Paul-Laurent Assoun

Freud and Nietzsche

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CONTENTS

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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

> this art does not so easily get anything done, it teaches us to read well, that is to say, to read slowly, deeply, looking cautiously before and aft, with reservations, with doors left open, with delicate eyes and fingers
>
> Nietzsche, *Daybreak*[1]

It is always a treat to see a master artisan at work, carefully fashioning the products of her labour. We come away with an appreciation not only of the product, but also of the processes involved in its production. As the recipient of the Bordin Prize in 1981 from the French Academy, the present text is no exception, equally valuable for what it says as for how it says it. A few points will highlight the processes of production demonstrated here, and hopefully will provide the reader with an informed base that enriches the reading experience.

For the reader of the English language, an understanding of the present study is complicated by the fact that, when originally published, this was the third work in a trilogy that began with *Freud, la philosophie et les philosophes*, followed by *Marx et la répétition historique*. This note will also try to set out some of the themes that subtend the trilogy, and to aid in understanding the status of the analysis presented here, in the context of Paul-Laurent Assoun's multi-volume *paleontology* of contemporary thought.

For Assoun, there are really three figures that constitute the universe of contemporary Western thought, Marx, Freud and Nietzsche, rough contemporaries who, beginning from more or less the *same* epistemological base, mark out three distinct fields, and provide us with a sort of menu of three basic theoretical 'choices', or rather starting points, that raise impressive, if deceptive, analogies, which in turn have spawned entire industries of synthetic work probing the points of contact between any pair. There, we can find combinations of Freud and Nietzsche, or Freud and Marx, alongside Nietzsche-inspired Marxians and Marx-inspired Nietzscheans. And some of us stand in the middle of this cloverleaf of interchanges and entry ramps, fascinated and bewildered by the circulation of traffic between and through the loops, by the complexity of the various *topoi* extending to the horizon, unable or unwilling to choose one or the other yet drawn to and wanting to explore all three directions at once.

Assoun is acutely aware of this difficult position, and so we first see him, in the context of his trilogy, standing in the Marx loop pondering 'Freud and Nietzsche.' At that distance, the analogies are suggestive, even seductive, in their resonance. To examine those analogies closely, though, means standing in the Freud loop and analysing Nietzsche, and then reversing the perspective, at successively complex conceptual levels (principle, theme, stake), all the while keeping in mind the point of origin.

Briefly speaking, the first book, *Freud, la philosophie et les philosophes*, constructs the philosophical topography from which Freud drew insight and/or

inspiration. The importance of the project lies not only in terms of mapping an epistemological field regarding the founder of psychoanalysis, but also in demystifying Freud's self-declared aversion to philosophy and, generally, to those who philosophize. *Marx et la répétition historique* analyses Marx's historical dialectic, in particular the idea of repetition as a phenomenon, or a condition. The present study sets the work of Freud and Nietzsche in a complex and nuanced dialectic that shuttles not only back and forth between the two proper names, but also back and forth through each author's work, professional and personal experiences, and even reading habits. Since its original publication, however, Assoun has been busy extending his study of Freud. The important Preface to the 1998 reissue of *Freud and Nietzsche*, included here, highlights the results of that ongoing study, although it may be useful to the reader to re-visit that 'preface' as an 'afterword' upon reading the complete text.

In the present study, Assoun's preliminary perspective challenges the very idea of conjoining two names, or two bodies of theory, on the basis of apparent analogies or 'rhetorical similitudes.'

> Our project will set out from the principle that we can legitimately suspect of being 'bad alloys' every conjunction of proper names which is satisfied by a seductive resonance without relating it to the less timely expression of problematics that at once make the resonance possible and permit the distribution of such honors and equivocations.

With this declaration, Assoun sets out on an amazing intellectual adventure, an impressive example of the type of 'compare and contrast' writing we were taught, and not very well, in grade school.

What does it mean to say 'Freud and Nietzsche'? Furthermore, what does it mean that for almost all of the twentieth century, we have in fact been saying 'Freud and Nietzsche'? These questions frame the present study, but the responses to the questions follow a complicated path, for Assoun quickly reveals that to say 'Freud and Nietzsche' is not at all the same thing as saying 'Nietzsche and Freud.' The conjunction itself constitutes a problem that needs to be understood and analysed, *as a problem*. In fact, in the 1998 preface, Assoun goes so far as to suggest that the stakes underlying the conjunction 'Freud and Nietzsche' extend to another, seemingly impossible conjunction, 'psychoanalysis and philosophy.'

It is, then, not a matter of an inclusive 'and', whereby the two names are set in a sort of orbit around a common terrain, like apples and oranges around the global construct of 'fruit'. What resonates, Assoun tells us, may still differ in tone. The 'and' in fact marks two conjunctions; two kinds of modality, and historicity, are involved. The first equation sets Freud and Nietzsche in a mode of linear time, amid allegations of Nietzsche as Freud's precursor; in the second, however, Freud and Nietzsche are set in parallel universes which, in the context of the history of ideas, begin from a more or less common base of knowledge but yield two widely disparate fields that seem to encroach upon each other at

several points, but with different stakes and therapeutic aims. In a way, the second equation treats Nietzsche as Freud's *contemporary* or, in the words of the 1998 preface, his *colleague*. In the first section of the study, 'Freud and Nietzsche,' Assoun composes the history of Freud's encounters with Nietzsche, both via Freud's own personal reading and interpretation, and through an astonishing array of mediators and champions of Nietzsche. In the second section, 'Nietzsche and Freud,' Assoun demystifies an extensive set of analogies and homologies whose surface readings suggest remarkable affinities between the two theorists.

Having done that, though, Assoun's surprising conclusion displaces the stakes of the whole study in two directions. In the direction of methodology, the question all along has been one of the status of knowledge, and the contributions that a dialectical study of non-dialectical theoretical fields (for Freud and Nietzsche both strongly reject closure and the construction of systems) can make. In the second, theoretical direction, the issue subtending the entire study has been that of the material status of drives and desire, in other words, the status of the *subject*. How do these ostensibly unconscious regimes figure in our material reality? Here, we should bear in mind that the present study is the third work in a trilogy. The last part of the conclusion to this study, then, really addresses all three works, and closes the series. The notation providing continuity throughout the series is the gentle appearance of a handful of reference notes and, even gentler, the spectre of Karl Marx.

It is important to recognize that Marx is always present in this text, though in remarkably subtle ways. Marx's name only appears in the notes in two places, in connection with the names of Heine and Reich. His name appears only once in the text, at the very end, though in a manner that is quite provocative. Assoun is summarizing his study; he says that Freud and Nietzsche have given two very different readings of the material nature of the drives, *whose traces Marx has pointed to in his own way*. At the end of this study, Assoun reminds us of where we were at the beginning of it, and in a way where we have been all along.

We have constantly kept close to the problem, perhaps an impossible one, with which the theory of the subject must be explained; it is the question of materiality itself and of the status of the drives and desire as a posture of materiality. As originally published, the problem was one *with which materialist theory must be explained*. 'Materialist theory' was a nod to Marx, a debt owed to Marx. Yet it turns out that neither Freud nor Nietzsche can be used to 'complete' Marx, nor can either be 'completed' by Marx. None of these three proper names identifies the figure of the Law. In the passage between the two publications of this text, materialism came to be displaced/renamed by the eminently anthropological category of subjectivity. Nihilism, neurosis and false consciousness comprise three distinct diagnostic readings, three bodies of thought, of *bodies*. Who, or what, is this *subject* thus referenced?

In Marx it is not always clear how a non-false consciousness arises in the proletariat, how unconscious drives and/or desire can manifest themselves in positive social change. With Freud and Nietzsche, on the other hand, it is not at

all clear what would happen if, along either of these two paths, a collective consciousness were to result. What would happen if society consisted exclusively of cured beings, or of *Übermenschen*? An impossible question, perhaps, but no less valid for being so. Does not one of Freud's last writings include in its title the words *analysis interminable*, indicating the impossibility of a total cure, and does not Nietzsche expect Overman *in the future*, an arrival interminably deferred? Marx's proletariat also rises in the future, *at the end of history*. A common set of questions confronts us. How will we *know* when we get there? How do we *know* where 'there' is? Who is this 'we', anyhow? For Marx, Nietzsche and Freud, wherever one starts, one ends up in anthropology!

Assoun declares that the real stake, arching over the study like a parabola, has been a question of the status of knowledge. The apparent convergences and divergences between Freud and Nietzsche reveal two distinct treatments of drives, desire and also of knowledge (as an eminently social construction), for there are two visions of what constitutes human society or 'civilization' and each individual's relation to that aggregate. Both having considered society as 'the' problem, the two theorists pose radically different therapeutics that mark distinct positions of the individual with regard to the social unity. Where Freud seeks to reintegrate the individual in the social, thus in a way making her free *in* society, Nietzsche poses a struggle to be free *of* society. Where the former seeks to come to terms with the moral order, and so validate it, the latter would destroy the present moral order, if only to replace it with another morality.

So it cannot be a question of taking the Freudian cure at first, to create a necessary space from which to engage in a Nietzschean therapeutic, nor can it be one of following Nietzsche in the construction of a new morality, only to require a Freud to integrate individuals into *that* moral order. To make matters worse, from Marx's perspective it could be said that, paradoxically, Freud correctly formulated the therapeutic while botching the diagnosis, whereas Nietzsche identified the real problem but applied an untenable cure. Or just the reverse. It is a puzzle of contradictions and complications that cannot be resolved in the type of dialectic taught to us by Hegel.

Freud and Nietzsche *sketch the contradictory modality by which a theory of drives can make a contribution as a non-dialectical theory, and which merits being fully considered, and understood, from a dialectical point of view*. We know that, where Marx tried to rescue the dialectic from a Hegelian perversion, both Freud and Nietzsche were highly critical of any philosophical system constructed through the dialectical method. But did they themselves manage to outline a non-dialectical theory? Yes, for where Marx argues that the becoming-conscious of living labour power, a rough analogue to desire, will result in a change to civilization through the dictatorship of the proletariat, neither Freud nor Nietzsche posit such an alteration to the basic social fabric. Freud never stops asking whether *any* society's benefits are worth the sacrifices required of the individual by it (his patients learn to live *within* society), while Nietzsche's Overman is the aristocrat who will transcend society without reconstituting it, learning to live in a way *without* society. For Marx's part, in his dialectic the

proletarian wants to be neither an obedient subject nor an aristocrat; she looks to a *new* society. But the question remains: can non-dialectical theories be analysed from a dialectical point of view?

Assoun's demonstration is a remarkably clear example of the dialectical method at work, as he shuttles back and forth, pausing as often as necessary (and he has an infinite patience for such interruptions) to examine the many contexts, both textual and historical, that further inform us as to the content and status of each concept or principle in question. It is not enough merely to read the conjunction in two directions and synthesize the analogies, constructing a Venn diagram that gives content to the operator, which would have the effect of raising the 'and' to the status of 'Freud' or 'Nietzsche'. For Assoun, the conjunction retains its status as a logical operator, its Boolean functionality, and the dialectic runs like a knitting machine in reverse, separating the threads and winding them back on to their skeins. Two fields are displayed in the end. What kind of dialectic is this? Assuredly, one without a synthetic terminus, without the comforting promise of resolution, and it only gets more complicated. A third figure stands in the wings.

Part of the challenge of reading this text lies in trying to recognize where that third figure is lurking, for at every key point the text is seemingly engaged in an ongoing dialectic, behind the scenes, with Marx. In the penultimate note, Assoun remarks that *we set out to compare the materialist status of repetition and its drive-related figures*, but we might have missed that point if we were not paying attention. And Assoun delivers several quiet admonitions and built-in tests throughout the text, to see if the reader really is paying attention. *We will leave to future research*; *we are not interested in external analogies here*; he marks the points where he refuses to be side-tracked. In the introduction to Part Two, Assoun warns us about jumping to conclusions and thinking that a simple comparison among analogies will suffice. Right away, we are told to slow down and accept nothing on face value. Then, in the chapter 'Instinct and Drive', after telling us a lot about both Freud's and Nietzsche's concepts of drives, Assoun states that *now that we have defined the phenomenological origins, we should be able to compare their natures and functions, but this still supposes that we have grasped their historical origins*. And so we begin again, reminded that phenomenology and historical materialism both need to be engaged in this study, and we need to be ready for that. Our being in the world is intimately affected by that world having a particular, material history.

Two other concepts which over-arch this text deserve mention. Assoun describes the work of Freud and Nietzsche as complementary psychological heuristics *under perpetual construction*; in other words, they are the products of *a process of permanent constitution*. In a late note, he refers to his own three-volume work as *the history of a field under construction*. Marx never finished his grand theoretical project, and since both Freud and Nietzsche resist systematization, closure is not possible, and subsequent contributors can build on or tear down these bodies of theory from any number of perspectives. There is, as Nietzsche said, much to be done. In Assoun's thought-universe, having read the

present text, we are subtly directed back to Marx, to study the latter from the perspective of the former, and then to examine those results. In a way, Assoun is teaching us dialectical reading habits, or more generally, in the spirit of the Nietzschean epigraph above, *to read well.*

The second term is one that we began with. Assoun calls his analytic method a *paleontology.* He describes paleontology as *the progressive reconstitution of two skeletons beginning with partially similar bones, of which we know that in a certain respect they belong to the same genre, but which remain under specific principles of organization.* This is a good definition to carry around while reading this book; it is a useful aid in recognizing what Assoun is trying to do, for there are points in this text where it does seem like he is literally sorting out bones. Set alongside the detailed analysis of genealogy and archaeology in the conclusion, 'paleontology' emerges as a label for a viable alternative mode of investigation, an inquiry into specific principles of organization.

SOURCES

Some technical issues need to be addressed as well. The main reference sources used by Paul-Laurent Assoun in this book are: Friedrich Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Werke in zwölf Bänden* (Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1964) (abbreviated as *SW* in the Notes); and Sigmund Freud, *Gesammelte Werke* (London: Imago Publishing Co., Ltd, 1948) (abbreviated as *GW* in the Notes).

In general, Assoun has himself translated passages of both Nietzsche and Freud from the original German. I have translated Assoun's French versions of these texts in order to maintain the flow of Assoun's rhetoric; in some cases, I have checked these translations against the original German texts, as well as against the standard, or most readily available and widely used English translations of Freud and Nietzsche. My main interest in consulting available English translations has been to verify the technical vocabulary used, and thus to provide a common intellectual background for the reader, since Assoun is analysing a commonly held perception of affinities between Freud and Nietzsche. For Nietzsche I have consulted the translations of Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale; for Freud, *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud,* James Strachey, general editor (24 volumes; London: Hogarth Press, 1953–66) (Abbreviated as *SE* in the Notes). For the most part, I have rendered the titles of Freud's and Nietzsche's works as they appear in these translations.

DIFFÉREND

In the 1998 preface, a new word appears, *différend.* It can be translated as 'dispute' or 'quarrel', but also as 'disagreement' or even 'difference'; in common English use, as fortune would have it, each of these words carries a particular emotional connotation. In the context of Assoun's use of the word, *différend* seems to me to mean all of these things and something else besides, and to

choose one or the other would prejudice the tone of the text. Thus, I have left it as it appears in the French, which is, I suppose, another form of prejudice, but the reader should take it in its general sense of marking a less-than-perfect fit or agreement.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I hope that, in the translation presented here, I have done justice to this important and timely work. As solitary as the labour seemed at times, it could not have been accomplished without the advice, assistance and inspiration of several people. I wish to thank Daniel W. Smith for his patience and wisdom concerning points of Nietzsche's work, as well as for his guidance through the difficulties of translation, which provided an invaluable learning experience. Still, all remaining errors are mine alone. Thanks also to the staff at The Athlone Press for their faith and support in bringing this project to fruition. Mostly, though, I would like to thank someone who believes everything always returns, who truly lives at the intersection of the two thematics analysed here.

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PREFACE TO THE 1998 EDITION

Freud and Nietzsche: how can we pronounce this conjunction, between two proper names that do not seem to 'rhyme' with any others? Where do we situate the 'and' in order to demonstrate the affinity between the founder of psychoanalysis and the 'transvaluator' of morals?

The question that we posed when we first published the results of our inquiry,[1] we must ask ourselves again, at the moment when our work reappears; once more we must confront, here in this strategic place, our exegesis–critique which interrogates the interface between philosophy and psychoanalysis. In this inquiry, we sought to approach the insistent, even persistent murmur associating Nietzsche with Freud, as a *question* in the most radical sense of the word. How can we shake ourselves out of a certain associative indolence – Nietzsche will go with Freud, insofar as we sense 'resemblances' among 'poles of interest' – in order to recognize the necessity of a confrontation (in the literal, 'confronting' violence of a face-to-face encounter) between the subversive affinities of two bodies of thought?

The present re-reading is, for us, in a way, a test of its truth. It is a matter, beyond any 'comparative anatomy' between two modes of thought, of remaining at the level of this 'Nietzscheo-Freudian' syntagm, which implies that we need to deconstruct it, in view of the various theoretical (and thus *ideological*) amalgams which have been produced in its name. That is the challenge: put in Nietzschean terms, to make resonate, with good 'hammer blows' – the hammer of textual and conceptual exegesis – the 'materials' of this 'alloy'. What is the point of consistency (that indicates the density) – and what are the silences that we need to refrain from artificially filling in? As far as the 'hammer' of commentary goes, it is necessary, at the risk of crushing one's object, to make it fit the 'mold' to the extent of those moments of plenitude when the texts correspond with one another.

That is why we have begun with Freud as we re-evaluate this conjunction, which is read first off *from* Freud *to* Nietzsche. It was, in fact, within the framework of an inquiry established on Freud's general attitude toward philosophy and philosophers[2] that we encountered, in the Freudian 'philosophical landscape,' a certain Nietzschean *site*.

On the one hand, Nietzsche is solidly placed among the philosophers cited by Freud as the poles of an *anticipatory reference* to his own discoveries. On the other hand, he is one of those rare, privileged characters who escapes the suspicion of illegitimacy that the creator of psychoanalysis generically casts upon philosophers, as those enamored of 'conscientiousness', who denigrate the Unconscious and belittle, by the same logic, the 'science' of 'unconscious processes,' all while fashioning their various 'world visions.'

The Nietzschean *topos* at the heart of Freud's discourse thus had to be archived in his behalf. And that – beyond the avatars that elaborate our own construction of the conjunction 'psychoanalysis and philosophy'[3] – created a symptom. The presence of Nietzsche *in* Freud exceeds that of a mere 'chapter', however rich, in a larger treatise on the 'philosophemes' in Freudian use. There is indeed a 'case of Nietzsche,' an exceptional status which gives rise to the present inquiry and upon which it has imposed its full enormity.

In this archaeology of the conjunction 'Freud, philosophy and philosophers,' it was in fact quickly apparent that the figure 'Freud and Nietzsche' merited a separate destiny. It is true, in a sense, that Nietzsche is only one among other elements in Freud's philosophical galaxy. He certainly appears at the central nucleus, the fourth 'term' of the quadrilateral Plato–Kant/Schopenhauer–*Nietzsche* that we saw outlined when we probed the 'philosophemes' referenced in the Freudian text. It is not even certain that Nietzsche is the one who 'counted' the most for the creator of psychoanalysis, as the link to Schopenhauer seems in a way more appropriate to Freud's immediate 'mode of use.'[4]

If we reconsider Nietzsche's appearance in the ensemble of the history of Freud's use of philosophy, on which we have previously written,[5] Nietzsche would seem to be neither more nor less than a significant episode in this general confrontation. But there is a wholly other thing that is in question here. Nietzsche – it is, in some way, his intention *and* his ambition – *is* a philosophy unto himself and for this reason he imposes upon the attention of the one who set out to forge a new 'psychology' – thus a totally different thing than *just another* psychology (a 'psycho-analysis') – which gives value *mutatis mutandis* to another link, from Freud to Wittgenstein.[6]

The inquiry which follows reflects a movement that starts from an intensive examination of Nietzsche's presence in Freud's speech and writings, and a reconstruction of the context of their encounter ('Freud and Nietzsche,' Part One of the present work). From there, however, the inquiry leads to a thematic and critical *dia-logue* ('Nietzsche and Freud,' Part Two of the present work) which is not simply a matter of 'communication' and a pacific exchange of ideas, but entails an active engagement of dual *logoi.*

There are indeed two ways of approaching the relation Freud-Nietzsche. First, there is the genesis of the encounter, which puts the *event* of this meeting in context; second, there is the thing itself, the bond that the founder of psychoanalysis himself forges, first with the Basel professor, and then with the thinker of Sils-Maria, and the effects of the latter on the thought and *text* of the former.

That is what we have placed as the first element in the present inquiry. We need to be able to judge in what context, and with what sort of *relays* Freud undertakes to comprehend Nietzsche (Part One, Chapter 1, the section 'The First Intermediary: Josef Paneth'), and without which Freud's reading of Nietzsche would remain indecipherable, or would be doomed either to distortion or to a retrospective 'optical illusion.' The essential thing lies rather in the 'vis-à-vis' that is here somehow forged between these two major bodies of thought, which invites philosophical discourse both to relinquish and reconsider its modes of 'authority'.

It is important, in this regard, to assume a certain 'decontextualization' here; let us agree that Freud adopts a very particular 'attitude' regarding Nietzsche, which is useful to put in relief. Interpellating Nietzsche, he must, in the name of his 'science', psychoanalysis, tear away from certain stereotypes that the contemporary reception of Nietzsche was already quick to establish. That sets the limit of every attempt to decipher this bond in terms of 'reception' and of the history of ideas; the *encounter* here comes to destabilize all models of 'reception'.

We can verify this, because it is not as a simple philosopher–reader (of other philosophers) that Freud produces some quite original philosophical effects that 'ricochet' and touch the very heart of philosophical *logos*.[7] Freud is decidedly not a reader (of Nietzsche) like any other, and on this point these two 'monstrous originals' are joined. Also, it is in this sense that the present inquiry, organized in conformity with the legitimate requirements of academic analyses – an efficacious antidote to the scatter-shot variations on content comparisons between the two works – has taken on the style, in a way imposed by its object, of a *genealogy*.

Moreover, we must become aware, while undertaking this comparison in its fullest breadth, of how Freud's position relative to Nietzsche is 'existentially' transformed. Freud, born in 1856, first encounters Nietzsche (1844–1900) with the energy and attitude of a young bachelor who has just begun his university studies, at the very moment when a university professor in Basel – himself a young man precociously employed as an academic, before abruptly abandoning his career – begins to make himself heard, hurling his first volleys of invectives (aimed precisely at the academic world and its mediocrities, among other things). The dialogue will be completed three quarters of a century later, by the creator of psychoanalysis, in an apparent soliloquy – Nietzsche having died in the meanwhile, exactly at the moment of the birth of psychoanalysis. Henceforth, then, Freud will reapproach Nietzsche *from his own foundation*. His attitude toward Nietzsche follows from the considerable internal metamorphosis that his own 'thinking' undergoes. Freud's beginnings coincide with the birth of Nietzscheism, just as the birth of psychoanalysis coincides with the death of Nietzsche.

Nietzsche was the object of Freud's youthful admiration, whose effects can be felt right through to the end of Freud's career; however, when the time came to undertake his own *conquista*, Freud reapproached the thinker of Sils-Maria, if not as an equal, at least as a 'colleague' in the field of enigmas, and reinterrogated him, in private, if not publicly, with the resources forged in the meantime from 'metapsychology', psychoanalysis' *ad hoc* knowledge.[8]

The best way to re-read this movement and reintroduce ourselves to it seems to us to consist in interrogating here these two aims of the trajectory and the two questions that they signify:

- On the plane of genesis, it is important to grasp how the bond between Freud and Nietzsche is formed, and renegotiated.
- On the plane of content, we need to show evidence of what led to this confrontation, the 'thing itself' which subtends the collision and gives significance to this 'encounter'.

I THE SPECTROSCOPY OF AN ENCOUNTER

The Figures of a 'Linkage': From 'Encounter' to 'Dialogue'

We can suggest an 'outline' of this Freud–Nietzsche link, whose stages and aspects are detailed in the present work, in order to perceive straight away the dynamic in its blueprint form, over the course of some three quarters of a century.

1 The moment of the sudden collision–encounter, matched by 'reservations' whose tenor and significance are plainly visible, occurs during Freud's formative years. He is informed, at the source, so to speak, in the context of the 'Viennese reception,' of the existence and importance of the author of the *Untimely Meditations.*
2 Thus 'integrated', at a respectful distance as well as with a sort of reasoned defiance, combined with the intelligence of a shared secret, Nietzsche seems to be rediscovered by Freud, precisely in the years of the first formulations of psychoanalysis. It is no accident if at this exact moment, when the creator of psychoanalysis begins to see himself as a 'conquistador', he (re)turns to Nietzsche, as in quest of an obscure but necessary 'alliance'. Here, the ambivalence is repeated, an aporia between the affinity of their enterprises (that of giving names to things which had not been named before)[9] and the heterogeneity of their 'codes' (for, here and there, they do not use the same words, and certainly not about the same 'things'). So it comes to pass, in any case, that Nietzsche begins to be cited in the *Freudian Oeuvre,*[10] on such decisive points as the conception of dreams, sexuality and the Unconscious.
3 In a third period, Nietzsche inhabits the Freudian text; he has become one of the chosen hosts. Not only is he hailed specifically as 'anticipating' some such 'article' evoked by the 'psychoanalytic doctrine,' which are designated as *Ahnungen und Einsichten,*[11] an ensemble of 'intuitions' and 'apperceptions' that constitute a Nietzschean 'pre-science' of the analytic 'thing' (examined in Part One, Chapter 2, 'Nietzsche in Freudian Discourse'), but in two major works dating from 1914 and 1925, Nietzsche is found, recognized, and even in a way 'enthroned' as a 'precursor' of psychoanalysis (but we must determine in what such a status can consist).
4 There is yet a final phase, more 'cryptic', which seems to us to strengthen and intensify the confrontation between Nietzsche and Freud in a more intimate sense. The enormous metapsychological recasting of the years 1920–30 will put the Nietzschean comet back in the metapsychological sky. This time, Nietzscheism is 'over-present', even though, paradoxically, Freud shows no need to cite explicitly the author of *The Will to Power.* It is here that the critical reading must be at its sharpest.

After having been an admirer – as reticent as sincere – of Nietzsche (around 1875), after having felt in the latter a 'colleague' in 'discoveries' (around 1900), then becoming a user of Nietzschean pre-metapsychological intuitions (around

1914), Freud turns out to be a reader of *The Will to Power*, this touchstone of Nietzscheism, as revealed in his concept of the death wish (around 1920).

This subterranean debate may contain the most capital stakes for the interface between philosophy and metapsychology. In addition, it is useful, to lend its weight to the present re-introduction, to highlight this moment of truth which in a way gives 'pause' to this inquiry.

Nietzsche's 'Viennese Reception': The 'Originary Scene' of the Encounter

There is indeed an originary scene of the 'encounter' between Freud and Nietzsche. It has a place – Vienna – and a time – around the 1870s. The 'Viennese connection' of a nascent 'Nietzscheism' furnished the context for the young Freud's discovery of Nietzsche, which revealed the promises and stakes of a link that, already, takes on an eminently personal cast, insofar as Freud manifests (somewhat precociously) his vocation as a *Selbstdenker*, a 'Self-thinker.'

It is symbolic that the *Neue Freie Presse*, the journal which would publish commentaries favorable to Freud from 1895 on, as well as to Stefan Zweig's works on psychoanalysis, and to which Freud gave one of his extremely rare interviews at the end of his life,[12] was also the journal that extended a warm reception to Nietzsche's Second *Untimely Meditation* in 1874.[13] At this point, Freud had just begun his medical studies and was in search of some philosophical benchmarks (1873–5). The 'Reading Society of German Students in Vienna' (*Leseverein der deutschen Studenten Wiens*), created in 1871, played an important role in Nietzscheism's *in statu nascendi*. Josef Paneth, whom Freud recognized as his first 'intercessor' with Nietzsche, in a well-known letter to Arnold Zweig (Part One, Chapter 1, 'Arnold Zweig and the Impossible Discourse'), organized around 1875, in concert with Victor Adler, a discussion of the *Untimely Meditations*.

We know that Freud was a member of the *Leseverein* between 1873–8.[14] He was thus implicated in this group of early interest in and of a certain adherence, even, to Nietzsche's thought. Given the ignorance in which Nietzsche was held by the German academic world that he so reviled, it is interesting to note this quasi-'exotic' infatuation of the 'Viennese group.' The most patent manifestation comes in 1877, with the profession of faith contained in a collective letter to Nietzsche, still at Basel,[15] in which we recognize the names of men with whom Freud was well acquainted, such as Victor Adler, Heinrich Braun and, the most fervent emulator of Nietzsche, Siegfried Lipiner.

But there is more. A number of Jewish students also participated in this enthusiastic Nietzschean movement,[16] in order to shore up their own position, in the framework of an interrogation of their cultural and intellectual identity, and within a debate concerning German culture and pagan mythology. Thus it is not by accident that Vienna figures at the 'head of the list' in the enumeration that Nietzsche makes, toward the end of his life, of the places who had recognized his work since 'the first hour.' 'In Vienna, in St. Petersburg, Stockholm,

Copenhagen, in Paris and New York, everywhere that I have been discovered,' in marked contrast to the attitude of indifference toward his thought that he felt in his native 'Germany, Europe's dull country.'[17] Everything happens as if Nietzsche, in 1888, remembered the warm Viennese reception of some 15 years earlier, and the demonstration of love from these 'lofty characters,' these 'elite intelligences' who had given him a such a sign that in 1877, he even considered returning to Vienna to meet these admirers and disciples. At that time, Vienna could have been called the capital of a small Nietzschean 'republic', though, it is true, a sparsely populated one! And among these adherents to Nietzscheism, would we not have to count a certain student named Sigmund Freud?

We will note, in any case, this very concrete conjuncture of a possible, physical encounter between Nietzsche and Freud, in 1877–8. How can we not re-read, without some retrospective regret, Nietzsche's letter to Paul Rée describing, in November 1877, a trip to Salzburg that was postponed until the following year?

> I would, perhaps, like to combine this trip with a visit to Vienna, for there may be found there a cluster of persons who have the dubious taste to appreciate my writings (you know that I have myself moved past this point of view), but it does seem to me that there are some capable minds among them, including one genius.'[18]

The genius to whom Nietzsche alludes is none other than Siegfried Lipiner (1856–1911), Freud's classmate and author of a *Prometheus* which Nietzsche had praised in the most vivid terms (before cooling off seriously toward its author). But had Nietzsche responded to the appeal of his imitators, he probably would have counted among his hosts a medical student, also enamoured of philosophy, named Sigmund Freud (no doubt curious to meet the author of the texts that he had read and admired). At the very least, this visit had a decisive resonance for the future creator of psychoanalysis, an 'historic' opportunity to see, 'in flesh and bone,' the author whose thoughts Freud would readily qualify as being in some way out of his reach.

In this concrete conjuncture, the notion of a 'missed encounter' between Nietzsche and Freud takes its most literal signification. Nietzsche will thus not make his planned trip to Vienna, where Freud would go on to hatch, some 20 years later (with Breuer), his own 'cuckoo's egg,' the *Studies on Hysteria*. And Nietzsche could not have suspected that, among this cenacle of sympathizers, would be found one who will use his own personal 'genius' to create a certain 'science of the Unconscious,' which in its own way will call into question his posterity. In a way, we remain the sole witnesses of this rendezvous, dated and missed! Indeed, Nietzsche finds himself at a turning point in his own destiny, which will lead him to resign from the University at Basel and set out on the route to Sils-Maria. At this point, the two destinies are disjoined, but how can we not be taken by this real, historical blink of an eye, at the moment of reconstructing in some way, via the text of their works, this encounter, as

impossible as it is necessary? The present work could well be conceived from the standpoint of supplementing the facts of this 'countermanded meeting.'

Freud in the Discovery of Nietzsche

Such is the context that favoured an encounter; but, we should recall, Freud is a strange sort of Viennese who, even though marked by his membership and implicated in the movements of ideas, never reacts purely and simply 'in the Viennese manner' according to the tempo of the *Zeitgeist*. It is important to grasp how he approaches Nietzsche, at the source as well as via mirror effects.

To this end, we can observe the appearance of Nietzsche's name in Freud's *Letters from Youth*, a magnificent testimony to his precocious intellectual autonomy. There, we see mentioned a certain 'shame' at citing David-Friedrich Strauss' formula 'Thus we live, happily.' Using this phrase to conclude a letter to his friend Silberstein in March, 1875, Freud adds that 'although in 1873, Fred. Nietzsche had reproached this phrase of David Strauss as an indication of philistinism.'[19]

This allusion to a first, sibyllic approach is interesting for several reasons. In the first place, we sense that Freud is well aware of the Nietzschean polemics of the moment and what is implicated in their stakes, which confirms that he had at least heard about the *Untimely Meditations*, presumably through the intermediary of the Viennese reception mentioned above (although he confuses Basel with Strasbourg!). Second, he cites Strauss, in all conscience, and in spite of Nietzsche's sarcasm (for whom Strauss was, we know, one of his 'bugbears'), as if the young Freud gallantly assumes the risk of indignity and 'opprobrium' on the scale of a Nietzschean evaluation, by making this 'philistine' adage his own. A certain 'eudemonism' may be involved, though trivial in view of the demands of Nietzsche's 'nobility', in the sense defined below. Finally, this allusion figures in the letter which preceded the great missive (of 15 March 1875) wherein Freud gives an account of his talks with Franz Brentano, his first 'master' in philosophy, and where we can gauge Freud's philosophical filiations. This letter contains a summary of Brentano's directives for the constitution of an authentic philosophical culture (*philosophische Bildung*), as we have detailed elsewhere,[20] and it is worth asking if Nietzsche had his place there.

In fact, we can search in vain for Nietzsche among the philosophers whom Brentano (whose influence on the young Freud was considerable) recommended his students, like Freud and Paneth, to read and become acquainted with. After Descartes, Locke and Hume, there is hardly any place for contemporary thought, according to Brentano's views, except for Auguste Comte and 'the Englishman,' John Stuart Mill.[21] We understand that, on the one hand, Nietzsche is only at the very edge of his own work in 1875; on the other hand, Brentano's 'philosophical universe' seems impervious to the 'instinctualist' vein in which he would have spontaneously ranked the author of *The Birth of Tragedy*. At best, Nietzsche would have represented the 'mystical' phase which, in the cyclical conception of history that subtends Brentano's perception of the

philosophical present, merely completes the 'movement'. So it is not certain from what side Freud might receive any encouragement for his nascent Nietzschean appetence ...

Indeed, around 1875 Freud is more sensitive to the thought of Ludwig Feuerbach, who had just died (1872), and whom Freud presents as 'of all the philosophers, the one that I venerate and admire the most,'[22] the hero of 'free thought' and of the struggle against religious prejudice. We also understand that, from this perspective, the struggle with D.-F. Strauss cannot be as antipathetic for Freud as it was for the author of the *Untimely Meditations.*

But precisely, if Freud adheres overall to the 'philosophical line' of his master Brentano, the respect that the latter inspires in him does not prevent him from being sensitive to a renewal that he perceives, with the nascent 'Nietzscheophilic' group, from the side of this 'untimely' thought. Furthermore, the author of the *Untimely Meditations*, through his critique of the educational system, could well appear as a support in this battle for a new *Aufklärung*, which is felt at least until the time of *Human, All Too Human* (1878), when a sort of 'Voltaireanism' arises, compatible with that of Freud.[23] A syncretism of the *Freie Denkers*, paradoxically, served as the crucible for a form of 'neo-liberalism', although Nietzsche, the philosopher of the tragic, would seem to be incompatible with 'rationalist' sobriety.

From this synthesis, a revealing action is taken. At the instigation of Freud himself, a small periodical is created, whose distribution, it seems, was ultra-confidential. Announcing its demise in January, 1875, Freud writes that 'the journal that we have founded, the three of us, then the four – myself, Paneth, Emmanuel Löwy, and Lipiner – died down in the peace of the Lord.'[24] Among these 'founders' and editors of this first Freudian review, we can recognize two notable mediators of Nietzscheism: Josef Paneth, the 'friend Josef' of the *Traumdeutung*, whom Freud presents as the one who more that anyone else initiated him to Nietzsche, and Siegfried Lipiner, the one most engaged in the Nietzschean 'apostolate', who could even boast of his status as a recognized disciple of Nietzsche.[25]

Freud seems resolved to assume parentage of this 'journal.' 'It is I who have delivered it the *coup de grâce*; I called it to life, and I called it back from life.'[26] Now, the review of which he was the animator in this decisive sense confronted metaphysical problems in which the Nietzschean component was very well represented, indicative of the Nietzschean *Gesinnung* – a sensitivity, if it does fall short of outright 'obedience' to things Nietzschean – of the principal editors.

The 'Case of Strauss'

We can appreciate, in this context, the meaning of the allusion to Nietzsche interposed by Strauss. David-Friedrich Strauss (1808–74) had been 'elected' by Nietzsche to play the part of the incarnation of an all-too 'timely' philistinism. This fierce diatribe, comprising the first *Untimely Meditation* (1873), paints the portrait of the 'cultivated philistine.' The term *Bildungsphilister* delightfully sets

side-by-side the most injurious and pejorative term in the academic vocabulary which, since the beginning of the nineteenth century,[27] had designated the self-satisfied and uncultivated (lacking culture) bourgeoisie – with the striking *Bildung*, which returns to the lofty notion of 'culture' or of an internal education, an ideal of cultivated individuality. What Nietzsche is aiming at, by way of Strauss (the author of the *Life of Jesus* (1835) and especially *Ancient and Modern Faith* (1872)) as a 'person-target', is precisely this form of profound un-culture disguised as knowledge, a 'philistinism' masquerading as 'science'.

The subtitle of Strauss' work especially targeted by Nietzsche, a 'confession', reveals its true subject, a new 'profession of faith' which, having abjured Christianity and the religious ideal, blissfully dedicates itself to a 'new faith' (*der neue Glaube*) that takes over from the old one (*der alte Glaube*). It replaces the suffering of the Cross with a sort of cult of happiness – a type of sentiment of joyously accepted dependence regarding creation, under the tutelary sign of 'science'. The theories of evolution and of Darwinism are called to the rescue of this *Weltanschauung*, in order to legitimize its rational harmony.

Nietzsche's 'tragic sense', combined with a kind of 'Voltairean' will to lucidity, would not know how to accommodate this cult of scientific determinism and its smug ideal of harmonious Reason. In addition, the author of the *Untimely Meditations* does not mince his words.

Thus, for Freud, Strauss' little phrase, which Nietzsche had cited, pops up: *So leben wir, so wandeln wir beglückt* (So we live, so we carry on, filled with happiness). The phrase, in fact, concludes a sort of profession of a eudemonist faith that the author of the first *Untimely Meditation* presents, in the fourth section of his anti-philistine assault, as 'the paradisiacal page' of this 'book of confessions.'[28] The whole force of Nietzsche's contemptuous sarcasm is contained in this act of citation, intended to illustrate the epitome of mediocrity in Strauss' *Weltanschauung*. ' "Here is our man," applauds the philistine reader, "because that is how we have always lived; it is how we live each and every day." ' The author of *Ancient and Modern Faith* only manages, in Nietzsche's eyes, to establish a 'philistine' ideal that is the furthest from any authentic 'culture', by dressing up with a vaguely lyrical pathos a scientific legitimation of common knowledge and the most trivial eudemonism, a type of intellectual 'comfort'.

What did Strauss want to signify by this maxim? It is an elegy to the universality of modernism, a type of cultural democracy that permits the citizen to gather all the fruits of 'historical studies,' of 'natural sciences' and of 'the works of our great poets.' At the moment when he evokes an intense enjoyment 'of reading great writers and performing the works of our great musicians,' while speaking of 'a stimulation of mind and sentiment, of imagination and humour which leaves nothing to be desired,' Strauss makes his declaration of the beatitude of the modern condition of culture, a kind of sentiment of the 'affluence' of material and cultural progress.

It is there that we can grasp the difference in attitude between Nietzsche and Freud, in their encounter with the same evocation. Where Nietzsche sees only a

journalistic culture, an enjoyment of the cafes and popular distractions, which finds its legitimation in what he calls a 'heinous theory of well-being,' dully animated by a 'hatred of genius,' Freud, for his part, could more easily give his approval to this programme of 'a happy life,' so derogatory to the Nietzschean ideal – or at least he could recognize a more magnanimous indulgence. After all, the young Freud is really a Feuerbachian, and subscribes to a certain confidence in the possibilities of a being reconciled with its sensible immanence, finding a legitimate happiness in its adherence to its own 'matter'.

It is no accident that a long time afterwards, in the anecdote narrated by Lou Salomé (see below, 'Lou Salomé, The Mercurial Feminine'), it is against the intoxication by torment, extolled by the Nietzschean poem, that Freud reacts by evoking the first 'head cold' that comes as sufficient to 'cure' him of such inclinations. This care of the self and the legitimation of the requirement for happiness, which amounts to a 'lack of taste' and the most severe and impardonable concession to the 'philistinism' for which Nietzsche cannot find harsh enough words, are not really shameful for Freud – no more so in 1875 than in 1913 – although the movement of his own thought would be in the direction of a strong relativization of the possibilities for happiness. Through an irony of the history of ideas, it is under the Nietzschean reference that Freud will return, in the years around 1920 when he introduces the death wish, to the theoretical and therapeutic revisions which will take as their slogan the 'will to happiness' (*Wille zum Glück*), after Otto Rank.[29] We can point here to a symbolic event of an impossible encounter; in 1926, after their last conversation and before their definitive estrangement, Rank offers Freud a gift of the complete works of Nietzsche![30]

This defence of the legitimacy of the pleasure principle and of a tempered eudemonism in no way prevents setting to rights, in an affinity with Nietzsche, a wholly other aspiration, that of the 'nocturnal aspects' that scientific lucidity neglects and, at base, denies.

The Différend of the Ideal: Vornehmheit

From the very beginning, Freud's attitude toward Nietzsche is fixed, and will remain so to the end of his life, as stated in his letter to Arnold Zweig. 'He represents a nobility inaccessible to me' (*eine mir unzugängliche Vornehmheit*).[31] Such is the original 'stopping point', a kind of non-encounter which constitutes the other side of this otherwise intense 'encounter'. The question, we will see, clarifies their differences (*différend*) over happiness.

How can we understand this *Vornehmheit*, alluded here as the limit-point of Freud's own access to an 'enjoyment' of Nietzsche? In its contemporary denotation, *Vornehmheit* designates the formal quality of what is 'noble' (*edel*) and refined (*fein*), with a nuance of elegance and of 'distinction' (even 'snobbery'). In a familiar connotation, *vornehm* is perhaps best rendered in French by 'huppé' (and in English by 'upper-crust'). The notion of 'superiority'

(in a certain sense of 'class') returns to the sentiment of an 'aristocracy' of spirit. In brief, Freud says that he is 'out-classed' by the Nietzschean ideal.

We would be wrong to interpret this remark as referring only to Nietzsche's idiosyncrasies; it is not the 'distinction' of the personality which is at stake here, but rather something that constitutes one of the main operators of Nietzsche's mode of thought. The recurrence of the term *Vornehmheit* in Nietzsche's work, from *The Birth of Tragedy* to *The Will to Power*, from the Greek tragic ethos to the quest for the Superhuman, attests that Nietzsche's thought is engaged in drawing out the conditions of possibility of this 'nobility', and even to promote it as an ethico-philosophical category.

Was ist vornehm? – it is a question that Nietzsche never ceases asking. It even appears as the title to the ninth chapter of *Beyond Good and Evil.*[32] At the other end of this trajectory, the question is literally taken up again in a long section in *The Will to Power.*[33] The term evokes the notion of 'elevation' or 'height' (*Höhe, Erhöhung*). The noble soul 'is marked' in that it 'always lives at a radiant height' (*in einer durchleuchtenden Höhe*), literally 'in a height shot through with light.'[34] The characteristics are 'an aptitude for recognition,' the absence of fear of oneself,[35] which goes together with a form of 'obedience'.[36] It is distinguished by a placid acceptance of 'the fact of its own selfishness'[37] at the same time as a certain depth of suffering (*das tiefe Leiden*) that isolates it.[38] In brief, the 'noble soul' thus defined is lofty, generous, courageous, mindful of and respectful of the self and suited for suffering.

It is certainly no accident if this vivid metaphor of *Vornehmheit* runs, like a 'thin red line,' through Nietzsche's thematic work. But it does reflect an evolution; taken at first in a Greek 'tragicist' aestheticism, it tends to be presented as a kind of wisdom. Freud, impressed by the portrait of the 'noble soul,' is quite capable of accommodating a remark from *Human, All Too Human*: 'A noble soul (*eine vornehme Seele*) is not that which is capable of the highest jumps (*Aufschwünge*), but that which rises a bit and falls a bit, always inhabiting a freely radiant air and height.'[39] 'Nobility' is here clearly demarcated from a kind of ethereal 'levitation', as far as its being a predilection for contortions. (*Aufschwünge*, in the vocabulary of sports, designates 'leaps that hang in the air'). The aptitude to maintain oneself constantly at the same height, in a sort of *tranquillitas animi*, is not unrelated to the disposition of the mind in 'free-floating attention' (*gleichschwebende Aufmerksamkeit*), which would be that ... *of the analyst in the position of listener.*

It is not that the notion of *Vornehmheit* will always take more 'flight' for Nietzsche than for Freud, before being in a way 'instituted' by the notion of the 'superhuman' (*Übermenschliches*). Freud confirms that his 'constitution' cannot support such 'takeoffs'. He has well understood what the idea implies and for his part rejects himself as a candidate to scale such peaks. His words seem to echo those of Nietzsche in *Ecce Homo*: 'He who knows how to breathe in the atmosphere that fills my work knows that it is an atmosphere of the heights, that the air is crisp. One must be made for this atmosphere ...'[40] 'Ah, well,' Freud seems to reply, 'I am not made for that.' We know that Freud's whole

profession of faith goes to call forth the necessity of working in the sub-soil.[41] Freud breathes rather poorly at the altitudes that Nietzsche requires; this is a theme that regularly returns, for example in the correspondence with Rée[42] (and recalls, with a Heine-inspired humour, the banal gravity of 'immanence'). To the sun-drenched, snow-covered heights symbolized by the Dolomites, Nietzsche's site of preference, Freud opposes a more temperate climate propitious to the legitimate requirements of happiness; it not the same vision of the 'land where the oranges bloom' in the words of Goethe (who was equally dear to one and the other).

It is again no accident if, to the question hammered out: 'What is noble?', Nietzsche answers: 'That one should disregard the happiness of the greatest number: the happiness of the peace of the soul, of the virtue of comfort (*sic*), of the Anglo-English haberdashery of a Spencer.'[43]

If we think about it, one question illustrates well the *différend*, that of the evaluation of labor. Nietzsche, sensitive to the grandeur of creative labour ('All the great ones were great workers'), puts a symmetrical emphasis on the mortal threat of labour as a social ideal, denouncing the 'praisers of labour' (*Lobredner der Arbeit*). In a well-known aphorism in *Daybreak*, we find this 'glorification (*Verherrlichung*) of labour' reviled for its celebration of 'actions useful to all', its impersonal nature, in short for its 'fear of everything that is individual.'[44] Freud appears to respond to Nietzsche in a note in *Civilization and Its Discontents*, half a century later. 'If no particular disposition prescribes as necessary a certain direction to one's interests in life, common professional labour can intervene in that place, as accessible to anyone.' What is evoked here is the counsel given by Voltaire's *Candide*, to 'cultivate one's garden.'[45] Freud and Nietzsche, great labourers who are gripped by a 'destiny' that demands an *œuvre*, concur at base on the diagnosis of the anonymizing effect of 'common' labour. But therein lies the difference, for where Nietzsche battles against this denaturalization of individuality by a laborious triviality functioning as the repressive 'police force' of unicity, Freud soberly declares that all in all, labour serves as an acceptable and accessible regulatory dynamic that can 'guide life' (*Lebensführung*) and allows 'the individual to be firmly anchored to reality, to the extent that he is integrated securely in a sphere of reality within the human community.' Without adding his voice to those of the *Lobredners*, the praisers of Labour, Freud links this 'activity' back to the libidinal economy. Indeed, it is the same stake as the question of happiness.

Once subjected to a retrospective appraisal, Freud's remark in the crucial letter to Arnold Zweig takes on its full meaning; whereas many of his friends and classmates became fascinated by Nietzsche's *Vornehmheit*, something, from this moment on, arrests the philosophy student named Sigmund Freud. He is not content to suggest that Nietzsche is 'too great for him' or that he 'places the bar too high' for his tastes and means, as one might be tempted to interpret him. He submits to a critique the demand for *Vornehmheit* that, lending its colour to Nietzscheism, even to its *Weltanschauung*, continues to gain density in his text and thought.

However, Freud does not profess to carry 'second-rate' ideals. What we hear within his reach, in his 1918 declaration, at the same moment where he claims hardly 'to worry about good and evil' (whereas that was *the* worry for Nietzsche), is that 'if it is necessary to speak of an ethic, I profess for my part a lofty ideal, of which I am aware of generally falling short in the most appalling ways.'[46] Freud, we know, presents himself as a Jewish atheist who refuses to make the least profession of moral faith, such that his ethics come from the Self (*selbstverständlich*). His claim for an ideal takes its meaning as a response to Nietzsche's affirmation that 'Israel triumphed with its vengeance over all of the most noble ideals.'[47] Indeed, there is for Freud a sort of *Vornehmheit* of the Law. Moreover, it is the creator of psychoanalysis, the supposed 'enemy of ideals,' who claims that his ideas are incompatible with the points of view of 'the solid majority' (Ibsen's phrase), little inclined toward 'free thought.' In a sense, then, there is a Freudian version of *Vornehmheit*, but precisely one relieved from the narcissistic elation of 'ideals'.

Freud and Nietzsche are defined by a somehow 'organically' recalcitrant character from the point of view of the 'great number,' but they do not place the principles of their 'dissidence' at the same point from the norm.

II GENESIS OF AN ALLIANCE: FREUD WITH NIETZSCHE

However, past the time of the encounter, we see an evolution, as 'logical' as it is 'historical', of the exchange between Nietzsche and Freud: the time of the 'alliance'. It is the passage from the conjunction of affinities to the conjugation of their foundational projects.

'Sources of the Nile': The Freudian 'Conquista'

This *Aufklärer* named Freud, defiant toward the 'vertigo of heights,' has sensed all the same in advance an exceptional ally in Nietzsche, a community of 'free spirits' (*Freie Geister*) in the sense of *Human, All Too Human.*

We now move on to a point a quarter of a century after Freud's encounter with Nietzsche, at the moment when the latter has just ended his life and the former is just beginning to undertake his 'creation' (*Schöpfung*). Nietzsche seems to Freud to be a pioneer of the *terra incognita* of the Unconscious; better put, Freud perceives in Nietzsche a *Tiefenpsycholog* 'before the fact' (*avant la lettre*), a true 'conquistador'. We can grasp the moment of Freud's realization of this affinity in his letter, dated 1 July 1900,[48] where Freud confides to his friend Fliess (in the final period of their impassioned intellectual 'liaison') that he finds himself on the verge of his own discovery, and confesses his 'return to Nietzsche' or at least to *his thoughts about* Nietzsche.

The missive begins on a somber note, associated with the emergence of a sense of a 'personal destiny,' a moment of 'difficult times for myself and my cure,' Freud says, by way of self-definition. What kind of man, then, is the inventor of 'psychoanalysis', in his own eyes, at this critical moment? 'I am not... not at all a man of science, nor an observer, nor an experimenter, nor a