



Pascaline Winand,
Andrea Benvenuti,
Max Guderzo (eds.)

THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION



P.I.E. Peter Lang

The book analyses the attitudes of non-EU countries towards European integration in historical and contemporary perspectives. The authors study a range of actors in Europe and beyond to explain the impact of the creation of the European Communities on the international system and how the EU is perceived in the world.

The book further shows the significance of the institutional interplay within the EU, and between EU institutions, member states and external actors led by their own internal dynamics to explain policy outcomes. It investigates to what extent the perceptions of the international community towards the European Communities and the EU have been influenced by the complexity of their decision-making and the difficulty of reconciling the views of member states on key external relations issues. The authors also study the interplay of non-EU countries and the EU within the broader context of international and regional institutions and forums for international cooperation.

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**The External Relations
of the European Union**

**Historical and Contemporary
Perspectives**



P.I.E. Peter Lang

Bruxelles · Bern · Berlin · Frankfurt am Main · New York · Oxford · Wien

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and Max Guderzo (eds.)**

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This book is dedicated to the memory of Alan Milward and Eric Remacle. It is the outcome of a conference on the external relations of the European Union held in Melbourne in September 2009. The conference was organised by the Monash European and EU Centre at Monash University (Melbourne) in collaboration with the University of New South Wales (Sydney), the Machiavelli Inter-University Centre for Cold War Studies (CIMA, Florence and Rome), the National Centre for Research on Europe at the University of Canterbury (Christchurch) and the Institut d'études européennes of the Université libre de Bruxelles. A special thank you to Cormac McMahon for his careful editing work on the manuscript.

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Abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CAN	Andean Community of Nations
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CFDT	<i>Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail</i>
CFP	Centre for Freedom and Prosperity
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CGT	Confédération Générale du Travail
CIEP	Conference for International Economic Policy
CNPF	Conseil National du Patronat Français
CT	Counter-terrorism
DEA	Department of External Affairs
DG	Directorate General
DT	Department of Trade
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
EEC	European Economic Community
EDC	European Defence Community
ESS	European Security Strategy
EPC	European Political Cooperation
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EDF	European Development Fund
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
ECJ	European Court of Justice
EP	European Parliament
EC	European Community
EIDHR	European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights

GDR	German Democratic Republic
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GFC	Global Financial Crisis
ILU	Intelligence Liaison Unit
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPAP	Industrial Policy Action Plan
MERCOSUR	Common Market of the South
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MITI	Ministry of International Trade and Industry
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPE	Normative Power Europe
NRF	NATO Response Force
OAU	Organisation for African Unity
ODA	Overseas Development Aid
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEEC	Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PMD	Prime Minister's Department
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSO	Peace Support Operation
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
USIA	United States Information Agency
VAT	Value Added Tax
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization
6PT	Six-Party Talks

The EU in International Affairs

A Global Actor *Sui Generis*

Andrea BENVENUTI and Max GUDERZO

*University of New South Wales and
University of Florence respectively*

In 1964, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson famously quipped that a week was “a long time in politics”. The Labour leader probably had in mind the dramatic change in his government’s fortunes following his victory at the October 1964 general election: the elation generated by Labour’s return to power after twenty-three years in the political wilderness soon gave way to serious concerns over the state of the British economy, and, more specifically, over the United Kingdom’s gloomy balance of payments figures and the weakness of sterling.¹ Born of Labour’s troubled early days in office, Wilson’s aphorism entered British political folklore. Its validity, however, remains universal, transcending political cultures and historical circumstances; it applies to political leaders as much as governments and other political institutions. The European Union (EU), of course, is no exception. Six years ago, when turmoil engulfed the global economy and the international financial system seemed to be on the verge of a disastrous meltdown as a result of the American subprime mortgage crisis, the European Monetary Union and its flagship, the euro, appeared to provide a safe shelter for countries badly hit by the financial storm. Central and eastern European countries were reported to be keen on adopting the euro; Iceland announced its intention to apply for EU membership with a view to eventually entering the eurozone; and the idea of the UK joining the euro was even mooted in the British press although never seriously considered by the British government. Alas, six years down the track – and in an almost Dickensian turn of events – we are witnessing a serious political and economic storm, which is threatening

¹ See, for instance, Newton, S., “The Two Sterling Crises of 1964 and the Decision not to Devalue,” *Cardiff Historical Papers*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2007, pp. 1-45, <http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/share/resources/CHP%20Newton%20-%20sterling%20crises.pdf>, accessed 31 May 2012.

the very existence of the euro and casting a dark shadow on the future of the EU itself.

How the current turbulence in Europe is going to play out and how it will impact on the eurozone's future as a viable fiscal and monetary union, on its member states, as well as on the cohesion of the wider Union, is as yet, unclear. Also uncertain are the implications of such turbulence for the rest of the world and the latter's political and economic relations with the EU. As one of the contributors to this volume suggests in an essay on Indian-EU relations, the current eurozone crisis does not seem to be conducive to the development of a close political partnership between the EU and India. Nor, it seems, would it augur well for the future of the EU's other major relationships if the economic turmoil in Europe were to spill over into the global economy and severely affect the EU's main partners.

Still, as policymakers and academic scholars are grappling with the political and economic implications of the EU's current travails, it is important not to indulge in facile euroscepticism and lose sight of the important accomplishments that have been achieved in Europe over the past sixty years as a result of the Old Continent's growing integration. During this period, not only did the EU act as a major force for the political and economic transformation of Europe, but it also emerged as a powerful trade negotiator and an important player in global issues such as the environment, development aid, social policy and human rights. Unsurprisingly, given the EU's rising profile and visibility at the international level, its role in world affairs has received increasing scholarly attention and has become the focus of intense debate among academics and practitioners. This edited volume is the outcome of a conference on the external relations of the European Union held in Melbourne in September 2009. It was organised by the European and EU Centre at Monash University (Melbourne) in collaboration with the University of New South Wales (Sydney), the Machiavelli Inter-University Centre for Cold War Studies (CIMA, Florence and Rome) and the National Centre for Research on Europe at the University of Canterbury (Christchurch) and it makes an important contribution to this ongoing debate by seeking to address a number of important questions on the nature of the EU's international role. Chief among these is no doubt the question of how the EU has been seen by non-EU countries since its inception in the 1950s. Has, for instance, the EU's view of itself as a growing political and strategic presence in the international system been shared by other international actors, and, if so, to what extent? In other words, exactly how is the EU perceived by the international community and how have these perceptions developed over time? Has the EU been perceived to be more of an economic actor or a political force? Is the EU seen as a regional model that could be emulated by others? In addressing these questions,

this volume aims to throw further light on the distinctive character of European integration and its external dimension.

The first part of this book comprises two essays which examine the EU's relations with its European neighbours. Part II focuses on the EU and the Asia-Pacific region and, in so doing, examines the EU's links with a number of influential regional actors, such as China, Japan, India, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand. The third part looks at the interactions and reciprocal perceptions between the EU, on one side, and the Americas on the other, while Part IV explores EU relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP), investigating the theme of a postcolonial heritage in EU external relations. Finally, the fifth part deals with the EU legal system, its possible contribution to global governance and its performance in multilateral taxation contexts.

The two essays belonging to the first section of the book are quite different in kind and perspective. Both, however, are concerned with the same (and peculiar) dimension of the European Economic Community (EEC)/European Union (EU)'s outward projection – namely, cold war and post-cold war relations between an integrated Western European bloc, the Soviet Union and the latter's former Eastern European satellites. Ambassador David Daly offers a lively personal view on the EU's eastward enlargement during the two momentous decades that followed the end of the Cold War. Karolina Pietras focuses on the diverging popular perceptions and collective memories of *Solidarność* (the Solidarity movement) (and the role played by it in the Polish crisis of the Eighties) in both Western Europe and Poland itself and how these perceptions/memories have changed over time.

More specifically, Ambassador Daly reflects on the challenges the EU has faced and the successes it has achieved in its five-decade-long expansion from the initial core of six founding partners to the current twenty-eight member states. In taking stock of what he calls a “sometimes tumultuous” process, Ambassador Daly notes how the enlargement of the EU has not only revolutionised (for the better) the political, economic and social face of post-war Europe, but has also transformed the EU itself and its member states. On this last point – which is also the focus of his chapter – he reminds us of the tremendous effort asked of candidate countries and the significant demands made upon them in their quest for EU membership. An experienced participant himself in the enlargement process, Ambassador Daly argues that, despite a certain air of near-inevitability often surrounding enlargement negotiations, the accession of candidate countries has never been a foregone conclusion, nor, as he puts it, a “pre-ordained and sealed fate”. Given the complexity of the enlargement process, Daly also does well to remind us of two things: first, that it

would be a mistake to consider EU membership a ready solution to every national or regional problem. Accession is a long adaptive process that continues well beyond the formal date of accession and the benefits of which are often only measurable in the longer term. Second, it would be wrong to fall into pessimism. As he points out, European integration has never been short of “nay-sayers” or “prophets of doom”. Yet, it is perhaps worth remembering, as Daly does, that “almost as satisfying as all that has happened over the years of [his] involvement with enlargement is what has not happened” in terms of doom and gloom scenarios.

In her chapter, Pietras makes a valuable contribution to a better understanding of the *Solidarność* legacy in contemporary European history and culture. In so doing, she effectively shows how distant Western and Eastern Europeans still are from sharing a genuine common European identity after the long Cold War interlude – and notwithstanding all the advantages brought about by enlargement, as outlined by Ambassador Daly in his previous chapter. Noting how Polish perceptions of *Solidarność* have moved from the wide popular support that the movement enjoyed in the Eighties to quite a different, and ultimately less positive, image subsequently, Pietras tries to explain why, and in what way, things have evolved differently in the West (essentially France and Germany). Although further research based on archival documents may one day cast a different light on the period and issues examined by Pietras, the author’s sound methodological approach to public opinion behaviour and the wide scope of her study, in parallel perspectives, on one of the most important inner crises of the Soviet empire, make this chapter a precious contribution in an area of key importance for the future of the EU. The building of a common European identity through a shared collective memory is, indeed, seen by many as the indispensable prerequisite for the emergence of a truly effective EU role in international affairs.

Coming to the section devoted to the EU’s relations with the Asia-Pacific region, both essays by Andrea Benvenuti, Natalia Chaban and Sarah Christie examine Australasian attitudes towards the early process of European integration in the 1950s. Whereas Benvenuti focuses on the Australian government’s attitude towards the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC), which he describes as rather hesitant and uncertain, Chaban and Christie cast an interesting light on New Zealand’s governmental and media perceptions of the early integration process. In their view, while generally supportive of steps towards closer continental collaboration, the New Zealand government was nonetheless awake to the risk that New Zealand might one day have to pay a heavy price for this support. As in the case of Australia, policymakers in Wellington viewed with concern the prospect of Britain’s membership

of the EEC since British entry would have significant economic implications for New Zealand. This attitude, Chaban and Christie show, was also broadly shared by the New Zealand media. The question of New Zealand's attitudes towards European integration is further explored in Serena Kelly's chapter on New Zealand and Singaporean contemporary perceptions of the EU. The focus here, of course, is on the present, rather than the past. Kelly finds that, while in both New Zealand and Singapore local political elites and public opinion tend to view the EU as a relatively strong economic power, uncertainty remains over the nature of the EU's role beyond the economic realm. Kelly observes that if the EU is trying to "brand" itself as a normative power, then it is clearly finding it hard to be recognised as such.

The next chapters further explore the EU's role and place in contemporary international affairs by focusing on India-EU relations. In examining the significance of the EU for Indian foreign policy and security strategy, Daniel Novotný argues that in spite of Indo-European attempts to deepen their ties through the signing of the Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2004, the bilateral relationship still lacks critical depth and sufficient closeness. The Indian foreign policy elite no doubt recognises the EU's clout in international economic affairs, yet it remains understandably sceptical of the EU's ability to give itself a coherent foreign and security policy. In Indian eyes, the problem of the EU's inability to speak with a single voice in foreign affairs is further compounded by a "perceived lack of common strategic interests" between India and the EU. Given these limitations, it is no surprise if the EU remains a marginal factor in New Delhi's foreign and defence policy calculations. Similar concerns are raised by Rajendra Jain in his chapter on contemporary Indian perspectives on the EU and its international role. Here Jain notes also the inability of both India and the EU – their strategic partnership notwithstanding – to establish a structured dialogue on security issues owing to different priorities and security concerns (with India essentially confronting traditional security threats in a largely hostile neighbourhood and the EU mostly preoccupied with non-traditional security threats). That said, Jain also reminds us of the progress that has been achieved in Indian-EU relations since the establishment of formal diplomatic ties in 1962. While such progress as has been achieved might not be exceptional, it is nonetheless real enough. Not only has Indo-European political dialogue "considerably widened and deepened" over the past fifty years, but, more importantly, there is still a growing willingness on the part of both India and the EU to engage further. More pessimistic, however, about the current (and future) state of India-EU relations is Emilian Kavalski. Despite the oft-heard claim that India and the EU are natural partners, Kavalski remarks how little there is beyond mere commercial interests that brings India and the EU together.

He also notes how often the “frenemy” pattern characterises the interactions between New Delhi and Brussels.

The peculiarities of the EU’s international role and the limitations of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are well illustrated in a revealing chapter by Gudrun Wacker on EU’s relations with East Asia. Like Novotný, Jain and Kavalski, this author also finds that the EU has been punching well below its weight in Asia. She concurs with the existing literature on EU relations towards Asia that not only has the EU traditionally focused on trade and investment in its dealings with the region, but that it has also been slow in recognising the current systemic power shift from Europe to Asia. She argues that while the EU is not a unified actor and is unlikely to become one in the foreseeable future, it has nonetheless the potential to “raise its game” and aspire to play a more prominent political role in East Asia. Much, of course, will depend on the EU itself. Unless it injects more substance, coherence and clarity into its policy towards the region, the EU is destined to become increasingly marginalised in the region.

Relations with the other emerging Asian great power, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), are the focus of Marie Julie Chenard’s chapter. She examines the evolution of the European Community (EC)’s policy towards the PRC between 1973 and 1975. She argues that the establishment of diplomatic relations between Brussels and Beijing “marked a decisive point in the Community’s opening to China”. More importantly, it indicated a readiness, on the European Commission’s part, to play a foreign policy role as well as its desire to show that the EC was “more than just the sum of its member states”. As Chenard points out, the EC’s opening to China required answers “regarding which external relations issues the EC should tackle, how the Community as a whole should tackle them and who should speak for the Community in international politics”.

No scholarly account of the EU’s role in, and policy towards, the Asia-Pacific region would be complete without a proper examination of Euro-Japanese relations. Hitoshi Suzuki provides just that by examining how the EC dealt with Japan in the 1970s. In this historical chapter, Suzuki focuses on how the European Commission resisted pressure from the EC member states to impose restrictions on the importation of Japanese cars, electronic goods and textiles in order to reduce Europe’s growing trade imbalances with Japan. Although it found it difficult to rein in the protectionist instincts of several member states (who still went ahead and introduced domestic safeguards against Japanese exports even at the cost of making the European Community’s common foreign trade appear as lacking consistency and clarity), the European Commission nonetheless managed to impose its approach. This policy was centred on the idea that

Euro-Japanese trade imbalances should be reduced through the expansion of EC exports to Japan and not the imposition of restrictions on Japanese exports. The Commission was able to persuade the Japanese government to begin to open up its highly protected internal market and, in so doing, to make a greater contribution to sustaining the world economy.

American attitudes towards the European Community and the EU make up the third part of the volume. Flora Anderson has written a convincing essay on US perceptions of the European integration process in the 1940s and 1950s through the lens of two prominent social scientists. Max Guderzo takes the story forward by studying those perceptions from a different angle and during a different period (1962-73). For his part, Rémy Davison proposes an innovative interpretation of the NATO context and its links with the EU. Latin America also figures prominently in this section through the contribution offered by Edward Moxon-Browne, whose chapter more specifically examines Central and South American perceptions and interpretations of the European integration process.

Anderson's essay belongs to a growing body of scholarship that seeks not only to chart the gradual emergence of a transatlantic intellectual network, but also to understand its influence. The network's effect on the political, diplomatic and economic dimensions of the European integration process and its close links with the US government, have been crucial also in the formulation of the latter's policies towards Europe during and after the Second World War. Based on primary sources available at the Harvard University archives, this chapter focuses on Talcott Parsons and Karl Deutsch, their scholarly work on European issues and their interactions with the Department of State and other branches of the US government on the subject of European post-war reconstruction. Where Parsons sought to understand the roots of National Socialism in Germany with a view to avoiding the re-emergence of totalitarianism across post-war Europe, Deutsch devoted his attention to the twin questions of European modernisation and integration through innovative patterns of international organisation. Both agreed on the need to develop a new "vision" of European integration, a vision that would help secure one of the most pressing objectives at the time – the reconstruction of the Old Continent – in a manner acceptable to American interests and global aspirations. In examining Parsons and Deutsch's intellectual contributions to the making of post-war Europe, the author throws an interesting new light on the conceptual framework that underpinned the well-known contribution of the US to the birth of an integrated and stable Western Europe.

Like Anderson's contribution, Guderzo's essay also deals with the political, economic and strategic rationale behind American moves in support of European integration in the decades immediately following

the end of the Second World War. Here, however, the focus is on the period beginning with John Kennedy's declaration of transatlantic interdependence in July 1962 and ending with the first EC enlargement in 1973. Starting from American responses to early Western European steps towards politico-economic co-operation in the 1950s, Guderzo identifies an important common theme between Kennedy's EC policy and that of his predecessors, Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower. Guderzo calls this theme "enlightened interest" and correctly views it as the main explanatory key behind the great degree of continuity that characterized American reactions to European integration between the early 1950s and mid-1960s. That said, the last years of the Johnson Administration and the new course set by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger saw an important change in American attitudes towards the EC and, accordingly, Guderzo examines this change through the lens of *realpolitik*. He argues that Nixon's tilt away from genuine multilateralism in favour of *realpolitik* cannot simply be ascribed to US domestic considerations and wider foreign policy calculations. It was, rather, a response to a noticeable sense of disillusionment with America's European partners that gripped the Administration in the aftermath of the latter's ill-fated attempt at transatlantic co-management of most world affairs.

Rémy Davison completes this framework of analysis centred on the United States and its relations with Western Europe by proposing a well-structured approach in eight steps to the gradual transformation of the EU-NATO partnership since the end of the Cold War. The chapter looks at the way in which NATO belied most predictions and academic analyses in the 1990s by successfully setting in motion its own transformation from its previous role as a deterrent force to an "out-of-area" offensive military force. The author rightly identifies the first Gulf War as the starting point of this metamorphosis and the intervention in the Bosnian war as its full demonstration, through air strikes on Serbian forces and the subsequent peace-keeping role played by the alliance. Emphasizing the logical connection between those developments and the development of the Military Concept introduced at the 2002 Prague Summit, the chapter also explores the 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States and its implications for EU-NATO relations. Substantial sections of the essay are devoted to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Partnership Action Plans on Terrorism and the major challenges identified (and faced) by NATO in the period under review. The author also analyses the main elements of collaboration and competition in the EU-NATO relationship, and interprets the roots of transatlantic divergence on specific issues. In this context, Davison not only mentions the American tolerance towards EU attempts to define its own security and defence policies, but also refers to Washington's fundamental scepticism about the EU's real readiness to

offer front-line contributions in an independent or joint capacity. These remarks, which may go a long way to explaining why the US has been building *ad hoc* constellations of power within and without NATO for the last two decades, once again remind us of the complex dynamics of trans-atlantic relations, as well as of the EU's tardiness in taking responsible roles in international affairs.

This "American picture" is completed by Moxon-Browne with an essay on the multi-nuanced nature of Central and South American perceptions of the European integration process. In the first part of his chapter, Moxon-Browne examines, in depth, public opinion trends for the period 1995-2000 and assesses Latin American awareness of the EU with specific attention to significant sub-regional variations, respondents' education levels, competition with other international organizations and the US in terms of "image" and presence. He shows that while no single Latin American viewpoint exists on the EU, it is nonetheless apparent that the latter does not enjoy the same well-defined profile as the United States. That said, regional elites and the more educated sections of Latin American societies are cognizant "of the nuances of EU policies in Latin America and in the world more broadly, especially in the context of upholding peace and providing international stability". In the chapter's second section, he not only investigates the suitability of Europe's path to regional integration as a model for Latin American regionalism, but also explores the extent to which the European example has directly or indirectly influenced the development of multilateralism in a context often dominated by strong nationalism. In addition, the author proposes a parallel view of MERCOSUR (Common Market of the South) and the EU. This is conveyed through an innovative perspective – that of the former as a "two-way mirror" of the EU against the backdrop of rival economic interactions due to the presence on stage of the US as a traditional strong actor.

Moving to Part IV of the book, Ferdinand Leikam and Laura Kottos offer two stimulating interpretations of Western Europe's relations with the ACP countries. More specifically, Leikam examines the EEC-Commonwealth Africa partnership from Rome to Lomé, whereas Kottos centres her attention on French, Belgian and British imperial attitudes on the eve of the establishment of the EEC in 1957-58. Leikam's work mainly relies on British and EC archival sources, but it also makes good use of available African material, including press reports and diplomatic accounts. The final product is an interesting essay articulated in four sections. The chapter's first part discusses the origins of the EEC and its association system, and focuses on the impact of these developments on British colonies and newly independent Commonwealth states in Africa. Here Leikam casts an interesting light on how these countries/colonies perceived the new European institutions from outside. Having done so,

the author then moves to examine Britain's first bid to join the EEC in 1961-63 and analyses the reactions of the British (African) Commonwealth to London's plans for the extension of the EEC's association regime to its current and former colonies. The chapter's third section deals with the decision taken by some members of the African Commonwealth to pursue association agreements with the Six, also in reaction to the first Yaoundé agreement signed in July 1963. The author shows that relations between Commonwealth Africa and the EEC remained uneasy for, while the EEC insisted on reverse preferences, the African Commonwealth remained opposed to the principle of reciprocity. In his last section, Leikam covers Britain's final (and successful) bid for EEC membership in 1970-72 and explores the consequences of British EEC accession on London's former African colonies. Here Leikam also looks at the impact of the Lomé Convention and the association system as a means to build a durable structure for relations between Africa and an integrated Europe.

In her chapter, Kottos, too, aims to show the profound connections between the process of European integration and decolonization in an historical perspective. The author complements Leikam's analysis by offering a different view – in her case, from inside Europe – of the crucial transition which saw the old imperial centres reassess and “restructure” the relationship with their own colonial peripheries in the second half of the 1950s. More specifically, the essay investigates the attitudes of France, Belgium and the United Kingdom to decolonization in a comparative context. It argues that the three colonial powers viewed the future of their political and economic links with their former colonies (as well as that of these newly independent states with the emerging European Communities) pretty much in the same way – that is, as a continuation of empire by other means. In this context, modernization was the key tool (and quite an expensive tool, at that) to reach such a goal. While France and Belgium chose to achieve this through the association system, Britain initially preferred to wait and remain outside the EEC, fearing that integration in Europe could slow down *inter alia* the needed transformation of its empire. Also relying on an analysis of public opinion trends as well as on an examination of the role played by domestic pressure groups in steering governmental choices towards new and stronger links between Europe and its former colonies, this chapter offers not only a stimulating comparative analysis of Europe's role in the decolonisation process, but also an original interpretation of Europe's end of empire.

The last section of the volume includes two essays by Rostam J. Neuwirth and George Gilligan. Neuwirth singles out the main flaws that undermine the current structure of the international legal order and proposes persuasive interpretations of the debate on the relationship between international law and European law. Key issues such as the legal status

of the EU, or its competences and capacities as an international actor are examined and the discussion also touches the core of external perceptions of Europe and the EU debated elsewhere in the book. The author gives specific attention to a central question, namely, why international law, based as it is on traditional relations between sovereign nation states, has not yet discovered the secret of inner dynamism characterizing European law, which has proven able to progress in sixty years from the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to the Treaty of Lisbon. The chapter also studies the reform of the United Nations system, the main trends in the related academic debate and the financial elements involved, including the taboo of supranational taxes. It examines the main features of the EU legal order, highlighting such key concepts as the single institutional framework, the subsidiarity principle and the financial aspects of the EU architecture. The concluding remarks summarise the preconditions for a reform of the international legal order as a whole, also building on the EU experience with its history of successes and failures.

Gilligan's essay adopts a different perspective to investigate the EU's interaction with other international organizations, examining its role as an efficient and proactive player in multilateral taxation contexts. The chapter devotes specific attention to the EU Savings Tax Directive (EUSTD), analysing in detail its genesis and impact, and to Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) activities in the area of harmful tax practices (OECDHTP), both deemed by Gilligan to be very significant anti-tax avoidance multilateral regulatory initiatives. Discussion of these issues involves parallel sets of intertwined reflections on sovereignty – in particular, national fiscal sovereignty and legitimacy – which, in turn, underpin the theoretical architecture of the essay. The author uses a wide range of sources to show the extent to which both the EUSTD and OECDHTP have either received significant support or generated strong opposition in a manner that demonstrates the force of globalization and the growing interdependence between nation states. Gilligan's conclusions not only underscore the perceptions of different jurisdictions in relation to their legitimate position on transparency in taxation and other financial domains. They also underline the crucial significance of normative issues in understanding compliance at all levels, whether at local, national or international level. The durable importance of market forces, the need for more research, empirical data collection and informed interpretations in order to assess the efficacy of international regulatory initiatives such as the EUSTD and the OECDHTP are also apparent. Each of these elements is needed to produce policy-relevant prescriptions on the benefits deriving from increased tax competition and from global, rather than regional, approaches to international tax coordination. In order to show that political economy contexts and their variations do matter

in explaining the different approaches examined in this essay, Gilligan also draws attention to the contrasting attitudes of the Bush and Obama Administrations to the proactive anti-avoidance initiatives taken by the EU in multilateral taxation contexts. He concludes that the EU is likely to become an increasingly important actor in these contexts.

The concluding remarks to this volume are by Pascaline Winand, the resourceful Director of the Monash European and EU Centre from 2007 to 2014 and expert organizer of the 2009 conference, upon which this book is based. Her conclusions offer an interpretative golden thread through the five different sections of this volume, skilfully drawing attention to the EU's role in international affairs that is at once complex and in flux. As she points out, the multifaceted nature of EU's external relations requires a continuing effort on the part of academic researchers and policy analysts to grasp and explain such complexity. It is in this spirit that this book has been written. Our hope is that it will not only make a significant contribution to a better understanding of a complex institution such as the European Union, but it will also provide a stimulating stepping stone to further research into a very challenging but equally rewarding field.

PART I

EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS

EU Enlargement

A Success but Never a Simple Question of Time

H.E. David DALY

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European foreign policy is an area that has seen more than its share of transformations over the years and certainly more than I personally expected to see when I started out in my career with the European Union. Thus, a book which brings together so many of the threads of the evolution of institutions and individuals in response to a changing world and context in Europe is a very useful addition to the literature in this sector. It is a great privilege for me to be asked to contribute to this volume and in so doing, share something of my own perception and experiences of what have been, by any reckoning, an extraordinary twenty years. In this chapter, I hope to offer some insights into the process of enlargement, an area with which I have had a long and, I hope, fruitful involvement.

In any discussion of enlargement of the European Union a single question seems to be asked more often than any other. That question is “when?”; “When will country X join the EU?” The EU has grown in numbers of member states many times in its history, with Ireland, the UK and Denmark being the first new member states to join in 1973 to the latest accessions – those of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, and Croatia in 2013 now bringing us to a Union of twenty-eight. So “when?” may seem the most obvious way to ask for an accession progress report. And yet, posing the question in this manner assumes a certain inevitability, almost a pre-ordained and sealed fate. The only element left in doubt is the final date of accession. Having had a direct involvement in trade liberalisation discussions with the countries of central and eastern Europe, accession negotiations with Hungary and on-going work to stabilise the West Balkans and the accession of Croatia, I have come to the view that the question of “when?” is unhelpful. Accession and stabilisation are dynamic processes that cannot be accomplished by the serene contemplation of a ticking clock. Before setting out a new and more pertinent

question with which to tackle the subject of enlargement I would like to examine the recent enlargements of the EU and their effects on the EU and the new member states.

The Most Successful Policy of the EU

At the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall the EU had 12 member states. German unification aside, enlargement to a Europe of 25 came to occupy the efforts of many in the EU for much of the 1990s, leading finally to the accession of ten very diverse new member states, most from central and eastern Europe on 1 May 2004. Chris Patten, a former European Commissioner for Competition and currently Chancellor of Oxford University, writing about the collapse of Russia's Communist empire in Europe, has noted: "We now had to cope with the results of the ending of Europe's division. We found a policy to support the emergence of open markets and democracy in central and eastern Europe – the enlargement of the EU. This has been the most successful foreign policy pursued by Europe".¹

The success of the policy of enlargement is particularly evident in the political sphere. The prospect of accession to the EU helped candidate countries to make changes that cemented key elements of a democratic free-market system in place and guaranteed the adoption of reforms in the areas of human rights, freedom of media, equality, institution building, regulatory convergence, as well as tackling organised crime and corruption. This great raft of transformations in the candidate countries was not accomplished without difficulties, discussion and occasional stops and starts. Many times along the way we were told it would be much easier to garner support for reforms if there were a "target date", an accession deadline of sorts. Tempting though this line of thinking may be, I found myself wondering on many occasions why it was that people were so keen to ask the wrong question. There was a question that was rarely asked but that could usefully have figured a lot more prominently in people's minds. That question was not "when?", but rather "what?"; as in "What do we still have to do in order to be ready to join the EU?"

Accession – Not an Inevitable Outcome

To understand the importance of this latter question, we must remember what it means to accede to the EU. With accession comes an obligation on the new member state to implement EU law. European law has grown in breadth and in depth over the years and now is a substantial corpus of texts and accumulated jurisprudence. Any country joining the EU

¹ Patten, C., *Not Quite the Diplomat: Home Truths about World Affairs*, London, Allen Lane, 2005, p. 152.

is committing itself to adopting the entire corpus and to incorporating it, where appropriate, into domestic law. It also implies an acceptance of the twin obligations to muster the political will, firstly, to implement its provisions and secondly, to enforce EU law. This is a heavy burden and demands a sophisticated public administration in the new member state. The price for a member state neglecting its obligations in this regard can be high: the European Commission has powers to bring a case against a member state to the European Court of Justice, where it forms the opinion that the member state has failed to meet its obligations under European law.

It is pertinent here to remind ourselves that at the heart of the EU is the Single Market, which can only operate on a basis of mutual confidence in the legal structure and administrative capacities between the member states. If consumers in one member state did not have confidence in the authorities of another the Single Market would unravel because barriers to the free movement of goods, workers and capital would be created. These barriers would, no doubt, further undermine confidence among ordinary consumers and the business community and would in the end be the undoing of the entire project.

Given the central importance of confidence in the operation of the Single Market, candidate countries must convince the European Commission and the other member states that they do, in fact, possess the necessary legal framework, administrative capacity and political will to implement and enforce EU law. This must be proven to the satisfaction of all parties concerned. But how is a candidate country to know what is expected of it? How is it to convince the European Commission and the member states that it has made the necessary changes to prepare for membership?

The Copenhagen Criteria

The EU adopted a set of criteria in 1993, known as the Copenhagen Criteria, which outline the general principles to be respected. The Communiqué of the Copenhagen Presidency Council (quoted in part below) sets out the essential elements to be achieved:

Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.²

² Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council, 21-22 June 1993, Section (iii), para. 2, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdf, accessed 27 September 2012.

To summarise, the criteria can be divided into four distinct groups: political (functioning democracy, respect for human rights and for minorities); economic (functioning market economy and the ability to withstand the competitive pressures of the EU single market); legal (presence of a legal system, adoption of the corpus of EU law) and administrative (an ability to implement and enforce the law). The accession of a new member state changes life, not just for that state but also for the rest of the EU states and in some ways for the character of the EU as a whole. Thus, there is also a need for the EU, for its part, to be able to absorb the new member state and for the Union to continue to function successfully.

Viewed from the perspective of a candidate country, however, principles are suitable as a starting point but they do not provide the sort of detailed guidance that is needed for that country to take practical steps towards membership. What is really needed is detailed guidance, sector by sector, that allows a candidate country to proceed in an organised fashion with the legal, economic and administrative transformation that membership demands of them. Candidate countries are assisted in their preparations by the Commission in two ways: firstly, the Commission undertakes an annual review of progress made by all candidate – and potential candidate countries. This review contains detailed recommendations under each of the Copenhagen Criteria. Secondly, the Commission sets a series of very detailed benchmarks at the start of the accession negotiation process. These benchmarks relate to “chapters” or portions of the *acquis communautaire* or corpus of EU law that the candidate countries must adopt before their candidacy can be accepted for accession. When the EU and the candidate country agree that the necessary changes have been made under a particular chapter, that chapter is said to be closed. In the case of the membership application of Estonia, for example, there were 30 chapters in all. Six were opened in 1998, seventeen in 1999, six in 2000 and one in 2002. All chapters were closed in December 2002 and an Accession Treaty was signed by the Estonian government six months later and approved by referendum in September 2003. Formal accession came on 1 May 2004.

The benchmarks are the agreed standards against which the progress of the candidate country can be measured. Some examples of these include: the correct application of State Aid law in industrial sectors undergoing restructuring, e.g. ship-building or steel; the respect of basic freedoms under law and in practice, e.g., access to courts, free media, and respect for human rights; the incorporation of a reasonable strategy for budgeting for the infrastructure investments needed to comply with EU environmental law.

How, then, does a candidate country show that it is really ready for membership? How does a country prove that it has met the conditions? The process of evaluation begins even before the candidate country has applied for membership. Each candidate country signs a “Europe Agreement” before their formal application for membership. The provisions of this agreement set the scene for many of the changes that will be required before the candidate country can accede to membership. In the case of the West Balkans, association agreements were drawn up before formal accession negotiations were entered into. Whether by Europe Agreement or by Association Agreement, the intention was the same: to provide something akin to a membership training ground for states that had many changes and transformations to adopt before they could say that they were ready to become fully fledged EU member states.

Getting to Know You

It was also an opportunity for the EU (both Commission and member states) to get to know the candidate countries, and to become aware of the strategies and policies that were intended to enact change and compliance with the *acquis*. At particular stages along the way, there were also opportunities for EU member states and the Commission to conduct “peer reviews”, where public servants from member states worked alongside their candidate country counterparts and reviewed progress that had been made. Non-government organisations were also invited to take part in the process and to contribute their comments and observations at this point. Rather than concentrating on any one of these many steps along the way as a single snap-shot of progress, I like to think of the whole process as a period of engagement, shading into involvement. All of these contacts and interchanges build into a more and more complete picture of the candidate country and allow everyone involved to assess progress towards the eventual goal of incorporation of the *acquis*.

Of course, bumps along the road are part of the journey. Candidate countries will always have their difficulties along the way. Past experience tells us that some industries have more work to do than others in preparing themselves for a new competitive environment. Agriculture has often been a cause of extensive discussion and the question of state aid to particular industries or sectors is commonly another important area of negotiation. Transition towards agreed procedures and standards under the headings of Justice, Freedom and Security also commonly require a steady hand on the tiller, if I might borrow a boating metaphor. The free movement of workers and capital have both undergone a phasing-in regime across Europe as both the candidate countries and the member states assess the eventual impact of membership. None of these areas of

discussion, negotiation and occasionally, of controversy, should obscure the larger picture, however. The simple fact of the matter is that the candidate countries have many excellent political, strategic, economic and social reasons for wishing to join the EU and existing member states have a direct interest in the transition to membership being a success for both the candidate country and established members. Fortified by the positive impetus that comes with membership candidacy, we have seen great development and transformation in the Western Balkans and in many other jurisdictions since those heady days that followed the fall of the Eastern bloc.

Not a Miracle Cure

It would be a mistake, however, to imagine that EU membership was a panacea or a “miracle cure” for every ill. It is not. Any country that has taken on itself the strictures of applying for candidacy and which has undergone the ensuing transformation that necessarily accompanies an application for full membership of the EU will have experienced something closer to a “dawning” EU membership than to a single “light-bulb” moment. That is to say, membership, with its ensuing advantages and obligations, is not turned on in the casual flick of a switch, nor is it entered into lightly. Although it is solemnised by a binding treaty and ratified by each of the Parliaments of the EU, it is the culmination of a whole process of transformation and development that will have lasted many years. Concentrating on the supposed end point (EU membership) is, in my opinion, a failure to apprehend the true nature of what is involved. In reality, in undergoing the process of candidacy, the candidate countries make changes that have many powerful effects, independent of any final outcome to the process.

So it is that we saw a rise in foreign direct investment (FDI) in candidate countries all through the 1990s, long before accession in 2004. A country that is actively adopting stricter and more transparent systems across all areas of public and commercial administration is a country that can attract investors who need to be reassured that their investment will bear fruit and that the jurisdiction has a stable and predictable legal and administrative platform from which to build a long-term business partnership. Not only did FDI grow in this period, so also did trade and that trade became more sophisticated in nature. Foreign direct investment in the candidate countries brought not just capital but also business and technological know-how. When companies decide to invest in an emerging market, capital is only one of many things they bring to the table. They transfer their knowledge of their home market and production methods, their experience of working in the new regulatory framework and their

business and production contacts. All of these transfers are important if a country is to emerge truly prepared for the competitive environment that is Europe. To have a right to compete without access to the ramping-up process would be a right in name only. Another sign of the success of the process is that competitiveness improved and productivity increased over the candidatureship period. This reflects the successful strategic nature of the partnerships that were forged at this time.

These benefits of the candidature period were not lost as time went on. Rather they continue to bear fruit, not just to the candidate countries themselves but also to the wider European Union. The formal accession of the ten candidate countries on 1 May 2004 came as the culmination of a long process of engagement that has added significant momentum to the adoption of European policies not just in the region but as a flag bearer for policies that will be emulated across the region and in the wider world.

Looking at the case of Croatia, there is no doubt that the candidacy period has proved important not just for Croatia itself but also for the wider western Balkan region. Croatia has been engaged in the candidacy and accession process since 2003 and acceded on 1 July 2013. We all know the upheaval, not to mention the terrible destruction and loss of life that accompanied the break-up of Yugoslavia. In taking upon itself the challenges of candidacy, Croatia has taken a decisive step towards a better future. Without a clear change in direction, the conflicts of the 1990s could end up casting a very dark shadow over the future peace and prosperity of a new generation coming to the fore in the western Balkans. Croatia's strategic change of direction and its accession process have succeeded in mobilising a population behind something new, a project that promises a brighter future for its people.

Wider than the immediate successes in Croatia alone, however, is the impact of the demonstration effect of the Croatian experience. In the same region, the EU has recognised Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro as official candidate countries. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo have also been recognised as potential candidate countries. I feel confident that the path taken by Croatia will be emulated by many of its neighbours, copper-fastening stability and prosperity in the region. It is particularly encouraging to see that Croatia has offered to cooperate with Serbia in making translations of *acquis* documents available to Belgrade. This is a very hopeful sign that Croatia is not seeking to play anything but a positive role as a future member state.

Each Path of Engagement Unique

It is opportune to mention at this point that the path that was taken by each country is a unique mix of local circumstances and engagement

with the EU at a given period of time. It will not be repeated in identical fashion by new candidate countries. The newest candidate states come to the process of acclimatisation, adoption of the *acquis* and adaptation at a moment in time when international and European Union dynamics have evolved anew in light of developments. The priorities of the moment are necessarily different, the challenges of the moment have changed and as such, the process of becoming a member state of the EU will also have evolved to some degree. The saying of Heraclitus comes to mind: one can never step in the same river twice. It must be said that although some things do change and even may change drastically, the aim of the process of membership remains constant. Each new member state still needs to prepare for the rigors of the internal market and to adapt to and adopt the ground rules that form the basis of our agreed common market and common economic, social, political and legal space. Just as much as any prospective member state, the EU has an interest in every new member being a successful member. This is quite simply because standing together we are always stronger than standing apart.

Tumultuous Change, Strong Benefits

To take stock of the results of the sometimes tumultuous period of expansion, the EU is now the largest importer and exporter, particularly of agricultural products from the developing world. The expansion of the EU has brought with it a rise in GDP in the new member states in the order of 1.75-1.85%, a significant boost. EU-15 has benefited to the tune of a more modest 0.5%, but clearly from a much larger base. More countries are covered by EU climate change policies than ever before. This means that more countries are committed to the EU's ambitious greenhouse gas emission targets and other mitigating measures: a base figure of 20% carbon emissions reduction, our emissions trading scheme, a 20% energy efficiency target and a 20% renewable energy target for 2020. There are now more countries contributing to overseas development aid (ODA) than before and Europe's contributions account for 60% of all ODA given globally. More countries contribute to the EU's security operations around the world. More countries are contributing to the on-going process of developing our relationship to our new "next-door neighbours", those countries that, as a result of the enlargement process, find themselves sharing a border with the EU.

The cause of a successful and strong Europe has never lacked for nay-sayers. The prophets of doom have always had their distinctive, shrill cry. Almost as satisfying as all that has happened over the years of my involvement with enlargement is what has *not* happened. Some critics said that Western Europe would be overrun with an exodus of millions

from the East. There were movements of people, of course, but nothing of that order. There were others who doubted the capacity of the new member states to assume their responsibilities in the EU institutions, but that has proven to be a false alarm. The Cypriot Presidency of 2012, the Hungarian and the Polish Presidencies of the previous year are proof positive that newer member states have taken up their duties within the administration of the EU and served with great distinction in the range of roles that they have been asked to play.

This volume, quite properly, seeks to evaluate enlargement from many different angles and points of view. Some scholars may well have their doubts about the finer points of the path that has been traversed over the years. Speaking personally however, to cast my mind back to the early 1990s is to remember a time of excitement and possibilities but also of real fears and dangers. Not every country made the sorts of choices that have brought the thirteen new member states into the EU. Not every country sought the open market, embraced open administration, adopted the supremacy of the rule of law or applied free movement principles that are so characteristic of Europe. Those that did prospered; many that did not have paid a heavy price.

For all these reasons, as Europe confronts the opportunities and the challenges of this century there is no doubt in my mind that, to use Lord Patten's words again, the "enlargement [...] has been the most successful foreign policy pursued by Europe".³

³ Patten, C., *Not Quite the Diplomat: Home Truths about World Affairs*, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

Differences in Collective Memory

Perception of *Solidarność* in Western Europe and in Poland

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Memory and history are closely connected to communal and individual identity. Memory and history are therefore also constructed according to present demands, especially recent history. Yet, the past sometimes also presses into the present.¹

The fate of the Polish workers' movement *Solidarność* fits perfectly into this framework. *Solidarność*, the first independent labour union in a Soviet bloc country, was born during strikes in the summer of 1980 at the Lenin Shipyard (now called Gdańsk Shipyards). Initially, this great workers' movement – almost ten million workers – and its leader Lech Wałęsa enjoyed in Poland an enormous popularity and massive support. But after the imposition of martial law in December 1981 and almost eight years of conspiracy, the movement lost its popular support. After the Round Table² negotiations between the government and the opposition, which resulted in semi-free elections in 1989, the involvement of *Solidarność* in politics (for which the movement was unprepared), and the problematic presidency of Lech Wałęsa (1990-1995), the image of *Solidarność* within Polish society deteriorated strongly.

This is partially due to the nature of the agreement between the Polish democratic opposition and the authorities in 1989. The former dissidents broke the first rule of *Solidarność*: the transparency and accessibility of negotiations. Whereas during the Gdańsk strikes everybody heard and

¹ Bergson, Henri, *Matter and Memory*, Trans. N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer, New York, Zone Books, 1991.

² The Round Table Talks took place in Warsaw from 6 February to 4 April 1989. They included *Solidarność* members such as Lech Wałęsa, Bronisław Geremek, Bogdan Lis, Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Jacek Kuron, Adam Michnik (and others) and members of the communist government such as Czesław Kiszczak, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Leszek Miller, and others.

could participate in the discussion, in Magdalenka,³ the first, and most important part of negotiations happened behind close doors. This secretive mode of negotiation, which broke the much-admired principle of self-management, self-administration, democracy and transparency, left a bitter taste in society. The newborn “civil society and participative democracy” never really had the chance to mature.

Of course, the first big success of *Solidarność* was the non-violent transition from a communist system to a democratic one, but according to a study by *Rzeczpospolita* conducted in 2005, the Poles who disapprove of the changes started by *Solidarność* outnumber those who approve of them.⁴ Even the perception of a positive event, such as the non-violent revolution started by *Solidarność*, can change according to present demands.

In light of the celebration of the 25th anniversary of *Solidarność*, it is interesting to examine the diverging popular perceptions of this movement, and how they have changed since its conception, in Western Europe and in Poland.

The *Solidarność* movement in communist Poland and developments leading up to the imposition of martial law, attracted wide interest in several countries, especially in France, Germany, Italy and the USA. In this chapter, I would like to present my research on perceptions of the *Solidarność* movement especially in France and West Germany, from the beginning of the strikes in August 1980, through the declaration of martial law by General Jaruzelski on 13 December 1981, up until recently.

The topic will be analysed through two different lenses: geographical and temporal. The two time periods in question are the 1980s and the present time (before and after communism), and the regions of interest are two western countries: France and Germany. This will be analysed with a special focus on press coverage of the events. Comparable national newspapers such as France’s *Le Monde*, and Germany’s *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* make up the test field, although some reactions from *Le Figaro* and *L’Humanité* and from the German weekly magazine *Die Zeit* will be also presented.

The choice of these countries and these periods for this study is not arbitrary. On one hand, the perception of *Solidarność* deteriorated in Poland, while on the other, the union and its leader Lech Wałęsa are still positively perceived in Western societies. Sometimes a historical event is

³ Talks between the democratic opposition and the Communist regime in Magdalenka, near Warsaw, started on 16 September 1988. These meetings paved the way for the Round Table discussions.

⁴ *Rzeczpospolita* (Polish national daily newspaper), 16 August 2005.

clearer and easier to understand when looked at from the outside, from the perspective of a foreign country. Current politics in Poland have tended to cloud the perception of the historical facts in its country of origin.

As for 1980s France and Germany, they constitute interesting case-studies to observe the repercussions, in “non-communist” countries of crisis at the heart of the communist bloc.

Historical Background

Let us point out briefly the historical background. Communist Poland of 1980 was struggling with the economic crisis and gigantic debts in western banks. The raising of food prices in the summer of 1980 started a wave of labour unrest through the whole country. The strikers in Gdansk, led by an electrician Lech Wałęsa, issued far-reaching demands for labour reform and more civil rights. The workers’ priority was the establishment of an independent trade union with the legal right to strike. After two weeks of strikes, an agreement between the workers and the government was signed on 31 August. It was as a social contract, authorizing citizens to introduce democratic change, nonetheless trammelled by the limits of the communist system.

Sixteen months later, on 13 December 1981, the government took a hard line against the union, and martial law was introduced by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, drastically restricting normal life. *Solidarność* was declared illegal and thousands of opposition members were arrested.

In the 1980s, *Solidarność* was perceived differently in France and in West Germany. While many remember the French as the biggest allies and supporters of *Solidarność*, Germans are remembered as having been reserved and cold to the nascent political movement. The West German reaction to the Polish crisis of the 1980s is often represented as contrasting strongly with the reaction of the French. Does this received wisdom correspond to the facts? Was the sympathy shown for altruistic or idealistic reasons or was it based on various domestic strategies?

In Germany, the prudent reaction of the government was the result of the prevailing policy of *détente*; *Ostpolitik* had priority. In France, the official rhetoric of the government seemed to be more pro-*Solidarność* than the German one. However, was it also backed by political action? The support of French society gave the impression of being almost unanimous, but was it really so?

The Hot Polish Summer of 1980

The strikes in the Baltic Sea towns in the summer of 1980 monopolized the headlines of the Western European media. All of the major