previous Arabic editions.

The research toward the present translation and commentary has been supported and facilitated by numerous institutions and individuals. Averroes' approach to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and in particular his work presented here have been part of a more comprehensive project focusing on medieval Arabic metaphysics. During the years 2005–08, the *Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach-Stiftung* financed a full-time research position of the present editor for this project. The final

revision of the translation and the annotations and their appropriate digitization have been supported by funds granted by the *Gesellschaft der Freunde und Förderer der Nordrhein-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*. Furthermore, the *Nordrhein-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Künste* kindly subsidized the printing of the present volume. It is my great pleasure to express my gratitude to these institutions, without whose support I would never have been able to undertake this project.

Equally important was the help I have received from a number of friends and colleagues. First and foremost I wish to thank Peter Adamson for his minute corrections of my English and for his incisive criticisms of the translation and my annotations. Many of his suggestions led me to further reflection on problems concerning the interpretation of the Arabic text or called my attention to publications or philosophical questions and contexts I had not been aware of before.

The second pillar of the project was Horst Schmiejka who wrote a specially adapted version of the TUSTEP programme for the preparation of a camera-ready copy of the present volume and provided technical assistance and advice at each stage of the project. I am deeply indebted to him for this friendly help.

Gerhard Endress kindly shared his profound knowledge about the transmission and interdependence of the Arabic manuscripts containing Ibn Rushd's works during the initial stage of the project. Cecilia Martini Bonadeo and Gerhard Endress lent me their photographs of some Arabic manuscripts. Firouzeh Saatchian and Jan-Peter Hartung helped in obtaining copies of two Iranian and Indian manuscripts. Mauro Zonta offered invaluable help and advice regarding the Hebrew transmission of the text. I am grateful to each of these persons for their willingness to give a helping hand. Thanks are also due to the personnel of the Thomas Institute of the University of Cologne, especially to Andreas Speer, its director, and to Wolfram Klatt, its librarian, who readily provided all necessary research facilities and supported the project in many ways.

My gratitude also extends to the general editor of the *Averrois Opera* series, Gerhard Endress, for his willingness to include the present volume in this series. Since the initial "plan for the publication of a *Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem*", drafted in 1931 by Harry Austryn Wolfson, a number of editions and translations of Ibn Rushd's

works have been published by various publishers in this series, which is currently being carried on under the aegis of the Union Académique Internationale.

Finally, I wish to thank Marwan Rashed, the editor of the excellent newly-introduced series *Scientia Graeco-Arabica*, for having invited me to publish the present work in this series.

Autumn 2009

R. A.

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TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

1. Title, nature, and structure of the treatise

The treatise presented here is commonly referred to as Ibn Rushd's "Epitome of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*". Adopting this denomination for the sake of convenience, we must be aware of the following two facts. First, the majority of the Arabic manuscripts (including the oldest manuscripts Madrid, *Biblioteca Nacional, ms. ar. 5000*, Cairo, *Dār al-Kutub, al-Hikma wa-l-Falsafa 5*, and Cairo, *Dār al-Kutub, Coll. Taymūr Pāshā, Hikma 117*) contain the treatise without displaying any title whatsoever. Ibn Rushd himself does not refer to the present treatise by any title in his other works. Hence, we cannot be sure what title Ibn Rushd chose for this work or whether he intended a separate entitlement in its own right at all¹. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that Ibn Rushd himself conceived this treatise as a kind of exegetical work on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, as he states right at the beginning that "in this treatise, we wish to present scientific doctrines gathered from the treatises Aristotle devoted to the science of metaphysics". Secondly, the content and structure of the treatise show certain peculiarities not displayed by the other works usually classified as epitomes (*Jawāmi'* or *Mukhtaṣar* in the Arabic); and even those Arabic manuscripts which do display a separate title of the work, do not depict it as an epitome, but simply call it 'Book of Metaphysics' (*Kitāb Mā ba'd al-ṭabī'a*).

However, we are relatively safe in grouping together the present treatise with the other epitomes Ibn Rushd composed on various Aristotelian works. Basically, Ibn Rushd dealt with Aristotle's works in writings of four different literary genres: (i) literal or so-called 'long commentaries' (*Sharḥ* or *Tafsīr*) quoting and commenting upon the authoritative work section by section in a complete and exhaustive

1 This uncertainty is reflected in the fact that the five modern Arabic editions of the work display four different titles (cf. below, section 3).

manner; (ii) paraphrases (*Talkhīṣ*), the so-called 'middle commentaries', i.e. rewordings of the Aristotelian text which avoid for the most part raising any textual problems or dogmatic inconsistencies and are characterized by the highest degree of approval to and coherent representation of the Aristotelian doctrines; (iii) epitomes, i.e. abridged introductions or summaries, in which Ibn Rushd breaks away from the authoritative work at a remarkably higher degree than in the two aforementioned literary forms, secludes any non-demonstrative sections or excursions he encountered in the Aristotelian work or in the commentaries thereon he had at his disposal, and presents what he conceives as the gist of this work in his own words; and (iv) questions or problems (usually entitled "Treatise on...", *Maqāla fī...*, followed either by the problem to be discussed or by the title of the Aristotelian work in which the relevant question occurs), i.e. treatises focusing on well-delimited problems raised in a particular Aristotelian writing, which take into consideration all ancient and "modern" Arabic positions regarding this question².

That the present work pertains neither to the class of literal commentaries nor to that of the paraphrases is clear from the fact that both Ibn Rushd's literal commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* as well as his paraphrase are extant and differ substantially from the present text³.

- 2 On these four literary genres and their interrelations cf. J. al-ʿAlawī, *Al-Matn al-rushdī: Madkhal li-ḡirāʾa jadīda*, p. 127–53; idem, "Al-Ghazzālī wa-l-khiṭāb al-falsafī fī l-gharb al-islāmī: al-Ghazzālī wa-tashakkul al-khiṭāb al-falsafī li-bn Rushd," *Majallat Kulliyat al-Ādāb wa-l-ʿUlūm al-Insāniyya* 8 (1986), esp. p. 28–48. For studies in European languages cf. Thérèse-Anne Druart, "Averroes: The Commentator and the Commentators," in *Aristotle in Late Antiquity*, edited by L. P. Schrenk (Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1994); Miguel Cruz Hernández, "El sentido de las tres lecturas de Aristóteles por Averroes," in *Ensayos sobre la filosofía en el Al-Andalus*, edited by A. Martínez Lorca (Barcelona: Ed. Anthropos, 1990).
- 3 The literal commentary is available in the Arabic edition *Averroès: Tafṣīr mā baʿd at-Ṭabīʿat*. Texte arabe inédit établi par Maurice Bouyges, 3 vols., Beyrouth: Imprimerie Catholique, 1938–42, and in the Latin translation printed by the Giunta brothers in several editions since 1550, reprinted as *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis*, 9 vols. and 3 supplementa, Frankfurt am Main: Minerva 1962. (A new Latin edition is currently being prepared by Dag N. Hasse, University of Würzburg. For further partial editions and translations into modern languages cf. www.thomasinstitut.uni-koeln.de/averroes_db/averrois_opera.html.) The paraphrase or 'middle commentary' is ex-

Furthermore, it is certainly not an inquiry into a particular topic or problem of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* adhering to the genre of *Maqālāt*. In the introduction to the work, Ibn Rushd states repeatedly that he is addressing here the discipline of metaphysics in its entirety⁴. Also, the structure of the work, and especially of the introduction, leaves no doubt that Ibn Rushd does not focus on a particular metaphysical question, but rather approaches this discipline as such in a systematic and comprehensive manner. As in the other epitomes, Ibn Rushd's diction is rather independent from the Aristotelian work dealt with; there are no literal quotations of the *Metaphysics*, only seldom do paraphrases occur.

Apart from this determination *ex negativo*, there are certain positive indicators corroborating the assumption that we are faced with Ibn Rushd's Epitome of the *Metaphysics*. Above all, we may adduce Ibn Rushd's own statements in this work and in other epitomes. In 1159, Ibn Rushd completed his epitomes of four Aristotelian treatises on natural philosophy (*Physics*, *De caelo*, *De generatione et corruptione*, and *Meteorologica*), which he conceived as a literary unit. In his introduction to this four-part work, which has been preserved in two different versions, Ibn Rushd describes the aim of these epitomes as presenting the "necessary doctrines" (*al-aqāwīl al-darūriyya*) or the "scientific doctrines which render Aristotle's method a necessary method" (*al-aqāwīl al-ʿilmiyya allatī taqtadī madhhabahū*)⁵. This seems to be exactly what Ibn Rushd is referring to at the beginning of the treatise presented here, when he says: "In this treatise, we wish to present scientific doctrines (*al-aqāwīl al-ʿilmiyya*) gathered from the treatises Aristotle devoted to the science of metaphysics in the manner we have practised generally in the preceding books." That these "preceding books" alluded to here are none other than these four epitomes is further confirmed by another methodological remark which refers again to "the other [theoretical] sciences" dealt with there and is found

tant in two Hebrew versions edited by Mauro Zonta in his unpublished dissertation "La tradizione ebraica del Commento Medio di Averroè alla *Metafisica* di Aristotele," Università di Torino, 1995.

4 Cf. p. 21–27 of the translation.

5 Cf. J. al-ʿAlawī, *Al-Matn al-rushdī: Madkhal li-qirāʾa jadīda*, p. 161; cf. also the introduction of Ibn Rushd's Epitome of the *Organon* (the so-called *Darūrī fī l-Mantiq*), quoted in J. al-ʿAlawī, *Al-Matn al-rushdī*, p. 50sq.

in almost identical form in the present work and in the Cairo version of the introduction to the four epitomes on natural philosophy. It says that the appropriate method for the acquisition of these sciences is the method of instruction (*naḥw al-ta'ālīm/jihat al-ta'ālīm*), that is the method which “proceeds from things better known-to-us to things better known-by-nature”⁶. Remarks of this type are, as far as I can see, not found at the beginning of any of Ibn Rushd's ‘middle commentaries’.

Furthermore, there is certain bibliographical evidence for the fact that the treatise presented here indeed was conceived as an epitome shortly after Ibn Rushd's death. In his ‘*Uyūn al-anbā' fī tabaqāt al-aṭibbā'*’, Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a (d. 1270) mentions Ibn Rushd's “Epitomes of Aristotle's Books on Natural Sciences and Metaphysics” (*Jawāmi' kutub Aristūṭālīs fī l-ṭabī'iyyāt wa-l-ilāhiyyāt*), in all likelihood referring to the present work and the four epitomes on Aristotle's physical works⁷. Being independent from these biographies two medieval catalogues of Ibn Rushd's writings mention his “Epitomes on Philosophy” (*Jawāmi' fī l-falsafa*)⁸. Taking into consideration that Ibn Rushd conceived and introduced the four epitomes on natural sciences as one work of four parts and that this work is commonly entitled, not as Epitomes on *Philosophy*, but rather as Epitomes on *Natural Sciences*, this title may be regarded as further evidence for the fact that the present treatise was grouped together with the epitomes on natural sciences by Ibn Rushd himself or in an early stage of its transmission. This is additionally confirmed by the fact that the work has been transmitted in almost all Arabic manuscripts together with these four epitomes⁹.

6 Cf. below, p. 27 of the translation, and *Averrois Epitome in Physicorum libros*, ed. Josep Puig. Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem. Series A, vol. 20. Madrid 1983, p. 7sq., apparatus criticus. For the affinity of this method and the genre of epitomes cf. J. al-‘Alawī, *Al-Matn al-rushdī*, p. 52–56.

7 The same reference is found in two other biographies dating from the first half of the fourteenth century, i.e. the *Ta'riḫ al-islām wa-wafayāt al-mashāhīr wa-l-a'ālām* by Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī (d. 1348), and the *Kitāb al-Wāfī bi-l-wafayāt* by Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ṣafadī (d. 1363); cf. J. al-‘Alawī, *Al-Matn al-rushdī*, p. 12, 15.

8 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 11sq., 15. The earlier of these catalogues is found in a manuscript dating from Jumādā II 637 / January 1240; cf. *Commentaria Averrois in Galenium*, edidit María de la Concepción Vázquez de Benito, p. 281, 283.

As for the above-mentioned peculiarities of the present treatise regarding the genre of Ibn Rushd's epitomes, this concerns primarily the following two features. All other epitomes of Aristotelian works composed by Ibn Rushd follow the textual order of the authoritative writing by Aristotle. Not so the present work, which re-arranges the materials found in the *Metaphysics* in an entirely new way. Secondly, while the other epitomes cover the contents of the relevant Aristotelian works more or less completely, this is not the case with the present work, and this in a deliberate manner. As Ibn Rushd explains right at the outset of the writing, he intends, not to provide a complete synopsis of the Aristotelian work, but "to present scientific doctrines *gathered from (nal-taqīṭa min)* the treatises Aristotle devoted to the science of metaphysics". In other words, Ibn Rushd does not claim completeness and proceeds rather selectively.

The most striking evidence for the re-arrangement of the Aristotelian work is supplied by the fact that the latter is divided into fourteen books, whereas Ibn Rushd explains that its contents can be arranged in three main parts, and divides his treatise into five chapters. In the introduction, he says:

"We find this [science] unfolded in the [single] treatises [of the *Metaphysics*] attributed to Aristotle. However, it can be reduced to three [major] parts [as follows]. [(I)] In the first part [Aristotle] takes into consideration [(I.a)] sensible things inasmuch as they are existents, all their genera which form the ten categories, and [(I.b)] all their concomitants which adhere to them, and relates [all] this to what is first in them, as far as this is possible in this part [of metaphysics]. [(II)] In the second part he takes into consideration the principles of substance—these are the separate things—, explains their mode of existence, relates them likewise to their first principle, which is God (exalted is He), explains His specific attributes and acts, and shows also the relationship between Him and the remaining existents and [the fact] that He is the utmost perfection, the first form, and the first agent [...].

9 To which, in most manuscripts, also the Epitome on Aristotle's *De anima* has been appended. As a matter of fact, this conjoined manuscript transmission of the present treatise as a sequel of the epitomes on natural philosophy might be the reason for the subheading-like title 'Book of Metaphysics' we encounter in some of the younger manuscripts. This title just assumes as self-evident that in what follows the series of epitomes is continued. In some manuscripts, such a continuation is explicitly stated in the colophon of the preceding epitome.

[(III)] In the third part he takes into consideration the subject matters of the departmental sciences and eliminates the mistakes committed by the ancients on this [subject], namely in the discipline of logic and in the two departmental disciplines, that is physics and mathematics.”

From internal references to this division and the following discussion of the Aristotelian doctrines it becomes clear how these three main parts relate to the Aristotelian text. *Part I.a* comprises Books VII (Z) and VIII (H) of the *Metaphysics*. In his discussion of these books, Ibn Rushd proceeds here and there rather independently by grouping together what in his view belongs together (such as VII [Z] 12 and VIII [H] 6, both of which deal with the unity of definition) or by postponing questions because they require the previous consideration of subsequent sections of these books (such as the question whether the three corporeal dimensions are substances raised in VII [Z] 2, 1028 b 16sq., yet explicitly postponed by Ibn Rushd to the end of this part).

Part I.b falls into three sections. The first section contains most of Book IX (Θ) to be discussed by Ibn Rushd in the following order: Chs. 1–3 (kinds of potencies, the Megarian position), Chs. 5–8 (actualization of potencies, actuality, priority of actuality) including a short excursion on Book II (α) 1, 993 b 23–31, first half of Ch. 9 (good and evil in actuality and potentiality), Ch. 10 (truth). In the second section, Ibn Rushd treats the contents of Book X (I) as follows: Chs. 1–4 (the one and the many, contrariety), Chs. 7–10 (intermediates in contrariety, contrariety in species and genus), Ch. 6 (aporia regarding the opposition of the one and the many), Ch. 5 (aporia regarding the opposition of small, great and equal). The third section comprises Aristotle's discourse on the finiteness of causal chains provided in *Metaphysics* II (α) 2.

Ibn Rushd's explanations on *Part II* start with a section on *Metaphysics* XII (Λ) 6–7, which draws intensely on Aristotle's *Physics* VIII 1–3, and 7–8. The second section of this part is constituted by Book XII (Λ) 8–10, which is discussed in much greater detail than the preceding section and by taking into account various works by Alexander of Aphrodisias, al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, and others. References to Chs. 1–5 of this Book occur only incidentally and very briefly.

The contents of *Part III* can only be reconstructed on the basis of internal references and of Ibn Rushd's statements on the structure of the *Metaphysics* propounded in his *Literal Commentary* on this work, because the relevant chapter of the present treatise is not extant. In Ibn

Rushd's conception, this part comprises Book IV (Γ) 4–8 (possibly also the correlate Chs. 4–7 of Book XI [K]), Aristotle's defense of the validity of the first principles of demonstration, and Books XIII (M) and XIV (N) which, in Ibn Rushd's view, deal primarily with the subject matters of mathematics and physics and errors committed by the ancients (i.e. Plato and the Pythagoreans) on this subject¹⁰.

These three major parts of the *Metaphysics* relate to the subdivision of the present treatise as follows.

<i>Part</i>	<i>Chapter</i>	<i>Section of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'</i>
<i>I.a</i>	Two	VII (Z) and VIII (H)
<i>I.b</i>	Three	IX (Θ), 1–3, 5–8; II (α) 1; IX (Θ), 9–10; X (I) 1–4, 7–10, 6, 5; II (α) 2
<i>II</i>	Four	XII (Λ) 6–10 (occasional ref. to XII [Λ] 1–5)
<i>III</i>	[Five] (not extant)	IV (Γ) 4–8 (possibly XI [K] 4–7); XIII (M) and XIV (N) (partially?)

Chapter One of our treatise, which has no correspondence to any of the three main parts, is divided into two sections: (A) an introduction which deals, following the commentary tradition of late antiquity, with the subject matter, aim, and usefulness of metaphysics, and (B) a glossary of twenty-eight fundamental terms of metaphysics. The purpose of both sections is described as introductory and preparatory. In the introduction (A), Ibn Rushd considers, in addition to his own contributions to the topics in question, the following sections of the *Metaphysics* (in this order): 1. Book IV (Γ) 1 (there is a universal science which studies being *qua* being). 2. Book VI (E) 1 (metaphysics is one of three theoretical sciences, besides physics and mathematics). 3. Book IV (Γ) 2 (there are universal concomitants of all existents which cannot be considered by any other science except the one which has being as such as its subject matter). 4. Book IV (Γ) 3 (the principles [and subject matters, as Ibn Rushd adds] of the departmental sciences must be stud-

10 I have dealt with *Part III* of Ibn Rushd's division of the *Metaphysics* and the unpreserved fifth chapter of the present treatise separately in the article "On the Nature and Fate of Chapter V of Ibn Rushd's *Epitome* of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*."

ied and verified by metaphysics). 5. Book VI (E) 1 (metaphysics is the supreme science because it deals with most remote causes the knowledge of which is the end and completion of the theoretical sciences).

The following glossary (B) deals with twenty-five notions explained in the thirty chapters of Book V (Δ). In addition, Ibn Rushd includes three paragraphs on notions not discussed in this book of the *Metaphysics*, namely 'thing', 'matter', and 'form'. The paragraph on 'being' of this section is the only part of the treatise which draws additionally on *Metaphysics* VI (E) 2–4.

In view of the fact that what Ibn Rushd calls *Part I* of the *Metaphysics* is not dealt with until Chapter Two of the treatise, and that the contents of Chapter One are characterized as preliminary, we are thus quite safe in judging that Books IV (Γ) 1–3, V (Δ), and VI (E) were conceived by Ibn Rushd as a sort of logical and epistemological proaedeutics and introduction to the major concepts of what he considered as metaphysics proper¹¹. The selective and independent approach to the contents and structure of the *Metaphysics* comes also to the fore in the way Ibn Rushd deals with Book III (B). Obviously, Ibn Rushd did not consider the catalogue of metaphysical aporiae presented there as a map or program for the *Metaphysics*. He follows Ibn Sīnā¹² in transposing selected aporiae into the relevant contexts of his discussion. The dialectical character of this book did not fit into Ibn Rushd's program of the purely demonstrative structure of the epitomes.

2. *Transmission, revision, and completeness of the treatise*

The present treatise is preserved in 17 Arabic manuscripts dating from the thirteenth to the nineteenth centuries. During the first half of the thirteenth century it was translated into Hebrew twice: the translation prepared by Moses Ibn Tibbon is preserved in at least 14 manuscripts, while another, anonymous, translation is quoted in books IX and X of

11 The same approach is displayed in the introductions to Books IV (Γ) and XII (Λ) of Ibn Rushd's Literal Commentary (*Tafsīr*) on the *Metaphysics*. It is heavily influenced by Alexander of Aphrodisias' conception of metaphysics, as I try to show in my "Ibn Rušd on the Structure of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*."

12 And Nicolaus of Damascus, cf. A. Bertolacci, *The Reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics in Avicenna's Kitāb al-Šifā'*, p. 409–40, Arnzen, "Ibn Rušd on the Structure of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*."

Ibn Falaquera's *De'ot ha-filosofim*, of which we have two manuscripts. The Hebrew version by Ibn Tibbon was translated into Latin by the famous Italian physician and translator Iacob Mantino ben Samuel and printed for the first time in 1523 in Bologna.

As mentioned above, the treatise as we have it today is incomplete. All versions transmit unanimously Ibn Rushd's declaration in the introduction that he had divided the work into five chapters, as well as his repeated references to the fifth chapter. However, all versions break off after the end of the fourth chapter. It is not clear whether the absence of Chapter Five was caused by a codicological mishap in an early stage of the transmission or by Ibn Rushd's—unrealized—plan to revise or entirely re-write this chapter. What can be excluded with certainty is that its absence was caused by Ibn Rushd's deliberate decision either never to compose it or to delete an early version without any substitute, as claimed in the colophon of some manuscripts¹³.

That Ibn Rushd indeed revised the present treatise—presumably several times—can be inferred from the following observations. First, in all probability he began working on it shortly after having completed the "Epitomes on Natural Philosophy"¹⁴, that is in the early sixties of the twelfth century. As already recognized by al-'Alawī¹⁵ the treatise as we have it today contains a reference to Ibn Rushd's *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*. This reference occurs in a section transmitted in two versions the earlier of which lacks the reference¹⁶. Accordingly, the second version including the reference must have been added during or after the composition of the literal commentary on the *Metaphysics*, which dates from a late period, probably from the years 1192–94¹⁷.

13 This problem is discussed in detail in my article "On the Nature and Fate of Chapter V of Ibn Rushd's *Epitome* of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*," cf. also below, note 688.

14 Cf. M. Alonso, *Teología de Averroes* p. 56, 67sq., J. al-'Alawī, *Al-Matn al-rushdī*, p. 57sq.

15 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 58.

16 Cf. p. 73, l. 5–7 of the translation, and note 254.

17 Cf. J. al-'Alawī, *Al-Matn al-rushdī*, p. 109sq., M. Bouyges, *NOTICE*, p. XXV. As a matter of fact, a reference found in the literal commentary ("We have mentioned ... at another place," *Tafsīr Mā ba'd al-ṭabī'a*, p. 1279, l. 15 – p. 1280, l. 1) is in all likelihood to the present *Epitome* of the *Metaphysics*; cf. below, note 439. If this is in fact the case, the composition of the literal commentary and the revision of the present treatise must have taken place at least partially at the same time; cf. also p. 259sq., note 352.

Other references point in the same direction, e.g. two references to “the natural sciences” seem to relate to the paraphrase (*Talkhīṣ*) of *De caelo* composed in 1171¹⁸. Again another reference, now to what “has been discussed elsewhere” very likely directs us to Ibn Rushd’s *Tahāfut al-tahāfut*, a work he wrote after 1170, in all probability after 1180¹⁹.

Unlike the above-mentioned reference to the *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*, these references do not occur in sections transmitted in more than one version. This may possibly point to the fact that the splitting of the transmission testified by sections transmitted in more than one version is to be dated after approximately 1180. The manuscripts I had at my disposal contain eight sections of varying length transmitted in more than one version²⁰. In most of these cases, the manuscripts display two versions, in some cases even three, where the third version consists either in subsequent copies of the two versions transmitted in the other manuscripts or in a hybrid combination of these²¹.

In all cases, these sections fit coherently in the overall context. As their contents concern topics which are known to have posed a problem to Ibn Rushd and to have caused constant grappling and modification of his approach, such as the role of universal forms in the generation of living beings, the spontaneous generation of animals, or the one *qua* principle of numbers, there can be little doubt that we are faced with authentic revisions by Ibn Rushd himself²². This assumption is further born out by passages transmitted in one branch of the manuscripts, yet omitted in the other. As far as the absence of such passages cannot be explained through omission by homoioteleuton, these passages may be considered as later additions by Ibn Rushd²³.

18 Cf. below, p. 145, lines 4 and 11 of the translation, and notes 566sq. For the date cf. Ibn Rushd, *Talkhīṣ al-samāʾ wa-l-ʿālam*, ed. J. al-ʿAlawī, p. 46sq.

19 Cf. below, p. 168ult. of the translation, and note 642. For the date cf. Ibn Rushd, *Tahāfut al-tahāfut*, ed. M. Bouyges, p. XI sq., J. al-ʿAlawī, *Al-Matn al-rushdī*, p. 100sq.

20 These sections are found in the translation on p. 37, 65sq., 71, 73, 93sq., 112–14, and 171–74, printed in two columns.

21 Whenever the transmission of integral sections splits up into three branches it can thus be reduced to exactly two competing versions.

22 That Ibn Rushd revised the epitomes in later periods of his project is also known from other works, such as the epitomes on *De anima* and the *Physics*.

23 Such additions occur on p. 40sq., 60, 61sq., 72sq., 111sq., 118, 123sq., 128,

Provided the above assumption is correct, the extant manuscripts thus reflect at least three different stages of Ibn Rushd's work on the present treatise, namely the initial period of the original composition in the early sixties of the twelfth century, the first stage of revision up to around 1180, and a second stage of revision contemporaneous with the composition of the *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*²⁴. The absence of Chapter Five even points to a third stage of revision, now devoted to the intense revision or complete re-writing of this chapter. Obviously, Ibn Rushd could not complete this final stage of revision, probably due to the political and biographical turbulences that marked the last years of his life and, finally, his death in 1198.

3. Editions and previous translations

There are five editions of the Arabic text of the present treatise, none of which meets the requirements of definitive critical editions. In chronological order these are:

1. *Kitāb Mā ba'd al-ṭabī'a*. [Edited by] Muṣṭafā al-Qabbānī. Cairo: al-Maṭba'at al-adabiyya, n.d. [1905?].

Al-Qabbānī's edition is solely based on ms. Cairo, *Dār al-Kutub, al-Ḥikma wa-l-Falsafa 5*. It is marked by misreadings, omissions, and deliberate changes to the wording of the manuscript.

168, and 178 of the translation, as noted in the relevant footnotes to the text. In most cases, the additions are transmitted in all manuscripts to the exclusion of ms. Cairo, *Dār al-Kutub, al-Ḥikma wa-l-Falsafa 5*. Hence, we may conclude that this manuscript represents an earlier stage of revision of the present treatise. As this manuscript also lacks the two references to the *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics* and to the *Tahāfut al-tahāfut* mentioned above, the manuscript from which it was copied might possibly go back to a version copied before approximately 1180. However, since ms. Cairo, *Dār al-Kutub, al-Ḥikma wa-l-Falsafa 5* is also otherwise unreliable and lacunose, we must be cautious with these kinds of inferences.

- 24 Among the causes that motivated these revisions one might take into account Ibn Rushd's re-consideration of the Aristotelian work during the composition of the paraphrase and the literal commentary on the *Metaphysics*. The former possibly dates from the year 1174; cf. M. Alonso, *Teología de Averroes* p. 65, 85 sq.

2. *Compendio de Metafísica*. Texto árabe con traducción y notas de Carlos Quirós Rodríguez. Madrid: Imprenta de Estanislao Maestre, 1919.

This edition is based on two manuscripts, ms. Madrid, *Biblioteca Nacional*, ms. ar. 5000 and the Cairo manuscript used by al-Qabbānī. It is not free of misreadings, but much more reliable than al-Qabbānī's edition. However, there is no apparatus criticus for the numerous discrepancies between the two manuscripts; and in many cases, Quirós Rodríguez has fabricated his own text by mixing up the two manuscripts. The edition has been reprinted twice:

2.1 *Averroes. Compendio de Metafísica*. Presentación Josep Puig Montada. Edición Pedro Bazán Correa. Córdoba: Universidad de Córdoba, 1998.

2.2 *Abū l-Walīd Ibn Rushd. Kitāb 'Ilm mā ba'd aṭ-ṭabī'a (Compendio de metafísica): Texto árabe de Carlos Quirós Rodríguez*. Edited by Fuat Sezgin. Publications of the Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science. Islamic Philosophy, vol. 57. Frankfurt am Main: Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science, 1999.

3. *Kitāb Mā ba'd al-ṭabī'a li-l-Faqīh al-Qādī al-'Allāma Abī l-Walīd Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Rushd al-Qurtubī*. Rasā'il Ibn Rushd, vol. 6. Hyderabad: Maṭba'at Dā'irat al-Ma'ārif al-'Uthmāniyya, 1365/1946.

This edition is based on a manuscript of the *Kitābkhāna-i Āṣafīya-i Sarkār-i 'Alī* in Hyderabad²⁵, which sometimes supports the readings of ms. Madrid, *Biblioteca Nacional*, ms. ar. 5000, sometimes those of ms. Cairo, *Dār al-Kutub, al-Ḥikma wa-l-Falsafa* 5, and at other places proceeds independently. In the margins, the edition occasionally gives the variant readings of ms. Hyderabad, *Maktabat Dā'irat al-Ma'ārif al-'Uthmāniyya, Acq[uisition] 665*, referred to by the siglum ɔ.

4. *Talkhīṣ Mā ba'd al-ṭabī'a*. Ḥaḡḡaḡahū wa-qaddama laḥū 'Uthmān Amīn. Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1958.

In addition to the two manuscripts used by Quirós Rodríguez, Amīn relies on ms. Cairo, *Dār al-Kutub, Coll. Taymūr Pāshā, Ḥikma 117*, which is certainly a step forward for the constitution of the text. However, Amīn's choice between variant readings of the three manuscripts is rather unsystematic. On a number of occasions he arbitrarily implements modifications to the actual wording of these manuscripts

25 Presumably, this is the undated ms. 597 which contains, according to the library catalogue, the *Rasā'il Ibn Rushd*; cf. Mīr 'Uthmān 'Alīkhān Bahādur, *Fihrist-i kutub-i 'arabī wa-farsī wa-urdū makhzūna-i Kitābkhāna-i Āṣafīya-i Sarkār-i 'Alī*. 4 vols. Hyderabad: Dār al-Ṭab' Jāmi'a-i 'Uthmāniya-i Sarkār-i 'Alī, 1332/1914–1355/1936, vol. 4, p. 488.

or the order of the text without manuscript evidence (often following suggestions by al-Qabbānī or by Van den Bergh in the notes to his translation, cf. below, #11). Amīn's edition, which depicts the text erroneously as a Paraphrase (*Talkhīs*), has been reprinted in Teheran:

4.1 *Talkhīs Mā ba'd al-tabr'a*. Ḥaqqāqahū wa-qaddama lahū 'Uthmān Amīn. Majmū'a-i Āshnā'ī bā Falsafa-i Gharb, vol. 9. Teheran: Intishārāt-i Ḥikmat, 1377/1998.

5. *Risālat Mā ba'd al-tabr'a*. [Ed.] Jīrār Jihāmī. Taqdīm wa-dabt wa-ta'liq Rafīq al-'Ajam. Rasā'il Ibn Rushd al-Falsafiyya, vol. 6. Beirut: Dār al-Fikr al-Lubnānī, 1994.

This edition is basically a reprint of edition # 3, to which the editors supplied some corrections and modifications. Furthermore, the segmentation of the text is different, and sub-headings have been added.

While there is no edition of the medieval Hebrew translations available, Jacob Mantino's Latin translation of Ibn Tibbon's Hebrew version has been printed several times. The first edition, not available to me, appeared in 1523 in Bologna, dedicated to Hercules (Ercole) Gonzaga, bishop of Mantua. In the following four decades, at least four further editions appeared.

6. *Averrois Epithoma totius Metaphisices Aristotelis in quattuor sectvm tractatvs*. Interprete Iacob Mantin Dertvaensi Hebreo artivm et medicinae Doctore ad Ill.m Principem ac D.R.D. Hercvlem Consagam, electvm Mantvanvm. Ad instantiam heredum Benedicti Hecctoris, bibliopolae Bononiensis, anno Domini 1523, die 3 decembris²⁶.

7. "Epithoma Averrois in Librum Metaphysicae. Iacob Mantin medico hebreo interprete." In *Averrois Cordvbensis Epithoma totius Metaphisices Aristotelis. Prohemium duodecimi libri Metaphisices. Eivsdem Paraphrases in Libris quatuor de Cælo, & duobus de Generatione & corruptione Aristotelis*. Venetiis apud Hieronymum Scotum, 1542, p. 2–156²⁷.

8. "Averrois Cordvbensis Epitome in librvm Metaphysicæ Aristotelis. Iacob Mantino hebræo medico interprete." In *Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri XIII. Cum Averrois Cordvbensis in eosdem commentariis, et Epitome. Theophrasti Metaphysicorum liber*. Vol. 8 of *Aris-*

26 Cf. *Index Aureliensis* # 109.809.

27 Cf. *Index Aureliensis* # 109.818. A scan of this edition is accessible online via www.thomasinstitut.uni-koeln.de/averroes_db/links.html.

totelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis. Venetiis apud Iunctas, 1562, fol. 356r–397r²⁸.

Reprinted, with identical foliation, in:

8.1 *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis*. 9 vols. and 3 supplementa. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1962.

There are three previous modern translations of the Arabic text. Horten's translation is based on ms. Cairo, *Dār al-Kutub, al-Hikma wa-l-Falsafa* 5. The other two translations have been prepared from this Cairo manuscript plus ms. Madrid, *Biblioteca Nacional, ms. ar. 5000*. Van den Bergh also takes the Latin translation by Mantino into consideration.

- 9.** *Die Metaphysik des Averroes (1198†)*. Nach dem Arabischen übersetzt und erläutert von Max Horten. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte, vol. 36. Halle an der Saale: Max Niemeyer, 1912. Reprint, Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1960.
- 10.** *Compendio de Metafísica*. Texto árabe con traducción y notas de Carlos Quirós Rodríguez. Madrid: Imprenta de Estanislao Maestre, 1919. Reprinted in # **2.1**.
- 11.** *Die Epitome der Metaphysik des Averroes*. Übersetzt und mit einer Einleitung und Erläuterungen versehen von Simon Van den Bergh. Veröffentlichungen der De Goeje-Stiftung, vol. 7. Leiden: Brill, 1924.

4. *The present translation and notes*

The present translation is based on a complete collation of eight Arabic manuscripts and edition # 3, which represents a ninth manuscript, otherwise not accessible to me²⁹. Additionally, the Arabic manuscripts have been completely collated with I. Mantino's Latin translation. It goes without saying that a definitive *constitutio textus* is not possible until the remaining Arabic manuscripts, not available to me, have been

28 A scan of this edition is accessible online at <http://gallica.bnf.fr>. Two further editions of *Aristotelis Opera* including Mantino's translation appeared in Venice in 1552 (apud Iunctas) and 1560 (apud Cominum de Tridino Montisferrati); cf. *Index Aureliensis* # 108.193 and # 108.423; Ferdinand Edward Cranz, *A Bibliography of Aristotle Editions, 1501–1600*. 2d ed. with addenda and revisions by Charles B. Schmitt. Bibliotheca Bibliographica Aureliana, vol. 38. Baden-Baden: Valentin Koerner, 1984, p. 55, 75.

29 For these manuscripts cf. above, note 25, and the list of sigla, below.

collated and considered regarding their filiation. However, the text reconstructible on the basis of these ten testimonies is considerably more reliable than the versions accessible in the previous editions.

For the constitution of the text, one has to keep separate, in general, sections revised by Ibn Rushd *and* transmitted in more than one version from the remaining text. Sections of this type are printed in the translation in two columns, and their manuscript transmission is explained in the relevant footnotes. In some cases, one of the two reconstructible versions has been transmitted in one manuscript only. Accordingly, the degree of uncertainty inherent in such a unique transmission is remarkably higher than in the second version. In view of the intense contamination of the transmission, I refrained from attempting to identify and present the other stages of revision as well by specific modes of layout. Instead of this, problems of different versions and revisions are discussed in the endnotes.

As for the remaining text, the filiation of the manuscripts is divided into two main branches: on the one side (α) mss. *A*, *D*, *H*, *M*, and *Q*, on the other side (β) mss. *G*, *P*, *R*, and *T*. However, with the exception of mss. *H* and *M*, all testimonies including Mantino's translation are contaminated with variant readings adopted from the other branch of filiation. The oldest manuscripts, *H*, *M*, and *Q*, belong to family (α) which is thus reconstructible in a more reliable way than family (β). Ms. *Q* is closely related to ms. *H*; however, its *Vorlage* must have been contaminated by ms. *M* or one of its apographs. Mss. *A* and *D* show traces of both lines of family (α). The most important manuscript of family (β) is ms. *P*, which stems from an early representative of this family and is less heavily contaminated from the side of family (α) than the remaining mss. of this branch. Mss. *G* and *T* are closely related and stem from an ancestor heavily contaminated by variant readings from ms. *Q*. Ms. *Q* is also the manuscript which shows the closest relation to the Hebrew manuscript(s) used by I. Mantino.

At some places, edition # 8 of Mantino's translation indicates at the margins variant readings by the abbreviation *a.l.* (= *alia lectio*). In all likelihood, such notes point, not to variant readings of the Latin translation, but rather to those in the Arabic manuscripts. E.g. the reading 'genus' instead of 'corpus' (fol. 374rb) suggests the manuscript transmission of '*jins*' instead of '*jism*', that of 'concordia' instead of 'copulatiua' (fol. 375rb) the reading '*ijmā*' instead of '*jimā*'. Some of these variant readings are not attested by any of the Arabic manuscripts at my disposal.

As the translation below draws on my own reconstruction of the text based on the collation of these ten testimonies, it often deviates from the wording found in the above-mentioned Arabic editions. Noting each variant reading would have required a complete apparatus criticus in its own right—an undertaking obviously inappropriate for the publication of a translation. Therefore, information about the Arabic text has been restricted to three modes of presentation. (i) The most important variants of the manuscripts and deviations from the Arabic editions have been noted in footnotes underneath the translation (referred to by superscript letters). (ii) Whenever problems of the transmission concern entire paragraphs of the text, e.g. sections transmitted in more than one version and similar cases, the reconstructed Arabic text which served as the basis of the translation is quoted in the relevant endnote. (iii) A number of less significant problems of the *constitutio textus* are discussed en passant in the endnotes (referred to by bracketed numbers).

In a few exceptional cases the translation deviates from all ten testimonies. In these cases, I assume an omission or mistake handed down from the initial stage of transmission. That the archetype of the ten testimonies was not perfect is clear from two lacunae present in all manuscripts including Mantino's translation³⁰. In three cases I assume omissions of one or two words³¹; in two other cases I assume genuine scribal errors³². Furthermore, a number of deviations consist in minor modifications of wrongly dotted Arabic words.

In general, I have tried to translate as literal as possible, to preserve the terminological and phraseological details and peculiarities, to uncover Ibn Rushd's intention as precise as possible, and to be consistent in all this³³. The previous modern translations have been taken into

30 Cf. p. 64, footnote (a), and p. 80, footnote (c).

31 The relevant conjectural additions are printed in the translation between angle brackets and explained in the footnotes; cf. p. 21, footnote (a), p. 44, footnote (a), p. 50, footnote (a).

32 Cf. p. 97, footnote (a), p. 131, footnote (a), and the related endnotes 347 and 506.

33 However, sometimes these aims come into conflict. A good example is the expression *al-'ilm al-ṭabī'ī* which, in the present treatise, may mean (i) natural sciences/philosophy as a discipline, (ii) Aristotle's works on natural philosophy, (iii) Ibn Rushd's commentaries on Aristotle's works on natural philosophy, (iv) Aristotle's *Physics* in particular, and (v) one of Ibn Rushd's writings on Aristotle's *Physics*. In my translation of this term I discarded terminological

account for each part of the work. Van den Bergh's notes, though often missing the mark, provided lots of useful hints. As compared to these earlier works, I had the great advantage of having at my disposal a number of texts not available at that time. E.g. the first chapter of the treatise draws heavily on al-Fārābī's *Kitāb al-Hurūf* the consultation of which helped clarify a number of difficult sections. Many problems of the constitution of the text and its meaning could be solved by taking into consideration Ibn Rushd's *Tahāfut al-tahāfut* and, especially, the corresponding sections of the *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*. The same holds true for the Arabic versions of works composed by (or ascribed to) Alexander of Aphrodisias intensely referred to by Ibn Rushd in the fourth chapter, yet unavailable to the previous translators.

In the translation below, words, phrases, or paragraph numbers added in order to render the text more fluent and unambiguous or to make the structure of the argument readily accessible are set between square brackets. The same applies to the translation of personal pronouns replaced by the relevant word or concept to which they refer and to translations of implied subjects or objects of finite verbs. In order to facilitate the comparison with the Arabic and Latin texts, page and folio numbers of the three most widespread Arabic editions and the Latin edition # 8 (resp. 8.1) are given in the margins of the translation.

While the footnotes indicate major problems of the constitution of the text and of the previous translations, the endnotes aim at other purposes. First, they serve to indicate the relevant sections of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and other works commented upon or referred to by Ibn Rushd. Secondly, I tried there to supply exact references to the available editions for Ibn Rushd's references to other works of his as well as to point out interesting or more detailed discussions of a topic in other works. Thirdly, the endnotes discuss and explain difficult sections of the treatise and suggest further reading. Finally, special attention is paid to Ibn Rushd's terminology and its roots in the earlier Arabic philosophy and in the Graeco-Arabic translations. All translations in the footnotes and endnotes are mine, unless otherwise indicated.

consistency and aimed at precision. In other words, when it was evident that Ibn Rushd referred to a particular passage in Aristotle's *Physics* or to his epitomes of Aristotle's physical writings rather than to the discipline of natural philosophy in general, I made this explicit in the translation.

SIGLA AND ABBREVIATIONS

*Sigla**1. Manuscripts*

- A* Hyderabad, *Kitābkhāna-i Āṣafīya-i Sarkār-i ‘Alī*, as printed in edition # 3 (cf. above, p. 12).
- D* (*D^{marg}*) Dublin, *The Chester Beatty Library*, ms. 4523 (marginal corrections in *D*).
- G* (*G^{marg}*) Princeton, *Yahuda Section of the Garret Collection of Arabic Manuscripts in the Princeton University Library*, ms. 860 (marginal corrections in *G*).
- H* Cairo, *Dār al-Kutub, al-Hikma wa-l-Falsafa* 5.
- M* (*M^{marg}*) Madrid, *Biblioteca Nacional*, ms. ar. 5000 (marginal corrections in *M*).
- P* Princeton, *Yahuda Section of the Garret Collection of Arabic Manuscripts in the Princeton University Library*, ms. 849.
- Q* (*Q²/Q^{a.m.}*) Cairo, *Dār al-Kutub, Collection Taymūr Pāshā, Hikma 117* (additions and correction by the same hand/by another hand).
- R* Rampur, *Raza Library*, ms. ع 3609 (olim *Kitābkhāna-i Riyāsat-i Rāmpūr*, ms. 3905).
- T* (*T^{marg}*) Teheran, *Kitābkhāna-i Markazī-yi Dānishgāh-i Tih-rān, Coll. Mishkāt*, ms. 275 (marginal corrections in *T*).

2. Editions (page/folio concordance given in the margins)

- a* *Talkhīṣ Mā ba‘d al-ṭabī‘a. Ḥaqqaqahū wa-qaddama lahū ‘Uth-mān Amīn*. Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1958.

- j* *Risālat Mā ba‘d al-tabī‘a*. [Ed.] Jirār Jihāmī. Taqdīm wa-dabṭ wa-ta‘līq Rafīq al-‘Ājam. Rasā‘il Ibn Rushd al-Falsafiyya, vol. 6. Beirut: Dār al-Fikr al-Lubnānī, 1994.
- m* “Averrois Cordvbensis Epitome in librvm Metaphysicæ Aristotelis. Iacob Mantino hebræo medico interprete.” In *Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri XIII. Cum Averrois Cordvbensis in eisdem commentariis, et Epitome. Theophrasti Metaphysicorum liber*. Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis. Vol. 8. Venetiis apud Iunctas, 1562.
- q* *Compendio de Metafísica*. Texto árabe con traducción y notas de Carlos Quirós Rodríguez. Madrid: Imprenta de Estanislao Maestre, 1919.

Abbreviations

<i>An. post.</i>	Aristotle, <i>Posterior Analytics</i>
<i>c.</i>	cum, used together with
<i>CAG</i>	Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca
<i>Cat.</i>	Aristotle, <i>Categories</i>
<i>De gen. et corr.</i>	Aristotle, <i>De generatione et corruptione</i>
<i>def.</i>	Definition
<i>ed.</i>	Edition, edited by
<i>GALex</i>	Endress, Gerhard, and Dimitri Gutas, eds., <i>A Greek & Arabic Lexicon (GALex): Materials for a Dictionary of the Mediæval Translations from the Greek into Arabic</i> . Leiden: Brill, 2002–.
<i>K.</i>	Kitāb
<i>Lit.</i>	Literally
<i>Metaph.</i>	Aristotle, <i>Metaphysics</i>
<i>ms. (mss.)</i>	Manuscript(s)
<i>s.v.</i>	sub voce, under the word
<i>transl.</i>	translation, translated by
<i>vs.</i>	versus
<i>WGAÜ</i>	Ullmann, Manfred, <i>Wörterbuch zu den griechisch-arabischen Übersetzungen des 9. Jahrhunderts</i> . Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2002; idem, <i>Wörterbuch</i>

zu den griechisch-arabischen Übersetzungen des 9. Jahrhunderts. Supplement. 2 vols. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2006–2007.

- WKAS Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft, *Wörterbuch der Klassischen Arabischen Sprache*. Bearbeitet von Manfred Ullmann. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1970–.
- [] Added by the translator, in order to render the text more fluent and clear-cut.
- < > Translation of a conjectural addition to the text of the manuscripts.
- { } Translation of words found in the manuscripts, which appear to be redundant.
- † ... † Omission in the Arabic manuscripts, which cannot be restored.

[Abū l-Walīd Muḥammad ibn Rushd's So-called Epitome of the *Metaphysics*]

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

⟨CHAPTER ONE⟩^a

In this treatise, we wish to present scientific doctrines gathered from [1] the treatises Aristotle devoted to the science of metaphysics in the manner we have practised generally in the preceding books [2]. Accordingly, we shall start by supplying information on the aim of this science, its usefulness, its parts, its place [in the order of the sciences] and its relationship [with the other sciences], in short, we begin with that the consideration of which may help to get access to this science [3].

We say: As mentioned elsewhere [4] there are three sorts of disciplines and sciences: [(i)] theoretical disciplines (these are [the disciplines] which aim at nothing but knowledge), [(ii)] practical disciplines (these are [the disciplines] in which knowledge is [sought] for the sake of deeds), [(iii)] disciplines which serve and guide these [theoretical and practical sciences], namely the logical disciplines. Furthermore, it has been mentioned in the *Book of Demonstration* that there are two sorts of theoretical disciplines: universal and departmental [5]. Universal [disciplines] are those which take into consideration being as such and its essential concomitants. There are three such [disciplines]:

a1 j29
m356r q5

a2

q6

a All manuscripts begin, as usual, with the Basmalah. Only the relatively young manuscripts *D*, *P*, and *T* display, after the Basmalah, a title in its own right, namely *Kitāb mā ba'da l-tabr'a*, 'Book of Metaphysics'. The chapter heading added here is omitted in all manuscripts. However, all manuscripts indicate the beginning of the following chapters, starting with Chapter Two (cf. below, p. 52 of the translation), and Ibn Rushd refers to the present section of the work explicitly as "Chapter One" (*al-maqāla al-ūlā*, cf. below, p. 26). Ms. *M* adds after the Basmalah "It says the judge Abū l-Walīd Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Rushd (may God be pleased with him)."

dialectic, sophistics, and this science [of metaphysics] [6]. The departmental [disciplines], on the other hand, take into consideration being in a certain disposition.

j30 At the same place, it is said that there are only two departmental [disciplines]: physics (this is the [discipline] which takes into consideration changeable being) and mathematics (the [discipline] which takes into consideration quantity as something separated from matter) [7]. All this has been laid down [generally] in the *Book of Demonstration*^a, and we have to take it into consideration in the present context.

We say: As for the division of these theoretical sciences into these three parts only, this is a necessary consequence of the division of beings themselves into the three kinds [mentioned above]^b. For, if one examines the beings, one finds that some of them are constituted in matter, and consequently one takes into consideration this species of beings and their concomitants independently (as is clear to anybody practising physics), and one finds also some [beings] in the definition of which matter does not occur, though they exist in matter (as is clear^c to anybody considering mathematics), and consequently all species of these [beings] and their concomitants are taken into consideration again independently. And since in physics there appeared other principles which are neither [something constituted] in matter nor something that is found with respect to a certain disposition, but rather are existence as such, these [principles] must be an object of consideration in a general discipline which takes into consideration being^d in an absolute manner.

m356v

Furthermore, there are general things shared by sensible [material] and nonsensible [immaterial] things such as oneness, multiplicity, potency, actuality and other general concomitants, and, in general, things which adhere to sensible things with respect to the fact that they are existents (this respect is peculiar to the things separated [from matter],

a3

q7

a After 'Demonstration' ms. *M* adds *wa-l-amru fīhi zāhirun* ('and the issue is evident'), I. Mantino adds & *est notum*.

b Lit. 'into those three kinds'.

c Omitting *ayḍan* after *bayyinun* ('also clear') as in ms. *G* and I. Mantino. The other manuscripts have *ayḍan* here due to a misplaced insertion of a marginal note in which the omission of another *ayḍan*, seven words later (after *al-naẓaru*), was corrected. This second (and correct) *ayḍan* having been omitted at an early stage of the transmission is absent in mss. *H*, *M*, and I. Mantino.

d *Al-wujūd* in all mss. except *M* and *P* which read *al-mawjūd* ('the existent').

as we shall show below). No other discipline can take into consideration things of this kind except the discipline whose subject matter is being^a as such.

Now, if this is the case, while it has [already] appeared that the theoretical sciences are [divided into] two parts, departmental and universal, the departmental ones having been dealt with in the preceding [treatises], that which remains to be dealt with is consequently this science. It aims, as has been shown, at considering [(i)] being inasmuch as it is being, [(ii)] all its species up to [that point] where it reaches the subject matters of the departmental sciences, [(iii)] the essential concomitants of [being *qua* being], and [(iv)] at the completion^b of all this [by considering] the first causes of [being *qua* being], i.e. the things separated [from matter]. This is why this science states only the formal and the final causes, and, in a specific respect, the efficient cause, that is to say, not in the respect in which the efficient cause is predicated of changeable things, since it is here [in metaphysics] not subject to the condition of being temporally prior to its effect as is the case [with efficient causes] in natural things [8]. Whenever causes are stated in physics, this is stated only with respect to nature and natural things. Correspondingly, the causes of the existents [*qua* existents] whose statement is sought here [in metaphysics], are stated only with respect to the divinity and the divine things^c.

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In short, it is [Aristotle's] basic aim in this science to state that which remains [to be stated] scientifically with respect to the knowledge of the most remote causes of sensible things [9], because that which has been shown in this respect in physics are only two remote causes, namely the material and the moving [causes]. What remains to be shown here [in metaphysics] are their formal and final causes, and [also] the agent. For [Aristotle] thinks that that which moves is distinct from the agent inasmuch as that which moves gives to the movable

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a *Al-mawjūd* in all mss. except *M* which reads *al-wujūd* ('existence').

b Reading *tawfiya* with almost all manuscripts instead of *tarqiya* ('raising', 'improving') attested by ms. *M* only and adopted by Quirós and Amīn.

c Reading *min jihat al-ilāhi wa-l-ashyā'i l-ilāhiyya*, as in almost all mss., instead of *min jihat al-ālati wa-l-ashyā'i l-ilāhiyya* (ms. *H*) or *min jihat al-ālati wa-l-ashyā'i l-āliyya* (ed. Jihāmī); cf. also *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*, p. 154, l. 14sq., p. 707, l. 4sq., p. 1421–1426.

only [its] motion, whereas the agent gives the form through which the motion [occurs]. This knowledge is peculiar to this science because it is through general things that one apprehends the existence of these causes; and this still [holds true] when we take for granted here what became plain in physics: that there is an immaterial [first] mover [10].

As for the material cause and the most remote moving cause, premises which facilitate their determination appeared there, I mean in physics. What is more, a specific demonstration [11] of the two [causes] is possible in no other [science], especially [in the case of] the moving cause. (The demonstrations employed by Ibn Sīnā in this science [of metaphysics] in order to show [the existence] of the first principle are, on the other hand, altogether dialectical and untrue propositions, which do not state anything in an appropriate manner [12], as can be seen from the counter-arguments set forth by Abū Ḥāmid [al-Ghazālī] against these [propositions] in his book on *The Incoherence [of the Philosophers]*). Therefore, he who practises this science [of metaphysics] takes for granted the existence of the [first mover] from physics, as said before, and states [only] the mode in which it is the moving [cause], just as he takes for granted the number of the [celestial] movers^a from the discipline of mathematical astronomy. What has become plain in physics with respect to the existence of separate principles is not superfluous in this science [of metaphysics], as Ibn Sīnā maintains, but rather necessary, because it is employed in this science as a supposition [13] and as such forms part of its presuppositions [14].

From what has been said so far, the aim and the presuppositions of this science have become clear. As for its parts, we find this [science] unfolded^b in the [single] treatises [of the *Metaphysics*] attributed to Aristotle [15]. However, it can be reduced to three [major] parts [as follows].

a Reading ‘*adada l-muḥarrikīna*’ with the Hebrew tradition and Mantino’s translation (“*numerus motorum*”). Most of the Arabic mss. have *wujūda ‘adadi l-muḥarrikīna* (‘the existence of the number of the [celestial] movers’) or ‘*adada wujūdi l-muḥarrikīna*’ (‘the number of the existence of the [celestial] movers’), presumably due to an erroneous interpolation of the variant reading *wujūd* instead of ‘*adad*’. Cf. also the almost identical phrasing in Ibn Rusūd’s *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*, p. 1653, l. 12–14.

b *Najiduhū muntashiran* in all Arabic mss., as opposed to “*inueniuntur (scil. partes ipsius) disseminatae*” in I. Mantino.

In the first part [Aristotle] takes into consideration sensible things inasmuch as they are existents, all their genera which form the ten categories, and all their concomitants which adhere to them, and relates [all] this to what is first in them, as far as this is possible in this part [of metaphysics].

In the second part he takes into consideration the principles of substance—these are the separate things—, explains their mode of existence, relates them likewise to their first principle, which is God (exalted is He), explains His specific attributes and acts, and shows also the relationship between Him and the remaining existents and [the fact] that He is the utmost perfection, the first form, and the first agent, until [he finally comes to] other things, [both those] which are specific to each of the separate things, and [those which] are common to more than one of them [16].

In the third part he takes into consideration the subject matters of the departmental sciences [17] and eliminates the mistakes committed by the ancients on this [subject], namely in the discipline of logic and in the two departmental disciplines, that is physics and mathematics. The reason for [proceeding in] this way is that it is inappropriate for the departmental sciences to establish the truth of their principles and to eliminate errors occurring about them (as is shown in the *Book of Demonstration* [18]). This is rather the task of a general discipline, that is either this discipline [of metaphysics] or the discipline of dialectic. However, the discipline of dialectic reduces such opinions to absurdity merely through generally accepted statements for which there is no guarantee that they do not contain any falsehood, whereas this discipline [of metaphysics does so] through true statements, even if they might accidentally serve as generally accepted [statements]. Accordingly, the verification of the principles of the departmental disciplines is not a necessary part of this science [19].

From this it is clear that only the first two parts of this science are necessary parts [of it], whereas the third part [is included] for the purpose of improving [the acquisition of the other sciences] [20], since the existence of most of the subject matters of the departmental sciences and their mode of existence belong to what is self-evident, and only the ancients who preceded [Aristotle] lapsed into mistakes in this [matter]. On the basis of a complete knowledge of these [things], however, these aporiai could be solved the way uncertainty occurring in anything is resolved, through completing one's knowledge of this [thing] together with acquiring knowledge of its substance [21].

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Nevertheless, we decided to arrange the present book in five chapters. In Chapter One we present the introduction^a, which we are now in the midst of, and explain the terms employed in this discipline [of metaphysics] [22]. In Chapter Two we set forth the things which serve as species for what belongs to the first part of this discipline. In Chapter
 j34 Three we set forth the general concomitants of these [things], while the Fourth [Chapter]^b contains a lecture on what the second part of this science includes. Chapter Five comprises what the third part of this discipline contains [23].

The benefit of this science is of the same kind as that of [the other] theoretical sciences. This has already become clear in the book *On the Soul* where it has been stated that their aim consists in perfecting the rational soul to such an extent that man achieves its utmost perfection [24]. However, although the benefit of this science is of the same kind as that of [the other] theoretical sciences, it occupies the highest rank among them in this [respect], because this science is related to the other theoretical sciences as an end and completion. For through the knowl-
 a7 q11 edge of this [science] one acquires knowledge of the beings in connection with their most remote causes, which is what human cognition is striving for. Furthermore, it is through this science [of metaphysics] that the departmental sciences achieve their completion, since it is [metaphysics] which verifies their principles and eliminates errors occurring about them, as expounded [above].

As for the position of this [science] in [the course of] education, it
 m357v [comes] after physics because it uses as a supposition what this science proves about the existence of immaterial potencies^c, as said [before] [25]. Apparently, it is only due to its position in [the course of] education that this science [of metaphysics] is called the science which [comes] after physics, but except for that, it is prior in being and therefore called first philosophy.

a Pace Van den Bergh, p. 275, the Cairo manuscript reads, as all other manuscripts, *al-ṣadr*.

b *Al-maqāla* is omitted in the oldest manuscripts (Madrid and Cairo) as well as in the Hebrew tradition and most later manuscripts.

c All manuscripts have *quwan*, not ‘forms’ as translated by Quirós (p. 15) and Van den Bergh (p. 6).

[So far] our discourse has explained the aim of this science, its parts, its benefit, its relation and rank [with respect to the other sciences], as well as the meaning of its name. As for the teaching methods employed in this [science], they are the same as those employed in the other sciences. Furthermore, as far as the kinds of proofs employed in this [science] are concerned, these are for the most part proofs [of the existence of something] [26], as we always proceed in this [science] from things better known to us to things better known by nature. However, as said [before], the main contents of this science are either evident or close to self-evident things, or things that have been shown in physics.

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Having explained all that we initially intended [to show], we shall soon proceed to a detailed discourse on what belongs to the first part of this science, after we have specified in how many ways the terms which signify the objects of this science and the parts of its objects are predicated, in order to be well prepared for the study of each thing searched for in this [science]. We say:

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[1] ‘Being’ is predicated in [various] ways. Firstly, [it is predicated] of each of the ten categories and, thus, belongs to the kinds of names^a which are predicated by order and analogy [27], not to those which are predicated^b by pure equivocation or univocally. Secondly, it is predicated of that which is true, that is [if] that which is in the mind is in correspondence with that which is outside the mind, as in statements on whether nature exists or on whether the void does not exist [28]. Furthermore, [‘being’] is predicated of the quiddity of all that has a quiddity or essence outside the soul, no matter whether this essence is conceptualized or not. Thus, it applies to the ten categories that both of these two meanings of the term ‘being’ are predicated of them, the one inasmuch as they have an essence outside the soul, the other inasmuch as they signify the quiddities of these [extramental] essences. Accordingly, the term ‘being’ can be reduced to precisely the following two meanings: that which is true, and that which exists outside the soul,

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a Reading with most of the manuscripts (and I. Mantino) *wa-huwa min anwā' al-asmā'* instead of *wa-huwa/hiya anwā' al-asmā'* (‘and these are the kinds of names’), as edited by Quirós and Jihāmī.

b Reading with the oldest Arabic manuscripts (and I. Mantino) *allatī tuqālu* instead of *alladhī yuqālu* transmitted in some younger manuscripts and edited by Jihāmī.

where the latter is again [divided] into two groups, either species or forms, I mean the forms and quiddities of species^a.

Accidental being cannot be conceptualized as a separately existing [thing] [29], since the essence or quiddity of a thing cannot be an accident. Rather [accidental being] can only be conceptualized in connection with the relation between one existent and another existent. For if we relate one existent to another and this relation requires that one of the two [existents] is part of the quiddity of the other^b, as with the existence of the centre with respect to the circle or of the equality of two right angles with respect to [the sum of] the angles of a triangle, or [if it requires] that either of the two [existents] is part of the quiddity of the other, as with father and son, [then] we say of both of the two [existents] that they are essential existents. But if it does not pertain to the quiddity of at least one of the two to exist [as] belonging to the other^c, [then] it is said that this [exists] accidentally, as when we say ‘the architect is playing oud’, or ‘the physician is white’. The word ‘being’ may [also] signify the relation by which the predicate is connected with the subject in the mind, as well as the words signifying such a relation, no matter whether this connecting link is affirmative or negative, true or false, essential or accidental.

Now, these are the most prominent meanings by which the term ‘being’ is predicated in philosophy, [where] it belongs to the terms transferred [into technical terminology] [30]. The meaning it has in [the language of] the masses is different from what it signifies here [in philosophy], as it signifies among the masses merely a certain [accidental] disposition, as when one says that a stray animal ‘has been found’ [31]. In short, among them it signifies something in a substrate [the meaning of] which is not quite clear. Therefore, some of them thought that [the term] signifies not the essence of a thing, but rather an accident in it, because it is [used] in [the language of] the masses [like] derived [forms of] words [32]. There is no need to take this [meaning further] into account, rather what has to be understood by this [term]

a *Wa-dhālika aydan ilā qismayn immā ilā l-anwāʿ wa-immā ilā l-ṣuwar aʿnī ṣuwar al-anwāʿ wa-māhiyyātihā*, transmitted in all manuscripts except ms. *H*, is partly or entirely secluded in Van den Bergh (p. 7) and Amīn.

b Reading *fī māhiyyat al-thānī* with mss. *H* and *M* (cf. “de quidditate alterius,” I. Mantino, fol. 357vb).

c All manuscripts read *li-l-ākhar*, not *al-ākhar* as edited by Quirós and Amīn.

here, when we are using it in order to signify the essence, is the same as that which is understood by saying ‘thing’ and ‘essence’, and in general as that which is understood by terms which are root morphemes [33]. Therefore, we find some of them maintaining that the term ‘being’ as applied to^a what is true is the same as [‘being’] as applied to the essence; and it is for the same reason that some thought that [being] is an accident, arguing that if the word ‘being’ signified the essence, it would be self-contradictory to say that there is a [certain] being in the substance^b. They failed to notice that ‘being’ in the present [statement] has a meaning different from that propounded above [34].

Furthermore, if [‘being’] signifies an accident in a thing, as stated repeatedly by Ibn Sīnā, one of the [following] two cases must apply to it: this accident is either one of the second intentions or one of the first intentions. If it is one of the first intentions, it is necessarily one of the nine [accidental] categories, and [consequently] the term ‘being’ cannot apply to the substance and^c the remaining categories of the accident, unless this [mode of] predication is somehow accidental to [all of] them or there is one genus of accidents common to [all] ten categories. But all this is absurd and unacceptable. According to this [doctrine], if one were asked what each of the ten categories contains, it would be incorrect to answer [“being”] [35], but all this is self-evident.

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On the other hand, if it is [conceived as] one of the second intentions (that is, intentions which exist only in the mind), nothing prevents us from [holding] this [doctrine of the accidentality of being], for this meaning is one of [the ones] we enumerated, to which the term ‘being’ applies, namely that which is synonymous with the true. However, this meaning and the meaning by which this [term] signifies the essences individually are entirely distinct. All this becomes clear upon a moment

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a Reading, with mss. *Q*, *D*, *T* and I. Mantino, *al-munṭaliq ‘alā* instead of *al-muṭlaq ‘alā* as transmitted in the remaining mss. and adopted by Quirós. For Ibn Rushd’s use of *inṭalaqa* c. *‘alā* cf. his *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*, p. 270, l. 13.

b Reading *innahū fī l-jawhari mawjūdun* instead of *fī l-jawhari innahū mawjūdun*; cf. note 34.

c Reading, with mss. *A*, *D*, *G*, *H*, and *T*, *wa-‘alā* instead of *wa-lā ‘alā* (‘nor on’) transmitted in the remaining mss. and adopted in the editions by Quirós (but not[!] in Quirós’ translation [“no podría aplicarse la palabra *ser* a la substancia y a los restantes predicamentos accidentales”], p. 20sq.) and Amīn.