

Propositions in the Making



Experiments in a
Whiteheadian Laboratory

Edited by
Roland Faber, Michael Halewood,
and Andrew M. Davis

Propositions in the Making

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List of Abbreviations

ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD

AI	<i>Adventures of Ideas</i> (1933)
CN	<i>Concept of Nature</i> (1920)
ESP	<i>Essays in Science and Philosophy</i> (1948)
FR	<i>The Function of Reason</i> (1929)
MT	<i>Modes of Thought</i> (1938)
PNK	<i>An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge</i> (1919)
PR	<i>Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology</i> (1929)
R	<i>The Principle of Relativity</i> (1922)
RM	<i>Religion in the Making</i> (1926)
S	<i>Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect</i> (1927)
SMW	<i>Science and the Modern World</i> (1925)

These abbreviations refer to works by Whitehead and not to any particular published edition. While there are several editions that share common pagination, there are some whose pagination differs between publishers. To find a specific reference, consult the relevant bibliographic list for the chapter in which the reference appears.

Editors Preamble

Whitehead's thought continues to offer fresh interdisciplinary insight for the shifting contours of our postmodern world. Whether in metaphysics or cosmology, ethics, education, or society, scholars persist in creatively applying his philosophy in new contexts and amid new challenges.

In 2016, a unique conference between SenseLab and the Whitehead Research Project met at Claremont School of Theology in Claremont, California. This conference was spurred as a result of innovative conversations between philosophers, Erin Manning and Brian Massumi, and process philosophers, Roland Faber and Michael Halewood. The meeting of their respective communities in Claremont aimed chiefly to expose and explore the multivalent connections between postmodern thought and Whitehead's philosophy, particularly as they relate to his novel understanding of "propositions."

Rather than a "logical assertion," Whitehead described a proposition as a "lure for feeling" for a collectivity to come. Propositions cannot be reduced to the verbal content of logical justifications; rather they are infused with the communal feeling of aesthetic valuations. It is this understanding of propositions which formed the contextual horizon for the conference and SenseLab's central inquiry:

What would a conference look like were it to take Whitehead's propositions about propositions seriously? It would look more like a laboratory of speculative thought, we proposed, than a "marketplace" of ideas. A matter of fact in potential, directly experienced, is enacted, not exchanged. Our questions were: what would it mean to make the conference form "propositional" in the way that process philosophy understands it? How would that reorient what Isabelle Stengers calls ecologies of practice, within the academy, as well as in the academy's relation to the world's awaiting collectivities-to-come?¹

How indeed might the philosophy of A. N. Whitehead aid us not simply in thinking differently, but also acting, living, communicating, and learning differently? The deeper question of the conference emerged: *How do we make ourselves a Whiteheadian proposition?* In answering this question, philosophers, artists, and activists creatively expressed Whiteheadian propositions in wide relevance to existential, ethical, educational, theological, aesthetic, technological, and societal concerns. What was enacted in this conference was nothing short of what Roland Faber called “a Whiteheadian Laboratory.” It is the experiments of this laboratory which have become the present volume.

Published here for the first time, the unique contributions in *Propositions in the Making* articulate the newest reaches of Whiteheadian propositions for a postmodern world. They do so not by presenting completed ideas or arguments, but by activating interdisciplinary lures of feeling, living, and co-creating the world anew.

In chapter 1, “For a Whiteheadian Laboratory: How Do You Make Yourself a Proposition?,” Erin Manning and Brian Massumi put forth an excellent challenge to think about Whiteheadian propositions, and the difference they could make to the various fields engaged, if they would be sensed and explicated in the profound impact they have in changing the frame of thought. Their contribution is, therefore, an introduction to the context and concerns of the book as a whole. Here, Manning and Massumi explore what it might mean to practice academic research and communication as a Whiteheadian laboratory. The discussion centers on Whitehead’s concept of the proposition understood as a dimension of the event—its performative infusion with graded potential—irreducible to a logical statement. They also discuss the “research-creation” practice of the SenseLab in Montreal, particularly as it contributed to the planning and execution of the 2016 Whitehead Research Project conference in Claremont.

In chapter 2, “Knowing Whitehead?,” Michael Halewood investigates what it would mean to “know” Whitehead. Whitehead published a large number of texts on a variety of topics. Much of his work is technical, sometimes mathematical, and often, deeply philosophical. This makes any claim to “know” all of these texts a very bold, perhaps, impossible, one. Drawing on insights from Foucault, Halewood argues that a claim to “know” Whitehead runs the risk of substantializing his thought into some object—something Whitehead’s own process philosophy warns against. Halewood argues that a researcher into Whitehead must take responsibility for working on his ideas and applying them afresh. He does this by reviewing some of his previous contributions on the tuning of musical instruments (Equal Temperament) and Alzheimer’s disease, and by demonstrating that while an awareness of the technicalities of Whitehead’s thought is crucial, it requires proper balanced with attention paid not only to *what* we think, but to *how* we think.

In chapter 3, “Space, Time, and the Deity of Peace,” Roland Faber engages the question “How do we make ourselves a Whiteheadian proposition?” as a suggestion not only regarding reality—of what is—but as an imaginative impulse for the realization of that which could or should be. Faber unfolds this question with reference to one of the most enigmatic propositions in Whitehead’s work, namely, that of the meaning, reality, and motive-force of peace. His considerations intend to demonstrate that peace is not just a paradigmatic proposition that we must glean from Whitehead’s work in order to understand his whole project, but in fact represents the structural paradox at the heart of the creation of propositions in Whitehead’s sense as such. Faber stresses that this endeavor is not so much meant as an exercise in understanding Whitehead or the function of a proposition in his thought, but as useful engagement with an existing Whiteheadian proposition, even if it cannot be reduced to Whitehead, as it ventures out to a current imperative for making proposals of peace for the future of humanity.

In chapter 4, “Designing Propositions,” A. J. Nocek unpacks the meaning of speculation within the rapidly growing field of speculative design. He does this by showing how Whitehead’s philosophy might serve as an important touchstone for design research. He also examines how contemporary media theory is an especially valuable resource for understanding how speculative design propositions mediate experience within our current technical milieu.

In chapter 5, “An Internet of Actual Occasions: Notes toward Understanding Twenty-First-Century Tendencies in Media, Communications, and World,” Andrew Murphie proposes that we think socio-technical developments differently. In particular, he brings some of Whitehead’s key concepts into speculation concerning “an internet of actual occasions.” He proposes, moreover, that the “internet of actual occasions” is a way of understanding contemporary and future media and communications in both their conceptual and practical dimensions, and perhaps also a way to think and work with them differently.

In chapter 6, “Thinking with Whitehead about Existential Risk,” James Burton argues that the conceptual framework of “existential risk” (Bostrom), while heuristically valuable for thinking and making concrete speculations regarding possible human-eradicating future events, nevertheless entails certain pitfalls and blindspots. These arise from its in-built probabilistic and categorial biases. He argues that a process-oriented approach in the Whiteheadian tradition may prove a valuable supplement with resources that could counterbalance some of these potentially disastrous effects.

In chapter 7, “Witness at the Slaughterhouse: Seeking Conflicting Propositions for Alternate Futures,” Brianne Donaldson argues that social transformation of complex ethical issues requires a confident grasp of conflicting propositions, even and especially when those views are believed to be wrong.

Drawing upon three years of field research of Midwest pork production, and utilizing epistemologies of multiplicity articulated by Whitehead, Jain philosophy, and Nietzsche, Donaldson puts forth a poetic philosophical meditation on witnessing the many sides of a social ill in order to craft a more complete alternative.

In chapter 8, “Communities Keep the Dream Alive as Proposition?,” Timothy Murphy argues that communities are a necessary location for propositions that envision a more just world and essential for such real potentials to remain available for feeling. For Murphy, it is not essential that they “be” the proposition as an actuality, rather he insists that what matters is that they “hold” the proposition for the sake of the planet in order that it might be felt positively at some point. In wrestling with concerns for the need for social transformation and its often perpetually deferred actualization, Murphy speaks to the need to overcome capitalism and its many devastating impacts, especially those on ecology and communities of color.

In chapter 9, “Geology Not Chronology: Problems of Naming in Education,” Matthew Goulish considers the challenge of fitting words to experience—the challenge of naming. He argues that geology rather than chronology surveys a given name’s tendency to ensnare us in a limbo of conceptual miscategorization. In attending specifically to problems of art education, he draws on ideas from Whitehead, Deleuze, Nietzsche, Susan Howe, Branislav Jakovljević, and Mark Wilson. He also considers contemporary artist, Alberto Aguilar, in proposing the reality of “doubled” names.

In chapter 10, “Under Construction,” Susanne Valerie [Granzer] considers the themes and questions of the Claremont conference and the insights of Whitehead’s propositions through the lens of the artist, in particular, the actress. By virtue of the radical exposure toward others, she reveals the ways in which the self-centered subjectivity of an actress dies on stage. It is this outstanding condition in which the pro-position of a pre-subjective layer of life can pop up: life itself as the adventure of creativity.

In chapter 11, “Choreographic Propositions: Grasping the Environmental Excess That Feels Like nothing, Yet,” Diego Gil engages Whitehead’s concept of the proposition with the aim of formulating an alternative vision of choreography. His aim is to think choreography as a pedagogical tool in order to register and to invest in the relay of potential processes that remain at the edge of actual perceptions.

The diverse and creative voices, topics, and considerations of this volume articulate the wide reaches of Whitehead’s propositional philosophy in conversation with a variety of disciplines and contexts. The contributors of this volume are confident that the mounting challenges of the postmodern world require philosophical resources able to meet and overcome them. Whether in philosophy, science and ethics, or education, ecology, and technology,

Whitehead's prehensive and value-laden philosophy challenges us to not simply *think* these matters, but to *feel* them. How indeed do we make ourselves a Whiteheadian proposition? Whatever answer we give to this question must not simply remain in the theoretical spaces of the page; rather, it must be *brought to life* and *practiced* in and among the lived and related spaces that together form a becoming world.

Roland Faber
Michael Halewood
Andrew M. Davis

NOTE

1. "How Do You Make Yourself A Proposition? A Whitehead Laboratory—Dec 1–3 2016," [Senselab.ca/wp2/](http://senselab.ca/wp2/), available at: <http://senselab.ca/wp2/events/how-do-you-make-yourself-a-proposition-a-whitehead-laboratory/>.

Part I

THE MAKING OF PROPOSITIONS

Chapter 1

For a Whiteheadian Laboratory

How Do You Make Yourself a Proposition?

Erin Manning and Brian Massumi

Propositions, Whitehead proposes, “are not primarily for belief, but for feeling at the physical level of unconsciousness. They constitute a source of the origination of feeling which is not tied down to mere datum” (PR, 186). The Whiteheadian proposition, of course, may rise selectively to consciousness and filter through judgment to form a derivative “intellectual belief” answering more recognizably to what in everyday life, and in other philosophies, responds to the same name. Few domains are as dedicated to this filtering as academe. Few genres are more in the thrall of intellectual judgment and belief than the academic conference. To raise the question of what it might mean to practice academic discourse propositionally in the Whiteheadian sense, specifically in the context of a conference, is apt in most quarters to elicit primarily disbelief. Originating feeling at the physical level—seated stiffly on a panel? Unconsciousness—in the atmosphere of intense self-consciousness so often setting the dominant tone of the room? Not tying oneself down to the datum—in other words, surpassing the given—in a context tailored to the transmission of the judgmentally already-arrived-at? Not a proposition likely to fly.

If it would fly anywhere, it would be at a conference of the Whitehead Research Project. It was with this belief that SenseLab accepted the invitation to contribute to the planning of the Project’s December 2016 conference. At the previous year’s Center for Process Studies international conference, Roland Faber had responded to a presentation of SenseLab’s (decidedly unconference-like) activities by saying that it was as if SenseLab styled itself as a “Whiteheadian laboratory.” Flattered, and feeling an immediate kinship in the mere evocation that such a thing was, first, possible and, second, desirable, we were ripe for the lure. So it was natural for the group to accept the invitation when it came. SenseLab received the invitation as a challenge to

transport some of SenseLab's techniques into the conference context to see if the compass of the genre could be gently inflected a degree or two toward a propositional practice in the Whiteheadian sense. How, the SenseLab asked the conference to be, do we make ourselves a proposition?

This question—how do we make *ourselves* a proposition—arose from one of the most striking characteristics of the Whiteheadian proposition. Unlike the conventional, or merely logical, proposition, it does not enshrine a separation between the subject of the statement and the subject of the enunciation. In the conventional proposition, the subject of the statement is the logical subject, or what the proposition is about (essentially, the grammatical subject). The subject of the enunciation is the producer of the statement. The action of the subject of the enunciation, says a philosopher, is to designate the logical subject and make a statement about it by attaching a fitting predicate to it (“mortal,” “three-cornered,” “on the mat,” to take the classic examples). The action of the subject of the enunciation does not figure. It is bracketed, sequestered from the logical proposition itself, as if it went just as well without saying. The statement is treated as if it resided in a realm of pure thought, outside the world of work-a-day philosophers whose mundane lives inspire them to think of no better examples. In a word, the conventional proposition is generally specifying (qualifying a class of being in the abstract). This schema is transposed into the academy in the treatment of the subject of study as a neutral content of general validity separate from the subject of the teacher or researcher enunciating it. This sequestering of logical content—nowadays degraded to the status of information—enables the transmission model of teaching and scholarly communication. The transmitter figures only in the role of master of propositional ceremony: expert designator and predicator, to the general edification of the information's recipients.

Ostensibly, that is. There can be a prestige that attaches to that role (hence the self-consciousness of the conference milieu). The prestige relies on the separation between the subject of the statement and the subject of the enunciation that makes of the proposition a neutral content to be mastered in the abstract, and at the same time belies it. It implicates the subject of the enunciation concretely in the proceedings. It makes it palpable that the fitness of the statement is not the only thing at stake. The status of the speaker himself is as well. The speaker (or writer) performs herself. The performance can be felicitous, or it can go bad. It plays out. This makes it something of an event. The communication of a logical proposition is never a pure transmission. It plays out, event-like, in a way that fatally binds the subject of the enunciation to the proposition. The moment of separation was only ever abstract. The artifice of its abstraction only succeeded in deferring the non-separability between the subject of the statement and the subject of the enunciation, displacing it from the production of the proposition to its reproduction in

transmission. Concretely, the bare neutrality of the logical content of the proposition is always clothed in the finery of a performance. In the event of the performance, all manner of elements enter in. Feelings of many a kind may originate: pride, shame, shyness, bluster. These feelings physically implicate the speaker, with sweat and tics, or on the contrary bodily signs of self-possession. Much of what is at stake in what is at stake remains unsaid, even unconscious. What is at stake is the prestige of mastery. What is at stake in what is at stake might lend itself to psychological analysis, in terms, for example, of mimetic rivalry, whose feeling of competition is famously just the tip of an unconscious iceberg. In short, in practice, the *generality* of the conventional proposition surreptitiously *personalizes* the proposition, down to its unconscious concomitants. The non-Whiteheadian proposition lives uncomfortably in the element of the generally personal. The discomfiture resides in its disavowed dramatization of what it contrives to neutralize.

Where the conventional proposition personalizes, the Whiteheadian proposition historicizes. It does this most importantly not in the usual sense of making statements about the past, even less by concerning itself with a purportedly linear descent through time, but more radically by removing the emphasis in the first instance from the statement and placing it squarely on the event. When Whitehead launches his discussion of the proposition in *Process and Reality*, he moves quickly to an historical example, the Battle of Waterloo (PR, 185). What most immediately interests him is not the truth-value of a statement about Napoleon's defeat. He does not subscribe to the logician's (and common sense) creed that the "one function" of propositions "is to be judged as to their truth or falsehood" (PR, 184). Their primary function, rather, is as "*a lure for feeling* providing immediacy of enjoyment" (PR, 184). Propositions are to be *entertained*, more fundamentally than they are to be judged.¹ What interests Whitehead is the event's fecundity in spinning off lures for feeling, its affording occasions for entertainment beyond its own occurrence. An event throws off lures like spores to the future. It can do this because its occurrence is surrounded by a "penumbra of alternatives" (PR, 185) to its truth—or truths. As he explains, the statement of every proposition, even the classic examples, carries a degree of ambiguity. " 'Socrates is mortal' . . . may mean 'The *man* Socrates is mortal,' or 'The *philosopher* Socrates is mortal.' " The basic statement "Socrates is mortal" presupposes a "relational system" that "can be carried further than the mere requirements of indication" (PR, 195). The statement's truth is surrounded by a penumbra of alternative nuances. These are an integral part of what the statement proposes, and cannot fail to be activated each time it is stated. Not only are they integral to what is proposed, they constitute propositions in their own right.² Every proposition is complex, carrying a multiplicity of implicit variations on itself. So much so that this multiplicity is essential to our understanding

of what a proposition is. Not even the simplest proposition can be reduced to what its statement says in so many words. The “form of words symbolizes an indefinite number of diverse propositions” (PR, 195). “No verbal statement is the adequate expression of a proposition” (PR, 13). “It is merely credulous to accept verbal phrases as adequate statements of propositions. The distinction between verbal phrases and complete propositions is one of the reasons why the logicians’ rigid alternative, ‘true or false,’ is so largely irrelevant for the pursuit of knowledge” (PR, 11).

Now, credulity toward verbal phrases as adequate statements of propositions is precisely what defines academic communication. The Whiteheadian understanding of the proposition lays down a challenge to its relevance, to the extent that it insistently fails to make the distinction between verbal phrases and the complete proposition (the proposition in Whitehead’s broader conception). The challenge is all the harder because the penumbra of alternatives composing the proposition can extend much farther than nuances on what is being indicated, or what the predicate (“mortal”) is being applied to. It can extend as far as alternative courses of the world. What is relevant to, and therefore presupposed by, the statement, includes *what “might have been, but is not”* (PR, 226). The “impress” of these alternatives is felt differently—with different emphasis, different gradations of felt germaneness, at the limit fading off into what amounts to an exclusion—depending on the mode of entertainment characterizing the occasion in which the proposition is repeated.

One person, Whitehead says (PR, 185), may daydream a Waterloo, in which case the alternatives of its penumbra “float . . . without consciousness of deliberate decision.” In this case, the alternatives are “admitted” into entertainment by an “internal decision.” This can only mean a decision internal to the proposition itself—to its own pressing to make an impress. The complex of relevant alternatives carries a propositional *force*, such that it is essentially self-proposing. This force is what makes the proposition a lure to feeling. The pressing to make an impress beckons some manner of attention, awakens a degree of interest. The gradation of the penumbral complex of alternatives it introduces into the dawning occasion now coming to entertain it “obscurely influences” how it will play out. For some, more attentive than the daydreamer, the influence may be felt in an “emotional tone . . . without any conscious analysis of [the] content.” The tone may vary widely, from one “of gratification, or regret, of friendliness or hatred,” depending on the conditions. The tone is not determined solely by the force of proposition as given, but also by how it is taken up. It marks how the lure for feeling that the proposition has impressed upon the circumstances is transduced by the arising occasion into the first stirrings of an *aim* providing its impetus toward self-completion.

Peculiar things happen when the aim is a professedly dispassionate judgment. The floating of alternatives is arrested as much as possible. The emotional tone is bracketed. The proposition is nailed to what it indicates, gradating away the relevance of alternative courses of history, nuances held to background as much as possible. But this is rearguard action. The penumbral complex will have already exercised its strike force. It will have already made the internal decision to set the lure of daydreaming. Although this provocation is declined, it cannot but have made itself felt after a manner (if only through the effort of turning them away, in negative prehension).³ And it will already have exerted an obscure influence clothing itself in emotional tones, which the dispassion of judgment will have to strip from it as it admits the proposition into consciousness for logical analysis. By the time the proposition has reached the level of conscious judgment, its field of relevance will have been whittled down, to the point of making the proposition, however true it is judged, largely irrelevant to the pursuit of knowledge. That is, if knowledge is understood to concern itself with the composition of the actual world as it happens—in other words, as it is eventfully influenced by a propositional *force of thought* that is internally decided to make felt alternative courses of its own realization, in aim-inviting excess over any particular verbal phrasing of it, and in emotional surplus over any supposedly neutral analysis. “The conception of propositions as merely material for judgments is fatal to any understanding of their role in the universe” (PR, 187).

The notion of the proposition as a lure for feeling relaying into an aim providing an impetus for the self-completion of an arising occasion dramatically changes our sense of what a proposition is. It makes the circumstances, normally conceived as externalities that can be safely disregarded for all logical intents and purposes, into an *internal variable* of the proposition itself, part of its very warp and weft. Propositions don’t hover in an ether of general thought. They have a “locus.” By Whitehead’s “ontological principle,” every thing that is, must be somewhere. The locus of the proposition is the somewhere of its event of entertainment. The locus “consists of those actual occasions whose actual worlds include the logical subjects of the proposition” (PR, 186). This is a proliferating series. Propositional force is fertile.

Take Whitehead’s second historical example, Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon (PR, 195–196). The locus is the “society” of occasions forming a nexus around that event. The defining characteristic of the society is the manner of the two logical subjects, Caesar and the Rubicon, coming together for the crossing. That defining characteristic subsists as a complex eternal object—a composite relational potential. This can be “conjecturally supposed to be prolonged up to the contemporary world with the judging subject, or, even more conjecturally, into the future world beyond the subject.” In other words, the relational potential is re-realized in the contemporary world for a

later subject re-feeling the propositional force of the event. When this happens, a variation on the proposition occurs. Whitehead evokes an old soldier from Caesar's army sitting on the banks of the Rubicon many years later. His contemporary world now also contains Caesar's having been assassinated, inextricably linked, in an extended nexus, with his having crossed the river. The emotional tone of this later-life, peacetime entertainment is markedly different from the same soldier's experience of the crossing as it happened in his youth. Among other things, a new logical subject figures in the extended scene: enter Brutus. Another predicate, "having been assassinated," links itself to "having crossed." The composite of relational potential carried by the proposition has expanded and complexified into a *propositional field* folding in a multiplicatory set of interwoven logical subjects and predicates, partially disjunct but overlapping. Each predicate is a thread that can be extricated from the weave to stand out in and as a separate proposition, as different as crossing and being assassinated. The penumbral complex has expanded to include all this, and more—stretching on as far as daydreaming can rove. At each entertainment, the complex of relational potentials is re-graded to include more or less in its focal length. The propositional field telescopes in or out, encompassing more or fewer logical subjects and predications, in differing patterns of emphasis. Think of a traveler today sitting on the banks of Rubicon, and all that their contemporary world includes. Think of the differing emotional tones those inclusions invite. Think of the diversity of aims that the once-again varying proposition might now incite with its lure for feeling. The proposition is so much more than a statement. It is nothing less than a worlding. It is a serial iteration of the world's complexing, and re-complexing, of its own relational potential. The proposition is the force of thought gone worlding.

Not only are the circumstances of the entertainment an internal variable of the proposition, so too is the entertaining subject itself. "Everything" in this worlding "depends upon the differences in direct perceptive knowledge" which the iterations presuppose for their entertaining subject (PR, 196). "The particular subject of experience can, in the nature of the case, never be eliminated from the experienced fact" (PR, 195). This is "the doctrine of *the inherence of the subject in the process of its production*" (PR, 224).⁴ The separation between the subject of the enunciation and the subject of statement safeguarding the neutrality and generality of the proposition in its conventional modeling is brushed aside. Each variation on the proposition in its series of avatars becomes irreducibly *singular*—unisolatable from the circumstances in which its lure is felt—and irrevocably *interested*—formatively inflected by a renaissance of aim, born in direct perceptive knowledge.

What constitutes transmission is also complicated, in a way that removes it from the passive/active dichotomy. On the one hand, the proposition is

self-proposing, in its alluring beckoning of attention. In its role as lure for feeling, it is playing the role of provoker. But it is nothing outside of its taking up into an aiming of the coming occasion toward its own self-completion, for whose coming it is patient. It “awaits its logical subjects” (PR, 188)—which now include among their number the entertaining subject itself, recognized as an internal variable of the proposition. The proposition as datum—in its givenness to an occasion—is simultaneously active and passive, provoker and patient. The entertaining subject also displays this combination of activity and passivity. It receives the lure at the same time as it actively transduces the lure into an aim. The two active-passive syntheses overlap on the threshold to the new event in which the proposition will play out. The dividing line between the entertaining subject, or subject of the enunciation, and the logical subject, or subject of the statement, falls away in a dual act of origination, singularly occurring. The proposition awaits its subject, and the force of its strike kick-starts the subject’s actively coming into itself. Just thus, with just this emotional tone, for just this lure-begotten aim, constituting just this event in the series that will continue past it.

The entertaining subject *does not preexist* the entertainment. It emerges in it and as it, one with its event, in a singular manner. “It is new, a *new type of individual*, and not merely a new intensity of individual feeling. That member of the locus [that is the entertaining subject] has introduced a new form into the actual world” (PR, 187). The proposition is a real *individuation*, serving as the focal point of an actual reworlding. The individuation is a *speciation*: the veritable invention of a new *type* of individual. Rather than transmission, *creation*. Rather than linear progression, self-complicating seriation. Or, if this is transmission, it is the transmission not of statements about the truth, but truly of creative events.

Creation is *affirmed* before it is judged true or false. The proposition “enters, as a value, into the satisfaction [self-completion] of that subject; and it can only be criticized by the judgments of actual entities in the future” (PR, 191). In the event, it is a pure affirmation, in the sense of the direct, perceptive, “intuitive judgment” of “what is,” prior to any “intellectual judgment” of what is “true or false” that may be brought to bear later.

The term “individuation” should not mislead. The proposition is “not restricted to that individual experience” (PR, 191), referring to the singular experience coming into itself in response to the lure. To the extent that the new individual that emerges is the recipient of the proposition’s self-proposing, it integrates into its coming-to-be a “nexus whose relatedness is derived from the various experiences of its own members and not from that of the judging experient” (PR, 191). The patience of the entertaining subject is the immanence in its emerging character of the relational character of an indefinite multiplicity of others. “There are always others” (including, it must