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Edited by CLIFFORD J. ROGERS,
KELLY DeVRIES and JOHN FRANCE

JOURNAL OF
*Medieval Military
History*

Volume VIII

The journal's hallmark of a broad chronological, geographic, and thematic coverage of the subject is underlined in this volume. It begins with an examination of the the brief but fascinating career of an armed league of (mostly) commoners who fought to suppress mercenary bands and to impose a reign of peace in southern France in 1182–84. This is followed by a thorough re-examination of Matilda of Tuscany's defeat of Henry IV in 1090–97. Two pieces on Hispanic topics – a substantial analysis of the remarkable military career of Jaime I 'the Conqueror' of Aragon (r. 1208–76), and a case study of the campaigns of a single Spanish king, Enrique II of Castile (r. 1366–79), contributing to the active debate over the role of open battle in medieval strategy – come next. Shorter essays deal with the size of the Mongol armies that threatened Europe in the mid-thirteenth century, and with a surprising literary description, dating to 1210–20, of a knight employing the advanced surgical technique of thoracentesis. Further contributions correct the common misunderstanding of the nature of deeds of arms *à outrance* in the fifteenth century, and dissect the relevance of the 'infantry revolution' and 'artillery revolution' to the French successes at the end of the Hundred Years War. The final note explores what etymology can reveal about the origins of the trebuchet.

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The Journal, an annual publication of **De re militari: The Society for Medieval Military History**, covers medieval warfare in the broadest possible terms, both chronologically and thematically. It aims to encompass topics ranging from traditional studies of the strategic and tactical conduct of war, to explorations of the martial aspects of chivalric culture and *mentalité*, examinations of the development of military technology, and prosopographical treatments of the composition of medieval armies. Editions of previously unpublished documents of significance to the field are included. The Journal also seeks to foster debate on key disputed aspects of medieval military history.

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People against Mercenaries: The Capuchins in Southern Gaul

John France

The Capuchins were a sworn confraternity whose members took up arms in order to impose the peace in the violently disordered world of southern Gaul in the years 1182–84. In doing this they acted under the authority of Canon 27 of the Third Lateran Council of 1179, and took upon themselves something of the character of crusaders. Their movement originated amongst the townspeople of Le Puy in the Auvergne, and although it embraced all classes of society and enjoyed the approbation of bishops and clergy, it was clearly popular rather than aristocratic in nature. For a time it was remarkably successful. Ultimately the Capuchins found themselves confronting the great powers of the area and were crushed by troops in the service of the great men whose quarrels were the ultimate cause of the political disorder which plagued southern Gaul. The circumstances both of their success and their failure tell us something of military reality in twelfth-century Europe.

Our vision of medieval warfare in the twelfth century is dominated by the upper classes. The men on horseback, knights and great lords, claimed to be the rightful arms-bearers and protectors of society. They portray themselves on seals and in pictures, mounted, in full armor, often bearing swords, because the military role was central to their sense of identity. They even adapted their religious beliefs to suit their way of life.¹ Most of the chroniclers of the age, when they talk about war, focus on their deeds as warriors. And they certainly were the leading element in all the armies of the period. They were more than simply cavalymen: the mounted knight as a weapons-system has been overstated, as Matthew Bennett and Stephen Morillo have pointed out.² But nobles and knights came from the better-off in society and had the leisure to train for war, and, therefore to develop their physique and technique to a very high level. Ordericus Vitalis reports the deaths of two of the Giroie family while practising for war – one killed by a carelessly tossed javelin and the other from broken ribs when

¹ Richard W. Kaeuper, *Holy Warriors: The Religious Ideology of Chivalry* (Philadelphia, 2009).

² Matthew Bennett, "The Myth of the Supremacy of Knightly Cavalry," in Matthew J. Strickland, ed., *Armies, Chivalry and Warfare* (Stamford, 1998); Stephen Morillo, "The 'Age of Cavalry' Revisited," in Donald J. Kagay and L. J. Andrew Villalon, eds., *The Circle of War in the Middle Ages* (Woodbridge, 1999), pp. 45–59.

he was thrown onto stone steps during a friendly wrestling-match!³ At the battle of the Standard in 1138 Ordericus commented on how formidable they were as footsoldiers, stiffening the ranks of the English infantry so that “mounted knights could by no means continue against knights in armour who fought on foot, close together in immovable formation.”⁴ At the battle of Worringen in 1288 a sergeant advised the army to kill the enemy nobles first of all: “As each man comes to any noble, let him not turn aside until he has slain him. For, were their army so great that it stretched from here to Cologne, They will lose the battle if their nobles are killed.”⁵

Yet these men were not the majority in the armies of the day. Chroniclers describe forces as made up of *milites et pedites*, and the latter were clearly far more numerous than the former in almost all cases. Furthermore, even amongst the cavalry noblemen and knights were a shrinking group. As the twelfth century wore on nobles became ever more exclusive and the wealthier knights were increasingly regarded as being aristocrats, so that while *milites* in the eleventh century can usually be translated as “cavalry,” by the end of the twelfth the cavalry was made up of nobles, knights and others.⁶ The word *servientes* appears in our sources, usually translated “sergeants,” meaning non-noble soldiers, and it is clear that sometimes they acted as horsemen. Gilbert of Mons was chancellor of the count of Hainaut and he is very careful to distinguish this group from the knights. They were usually, but not always, less well-equipped, and we can assume this is because they were drawn from people of limited means.⁷ But they were clearly of great value and they seem to become commoner with the passing of time. Some at least seem to have been professionals of war and this means that they merge into another group numerous in twelfth-century armies, the mercenaries.

We usually think of mercenaries in the twelfth century as being footsoldiers, and many of them were. But there is evidence that others fought on horseback and could compete on equal terms with the greatest. At Dol in 1174 Henry II (1154–89) of England sent a mercenary force which destroyed the Breton rebels at the battle of Dol.⁸ Mercadier, Richard of England’s great mercenary leader,

³ Ordericus Vitalis, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, ed. Marjorie Chibnall, 6 vols. (Oxford, 1969–79), 2:23–31. Hereafter cited as OV.

⁴ OV, 6:350–51.

⁵ Jan van Heelu, *Rijkronijk*, translated in J. F. Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages*, trans. Sumner Willard and Mrs. R. W. Southern (Woodbridge, 1997), p. 267.

⁶ David Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility: Constructing Aristocracy in England and France 900–1300* (Harlow, 2005).

⁷ For example: Gilbert of Mons, *Chronique*, ed. Léon Vanderkindere (Brussels, 1904), pp. 171, 197; trans. Laura Napran, *Chronicle of Hainaut* (Woodbridge, 2005), pp. 95 and 108. The terms *servientes* or *stratores* are very fluid. Some clearly had landholdings, but others were very humble people indeed. For a discussion see John France, *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades 1000–1300* (London, 1990), pp. 64–66.

⁸ John D. Hosler, *Henry II: A Medieval Soldier at War, 1147–1189* (Leiden, 2007), p. 144.

seems to have been a person of some status.⁹ Such formidable competence allied to an ambiguous status may go some way to explaining the aristocratic William the Marshal's bitter dislike of Mercadier whom he in many ways resembles – as being one who rose in the service of kings by military ability.¹⁰ But most mercenaries were footsoldiers. We know very little about where and how infantry were recruited. Many were undoubtedly the servants of greater men and knights raised from amongst the more adventurous peasants on their estates. Henry II at the start of his reign attempted to impose on his magnates infantry quotas comparable to their obligation as tenants to produce knights, but this failed. Ultimately he was noted for his employment of mercenaries.¹¹ Their great virtue was that, as long as they were paid, they were willing soldiers and they formed an important element in almost all European armies.¹²

These, then, are the *dramatis personae* of medieval warfare. They are a familiar cavalcade. The mounted knights clad in iron helm and chain-mail and equipped with shield, lance and sword; the infantry in padded jackets, perhaps with iron helmets, wielding spears for the close-order battle, and bows, sometimes crossbows, which were useful in the field and at sieges. But these forces existed in a wider society which in a military sense we tend to ignore and regard as essentially demilitarized. Indeed a famous passage in the Annals of St Bertin has long been interpreted as a crucial moment when the mass of the population in Gaul were excluded from the bearing of arms:

The Danes ravaged the places beyond the Scheldt. Some of the common people living between the Seine and the Loire formed a sworn association amongst themselves and fought bravely against the Danes on the Seine. But because their association had been made without due consideration, they were easily slain by our more powerful people.¹³

⁹ Mercadier was never ennobled but he was given substantial lands and permitted to make a very advantageous marriage, which suggests that he was by no means of very humble origins: H. Géraud, "Les routiers au xii^e siècle," and "Mercadier. Les routiers au xii^e siècle," *Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Chartes* 3 (1841–42), 125–47, 417–43.

¹⁰ David Crouch, "William Marshal and the Mercenariat," in John France, ed., *The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Age* (Leiden, 2008), pp. 15–32.

¹¹ At the Northampton Court of 1164 Henry II experimented with a system of infantry recruitment based on the magnates raising them in parallel with their obligation to produce knights, but this was not a success and was quickly abandoned: Michael Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience* (New Haven, 1996), pp. 120–21, 148–50.

¹² Important general surveys of mercenaries in this period remain H. Grundmann, "Rotten und Brabazonen, Söldner-heere in 12. Jahrhundert," *Deutsches Archiv für die Erforschung des Mittelalters* 5 (1942), 419–92; J. Boussard, "Les mercenaires au xii^e siècle. Henri II Plantagenet et les origines de l'armée de métier," *Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Chartes* 106 (1945–6), 189–224; J. Boussard, "Services féodaux, milices et mercenaires aux X et XI siècles," in *Ordinamenti militari in Occidenti nell'Alto Medioevo: Settimane di Studio del Centro Italiano di Studi sull'Alto Medioevo XV, Spoleto 30 March – 5 April 1967* (Spoleto, 1968), pp. 131–68; J. Schlight, *Monarchs and Mercenaries* (Bridgeport, 1968); Stephen D. B. Brown, "The Mercenary and his Master: Military Service and Monetary Reward in the Eleventh and Twelfth Century," *History* 74 (1989), 20–38; France, ed., *Mercenary Identity*.

¹³ *Annals of St Bertin*, ed. Janet Nelson (Manchester, 1991), s.a. 859, p. 89.

The mass of the population is indeed portrayed as passive in a military sense, and even in consequence, some have thought, enjoyed a certain immunity from war's terrors because of this exclusion.¹⁴ But in fact the mass of the population regularly suffered from the attentions of warriors. In medieval circumstances battle was relatively rare. This was because both parties had to want to hazard all on a collision in the open field, not a common eventuality. Commanders knew that, in the words of Vegetius: "It is preferable to subdue an enemy by famine, raids and terror, than in battle where fortune tends to have more influence than bravery."¹⁵

And they understood all too well the risks to their own lives. Their armies were very imperfect instruments with poor command structures and this increased the hazards of battle immensely. Moreover a defeated enemy could take refuge in fortified towns and castles, so that a victory might merely lead to a siege with all its problems of supply and organization.¹⁶ In these circumstances the best means of waging war was to ravage an enemy's lands. This undermined the will of his supporters, damaged his economic base and provided attacking soldiers with food and loot. This was war which could pay for itself, always an attractive notion. Of course it was not very pleasant for the "civilian" population. William the Conqueror's biographer famously praised him for his methods of war:

He [William the Bastard, duke of Normandy] sowed terror in the land by his frequent and lengthy invasions; he devastated vineyards, fields and estates; he seized neighbouring strongpoints and where advisable put garrisons in them; in short he incessantly inflicted innumerable calamities upon the land.¹⁷

And William notoriously devastated northern England in a way which even contemporaries found shocking. But these were not unusual acts. William de Breteuil in his feud in Normandy in 1089–92 with the Goël family funded his struggle by extorting ransoms from the country people.¹⁸ In 1185 Baldwin of Hainaut devastated some 110 villages belonging to his enemy, Jacques of Avesnes, as an act of revenge.¹⁹ This was how war was fought – at the expense of the mass of the population.

In southern Gaul this kind of devastation reached critical levels towards

¹⁴ For example see Matthew Strickland, *War and Chivalry: The Conduct and Perception of War in England and Normandy 1066–1217* (Cambridge, 1996).

¹⁵ Vegetius, *Epitome of Military Science*, trans. N. P. Milner (Liverpool, 1993), p. 108.

¹⁶ On the nature of medieval armies see France, *Western Warfare*, 39–52. For the discussion amongst historians on the importance or otherwise of evading battle see Clifford J. Rogers, "The 'Vegetian Science of Warfare' in the Middle Ages" and Stephen Morillo, "Battle Seeking: The Contexts and Limits of Vegetian Strategy," both in *The Journal of Medieval Military History* 1 (2002), 1–20, 21–42.

¹⁷ Trans. John Gillingham, in "William the Bastard at War," in *Studies in History presented to R. Allen Brown*, ed. Christopher Harper-Bill, Christopher J. Holdsworth and Janet L. Nelson (Woodbridge, 1986), p. 148. There is a more recent translation: William of Poitiers, *Gesta Guillelmi*, ed. and trans. R. H. C. Davis and Marjorie Chibnall (New York, 1998).

¹⁸ *OV*, 4:287–96.

¹⁹ Gilbert of Mons, *Chronique*, p. 182; *Chronicle*, p. 97.

1180. The area suffered from political fragmentation, and though strong political authorities intruded into the area, their actual power was limited. The Plantagenet, Henry II, as duke of Aquitaine, had laid claim to the county of Toulouse as early as 1156, but this was rejected by the counts of Toulouse. There followed Henry's great expedition against Toulouse in 1159 and what has been called "The Forty Years War," really an intermittent series of conflicts, which dragged on until 1196. Henry's son, Richard, as duke of Aquitaine, was especially concerned with the claim to Toulouse after he had gained possession of the duchy by 1174. Inevitably, the kings of France took an interest in this dispute, and usually supported the counts of Toulouse. This conflict, therefore, became enmeshed in the wider Angevin-Capetian rivalry which in the 1180s would severely affect the region of Berry, where Bourges was an important French royal centre.²⁰ Moreover, the barons of Aquitaine did not enjoy the stern rule of their Angevin masters, and there were serious rebellions against Henry II and Richard in 1168, 1173–74, 1176, 1178/9, 1182/3, 1188, 1192 and 1193, that of 1183 being strikingly important and far-reaching because of the participation of Henry II's eldest son, Henry the Young King.²¹ But there was also another war in the same area. The kings of Aragon wanted to assert their claim to Provence, the lands east of the Rhône, and other parts of the south, against the counts of Toulouse. This resulted in a series of wars embroiling Provence, the Auvergne and the Languedoc which smouldered on in parallel with the Angevin-Capetian conflicts, particularly after 1166. It is hardly surprising that the kings of Aragon and the Angevins were commonly allies during the twelfth century.²² The consequences of all this violence are described by Stephen, abbot of St.-Geneviève of Paris, who was in the entourage of the Papal Legate, Cardinal Henri de Marcy:

I followed the bishop of Albano through mountains and valleys, through vast wastelands and the savagery of robbers and the very image of death, through burnt villages and the ruins of houses where there was no security and nothing which did not threaten peace and life itself.²³

²⁰ For the wider context see John Gillingham, *The Angevin Empire* (London, 2001). On the war see Jane P. Martindale, "'An Unfinished Business': Angevin Politics and the Siege of Toulouse, 1159," *Anglo-Norman Studies* 23 (2000), 115–54; Richard Benjamin, "A Forty Years War: Toulouse and the Plantagenets, 1156–96," *Historical Research* 61 (1988), 270–85. This author died in an accident and his supervisor, Professor John Gillingham, brought this work to press. Bourges had been purchased by Philip I (1060–1108) in 1101, on which see Jean Dunbabin, *France in the Making 843–1180* (Oxford, 1985), p. 219.

²¹ André Debord, *La société laïque dans les pays de la Charente, X^e–XII^e siècles* (Paris, 1984), pp. 382–402.

²² Charles Higounet, "La rivalité des maisons de Toulouse et de Barcelone pour la prépondérance médiévale," in Charles-Edmond Perrin, ed., *Mélanges d'histoire du moyen âge dédiés à la mémoire de Louis Halphen* (Paris, 1951), pp. 313–22.

²³ "Sequor Albanum episcopum per montes et valles, per vastas solitudines, per praedonum rabiem et mortis imaginem, per incendi villarum et ruinas domorum, ubi nihil tutum, nihil quod non minetur saluti et non insidietur vitae." Quoted in Yves M.-J. Congar, "Henri de Marcy, abbé de Clairvaux, Cardinal-Évêque d'Albano et Légat Pontifical," *Studia Anselmiana* 43 (1958), 39.

At the root of these disasters were the wars of the kings of France, England and Aragon and the counts of Toulouse, together with their friends and supporters. Contemporaries were well aware that it was the great who started wars and prosecuted them with little regard to innocent victims. Geoffroy de Breuil de Vigeois was a monk of St.-Martial at Limoges who later became abbot of Vigeois (1170–84), to the south-east of Limoges in the modern département of Corrèze. In his chronicle he records that in a single day in the spring of 1177 some nobles of the Limousin, led by Aymar, Viscount of Limoges, massacred 2,000 people of both sexes in a drive towards Brive.²⁴ But condemning such grandees and their great vassals was, to say the least, impolitic. Contemporaries, therefore, blamed their instruments, the mercenaries. These professional soldiers were used by all the great kings, but they were regarded with contempt and disdain by their employers and with fear by the Church and all others who were their victims.²⁵ The Church disliked all violence but drew a clear line between those who served kings as vassals and were, therefore, defenders of the social order, and men who only fought for money and were regarded as deeply sinful.²⁶

The grave troubles in southern Gaul explain why the vast majority of the twenty-six French bishops who attended the Third Lateran Council in 1179 were from southern Gaul. Alexander III (1159–81), now firmly in unchallenged possession of the Holy See, was determined to establish proper order in Christian society.²⁷ The concerns of the southern bishops were powerfully amplified by Henri de Marcy, abbot of Clairvaux (1176–79) and later Cardinal Legate to the area. He had written to the pope before the council, urging him to launch a crusade against the heresy which was rampant in the south. Indeed, at some time during the years 1174–77 the Cathar Council of Saint-Félix-de-Caraman (now Saint-Félix-Lauragais) had openly challenged the Roman church with the creation of four Cathar bishops for Albi, Agen, Carcassonne and Toulouse.²⁸

Of course Stephen may well have exaggerated the devastation to highlight his own devotion, but it is unlikely that he invented it.

²⁴ Geoffroy de Vigeois, *Chronica*, in vol. 2 of Philippe Labbe, *Novae Bibliothecae manuscriptorum et librorum rerum Aquitanicarum*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1657), p. 323.

²⁵ Hosler, *Henry II*, pp. 119–24, discusses Henry's employment of mercenaries while for aristocratic attitudes see Crouch, "William Marshal and the Mercenariat."

²⁶ After Hastings all the soldiers of the Norman army had to perform penance for homicide, but it was much heavier for the mercenaries than for Duke William's own men, on which see H. E. J. Cowdrey, "Bishop Ermenford of Sion and the Penitential Ordinance Following the Battle of Hastings," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 20 (1969), 225–42.

²⁷ On the Council see Raymonde Foreville, "La place de Latran III dans l'histoire conciliaire du xii siècle," in J. Longère, ed., *Communications présentées à la table ronde du CNRS 26 avril 1980* (Paris, 1982), pp. 11–31.

²⁸ Congar, "Henri de Marcy," pp. 12–19; Beverly Mayne Kienzle, *Cistercians, Heresy and Crusade in Occitania, 1145–1229: Preaching in the Lord's Vineyard* (Woodbridge, 2001), pp. 109–34. Rather curiously this work ignores the Capuchins; Bernard Guillemain, "L'épiscopat français à Latran III," in J. Longère, ed., *Le Troisième Concile de Latran (1179)* (Paris, 1982), pp. 23–32. Amongst the French bishops present who will be mentioned in this article were Guillaume de Toucy, Bishop of Auxerre (1167–81) (*Gesta Episcoporum Autissiodorensium*, in L. M. Duru,

Canon 27 of the Third Lateran Council in 1179 anathematized the heretics of Gascony, the Albigeois and the Toulousaine, and, in the very same breath condemned those called “Brabantionibus et Aragonensibus, Navariis, Bascolis, Coterellis et Triaverdinis” who destroyed churches and the countryside, the poor and the innocent without any distinction of sex or status. Anyone who employed such mercenary soldiers would have their names published in churches and be liable to excommunication. Those who associated with either the heretics or the mercenary bands would also be liable to excommunication. Anyone who acted against these outlaws, providing they were “following the council of holy bishops and priests,” would receive “a remission of two years penance and will be placed under the protection of the Church just like those who undertake the journey to Jerusalem.”²⁹

“Mercenary” (*mercenarius*) is rather a rare word in the Latin sources of the high Middle Ages, and always used pejoratively, because it clearly had heavy overtones of Christ’s words in which he contrasts the mere hireling (*mercenarius*) who flees at the first sign of trouble for his flock, with himself, the “Good Shepherd.”³⁰ It was not used in Canon 27. Geoffroy was writing his chronicle in the Limousin in the 1180s at the heart of the area troubled by these soldiers, and he recorded the terrible sufferings they inflicted. He uses the term *mercenarios* of churchmen corrupted by rich living, before going on almost immediately to list the soldiers who afflicted the Aquitaine as “Primo Basucli, postmodum Teuthonici Flandrenses et, ut rustice loquar, Brabantons, Hannuyers, Asperes, Pailer, Navar, Turlau, Vales, Roma, Cotarel, Catalans, Aragonens.”³¹ A thirteenth-century chronicler who provided valuable information on the subject of this paper referred to the mercenaries as: “Ruthariorum, Arragonensium, Bascorum, Brabantionum et aliorum conducticiorum.”³² For the most part such words derive from the supposed origins of these professional soldiers. Brabançons (men of Brabant) is the commonest word used for mercenaries in the twelfth century, but the range of terms used in these sources reflects

Bibliothèque historique de l’Yonne, 2 vols. (Auxerre and Paris, 1850–63), 1:428) and Pons d’Arsace, Archbishop of Narbonne (1162–82), on whom see below, p. 000; the earlier date of 1167 for the Council of Saint-Félix-de-Caraman is not now favored, on which see Claire Taylor, *Heresy in Medieval France: Dualism in Aquitaine and the Agenais, 1000–1249* (Woodbridge, 2005), pp. 172–73.

²⁹ Charles Joseph Hefele, *Histoire des Conciles*, ed. and trans. H. Leclercq, 9 vols. (Hildesheim, 1973), 5.2:1106–08.

³⁰ Vulgate: Iohannes 10.12–14.

³¹ Geoffroy de Vigeois, *Chronica*, p. 328. Geoffroy’s Latin is very difficult and the P. Labbe edition is not very satisfactory. However, it is the only full text of the Chronicle, though extracts from it appear in *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France*, ed. Léopold Delisle, 24 vols. (Paris, 1869–1904), 10:267–9, 11:288, 12:421–51, 18:211–23 and MGH SS 26:199–203. There is a study by Pierre Botineau, “Chronique de Geoffroi de Breuil, prieur de Vigeois,” unpublished doctoral thesis, École des Chartes (Paris, 1964), but I have not been able to obtain a copy of this.

³² Anonymous of Laon, *Chronicon Universale Anonymi Laudunensis (1154–1219)*, ed. Alexander Cartellieri and Wolf Stechele (Leipzig and Paris, 1929), p. 37.

the diverse origins of those who troubled them, recruited by rulers from several areas.

Roger of Howden was an important historian who had served as a royal clerk under Henry II and later went on crusade with Richard I (1189–99).³³ He must have come into close contact with the military household of the English kings, and had a sharp perception of the kinds of soldiers with whom he was dealing.³⁴ He always uses the term *Brabanceni* and is careful to distinguish them from others in the service of King Henry.³⁵ *Aragonensibus*, *Navariis*, *Bascolis* and *Hannuyers* are, respectively, those from Aragon, Navarre, the Basque lands and Hainaut. *Turlau* could refer to Le Puy-Turlau (Périgord) or Turlau near the town of Curemonte (Corrèze) but these seem unlikely, while *Vales* and *Roma* are obscure. *Asperes* poses difficulties. Geoffroy de Vigeois includes them in a list of people from the Netherlands, but goes on to mention Aragonese and others in the same breath. Asperen, in what is now Holland, is a possible place of origin, but so is Vallée d’Aspe (Pyrénées Atlantiques, région du Béarn). Alternatively this may be derived from Latin *asper* (rough) (which perhaps could be rendered in English as “ruffians”) or an allusion to the *asperiolus*, a coin. Other obvious generic terms are *Rutharii* – derived from *Rupta* or *Ruta*, meaning men of the companies, analogous to *routiers* – *conducticii* and *coterelles*, and all could be translated as gangsters or cut-throats in English.³⁶ *Triaverdinis*, used in the list given by Canon 27, is a very rare word which Ducange thinks may be connected with *Trialemello* meaning thrice-armored. Geoffroy de Vigeois explicitly reserves *Palearii* (rough sleepers) for a large group of diverse origins who were sent to the Limousin by Philip II Augustus, King of France (1180–1223), to assist those who supported the rebellion of his eldest son, Henry “the Young King,” against Henry II in 1183. Interestingly, Geoffroy reports that the young king was afraid his father would hire these mercenaries away from him by paying them more.³⁷ In his list of mercenaries Geoffroy gives pride of place to the Basques (*Basculi*), and this is paralleled in *The Miracles of Our Lady of Rocamadour*, which report a number of stories connected with mercenaries,

³³ David Corner, “Howden,” in *Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2005–), <http://www.oxforddnb.com/articles/>

³⁴ The classic study of the military household is that of J. O. Prestwich, “The Military Household of the Norman Kings,” *English Historical Review* 96 (1981), 1–35. It should be said that we have no comparable study of the household under the Angevins though the work of S. D. Church, *The Household Knights of King John* (Cambridge, 1999) is very valuable.

³⁵ Roger of Howden, *Chronica*, ed. William Stubbs, 4 vols. (London, 1868–71), 2:47, 51, 55, 64–5.

³⁶ I have used Charles du Fresne Du Cange, *Glossarium ad scriptores mediae et infimae Latinitatis*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1678); J. F. Niermeyer and C. Van der Kieft, *Mediae Latinitatis Lexicon Minus*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 2002) and other dictionaries. I would like to thank Nicolas Prouteau of the University of Toulouse who consulted Ernest Langlois, *Table des noms propres de toute nature compris dans les chansons de geste* (Paris, 1904) and introduced me to www.gencom.org which is so valuable for topographic and village names before the French Revolution.

³⁷ Geoffroy de Vigeois, *Chronica*, p. 334. *Palearii* is connected with *paleare* meaning a stack of straw: Niermeyer and Van der Kieft, *Mediae Latinitatis Lexicon Minus*, 2:983.

at first always referring to Basques, but later changing to Brabançons.³⁸ This change may reflect the increasingly firm action taken by the Angevins, for they were great hirers of Brabançons, as Howden makes clear. Amongst the stories about mercenaries, the Rocamadour miracles report that Mende, attacked by Basques and Brabançons, was saved after its inhabitants prayed to Our Lady of Rocamadour, who caused part of the wall to fall on the attackers, frightening them off. This collection was created after 1172 and the stories indicate the long-term presence of the mercenaries in the area.³⁹ This extraordinary range of terms reflects the fact that southern and central Gaul was the theater for several conflicts whose protagonists recruited in different areas. These conflagrations came to a head in the early 1180s. Even Howden, who must, as a servant of Henry II, have been inured to the horrors of war, comments on the ruthless devastation of the area by mercenaries.⁴⁰

A combination of circumstances raised these wars to a new pitch towards 1180. The Emperor Frederick Barbarossa (1152–90) had ambitions west of the Saône-Rhône corridor, and in 1166 it was probably his mercenaries (Brabançons) who supported Count William of Chalon in his attack on Cluny, which resulted in a massacre of the town militia. Shortly after this, Louis VII and Barbarossa concluded a treaty outlawing mercenaries in their lands, but excluding those permanently retained by a lord or married to local women.⁴¹ Although the treaty between Frederick and Louis VII ended this particular confrontation, mercenaries employed by the emperor must have continued to move down the Saône-Rhône corridor to the western passes into Italy which Frederick often used, and after the treaty of Venice of 1177 they would have found themselves out of work as the Italian wars fizzled out. Alfonso II (1162–96) of Aragon was particularly vigorous in pursuing the claims of his house in southern Gaul against the house of Toulouse. In 1180 his brother, the count of Provence, was assassinated, and

³⁸ Marcus Bull, ed., *The Miracles of Our Lady of Rocamadour* (Woodbridge, 1999) refers to Basques (pp. 104–05, 134), to Basques and Brabançons (p. 184), and Brabançons only (pp. 191, 192–3).

³⁹ Bull, *Miracles of Rocamadour*, pp. 104–05, 134, 184, 191, 192–3. I would like to thank Marcus Bull for drawing my attention to this aspect of the *Miracles*.

⁴⁰ Howden, *Chronica*, 2:277; on this chronicler's knowledge of the Aquitaine see John Gillingham, "Events and Opinions: Norman and English Views of Aquitaine, c. 1152–c. 1204," in Marcus Bull and Catherine Légü, eds., *The World of Eleanor of Aquitaine: Literature and Society in Southern France between the Eleventh and Thirteenth Centuries* (Woodbridge, 2005), pp. 71–81.

⁴¹ Edmond Martène and Ursin Durand, *Veterum scriptorum et monumentorum historicorum, dogmaticorum, moralium; amplissima collectio*, 9 vols. (Paris, 1724–33), 2:880–81, and also MGH *Diplomata* 10/3.No. 575, 46–7; Marcel Pacaut, *Louis VII et son royaume* (Paris, 1964), pp. 88–90; Giles Constable, "The Abbot and Townsmen of Cluny in the Twelfth Century," in David Abulafia, Michael J. Franklin and Miri Rubin, eds., *Church and City 1000–1500: Essays in Honour of Christopher Brooke* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 161–63, reprinted in Giles Constable, *Cluny from the Tenth to the Twelfth Centuries* (Aldershot, 2000), and see Brown, "Military Service and Monetary Reward," p. 29.

this led to a close alliance with Henry II in 1181 and a new phase of war.⁴² The rebellion of Henry II's son, Henry the Young King, in 1183 triggered a particularly violent convulsion in the Limousin as the lords of the area took the opportunity to rise against Henry II and his son, Duke Richard. The death of Henry the Young King on 11 June 1183 did not end the rebellion led by Aimar of Limoges and Archambaud de Comborn. The rebels were supported by the king of France and the count of Toulouse, and savage fighting ravaged the area.

These horrors had prompted the condemnation of mercenaries issued at the Third Lateran Council in 1179, but the Council went further than mere condemnation. Canon 27 offered to those who took active steps to attack the heretics and mercenaries something of the status of crusaders: "a remission of two years penance and [placement] under the protection of the Church just like those who undertake the journey to Jerusalem."⁴³ The mention of Jerusalem cannot have been accidental. In this way action against the enemies of Christendom in southern Gaul was given enormous prestige and appeal. The architect of Canon 27 was Henri de Marcy, who had become firmly convinced of the need for a crusade against the heretics.⁴⁴ By 1181 he was Cardinal of Albano and a Papal Legate, and in that year led the "Crusade against Lavaur," which violently eliminated a major heretic center 30 kilometers north of Toulouse, where Count Roger of Béziers, his wife, and numerous heretics had taken refuge. The surrender of this place was attributed by the *Chronicle of Clairvaux* to a miracle. By the terms of the surrender all the heretics renounced their errors, though it seems that most soon lapsed.⁴⁵ In September 1181 Henri de Marcy, in his capacity as Papal Legate to southern Gaul, attended a council at Le Puy, very shortly after his triumph in the "Crusade of Lavaur." He subsequently summoned Councils at Bazas on 24 November and Limoges on 28 February 1182.⁴⁶ Since his legacy was specifically intended to purify the Church and to mitigate the evils which the area was suffering, and since he was the architect of Canon 27 of Third Lateran, it is not hard to imagine that he urged these assemblies to take militant steps, for that was the whole tenor of his preaching mission in southern Gaul. Canon 27 was an astonishing decree for it in effect created a crusade against heretics and mercenaries, but did not specify who could call it. Those who took such action could only do so "following the council of holy bishops and priests." This radical step reflected the breakdown of society and its institutions in southern Gaul at this time.

⁴² Geoffroy de Vigeois, *Chronica*, p. 326; Higounet, "Rivalité des maisons de Toulouse et de Barcelone," p. 386.

⁴³ See above, p. 7, n. 29.

⁴⁴ Kienzle, *Cistercians, Heresy and Crusade in Occitania*, pp. 121–24, 127.

⁴⁵ Geoffroy de Vigeois, *Chronica*, 326; Howden, *Chronica*, 2:160–66; Congar, "Henri de Marcy," pp. 35–38.

⁴⁶ Claude de Vic and Jean Vaissette, *Histoire Générale de Languedoc*, 15 vols. (Toulouse, 1872–92), 8:341–44, 371–73; Hefele, *Histoire des Conciles*, 5:2.112.

Canon 27 urges a crusade against heretics and mercenaries, yet the significance and distinctiveness of this has not been recognized by modern historians. This is because the Capuchin movement has been seen in the light of an older tradition of peace-making which was important in southern Gaul at the time, and which itself is often connected with the crusading movement. The Peace and Truce of God has attracted much attention, both as something of importance in itself and because many have thought it played an important role in preparing men's minds for the appeal made at Clermont in 1095. This view was firmly endorsed by Erdmann, Delaruelle and Duby, to name simply the most important, and through them it passed into the common currency of crusader writing.⁴⁷ The only writer to have contested this view is Marcus Bull, who sharply doubts the impact of this movement on the arms-bearing laity by the end of the eleventh century.⁴⁸ The bishops of southern Gaul instituted The Peace of God in the later tenth century to combat the violence and disorder arising from the eclipse of royal power and the subsequent competition between rival local magnates.⁴⁹ At the Council of Le Puy in 975 Bishop Guy (c.975–93) had attempted to extract an oath from the arms-bearers of the region to respect the peace. This began the "Peace of God," which for over half a century attempted to impose a degree of stability in central and southern Gaul and even beyond. We tend to think of it simply as a form of moral pressure upon the arms-bearers, not least because of the vivid picture painted by Rodulfus Glaber who was writing in the 1030s at the height of the movement. He portrays a Peace Council as a kind of fervent camp-meeting, at which relics were exposed, miracles performed and sermons preached, at the culmination of which the bishops demanded an oath to observe the peace:

Such enthusiasm was generated that all the bishops raised their crosiers to the heavens, and all cried out with one voice to God, their hands extended: "Peace! Peace! Peace!" This was the sign of their perpetual covenant with God. It was understood that after five years all should repeat this wonderful celebration in order to confirm the peace.⁵⁰

But while the moral pressure of the excited masses was important, it was accompanied by the threat of force. Bishop Guy was able to call upon his relatives, the counts of Brioude and Gévaudan, to help him threaten the recalcitrant.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Carl Erdman, *Origins of the Idea of the Crusade*, trans. Marshall W. Baldwin and Walter Goffart (Princeton, 1977), chap II, pp. 57–94; Etienne Delaruelle, "Essai sur la formation de l'idée de Croisade," *Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique* 45 (1944), 37–42; Georges Duby, "Laity and the Peace of God," in *The Chivalrous Society*, trans. Cynthia Postan (London, 1977), pp. 124–31.

⁴⁸ Marcus Bull, *Knightly Piety and the Lay Response to the First Crusade: The Limousin and Gascony c.970–c.1130* (Oxford, 1993), chap. 1, pp. 21–69.

⁴⁹ On the movement in general see Roger Bonnaud-Delamare, "Fondement des institutions de paix au xi siècle," in *Mélanges d'Histoire dédiés à la mémoire de Louis Halphen* (Paris, 1951), pp. 19–26.

⁵⁰ Rodulfus Glaber, *Historiarum Libri Quinque*, in *Opera*, ed. John France (Oxford, 1989), 4:16, pp. 196–97.

⁵¹ H. E. J. Cowdrey, "The Peace and Truce of God in the Eleventh Century," *Past and Present* 46 (1970), 42–67.

Aimo de Bourbon, Archbishop of Bourges (1031–71), carried this to its logical conclusion by embodying a militia of peasants and some nobles which enjoyed a degree of military success before this attempt to create an army of the Church fell foul of local aristocratic faction and was destroyed in 1038.⁵²

The Truce of God (*Treuga Dei*) originated at the Council of Elne in 1027 and became important after the Council of Arles in 1041. It was a rather different concept which from its inception neither sought nor received the same mass enthusiasm. Instead of seeking to protect people, it tried to limit the violence of the powerful by forbidding fighting between Thursday and Monday in memory of the Crucifixion and in veneration of the Sabbath. At the same time those who promulgated it proclaimed that it was evil for any Christian to kill another. Implicitly this encouraged the arms-bearers to vent their violence upon non-Christians, though the immediate purpose was probably to reinforce their message of peace.⁵³ The movement survived as a result of agreements between bishops and local magnates, and indeed spread as a useful instrument in the hands of secular lords, producing the *Landfrieden* in Germany.⁵⁴ It may have lost some of its vigor in the course of the eleventh century, but Thomas Bisson has argued that it was revived by Urban II (1088–99) as a means of ensuring security for the lands of absent crusaders, especially in the troubled south of Gaul.⁵⁵ Bull does not think there was a “deep-seated ideological linkage” with the expedition proposed in 1095 at Clermont, and suggests that Urban was simply using it as a device to reassure potential crusaders.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, Bisson produces convincing evidence that in southern Gaul its vitality continued. In 1140 a Synod at Auch was demanding peace-oaths and in 1155 Louis VII of France (1137–80) proclaimed the “General Peace of the Whole Realm” shortly after a journey through the south to Compostella in 1155. Local peace agreements between bishops and magnates are quite frequent in Narbonne (1149–74) where the Templars were involved, confirmed by popes as late as 1190. They are also found at Elne (1156), and Tarascon (1226), where the agreements allowed for the raising of money and a peace-militia. In 1163 the count of Toulouse and the bishop of Albi made a peace proclamation after concluding an agreement with the viscount of Béziers. There were other agreements at Toulouse in 1163, Comminges in 1170 (where a peace-tax received papal confirmation), Rodez in

⁵² Thomas Head, “Andrew of Fleury’s Account of the Peace League of Bourges,” in Thomas Head and Richard Landes, eds., *The Peace of God: Social Violence and Religious Response in France around the Year 1000* (Ithaca, NY, 1992), pp. 219–38.

⁵³ Thomas Head and Richard Landes, “Introduction,” in Head and Landes, eds., *The Peace of God*, pp. 7–9. Cowdrey, “Peace and Truce of God,” p. 44.

⁵⁴ Aryeh Grabois, “De la trêve de Dieu à la paix du roi: Étude sur la transformation du mouvement de la paix au XII siècle,” in P. Gallais et Y-J. Riou, eds., *Mélanges offerts à René Crozet à l’occasion de son soixante-dixième anniversaire par ses amis, ses collègues, ses élèves et les membres du C.É.S.C.M.*, 2 vols. (Poitiers, 1966), 1:585–96.

⁵⁵ Thomas Bisson, “The Organized Peace in Southern France and Catalonia ca. 1140–1223,” *American Historical Review* 82 (1977), 295.

⁵⁶ Bull, *Knightly Piety*, pp. 58–59.

1169–70, Rouergue in 1169, Béziers in 1170, Rousillon in 1173, Albi in 1190, the Bordelais under Richard I in the years 1189–95 and Montpellier in 1215. Clearly agreements between the high nobility and the upper ranks of the Church were important efforts to stabilize society in southern Gaul, leading Bisson to comment: “the old *condominia* of higher clergy and baronage, ... as we are now learning, had survived the age of ecclesiastical reform.”⁵⁷

The effectiveness of such declarations is another matter. It is possible, but far from certain, that it was a coalition of this kind which gathered an army and crushed a group of Richard’s mercenaries in 1177.⁵⁸ Moral influences of this kind backed by the likelihood of force presumably had some restraining power provided they were backed by a broad consensus of aristocrats and senior clergy. However, the crisis of the mercenaries in the very early 1180s did not evoke any such response. Some of the lords of the area were clearly involved with the mercenaries, as witness Geoffroy de Vigeois’s story about Ebles VII de Charenton at Dun-le-Roi near Bourges, which will be discussed later.⁵⁹ Unemployed mercenaries and their families needed places to stay and markets, and this offered opportunities for lords. More simply, the local nobility were caught up in the rivalries of the great and forced to take sides. No consensus with the bishops could, therefore, arise. These divisions also go some way to explain the short life of the Capuchin movement which, despite its effectiveness and enormous spread, seems to have vanished by 1184.

Faced with this situation the bishops of the south at the Third Lateran sought an alternative, and under the leadership of Henri de Marcy found it in the notion of a crusade. Probably the hope may have been to enlist a sufficient force to overawe the quarreling forces in the area. In a sense this happened, but in a novel way, for the effect of Canon 27 was to create an armed fraternity originating at Le Puy in 1182, and founded in a wave of popular enthusiasm under the auspices of the Virgin, striving by armed might to impose peace. They were called Capuchins (*capuciati*) because they wore a distinctive hood (*capucium* or *caputium*) and cloak bearing a badge of the Virgin and Child.

Geoffroy de Vigeois wrote his account of the Capuchins very shortly before his death and it has a sense of immediacy. According to Geoffroy, a poor man of Le Puy, a carpenter called Peter Durandus, was inspired by a vision of the Virgin to approach the bishop of Le Puy, Peter IV of Solignac (1159–89), urging him to preach an oath of peace. The bishop was at first dismissive of this pious and humble man, but as the movement grew and organized itself, he was moved to support it. All who agreed to take the oath were required, apparently at the bidding of the Virgin, to wear a white hood (*caputium*) blazoned with her image

⁵⁷ Bisson, “The Organized Peace in Southern France and Catalonia,” p. 311.

⁵⁸ These continuations of the Peace Movement are noted by Frederic L. Cheyette, *Ermengarde of Narbonne and the World of the Troubadours* (Ithaca, NY, 2001), p. 283.

⁵⁹ See below, p. 20.

and the words “Agnus Dei qui tollis peccata Mundi, dona nobis pacem.”⁶⁰ He goes on to make it clear that this was a substantial movement, and his account implies that the Capuchins were already a considerable force before the death of “the Young King” on 11 June 1183, suggesting they originated in 1182–83. Robert of Torigni (c.1110–86), Abbot of Mont-St.-Michel from 1154, wrote a *Chronicon* in which he failed to mention the carpenter’s name, but confirms that a carpenter had a vision of the Virgin who presented him with an icon inscribed with the *Agnus Dei*. He was to report this to the bishop and bid him preach the peace, and the sign of its adherents would be a white hood and the icon of Our Lady. Robert stresses that the movement was joined by clergy and people of all classes and succeeded in destroying the enemies of the peace.⁶¹

Rigord was the author of a life of Philip Augustus, completed in 1196 then revised by 1200. He died in 1209. He emphasizes that the problems of the area arose from the quarrel between Aragon and Toulouse (thereby disassociating the king of France from these difficulties), and asserts that God sent aid not through any great person but Durand, a poor man of Le Puy who, shortly before the Assumption, had a vision of Christ who presented him with the picture of the Virgin and its inscription, which became the emblem of the movement. On the feast of the Assumption, Bishop Peter and a great assembly of the princes and people of the area listened to an exhortation by Durand, and all were moved to take an oath to maintain the peace and to wear a white scapular set with the holy icon of the Virgin as signs of adherence to this strict fraternity.⁶² Gervase of Canterbury was a Benedictine monk and chronicler (c.1145–c.1210) who started his *Chronica* about 1188, covering the period from 1100 to his own time. He stresses the ravages of the *Brabaceni* and says that an un-named carpenter of Le Puy had a vision of the Virgin who bade him preach the peace. He was at first reluctant, but eventually approached the bishop, who was impressed. Bishop Peter of Solignac then spoke secretly to twelve prominent good men of Le Puy who agreed to support the fraternity which then spread like wildfire, enlisting clergy and laity, rich and poor, who wore the hood bearing a leaden seal of the Virgin.⁶³

⁶⁰ Geoffroy de Vigeois, *Chronica*, pp. 338–39: “O Lamb of God, who takest away the sins of the world: grant us peace” (trans. *The English Missal for the Laity* [London, 1958], p. 325) is a prayer said in the Canon of the Mass between the consecration of the Host and the Communion. It would, therefore, have been very well known to the laity as well as the clergy; D. Kennelly, “Medieval Towns and the Peace of God,” *Medievalia et Humanistica* 15 (1963), 35–53, notes that the seal of Narbonne bore this same device and inscription, but this dates from 1218.

⁶¹ Robert of Torigni, *Chronicon*, in Richard Howlett, ed., *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I*, 4 vols. (London, 1884–89), 2:309.

⁶² Rigord, *Histoire de Philippe Auguste*, ed. Elisabeth Carpentier, Georges Pon and Yves Chauvin (Paris, 2006), Book 1, ch. 25, pp. 168–69. The older edition is that of H. François Delaborde, ed., *Gesta Philippi Augusti Christianissimi Francorum Regis*, in *Oeuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1882–85).

⁶³ Gervase of Canterbury, *Chronica*, in William Stubbs, ed., *The Historical Works of Gervase of Canterbury*, 2 vols. (London, 1879–80), 1:300–302, trans. Joseph Stevenson, *The Church Historians of England*, vol. 5, part 1 (London, 1879), p. 304.