

The Unity of Plutarch's Work



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The Unity of Plutarch's Work

'Moralia' Themes in the 'Lives',
Features of the 'Lives' in the 'Moralia'

Edited by
Anastasios G. Nikolaidis

Walter de Gruyter · Berlin · New York

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Preface

The annual work on Plutarch registered in *L'Année Philologique* 2006 takes up more than 7 pages, which is a spectacular progress in comparison with the only 2 Plutarch pages twenty years ago. Such eruption of interest in the sage of Chaeroneia can hardly be accidental and is linked, most probably, to the scholarly activities of the International Plutarch Society following its foundation in 1985 (primarily through the triennial international congresses, the local Plutarch conferences in Italy, Spain, USA and Belgium, and, as of 2003, the *Ploutarchos*, the Society's own review). Especially the conferences have invigorated and vitalized Plutarchean studies in two directions: a) by removing Plutarch from the group of the so-called reference authors, and establishing that the Chaeronean is an important literary figure *per se*, whose work deserves to be studied and evaluated for its own merit; and b) by attracting to Plutarch scholars from various other areas who, exploring his writings from their particular perspectives, have shed more light on them, thus conducing to a fuller understanding of our author and his work.

The idea of organizing the IPS triennial Congress at Rethymno was first conceived in response to relevant hints (and encouragement) of several fellow-Plutarchists during the Madrid-Cuenca V International Congress in 1999. The idea took deep roots and so, before the following conference in Nijmegen, I officially informed the Society of my readiness to organize the VII International Congress in Crete. I also proposed its topic (the title of this volume), and on 15/5/2002 Aurelio Pérez Jiménez, President of the IPS at the time, let me know in a letter that the Society had accepted my proposals and, therefore, he formally authorized me to organize the VII International Congress at Rethymno.

The IPS Congress was eventually held at the campus of the University of Crete on 4–8 May 2005, and the present volume (with the exception of 6 papers that were not submitted or were published elsewhere) contains its considerably updated proceedings. The funding came from various sources to which the organizer is deeply grateful. In particular, however, I wish to acknowledge the financial support of the University of Crete, the Greek Ministry of Education, the National Bank of Greece, Motor Oil Hellas, S.A., and Dot Repro, S.A. Further, I am also grateful to the J.F. Costopoulos Foundation and the Educational Research Centre for kindly subsidizing the pub-

lication of the Congress *Acta*. Yet the present volume would have never been published without the generosity and expertise of the De Gruyter publishers.

Special thanks I also owe to Dr. Sabine Vogt, editor of Classical and Ancient Near Eastern Studies, who took interest in the subject-matter of the present volume from the very beginning and kindly introduced me to the Millennium editors; and to Professor Dr. Peter Möllendorff, co-editor of the Millennium Studies, as well as to the reviewers of the series, who made useful suggestions to ameliorate the presentation of the contents of the volume. Finally, I would like to thank the colleague who wishes to remain anonymous for his spending endless hours on technically homogenizing the texts of 55 individual articles that were submitted in a frightful variety of fonts (especially Greek fonts), styles, sizes and spaces.

Rethymno, 12 February 2008

A. G. N.

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Introduction

Anastasios G. Nikolaidis

To speak of the unity of an author's work may, *prima facie*, sound as a truism. But when a literary artist occupies himself simultaneously with different kinds of literature (something not very unusual in antiquity), one may at least wonder about the nature of this variety. Does it consist of autonomous creations that represent the diverse abilities of a manifold intellect, or simply of multiform expressions of a rather uniform mind? Plutarch was not the only polymath and prolific writer in antiquity nor was he unique with respect to the multifariousness of his writings. Yet, whereas one can hardly find a *roter Faden* that runs through and holds together Aristotle's *Categories*, the *History of Animals* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*, for instance, or the *Roman Antiquities* and *On Literary Composition* of Dionysios of Halikarnassos, in Plutarch this connecting thread is always, more or less, discernible in almost all his works whether biographical or philosophical or theological or political or whatever. Whether Plutarch puts down sympotic reminiscences or discourses about Isis and Osiris or on how to study poetry, and whether he writes to compare Aristophanes with Menander or to give political or marital advice, the underlying factor in all these writings is unmistakably one and the same: a profound interest in people and ethical matters in general, and in man's moral character and human behaviour in particular. As Volkmann put it almost one and a half century ago, "Das Ethische ist das eigentliche Element in welchem sein Denken und Wollen sich bewegt" (vol. 1, p. 13).¹ And Hartman, some fifty years later, would deny the Plutarchean authorship of the *Greek Questions* on the grounds that this treatise was not concerned with ethical matters (pp. 137 and 139). These findings, however, do not entail that Plutarch was a crude moralist who stigmatized deeds and conducts, meted out prescriptions for correct ways of living or put forward ideal, and therefore unattainable, patterns of behaviour. On the contrary, his writings demonstrate that he was perfectly aware of the frailty of human nature, which he respectfully regarded as man's lot, in other words, as an inbred characteristic and unavoidable fact.²

1 Cf. also Gréard's contemporaneous statement: "la morale n' est pas seulement une des applications de son génie; c' est son génie même" (p. XII). Since then, no Plutarch scholar has ever failed to cfirm, with various degrees of emphasis, P.'s preoccupation with morality.

2 Cf. *Kim.* 2.5, *Aem.* 34.7-8, *Kleom.* 16.8, and *Moralia* 474A, 481F, 964D-E.

Besides morality, one could also detect and bring up more factors that determine Plutarch's *œuvre*. Religion is one of them;³ the Hellenic *paideia*, which informs most of his writings and which he tries to impart to his readers, is another;⁴ but the unifying force of these factors is not as overwhelming as the moral one. Be that as it may, however important and overriding all the above factors are, Plutarch is neither a monotonous writer nor a dogmatic intellectual. His allegiance to Plato cannot be disputed,⁵ but, on the whole, Plutarch has no ideological fixations and his views and approaches (often of an eclectic nature) are more or less characterized by moderation, broadmindedness, common sense, and a peculiar practical spirit that yokes his theoretical considerations and principles to the realities of the every day life.

Nevertheless, the moral purpose that underlies and unifies Plutarch's literary production is always there. The very titles (let alone the contents) of many of his essays bear adequate witness to this moral purpose, which, after all, is what ultimately links Plutarch the essayist with Plutarch the biographer. For, thanks to the Peripatetics, the affinity between Ethics and biography had become conspicuous by his time, and Ethics, as has been acknowledged since long time ago, is "the branch of philosophy that fostered especially the study of individual lives as exemplars of its precepts."⁶ The genre of biography, therefore, perfectly suited Plutarch's personality and interests, for it satisfied his genuine predilection for ethical matters, and at the same time it served a valuable practical purpose: moral edification as well as self-cultivation and fulfilment by means of concrete historical examples.⁷

The ethical parameter aside, one can also perceive the unity of Plutarch's work through other indications. We already noted the commonsensical element of much of his thinking and the practical spirit underlying many of his evaluations and judgements. By applying common sense criteria, more or less, Plutarch assesses his heroes in the *Lives* and expounds his views in the *Moralia*; it is practical considerations that often mould his opinion about certain historical events, or shape the arguments, explanations and advice in his treatises;⁸ and it is the combination of both these factors that prompt his essays

3 For P.'s religious ideas see primarily Brenk, and more conveniently Flacelière, CLX-CC. See also García Valdés (ed.) and Oakesmith (not without value, despite its age).

4 Cf. Russell, 17.

5 For P.'s Platonism see Jones and cf. Dörrie.

6 Stuart, 121; cf. also Wardman, 94: "The *Lives* are in general a study of *aretê* as it is active in the world".

7 Cf. Wright, 217: "Plutarch's purpose...was a moral one, to illustrate virtue by concrete examples". Cf. also Gossage, 49; and for P.'s moralism in the *Lives* see Pelling, 237-251.

8 Theseus' liaisons with women, for example, discredit the Athenian hero; but Romulus' rape of the Sabines is put down to his credit, because this act of violence was intended

on popular philosophy, his emphasis on the significance of minor virtues and vices (such as πραότης, φιλανθρωπία, αοργησία, and conversely φιλονικία, φιλοπλουτία, but also αδολεσχία, δυσωπία, πολυπραγμοσύνη),⁹ his practical advice on how to fulfil a noble purpose, accomplish a moral achievement, or on how to resist succumbing to passions and fight off shortcomings and weaknesses. By remaining throughout in touch with reality, Plutarch is both humane and practical.¹⁰

As a follower of Plato, Plutarch could not, of course, have been in sympathy with the materialistic systems of the Epicureans and the Stoics.¹¹ Yet the cornerstone of Plato's philosophy, the theory of Ideas, shines through its absence in Plutarch's extant writings, whereas his war against both the Stoa and the Garden is not so much waged at a theoretical level, but more often concerned with the absurdities (as he thought) and the negative practical consequences of their respective doctrines. In Plutarch's mind, the ethical absolutism of the Stoics, proclaiming that there are no small and big vices, that badness is one, and that, unless one is entirely virtuous, one is bad, in other words, recognizing no intermediate condition or any gradation between perfect virtue and utter wickedness, grossly violated common sense and was practically useless;¹² similarly, the Epicurean disparagement of political activity rendered one's qualifications useless to the community, since it deprived him of the opportunity to show his abilities and benefit his fellow-citizens and his country; further, the same discouragement prevented philosophy from refining politics through its educative influence.¹³ Yet, despite his vehement assaults on the Epicurean tenets, the practical Plutarch employs Epicurean arguments to combat superstition in his *Peri deisidaimonias*.

Another important parameter, emblematic of Plutarch's personality, is a deep humanity that pervades most of his writings. This also has long been recognized, and Hirzel (p. 26), devoting a whole chapter to Plutarch's

to benefit the whole Roman people (*Comp. Thes.* - *Rom.* 6). Cf. also the nature of his advice in *Mor.* 91A-92B, 140B, 142C, 470B-C etc. For more examples and discussion see Nikolaidis, 1991, 175-186. Cf. also Russell, 85.

- 9 Cf. also Johnson, 33, Russell, 135. And for the nature of P.'s advice on some of these minor virtues and vices see Ingenkamp. As a matter of fact, P. believed that a sharp distinction between minor and major Ethics was artificial, and that whoever was susceptible to such weaknesses as avidity, irascibility, meddlesomeness, excessive bashfulness or garrulity could never achieve ethical fulfilment. Hence the importance he attaches to denouncing those 'minor' foibles.
- 10 Cf. also Sandbach, 698.
- 11 For P.'s stance toward the Stoics, Babut's thorough study remains the standard work on the subject; for that toward the Epicureans cf. Boulogne; for P.'s attitude towards both cf. Hershbell's twin surveys.
- 12 Cf. Babbitt, 399.
- 13 On these issues cf. Wardman, 197-220, Adam, Barigazzi, Roskam, and Berner – Feldmeier – Heininger – Hirsch-Luipold.

“Philanthropie”, declares that nothing can express better “das Prinzip Plutarchischer Moral in Leben und Lehre...als eben die Philantropie.”¹⁴ It is because of this humanity that he frowns upon the Spartans’ habit to intoxicate the Helots by force in order to exemplify drunkenness to their youth (*Demetr.* 1.5); or upon the practice of *krypteia*, on account of which he regards Numa, who would allow slaves to dine with their masters during the *Saturnalia*, as far more Hellenic a lawgiver than Lykourgos (*Comp. Lyk.-Nu.* 1.10), the best (and Plutarch’s favourite hero), otherwise, Greek (*Comp. Ag./Kleom.-Gr.* 5.4 and *Lyk.* 31.3). It is the same humanity and kind-heartedness again that make him criticize the elder Cato’s attitude towards his aged slaves (*Cma.* 4.5 and all ch. 5) and disapprove of Demosthenes’ jubilation at the news of Philip’s death (*Demo.* 22.2–4). Being of an essentially kindly mind, Plutarch was not simply interested in people, but also ready to find good in them.¹⁵ This is why he does not only – and primarily – seek to advance the virtues of his worthies (cf. *Kim.* 2.5), but also tries to locate and bring forward the good qualities of his villains.¹⁶

Finally, his methods of work, whether composing a biography or an essay, are very similar, despite the different nature and conventions of these genres. The use of historical examples, the employment of poetical quotations (whether *per se* or adroitly embodied in his own text), comparative techniques, ways of material adaptation, tacit incorporation of oral information are only some of the authorial devices equally to be found in the *Lives* and the *Moralia*. Thus, Plutarch’s methods of work appear to confirm from yet another angle the unity of his *œuvre*.¹⁷

It is hoped that the contributions in this book will convincingly bear out its title. The subject-matter has been categorized in eight chapters corresponding to the following thematic units: Plutarch’s methods of work, *Moralia in Vitis*, Plutarch and politics, Plutarch and philosophy, Literary aspects of Plutarch’s *œuvre*, Women, *eros*, marriage, and parenthood in Plutarch, Plutarch in his

14 Cf. also Ziegler, 306/943: “Aus fast allen seinen Schriften strahlt die Menschlichkeit, die Nächstenliebe, die Herzensgüte, die Versöhnlichkeit, die φιλανθρωπία (um seinen eigenen Lieblingsausdruck zu benutzen), die er, wo immer sie ihm begegnete, gerühmt, seinen Lesern empfohlen hat und selbst zu üben sicherlich nicht müde geworden ist, nicht nur gegen seine Landsleute, sondern gegen alles, was Menschenantlitz trägt, ja selbst gegen die Tiere...”. For P.’s notion of *philanthropia* in the *Lives* see Martin, and cf. also Johnson.

15 See *Mor.* 463C, and cf. his stance towards doubtful historical events in 855F. Cf. also Barrow, 147, Sandbach, 700, and Wardman, 189, 192–93.

16 For the good aspects of Demetrios’ character see *Demetr.* 2.3, 3.1, ch. 4, 6.4, 9.2, 17.1. For those of Antony see *Ant.* 3.10, 4.6–9, 6.5, 23.2 and, above all, 17.3–5. See also *Mor.* 485A, and cf. Russell, 135, and Wardman, 183.

17 For P.’s methods see Pelling’s articles in *JHS* 1979 and 1980, now conveniently together in id 2002, 1–44 and 91–115. Cf. also Nikolaidis 2005.

epistemological and socio-historical context. Each chapter is preceded by a synopsis summarizing the articles which comprise the chapter,¹⁸ while chapter one consists of only one article which, owing to its subject, serves as an appropriate prelude to the whole volume.

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18 These summaries are based on the abstracts of the authors themselves.

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1. The Formation of Plutarch's *Corpus*

Synopsis

In this introductory article **Joseph Geiger** asks an important question preliminary to the subject of the present book. Even before starting to consider the unity and concord of the *Lives* and of the so-called *Moralia*, we must ask ourselves how did it come about that Plutarch's *œuvre* became separated into two, seemingly distinct, parts? It is maintained that, though we are ill-informed about Plutarch's methods of work and the chronology of his writings, there is no reason to believe that they were significantly different for *Lives* and *Moralia* or that there was a strict chronological separation between the two. Nor had readers in antiquity restricted or centred their interest on one or other group of works; organisation such as the one we find in the Lamprias catalogue reflects only the convenience of librarians. It was only towards the end of the thirteenth century that the efforts of Maximus Planudes brought about a collection of the available non-biographical works, creating hereby a corpus of *Moralia*. However, when the works of Plutarch first appeared in the West at the very end of the fourteenth century, they arrived gradually and were copied, translated and, after the invention of printing, printed piecemeal. The Aldine edition of 1509 established anew a corpus of the *Moralia*, followed a few years later by that of the *Lives*, hereby bringing about the separation that persists to the present day. The main purpose of the present paper then is to investigate how Plutarch's scattered works in the fifteenth century came to form the *corpora* at the beginning of the sixteenth.

Lives and Moralia: How Were Put Asunder What Plutarch Hath Joined Together★

Joseph Geiger

The theme of the present conference unmistakably announces a guiding principle, inherent in the very founding and activities of this Society: Plutarch's works are of a piece, students of our author ought to view the *œuvre* as a whole, a logical consequence of adhering to the ideal of *klassische Altertumswissenschaft*. Yet every declaration of policy hides some criticism or polemics against a certain state of affairs. It is no secret, that many students of the *Lives* only take occasional recourse, when needed, to the *Moralia* and of course vice versa. Though this situation is but an outcome of the various interests of a rich assortment of scholars and of the fashion of specialisation, it is no doubt facilitated by the customary division of the works of Plutarch and by the long tradition of their study. In the present paper I shall attempt to survey one aspect of the history of Plutarch's reception, viz. the question of the genesis of the present division. My paper will be of two parts: the first will deal summarily with what happened from Plutarch's own day until the reappearance of his works in the West at the end of the fourteenth century. This shorter part will on the whole repeat some well-established facts. In the second part, dealing, in the main, with the fifteenth century, I shall try to uncover the roots of the present situation.

I

It hardly needs repeating that the chronology of Plutarch's works is one of their less well-known aspects, and that very little progress has been made in the almost forty years since the study of C.P. Jones and that not much advance can be expected in the future. It is one of the unambiguous outcomes of that survey that Plutarch worked on *Lives* and *Moralia* at the same time, though of course it is not known whether he did so *pari passu* or in a number of separate bursts of energy. Certainly the innumerable threads connecting the two

★ When composing this paper, Marianne Pade, *The Reception of Plutarch's Lives in Fifteenth Century Italy*, 2 vols., Copenhagen 2007, had not appeared yet; see now my review in *SCI* 27 (2008), 164–166.

corpora attest to the author's composing in proximity various works, often exploiting for them the very same source material. Nor do we possess evidence for a twofold division in Antiquity. It suffices to quote in this connexion Eunapius in his survey of writers on the history of philosophers (*VS* 454), where he calls Plutarch divine (θείοτατος) and the charm and lyre of all philosophy (ἡ φιλοσοφίας ἀπάσης ἀφροδίτη καὶ λύρα) and later also divinely inspired (θεσπέσιος) and seems, at least in part, to explicate these epithets by the fact that 'Parallel Lives of the best men according to their deeds and achievements', are his 'most beautiful' (κάλλιστον) work. It is not so much the context of these remarks – Plutarch's failure to compose his own *Life* or that of his teacher Ammonius, which thus must be gathered from scattered references – that is of interest in the present context, as the seemingly natural assumption that the *Parallel Lives* were the most distinguished work of the 'philosopher'.

I shall only repeat in brief the relevant facts concerning the *Lamprias Catalogue*. It was composed in the third or fourth centuries and it seems to be agreed that it reflects the convenience of some librarian rather than a scholarly edition of the works.¹ Its positioning at the head the *Parallel Lives*, followed by the other, now mostly lost, biographical writings was but an expediency of organisation, and no attempt has been made to introduce any logical order in the remaining titles. Moreover, let it be said already here that the series of *Parallel Lives*² could and were often viewed as one work and that placing them together was but the self-evident conclusion from this fact. Probably not far removed in time from the *Catalogue of Lamprias* is the sophist Sopatros, excerpted by Photius (*cod.* 161). The excerpts made use of a fair number of the *Moralia* (including some lost and some spurious works) and *Lives*.³ It is of some interest that but for the *Life of Brutus*, for some reason mentioned together with that of Demetrius, Sopatros excerpted only the Greek *Lives* and ignored the Romans. The deplorable separation between *Parallels* still fashionable in some quarters looks back to a tradition at least as early as the fourth century.

There is no need here to repeat what is known about the textual tradition of the various works nor to assess the impact of the transition from roll to codex on its development and we may hurry on to the man whose work was decisive for the transmission of the works of Plutarch. The works other than the biographical ones were transmitted singly, or in small groups, until towards the end of the thirteenth century Maximus Planudes collected all that was available of these works, placing at the top a group of writings, named with

1 Treu; cf. Ziegler, 60–61.

2 Including almost always the *Lives* of Aratus, Artaxerxes, Galba and Otho.

3 It is a rare misjudgment of Hirzel, 82, to say that already at that time readers of the *Lives* and the *Moralia* were separated, and to mention Sopater as an example of the former.

only partially justifiable claim Ἡθικά.⁴ Thus the partition between the *Lives* and the other works came to be established, as the collection of Maximus Planudes included almost all that has survived from Antiquity.⁵

This is where the best-known part of the story of the transmission of Plutarch's works comes to its end, and this is where our main story begins. For in the beginning it was not the collection of Maximus Planudes that has reached the West, it was not this compilation that maintained the division of the works until it became permanent with the invention of printing. On the contrary, the spread of Plutarch's works in the West was slow and piecemeal. The renewed division between *Lives* and *Moralia* that came into being with the printed editions of the collected works and that lives on to the present day was the result of the reception of Plutarch's works in the fifteenth century. How did this division come about?

II

It is well known that Plutarch's works were unfamiliar in the West in the Middle Ages: Petrarch knew only the spurious *Institutio Traiani*.⁶ It was the early Renaissance that first showed its interest in the author and the imminent and eventual fall of Constantinople and the growing number of refugees reaching Italy that satisfied the demand. The story has been told more than once, though not with the present emphasis on the separate histories of the two divisions of Plutarch's text.

As we have learned many years ago from Philip Stadter, the Ambrosian MS of the *Moralia* had arrived in Italy already early in the fourteenth century, not long after its completion, and was in the possession of Pace of Ferrara of the pre-humanist circle of Padua (see Stadter). Yet it appears that Pace had no Greek, and that his ownership of the Planudean MS is only a prologue to the reception of Plutarch in the West. The ground was not ready to receive the entire corpus of the *Moralia* in one fell scoop. In fact it is only late in the fifteenth century that we have definite evidence that the MS has been read. But in the meantime the first real arrival of Plutarch in Italy took place.

4 Ziegler, 313–4 quotes the relevant bibliography.

5 For a summary of Planudes' work see Ziegler, 314–5: first Planudes collected all the available non-biographical writings: these 69 works are included in Ambros. 859 written in 1295; in July 1296 a second MS, Paris. 1671, was finished. It included the *Lives* and after them the same collection of the *Moralia*. The last effort was the luxury codex Paris. 1672, written in the beginning of the next century and containing nine more works of the *Moralia*, thus in fact fixing almost entirely what is now extant.

6 Weiss, 323; cf. Zucchelli.

This arrival was piecemeal and lasted over two generations. Albeit the role of the correspondence of Coluccio Salutati with Manuel Chrysoloras is acknowledged as giving the initial push to the diffusion of the works of Plutarch in Italy the differing aims of the two men should not be lost on us (see Berti). Chrysoloras wished to impart acquaintance with Greek language and literature, while Salutati, typically for the humanists, saw the works as important new sources for an improved familiarity with Antiquity, and was attracted to the opportunity of learning about Rome and the heroes of the Republic from Greek sources. On the whole, of course, it was the contents of the newly recovered works that mattered most for the West, and in our case, as Pfeiffer puts it⁷ ‘the Lives of Plutarch strongly appealed to the feeling of the Italian Renaissance for the individual, in particular those of the great Romans; and to a lesser degree his *Moralia* appealed to its concern for problems of moral philosophy’. (I would make here the reservation that, as will be seen presently, Pfeiffer’s words are valid for only a part of the *Moralia*). Add to this the sheer volume of the works of our author and one easily understands the piecemeal reception as well as the separation between *Lives* and *Moralia*.

Both *Lives* and *Moralia*, not differently from the rest of Greek literature, were studied for their intrinsic values, for the insights one could derive from the accumulated wisdom of Antiquity. A good way of appreciating the different attitudes to these two corpora is viewing the history of the translations and of the printed editions, both in the original and in translations into Latin and into the various vernaculars. Only thus do we appreciate the gradual reception of this bulky *œuvre* and its absorption into Western tradition. Single *Lives* and tractates of the *Moralia* were translated, occasionally joined into small groups. The diverse works were chosen for their particular appeal, more often than not assimilated to the (imagined) taste of an assortment of dedicatees or the preferences of the translator. Thus the first half of the fifteenth century brought about the translation into Latin of all the *Lives*, more or less one by one,⁸ and they were then printed in 1470, not very long after the art of printing had reached Italy. While particular *Lives* may have seemed more appropriate to certain dedicatees or to the political circumstances of a given translator,⁹ very soon the common usefulness of both their moralistic attitude and of the historical information contained in them was acknowledged. Thus collected editions of the *Lives* became the rule, although of course single *Lives*, or small groups of them, continued, and continue, to be printed. Another indicator of the reasons for the popularity of the *Lives* provide the various

7 Pfeiffer, 29.

8 See the comprehensive account of Giustiniani and cf. Pade 1998.

9 Some examples of this will be found in Celenza; Pade 1991; cf also Pade 1989; Botley, 16–20.

epitomes composed in the Quattrocento: it was the historical facts contained in the *Lives*, rather than their style, that was of interest.¹⁰ Yet another pointer by which the popularity of the *Lives* may be gauged cannot here be treated as it requires a separate study: Plutarch's *Lives* – but very seldom any of the *Moralia* – provided major themes for Renaissance art. Specifically one may mention in this context the impact of the 1470 Campano translation.¹¹

But this translation also bears important witness to the biographical, or shall we say historical, interest rather than to the literary attraction of our author. To the *Lives* translated by Filelfo, Tortelli, Lapo Birago, Acciajuoli, Guarino, Pasini, Barbaro, Leonardo Bruni and Leonardo Giustiniani there were added the *Lives of Hannibal, Scipio Africanus and Charlemagne* by Acciaiuoli as well as Isocrates' *Euagoras*, translated by Guarino, and Nepos' *Atticus*. To these the *Life of Plato* by Guarino and biography of Aristotle by Bruni were added, and the volume was rounded off with the *Life of Homer* ascribed to Herodotus and translated by P. Allius and finally, the *Life of Virgil*.

On the other hand the *Moralia* were – and are – a mixed bag. How to Educate Children, How to Derive Profit from One's Enemies, How to Maintain Good Health and a number of other subjects were obviously profitable, very soon enjoying great popularity. For example, between 1400 and 1530 there are 'seven extant Latin versions of Plutarch's *quomodo ab adulatore discernatur amicus*'; at least seven of his *De utilitate quae habetur ex amicis*'. It is also easy to see that as long as *Mirrors for Princes* were in demand the apocryphal *Institutio Traiani* did not lose from its attractiveness. Other works were or were thought to be of a piece with the *Lives* as far as the historical information was concerned, among them the *Greek and Roman Questions*, the variously attributed *Sayings*, the *Fortune of Alexander* or the miscellaneous anecdotes contained in the *Parallela Minora*. On the contrary some of the treatises did not arouse any interest and remained the property of a few scholars conversant with Greek or were translated only rarely: so, understandably enough, perhaps, the technical philosophical works, but more surprisingly also the Delphic dialogues and other works of a religious character. One may instance the German translations of Plutarch up to 1550 as indicators of these trends.¹² Some of the *Lives* – including those of Scipio Africanus and Hannibal by Acciaiuoli erroneously attributed to Plutarch – were printed already in the

10 Resta, 58: Era necessario, pertanto, presentare ai lettori non parti più o meno ampie, ma tutta l'opera di Plutarco, in stile semplice e senza eleganti e fastidiosi orpelli, ordinatamente disposta, compendiata con misura ed opportunità, rispettando i fatti storici ma tralasciando le inutili prolissità.

11 Guerrini is the latest important contribution on the subject with an ample bibliography; for the impact of the 1470 Latin translation see the contribution of Marilena Caciorgna in that volume.

12 For what follows see Worstbrock, 117–125.

very first year of the sixteenth century (1501), and eventually the entire *Parallelae*, including *Aratus* and *Artaxerxes*, were available in German by 1541. The *Moralia* fared very differently: early in the century there were editions of *de liberis educandis* (1508), *mulierum virtutes* (ca. 1505), *de capienda ex inimicis utilitate* was translated twice (once from the Latin of Erasmus) in the second decade of the century, and there were also early translations of *quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur*, the *coniugalia praecepta* and the various *apophthegmata* collections; by 1535 a collection of the *Moralia* appeared comprising twenty-one tractates, including all those mentioned and some other ethical works, but also the *praecepta gerendae rei publicae*, *ad principem ineruditum*, *maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum*, as well as the entire *quaestiones convivales* and from among the more technical philosophical works *an recte dictum sit latenter esse vivendum* and the *de sera numinis vindicta* from among the Delphic dialogues. It is easy to make up the list of the missing works and not much more difficult to account for the taste of the time.

Admittedly, this reception of Plutarch's works was typical for the German-speaking countries, as we have been reminded at our last conference (see Gemert), and one could indeed usefully compare this with the situation in France, where Montaigne debated with Jean Bodin the historical accuracy of the biographer (see Smith).

Returning to the Latin translations, one is now hardly startled to find that the first edition of the entire corpus of the *Moralia* was printed almost a century later than the corresponding *Lives*. If I am not mistaken, some of the works were first translated for this collection. These are the dates that are significant, not the eight years or so that elapsed between the printing of the Greek texts of the *Moralia* and of the *Lives*. These editions were aimed at scholars who could read Greek – and perhaps also at persons who wished to display original Greek works in their libraries. The scholarly editions are not the most significant indicators of the influence of Plutarch and of the attitudes to his *œuvre* as a whole.

It appears also, that the translators of *Vitae* and *Moralia* were often very different sets of people. Let me illustrate this by an example from a somewhat later period. Plutarch in Elizabethan England will evoke in everybody's mind Shakespeare's tragedies based on the *Lives* of Coriolan, Caesar and Antony. But Elizabethan England was not all stage-stricken: John Rainolds, Shakespeare's contemporary and President of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, best known as the initiator of the King James Bible, published a tractate almost two hundred pages long, on 'The over-throw of Stage-Playes' fuming against that wicked activity and proving its sinfulness from both Scripture and the classics. That learned man also translated Plutarch's tractates *de utilitate ex inimicis capienda* and *de morbis animi et corporis*, (that is, *de tuenda sanitate*) both dedicated

to Elizabeth. I dare say that such a division between men interested in the two *corpora* of Plutarch's works was not entirely accidental.

Let me sum up: the *Moralia* is not a *corpus* in the same sense as the *Lives* are. While interest in the *Lives* was comprehensive, though of course some people had their favourites and, as mentioned, from early on the Greek and Roman *Lives* were often studied separately, some of the *Moralia* attracted some readers, others again others, while a great number of them were all but totally neglected. This, in turn, is not unconnected with the simple fact that while some of the *Moralia* have looser or stronger connexions with the *Lives*, other works share only the feature of a common author with perhaps common linguistic usages unconsciously applied and of course a common cultural background.

Thus, I guess that to a certain extent the success of the theme set by this conference, *The Unity of Plutarch's Work: Moralia Themes in the Lives, Features of the Lives in the Moralia*, may be in part subject to the lack of the unity of the *Moralia*: and in fact it is evident that while even here the interest in the various *Lives* is fairly evenly distributed, the *Moralia*, as always, remain a mixed bag, with a greatly varying attractiveness of the diverse tractates.

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2. Plutarch's Methods of Work

Synopsis

Beginning from different starting-points, discussing different works, asking different questions and focusing on different issues, the articles of this chapter illuminate Plutarch's methods and compositional techniques from various angles and perspectives. The chapter is divided into two sections: the articles of section **2a** focus on how Plutarch deals with other literary genres, while those of section **2b** discuss his authorial techniques at large.

2a: How Plutarch deals with other genres

José Antonio Fernández Delgado explores the problematic classification of some rhetorical elements in Plutarch. Among the frequent references to fables, he notes, and particularly but not only in the *Moralia*, some of them, at present classified as such, actually seem to correspond to other literary forms which, like these, became in time rhetorical *progymnasmata*: these can be *gnômae* or much more often *chreiai*. The aim of this paper is, first of all, to try to single out and define such forms individually, and to discount them from the list of Plutarchean fables; and then to explain the confusion, using the double basis of (a) the existing affinity among these elementary literary forms, and (b) their handling by the writer.

On the other hand, **Francisca Pordomingo Pardo** studies the intratextual dialogue in Plutarch's corpus, examining in particular his reuse of quotations from epigrams. She observes that from Plutarch's quotations from epigrams only a small number corresponds to epigrams that are also transmitted by the *Anthologia Palatina* and the *Anthologia Planudea*, while the largest number corresponds to epigrams transmitted by Plutarch, either alone or together with different ancient sources (rarely epigraphical). In her article the author will particularly deal with quotations from epigrams that are repeated more than once in Plutarch's *corpus*, in order to discover aspects of their contextual function in the different contexts they occur. At the same time, she examines the reception of the epigrammatic genre as well as the intertextual dialogue between the text containing the quote and the one quoted; and there is also discussion of the integrated and hidden quotations (paraphrases and allusions). This study could help not only in recuperating the form of the quoted epigram itself, but also in clarifying relationships (including the chronological ones) between works of *Moralia* and *Vitae* (by examining moreover the repetition of quotations which belong to other genres).

Philip Stadter discusses the function of anecdotes in three different works of Plutarch: *Lives*, *Political Precepts*, *Sayings of Kings and Commanders*. Anecdotes, he notes, are a fundamental feature of Plutarch's writing, and recently they have received a great deal of attention, since we have come to realize that they can furnish insight into Plutarch's, methods, audience, and purposes. The article attempts to refine some of the recent findings by an examination of a select group of anecdotes which recur in the works mentioned above. This circumstance offers an opportunity to probe the way the same anecdotes are used across several works, written in different genres, for different audiences, and for different purposes. Besides giving more understanding of the relation of the anecdotes to earlier notes or compilations, this examination reveals the different techniques employed by Plutarch.

It appears that no single version of an anecdote need give all the information Plutarch had available to him: we must piece together what he knew by considering all his versions. A proper analysis of Plutarch's technique requires close examination of all versions, not to establish priority, but to clarify the focus and import of each. The three works studied each have different audiences and goals, reflected in the manner in which the anecdotes are presented, or by omissions of certain items. For Plutarch anecdotes were discreet items which could be shifted from one category to another, permitting the formation of lists of anecdotes for different topics, or complex clusters which could be used in different contexts. The items of *Apophthegmata regum* are free of context, but are selected for their positive value as *exempla*. Those of the *Precepts* are set in a rich rhetorical, argumentative context, with interpretive comments, and may be either positive or negative. Finally, the anecdotes of the *Lives* develop the interpretive possibilities of context much further, introducing nuance and ambivalences closely related to major themes and outcomes of a given *Life*. They employ foreshadowing, authorial comment, historical background, and the contemporary context to create a multilayered tapestry of meaning.

Craig Cooper also notes the relationship between the *Lives* and the *Political Precepts* as well as the largely anecdotal nature of the common material, but he mainly focuses on the moral interplay between the *Praecepta* and the *Life of Demosthenes*. In some cases, he observes, the anecdotes, which are scattered across several *Lives*, are collected together in *Statecraft* (799d–800a) to illustrate a single theme, e.g. the easy-going nature of the Athenian assembly, as is gathered from its reaction to Cleon's request for an adjournment. In this particular section of the essay Plutarch seems to have collected together from several different sources a variety of anecdotes that he would later use for different ends in the *Lives*. Cleon's request in the *Life of Nicias* (9.5), for instance, says less about the character of the Athenian assembly than about Cleon's own buffoonery. In another section of *Statecraft*, (802e–804c), dealing with the statesman's oratory, Plutarch seems instead to have excerpted a single Peripatetic source on rhetoric, a large part of which he would later reproduce in his *Life of Demosthenes* (9–10). But again there are some differences in details and points of emphasis between the two accounts which suggest different, though perhaps related, uses being made of the same material by Plutarch. In the *Life* Plutarch supplements the Peripatetic source with material from a second Peripatetic source (Demetrius of Phalerum), which in part helps to shape the particular emphasis that is taken in the *Life* by Plutarch, who is constrained by the accepted biographical tradition to represent Demosthenes as practised rather than naturally gifted orator. The material from *Statecraft* helps to put a more positive spin on that tradition. Moreover, a reference in *Statecraft*

(815d) to recent troubles under Domitian may suggest that the essay was written soon after Domitian's death (A.D 96) and thus before Plutarch came to compose *Demosthenes-Cicero*, which is fifth in the series of *Parallel Lives*. If that is the case, we have an opportunity to see how Plutarch reuses material put together for a moral essay in a *Life*, or at the very least how the same material is adapted in different contexts.

Christophe Brechet observes that the frequency of references to Homer differs markedly between the two parts of Plutarch's corpus, with several hundred references in the *Moralia* as against a few dozen in the *Lives*. Yet, despite this difference in distribution, we may ascertain that the Homeric references follow a consistent, more or less, pattern: Plutarch associates, on the one hand, the Greeks and Alexander with the Achaeans and, on the other, the Romans with the Trojans, thus continuing the mythical genealogies. This use of Homer betrays no polemical intent, despite Plutarch's identification of the Trojans with the Barbarians. Yet his conception of a common culture shared by Greeks and Romans does not efface his sense of Hellenic identity. It appears that the use of Homer, the very source of Greek *paideia*, is a discreet reminder of the divide between Greeks and Romans: the Romans may not constitute the "Other", the barbarian, but they are, nevertheless, other.

Diotima Papadi, after observing that in Plutarch's *Moralia* tragic poetry plays an important role, not only for educational purposes (e.g. in *De audiendis poetis*), but also for literary, philosophical and rhetorical purposes, will try to show how tragedy and theatrical atmosphere are equally significant in the *Lives*, as the *Life of Pompey*, rich in tragic imagery and theatricality, distinctly manifests. Plutarch here creates theatrical tension and tragic patterns out of his non-theatrical material; thus theatricality and tragic texture, in all their forms and versions, are used to make a point of reference for life, not only for the life of Pompey but also for anyone's life, pointing to general characteristics of human attitude and passions.

Finally, **Peter Liddel** discusses Plutarch's use of inscriptions and proposes that our author's originality as an epigraphist lay in his employment of epigraphical evidence in the investigation of morality, politics, philosophy and sociology; and his deployment of inscriptions in scholarly polemic. It is observed that in both the *Lives* and *Moralia*, Plutarch alludes to, discusses and quotes a range of Greek and Latin epigraphical categories: honorary decrees, choregic tripod-bases and other dedications, *katalogoi*, grave monuments public and private, laws and decrees, magical inscriptions, graffiti, boundary stones, and even inscribed *thaumata*. Inscriptions in the *Lives* and *Moralia* play a variety of roles: they contribute to the reconstruction of or dramatization of history; they

reveal the level of fame, *philotimia*, and wealth of an individual; they create impressions of individual and community virtues to be emulated and vices to be avoided; they act as proofs in arguments or as evidence to substantiate an assertion; they provide insight into those characters who read them and react to them; they are instruments of magic, *hubris*, *nemesis* or other species of divine intervention; they provide a starting point for philosophical inquiry; a point of opening or closure for individual lives.

Although chiefly an ‘armchair epigraphist’, Plutarch declares that knowledge of epigraphical evidence is central to meticulous and even-handed biographical and historical research. And it is his belief that the epigraphist occupies a privileged position in the world of scholarship that validates his use of epigraphy as a weapon in scholarly controversies and in the reconstruction of Greek history and biography. This is because the evidence of epigraphy is, for Plutarch, a good measure of certain aspects of public morality. Dedications commemorating victories of Greeks over non-Greeks fulfil the moral potential of the epigraphic habit, whereas commemorations of victories of Greek states over other Greek states represent an abuse of the habit. With reference to the agonistic and competitive tendency of the epigraphic language of the ancient Greek world, this paper argues that Plutarch is a good ‘reader’ of ancient Greek inscriptions, and attempts to use them with insight in the reconstruction in particular of the workings of *philotimia* in the ancient Greek city.

On the Problematic Classification of Some Rhetorical Elements in Plutarch

José Antonio Fernández Delgado

0. That the fable is a difficult genre to define is clear in the very instability and ambivalence of the terminology used to designate it.* The name with which it has passed into posterity is not even from the original Greek: αἶνος is its archaic and poetic name, which also meant “proverb” and “riddle”; subsequently, λόγος “story” in general (often adjectivized Αἰσώπειος) and μῦθος “fictitious story”, preferentially (and thus also “myth”), as well as ἀπόλογος were its usual designations.¹ It can, indeed, become confused with all these literary forms of similar popular tradition and like structure, and also be confused with others,² of which we should highlight the ἀπόφθεγμα, in rhetorical terms known as χρεῖα,³ if we wish to complete the list of compositional elements which, together with the many literary quotations, confer on Plutarch’s scriptory technique its perhaps most characteristic note.⁴

However, the fact that the ancient collections of fables (Anonymous, Babrius, Phaedrus...) already included, together with the animal fables and others, some of these related forms, does not, in my opinion, authorize what has been done by some modern editors in the genre, who, like Perry⁵, add other similar ones taking them from authors such as Plutarch. This attitude has, in turn, dire consequences for a sensible judgement of the fable in the Chaeronean, taking into account that a bibliographic instrument as essential as the Helmbold-O’Neil repertory of Plutarch’s quotations (s.v. Aesop, Fabulae), for the fable is based precisely on Perry’s catalogue. Apart from the existence, from very early on, of collections of proverbs and of *chreiai* as well as of fables,

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1 Cf. Van Dijk; Adrados 1979, 18 et sq.; Josifovic, col. 15 et sq.

2 Cf. Adrados, *ibid.*, 52 et sq., 204 et sq.

3 Cf. Trouillet; Kindstrand; Hock & O’Neil, 49.

4 Cf. Gallo 9; Meriani.

5 Perry thus goes far beyond the limits of his own definition of the fable (p. IX). The same practice is adopted in the diverse translations of Aesop’s Fables, which take Perry’s collection as a basis.

and of the important presence in our author of all of these,⁶ the ancient progymnasmatic theory, whose influence in Plutarch has recently become a true object of study,⁷ made quite clear not only the points of affinity, but also the differences between these literary forms, at the same time as their rhetorical potential: four of them, the fable, the story, the *chreia* and the maxim, one after the other, became the first four *progymnasmata* of the series of fourteen that made up the educational cycle, and formed a particularly apt block for the deliberative type of rhetoric, the model of elaboration and the argumentative *topoi* being, nevertheless, practically the same in the theoretical development of the four exercises (cf. Kennedy and Reche Martínez). Thus, it is our intention to clarify, using Helmbold-O'Neil's list of quotations from fables by Plutarch, taken from Perry's edition, those manifestations of rhetorical-literary forms close to the fable which are not fables in the strict sense, nor even in the ancient sense, which is less restrictive than the modern concept of fable.⁸

1. One of these elements is, we have said, the proverb, so that quite often the moral (*epimythion* or *promythion*) of a fable is directly constituted by a maxim or a maxim-like phrase, and a usual practice of the *fabula* exercise consisted of proposing a moral to the students for them to compose a fable to suit it, or else proposing that they compose one or more possible morals for a particular fable.⁹

Thus, it may occur that the meaning of a proverb is explained by a fable that accompanies it, as in *Coniug. praec.*, 2 (139D), where the proverb 'Ο ἥλιος τὸν βορέαν ἐνίκησε "The sun vanquishes (gnomic aorist) Boreas" has juxtaposed to it, in summarised form, the content of fable 73 Chambry (46 P.), which serves to illustrate it, to wit, essentially: a man who was threatened with having his clothes torn off by the strong wind fastened them more strongly, whereas, when the heat of the sun ensued, he himself took them off because he was hot. In Plutarch this is applied to a woman, who resists if the man takes away luxury from her by force, but renounces it if he persuades her by reasoning.

Or, unlike this case, in which there is no way of being sure which of the two, the proverb or the fable, came first, it may be that a proverb, or in this

6 Demetrius of Phalerum, supposedly the first collectionist of Aesop's fables, is also attributed with a collection of proverbs. Collections of *chreiai* for school teaching are supposed to have existed at least since the Hellenistic age. On the presence of one and the other in Plutarch, cf. Fernández Delgado 1991; Durán; Bellu 2005 b, 55 et sqs.

7 Besides the already traditional and abundant studies on the *syncrisis*, cf. among others Ramón Palerm; Beck 2000; 2003; Fernández Delgado 2000; 2005; 2005 b.; Pordomingo; Bellu 2005; 2005 b; Miguélez; Vicente Sánchez.

8 Cf. Adrados 1979, 32 et sq.

9 Cf. Theo, 74–75 Sp. The ancient writers of treatises came to consider the fable as an expanded proverb, cf. Josifovic, col. 35.

case rather a proverbial expression, both because of its form and because it is thus expressly said, has arisen from a fable. This is what happens with the proverbial expression ὄνος ἵππον μιμούμενος “An ass that imitates a horse”, which figures in Macarius’s collection of proverbs (VI 32)¹⁰ accompanied by the specification (*proverbium*) *natum ex fabula*. The fable from which it is said to have arisen is, without doubt, 128 Ch. (315 a P.), which is echoed, with variations, by Plutarch in *Sept. sap. conv.*, 4 (150A) (as well as Babrius 62). This is the story of a mule (not an ass) that boasted of being the daughter of a horse until, after having started to run, had to remember that she was also the daughter of an ass.

That the creation of a fable to explain a proverb is something usual is also testified to, in this same work by Plutarch, *Sept. sap. conv.*, 21 (164B), by Pittacus’s answer to Chersias when he asked the Sages for the meaning of their maxims Nothing in excess, Know thyself and Committing oneself brings misfortune. “And what need do you have”, said Pittacus, “for us to explain these phrases to you? It is some time since Aesop composed, it seems, a fable for each of them...”

However, in the next two cases, included by Perry with numbers 433 and 460 in his compilation, there is no record of it being a matter of fables. On the contrary, the first one, included by Plutarch in his *Aet. Gr.*, 54 (303A), is, as Plutarch’s classification suggests, an explanatory story, an *aition*, of Aphrodite’s name “of Dexicreon”, that the goddess received in Samos. According to him, this Dexicreon was a sailor who baptized the goddess with his name, because, on a trading journey to Cyprus, when he was going to load his boat, Aphrodite ordered him to fill it with water, which he later sold and made a lot of money from.¹¹

The second tale, included in Perry’s compilation as no. 460, is presented in Plutarch, *Vit. X orat.* (848A), which is its main testimonial, not as a fable, but rather, I believe, in the form of that other related rhetorical component that the authors of progymnasmatic theory classify as *chreia* with *dicta*.¹² The story

10 Leutsch & Schneidewin II, 193.

11 This case is also denied its nature as fable by Adrados 1979, despite his not very restricted conception of the same and the recognition that in the fable writers of the empire this conception was even broader, when he argues (56 et sq.): “Por este camino todos los αἴτια culturales y mitológicos, Calímaco y Ovidio casi enteros, entre otras mil cosas, serían fábulas” (“According to this, all the αἴτια, both cultural and mythological, almost all of Callimachus and Ovid, among thousands of other things, would be fables”).

12 Cf. Theo, 97 Sp... This interpretation should be endorsed by the fact that the story is attributed to a typical character of *chreiai* (an orator) and presents its final *dictum* in a somewhat witty and enthymematic way, cf. Hock & O’Neil, 4–7. The criterion of functionality is also important for Adrados (1979, 47) when trying to separate the concept of fable from that of other similar genres.

is put into the mouth of Demosthenes on an occasion when the Athenians prevented him from speaking and he said that he wanted to say something to them briefly, they were quiet and he told them that one day in summer, a young man hired an ass from the city to Megara and at midday, when the sun was at its highest, both the owner and the renter struggled to get into the shade, one arguing that he had hired out the ass, not its shade, the other that he had a right to the whole thing. The orator was about to leave when, being retained by the Athenians to end the story he said: “So, you want to listen to me about the shade of an ass, but not when I speak of serious things?”

However, the proverbial expression “the shade of an ass” to designate something without importance, and apart from Plutarch’s tale, is also recorded, among other cases, in Lucian (*Hermot.*, 71), Dio of Prusa (XXXIV 48) and even earlier, in Plato (*Phdr.* 260c) and, apart from being the title of a comedy by Archytus, also in Aristophanes (*Vesp.* 191), in which a *scholium* refers to the story of the hiring of the ass almost in the same terms as Plutarch, as an explanation of the saying. Thus, if on the one hand there is nothing to make us think that it should be catalogued as a fable, as it is by Perry, on the other hand, and in spite of the testimonial of the *scholium* to Aristophanes, we cannot be certain whether the proverbial expression came from the story, as is assumed in the case of the saying related to the testimonial cited 315 a P., or if on the contrary the latter is an explanatory *aition* of the former.¹³

2. No. 53 of the Perry collection comprises two of Plutarch’s adaptations in the form of *chreia* with *facta*, of which the second, *Apophth.* (174F), is an *amplificatio* (based on an addition of information on the protagonist, Scilurus, “king of the Scythes” and the rhetorical *uplicatio* of several terms) of the first, *Garr.*, 17 (511C), with respect to fab. 86 Ch. of Aesop.¹⁴ Unlike those, which in accordance with the characteristics of the genre, have a typical character of *chreia* as protagonist, a king from the 2nd to the 1st century B.C.,¹⁵ and which consist of a lesson without words, merely gestural, with the *apophthegma* being introduced in *Garr.* 17 as the response given by Heraclitus to his fellow citizens when they asked him his opinion on concord, in Aesop’s fable the protagonist is an anonymous peasant (of whom it is not said, as was the case in Plutarch, that he was about to die) whose sons (of whom it is not said either that there were eighty as in the Plutarchean version) were fighting among themselves, and who, not being able to persuade them by talk, decided to do it by way of

13 Lasso de la Vega, 133–135, suggests that this saying arose from another, *ὀνείρου σκιά* “the shade of a dream”. On the close relationship between the proverb and the fable and the possibilities of mutual generation, cf. also Adrados 1979, 218 et sq.

14 Which in turn comes in an iambic version in Babrius 47 and another later one in La Fontaine 418 “Le vieillard et ses enfants”. Cf. Fernández Delgado 2005 b.

15 Cf. Hock & O’Neil, 4–7.

example, although at the end of the demonstration, contradictorily, the message implied is also expressed by the father verbally. The gestural lesson, which is the essentially fixed part in the different versions of the story (and what underlies the well-known heraldic emblem of the bundle of arrows) consists of the father ordering his sons to break a bundle of darts (or sticks in the case of the fable), and when they see that this cannot be done he takes the darts out one by one and breaks them with ease, thus showing them the strength to be found in union as opposed to the weakness of discord. In this case, then, we can see more clearly than in others the derivation and change of attribution of both chreic incidences in Plutarch from Aesop's fable, which is not lacking a moral, the content of which is exactly that of the message of the *chreía*.

3. The series of cases that we shall examine below all have in common, first, that they lack any reference made by Plutarch to their supposedly fabulous nature, which is only considered as such by Perry, within the most well-known collections (Chambry, Hausrath); second, that they are presented in the form of *chreía*, even when other rhetorical elements can sometimes be identified within them.

3.1. We shall approach them in the same order in which Perry has numbered them, although we shall put before the cases of *Moralia* the only case belonging exclusively to *Vitae* (441 P.), where the fable is less abundant. This one takes place in the *Life of Themistocles* (18), of whom it is said that, when one of his generals bragged to him, comparing his own feats with his, Themistocles told him that, when a dispute arose between the day after and the holiday, and the former argued that it was full of work and fatigue, whereas in the latter everyone enjoyed what was prepared without doing anything, the holiday replied: what you say is true, but if I hadn't existed, you would not be here. And thus also, said Themistocles, if I had not existed before, where would you be now?

The story is introduced by Plutarch, as far as we can see, as a *chreía* with *dicta*, attributed to a character known as the protagonist of many others.¹⁶ But, apart from its use as an *exemplum* (another rhetorical component which in turn is easily confused with the *chreía*),¹⁷ it can constitute the story, a fable or not, from which, as in the case of 315 a P. and perhaps 460 P. quoted, has arisen the expression, perhaps proverbial, although not documented as such: ἑορτὴ καὶ ὑπερραία.¹⁸

16 Cf. M. Bellu, *passim*. It is a symbolic *chreía* in the form of example and of enthymem.

17 Cf. Guerrini; Aragüés Aldaz.

18 The attempted dispute between these two entities seems to respond to the type of debate or agonal confrontation, an antecedant of the theatrical agon itself, between natural phenomena, seasons, animals, plants, sexes.... frequent in popular Greek

3.2. No. 440 P. gives the story of someone who, seeing a slave who had escaped from him some time before, began to chase him; the slave took refuge in a mill and he said: what better place than here could I have wished to find you? And this is referred to by Plutarch, *Coniug. Praec.*, 41 (144A), as a dissuasive example for the woman who is suffering from jealousy and is getting ready for divorce, so that she may think about what attitude her rival would like to see her in rather than like that.

The chreic nature of the tale, and not only its application, is endorsed by another, this time, however, not included by Perry, which, although different in its details, contains the same message and conclusion, being put by Plutarch into the mouth of the Athenian leader Phocion on two occasions, which differ very little in their expression: in *Life of Phocion* (10.9) and in *Apophth.* (188A–B). According to this story, when the sycophant Aristogiton was in prison, condemned to death, and having asked to see Phocion, the latter said to his friends, who wanted to stop him from going: where could one have a more pleasant talk with Aristogiton? The only structural difference between the anecdote in which Phocion was involved and that of *Coniug. Praec.* 41 is the impersonal form of the latter, which could be interpreted as a trait of its possible making into a fable; Theon (96), however, on defining the *chreía*, points out that this could be attributed to a generic character, in this case to the owner of a fugitive slave.

3.3. A similar process of fable-making, in the sense of attribution to diverse protagonists, all indeed Spartans,¹⁹ and with some variations, is the only strictly fabulous trait that can be glimpsed in the saying numbered 450 P. and included by Plutarch in *Apophth. Lac.* “Agesilaos”, 56 (212 E) attributed to king Agesilaos, and in *Apophth. Lac.* “Lysandros”, 8 (229E) and *Apophth.*, 5 (190F) (as well as in *V. Lys.* XXII 3 and *Adulat.* (71E) attributed to General Lysandros: the attribution to different personages, however, was another phenomenon which a *chreía* could undergo.²⁰ Both apophthegmas possibly inspired by this, but without its satirical “pointe” (against the city of Megara), are also attributed by Plutarch in *Apophth. Lac.* “Agis Archidamou”, 13 (216A) to king Agis, son of Archidamos, in *Apophth. Lac.* “Ádela”, 3 (232D) to anonymous Spartans.

literature and also in Middle Eastern literature, one of the manifestations of which, a debate between winter and spring, has indeed come to form part of the corpus of Aesop's fables (346 Ch.); cf. Radermacher, 25 et sq.; Adrados 1979, 317 et sq.

19 According to the testimony of Hdt. VIII 61, Themistocles would also have been offended in the same way by the Corinthian Adimantus. Cf. Arist. Pol. III 13, 2 (1284a).

20 Cf. Hock & O'Neil, 42–46.

According to the most mentioned anecdote – undoubtedly a *chreia* with *dicta kata charientismón*,²¹ as is demonstrated by its classification among the *Apophthégmata*–, its protagonist (namely, Agesilaos) said to a Megarian who was boasting of his city: your words, my lad, do not have much strength. The most significant variation of the version attributed to Lysandros substitutes “much strength” (πολλῆς δυνάμεως) with “city” (πόλεως).

3.4. The passage of *Cap ex inim. ut.*, 2 (86E–F) included as no. 467 in Perry’s compilation does not contain either a fable or a *chreia* strictly speaking, but rather a literary quotation used as a *chreia*. This means that the quotation also belongs to that constellation of rhetorical-literary components structurally related and destined to carrying out similar functions, basically of an exemplary nature. As a *chreia*, the passage forms part of a simile, that of fire, which, together with sea water, both elements that are harmful in themselves but which provide great benefits, serves as a comparison for exhortation to know how to make use even of enemies. The same as in a *chreia* with *dicta* there is a circumstance, a protagonist with a good reputation and a saying by him, and the same as in a *chreia* with *dicta kata charientismón*, the way the protagonist handles the situation is really congenial. However, the circumstance has been extracted from a passage of the satirical drama *Prometheus Pyrkaïos* by Aeschylus, in which the satyr sees fire for the first time and wants to kiss it; the protagonist is not a historical character but Prometheus; and the saying is the iambic trimeter “satyr, you’re going to cry for your beard”, which constitutes the fr. 207 N. of the work.²²

3.5. The story numbered as fable no. 468 in Perry’s collection fulfils, like the previous one, the function of a *chreia* with *dicta kata charientismón*. Put by Plutarch, *Sept. sap. conv.*, 14 (157A–B), into the mouth of one of the Seven Sages, Cleobulus, who in turn refers it to his no less wise daughter, Cleobuline, it is used as a simile of the lack of measurement of wealth among the common people, whose needs change according to circumstances. The story in itself, according to which the moon asked her mother to weave her a shirt and the mother asked how she was going to make it the right size if sometimes she saw her full, sometimes a half and sometimes a quarter, rather than a fable, the nature of which makes it difficult to reconcile with the absurdness of the petition and the mother of the moon, seems to suggest a type of tale or enigma – αἰνίγμα comes from αἶνος, the old name of the fable –

21 Cf. Theo, 97 Sp.

22 Τράγος γένειον ἄρα πενθήσεις σύ γε. On the use of literary passages handled as real *chreiai*, cf. the elaboration of the famous verse 1252 (ἀλλ’ οἱ φρονούντες εὖ κρατοῦσι πανταχοῦ) of the Sophoclean *Ajax* in the *Rhet. Marciana I* 602, 1–I 605, 18 Walz.

perhaps based on a riddle formulated in more ambiguous terms (e.g., what sometimes uses a full size, others a half size, and others a quarter size?).²³

3.6. Finally, no. 495 P., the same as the former case and another quoted at the beginning, comes from *Sept. sap. conv.*, 3 (149E) – a particularly appropriate framework, this of the *symposion*, for the deployment, and at the same time generic contamination of all these ingenious elements²⁴ – and, the same as the former, it can be classified as an amusing *chreía* of sayings, the ingenuity of which in this case, however, is not at the service of any teaching, but is consumed in itself, is a true joke.²⁵ Indeed, after asking the tyrant Periander his opinion concerning the prodigy born in his house, a being whose upper half was man and whose lower half was horse, Thales advised him not to use young stable boys or else to provide them with women (a reply which caused Periander to burst out laughing).

The justification of its inclusion in Perry's catalogue is based on the fact that Phaedrus has a fable (III 3) with this same plot. With the difference that: with a clear intention to make it a fable, instead of the tyrant of Corinth there is an anonymous peasant, the prodigy consists of *agnos humano capite*, the recommendation is directly to find wives for the shepherds and the one who gives the advice, instead of Thales, is Aesop himself. However, the fact that Aesop appears as protagonist of the saying could be an indication, but not at all a guarantee that the story existed as one of Aesop's fables.²⁶

4. The diverse cases analysed here thus show, indeed, the profound affinity existing between all these rhetorical-literary elements of a basically exemplary nature – the fable, the *chreía*, the proverb, the mythical-fictitious or enigmatic tale, the literary quotation itself... – which actually constitute the most visible and homogeneous component of Plutarchean style. Of all these, those that are most confused with the allusion to the fable are undoubtedly the three mentioned after this one, i.e. those that, apart from their traditional structural and terminological affinity with the fable, with it constitute precisely the block of the first four in the series of *progymnasmata* which served as an introduction to the study of rhetoric strictly speaking, sharing among them one similar type of elaboration and similar topoi of arguments. But, the very criteria used for differentiating between these four exercises by progymnasmatic theory, which shows great impact on Plutarch's preparation as a literary author, can serve as a pattern for a better classification of the corresponding literary forms, and, in

23 On the relationship between the riddle and the fable, cf. Adrados 1979, 216 et sq.

24 Cf. Adrados 1979, 220, 245 et sq., 261 et sq.; 1996.

25 In general, the *chreiai* with *dicta kata charientismón* are the remote forerunner of our current jokes, as is shown by many of the contents in *Philogelos*.

26 Other fables by Phaedrus are not considered as such by Adrados (1979, 56 et sq.). On the complex question of the sources of Phaedrus and the differentiation between inherited and added material, cf. Adrados 1983.

the cases examined here, to correct their unjustified cataloguing as manifestations of fables in most cases, both in Perry's edition of Aesop's fables and in Helmbold-O'Neil's repertory of Plutarchean quotations of fables.

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La reutilización de citas de epigramas: una manifestación del diálogo intratextual en el *corpus* plutarqueo★

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El tema de este congreso, «Plutarco en Plutarco», me ha brindado la oportunidad de desarrollar un aspecto que en un anterior trabajo (2004), «El epigrama en Plutarco», había quedado únicamente enunciado: la reutilización de citas de epigramas dentro de la misma obra o en dos obras del *corpus* plutarqueo, de los *Moralia* o de *Moralia* y *Vitae*, en aras de hallar similitudes, diferencias y razones para la cita del mismo epigrama.

La reutilización de una misma cita dentro del *corpus* plutarqueo, sobre todo de formas literarias breves, fácilmente citables y repetibles, que con frecuencia son remodeladas o expandidas, y que tienen un cierto carácter «sentencioso», es un fenómeno frecuente: *chreiai*, fábulas, *gnomai*, oráculos se repiten,¹ pero también se repiten breves pasajes de composiciones poéticas de más largo alcance.² Constituyen un stock «fijado» del que Plutarco se sirve, bien a partir de repertorios (colecciones, *hypomnemata*, suyos o de otros), bien usando de una buena memoria, sin excluir la lectura directa de autores, con un proceder

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1 Especialmente llamativa es la repetición de *chreiai* entre *Moralia* y *Vitae*: sobre dicha repetición en *Apophthegmata laconica* y las *Vitae* de Licurgo, Agesilao y Lisandro vid. una breve consideración en Santaniello, 13 y ss. Beck, se refiere a los distintos tratamientos, basados en el ejercicio escolar de *epekteinosis* de la *chreia*, de ciertos dichos en las *Vitae* de César, Augusto y Alejandro. Ramón, se refiere brevemente a la repetición de anécdotas y a su distinto tratamiento en *Moralia* y *Vitae*. Vid. también, en sendos Índices, las *chreiai* repetidas dentro del corpus de *Moralia* seleccionado y analizado por Mariangela Bellu. Para los proverbios y las fábulas vid. Fernández Delgado 1991 y 2005. Para los oráculos vid. Helmbold & O’Neil, s.v. «Oracula». La reiteración de citas de distintos géneros necesita ser investigada.

2 Una simple ojeada al «Índice dei paragrafi» de Cannatà Fera, pone en evidencia la frecuencia con que se repiten las citas del mismo pasaje pindárico: de 89 citas, 25 se repiten más de una vez; con relativa frecuencia hasta tres veces y en un caso, el fr. 57 Snell-Maehler, hasta cinco veces. Vid. las citas homéricas repetidas (literales, paráfrasis, compendios, alusiones...) en el corpus de *Moralia* (*Aud. poet.*; *Adulat.*; *Superst.*; *Aet. Rom.*; *Alex. fort. virt.*; *Pyth. or.*; *Tranq. an.*; *Garr.*; *Laud. ips.*; *Quaest. conv.*; *Amat.*; *Praec. ger. reip.*; *Plac. philos.*; *Fac. lun.*; *Soll. anim.*; *Suav. viv. Epic.*) analizado por Díaz Lavado.

característico de su formación escolar y retórica en la conformación de una obra literaria cuyo estilo «de mosaico» es rico y alusivo.³ La utilización y reutilización de epigramas o partes de epigramas parece obedecer en sus líneas generales a las mismas razones: versos sueltos o pares de versos (dísticos) epigramáticos parece que con una cierta frecuencia se habían convertido en *loci communes*, en dichos sentenciosos o frases hechas, que posiblemente circulaban formando parte de un acervo culturalmente rico. Pero quizá sea posible hallar también otras razones.

Hemos analizado el diálogo que se establece entre el texto citado y los textos citantes, observando la forma de la citación, la forma y función de la cita en los diferentes contextos, la fidelidad textual al «arquetipo» (incluida la extensión) cuando el texto del epigrama puede ser contrastado con el de otras fuentes (*Antología Palatina*, *Antología Planudea*, otras fuentes literarias), y teniendo también a la vista la «cronología» de las obras cuando con una cierta aproximación puede ser fijada,⁴ por lo que de significativo puede tener en el análisis. Se establece ahora un diálogo «a tres bandas», entre el texto citado y los textos citantes, y entre los textos citantes entre sí, es decir intertextual e intratextual al *corpus*, del que se pueden derivar conclusiones interesantes tanto para el género epigramático y su recepción en Plutarco, como para una mayor comprensión de los procedimientos de composición plutarqueos y para el esclarecimiento de relaciones entre las obras en las que las citas se insertan.

El número de citas de epigramas, literales y casi todas explícitas por lo que a la adscripción genérica se refiere, pero sin mencionar al autor del epigrama, se sitúa en torno a las 70,⁵ un número no alto si se tiene en cuenta la amplitud del *corpus* plutarqueo y también la riqueza del género epigramático, pero tampoco desdeñable. Del número señalado, una cifra menor (en torno a 23) corresponde a epigramas transmitidos también por las antologías *Palatina* y *Planudea*, mientras que la cifra más alta corresponde a epigramas que sólo Plutarco, o con otras fuentes antiguas, excepcionalmente epigráficas,⁶ transmite.⁷ Plutarco

3 Russell, 46: «...richness and allusiveness of his own «mosaic» style».

4 Cf. Jones 1966 y 1971, 135–137 «Chronological Table». Sólo para algunas de las obras aquí referidas puede ser fijada una cronología aproximada: al período retórico (c.60–65) pertenece el *de Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute*; las *Vidas Paralelas* entre c. 96 y c.120, es decir hacia la última parte de su vida; para el *De laude ips.* es posible fijar una cronología relativa: después del 100.

5 A la información proporcionada por Hembold-O'Neil 1959 (entradas «Anthologia Palatina», «Inscriptiones», «Simonides», «Callimachus», «Asclepiades») y por los «Índices» de las más importantes colecciones de epigramas (Hansen 1983 y 1989; Gow-Page 1965 y 1968; Page 1981) ha sido añadida la proporcionada por el TLG bajo las entradas ἐπίγραμμα, ἔλεγος, ἐπικήδειον (alguna de cuyas citas ha debido ser depurada). Estos repertorios no registran la cita integrada.

6 En *Coh. ira* 455 B, cita los versos 5–6 del epigrama de Calímaco AP XII 118 (un paraklausithyron), hallado en forma mutilada (comienzo de los vv. 1–3 y final de los

(junto con Ateneo y Pausanias) se sitúa entre los autores que más citas tiene de epigramas no recogidos en las antologías *Palatina* y *Planudea*. Por su tipología predominan los sepulcrales y los votivos, mientras que son muy pocos los ejemplos de otros tipos que tienen en la época helenística sus mejores cultivadores (eróticos, simposíacos, ecrásticos, de homenaje a personajes célebres, etc.).

El hecho de que los epigramas reutilizados pertenezcan fundamentalmente a los tipos sepulcral y votivo abunda en la idea de que no le interesó o le interesó poco el epigrama literario, conclusión a la que llegamos en nuestro anterior trabajo. El hecho de que lo que usualmente se repite, como vamos a mostrar, sea sólo parte del epigrama y que el nombre del autor en general sea silenciado abunda en la idea de que se trata de versos que entraron a formar parte del acervo popular gnómico; de hecho asistimos a una recategorización genérica en bastantes citas de epigramas: en *Apophthegmata Laconica*, en cuanto que los epigramas se convierten en «lo dicho» dentro del apotegma o se convierten incluso en un apotegma (vid. *infra*), o simplemente en «dichos» en *De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute* y en *De Laude ipsius*, sirviéndose Plutarco, para esa reconversión, de la variedad formal que el género epigramático le ofrecía. El que haya o no coincidencia entre el texto de la doble cita y su función en ambos contextos genera conclusiones diversas sobre el diálogo establecido, intertextual e intratextual al *corpus* plutarqueo (vid. *infra*).

1. El número de epigramas (o parte de epigramas) repetidos se sitúa en la decena, un número que nos permite un análisis detallado en el tiempo de que disponemos para esta comunicación. Consideremos en primer lugar la cita repetida dentro de una misma obra. Esto ocurre en los *Apophthegmata laconica* y en las dos *orationes* del *De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute*, un tipo de obras un tanto «especiales» dentro del *corpus* plutarqueo, que por su carácter, -la primera con autonomía de cada uno de los apotegmas o de los grupos que estos

vv. 1–6) en una inscripción del s. I encontrada en una pared de una casa del monte Esquilino en Roma (Dressler; Kaibel 1876 = 1878, n° 1111, 502: *primo fere saeculo ab homine romano doctissimo Callimachi admiratore in cubiculi pariete pictum*); en Herod. mal. 870 E, cita el epigrama (Page 1975; Simonides XI) también recuperado en IG I² 927 (Geffken, 96; Schwyzer 1960 (1923¹), 126), transmitido también por Favorino, *Corinthiaca* 8 (Ps.–Dio Prus., Or. 37.18, II 21 von Arnim); Plutarco (sin atribución de autor) y Favorino añaden un dístico más a la inscripción corintia, del s. V a. C (Hansen 1983, 131, la ha fechado en el 480 a. C.); en *An. procr.* 1030 A, cita el verso 1 de *AP* VII 35 (un epitafio ficticio por Píndaro, atribuido por el manuscrito *Palatino* a Leónidas de Tarento), también incorporado a un epitafio de Heraclea Póntica para un tal Herondas, fechado en el tránsito del III al II por Peek, 905.

- 7 Corresponden estas citas básicamente a las aportadas por Preger 1891, más algunas añadidas a partir del *TLG*. Muchos de los epigramas recogidos en este *corpus* han sido reeditados y comentados por Page 1981). A ambos *corpora* nos referiremos de forma abreviada al identificar los epigramas considerados en este trabajo que están contenidos en ellos.

constituyen⁸ y la segunda constituida por dos *declamationes* bajo un título de signo antilógico, aunque en realidad complementarias⁹ hacen que quede un tanto atemperada la repetición, que incluso, alguna vez, se produce de forma contigua, como en *Apophthegmata laconica* 240F-241A. Pasemos al análisis (los textos figuran en un Apéndice).

1.1. En 235A, formando parte de un apotegma referido a un tal Tímnico, que sorprendentemente es el n° 51 de los llamados «apotegmas anónimos», se cita completo, aunque con importantes variantes en todo el v. 4, un epigrama de seis versos, también transmitido por la *Antología Palatina* VII 229 y atribuido a Dioscórides, cuyo tema central es el del «valiente espartano que sin vida vuelve del combate sobre el escudo». ¹⁰ Su función es la de cita de autoridad, aunque no sea explicitado así (es introducido καὶ ἐπίγραμμα εἰς τοῦτον ἐγένετο), pero al mismo tiempo el epigrama en su segunda parte se constituye en un apotegma de «dicho», circunstancia posibilitada por su forma narrativa, que incluye un pequeño parlamento en el tercer dístico; es decir, asistimos, en realidad, a la presencia de un apotegma dentro de otro.

Ese tercer dístico, en estilo directo en el epigrama (introducido por εἶπε τόδε «palabras de Tímnico al colocar en la pira a su hijo»), es repetido en 241 A, integrado también dentro de un apotegma como «lo dicho» ahora por una laconia anónima al enterarse de que su hijo había caído valientemente en el combate. El epigrama está completamente recategorizado, siendo introducido por un simple ἔφη, a diferencia de la cita anterior, que lo era con el formal καὶ ἐπίγραμμα εἰς τοῦτον ... Es decir, se trata de una cita integrada.

1.2. En 240F Plutarco selecciona los dos primeros versos del epigrama sepulcral narrativo *AP* VII 433, atribuido a Timnes, integrándolos como cita de autoridad (τὸ δ' ἐπίγραμμα ἐπ' αὐτῆς τόδε «y el epigrama que la rememora es éste») en el apotegma de Damatria, una espartana que inmola a su hijo, por haber sido un cobarde, cuando llega a su presencia.¹¹ Del mismo epigrama

8 Fue Stephanus en realidad el que introdujo la distinción que estaba implícita en los contenidos de los apotegmas, en: *Apophthegmata laconica* 208A-236F; *Instituta laconica* 236F-240B; *Lacaenarum apophthegmata* 240C-242D.

9 D'Angelo, señala: «Inoltre il *topos* della *Tychê*, indicata dai detrattori di Alessandro quale vera artefice dei suoi successi, viene utilizzato dall'autore per dimostrare che anche nei riguardi dei beni esteriori il Macedone diede prova di virtù, essendogli la fortuna avversaria e non alleata» (p. 11) y «L'apologia della paideia filosofica del Macedone è la struttura portante delle due orazioni *De Alex. fort.*» (p. 19).

10 Sobre la orientación filolacedemonia de Dioscórides y de otros epigramatistas de su generación cf. Degani 1991², 290 ss., y 1993, 220 ss.; vid. también el comentario a este epigrama de Galán Vioque, n° 26, 308-313.

11 Es éste un tema que, anticipado ya en un epigrama transmitido muy fragmentariamente en *P. Tebt.* I 3, posiblemente de Asclepiades (Page 89), está bien representado en la segunda generación de epigramatistas y después: *AP* VII 433 (Timnes); *AP* VII 230 (Erucio); *AP* VII 531 (Antípatro de Tesalónica); *AP* IX 61 (anón.); *AP* IX 397

selecciona los dos últimos versos, integrándolos (con llamativas variantes)¹² en el apotegma «mixto» de una espartana anónima que, con el mismo tema, sigue inmediatamente después (241A), aparentemente como cita de autoridad, pero en realidad, en lo que es un ejemplo más de recategorización de un epigrama, como representando «lo dicho» (pues el epigrama expande οὐκ ἔμὸν τὸ φίτυμα)¹³ por la espartana anónima: los dos versos, en estilo directo en el epigrama, son fácilmente reutilizables de esa forma. La cita completa consta además de otros dos versos, que preceden a los anteriores y parecen proceder de otro epigrama,¹⁴ al menos en parte, pues la palabra inicial Ἔρρε (v. 1) también podría haber sido tomada y desplazada de la inicial del último dístico de *AP* VII 433 (en el v. 3 del epigrama citado en Plutarco, ἀχρεῖον es una variante por ἔρρε κακὸν del v. 5 de *AP* VII 433), para ser adaptado todo el epigrama, rehecho, como «palabras dichas»: esto no hubiera podido ocurrir con los versos centrales del epigrama, en forma narrativa como su comienzo. Es decir, asistimos a un proceso de contaminación y el epigrama resultante, que cita Plutarco, es un «pequeño monstruo» desde el punto de vista de la forma «canónica» del epigrama.

En la recategorización de las dos citas del epigrama inciden el ἐπ' αὐτῆς y ἐφ' ἧς de la fórmula introductoria: los versos rememoran a estas mujeres y su moral, y están utilizados desde el punto de vista de los protagonistas de los apotegmas, aunque el epigrama en su origen esté dedicado al hijo al que han dado muerte.

Es sorprendente la contigüidad en la citación, pero también el cuidado para que no se repitan los mismos dísticos del epigrama, aunque podríamos decir que su función semántica es la misma. Es como si Plutarco hubiera dividido el epigrama en dos partes, con una adaptación especial en cada caso en aras de una variación. De ello pueden derivarse conclusiones respecto a la autoría de Plutarco y a la conformación personal suya de esta obra, tan discutidas, aunque él trabajara sobre un material coleccionado por otro (u otros) o por él mismo.

El epigrama funerario, por su carácter conmemorativo, sirvió como instrumento eficaz a Plutarco para caracterizar el valor de los espartanos. Las citas que terminamos de estudiar son citas de autoridad que avalan ese

(Páladas); *AP* IX 447 (Juliano el egipcio). Existía el célebre dicho «o con el escudo o sobre el escudo», con el que las madres espartanas despedían a sus hijos: cf. Plu., *Apophth. Lac.* 241F (16) Ἄλλη προσαναδιδοῦσα τῷ παιδί τὴν ἀσπίδα καὶ παρακελευομένη «Τέκνον» ἔφη «ἢ ταῦταν ἢ ἐπὶ ταύτας» (para otras fuentes vid. Santaniello 1995, 431 n. 580; Sext. Emp., *Pyrh. Hyp.* III 216).

12 ἀχρεῖον Plu. ἔρρε κακὸν *AP*; τὸ μὴ Plu. τὸν οὐ *AP*

13 Cf. *Apophth. Lac.* 242A οὐ γὰρ ἦς ἐμὸς y *AP* VII 531.

14 En el aparato crítico de la edición del epigrama en Waltz se señala que estos dos versos serían tomados de otro epigrama sobre el mismo tema o de una paráfrasis escrita en el margen y después insertada en el texto. Otros dos epigramas, *AP* VII 230 y 531, son consagrados al castigo de Damatrio, tan desconocido como su madre.

proverbial valor, aludido de forma indirecta por la declaración de los padres: de orgullo, en el primero de los epigramas, por el comportamiento del hijo resistiendo hasta la muerte, de repudio ante el acto de desertión hasta llegar a infligirle la muerte, en el segundo. Wissmann (2002) se refiere a que quizá Plutarco pudo disponer de una colección de epigramas sobre la moral espartana, algunos de los cuales también se encuentran en ámbito claramente escolar.¹⁵

1.3. Un caso especial, como hemos señalado, por su aparente carácter antilógico, aunque realmente complementario, lo constituyen las dos declamaciones que conforman el *De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute*, en las que, en la segunda mitad de la primera (331A) y al comienzo de la segunda (335B), con distinta función semántica es introducido el último dístico de un epigrama transmitido completo en la *Antología Planudea* (AP XVI 120): en la primera *declamatio*, en un pasaje relativo a los dichos de Alejandro, el epigrama constituye un dicho más que refleja su δύναμις «poder», significado por la μεγαληγορία «declaración orgullosa», que los poetas le atribuyeron en sus pinturas y en sus estatuas (con él va coordinada la cita también verbal Ἀλέξανδρος ἐγὼ Διὸς μὲν υἱός); en la segunda, en cambio, para avalar que adolecía del defecto físico de tener el cuello ligeramente torcido hacia la izquierda y mirar hacia arriba, pose en la que tan bien lo esculpió Lisipo,¹⁶ en una de cuyas numerosas estatuas de Alejandro estaba grabado este epigrama.

Hay también variación en la forma de la citación: la primera es una cita integrada (aunque haya una mención indirecta a su carácter inscripcional en el microcontexto), que ejemplifica el δεύτερον δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς φωνὰς ἴδωμεν de varias líneas más arriba (230E); la segunda es una cita explícita: ἐπέγραψέ τις.

Sospechosamente, el epigrama ha sido transmitido sólo por la *Antología de Planudes*, con doble atribución: a Arquelao o a Asclepiades, doble atribución que los datos disponibles no permiten resolver inequívocamente en uno u otro sentido, pero que parecen inclinar la balanza a favor del segundo.¹⁷

15 Vid. Pordomingo 2002: cf. O. Bodl. II 2172; 2173 (Lloyd-Jones & Parsons, *Suppl. Hell.* 971), dos copias escolares del mismo epigrama, cuyos dos últimos versos son especialmente significativos de lo que aquí estamos considerando, además de contener el término ἀχρεῖον del v. 4 del epigrama citado por Plutarco:

ἴσομαι, οὐ δ' ἀχρεῖον ἐφόλκιον ἴσομαι, σίχμάν
οὐ φεύγειν ὁ Λάκων, ἀλλὰ μένειν ἔμαθον.

16 Cf. *Alex.* 4. Esa ligera inclinación (hacia la izquierda) del cuello de Alejandro es también mencionada en *Adulat.* 53D y *Pyrh.* 8. 2. Sobre las representaciones de la figura de Alejandro vid., entre otra bibliografía, Bieber; Ch. Picard, IV, 691 s.; 710.

17 Ningún otro epigrama en la *Antología Palatina* es atribuido a Arquelao y el único Arquelao conocido, autor de epigramas, es un escritor del s. III a. C., del cual Antígono de Caristo cita tres epigramas y Varrón un cuarto, de una temática muy diferente. *Antología Palatina* XVI 119–122 corresponde a una serie de epigramas sobre las representaciones de Alejandro: el 119, que precede a éste, es un epigrama de Posidipo

2. El resto de las citas de epigramas repetidas se dan entre dos obras de *Moralia* o de *Moralia* y *Vitae*.

2.1. En *De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute* 330F se cita solamente el v. 1 (hasta la diéresis bucólica) del epigrama sepulcral *AP* VII 325 por Sardanápalo, que, aunque es introducido explícitamente (τοῖς δὲ Σαρδαναπάλλου μνημείοις ἐπιγέγραπται) es también recategorizado a continuación como un apotegma, lo cual ha podido hacer fácilmente Plutarco en cuanto que la *persona loquens* del epigrama es el propio difunto, Sardanápalo. Forma parte de una serie de tres apotegmas que caracterizan negativamente a tres personajes (Antígono, Dionisio y Sardanápalo), frente a los que se yergue la figura de Alejandro «cuyos dichos son dignos de un Sócrates, un Platón y un Pitágoras».¹⁸

En *De laude ipsius* 546A,¹⁹ silenciando al personaje (Sardanápalo) son introducidos, mediante el deíctico intertextual πρὸς τό, como si fuera un dicho anónimo -¡tal era la fortuna de este epigrama!-, todo el verso 1 y parte del siguiente del epigrama,²⁰ sirviendo la cita de contrapunto semántico, en cuanto que expresa elogio del vicio, a la utilidad de alabarse a sí mismo cuando se trata de valores positivos como los personificados por Crates, autor de un epigrama (= *AP* VII 326, 1–2) claramente paralelo y antitético. Son citas de autoridad en ambos casos.

2.2. En *Apophthegmata laconica* 217F Plutarco integra de forma explícita,²¹ en el segundo apotegma relativo a Areo, rey agiada desde el 309 al 265, un

que se refiere también a una de las estatuas esculpidas por Lisipo; la frecuente asociación de ambos poetas favorecería la adscripción a Asclepiades del 120; vid. el comentario de Guichard, 433 ss. sobre este epigrama.

18 A continuación de la cita de Sardanápalo, la última de la serie, se señala: Τίς οὐκ εἶποι τῶν ἀποφθεγγμάτων τούτων τῷ μὲν ἀποφαίνεσθαι φιληδονίαν, τῷ δ' ἀρεσότητα, τῷ δ' ἀδικίαν καὶ πλεονεξίαν;

19 Jones 1966, 73 fecha este tratado, uno de los pocos a los que atribuye una fecha segura, poco después del año 100.

20 Πάνυ δὲ χαρίεντως καὶ ὁ Κράτης πρὸς τό[] ἀντέγραψε τό· El epigrama anónimo sobre Sardanápalo (*AP* VII 325), además de ser citado parcialmente por Plutarco, *Alex. fort. virt.* 330F (parte del v. 1) y *Laud. ips.* 546A (v. 1 y parte de 2), lo es por Str. XIV, p. 672; D. Chrys. IV, 135; St. Byz. s.v. Ἀγχιάλη; Polb. VIII, 10 (12), 4 (que omite la misma parte del v. 2 que Plutarco en *Laud. ips.*); y, a través del testimonio de Cicerón (*Tusc.* V 35,101 y *Fin.* II 32, 106), que traduce el dístico en *Tusc.* V 35, 101, sabemos que era conocido por Aristóteles. Sardanápalo era ya tema de la comedia (*Ar. Av.* 1021). Los dos versos de *AP* VII 325 forman parte de un epitafio más largo (=vv. 4–5 de *A. Plan.* 27), que, según Diodoro de Sicilia (II 23), Sardanápalo había compuesto para sí mismo en asirio y después fue traducido al griego; según Estrabón (XIV, 672) era la obra de un Quérilo (el trágico del s. VI o el samio del s. V); el número de fuentes (a añadir a las anteriormente citadas) que transmiten parcial o totalmente el epigrama es impresionante (vid. aparato crítico de la edición del texto). Se plantea aquí el problema de si el epigrama correspondiente a *AP* VII 325 se desgajó de *A. Plan.* 27 (lo más probable) o era el núcleo en torno al cual el epigrama se habría desarrollado.

21 ἰδὼν ἐπὶ μνήματος ἐλεγείον ἐπιγεγραμμένον...

epigrama funerario de forma narrativa, conmemorativo del derrocamiento de la tiranía (Preger 41; Page 1981, 404 «Anon. C»). El apotegma, «de dicho», construido sobre la figura de Areo caminando delante de una tumba colectiva y lector del epigrama, gira en su ironía, manifestada en el «dicho», en torno a la primera palabra del epigrama σβεννύντος, usada metafóricamente: «sofocar».²²

El mismo apotegma, con el epigrama integrado mediante una introducción más breve, es referido a un espartano anónimo en la *Vita Lycurgi* 20.13, formando parte de una serie de apotegmas caracterizadores del prototipo del espartano como gente de mente ingeniosa: ¿recordaba Plutarco el pasaje anterior? o ¿hay que apelar a una fuente externa para ambos apotegmas y para el epigrama que llevan integrado?²³ La fraseología es la misma, pero se introduce variación en la forma del «dicho»: uso de la segunda persona en *Apophth. Lac.* (estilo directo), de la tercera persona en la *Vita* (forma narrativa); formas dorias en la *Vita* -τεθνάκοντι, ἀφόμεν, ὅλαν αὐτάν, κατακαῆμεν- frente a las paralelas jónicas en *Apophth. Lac.* La forma de citar el epigrama, en cambio, y su forma y función dentro del apotegma, es la misma en ambos pasajes. Con los datos disponibles nos inclinamos por reivindicar la originalidad plutarquea del apotegma, que gira en torno al epigrama y que de nuevo se sirve de él en la *Vita*.

Plutarco es, en efecto, la única fuente del epigrama. Parece que éste evoca aquel tumulto con el que los de Selinunte expulsaron al tirano Eurileonte. Heródoto 5, 46, recuerda la tiranía de Pitágoras, derrocado por Eurileonte, que a su vez fue asesinado en una revuelta (Holm, 311).

2.3. Un dístico (Preger 3 B, Page 1981, 440 «Anon. CXXXI»), de inseguro comienzo, es citado en la *Consolatio ad Apollonium* 110B, en una serie de citas de autoridad que se imbrican en el *continuum* expositivo-narrativo formando parte de la argumentación (función erudito-amplificativa), en un pasaje de reflexión sobre la muerte como liberadora de las penas y sobre su iniquidad (cap. 15). Parece tratarse de un epitafio colectivo lacedemonio, confirmado por la canción espartana (Diehl II 6, 34) sobre el paso del tiempo (explícitamente introducida: Γενναῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ λακωνικόν), con la que el epigrama, introducido mediante un nexo deíctico intertextual muy laxo, καὶ πάλιν, va coordinado, y confirmado asimismo por el contexto de la *Vida de Pelópidas* 1.7, en la que de nuevo se cita.

El mismo espíritu, la idea de que la muerte libera de los sufrimientos, anima el prefacio de la *Vita*. Sin embargo aquí, en el contexto más inmediato, el

22 «Y un día, cuando (Areo) caminaba por Selinunte, en Sicilia, al ver en una tumba grabado el epigrama ‘un día, cuando sofocaban la tiranía, Ares cruel los sorprendió, y ante las puertas de Selinunte murieron’, dijo: con razón perecisteis al intentar sofocar la tiranía, pues hubiera sido necesario lo contrario, dejarla que se consumiera toda entera».

23 Sobre esta difícil cuestión vid. Santaniello, 14 ss.

dístico sirve de cita de autoridad para avalar la constatación del carácter equilibrado de los lacedemonios,²⁴ que gracias a su virtud experimentaban la misma alegría en vivir y en morir, la misma que testimonia este epigrama funerario, cuyo sentido está integrado aquí perfectamente. Es introducido explícitamente: ὡς δηλοῖ τὸ ἐπικήδειον, y de forma *abundans*: γὰρ φησίν, posiblemente para resolver el hiato.

El epigrama transmitido por Plutarco nos da en las dos obras un primer verso que es amétrico en su comienzo: el hiato οἶδε ἔθονον habla quizá de corruptela, favorecida por el carácter formular de οἶδε al comienzo de los epigramas sepulcrales. La coincidencia de contenidos y la corruptela común hablan de que la *Consolatio* actuó quizá como hipotexto de la *Vita*. La propuesta de Preger οἶ ἔθονον recompone el hexámetro pero deja privado del οἶδε deíctico sepulcral. El testimonio de Teles sobre su carácter inscripcional es claro²⁵ y la dificultad de un οἶ relativo comenzando el epigrama se solventa si es un relativo que liga la frase del dístico a la composición completa. La frecuencia con la que los epigramas están fragmentados en las citas de Plutarco es un hecho.²⁶

2.4. En *Vitae decem oratorum* 847A, en la presentación de la serie de manifestaciones antimacedónicas de Demóstenes, figura el epigrama que Plutarco considera autógrafo del orador (Preger 159; Page 1981, 447 «Anon. CXXXIX») y que después fue grabado en una estatua en Atenas. Sirve de cita de autoridad. Es un epigrama votivo cuya forma responde al punto de vista del transeúnte que pasa delante de la estatua y lee el epigrama, pero también esta forma delata el distanciamiento buscado por el «supuesto autor, Demóstenes» prestándole su voz a una segunda persona (el sujeto lírico) y convirtiéndose él en objeto de la interpelación. Es plenamente caracterizador, por otra parte, del estilo oratorio, con un perfecto período condicional que expresa la irrealidad: todo el epigrama es una frase de orador.

Hacia el final del capítulo dedicado a la muerte del orador, en la *Vita de Demóstenes* 30.5, de nuevo introduce Plutarco el epigrama, de forma explícita y

24 Parece contradecirse con lo que pone en boca de un sibarita respecto a los espartanos en 1. 5: «no tiene gran mérito hacerse matar en la guerra para escapar a tanta fatiga y a tal régimen de vida». Evidentemente, para los sibaritas, entre los cuales el lujo y la vida muelle habían hecho amar el honor y la gloria, odiar la vida era la razón de no temer a la muerte.

25 La cita de Teles (fl. 235 a. c.) no incluye οἶδε (Stob. IV 44, 83, p. 989 Hense): καὶ ἐπιγράφουσι Λακεδαιμόνιοι· οὔτε τὸ ζῆν-ἐκτελέσαι.

26 Page 1981, 440 (com. ad loc.), que acepta el texto de Preger, aporta toda una serie de argumentos para postular que posiblemente formaba parte de una elegía, al igual que el dístico que precede en *Consolatio ad Apollonium*, porque en la esfera pública, a la que pertenecerían estas líneas, no hay ningún epitafio en verso en *Esparta*. Argumenta partiendo de que Plutarco lo califica como epicedio y del pasaje *Apophth. lac.* 238A.

con el calificativo de «muy conocido» (τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τὸ θρυλούμενον ἐπιγραφῆναι τῇ βάσει τοῦ ἀνδριάντος).²⁷ Forma parte de la noticia sobre la dedicación, por parte del pueblo ateniense, de una estatua honorífica al orador, poco después de su muerte.

La función semántica es distinta en los dos contextos. En el primero sirve de cita de autoridad; en el segundo es un mero documento que explicita τὸ ἐπίγραμμα.

2.5. En el tratado *de Herodoti malignitate* 867F, a la aserción de Heródoto, en el libro VIII, de que los griegos, presa del pánico, pensaban abandonar el Artemisio para refugiarse en el interior de Grecia,²⁸ Plutarco contrapone la afirmación de que permanecieron y libraron la batalla marítima contra los bárbaros. Los versos de un ditirambo con el que Píndaro exaltó la espléndida victoria de los atenienses (fr. 77 Snell-Maehler) y un epigrama votivo refiriéndose a la misma (Preger 103; Page 1981, 237 «Simonides XXIV»),²⁹ que estaba grabado junto al templo de Atenea Proseoa (ἔχει δ' οὕτω τὸ ἐπίγραμμα), sirven como citas de autoridad dentro de la argumentación.³⁰

Los mismos versos de Píndaro y el mismo epigrama son citados también en la *Vida de Temístocles* 9. 4–6: los versos de Píndaro con una función similar a la que tenían en el pasaje del *de Herodoti malignitate*, avalando el valor de los griegos en la victoria del Artemisio; el epigrama, en cambio, introducido a menos distancia incluso que en el *De malignitate* y bajo la designación ahora como ἐλεγεῖον, formando parte de una descripción detallada y pintoresca del lugar (el promontorio Artemisio de Eubea) y del templo de Ártemis Proseoa, rodeado de árboles y estelas de mármol blanco, en una de las cuales estaba grabado. Es introducido explícitamente: Ἐν μῆδ' οὖν τῶν στήλων ἐλεγεῖον ἦν τόδε γεγραμμένον·

Dado que las dos citas, la de Píndaro y el epigrama, reaparecen de nuevo, aunque con distinta función ζτενία Plutarco a la vista el texto del *de Herodoti malignitate* cuando compuso la *Vita*? Posiblemente sí.

2.6. De nuevo en el *de Herodoti malignitate* 873B, en la «Querelle» con Heródoto por la batalla de Platea, se inserta otro epigrama votivo, también como cita de autoridad, dentro de la argumentación de que los griegos

27 El calificativo θρυλούμενον incide en la idea de que un buen número de estos epigramas, utilizados y reutilizados por Plutarco, forma parte de ese acervo cultural común, en el que la identidad de género aparece desdibujada.

28 *Herod. mal.* 867B: Ἐν δὲ τῇ ὁγδόῃ τοὺς Ἑλληνάς φησι καταδειλιάσαντας ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀρτεμισίου δρησμόν βουλευέσθαι ἕσω εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα...

29 Vid. la interpretación de Page 1981 de la frase parentética del tercer verso, con valor temporal como mirando hacia delante, pues el ejército de los medos no pereció después de la batalla del Artemisio, sino después de ser vencido en Platea (quizá haya que suprimir la coma del final del v. 3 para poder mantener esta interpretación).

30 Vid. Manfredini, 560.

intervinieron todos en la batalla contra los persas. En la *Vida de Arístides* 19.7 lo introduce de nuevo para, junto a los argumentos que preceden a la cita, servir de base a la defensa de la misma idea de que hicieron causa común. En ambos contextos hay una introducción explícita de que el epigrama estuvo grabado: τέλος δὲ τῷ βωμῷ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τοῦτο γράφοντες ἐνεχάραξαν (*Herod. mal.* 873B) y καὶ τὸν βωμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐπέγραψαν οὕτως (*Arist.* 330e).

El epigrama, transmitido también en *AP* VI 50, conformado por dos dísticos y atribuido a Simónides (Preger 78; Page 212 «Simonides XV»), tiene en las dos citas de Plutarco sólo tres versos, «faltando» el pentámetro de lo que sería el primer dístico elegíaco. Existen además importantes variantes respecto al texto de la *Antología Palatina* en los demás versos: v.1. Νίκης κράτει *Herod. mal.*: νίκας κράτει *Arist.*: ῥώμῃ χερὸς P; v.3. ἐλευθέρῃ *Herod. mal.*, *Arist. cod.S.*: ἐλεύθερον *P Pl, Arist. codd.* U A; κοινὸν *Herodot. mal.*, *Arist.*: κόσμον *P Pl*.

La expresión central, sobre la que gira el epigrama y por la que Plutarco lo cita, es κοινὸν ἰδρύσαντο Διὸς βωμόν ¿Cuál de los epigramas es el originario? ¿Ha sido rehecho el epigrama por Plutarco para servir de evidencia a la causa por él defendida? Es significativo que, además de que el epigrama coincide en su forma en las dos citas de Plutarco (en la *Vita* con lengua dorizante: Ἑλλανες, νίκῃ),³¹ los dos contextos en que se cita coincidan en su mensaje y que la utilización del epigrama tenga la misma función lógica de cita de autoridad que avala ese mensaje. Posiblemente tenía ante los ojos el texto del de *Herodoti malignitate* en la composición del pasaje de la *Vita*.

El epigrama puede ser considerado copia de una inscripción (anónima) sobre el altar de Zeus Eleuterio en Platea, cuya existencia es testimoniada por Pausanias y por Estrabón.³² Plutarco posiblemente lo tomó de la fuente que está en la base del pasaje, posiblemente Eforo, que tendía a acentuar el carácter panhelénico de la victoria sobre los persas.

Que la forma originaria del epigrama sea la transmitida por Plutarco, es decir 2 hex.+1 pent.,³³ después normalizada en dos dísticos atribuidos a Simónides, es defendido por Manfredini (p. 588 s.) y también por Page, quien señala que la forma métrica, no encontrada en el s. V ni antes, delata una mano no práctica, como también la delata la mediocridad de la composición. El

31 También en *Lyc.* 20.13 el texto del epigrama presenta una lengua dorizante, frente al transmitido en *Apophth. Lac.* 217F: vid. *supra*.

32 Paus. 9.2.5 «En la entrada de Platea están las tumbas de los que pelearon contra los persas. De los griegos restantes hay una tumba común, pero de los espartanos y atenienses que cayeron hay tumbas separadas con epigramas (*elegeia*) de Simónides grabados. Οὐ πόρρω δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ τάφου τῶν Ἑλλήνων Διὸς ἐστὶν Ἐλευθερίου βωμός»; Estr. II.9 2.31: αἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων δυνάμεις... ἰδρύσαντο... Ἐλευθερίου Διὸς ἱερόν.

33 Algunos códigos de *Arist.* transmiten dos dísticos.

primer pentámetro y la adscripción a Simónides han de ser considerados como ficciones tardías.³⁴

2.7. En la *Vida de Marcelo* 30.7–9, tras la enumeración de los monumentos consagrados por Marcelo, Plutarco se refiere a su propia estatua en Lindos, en el recinto del templo de Atenea, sobre la que, según cuenta Posidonio, había un epigrama votivo en la forma de alocución al caminante por parte de la estatua, que es la *persona loquens*, con contenidos que elogian su actividad política y militar (Preger 168; Page 461 «Anon. CXLIX»). El primer verso, totalmente descontextualizado, es incluido, en *Non posse suaviter...* 1098A, en una lista seriada de citas que, con una función erudito-amplificativa, contribuyen al desarrollo argumentativo del discurso sobre la superioridad de los placeres por ellas significados.

La duplicidad de ese primer verso, poco significativa en otros aspectos, sí tiene una aportación textual: invalida la corrección de Estéfano, que, basándose en algunos códices de la *Vida de Marcelo*, propone para el último término del primer verso ἄστος, en vez de ἄστηρ, lectura ésta última en la que coinciden las dos fuentes plutarqueas y que creemos ha de ser preferida.³⁵

Llega el momento de concluir. El bajo número de citas literales analizado, ajustado al tiempo disponible para una comunicación, es significativo, sin embargo, del modo y función de la reutilización de citas de epigramas, aunque a nadie se le escapa que estas conclusiones sólo pueden adquirir una validez más general si se unen a las obtenidas en el estudio de la duplicidad de citas pertenecientes a otros géneros³⁶. Las relaciones que se establecen entre las citas y los contextos en los que se enmarcan, y su hipotexto son complejas y pueden arrojar luz sobre la recepción del epigrama por Plutarco y sobre aspectos de la composición y autoría de la obra plutarquea.

En citas dentro de la misma obra (1.1; 1.2; 1.3), que incluso se repiten muy próximas, hemos observado un deliberado intento de variación, bien en la forma de la cita (observable sobre todo en su extensión: 1.1; 1.2) bien en su función semántica de cita de autoridad (1.3); pero también coincidencia frente a la fuente externa: las citas representan un segmento del epigrama (1.3), o, al menos, una segmentación del mismo epigrama (1.2). El texto de las citas (1.1) presenta importantes variantes respecto al de los correspondientes epigramas de la *Antología Palatina*.

34 Page 1981, 212 «Simonides XV»; el ej. más temprano Peek, 82 (Atenas, temprano s. IV); IG II/III 3.1.4319; la forma 2 hex.+pent. recurre en una dedicación por Sila en el 82 a.C. (Preger, 116); cf. AP XIII 16, dedicación de Cinisca en Olimpia en 3 hex.+1 pent.

35 Ἀστός, en cambio, es la aceptada por Ziegler.

36 Vid. Cannatà, 165.

En citas repetidas en dos obras de *Moralia* o de *Moralia* y *Vitae* parece haber casos claros en que un pasaje de una obra de Plutarco se constituye en hipotexto del otro (2.2; 2.3; 2.5; 2.6), por las relaciones (de igualdad o variación) que es posible establecer entre ellas y que se refieren a:

La forma de la cita: el texto de las dos citas coincide en las importantes variantes que presenta frente al de la fuente externa (2.6); se observa colorido dialectal dorio en las citas de *Vitae* frente a las correspondientes de *Moralia* (2.2; 2.6); la cita representa un segmento del epigrama (2.1, aunque de distinta extensión).

La función de la cita: si bien la función lógica de cita de autoridad predomina, hay concordancia (2.2; 2.6) o variación (2.3; 2.5) en el mensaje, es decir en la adaptación de los contenidos del texto citado (¿llegando incluso a manipularlo en 2.6?).

Forma de la citación: en general, la citación es explícita respecto al género (términos ἐπίγραμμα y ἔλεγεῖον, alternándose incluso para la misma cita)³⁷ y no incluye en ningún caso el nombre del autor; pero la explicitud de rasgos del género epigramático en la deixis intertextual es superior en *Vitae*, llegando en cambio a manifestarse en las marcas de esa deixis (por ej. en *Laud. ips.* 546A mediante πρὸς τὸ) la recategorización genérica de carácter «moralizante», como «dichos», que un buen número de epigramas, o partes de ellos, experimenta en *Moralia*.

Textos citados:³⁸

1.1

Apophthegmata laconica 235A

Τύννιχος, Θρασυβούλου τοῦ παιδὸς ἀποθανόντος, εὐρώστως ἤνεγκε· καὶ ἐπίγραμμα εἰς τοῦτον ἐγένετο·

τὰν Πιτάναν Θρασύβουλος ἐπ' ἀσπίδος ἤλυθεν ἄπνους

ἐπταὶ πρὸς Ἀργείων τραύματα δεξάμενος,

δεικνὺς ἀντία πάντα· τὸν αἱματόεντα δ' ὁ πρέσβυς

θεῖς ἐπὶ πυρκαϊήν Τύννιχος εἶπε τάδε·

«Δειλοὶ κλαίέσθωσαν· ἐγὼ δέ σε τέκνον ἄδακρυς

θάψω, τὸν καὶ ἔμὸν καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιον».

241A

Ἄλλη τὸν υἱὸν ἐν παρατάξει μαθοῦσα πεσόντα ἔφη·

δειλοὶ κλαίέσθωσαν· ἐγὼ δέ σε, τέκνον, ἄδακρυς

θάπτω τὸν καὶ ἔμὸν καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιον.

37 En *Apophth.* Lac. 217 (ἔλεγεῖον) y *Lyc.* 20.13 (ἐπίγραμμα); también ἐπικήδειον (*Pel.* 1.7).

38 Los textos han sido tomados de la Ed. «Les Belles Lettres», tanto para las citas de pasajes de las obras de Plutarco como para las de la *Antología Griega*, excepto el último, de la Loeb.

AP VII 229

Τῷ Πιτάνῃ Θρασύβουλος ἐπ' ἀσπίδος ἤλυθεν ἄπνους,
 ἐπτά πρὸς Ἀργείων τραύματα δεξάμενος,
 δεικνὺς ἀντία πάντα· τὸν αἱματόεντα δ' ὁ πρέσβυς
 παῖδ' ἐπὶ πυρκαϊῇν Τύννιχος εἶπε τιθεῖς·
 «Δειλοὶ κλαίεσθωσαν· ἐγὼ δὲ σέ, τέκνον, ἄδακρυς
 θάψω, τὸν καὶ ἔμὸν καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιον».

1.2

Apophthegmata laconica 240F

Δαματρία τὸν υἱὸν δειλὸν καὶ ἀνάξιον ἑαυτῆς ἀκούσασα, παραγενόμενον ἀνεῖλε· τὸ δ'
 ἐπίγραμμα ἐπ' αὐτῆς τόδε·
 τὸν παραβάντα νόμους Δαμάτριον ἔκτανε μάτηρ,
 ἃ Λακεδαιμονία τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον.

241A

Ἐτέρα Λάκαινα τὸν υἱὸν λιποτακτήσαντα ὡς ἀνάξιον τῆς πατρίδος ἀνείλεν, εἰποῦσα
 «οὐκ ἔμὸν τὸ φίτυμα»· ἐφ' ἧς τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τόδε·
 Ἔρρε κακὸν φίτυμα διὰ σκότος, οὗ διὰ μῖσος
 Εὐρώτας δειλαῖς μὴδ' ἐλάφοισι ῥέοι.
 Ἀχρεῖον σκυλάκευμα, κακὰ μερίς, ἔρρε ποθ' Ἄιδαν,
 ἔρρε· τὸ μὴ Σπάρτας ἄξιον οὐδ' ἔτεκεν.

AP VII 433

Τὸν παραβάντα νόμους Δαμάτριον ἔκτανε μάτηρ
 ἃ Λακεδαιμονία τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον.
 Θηκτὸν δ' ἐν προβολᾷ θεμένα ξίφος εἶπεν, ὀδόντα
 ὄξυν ἐπιβρύκουσ', οἷα Λάκαινα γυνά
 «Ἔρρε, κακὸν σκυλάκευμα, κακὰ μερίς, ἔρρε ποθ' Ἄιδαν,
 ἔρρε· τὸν οὐ Σπάρτας ἄξιον οὐδ' ἔτεκεν».

1.3

De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute 331A

Μὴ γὰρ ὅς οἱ ποιηταὶ ταῖς εἰκόσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδριᾶσι μεγαληγορίας ἐπεχάραττον,
 οὐ τῆς μετριότητος, ἀλλὰ τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου στοχαζόμενοι, σκοπῶμεν·
 «αὐδασοῦντι δ' ἔοικεν ὁ χάλκεος εἰς Δία λεύσσω·
 Γὰν ὑπ' ἐμοὶ τίθεται· Ζεῦ, σὺ δ' Ὀλυμπον ἔχε».
 καὶ «Ἀλέξανδρος ἐγὼ Διὸς μὲν υἱός». ταῦτα μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἔφην, οἱ ποιηταὶ κολακεύοντες
 αὐτοῦ τὴν τύχην προσεῖπον

335B

Λυσίππου δὲ τὸ πρῶτον Ἀλέξανδρον πλάσαντος, ἄνω βλέποντα τῷ προσώπῳ πρὸς
 τὸν οὐρανὸν (ὥσπερ αὐτὸς εἰώθει βλέπειν Ἀλέξανδρος ἡσυχῇ παρεγκλίνων τὸν τράχηλον)
 ἐπέγραψέ τις οὐκ ἀπιθάνως
 «αὐδασοῦντι δ' ἔοικεν ὁ χάλκεος εἰς Δία λεύσσω·
 Γὰν ὑπ' ἐμοὶ τίθεται· Ζεῦ, σὺ δ' Ὀλυμπον ἔχε».

Διὸ καὶ μόνον Ἀλέξανδρος ἐκέλευε Λύσιππον εἰκόνας αὐτοῦ δημιουργεῖν. Μόνος γὰρ οὗτος, ὥς ἔοικε, κατεμήνυε τῷ χαλκῷ τὸ ἦθος αὐτοῦ καὶ συνεξέφερε τῇ μορφῇ τὴν ἀρετὴν·

A. Plan. 120

Τόλμαν Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ ὅλαν ἀπεμάξατο μορφάν

Λύσιππος· τίν' ὁδὶ χαλκὸς ἔχει δύναμιν.

Αὐδάσονται δ' εἰκεν ὁ χάλκεος ἐς Δία λεύσσων·

«Γὰν ὑπ' ἐμοὶ τίθεμαι, Ζεῦ, σὺ δ' Ὀλυμπον ἔχε».

2.1

De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute 330F

Διουύσιος δ' ὁ τύραννος ἐκέλευε τοὺς μὲν παῖδας ἀστραγάλοις, τοὺς δ' ἄνδρας ὄρκοις ἐξαπατᾶν. τοῖς δὲ Σαρδαναπάλλου μνημείοις ἐπιγέγραπται

«ταῦτ' ἔχω ὅσος ἔφαγον καὶ ἐφύβρισα».

Τίς οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τῶν ἀποφθεγμάτων τούτων τῷ μὲν ἀποφαίνεσθαι φιληδονίαν, τῷ δ' ἀθεότητα, τῷ δ' ἀδικίαν καὶ πλεονεξίαν; Τῶν δ' Ἀλεξάνδρου φωνῶν ἂν ἀφέλης τὸ διδάγμα καὶ τὸν Ἀμωωνα καὶ τὴν εὐγένειαν, Σωκράτους ἢ Πλάτωνος ἢ Πυθαγόρου σοὶ φανοῦνται.

De laude ipsius 546A

Πάνυ δὲ χαριέντως καὶ ὁ Κράτης πρὸς τό·

«Ταῦτ' ἔχω, ὅσος ἔφαγον καὶ ἐφύβρισα καὶ μετ' ἔρωτος

τέρπν' ἔπαθον»,

ἀντέγραψε τό·

«Ταῦτ' ἔχω, ὅσος ἔμαθον καὶ ἐφρόντισα καὶ μετὰ Μουσῶν

σέμν' ἐδάην».

καλὸς γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἔπαινος καὶ ὠφέλιμος καὶ διδάσκων τὰ χρήσιμα καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα θαυμάζειν καὶ ἀγαπᾶν ἀντὶ τῶν κενῶν καὶ περιττῶν. Διὸ τοῦτο μὲν συγκατατετάχθω τοῖς εἰρημένοις εἰς τὸ πρόβλημα.

AP VII 325

Τόσος ἔχω ὅσος ἔφαγον καὶ ἐφύβρισα καὶ μετ' ἐρώτων

τέρπν' ἐδάην· τὰ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ὀλβία πάντα λέλειπται.

2.2

Apophthegmata laconica 217 F

Διὰ Σελινοῦντος δὲ ποτε τῆς Σικελίας πορευόμενος ἰδὼν ἐπὶ μνήματος ἐλεγεῖον

ἐπιγεγραμμένον

σβεννύντας ποτὲ τούσδε τυραννίδα χάλκεος Ἄρης

εἶλε· Σελινοῦντος δ' ἀμφὶ πύλας ἔθανον,

«δικαίως» ἔφη «ἀπεθάνετε τυραννίδα καιομένην ἀποσβεννύναι ἐπιχειρήσαντες· τοῦναντίον γὰρ ἔδει ὅλην αὐτὴν ἀφεῖναι κατακαῆναι».

Lycourus 20.13

ὁ δ' ἀναγνούς τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τοῦτο·

Σβεννύντας ποτὲ τούσδε τυραννίδα χάλκεος Ἄρης

εἶλε· Σελινοῦντος δ' ἀμφὶ πύλας ἔθανον,

«Δικαίως γ'», εἶπε, «τεθνήκαντι τοὶ ἄνδρες· ἔδει γὰρ ἀφένειν ὅλαν αὐτὰν κατακαῆμεν.»

2.3

Consolatio ad Apollonium 110 B

Γενναῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ Λακωνικόν·

Νῦν ἄμμες, πρόσθ' ἄλλοι ἐθάλεον, αὐτίκα δ' ἄλλοι,

ὣν ἄμμες γενεὰν οὐκέτ' ἐποψόμεθα,

καὶ πάλιν·

οἶδε ἔθανον, οὐ τὸ ζῆν θέμενοι καλὸν οὐδὲ τὸ θνήσκειν,

ἀλλὰ τὸ ταῦτα καλῶς ἀμφοτέρ' Ὁ ἐκτελέσαι.

Pelopidas 1.7

Λακεδαιμονίοις δὲ καὶ ζῆν ἡδέως καὶ θνήσκειν ἀμφοτέρα ἀρετὴ παρεῖχεν, ὡς δηλοῖ τὸ ἐπικήδειον· «οἶδε» γάρ φησιν «ἔθανον

οὐ τὸ ζῆν θέμενοι καλὸν οὐδὲ τὸ θνήσκειν,

ἀλλὰ τὸ ταῦτα καλῶς ἀμφοτέρ' ἐκτελέσαι.»

Οὔτε γὰρ φυγὴ θανάτου μεμπτόν, ἂν ὀρέγηται τις τοῦ βίου μὴ αἰσχυρῶς, οὐθ' ὑπομονὴ καλόν, εἰ μετ' ὀλιγωρίας γίνοιτο τοῦ ζῆν.

2.4

Vitae decem oratorum 847 A

Αἰτήσας τε γραμματεῖον ἔγραψεν, ὡς μὲν Δημήτριος ὁ Μάγνης φησί, τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς εἰκόνης αὐτοῦ ἐλεγεῖον, ἐπιγεγραμμένον ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὕστερον·

«Εἵπερ ἴσῃν ῥώμην γνῶμη, Δημόσθενες, ἔσχες,

οὔποτ' ἂν Ἑλλήνων ἦρξεν Ἄρης Μακεδών.»

Κεῖται δ' <ή> εἰκὼν πλησίον τοῦ περισχοινίσματος καὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ τῶν δώδεκα Θεῶν, ὑπὸ Πολυεύκτου πεποιημένη.

Demosthenes 30.5

Τούτῳ μὲν οὖν ὀλίγον ὕστερον ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων δῆμος ἀξίαν ἀποδιδούς τιμὴν, εἰκόνα τε χαλκῇν ἀνέστησε καὶ τὸν πρεσβύτατον ἐψηφίσατο τῶν ἀπὸ γένους ἐν Πρυτανείῳ σίτησιν ἔχειν καὶ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τὸ θρυλούμενον ἐπιγραφῆναι τῇ βάσει τοῦ ἀνδριάντος·

Εἵπερ ἴσῃν γνῶμη ῥώμην, Δημόσθενες, ἔσχες,

οὔποτ' ἂν Ἑλλήνων ἦρξεν Ἄρης Μακεδών.

Οἱ γὰρ αὐτὸν τὸν Δημοσθένην τοῦτο ποιῆσαι λέγοντες ἐν Καλαυρίᾳ μέλλοντα τὸ φάρμακον προσφέρεισθαι κομιδῇ φλυαροῦσι.

2.5

De Herodoti malignitate 867 F

Τί σὺ λέγεις; ἀποδιδράσκειν ὡς κεκρατημένους, οὓς οἱ πολέμιοι μετὰ τὴν μάχην ἀπιστοῦσι φεύγειν ὡς πολὺ κρατοῦντας; εἴτα πιστεύειν ἄξιον τούτῳ γράφοντι περὶ ἀνδρὸς ἢ πόλεως μιᾶς, ὃς ἐνὶ ῥήματι τὸ νίκημα τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀφαιρεῖται καὶ τὸ τρόπαιον καθαιρεῖ καὶ τὰς ἐπιγραφὰς ἃς ἔθεντο παρὰ τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι τῇ Προσ<ηρώ> κόμπων ἀποφαίνει καὶ ἀλαζονείαν; ἔχει δ' οὕτω τὸ ἐπίγραμμα·

Παντοδαπῶν ἀνδρῶν γενεὰς Ἀσίας ἀπὸ χώρας

παῖδες Ἀθηναίων τῷδέ ποτ' ἐν πελάγει

ναυμαχίᾳ δαμάσαντες, ἐπεὶ στρατὸς ὤλετο Μήδων,

σήματα ταῦτ' ἔθεσαν παρθένω Ἀρτέμιδι.

Themistocles 9.4–6

Ἔχει δὲ ναὸν οὐ μέγαν Ἀρτέμιδος ἐπικλησιν Προσηώας, καὶ δένδρα περὶ αὐτὸν πέφυκε καὶ
στηλαὶ κύκλῳ λίθου λευκοῦ πεπήγασιν· ὁ δὲ λίθος τῇ χειρὶ τριβόμενος καὶ χροῖαν καὶ
ὁσμήν κροκίζουσιν ἀναδίδωσιν. Ἐν μιᾷ δὲ τῶν στηλῶν ἐλεγείον ἦν τότε γεγραμμένον·

Παντοδαπῶν ἀνδρῶν γενεὰς Ἀσίας ἀπὸ χώρας
παῖδες Ἀθηναίων τῷδέ ποτ' ἐν πελάγει
ναυμαχίᾳ δαμάσαντες, ἐπεὶ στρατὸς ὤλετο Μήδων,
σήματα ταῦτ' ἔθεσαν παρθένῳ Ἀρτέμιδι.

Δείκνυται δὲ τῆς ἀκτῆς τόπος ἐν πολλῇ τῇ περίξ θινὶ κόνιν τεφρώδη καὶ μέλαιναν ἐκ
βάθους ἀναδιδούς, ὥσπερ πυρίκαυστον, ἐν ᾧ τὰ ναυάγια καὶ <τούς> νεκροὺς καῦσαι
δοκοῦσι.

2.6

De Herodoti malignitate 873 B

τοὺς δ' Ἕλληνας ἀποδειλιάσαντας καὶ ἀποδράντας οὐκ ἀπήλυνον τῶν ἀριστείων, ἀλλ'
ἐνέγραφον τοῖς τρίποσι καὶ τοῖς κολοσσοῖς καὶ μετεδίδοσαν τῶν λαφύρων, τέλος δὲ τῷ
βωμῷ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τοῦτο γράφοντες ἐνεχάραξαν·

Τόνδε ποθ' Ἕλληνες Νίκης κράτει, ἔργῳ Ἄρης,
<εὐτόλμῳ ψυχῇς λήματι πειθόμενοι,>
Πέρσας ἐξελάσαντες, ἔλευθέρᾳ Ἑλλάδι κοινὸν
ἰδρύσαντο Διὸς βωμὸν Ἑλευθερίου.

Μὴ καὶ τοῦτο Κλεάδας ἢ τις ἄλλος, ὃ Ἡρόδοτε, κολακεύων τὰς πόλεις ἐπέγραψε; τί οὖν
ἔδεοντο τὴν γῆν ὀρύσσοντες διακενῆς ἔχειν [τὰ] πράγματα καὶ ῥαδιουργεῖν χώματα καὶ
μνήματα τῶν ἐπιγινόμενων ἕνεκ' ἀνθρώπων κατασκευάζοντες, ἐν τοῖς ἐπιφανεστάτοις
καὶ μεγίστοις ἀναθήμασι τὴν δόξαν αὐτῶν καθιερουμένην ὀρώντες;

Aristides 19.7

Θαυμαστὸν οὖν τὸ Ἡροδότου, πῶς μόνους τούτους φησὶν εἰς χεῖρας ἔλθεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις,
τῶν δ' ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων μηδένα. καὶ γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πεσόντων μαρτυρεῖ καὶ τὰ
μνήματα κοινὸν γενέσθαι τὸ κατόρθωμα καὶ τὸν βωμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐπέγραψαν οὕτως εἰ
μόνοι τρεῖς πόλεις ἡγωνίσαντο, τῶν ἄλλων ἀτρέμα καθεζομένων·

τόνδε ποθ' Ἕλλανες νίκας κράτει, ἔργῳ Ἄρης,
<εὐτόλμῳ ψυχῇς λήματι πειθόμενοι>
Πέρσας ἐξελάσαντες ἔλευθέρᾳ Ἑλλάδι κοινὸν
ἰδρύσαντο Διὸς βωμὸν Ἑλευθερίου.

AP VI 50

Τόνδε ποθ' Ἕλληνες, ῥώμῃ χερὸς, ἔργῳ Ἄρης,
εὐτόλμῳ ψυχῇς λήματι πειθόμενοι,
Πέρσας ἐξελάσαντες, ἐλεύθερον Ἑλλάδι κόσμον
ἰδρύσαντο Διὸς βωμὸν Ἑλευθερίου.

2.7

Marcellus 30.7–9

Ἐκεῖ δ' αὐτοῦ τῷ ἀνδριάντι τοῦτ' ἦν ἐπιγεγραμμένον, ὡς Ποσειδωνίος φησι, τὸ ἐπίγραμμα

Οὗτός τοι Ῥώμης ὁ μέγας, ξένε, πατρίδος ἀστήρ,
 Μάρκελλος κλεινῶν Κλαύδιος ἐκ πατέρων,
 ἐπτάκι τὰν ὑπάταν ἀρχὰν ἐν Ἀρῇ φυλάξας,
 καὶ πολὺν ἀντιπάλων ἐγκατέχευε φόνον.

Τὴν γὰρ ἀνθύπατον ἀρχήν, ἣν δις ἤρξε, ταῖς πέντε προσκατηρίσθησεν ὑπατείαις ὁ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα ποιήσας.

Suav. Viv. Epic. 1098 A

καί

”οὗτός τοι Ῥώμης ὁ μέγας, ξένε, πατρίδος ἀστήρ”

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Notes and Anecdotes: Observations on Cross-Genre *Apophthegmata*

Philip A. Stadter

Plutarch's anecdotes, long recognized as a fundamental feature of his writing, have recently received renewed attention, since we have come to realize that these sayings or short narratives can furnish insight into the biographer's methods, purposes, and audience.¹ Van der Stockt and van Meirvenne have produced a series of papers on what they call clusters, sets of discrete items, often including anecdotes, which reappear in different works, and point to Plutarch's use of some sort of previously written preliminary notes or *hypomnemata*.² New editions of the *Apophthegmata regum* and the *Apophthegmata Laconica* have invited us to reconsider the authorship and relationship to Plutarch's other works of these anecdote collections. Beck has demonstrated that the letter to Trajan which introduces *Apophthegmata regum* is probably genuine, increasing the probability that the whole collection was edited by Plutarch himself (Beck 2002). Papers by Pelling and myself presented at a 2000 conference in Leuven seem to confirm the Plutarchan origin of both collections, and raise complex issues regarding his working methods.³ Pelling's paper studied the ties between the *Apophthegmata regum* and several Roman *Lives*, especially the *Caesar*; my paper, among other things, examined the relationship between the *Lives* of Lycurgus and Agesilaus, the *Apophthegmata Laconica*, and the *Apophthegmata regum*. The two papers came up with slightly different results, although they agreed that *Apophthegmata regum* had most probably been prepared by Plutarch as an independent work. Pelling argued that the *Apophthegmata regum* was drawn from preliminary narrative hypomnemata prepared for individual *Lives* such as the *Caesar*. These hypomnemata would be rather different from those recognized by cluster analysis, though both would represent a well-thought draft combining different kinds of material, including anecdotes: Pelling's hypomnemata would be chiefly historical; cluster hypomnemata chiefly ethical-philosophical. I instead argued that Plutarch had first prepared an unpolished collection of *apophthegmata*, in which he arranged anecdotes that he planned to use in at least some *Lives* in the

1 See Carrière, Fuhrmann, Pettine, Caiazza, Santaniello, and Beck 1998, 1999, 2000.

2 See Van der Stockt 1999a, 1999b, 2002, 2003/2004, 2004 and Van Meirvenne. On the multivalency of the term *hypomnemata*, see Ambaglio 1990.

3 See Pelling 2002, Stadter forthcoming.

order they would be found in the *Lives*. *Apophthegmata Laconica*, in which the anecdotes of Lysurgus and Agesilaus are in the order of the respective *Lives*, apparently is the Spartan section of this rough collection, or a part of it. *Apophthegmata regum* instead represented a selection edited by Plutarch from this larger, less carefully written (since not designed for publication) but still Plutarchan collection of anecdotes. The two hypotheses are similar, but differ in how they relate the disposition of anecdotes in Plutarch's working collections to the narrative drafts and the final text of the *Lives*.

The present paper attempts to refine some of the findings of these papers by an examination of a select group of anecdotes which recur in a third work, the *Political Precepts*, as well as the *Apophthegmata regum* and the *Parallel Lives*. The *Political Precepts*, scholars have long recognized, shares many anecdotes with the *Lives*, and reflects the same research that lies behind the *Lives*.⁴ Of the anecdotes in the *Precepts*, nineteen also appear in *Apophthegmata regum*. Fourteen of the nineteen occur in one of the *Parallel Lives* as well, and eight in other works.⁵ These repetitions offer an opportunity to probe the way the same anecdotes are used across several works, written in different genres, for different audiences, and for different purposes. Besides giving more understanding of the relation of the anecdotes to earlier notes or compilations, this examination reveals the different techniques employed by Plutarch, and especially the subtlety of his handling of anecdotes in the *Lives*.

The differences of genre and audience between the three works are significant. The *Praecepts* is dedicated to Menemachus, a young aristocrat of Sardis who is entering politics, and presents itself as a basic guide to how an aspiring politician in a Greek polis should comport himself, with special emphasis on working smoothly with his colleagues among the city's elite and not provoking Roman interference in civic affairs. It is rich with anecdotal examples of good and bad attitudes and behavior in civic life, to the exclusion of foreign policy or military affairs (see Prandi and Cook). The implied audience is the politically active elite of Greek cities under Roman rule; we are told that it was found useful by at least one eminent Greek, who at various periods held major magistracies in Corinth and later held prominent equestrian positions in Epirus and Egypt.⁶ The *Parallel Lives* had a different dedicatee, and a much broader scope and purpose. Several *Lives*, and probably all, were dedicated to Sosius Senecio, a prominent Roman, twice consul, and an associate of Trajan. The biographical project grew to be enormous, treated both internal and foreign affairs, civil and military, and involved a rethinking of much of Greek and Roman history, especially the turbulent period of the late

4 See Carrière, 14–18, who counts 117 parallel passages in the *Lives*.

5 See Table of Correspondences.

6 Cornelius Pulcher: see *De cap. ex inim. util.* 86B–D, with Puech, 4843.

republic and the Roman civil war. Its implied audience was all those, both Romans and Greeks, who desired a philosophically based and ethically focused examination of the leading statesmen of Greece and Rome, their policies, and their actions. While explicitly didactic in purpose, the method of the biographies, in particular their parallel structure, permitted complex and often open-ended presentation of character, decisions, and outcomes.⁷ The third work, *Apophthegmata regum*, long considered a non-Plutarchan compilation, a crude combination of earlier collections and anecdotes drawn from the *Lives*, now seems much more likely to be a genuine work of Plutarch.⁸ If the prefatory letter to Trajan is genuine, as it seems to be, then Plutarch put together these anecdotes at least notionally for the emperor, to provide an easily assimilated survey of the wisdom of famous leaders. Its larger implied audience was all those busy but relatively cultured people who might enjoy such a collection. Although its format, in which each anecdote (with some exceptions) is isolated from the next, makes it easy to read, its style is not crude or unliterary.⁹ The collection is arranged by peoples, first barbarians, then Greeks, then Romans, with subgroups for nations or cities. Within these groups the individuals are given chronologically.¹⁰ Many individuals also figure in the *Parallel Lives*: in that case the anecdotes usually are given in the order they appear in the *Lives*.¹¹ The Athenian statesmen begin with Themistocles (Peisistratus appears in a separate section on Athenian tyrants); the collection omits some Athenians awarded *Lives* – Cimon, Nicias, Demosthenes – while including others. Early legendary figures are excluded from the Roman section: there are no anecdotes for Romulus, Numa, Publicola, Coriolanus, or Camillus. The Roman examples begin in the third century with Manius Curius and Fabricius (five anecdotes, all found in the same order in the life of Pyrrhus). Some subjects of biographies – the Gracchi, Sertorius, Crassus, Cato Minor, Brutus, Antony – are omitted, perhaps as unsuitable or unedifying.

7 See for a fine overview Duff 1999.

8 See Fuhrmann, 3–15, Pelling 2002, Stadter forthcoming. Of course, some anecdotes in this collection, as well as in the *Lives* and *Precepts*, appear in earlier authors, and no doubt were found either in frequently read writers or earlier collections. Of those in the set under scrutiny, note those of Themistocles and Miltiades' trophy (800B) and Epaminondas' trial (799E).

9 Pace Swain.

10 The anecdote of Semiramis' (Nitocris'?) tomb is included under Darius, who opened it. Some minor Spartans are grouped achronologically at the end of the Spartan section. In the Roman set only C. Popillius (cos. 172) appears out of order, after Sulla. The historical setting is firmly set by the confrontation with Antiochus (Epiphanes) in Egypt, which suggests that a physical record—a tablet or papyrus slip—had gotten out of place.

11 See Stadter forthcoming, n. 65.

The last Roman treated is Augustus, presumably drawing upon material assembled for the *Lives of the Caesars*.¹²

What then can we learn from this set of anecdotes found across the three works? First, a negative observation: the *Apophthegmata regum* omits many anecdotes, unattractive or unsuitable to imitate, that are reported in both *Precepts* and *Lives*, such as Alcibiades and the quail (799D, Alc. 10), the harsh rebuke of Cato the Younger to Catulus (808E, *CMin.* 16.6–8), and the implacability of Sulla (815F, *Sull.* 32.2).¹³ This implies that *Apophthegmata regum* represents a selection from a larger body of anecdotes. A comparison of the Spartan material in *Apophthegmata regum* with the anecdotes in *Apophthegmata Laconica* yields a similar conclusion: duplicates found in *Apophthegmata Laconica* have been weeded out and the stylistic level raised; many anecdotes have been omitted.¹⁴ Plutarch probably began assembling his rough collection quite early, since Beck has noted evidence for its use already in the speeches *De fortuna Romanorum* and *De Alexandri fortuna an virtute* (see Beck 2003).

Moreover, the items in *Apophthegmata regum* were not taken directly from the *Lives*, but from material used for the *Lives*. In fact, there are items found in *Apophthegmata* and *Precepts*, but not included in the relevant *Life*, such as Pericles' thoughts on assuming command of the Athenians (186C, 813C) or on friendship (186C, 808A), or Pytheas on honors to Alexander (187E, 804B). In addition, one item in the *Apophthegmata*, such as Themistocles #13 (186E), his complaints about the Athenians, can combine two items which are separate in the *Life*. The two sayings joined as one in the *Apophthegmata* are reported in the same order in *On self-praise* 541D, but are several chapters apart and in the reverse order in *Them.* 22 and 18. (Only the first part appears in *Precepts* 812B.) On other occasions the anecdotes may be contiguous, but in a different order. Thus Pompey #2 and 3 (203CD) not only makes the error, not found in the *Life*, of speaking of Mamertines rather than Himeraeans (repeated at *Precepts* 815E), as noted by Pelling,¹⁵ but also reverses the order of that anecdote and the anecdote of the swords sealed in their scabbards found in the *Pompey*. These cases raise some obstacles to the theory that the *Apophthegmata* are derived from narrative *hypomnemata* written for each *Life*. It is also remarkable that several heroes whose *Lives* are usually thought to be early are missing, such as Cimon and Demosthenes.

12 See Stadter 2005. The omission of the other emperors, who had also been treated in the *Lives of the Caesars*, is noteworthy.

13 Cf. the additional examples in Pelling 2002, 82.

14 See Fuhrmann, 4, Stadter forthcoming.

15 Pelling 2002, 72. Note also that the form of the Sicilian leader's name appears differently in each of the three works, although this probably also reflects textual corruption.

Whereas the anecdotes in the *Apophthegmata regum* are arranged by people, city, and chronological sequence, the same anecdotes in the *Precepts* are ordered by topics. In the latter work the anecdotes commonly appear in lists, arranged in categories to reinforce a particular point in the argument. We find sequences of anecdotes on political oratory, on early brilliant beginnings, on friends, on political opponents, on not trying to do too much, on helping one's city through friendship with Romans, on allowing others to share in praise, on the honors granted a good leader, and on being willing to admit to limited wealth. Within these categories the variety of examples is impressive, though heavily weighted toward Greeks. For political oratory (c. 6, 803AB) Plutarch recalls five examples: an unnamed speaker (elsewhere identified as Leptines), Demades, Archilochus, Pericles, and Phocion; for politicians' brilliant beginnings (c. 8, 804D–805A), he cites four men: Aratus, Alcibiades, Pompey, and Scipio. The section on treatment of friends (c. 13, 806F–809B) is particularly rich: anecdotes, sayings, and quotations from or about Cleon, Themistocles (two), Callimachus, Pindar, Solon, Agesilaus, Euripides, Phocion, Timoleon, Pericles, Agesilaus again, Diomedes and Odysseus (with Homeric quotes), Plato, Epaminondas, Cato Minor, Themistocles again, Epaminondas again, and Agesilaus a third time.

How were these lists formed? The overlap of these lists with the *Apophthegmata regum* – to look just at the last category, treatment of friends, five anecdotes are found in both works¹⁶ – suggests that the *Precepts* drew from the same prior anecdote collection from which we have seen the *Apophthegmata regum* was derived. It seems likely that most if not all of the anecdotes in this and similar lists, and indeed in the *Precepts* as a whole, had already been gathered in this prior larger Plutarchan collection. Whereas in *Apophthegmata regum* the anecdotes are arranged by city and speaker, in the *Precepts* they are arranged by topic. In other words, the arrangement of anecdotes was flexible, and could be adapted to Plutarch's purposes. We may imagine that Plutarch may have made marginal notes or prepared some kind of *pro memoria* uniting anecdotes under topic headings, for easy reference, whether while preparing the *Precepts* or before. But he had also done more than that. Van der Stockt (2002) has identified two subsets of the list on friends which appear in other works. These 'clusters', which can be recognized by their appearance in other Plutarchan works, include not only anecdotes but poetic quotations and other rhetorical devices. They seem to be based on two short written *hypomnemata* that Plutarch drafted on specific topics: one on the politician as an 'excellent craftsman', like Zeus, and the other on politicians and the common good.

16 Two of the five are found also in the *Lives*, Themistocles (807B) and Agesilaus (807F–808A), and three not, Pericles (808A), Epaminondas (808E, though this may have been found also in *Epaminondas*), and Aristides and Themistocles (809B).

Although these two *hypomnemata* underlie separate passages elsewhere in Plutarch's works, in the *Precepts* they overlap. We can conclude that Plutarch worked at several levels: collecting anecdotes, grouping them variously by individual or by subject in more or less fixed format, and preparing organized notes on particular topics which he might use in teaching, lecturing, or his moral treatises.

The anecdotes of the *Precepts* are not disposed in bare lists, but form part of a rhetorically developed argument. As a result, they are mixed together with poetic citations, comparisons, and other rhetorical devices, as we have seen. Their setting within a connected discourse also encourages interpretative comments by the author. In some passages of the *Precepts*, Plutarch can suggest a positive assessment, noting, e.g., that Phocion's retort to Demades at 811A was 'witty' (χαριέντως). Others evaluations can be negative. Thus the letter of Agesilaus interceding for a certain Nicias (808A) is set in a larger context, in which Plutarch calls Agesilaus weak and unassertive in dealing with friends' requests, reinforces his statement by a citation of Euripides, and contrasts his behavior to the firmness of Phocion. Significantly, this interpretation of Agesilaus' intercession as weak and reprehensible reflects a negative shift with respect to the same anecdote in *Apophthegmata regum* (191B). There no interpretation is offered, but in keeping with the practice of that collection throughout, the anecdote should be taken positively, as indicating Agesilaus' support of his friends.¹⁷ An anecdote is not univocal: its interpretation in the *Precepts* need not be the same as that of the *Apophthegmata*.

It is time now to turn to the *Parallel Lives*, with which the *Apophthegmata* and the *Precepts* share so many anecdotes. First, we note that the *Lives*, like the *Precepts*, frequently offer lists of anecdotes arranged under categories, but here focused on one person, the protagonist of the *Life*. Thus Pericles' metaphor calling Aegina 'the eyesore of the Peiraeus' appears in a list of rhetorical figures used by different politicians at *Praec.* 803A, but as one of the few preserved fragments of Pericles' speeches at *Per.* 8.7, and Themistocles' rebuke of Simonides is part of a 'cluster' in the section on friends at 807B, but at *Them.* 5.6 belongs to a chain of anecdotes illustrating Themistocles' character. Similarly Phocion's retort to Demades, one of a several retorts listed at *Praec.* 811A, in the *Life* appears in a series of anecdotes demonstrating Phocion's wise indifference to popular sentiment (*Phoc.* 9.8). That is, Plutarch has the ability to rearrange anecdotes according to different criteria. We should not think of a fixed list. Neither the 'retorts' list of the *Precepts* nor the 'wisdom

17 As we have seen, the *Apophthegmata regum* does not report anecdotes which are clearly negative, such as Cato's rebuke of Catulus (808E), which appears not only in the *Precepts* and in *De vitioso pudore* (534D, as part of one of the 'clusters' identified by Vander Stockt 2002) but also at *CMin.* 16.6–8.

of Phocion' list of the *Life* is fixed or distinct from other possible arrangements, such as the list of exemplary sayings of the *Apophthegmata*. One has the impression that Plutarch can shuffle his notecards, rearranging his file to highlight new connections. Of course, he did not use notecards, much less a computer database, but he must have worked out some way to reorganize his material, either by making marginal annotations, by recopying material, or by using other writing surfaces, such as wooden or wax tablets, which would permit easy rearrangement. His excellent mind and memory would have overseen the task, recalling, judging, and sorting his store of anecdotes. Evidence may survive of such individual physical records in the erroneous placement of the anecdote of C. Popillius in the *Apophthegmata*.¹⁸

However, Plutarch's sophistication in the use of anecdotes appears not chiefly in the construction of lists, although this is important, but in their disposition in a rhetorical and discursive context. The study of clusters demonstrates how Plutarch prepared short *hypomnemata* constructing from anecdotes and other material a continuous argument. This procedure underlies the artistic and biographical achievement of the *Lives*. Comparison of anecdotes appearing in the *Precepts* with their use and meaning in the *Lives*, the *Apophthegmata*, and other treatises reveals that in the *Lives* Plutarch uses anecdotes like a virtuoso, uncovering implications not found in the other works. Of the many examples one might cite, let me discuss three.

First, the famous saying of Themistocles, that the trophy of Miltiades did not let him sleep. I begin with the use of this well-known anecdote – it is mentioned by Cicero, Valerius Maximus, and Libanius, as well as seven times by Plutarch – in the *Moralia*. In the *Precepts* (800B) the anecdote fits the dedicatee and the context especially well. Plutarch is urging the aspiring politician to discipline and put in order his character (ἐξάσκει καὶ κατακόσμη τὸν τρόπον). Using direct address to Menemachus (ἀκούεις γάρ), he introduces the example of the young Themistocles, who when he decided to enter politics, abandoned drinking and parties, and began working late and keeping sober, because, as he said to his friends, “Miltiades’ trophy doesn’t let me sleep.” The anecdote speaks directly to the need for self-discipline in the young politician. This ethical lesson perhaps was the original context for the anecdote, for the version in the *Apophthegmata* (184F–185A) has the same emphasis: after Miltiades’ victory Themistocles was never seen uncontrolled (ἀτακτῶν). The ethical theme is more developed in *On progress in virtue* (84 BC). There Plutarch emphasizes the necessity of moving from judgment to action, from words to deeds. All the Athenians no doubt praised Miltiades’ daring and courage, he writes, but Themistocles with his saying “not only

18 See n. 10 above. For some ancient evidence for recopying notes, see the work of Dorandi cited in Stadter forthcoming, n. 46.

praised and admired but emulated and imitated". In these three passages, though each is handled differently, the focus is on Themistocles' early wild life and the new discipline he acquired.¹⁹ However, in other contexts, Plutarch can use the apophthegm to exemplify emulation: at *Thes.* 6.9, it is offered as a parallel to Theseus' emulation of Heracles; at *De cap. ex inim.* 92C consideration of how to respond to one's opponents' successes produces the advice, 'don't envy them, surpass them,' and the citation of Themistocles.²⁰

The account in the *Life of Themistocles* (3.4–5) combines these themes but introduces a strikingly ambivalent tone. The context is now Themistocles' character, as revealed in his youth. The whole passage (*Them.* 2–3) with a series of anecdotes and echoes of Platonic educational theory from the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*, admirably analyzed by Duff 2008, brilliantly introduces the strengths and weaknesses which would make Themistocles first admired, then rejected. His saying about Miltiades' trophy now is an indication not of his new-found self-discipline but of his ambition and thirst for fame.²¹ The anecdote here reveals the ambivalent qualities which will both triumph at Salamis and lead to his ostracism. Yet Plutarch preserves the other resonances. Both the theme of training found in *Precepts* and the resolution to act highlighted in *De profectu* (as well as an echo of Thucydides) return in Plutarch's concluding evaluation of this change: "Others thought that the Persian defeat at Marathon was the end of the war, but Themistocles saw it as the beginning of greater contests, and so he began oiling himself and training his city to become leader of Greece".

The great achievement of Plutarch was to take the existing tradition of moral anecdotes employed for teaching and self-improvement, and set them in the much richer context of an individual's entire life – and even the larger contexts of the parallel life and of other pairs of *Lives*. The saying of Themistocles in its biographical context, with hints of its implications offered by adjacent anecdotes and discreet interpretive commentary, captures all the ambivalence of Themistocles' character. No longer a simple *exemplum*, with a single moral focus, it becomes a window into the protagonist's soul, a 'revelation' in the words of the *Alexander* preface, 'of ἀρετῇ and κακία'.

Consider now a second example, Pompey's words when he demanded of Sulla a triumph, which will indicate more clearly how Plutarch reworked his material in his biographies. Pompey audaciously challenged Sulla: 'More men

19 At *An seni* 795C, Plutarch gives credit rather to Mnesiphilus' advice for ending Themistocles' wild ways.

20 The second case doesn't really fit the context, since Miltiades is not usually considered an opponent of Themistocles.

21 *Them.* 3.4: "He is said to have been so passionate for fame and enamored of great actions because of his ambition...". This theme was inappropriate to the *Precepts*.

honor the rising sun than the setting', and Sulla yielded, granting him the triumph. In *Praec.* 804E–F, the anecdote is simply and rapidly told, with a minimum of historical setting, as one example of a political career brilliantly launched, like those of Aratus, Alcibiades, and Scipio the Younger. In the *Life*, however, the treatment is more ambivalent, and intricately related to Pompey's whole career. The 'rising sun' anecdote belongs to the narrative sequence on Pompey's return to Rome from Africa and his reception by Sulla (*Pomp.* 13.5–14.8), which begins with Sulla's eager welcome of Pompey and salutation as Magnus and ends with the acceptance of the triumph also by Servilius, an outspoken critic of Pompey. In this sequence Plutarch expands the historical and anecdotal information with his own comments and insertions: on when the title Magnus came into use, on the reasons that the title Maximus was awarded to Valerius and Fabius, on Scipio Major not receiving a triumph, on Pompey's youth at the time, and on Pompey's desire to annoy people by triumphing in a carriage drawn by elephants. All these set Pompey's demand in a poor light. Concluding the episode, Plutarch addresses the political realities behind Pompey's demand:

It is obvious that Pompey easily could have entered the senate, if he had wished. But he didn't want that, they say (ὡς λέγουσι), because he was seeking notoriety from something extraordinary (τὸ ἔνδοξον ἐκ τοῦ παραδόξου θηρώμενος). There would have been nothing startling about becoming a senator before the set time, but it was spectacular to triumph before becoming senator, and gained him popularity with the people, since even after the triumph he was still listed as a knight (14.9–11).

Clearly Plutarch elaborates his material not only to intensify the occasion, but to contrast the arrogance of Pompey's claim and his politics of shock and demagoguery with the achievements of earlier Roman generals.²²

Plutarch's raw material perhaps appears in *Apophthegmata regum* 203E. This is a three-part anecdote: Sulla gives Pompey the epithet Magnus, Pompey demands the triumph with his saying and Sulla acquiesces, and Servilius is first indignant, then approves. The tone of all three parts is positive, stressing Sulla's and Servilius' recognition of Pompey's early greatness. These anecdotes appear to derive, like those discussed earlier, from a larger collection whose excerpts were taken directly from a historical source, or from a rough draft prepared by Plutarch for the *Pompey*. The fifteen Pompey anecdotes in the *Apophthegmata* appear to be in historical order, almost the same order as in the *Life*, with one major exception: item #10 on Lucullus' thrushes appears at the beginning of

²² There is a parallel in Agesilaus' putdown of Lysander, who had supported him as Sulla had supported Pompey, where again Plutarch comments that accommodation would have been possible (*Ages.* 7–8).

the *Pompey* (2.11–12), establishing early one aspect of his character.²³ If indeed they were taken from a *Pompey-hypomnema*, that draft must have still been in rough form, far from the finished product. For it is clear Plutarch has reworked the triumph anecdotal sequence in the final version of the *Life* to make what seemed wholly laudatory in the *Apophthegmata* markedly ambivalent: Pompey is indeed brilliant, but his thirst for glory appears extreme, far different from that of the great men of old, and liable to overthrow the traditional system of senatorial rule. His self-assertion inspires envy, and his extraordinary status is artificial.²⁴ This is masterful biographical technique, and depends for its interpretation on a thoughtful overall view of Pompey's career. Furthermore, one suspects that Plutarch even creatively elaborated the delivery of the saying itself in the *Life*. Unlike our other two versions, the *Life* states that Sulla did not hear Pompey, but observed the expressions of surprise on the bystanders, and only after inquiry what had been said, did he twice cry out, shocked by his audacity "Let him triumph!" Sulla's initial lack of attention in this version nicely captures Pompey's rise from obscurity to fame.²⁵

A third anecdote, that of Areius accompanying Octavian on his entry into Alexandria, similarly reveals the differences between the straightforward and univocal versions of the *Apophthegmata* (207AB) and *Precepts* (814D) and the more complex biographical context of *Antony* 80.1, but also has a significant reflex for Plutarch's contemporary world. In the *Apophthegmata*, Octavian is presented as a clement conqueror and a friend; in the *Precepts*, Areius as

23 The different order of #2 and 3, 6 and 7, and 13 and 14 is not significant chronologically.

24 Cf. also the discussion of *Pomp.* 22, his surrender of his public horse, in Stadter forthcoming. The notion of a "raw" collection of anecdotes might explain the puzzle raised by Pelling concerning Caesar's criticism of Pompey's orders at Pharsalia (*Apophth.* reg. 206E, *Caes.* 44.7–8, *Pomp.* 69.6–7; see Pelling 2002, 79–80). The *Apophthegmata regum* and *Pompey* are closer to each other in language and image than to *Caesar*. This is most easily explained if there was a raw collection of anecdotes, which Plutarch adapted differently for the three works. The two similar versions are probably closer to the raw form (and therefore Plutarch's source), while the version of *Caesar* would represent a reworking. I would place this raw collection prior to the draft for the individual *Lives* proposed by Pelling. Appian *BC* 2.79 (329–330) seems to use the same historical source for the anecdote (although he refers to Caesar's *Letters*), but the battlefield situation is different, and he notes the vulnerability of the standing soldiers to javelin throws. Plutarch uses a richer vocabulary (κυμαῖνον, ἀντεξόρμησιν, ἀμαυρῶσαι, καταψῦξαι in *Pomp.*; σύρραξιν, συνεκαίει, ἀναρριπιζόμενον in *Caes.*) and doubles synonyms (ἐνθουσιασμοῦ καὶ φορᾶς, πῆξαι καὶ καταψῦξαι in *Pomp.*, μετὰ δρόμου καὶ φορᾶς in *Caes.*)

25 Manipulation of anecdotes for rhetorical purposes was a standard part of the progymnasmata of the educator: cf. Theon *Progymnasmata*, pp. 96, line 18 to 106, line 3, on the *chreia*, and Beck 2003, referring to Hock and O'Neil. For Plutarch's invention of probable detail, see Pelling 1990.

valuable to the Greek community because an influential friend of the Roman conqueror, like Polybius and Panaetius. The two are complementary examples of right action by ruler and subject. In neither case is any identification offered of Areius as philosopher, adviser, or magistrate: he is presumed to be well-known. From the *Precepts*, it is clear that Plutarch not only approved of Areius' friendship with Octavian but saw him as a model for all Greek statesmen under Roman rule: through friendship with a powerful Roman, 'holding his hand and conversing', a Greek statesman could benefit his city. We can hardly doubt that Plutarch wanted to be one of those whose Roman friendships would benefit Greeks.²⁶ This contemporary context gives special force to his use of the anecdote at the end of *Antony*. However, the focus there is on Octavian as good ruler rather than on Areius. Octavian's friendly entry into Alexandria, his respect for the city, for its founder, and for Areius, are in marked contrast to Antony's entry into Ephesus, with its accompanying heavy taxation, violence, and oppression (*Ant.* 24). Areius' success in interceding for the city and its leaders is the opposite of the anguish and despair of Ephesus' leaders. Octavian is alert to the needs and fears of the city and its leaders; Antony is good-naturedly indifferent, focused on his own pleasures, until awakened to the true situation. The Areius scene calls attention to Octavian's clemency not only toward Alexandria but toward Antony and Cleopatra. He lamented their deaths, granted them honorable, even royal burials, and allowed Antony's children to grow up in his own household and intermarry with his family, so that Antony became an ancestor of the Julio-Claudian emperors as much as Octavian. Only Cleopatra's child Caesarion was killed by Octavian, on the advice of Areius. Plutarch offers no judgment: does he scorn Areius' harshness, or rather admire his practical wisdom? His quotation of Areius' adaptation of the words, 'many rulers are not a good thing,' from the famous harangue of Odysseus (*Il.* 2.204) suggests that he considered it a necessary decision. Antony and Cleopatra certainly are sympathetic figures, but Octavian, despite what appears an unattractive coolness, emerges as a better statesman and exemplar for Roman emperors.

It is time to draw together our conclusions. First this study confirms what is already well known, that no single version of an anecdote need give all the information Plutarch had available to him: we must piece together what he knew by considering all his versions.²⁷ Some versions may include detail invented to enhance the anecdote's meaning or effectiveness in its context. A

26 For Plutarch's own activity in this regard, see Stadter 2004.

27 For Octavian's address at Alexandria, the *Precepts* speak of a βῆμα, but only from *Antony* do we discover that the βῆμα was in the gymnasium. Cf. also the different versions of Epaminondas' trial (799E, 194A-B, *Pel.* 25.2-3, *De laud. ips.* 540DE) and Phocion and the moneylender (822E, 188A, *Phoc.* 9.1, *De vit. pud.* 533A).

proper analysis of Plutarch's technique requires close examination of all versions, not to establish priority, but to clarify the focus and import of each. The three works studied each have different audiences and goals, reflected in the manner in which the anecdotes are presented and by omission of certain items. For Plutarch anecdotes were discreet items which could be shifted from one category to another, permitting the formation of lists of anecdotes for different topics, or complex clusters which could be used in different contexts. The items of *Apophthegmata regum* are free of context, but have been selected for their positive value as *exempla*. Those of the *Precepts* are set in a rich rhetorical and argumentative context, with interpretive comments, and may be either positive or negative. Finally, the anecdotes of the *Lives* develop the interpretive possibilities of context much further, introducing nuances and ambivalences closely related to major themes and outcomes of the Life where they are found. They employ foreshadowing, authorial comment, historical background, and the contemporary context to create a multi-layered tapestry of meaning. The simple anecdote, culled from a historical text or an earlier collection and preserved in Plutarch's notes, becomes in the *Parallel Lives* a window into the ambivalences of human action and of moral decision.

Table of correspondences

Subject	<i>Political precepts</i>	<i>Apophthegmata of kings and commanders</i>	<i>Parallel Lives</i>	Other works by Plutarch
I. Anecdotes in <i>Precepts</i> , <i>Apophth. reg.</i> and <i>Life</i>				
1. Epaminondas' trial	799E	194A-B	<i>Pel.</i> 25. 2-3 (<i>Epam.</i> ?)	
2. Themistocles and Miltiades' trophy	800B	184F-185A	<i>Them.</i> 3.4-5 (<i>Thes.</i> 6.9)	<i>De prof. in virt.</i> 84BC
3. Pericles and the Peiraeus	803A	186C	<i>Per.</i> 8.7 (<i>Dem.</i> 1.2)	
4. Pompey asks for a triumph	804E-F	203E	<i>Pomp.</i> 14.1-5	
5. Scipio's rise, and Cato's comment	804F-805A	200A	<i>CMaj.</i> 27 (<i>Scipio Min.</i> ? <i>Mar.</i> 12.2)	
6. Themistocles to Simonides	807B	185CD	<i>Them.</i> 5.6	<i>De vit. pud.</i> 534E
7. Agesilaus intercedes for Nicias	807F-808A	191B	<i>Ages.</i> 13.5	<i>Ap. Lac.</i> 209E-F
8. Antalcidas' retort	810F	192BC	<i>Ages.</i> 31.7	<i>Ap. Lac.</i> 217D
9. Phocion retorts to Demades	811A	188A	<i>Phoc.</i> 9.8	
10. Themistocles on the Athenians	812B	185E	<i>Them.</i> 22.1	<i>De laud. ips.</i> 541D

Table of correspondences (Continued)

Subject	<i>Political precepts</i>	<i>Apophthegmata of kings and commanders</i>	<i>Parallel Lives</i>	Other works by Plutarch
11. Areius and Augustus	814D	207AB	<i>Ant.</i> 80.1	
12. Pompey and Sthenno	815EF	203CD	<i>Pomp.</i> 10.11–12	
13. Cato refuses a statue	820B	198EF	<i>CMaj.</i> 19.6	
14. Phocion and his moneylender	822E	188A	<i>Phoc.</i> 9.1	<i>De vit. pud.</i> 533A
II. Anecdotes not in <i>Life</i>				
15. Pericles: friend 'to the altar'	808A	186C		<i>De vit. pud.</i> 531C
16. Epaminondas refuses Pelopidas	808E	192EF	(<i>Epam.</i> ?)	
17. Aristides' and Themistocles' agreement	809B	186B		
18. Pericles reminds himself	813C	186C		
19. Cyrus' nose	821E	172E		<i>De aud. adul. et am.</i> 56D

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The Moral Interplay Between Plutarch's *Political Precepts* and *Life of Demosthenes*

Craig Cooper

There are a number of points of contact between Plutarch's *Lives* and *Political Precepts* (*Moralia* 798a–825f). The common material is largely anecdotal; in some cases the anecdotes, which are scattered across several *Lives* (*Nicias*, *Alcibiades*, *Demetrius*), are collected together in the essay (*Mor.* 799d–800a) to illustrate a single theme, such as the easy-going nature of the Athenian assembly, which itself forms part of a larger discussion by Plutarch on the need of the statesman to understand the character of his audience. In *Political Precepts* the easy-going reaction of the Athenian assembly to Cleon's request for an adjournment or to the escape of Alcibiades' quail is contrasted with the sullen reaction that one can expect of a Carthaginian or Theban assembly. In this particular section of the essay Plutarch has collected together from several different sources a variety of anecdotes that he would later use for different ends in the *Lives*. Cleon's request in the *Life of Nicias* (9. 5), for instance, speaks less about the character of the Athenian assembly and more about Cleon's own buffoonery. It serves as an addendum to Plutarch's account of the Pylos affair, where Cleon's boast that he would return to Athens within twenty days with Spartan prisoners in tow was met with laughter and incredulity, because, as Plutarch adds, the Athenians "were wont to treat his levity and madness as a pleasant joke". In another section of *Political Precepts*, (*Mor.* 802e–804c), this time dealing with the statesman's oratory, Plutarch has instead excerpted a single Peripatetic source on rhetoric, a large part of which he would later reproduce in his *Life of Demosthenes* (9–10). But again there are differences in details and emphasis between the two accounts that suggest different uses being made of the same material. Specifically, in the *Life* Plutarch supplements his Peripatetic source with material from Demetrius of Phalerum, whom Plutarch does not seem to have consulted when composing the essay but whose treatment of Demosthenes would help shape significantly the particular emphasis taken by Plutarch in the *Life*. A reference in *Political Precepts* (815d) to recent troubles under Domitian may suggest that the essay was written soon after Domitian's death (A.D. 96) and thus before Plutarch came to compose *Demosthenes-Cicero*, which was fifth in the series of *Parallel Lives*. If that is the case, we have an opportunity to see how Plutarch reuses material put together for a moral essay in a *Life*.

Moral Interplay

In his survey of recent works on the *Moralia* James Barthelme comments that he finds “it difficult to discuss the *Moralia* without the *Lives*.” (61) He adds that the traditional division into these two categories suggests that “Plutarch had two different, discrete programs: biographical and ethical.” (61) As Barthelme points out, the trend in recent scholarship has been to see Plutarch’s work “as the reflection of a single energy and purpose,” (62) a point well illustrated in recent works, like Tim Duff’s *Plutarch’s Lives: exploring Virtue and Vice*, where we find many references to the *Moralia* in his broader discussion of the *Lives*. Before turning to the specific question of this paper, the relationship between *Demosthenes* and *Political Precepts*, I wish to discuss more broadly the kind of moral interplay between this essay and the *Lives* and try to suggest that *Political Precepts* serves as a precursor to Plutarch’s wider project the *Lives*. To this end I will need to discuss the thorny problem of chronology.

Political Precepts is addressed to Menemachus, a young man who intends to enter local politics. Since, he “has not had the time to observe the philosopher’s life openly in political deeds and public contests and become a spectator of *paradeigmata*, accomplished not in word but in action,” Plutarch has provided, at Menemachus’ request, a wide variety of historical *paradeigmata*. These *paradeigmata* are necessary since Plutarch does not want to be one of those philosophers who teaches but gives no advice, like those who trim their lamps but failed to pour in oil (798B). Plutarch’s comments suggest that for him political life is grounded in philosophy and the examples he includes, like oil in a lamp, allow his moral advice to shine brightly. Ideally, Menemachus should have had time personally to observe the philosopher’s life in the open action of politics and become, as it were, a spectator of contemporary examples; but since he cannot Plutarch will provide him with historical examples that illustrate the philosophical principles on which political life should be based.

The ideas contained in the opening address to Menemachus are reiterated and expanded on in a number of the programmatic statements to the *Lives*. At the beginning of prologue to *Timoleon-Aemilius Paulus* (1–2), Plutarch remarks that he began work on the *Lives* for others but has continued for his own sake, using *historia* (historical research) as a mirror to adorn and conform his life to the virtues of those men (found in history).¹ The result is, as Plutarch states, like spending time together and living with each man; as his “guest” (ἐπιξενούμενον), he “invites” (ὑποδεχόμενοι) and welcomes each one in turn through his *historia* and thereby observes carefully how great and what sort of

1 As Duff (p. 32) notes, the mirror image sets Plutarch’s work in the traditional of moralizing literature.

man he was, taking from his deeds the most important and finest things to know.² Presumably this is what Menemachus would have done had he the time to observe the philosopher's life in political action, and indeed this is precisely the advice that Plutarch advocates in *Progress in Virtue* (85d) for the young man seeking to improve his character. There Plutarch notes that such a youth finds no greater pleasure than being in the presence of good and honourable men, offering his home and table to them. Later in the prologue to *Timoleon-Aemilius Paulus* (4), Plutarch comments that his study of *historia* and his habit of writing, through which he has "invited" (ὑποδεχομένους) into his soul records of the noblest and distinguished men, has prepared him to repulse and repel what is mean and malicious, by directing his attention to the finest *paradeigmata*. According to Plutarch, historical examples, like the very presence of good men in one's house, can be morally efficacious.

Menemachus should, we are told, be a spectator, and this metaphor is also picked up in the *Lives*; the reader becomes, as it were, a spectator of the examples recorded in Plutarch's *Lives* (Duff, 38, 41). In the prologue (1–2) to *Pericles* Plutarch compares the affect that great works of art and virtuous deeds have on their respective spectators.³ Deeds of virtue implant in those who "have done historical research" (ιστορήσασιν) "a zeal and desire" (ζῆλόν τινα καὶ προθυμίαν) to imitate; but in the case of other works of art "an impulse" (ὁρμή) does not immediately follow the admiration of what has been created (1.4). Though a work of art may bring delight, it does not necessarily follow that the one who has crafted it is worth emulating. Such things do not benefit "the viewers" (τοὺς θεωμένους), because, as Plutarch states, they "create no zeal (in the spectator) to imitate, or arouse a desire and impulse to equal them" (πρὸς ἃ μιμητικὸς οὐ γίνεται ζῆλος οὐδὲ ἀνάδοσις κινουῖσα προθυμίαν καὶ ὁρμὴν ἐπὶ τὴν ἑξομοίωσιν). By contrast, virtue immediately disposes one both

2 By *historia* Plutarch may mean research: Duff, 33. Elsewhere Plutarch uses the word in that sense; see *Thes.* 1.2; *Per.* 2.5, 13.16. In *Thes.* 1.1–2, *historia* is twice used by Plutarch, first in the sense of history – "in the writing of *Parallel Lives*, now that I have gone through a period of time accessible to probable reason and the basis of a *historia* composed of facts" – and second in the sense of research – "since I have published an account of the lawgiver Lycurgus and the king Numa, I thought it not unreasonable to go back further to Romulus, now that I have gotten closer to his times in my *historia*." See also Duff, 18 and Wardman, 5.

3 Plutarch is here thinking of statues as later (2.1) he refers to Zeus at Olympia created by Pheidias and Hera at Argos by Polycleitus. Elsewhere Plutarch compares himself to a painter (*Alex.* 1.13), who express the character of his subject through the face and eyes. The metaphor of the portrait painter is used again in *Cimon* 2.4–5 to justify including a hero's blemishes in his *bios*. This suggests that early on in the series Plutarch was prepared to include not just the finest examples, as he suggests in *Timoleon*, but their opposite. Later in the production, as in the *Demetrius-Antony*, he goes much further to include whole *Lives* of bad men. On this last point see Duff, 45–49.

to admire the deeds and emulate the doers (2.2; cf. Duff, 34–45). According to Plutarch, the good actively stirs one to itself and immediately implants “an active impulse” (πρακτικὴν ὁρμήν), “fashioning the spectator’s character” (ἡθοιοῦν τὸν θεατὴν), not so much by imitation as “by historical investigation of the deed, providing him with a choice” (τῇ ἱστορίᾳ τοῦ ἔργου τὴν προαίρεσιν παρεχόμενον) (2.4). Examples of virtuous actions from the past, thus, have a “character-changing effect”, producing in the spectator a moral choice (Duff, 39). *Prohairesis* is a fundamental aspect of the character of the Plutarchean hero (Wardman, 107–114). It is also the foundation of any political action and thus the first piece of advice offered Menemachus (798c–799a).

Plutarch (798c) advises him that what must “underlie political activity” (ὑποκείμενον πολιτείας), as a firm and strong foundation, is “choice that arises from judgement and reason (ἡ προαίρεσις ἀρχὴν ἔχουσα κρίσιν καὶ λόγον) and “not from excitement aroused by vain glory, contention or a lack of other activities” (μὴ πτοίαν ὑπὸ δόξης κενῆς ἢ φιλονεικίας τινὸς ἢ πράξεων ἑτέρων ἀπορίας). Men who throw themselves into public affairs, because they have no have no personal business worth serious attention, “treat political activity as a pastime” (τῇ πολιτείᾳ διαγωγῇ χρώμενοι). Many, “who have latched on to public affairs by chance” (ἀπὸ τύχης ἀψάμενοι τῶν κοινῶν) and have had their fill of it, cannot easily escape (798d). Such men, Plutarch notes, bring the greatest discredit on public life “by their change of mind and sense of distress” (τῷ μετανοεῖν καὶ ἀσχάλλειν), whenever they fall into disgrace, after hoping for glory, and whenever they are drawn into affairs that involve dangers and disorders, after expecting to be feared by others (798de). “But the man who begins his political life from conviction and reasoning that it most befits him and is the finest undertaking” (ὁ δ’ ὡς μάλιστα προσήκον ἑαυτῷ καὶ κάλλιστον ἔργον ἀπὸ γνώμης καὶ λογισμῷ τὰ κοινὰ πράσσειν ἀρξάμενος) is not frightened by any such things nor “overturned in his conviction” (ἀναστρέφεται τὴν γνώμην). For Plutarch, then, political life is a noble enterprise but it must emanate from a rational moral choice that is firm and steadfast and does not rest on fleeting glory or “contention”, φιλονεικία; as a passion φιλονεικία is related to φιλοτιμία (Duff, 86; Wardman, 117),⁴ a character trait which Plutarch attributes to many of the heroes of his *Lives* (Wardman, 115–124; Russell, 106). Plutarch’s warning about the dangers of a change of mind brought on by passion is illustrated in the actions of some of the heroes in the *Lives*.

4 In *Phil.* 3.1 we are told that Philopoemen’s *philotimia* was not altogether free of *philoneikia* or *orgê*; cf. *Phil-Flam.* 1.3, where Titus’ errors stemmed from *philotimia* and Philopoemen’s from *philoneikia*. Fabius’ increasing opposition to Scipio grew out of his *philotimia* and *philoneikia* (*Fab.* 25.4). On *philotimia* see Wardman, 115–124.