

— *Monografías* —

THE THEATRE
OF ANTONIO
BUERO VALLEJO

IDEOLOGY, POLITICS
AND CENSORSHIP

Catherine O'Leary



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THE THEATRE OF ANTONIO BUERO VALLEJO

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This monograph examines the complex relationship between Antonio Buero Vallejo (1916–2000) and the ideologies of Francoist and post-Franco Spain. The central focus of the study is Buero's political theatre and his employment of myth and history to challenge the notion of an *España eterna*. It also considers Buero's creation of his own myths and his revision of history in order to rationalize and justify his own stance.

Censorship, both official and environmental, was the principal point of contact between writer and regime. The decisions made by Buero Vallejo in his determination to write and stage committed drama in a repressive society are evaluated here. Rejecting the more provocative stance of some other committed dramatists, as well as the position of those who resolved to ignore the political and social reality, Buero's choice, with its inherent contradictions and ambiguities, was *posibilismo*. This book looks at his pragmatic employment of language and silence, both in his art and in his dealings with the censors and with other representatives of the hegemony and analyses how *posibilismo* both aided and limited him.

The monograph also gives an account of Buero's post-Franco theatre, which to date has not received the attention that it merits. It examines the reasons for its initial negative reception and its renewed importance in today's Spain. Buero's post-Franco insistence on rejecting the *pacto de olvido* is perhaps more relevant now than ever before.

CATHERINE O'LEARY lectures in Spanish at the National University of Ireland, Maynooth.

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BUERO VALLEJO

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CENSORSHIP

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TAMESIS

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Introduction

*Ofendería, insultaría a los conocimientos y a la inteligencia de ustedes si dijera que, para lograr grandes obras de creación, hay que trabajar en libertad total. Pues todos sabemos que bajo las peores situaciones – antes me lo he permitido recordar – también se han dado creaciones extraordinarias. Y así sucedió también, sin libertad, en la anterior situación española.*¹

Antonio Buero Vallejo, who died on 28 April 2000, was the most important Spanish dramatist of the post-Civil War period. In his long career as a playwright, Buero published thirty original plays. Only three of these have never been performed.² This book focuses on the committed dramas and therefore has little to say about certain plays such as *El terror inmóvil*, *La señal que se espera* (1952), *Madrugada* (1953), *Hoy es fiesta* (1955), *Irene, o el tesoro* (1954) and *Una extraña armonía*, which do not deal with the themes of history, myth and ideology and contain only very limited social comment. It concentrates instead on an analysis of the more political dramas as the basis for an investigation of Buero's engagement with the ideologies of Francoism and of post-Franco Spain.

Despite his Republican allegiances, Buero Vallejo was the most commercially successful dramatist of the Franco era. In the 1950s, Buero was hailed as the saviour of the Spanish theatre and praised for the social realism of his work and for his exposé of the tragedy of a divided Spain. He was condemned by others, however, particularly as his success and reputation grew, for what was seen as his capitulation to the pressures of censorship and finally for coming to form a part of the Francoist Establishment, lending his prestige to the regime by accepting its honours. Thus his dedication to social drama and his opposition to the regime were brought into question. Yet, while he was at times damned for his silences by some of his contemporaries, so too was he denounced for his words by Franco's censors.

¹ Antonio Buero Vallejo, *Obra Completa*, ed. by Luis Iglesias Feijoo and Mariano de Paco, Clásicos Castellanos Nueva Serie, 2 vols (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1994), II, 497–8. Further references to these volumes are given after quotations in the text.

² *El terror inmóvil* (1949), *Una extraña armonía* (1956) and *Mito* (1967). Both *Mito* and *Una extraña armonía* were authorized for staging by the censorship authorities but, according to the *Obra Completa*, have never been staged. All of the dates given for the plays refer to the date of composition.

It is difficult to refute Alfonso Sastre's assertion that Buero was operating from *within* the Francoist system.³ Buero did choose to remain and work in Spain, and to adopt an attitude of compromise and *posibilismo* in his work and in his dealings with the regime. The question of whether this made Buero a *pluma prostituida*, as was suggested by some of his detractors, is addressed here. This book explores the degree of compromise inherent in his stance, considers his social commitment and investigates the contradictions evident in his relationship with Franco's repressive regime. Buero was neither radical nor evasionist, and his rebellion, in so far as it existed, often appeared to be more a moral than a political one. This study shows that, throughout his career, Buero used his theatre to defend his chosen stance against his many critics. Furthermore, it argues that the portraits of artists and intellectuals in his dramatic works are an attempt to justify and rationalize his peculiar position as the occasionally acceptable face of criticism: the critic within the system.

Buero's relationship with Francoism and its ideology was dominated by words and silences, which were carefully chosen. He is an important dramatist both for what he said and for what he failed to say about the society in which he lived and worked. For Buero, the choice was always one of silence or protest, yet he was criticized for failing to speak out in support of others, for the limited nature of his dissent, and, paradoxically, for daring to say too much.

The historical link between literature and ideology is evaluated, particularly with regard to the theatre, and the perceived threat posed by literature is identified. This book agrees with Eagleton's claim:

Language, that most innocent and spontaneous of common currencies, is in reality a terrain scarred, fissured and divided by the cataclysms of political history, strewn with the relics of imperialist, nationalist, regionalist and class combat. [. . .] Literature is an agent as well as effect of such struggles.⁴

The regime's concern with language, designed to convince others of its authority and to rationalize its dominant position, was allied to a determination to control the language used by others. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the regime legislated for silence also, by introducing measures to censor critical commentaries and to eliminate the voice of dissent. Censorship, of course, is the main point of contact between the writer and the dominant societal ideology. Buero defined it as:

un arma del poder político que pretende manipular y restringir la información pública, así como ahorrar el derecho de expresión y las actividades culturales

³ In an article critical of Buero Vallejo, Sastre defined the former's posture thus: 'Es preciso hacer un teatro posible en España, aunque para ello sea preciso realizar ciertos sacrificios que se derivan de la necesidad de acomodarse de algún modo a la estructura de las dificultades que se oponen a nuestro trabajo.' 'Teatro imposible y pacto social', *Primer Acto*, no. 14 (1960), 1–2 (p. 1).

⁴ Terry Eagleton, *Criticism and Ideology. A Study in Marxist Literary Theory* (London: Verso, 1998), pp. 54, 55.

en los marcos ideológicos oficiales. Todo ello la define como un arma contra la libertad del hombre.⁵

Buero recognized the power of language and its influence and sought to outwit the censors and propagandists at language manipulation. His achievement was to manipulate language in order to create a counter-mythology that directly contradicted that of the administration. However, Buero's employment of the device of *posibilismo* to do this left him open to charges of collaboration with the system or, at the very least, of self-censorship. This book thus explores the ambiguity of his position as one who would be at once critical of and acceptable to the regime. Buero Vallejo's theatre, while mild in comparison to some other theatre of opposition, was calculated to be so and was successful as a result. Nonetheless, the question then arises whether Buero was limited by his own values and beliefs and by the parameters laid down by the regime, which he usually accepted. In his dramatic works, Buero defined the role of the artist as both a moral and a political one; this book compares his words with his actions. In addition, it asks whether writers such as Buero Vallejo were engaged in a type of self-induced bewilderment or self-deception, by their determination to believe that they were really challenging the regime to the best of their ability by remaining in Spain.

While the censorship of Buero's work and the silencing of his views in public are evidence of the regime's mistrust of him and of an awareness of the influence of his words, his career as a dramatist under Franco was very successful. This raises the question of why he was not censored more. After all, many of his contemporaries and later dramatists, who were not as clearly identified with Republicanism as Buero was, were more heavily censored.⁶ Hence this study explores whether his successes were owing to the subtlety and intelligence of his argument and method, the failings of the censors and the censorship legislation or some other cause.

Also analysed are Buero's attempts to subvert official history and to demystify the regime's presentation of itself and what Raymond Williams termed, 'a sense of *predisposed continuity*'.⁷ The analysis is extended to show how Buero's historical

⁵ Quoted in Antonio Beneyto, *Censura y política en los escritores españoles* (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, 1979), p. 21. On p. 11 of the same book, Beneyto says of censorship: 'No cabe duda que la censura es el medio represivo de que disponen los gobiernos débiles de todo el mundo para despersonalizar a la población y convertirla en una masa uniforme, compacta, produciendo en ella una parálisis política, social, cultural, etc. [. . .] o sea, que el pueblo se encuentra ante tal actitud en la obligación de pensar lo que el Gobierno le impone.'

⁶ Buero Vallejo was active on the Republican side in the Civil War. In an episode that demonstrates both the brutality of the victors and their manipulation of language, Buero was initially sentenced to death in the aftermath of the war for his 'adhesión a la rebelión'. Luciano García Lorenzo, 'Reportaje biográfico', Luciano García Lorenzo and others, *Antonio Buero Vallejo: Premio 'Miguel de Cervantes' 1986*, Ámbitos literarios/Premios Cervantes, 12 (Barcelona: Anthros-Ministerio de Cultura, 1987), pp. 13–35 (p. 18).

⁷ Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 116.

and mythical dramas challenge the notion of fate and instead stress history as progression. The study then moves on to question Buero's own motivated use of history and myth and his controversial portraits of certain historical figures.

The transition period is examined as a time of ideological crisis, and the dismantling of the elements that had previously supported the dominant ideology is reviewed. It was a period when old myths were deliberately forgotten and new ones created. This led to a determination to forget the past and to embrace the *pacto de olvido*, which was to be the focus of Buero's post-Franco theatre.

Buero wrote some of his most important political work in the post-Franco period and took a moralistic stance on accountability and remembering. However, these works display a disillusionment and pessimism not in evidence in his earlier dramas. Finally, the book explores the choices made by the dramatist when at last free to speak clearly and assesses the claim that 'contra Franco escribía mejor'. In his depictions of past and present, Buero once again raised questions of a *pluma prostituida* and the contradictory nature of his relationship both to the Francoist ideology and to modern democratic Spain.

The Ideology of Francoism

Truth and Distortion

There is no agreed definition of the Francoist ideology. It was more than simple illusion or false consciousness, and it did not merely falsify reality to reflect the values of the dominant group. It was more than symbol and myth; it contained lived elements in the discourse between politics and society.¹ It was also the signs and values infused with certain motivated meanings in this discourse. It necessarily comprised both truth and myth. The presence of myth was the inevitable result of manipulating particular, often commonly held, values in an attempt to legitimate or rationalize certain self-serving political actions; the truth it contained was the reason many gave their consent to the preservation of the status quo.

The essential distortion of the Francoist ideology was that it claimed to reflect, rather than dictate, societal values. The regime did not merely impose unwanted values by force, as this would have led to greater resistance; rather it encompassed certain societal values, for example those of Roman Catholicism, in a larger, ruling ideology, often falsifying them to suit its needs in the process. It also traded on populist views of national identity. Under Franco, the dominant ideology contained elements of many alternative and residual practices, such as monarchism, theocracy and fascism. By amalgamating the Falange and other factions into the Movimiento, Franco not only reduced the power of each individual faction, but could also claim to reflect the values and identities of many differing groups in Spanish society. Moreover, Franco realized that by controlling or influencing what Althusser termed the 'ideological state apparatuses', the ruling elite could influence and shape the values, choices and

¹ In this sense it is similar to Raymond Williams's definition of hegemony: 'It is a lived system of meanings and values – constitutive and constituting – which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming. It thus constitutes a sense of reality for most people in the society, a sense of absolute because experienced reality beyond which it is very difficult for most members of the society to move, in most areas of their lives. [. . .] It is a realized complex of experiences, relationships, and activities, with specific and changing pressures and limits. [. . .] It does not just passively exist as a form of dominance. It has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended, and modified. It is also continually resisted, limited, altered, challenged by pressures not at all its own.' *Marxism and Literature*, pp. 110, 112.

lived reality of the populace.² The desire for longevity and the perpetuation of the social order was a preoccupation of Franco's, as is evident from his determination to choose his successor and to inculcate in him the ideology of the new regime.

In his essay on ideology and the state, Althusser stressed the crucial role of state institutions in the maintenance of a dominant ideology. Through these state institutions the populace is taught know-how compatible with the ruling ideology. The different social groups or classes were educated to be contented with their positions in the order of society and not to question their subjugation to the dominant ideology. In order for the ideology of the ruling class to take hold, it is thus necessary for the state institutions to become infused with it. Althusser divided these institutions into the repressive state apparatuses, such as the army, and the ideological state apparatuses, such as the media, culture, the education system and the Church. While the former are primarily concerned with the use of force, sanctions and threats in their support of the dominant ideology, the latter collude with the controlling group in the dissemination of the ruling ideology and the instruction of the masses of their place within it. The state apparatus, which functions as a repressive force in society, incorporates the government, the judiciary, the prison services, the police and the army. In Francoist Spain, the Civil Guard and the armed police were both under military control and were used to repel external sources of threat, whether real or mythical, and also to maintain order in society by warding off internal sources of threat. Throughout his dictatorship, Franco employed these repressive forces to back up the dominant ideology and to quash any perceived threat, such as that posed by the miners and students in the late 1950s and the 1960s.

In order to succeed, it is clear that those in possession of state power must also control the state apparatuses. If they do not, they are unlikely to retain hegemony for long. During the Second Republic in Spain, the rulers did not always control the state apparatuses, and thus did not have a firm grip on the power they were democratically elected to wield. When the Nationalists took control after the Civil War, they purged all of the state agencies of any opposition, thus ensuring the conservation of the state power that they had seized. The control of the repressive state apparatuses, while necessary, was not sufficient to ensure the subjection of the populace to the new social order: for this, the so-called ideological state apparatuses also had to be employed. The Franco regime was fortunate to have the co-operation of the Roman Catholic Church, which had seen its role diminished in Republican Spain. The ideology of the Roman Catholic Church coincided with the Francoist ideology in many respects, and both the Church and the regime took full advantage of this fact.

² Louis Althusser, 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes towards an Investigation', in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. by Ben Brewster (London: NLB, 1971), pp. 121–73.

The appeal of the ideological state apparatuses is, of course, their capacity for social control; they can be used to affirm the ruling ideology through ritual, anthems and ceremonies. By justifying the distribution of economic and political power, they allow the ruling group to maintain its dominant position, and they also aid in coercion and eliciting consent. They help the governing elite to define the boundaries within which individuals may exercise free will. Recognizing this, the nascent regime quickly set about securing the control, or the collaboration, of the ideological apparatuses. The outlawing of political parties and representative trade unions meant that, in addition, the only ideology that could be legally communicated was the ruling one.

The ruling group recognized that it had to command both the repressive and the ideological state apparatuses in order to control both the public and the private domains. The army, the police and the courts, while primarily repressive forces, were also infused with the dominant ideology, which they defended by force in the public domain. The Church, the schools, the media and the arts operate in the private sphere and, although primarily ideological, also used sanctions such as excommunication, expulsion and censorship. All were united by, and under, the ruling ideology. Once the ruling elite controlled both the public and private domains, it could define the role of the individual within each and quell any attempt at self-definition or self-determination. The co-operation of the ideological apparatuses ensured that even the private realm was permeated with a politically driven ideology.

The regime's laws reflected the Francoist ideology in an attempt to legitimize the New State in the name of an ill-defined common good. The regime's willingness to impose sanctions can be seen in its legislation. In 1938, the *Fuero del trabajo* abolished normal trade unions and the right to strike in the name of the integrity of the *Patria*. Falangist influence was also evident in its determination to return to the Spanish people 'la Patria, el Pan y la Justicia'.³ A 1940 law created the Tribunal Especial para la Represión de la Masonería y el Comunismo, which blamed the Freemasons and Communists for Spain's ills and was used to justify the harsh repression of Republicans in the aftermath of the Civil War. The *Código Penal*, introduced in December 1944, specified the severe material sanctions for behaviour that contradicted or challenged the dominant ideology, including reprisals for the communication of illegal propaganda. The *Fuero de los españoles*, introduced in July 1945, strengthened the Church-state alliance by establishing Roman Catholicism as the official state religion. Article 12 of the *Fuero*, in keeping with the ruling ideology, gave the impression of free will, which was nevertheless contradicted by the presence of censorship and other repressive legislation. It stated: 'Todo español podrá expresar libremente sus

³ This was the slogan of the national-sindicalist group, the Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista (JONS), whose mythology was important in the Francoist ideology. It was included in the preamble to the *Fuero del trabajo*. Quoted in Manuel Vázquez Montalbán, *Los demonios familiares de Franco. (Los tics obsesivos que configuraron la 'ideología' franquista)*, Colección Documentos (Barcelona: Planeta, 1987), p. 132.

ideas mientras no atente a los principios fundamentales del Estado.⁴ Article 22 outlawed collective lobbying and article 35 stipulated that, if circumstances demanded it, many of the citizens' rights *guaranteed* in the *Fuero* could be suspended. Finally, article 36 was a reminder that the freedoms laid down in the *Fuero* would be *defended* and upheld by the repressive state apparatuses. The regime also recognized early on the need to legislate for censorship in order to influence how the ideology was propagated, by stipulating what could be printed or viewed in schools, in the press, in literature, in cinemas and in theatres.

The regime claimed that the state was subordinate to, and reflective of, society, while in fact the opposite was true. It is a myth examined by Antonio Buero Vallejo in his theatre. He looked at the ideology of dominant groups and what they offer to those they seek to subjugate, their mythology and also the sanctions and threats they employ to uphold their dominant position. Buero depicted a clergy lacking in compassion and purity in *Las Meninas* (1960), *Un soñador para un pueblo* (1958) and *Las palabras en la arena* (1948). Moreover, in *El sueño de la razón* (1969) he noted how true, well-intentioned Catholicism, embodied in the character of Duaso, is misappropriated by the regime both for political purposes and to exact revenge for injured vanity. The supposed unity of the nation is exposed as a distortion in plays such as *En la ardiente oscuridad* (1946), in which a false unity is shown to be maintained by fear and coercion. The process of demonization of political opponents is examined in the dramas of Buero, particularly in *La doble historia del doctor Valmy* (1964) and *La Fundación* (1973). Earlier, in *Las Meninas* and *Un soñador para un pueblo*, Buero showed how the well-intentioned actions of an individual are not only misunderstood by some but also cynically misrepresented by others. The protection offered by political and military leaders is exposed in many of the plays as a falsification of the reality of self-preservation and the interpretation of the common good as personal interest.

The Role of the Ideological State Apparatuses

It is difficult to overstate the importance of the Roman Catholic Church as an ideological state apparatus of the Franco regime. Not only did it have a significant influence on the private life of many Spanish citizens but it also influenced the state. In fact, such was the Church–state alliance in the early Franco years that Spain was reminiscent of earlier theocratic states. The Civil War was presented as a type of Holy War against the infidels who defended a secular state. In September 1936, a pastoral letter from Enrique Pla y Deniel, Bishop of Salamanca, praised and defended the Nationalist rising as a Crusade; an earlier pastoral letter from the Bishops of Pamplona and Vitoria had defined the rising

⁴ Román Gubern, *La censura: función política y ordenamiento jurídico bajo el franquismo (1936–1975)* (Barcelona: Península, 1981), p. 82.

as a ‘movimiento “cívico–militar” en defensa de la religión’.⁵ In 1937, the Spanish Primate, Cardinal Gomá y Tomás, drafted a letter, which was signed by many members of the Spanish hierarchy and circulated internationally, in which both the rising and the Nationalist State were vindicated. In keeping with this, Franco was hailed as a defender of the faith. He enjoyed the support of the majority of the Spanish hierarchy, with the noteworthy exception of Francesc Vidal i Barraquer, Cardinal-Archbishop of Tarragona, who protested to the Pope about the political stance of the Church in Spain. Cooper records that, as a result, he was unacceptable in post-war Spain and did not return to his See in 1939.⁶ When Cardinal Gomá himself called for forgiveness and social justice in a pastoral letter in 1939, it was not circulated internationally; according to Preston, the censorship authorities did not allow it to be published outside the archdiocese of Toledo.⁷

September 1938 had seen the issue of some censorship guidelines from the Nationalist Delegación del Estado. The first of these referred to the maintenance of the idea of unity, and another insisted on the preservation of the dogma and morals of Catholic teaching, although it did state that tolerance must be extended to the Protestant and Muslim religions. However, in June 1939, this tolerance of other religions was deemed to have been forfeited because of Protestant support for the Popular Front. Later, article 6 of the *Fuero de los españoles* established religious tolerance, but not religious freedom, and stipulated: ‘No se permitirán otras ceremonias ni manifestaciones externas que las de la religión Católica.’⁸ Within the Catholic-influenced state, orthodoxy was stressed and other religions discriminated against. Harsh punishments were threatened for breaches of Church–state rules. These included the Church’s own forms of censure, such as excommunication or condemnation from the pulpit, as well as the material punishment meted out by the judicial and military forces of the state. In contrast to the nationalism found elsewhere in Europe, the nationalism of the Francoists demanded the loyalty of the people to a Catholic, rather than a secular, state. By allying itself so closely to the Roman Catholic Church, the Franco regime won the loyalty of many of the Church faithful. Moreover, the Roman Catholic Church lent to it the good will and moral authority it enjoyed among vast numbers of people both nationally and internationally. This support allowed Franco to claim that he was serving both God and country.

⁵ Quoted in Juan Pablo Fusi, *Franco: autoritarismo y poder personal* (Madrid: El País, 1985), p. 49.

⁶ Norman Cooper, ‘The Church: From Crusade to Christianity’, in *Spain in Crisis: The Evolution and Decline of the Franco Regime*, ed. by Paul Preston (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1976), pp. 48–81 (p. 51).

⁷ Paul Preston, *Franco: A Biography* (London: Harper Collins, 1993), p. 342.

⁸ Gubern, *La censura*, p. 82. However, Vatican II did have an impact on the regime. The Ley Orgánica del Estado, 10 January 1967, and later the Ley de 28 de junio de 1967 recognized religious freedom. José M. Cuenca Toribio, ‘Relaciones Iglesia y Estado en la España del siglo XX (1931–1980)’, *Hispania. Revista español de historia*, 40 (no. 144, 1980), 153–76 (p. 171).

Franco could be classed as what Anthony D. Smith called a neo-traditionalist and a self-conscious ideologue who used political means to revive religious heritage and thereby 'to organize the faithful into a political movement', though the influence of his personal beliefs should not be overlooked.⁹ In order to achieve this, Smith claimed, the history, the identity and the destiny of the faithful must be defined, and their fall from past glory explained. It is clear that in his creation of a mythical past for Spain and the identification of an essential Spanishness that had been betrayed by the liberals and the secular Republicans, Franco did indeed attempt this. The Catholic Nationalist thus became the embodiment of the noble Spanish race, descended from the race of the Reyes Católicos and destined to rise again after the recent fall, to recapture and relive its illustrious past. Of course, the contradiction in the myth was evident from the outset. Ironically, the rising and the eventual victory of the Nationalist forces might not have been possible without the initial support of Franco's African legionnaires. In 1937, Franco declared:

Nosotros, todos los que combatimos, cristianos y musulmanes, somos soldados de Dios y no luchamos contra hombres, sino contra el ateísmo y el materialismo, contra todo lo que rebaja la dignidad humana, que nosotros queremos elevar, purificar y ennoblecer.¹⁰

Although initially recognized by Franco, their role in the creation of the New State was soon lost in the myth of a Nationalist, Catholic state. The emergence of the myth of a crusade was already evident, and the Muslims were not to feature in the mythical *raza* of Francoist Spain. In the aftermath of the Axis defeat in WWII, Franco also played down the regime's fascist tendencies in order to gain wider support among Catholics internationally, particularly in his efforts to win Vatican recognition.

The significance of the Roman Catholic Church in the legitimation of the New State was critical. It provided the regime with support and legitimacy it might otherwise have lacked, having overthrown a democratically elected government. The regime adopted the Church's common good argument to defend policies that were developed to protect the regime. By arguing that the people were weak and in need of protection, leadership and salvation, the regime defended its paternalistic attitude and autocratic rule. Indeed, dependence on a patriarchal and more knowledgeable authority was encouraged by both Francoist and Catholic ideologies: both demanded the ceding of responsibility to a higher power. An acceptance of submission was encouraged and rationalized by the argument that it was destined or preordained, and protection was offered in exchange for freedom and independence. Both promised suffering now for sins of the past and gave

⁹ Anthony D. Smith, 'The Crisis of Dual Legitimation', in *Nationalism*, ed. by J. Hutchinson and A. D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 113–21 (p. 117).

¹⁰ Franco, in *L'Echo* (Paris), 16 November 1937. Quoted in Vázquez Montalbán, *Los demonios*, p. 141.

assurances about future salvation. The Church's values were critical in the consolidation of the relationship between the dominant ideology and the subjugated in Francoist Spain.¹¹ Ironically, Spain's isolation in the post-Civil War years may also have helped. Suffering and humility were praised by the Church-state alliance as virtues of the Spanish people in the face of internal hardship and external opposition; a myth of national martyrdom encouraged the Spanish people to feel triumphant in their isolation and subjugation. Similarly, Franco's single-party *organic democracy* was portrayed as evidence of Spanish superiority, as is clear from Franco's pronouncements on the subject of democracy to the Mexican press in 1947:

Ahora se habla de la democracia. Nosotros, los españoles, ya la hemos conocido. Y no nos dio resultado. Cuando otros van hacia la democracia, nosotros ya estamos de vuelta. Estamos dispuestos a sentarnos en la meta y esperar a que los otros regresen también.¹²

The Franco regime claimed to be defending an essential Catholic Spain from a Communist threat. With the collusion of the Roman Catholic Church, the regime was able to introduce censorship and sanctions, which silenced the dissenter in the name of the common good and of liberty. This can be seen clearly in the introduction to the 1966 *Ley de Prensa e Imprenta*:

Se puede decir que el principio inspirador de esta Ley lo constituye la idea de lograr el máximo desarrollo y el máximo despliegue posible de la libertad de la persona para la expresión de su pensamiento, consagrada en el art. 12 del Fuero de los Españoles conjugando adecuadamente el ejercicio de aquella libertad con las exigencias inexcusables del bien común, de la paz social y de un recto orden de convivencia para todos los españoles.¹³

Similar sentiments about the protection of the intellectually weak and the moral and political education of the Spanish people are expressed in the *Ley de Prensa* of 1938 and a Ministerial Order referring to censorship in 1939.¹⁴ Once some of the traditions and rituals of the Church had been incorporated into the culture of the regime, the dominant ideology could then claim to reflect the values of

¹¹ The importance of religion in the control of the *bewildered herd* is explored in Nietzsche's analysis of slave morality. Jorge Larrain, *Ideology and Cultural Identity: Modernity and the Third World Presence* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), pp. 42–4.

¹² *El Universal Gráfico* (México), October 1947. Quoted in Vázquez Montalbán, *Los demonios*, p. 116.

¹³ Ley 18 marzo 1966, Nº 14/66 (Jefatura del Estado). PRENSA. Ley de Prensa e Imprenta, *Boletín Oficial del Estado* (hereafter *BOE*), no. 67 (ref. 519, 19 March 1966), pp. 479–86.

¹⁴ Ley 22 abril 1938 (Ministerio del Interior). PERIODICOS. Ley de Prensa. *BOE*, no. 549 (23 April 1938), pp. 6915–17 and Orden 15 julio 1939 (Mº. Gobernación). CENSURA. Crea una Sección de Censura encargada de llevarla a cabo, *BOE*, no. 211 (ref. 916, 30 July 1939), p. 553.

a Spain united in its Catholicism. This can be seen in the 1966 *Ley de Prensa e Imprenta*, which stated that the legislation was intended to:

dar un nuevo paso en la labor constante y cotidiana de acometer la edificación del orden que reclama la progresiva y perdurable convivencia de los españoles dentro de un marco de sentido universal y cristiano, tradicional en la historia patria.¹⁵

Franco defined Spain as a Catholic state, as opposed to the definition of the Republican leader, Manuel Azaña, who had stated in 1931 that Spain was no longer Catholic.¹⁶ Franco also used the Roman Catholic Church to counter accusations that his rule was a totalitarian one.¹⁷

Roman Catholic doctrine was manipulated and employed by the Spanish hierarchy and the Francoists to make Church and state seem inseparable and mutually justifying and supportive. The Church's influential role in society was consolidated after the Concordat was signed in 1953. It no longer had to pay taxes and was given grants to construct churches. It was judged to be above the law as it applied to the ordinary citizens of the state and, while its clergy were employed as censors on Government Boards, some of its own publications were not subject to censorship. Nor could a priest be charged with a criminal offence without the consent of his religious superiors. Catholic marriages were the only ones recognized in the New State, and divorce, which had been legal during the years of the Second Republic, was outlawed. In the 1950s, the Roman Catholic Church dominated intellectual life in Spain, controlling such influential papers as *El Debate* and *Ya*. Aside from the Church publications and influence on censorship, some of the leading intellectuals of the day were members of Opus Dei. Yet perhaps the most insidious form of ideology propagation was in the schools: under the terms of the Concordat, Roman Catholic Church control of primary education in Spain was guaranteed, and the regime was satisfied to use the Church's expertise.

The Catholic viewpoint on censorship is a version of the common good argument. It allows for intervention by the Church to eliminate error and secure the victory of truth. The Catholic Church maintains that societies are formed naturally, as is the institution of authority, elected from and by the members of a society to make decisions and resolve differences. This society is God-given,

¹⁵ Ley 18 marzo 1966, de Prensa e Imprenta, p. 480.

¹⁶ Fusi, *Franco*, p. 59. Church and state were officially separated in 1931: 'Decretada ya por el Estatuto jurídico del gobierno provisional la separación de la Iglesia y el Estado, el Código de diciembre de 1931 ratificaba el laicismo del poder civil, al paso que su artículo 26 desmantelaba los principales centros de influencia y acción social de la Iglesia.' Cuenca Toribio, 'Relaciones Iglesia y Estado', p. 154.

¹⁷ 'El Regimen español no es totalitario porque es católico, y así lo ha reconocido la Iglesia. El totalitarismo ateo está condenado por Roma, y es, por tanto, incompatible con el catolicismo.' From *El Español*, nos 287-90 (1954). Quoted in Gabriel Arias Salgado, *Política española de la información: antología sistemática* (Madrid: Ministerio de Información y Turismo (hereafter MIT), 1958), II, p. 231.

as nature stems from God. In order for society to develop, man's free will must be harnessed to the greater good of the community:

Authority, therefore, is to be respected and loved, not only because it comes, reductively, from God, but because in its legitimate exercise, it also leads to God, because such exercise of authority leads to the common good which is also willed by God.¹⁸

The argument even embraces the use of coercion for the common good, while tacitly admitting that coercion may be abused by some. The state, it is claimed, has the right and duty to exercise authority and coercion in the name of the common good. The premise is that a good act generated by fear or coercion may eventually lead to a belief in the virtue of this good act and the will to do this good act voluntarily. Therefore, the argument goes, the initial application of threat and coercion is justified.

When viewed in the context of changing a morally corrupt person into a morally virtuous one, this argument may seem justifiable, if Panglossian in its naïve optimism; when this thinking is applied by a dictatorial state using coercion and fear to make people recognize the *good* that it represents, however, then it becomes indefensible. It might be suggested that this would be an abuse of power and in such a case the Catholic justification is not applicable. Yet a cursory glance at the history of twentieth-century Spain will show that Franco's totalitarian regime applied these fear and coercion techniques to ensure the support, or at least the apathy, of the people. Moreover, it did so with the full support and collusion of the Catholic Church.

The presence of Roman Catholic clergy among the censors on the state boards lent these bodies a certain degree of legitimacy. It allowed the regime to use the Catholic argument that it was not protecting itself by silencing certain voices, but rather that it was defending the interests of the citizens who were somehow threatened by such material. Church influence can be clearly seen in the censorship legislation of the Franco regime. In the 1938 *Ley de Prensa*, which despite its title, covered all forms of censorship, there is a peculiar mix of Catholic and Nationalist rhetoric in the description of the new breed of journalist as an 'apóstol del pensamiento y de la fe de la Nación recobrada a sus destinos'.¹⁹ These censorship guidelines were deliberately ambiguous. The stated reason for the lack of written rules for ecclesiastical censorship was, 'por la sencilla razón de que puede un libro, un artículo, una fotografía, etc., no atentar directamente contra el Dogma o la Moral y, sin embargo, su publicación o difusión ser peligrosa y, por tanto, no prudente'.²⁰ Church and state agreed that preventative

¹⁸ Harold C. Gardiner S. J., *Catholic Viewpoint on Censorship* (New York: Hanover House, 1958), p. 21.

¹⁹ Ley 22 abril 1938, de Prensa, p. 6915.

²⁰ Arias Salgado, *Política española*, p. 187.

censorship was better than punitive censorship. Cardinal Dalla Costa ridiculed the freedom of the press that sought to grant the same respect to all people and to all faiths: 'Supone que todos son capaces de doctrinar sobre cualquier cosa, que todos son capaces de aprender cualquier cosa, lo que es el summum del absurdo.'²¹ It is also worth noting that until 1966, the Roman Catholic Church issued an *Index of Forbidden Books*, which listed books perceived by the clergy to be dangerous to faith and morals. The Church claimed that it had a right and duty to control literature, and each diocese was to have its own appointed clerical censor. Canon 1395 of the *Code of Canon Law* gave the Church the right to ban books as it saw fit. Care was taken that books classed as obscene, that is to say, arousing the lower passions, should not 'fall into the hands of those whose minds are not prepared for mature reading'.²² All heretical, schismatic, materialistic or atheist publications were outlawed by the *Index*, as were religious books published without prior censorship. It was claimed that the *Index* did not interfere with an individual's liberty, as the Church, being an authority on such matters, was acting in his best moral interests. Possession, trading, or reading of works cited in the *Index* was punishable by excommunication, but, as always, the moral elite could obtain permission to examine these texts for scholarly purposes and survive with their souls unscathed.

The Church also played a significant role in the censorship of the theatre, and the legislation is clearly influenced by Catholic teaching on morals. The Roman Catholic Church retained its own watchdog body called the Oficina Nacional Permanente de Vigilancia de Espectáculos, which employed a system of classification of dramas from one to four. The former were judged to be acceptable to a wide audience and the latter a serious threat to its moral well-being. This was seen as necessary, as the Church guidelines for censorship were more severe in some respects than those of the regime, which were occasionally influenced more by political expediency than by Catholic moral teaching.²³ Certain authors, who because of their political background were acceptable to the regime, were censored by the Church because they did not comply with its strict moral code.

CALOMARDE *He mandado cerrar todas las Universidades. No eran más que focos de agitación liberal* (O.C. I: 1531).

Another important ideological state apparatus was the educational system. This played a very significant role in the legitimization of the regime and in the

²¹ Arias Salgado, *Política española*, pp. 190–1.

²² Redmond A. Burke, C.S.V., Ph.D., *What is the Index?* (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1952), p. 24.

²³ A report from the MIT, dating from 1963, defends its actions against Church criticism. The report is of further interest because of its insistence that the MIT is not guilty of *apertura* and also for the distinction it makes between Church and state censorship. *Informe sobre la censura cinematográfica y teatral*, Dirección General de Cinematografía y Teatro (Madrid: MIT, 1963).

indoctrination of future generations. Its significance changed from the late 1950s, when the universities became the sites for an ideological battle against the regime. Initially the situation was quite different, however, and the education system proved a useful tool for social control.

The regime recognized early on that it had to control the educational institutions and sought to secure its influence on them through legislation. The *Ley de Enseñanza Primaria* (1945) handed over control of primary education to the Roman Catholic clergy and made the school system subordinate to the new social and political order. The education system, in line with both Catholic and Francoist ideology, taught the importance of family, Church and regime to the stability and peace of the nation. The *Ley de Enseñanza Media*, introduced in 1953, did for secondary-level education what the 1945 law had done for primary level. In an article critical of the regime's motivated use of education, the historian Manuel Tuñón de Lara highlighted the use of myth and revisionism in the history taught at secondary-level. The Second Republic was condemned thus: 'Los pseudointelectuales despechados, la masonería y los financieros judíos internacionales hacen caer a la monarquía.' Catholicism, imperialism and the hero-leader were praised and the Enlightenment, liberalism, democracy and Freemasons were attacked; fascism, on the other hand, was defended for 'su sentido nacional, espiritual e histórico que reconstituye su dignidad a la persona humana'.²⁴ Under such a system, children were brought up with the official state version of their country and history, without necessarily ever being exposed to the opposing viewpoints. History books were rewritten to discredit Republicans and to laud the imperial tradition followed by Franco. Revising history in an attempt to control the collective memory, the regime sought to determine the future.

The *Ley de Ordenación Universitaria* (1943) placed the universities under state control and decreed that they should be run along Catholic and Falangist lines. The existing Falangist SEU (Sindicato Español Universitario) was recognized officially and replaced the outlawed FUE (Federación Universitaria Escolar) in all universities. The SEU was a pro-Francoist body and also had a role as campus guard. The creation of the *Milicia Universitaria* fulfilled the requirements of an ideological apparatus, as it allowed students to do their military service in an elite group, where they were separate from the ordinary workers and taught different *know-how* for their positions within the social order. When students reorganized the FUE clandestinely in Madrid and Barcelona in the 1940s, they were soon discovered and many arrests were made; some of those involved left Spain. Many Republican university teachers, if they had not already fled or been killed or imprisoned during the Civil War, were removed in the purges that followed the Nationalist victory and replaced by others who toed the ideological line of the

²⁴ Manuel Tuñón de Lara, 'Historia', in *La cultura bajo el franquismo*, ed. by José María Castellet, Ediciones de Bolsillo (Barcelona: Anagrama, 1977), pp. 23–46 (pp. 28–9). While no dates were given, the stress on fascism and imperialism would imply that these were from relatively early school texts.

regime, often without regard to their experience or aptitude for the job. In an article entitled 'Power, Freedom and Social Change in the Spanish University, 1939–1975', Salvador Giner refers to the removal of 'those supposedly sinister free-thinkers, members of an international Masonic conspiracy, whose sole aim had allegedly been and still remained the destruction of an *eternal Spain*'.²⁵

In 1965, the SEU was officially disbanded when the regime finally recognized that it was no longer in control and had been replaced by other, more representative student organizations on campus. The increasing unrest among students and their constant demands for a democratization of rule in Spain, combined with their eventual co-operation with workers' groups, represented a growing threat to the regime. In 1968, University Police were introduced, and they remained permanently on campus during the unrest. Speeches and declarations made by the Ministro de Información y Turismo during this period emphasized the representative nature of the government and its efforts to protect the stability of Spanish society from the unwelcome actions of a minority. The repressive measures taken against the students, and the declaration of a state of emergency, were thus represented as a positive action for the common good:

La escalada del desorden universitario culminó en las últimas jornadas en inadmisibles violaciones de la paz de todos y en un inconcebible ultraje a la enseña nacional. [. . .] La voz del pueblo exigiendo medidas ha llegado al Gobierno y el Gobierno, por unanimidad, ha pedido al Jefe de Estado un decreto-ley que garantice el derecho de todos a la paz. Aunque lo parezca, no es paradójico que el estado de excepción signifique la paz. El estado de excepción es el instrumento de nuestra legalidad que va a garantizar ese derecho de todos a seguir sin sobresaltos en nuestros quehaceres normales, en nuestro trabajo y en el disfrute de nuestro ocio.²⁶

The greatest problem for opponents of the regime was probably the lack of an alternative, cohesive, unified group with sufficient strength to mount a serious challenge to the dominant ideology and to gain state power. Giner points out that by demonizing Communism, the Francoists had cited a cohesive and well-developed alternative ideology, which many students and young liberals were attracted to as the antithesis of Francoism. However, because of the success of the regime's propaganda and the effects of the Cold War, as well as their Civil War activities, the Communist ideology did not appeal greatly to less hard-line critics of the regime outside the universities, nor to many who had lived through the Civil War. The fact that many opposition groups were based outside Spain meant that they were often out of touch with the reality of the situation there.

²⁵ Salvador Giner, 'Power, Freedom and Social Change in the Spanish University, 1939–1975', in *Spain in Crisis*, pp. 183–211 (p. 184).

²⁶ Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte, Archivo General de la Administración (hereafter AGA) /IDD 104.04 Topogr. 82-68 Ca. 576 MIT/00.102. Declaraciones y Discursos (25-1-69, Primera edición).

While alliances were formed between the various opposition groups on occasion, they seemed incapable of working together for long enough to achieve anything. Moreover, many of them did not trust the Communists, who in turn remained naïvely optimistic about the possibility of a workers' revolution.

The education system was only one of the apparatuses the regime sought to control. The ideological role of the media was also recognized and acted upon by the Nationalists. Legislation was introduced to control the press prior to the end of the Civil War, and this was later built upon in the aftermath of the Nationalist victory. Censorship guidelines from 1944, devised by the Provincial Delegate in Huesca and reproduced in Manuel Abellán's study of censorship in Spain, demonstrate the determination of the ruling elite to disseminate and defend its ideology in the media and in culture:

Es preciso difundir la cultura para el pueblo por medio de todos los medios de difusión a nuestra alcance, orientándolo de esta forma en las buenas costumbres en el sano concepto de nuestros ideales que inspiraron el Movimiento Nacional, y propagando la sana y tradicional cultura española así como la Doctrina Cristiana. Por otra parte nuestra labor había de ir encauzada a destruir todo aquello que pudiera ser dañino y perjudicial para nuestra moral y para todos los conceptos antes mencionados.²⁷

The media were also used to great effect when Franco sought to distance himself from the Axis powers after the Allied victory in WWII by disseminating the claim that Spain had been neutral.

The state not only controlled the flow of information through the national news agency CIFRA and the international agency EFE, but also actively involved itself in the training of journalists who, like university teachers, were required to swear a pledge of allegiance to the regime upon graduation.²⁸ It is clear from the *Documentos inéditos* that the agency EFE, established by the Interior Ministry, was created in a calculated effort to propagate the regime's version and justification of the Civil War.²⁹ The regime was conscious of the need to appear independent;

²⁷ From the 'Normas Generales confeccionadas por la Delegación Provincial de Huesca para las Delegaciones Comarcales dependientes de la misma regulando sus actividades de propaganda'. Reprinted in Manuel Abellán, *Censura y creación literaria en España (1939–1976)* (Barcelona: Península, 1980), p. 249.

²⁸ 'Junto ante Dios, por España y su Caudillo, servir a la Unidad, a la Grandeza y a la Libertad de la Patria con fidelidad íntegra y total a los principios del Estado Nacional Sindicalista, sin permitir jamás que la falsedad, la insidia o la ambición tuerzan mi pluma en la labor diaria.' Quoted in Gubern, *La censura*, p. 30.

²⁹ 'España vuelve a tener un ideal y una verdad que presentar al mundo, ante el que reivindica su derecho a ocupar un puesto preeminente. Pero necesita el órgano que difunda por el extranjero la voz de su ideal y su verdad, que abra caminos exteriores a la vitalidad interna y le concite voluntades y simpatías.' 'Largo estudio acerca de lo que debe ser la agencia EFE', Burgos, December 1938. *Documentos inéditos para la historia del Generalísimo Franco*, Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco, Colección de Estudios Contemporáneos, 3 vols (Madrid: Azor, 1992), I, p. 240.

it had learned a lesson from the problems of the Russian TASS agency, which, because it was directly controlled by the Communist Party, was dismissed internationally as an unreliable source. The model on which EFE was based was the Deutsche Nachrichtenbüro (DNB), which, although ostensibly run by a private company, was controlled by people sympathetic to the German regime. Unlike Fabra, the previous international agency in Spain, the regime ensured that EFE was Spanish owned and thus protected from foreign interference.

In the early years, the few news publications that were permitted were Nationalist. On 1 May 1941, a decree exempted the Falangist press from censorship other than that imposed by the Delegación Nacional de Prensa y Propaganda de FET y de las JONS. There was no forum for debate, and the official version of events went unchallenged. The Delegación Nacional de Prensa, established by the 1938 *Ley de Prensa*, was an all-powerful body, which dictated not only what was to be written but also the format to be used. Instructions were given on how many articles were to be dedicated to the reportage of Franco's latest speech and details specified of what was to be included in the article. A victim of the censors himself, Juan Goytisolo commented:

Frente a la media docena de revistillas independientes (y escasamente leídas) como *Ínsula*, *Papeles de Son Armadans*, etc., el Ministerio de Información y Turismo subvenciona generosamente varias publicaciones de alto nivel intelectual como *El Español*, *Poesía Española*, *La Estafeta Literaria* (que pudiera titularse también *Estafeta filatélica*, *bursátil* o *militar* sin necesidad de alterar su contenido) que colaboran de modo eficaz en la patriótica labor de saneamiento emprendida por la censura. La actividad de estas publicaciones, y de la prensa cotidiana en general respecto a los escritores varía como es lógico según se trate de autores adaptados a las exigencias morales y sociales del país o de individuos románticos, descontentos y resentidos. Para estas últimas categorías la prensa ha previsto una terapéutica muy sencilla: el silencio.³⁰

By mid-July 1939, censorship had extended to theatre, cinema, public speaking, art and music. Later, specific bodies were created to deal with each type of censorship. Allied to this, the NO-DO (Noticiarios y Documentales Cinematográficos), the state-produced newsreel, which was started in November 1942, was obligatory in cinema programmes until January 1976 and proved very useful for propaganda purposes.

Manufacturing Consent: The Mythology of the Raza

It is clear that in order to be successful, the regime needed to justify and legitimate its rule so as to win enough support or apathy to ensure its continuation. This it did in a variety of ways. In recognition of the importance of manufacturing consent,

³⁰ 'Escribir en España', in *El furgón de cola* (Paris: Ruedo Ibérico, 1967), pp. 21–7 (p. 24).

the regime attempted to create the impression of free will and a myth of representation. In addition, it engaged in a process of nationalization that stressed the unity and stability of society, while simultaneously strengthening its own hold on the state apparatuses. Furthermore, the regime offered benefits, both material and psychological, to those who lent it support; it also purported to provide answers and to define people's role in society. By implementation of these methods and by careful consideration of its image, the regime sought to naturalize the ruling ideology and to make it people's lived experience. Core values were presented as fact or natural, and alternatives to them rendered unthinkable. Contradictory ideas and values were discredited, and simultaneously myths were created to reconcile the reality to ideological promise by offering imaginary solutions to real contradictions. Like much of ideology, myth does not merely deny truths or reality but rather uses language and signs to distort them: 'Simplement, il les purifie, les innocente, les fonde en nature et en éternité, il leur donne une clarté qui n'est pas celle de l'explication, mais celle du constat.'³¹ Its motivation is ideological in that it naturalizes history or historical concepts, and signifier and signified are given the appearance of having a *natural* relationship. Nonetheless, in Franco's Spain it was implied that where consent could not be manufactured, it would be imposed.

By assimilating some members of the subjugated masses into the dominant group, the latter not only can give the appearance of being representative, but can also deprive the opposition of potential leaders. At various stages certain Monarchists, *aperturistas* and Falangists were given government or administrative positions in an effort to appease those groups in society, who, having some degree of representation, were thus less likely to challenge the leadership. Those upholding the ruling ideology were concerned with conditioning people to believe and accept its values but were also willing to use sanctions to suppress any opposition to them. Yet the ruling elite did not simply dupe people into believing what was false by mystification; it also expended much energy in its attempts to justify and legitimate the social order. One of the attractions of the Francoist ideology was the appearance of a cohesive, unified and stable society. Many people accepted the myth that they were represented as a nation by the regime. Franco treated Spain as a nation-state, making appeals to the people in the name of the *Nuevo Estado*; he called on those loyal to the nation, that is Spain, to demonstrate this loyalty by fealty to the regime. The regime also justified its actions in the name of the common good, a term cleverly appropriated by the regime to protect its interests. Furthermore, the regime was described as an *organic democracy*, a term that implies representation, although in reality it meant nothing of the sort.

The myth of representation was secured with events such as the vote on the *Ley Orgánica del Estado* in 1966. The huge vote in support of the law was interpreted

³¹ Roland Barthes, *Mythologies* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1957), p. 230. Put simply, it purifies them, it makes them innocent and bases them in nature or eternity, it gives them a clarity that is not that of an explanation, but rather of a certified fact.

by the regime's propagandists and mythmakers as an overwhelming demonstration of popular support for Franco and the ruling ideology. The victory was presented by the media as a culmination of Franco's 1938–39 development plan. The reality of the dubious vote was not acknowledged: no opposition had been allowed and the ballot was not secret.³² Fusi reports that when Eisenhower visited in December 1959, the number of people who turned out on the streets to celebrate the end of Spain's isolation was claimed by the regime as popular support.³³ The regime's propagandists fed the myth of Franco's huge popularity in the press and on national days of celebration when, as Preston asserts, the poor and unwaged were often bused in and given a day's wage to cheer and support the dictator.³⁴

Linked to the myth of representation is the illusion of free will. Another feature of a successful ideology is that the subjects will believe their submission to the system is freely chosen, at least to a degree. For many who might have doubts, but who are fearful, it makes a disagreeable situation seem both tolerable and reasonable. In a well-known study Therborn expanded on Althusser's ideas to show just how subjects are ideologically interpellated.³⁵ The first objective is to define what exists and what does not exist, so that identity, reality and truth are all determined. Desires are manipulated and controlled by the specification of what is good, what is right and what is attractive, as well as their opposites. Finally, the ruling ideology also defines what is possible and what is impossible in the social order, thereby controlling ambitions, hopes and fears. Some freedoms are occasionally granted, and these seem to confirm the illusion of free will but are in fact controlled by the rulers. An example of this is when, in 1963, Fraga as Ministro de Información y Turismo, allowed the publication of a letter of protest, which had been signed by many of the country's most respected intellectuals and artists.³⁶ Despite allowing the letter to be published, Fraga responded by dismissing the allegations and attempting to discredit the leaders of the protest. When those involved tried to take the protest further, they were soon stopped and the illusion of liberalization was shattered. Fraga was not loved by members of the intellectual community in Spain, who were generally unimpressed by the surface *apertura* he introduced. Francisco Candel, who had classed his predecessor, Arias Salgado, as 'la bestia negra de la censura española', said that under Fraga,

³² Preston reports turnouts of over 100 percent of the electorate in some areas, an occurrence explained by the regime as the result of 'voters in transit'. *Franco*, p. 730.

³³ Fusi, *Franco*, pp. 143–4.

³⁴ Preston, *Franco*, pp. 625–7. Buero explored the myth of representation and of free will in *Un soñador para el pueblo*. In the play, the apparently popular revolt against Esquilache is revealed to have been orchestrated by members of the ruling elite whose privilege was threatened by the former's proposals for reform.

³⁵ Göran Therborn, *The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology* (London: Verso and NLB, 1980), pp. 18–19.

³⁶ Files relating to this held in the Archivo General de la Administración are not accessible until the year 2014. However, other letters of protest, some of which refer to the treatment of miners, as well as issues of freedom of expression, are available for consultation. AGA/IDD 104.04 Topogr. 82-68 Ca. 653. Orden Público.

'las cosas se pusieron más kaffianas'.³⁷ The so-called *apertura* of Fraga's day seemed no more than an attempt to adjust the system in preparation for the continuation of Francoist ideology in the future.

Nationalism was another important feature in the myth of representation. The nascent regime quickly set about nationalizing institutions in Spain, including education and the press, and instilling the values of the regime in the practices and rituals of these institutions. This allowed the rulers to claim that their ideology reflected not merely the narrow views of the ruling elite, but also the institutions of society, and therefore society itself. The introduction to the 1966 *Ley de Prensa e Imprenta* reiterated this assurance that the government was reflecting the feelings and thinking of the people: 'Al emprender decididamente esta tarea, el Gobierno ha cumplido escrupulosamente su papel de fiel intérprete del sentir y del pensar del país.'³⁸

One of the regime's achievements, then, was that it recognized the need to manufacture consent. Its success in doing so depended to some extent on the provision of material benefits for its supporters. The regime rationalized its ideology, offering reasons for certain values contained therein. For example, anti-Communism was presented as a positive value in opposition to those who would seek to threaten the mythical peace, order and stability of the regime. It helped that an anti-Communist ideology coincided with the self-interest of many landowners and industrialists who welcomed this rationalization by the regime. Similarly, the punishment of Republicans was justified by the regime for the sake of society, peace and order. In reality, it also materially benefited many Nationalists, as those who had fought for the peace and order of the nation could hope to be treated more favourably than the Republicans. Of course, another reason why ruling ideologies are successful is simply because they are defended by the most powerful people in society in whose material interests it is to seek to reproduce the social order. There were unquestionably some in the Franco regime who were guilty of what Peter Sloterdijk termed 'enlightened false consciousness'.³⁹ Certain members of the regime and of society, who did not necessarily believe in the truth of the ideology, cynically chose to align themselves with it for personal gain.

Another reason that ideology is successful is, as John Breuilly highlights, that it provides answers, albeit ones that falsify or distort reality to some degree.⁴⁰ As a result it may be perceived as legitimate and rational. It has also been suggested, by Nietzsche among others, that people do not desire the truth of their reality and

³⁷ Beneyto, *Censura y política*, p. 37.

³⁸ Ley 18 marzo 1966, de Prensa e Imprenta, p. 479. Articles 16 to 18 stipulate that the press is to be controlled by Spanish nationals, resident in Spain.

³⁹ Terry Eagleton, *Ideology: An Introduction* (London: Verso, 1991), p. 27.

⁴⁰ 'Nationalist ideology is neither an expression of national identity [. . .] nor the arbitrary invention of Nationalists for political purposes. It arises out of the need to make sense of complex social and political arrangements.' John Breuilly, 'The Sources of Nationalist Ideology', in *Nationalism*, pp. 103–13 (p. 110).

prefer to live by an ideological system devised by others, which defines one's role and identity in an otherwise incomprehensible reality. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the Franco regime went unchallenged by the majority simply for ease of life without responsibility; the regime ensured that citizens were also aware of the negative consequences of any challenge to its hegemony.

The dominant ideology offered more than the views and values of the ruling elite. It also defined the various roles and relations within society and between the ruling elite and its subjects. As Eagleton argues, the task of a ruling ideology is 'to recreate, at an "imaginary" level, the *unity* of the entire social formation, not just to lend coherence to the consciousness of its rulers'.⁴¹ When, as in Spain under Franco, the ruling ideology pervades the apparatuses of the state, and is experienced by people in their private as well as their public lives, it begins to appear normal to many people. This in turn tends to preclude a revolutionary response. Althusser suggested that once certain material practices are part of the institutions of a society, they become normal and naturalized; people will experience and live according to the ruling ideology without being aware that they are doing so. While this is certainly plausible to a degree, it would seem to suggest that people neither think for themselves nor question their political environment. It also ignores the role of fear in the upholding of a ruling ideology. It is likely that, rather than being completely ignorant of the aims and machinations of the ruling power, people resigned themselves to the status quo and, for as long as they were not directly adversely affected by its repressive forces, remained apathetic.⁴²

The regime was also concerned with image as a persuasive tool in the fabrication of the myth of popular and unanimous consent. Breuille claims that political ideology can be popularized and made acceptable by simplification, repetition and definition. Not surprisingly, there are many examples of this in Francoist Spain. Simplifications included the creation of national stereotypes of the noble, loyal *raza*, of the unnatural, unpatriotic opposition and of the hardworking, representative leadership. These stereotypes coupled with messages about progress, the common good and the enemy were repeated in the media, at rallies, and incorporated into ceremonies, rituals and anthems. Such ceremonies, along with symbols such as the flag, notes and coins, as well as the renaming of public spaces and the erection of statues and monuments, gave the ideology concrete form and helped to legitimate it in the eyes of the populace. The elevation of Manuel Fraga to the head of the MIT also enhanced the regime's hackneyed image. Under Fraga, the diatribes against the Communists were replaced by positive economic messages.⁴³

⁴¹ Eagleton, *Ideology*, p. 122.

⁴² In fact, apathy in the face of a dominant and unjust ruling ideology is one of the reactions most criticized by Buero in his dramatic work. Yet it is interesting to note that the dramatist himself was accused of apathy and worse in his own relationship with the regime.

⁴³ Manuel Fraga was very aware of the need for the appearance of legitimacy, even if it did not reflect the reality. This concern for image even extended to his own appearance. In his autobiography he wrote: 'El lunes fui al sastre; me encargué tres trajes severos y ministeriales.' *Memoria breve de una vida política* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1980), p. 32.

This is not to say, however, that popular consent was always freely forthcoming. The regime could not convert the enemies of its ideology to consent or apathy; instead it portrayed them as enemies of the people and sought to eliminate them from the discourse. The omnipresence of repressive state apparatuses led to a certain sense of fear in society and discouraged many people from challenging the dominant ideology. Similarly, the indoctrination of the populace through the ideological state apparatuses, which taught not only one's place in the social order but also the dangers inherent in any attempt to change it, led to widespread apathy. The regime would at times acknowledge repression or state intervention in the private lives of citizens, but either blamed an outside group or claimed that it was a necessary short-term measure in the interests of national security and for the benefit of the population. This can be seen in the wording of the Ministerial Order of 15 July 1939:

En distintas ocasiones ha sido expuesta la necesidad de una intervención celosa y constante del Estado en orden a la educación política y moral de los españoles, como exigencia de éste que surge de nuestra guerra y de la Revolución Nacional.⁴⁴

It can be seen again in 1969, when the government, in order to guarantee peace and in answer to a call from the people, declared a state of emergency (Appendix II).

CALOMARDE *Aún hemos de ver restauradas en nuestra gloriosa España las virtudes que la hicieron grande* (O.C. I: 1513).

Psychological needs were also met in recognition of their importance in securing the acquiescence of the population to the ruling ideology. Perhaps the greatest attraction of a successful ruling ideology is that it offers people an identity and a recognized role in society, and it claims to do so in the name of freedom. As Tom Nairn points out, the myth of nationalism, which was such an important feature of the Francoist ideology, 'corresponds to certain internal needs of the society in question, and to certain individual, psychological needs as well. It supplies peoples and persons with an important commodity, *identity*.'⁴⁵ In Francoist Spain, the *raza* was linked to a mythical, unified, Catholic Spanish race and defined against the Reds, the Republicans and the anti-Spanish liberals who were identified as the *other*. The Francoist ideology was successful because it traded on many beliefs and values already held by people about their identity and incorporated them into a new and distorted definition of Spanishness determined by the regime's ideological needs.

The importance of myth in the naturalization of the Francoist ideology is difficult to overstate. Labanyi highlights how autocrats incorporated myth into the official culture, thus appropriating the symbolic truth it is presumed to contain,

⁴⁴ Orden 15 julio 1939, Censura, p. 553.

⁴⁵ Tom Nairn, 'The Maladies of Development', in *Nationalism*, pp. 70–6 (p. 71).

which in turn lends both universality and legitimacy to the ruling ideology. She also stresses the use of myth in the creation of a national identity.⁴⁶ In his 1882 article 'Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?', Ernest Renan wrote: 'To have common glories in the past, a common will in the present; to have accomplished great things together, to wish to do so again, that is the essential condition for being a nation.'⁴⁷ In Francoist Spain, the people were divided, so myth was employed to create the illusion of fulfilling the conditions of nationhood. The regime's propagandists sought to convince the populace that they belonged to a noble Spanish nation, which had been betrayed by the liberals and Republicans. By portraying the regime as upholders and defenders of this essential Spain and connecting the myth of nationalism to the myth of representation, the regime was able to draw on people's desire for identity and belonging. It also enabled the regime to portray the opposition as a threat to this identity and nature. Underlying this, of course, was the threat that those who disagreed with, or challenged, the dominant group would also be dismissed as anti-Spanish. In myth the Nationalist victory was inevitable, essential and the restoration of a *natural* order disturbed by the Second Republic. Myth, like ideology, of which it is a part, may contain some truth, but it is exaggerated or distorted, and this exaggeration is given the appearance of fact or nature.

As John Breuilly contends, the plausibility of nationalist ideology arises from the fact that at its core is an authentic intellectual response to the problematic one of state–society relations. He goes on to explain its success:

By seeming to abolish the distinctions between culture and politics, society and state, private and public, the nationalist has access to a whole range of sentiments, idioms and practices which would hitherto have been regarded as irrelevant to politics but are now turned into the values underlying political action.⁴⁸

In Spain, the established *natural* unity of the people and progression under Franco was perceived to be undermined by the unnatural developments of the Republicans, the Communists and others who did not fit in with the Francoist definition of the natural state of Spain and the Spaniards.⁴⁹ Unity, under Franco, was enforced. All linguistic expression, religious practice and territorial claims that threatened the unity of the Nationalist–Catholic state were outlawed. As early as May 1937, the Ministerio de Interior issued an order in which article 1 prohibited the use of languages other than Castilian in all dealings with the ministry. Government was centralized and autocratic, and normal trade unions were replaced

⁴⁶ Jo Labanyi, *Myth and History in the Contemporary Spanish Novel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 23, 36, 67.

⁴⁷ Reproduced in *Nationalism*, pp. 17–18 (p. 17).

⁴⁸ Breuilly, 'The Sources of Nationalist Ideology', p. 112.

⁴⁹ As Breuilly put it: 'Derivations from that natural state are, of course, unnatural, and what is unnatural is bad.' 'The Sources of Nationalist Ideology', p. 108.

by vertical syndicates, which sought to eradicate class-consciousness among workers. Arias Salgado claimed the word and concept of *unity* as the regime's own. At the fifth Consejo Nacional de Prensa in Salamanca in 1959, he declared:

Es en Salamanca, donde Francisco Franco, Caudillo de España, forja, temple y proclama con el decreto de Unificación la unidad religiosa (una sola fe), la unidad nacional (no más separatismos), la unidad política (no más partidos políticos) y la unidad social (no más lucha de clases entre españoles).⁵⁰

He thus managed to use the positive concept of unity to defend religious intolerance, centralism, dictatorship and elitism.

Myth stresses areas of common interest and creates or emphasizes common enemies. The appeal to myth can be seen even in the wording of the 1938 *Ley de Prensa*, which aspired to 'devolver a España su rango de Nación unida, grande y libre, de los daños que una libertad entendida al estilo democrático había ocasionado a una masa de lectores diariamente envenenada por una Prensa sectaria y antinacional'.⁵¹ This not only presupposes that Spain was once such a united and free nation, but also that it was not one under democratic rule and that the democratic press was both sectarian and disloyal to the nation. The law went on to claim that the new press under the guidance of the new regime would be based on truth and responsibility, again assuming that this nobility of purpose was not present in the earlier press. It further states that the press was to be returned its dignity and its prestige, an idea that not only was in keeping with the mythology of the new regime, but also managed to damn the old. The New State, it was claimed, would redeem the press and, by implication, the country, from the contradictory 'servidumbre capitalista de las clientelas reaccionarias o marxistas'. Paradoxically, the freedom of the press was to be guaranteed by the suppression of democracy, or democratic libertarianism, as it was termed in the legislation. The latter, it was claimed, not only went against the *Patria*, but also promoted lies and defamation in an attempt by unspecified 'poderes ocultos' to destroy Spain. In short, then, the 1938 *Ley de Prensa* claims Spain, truth and righteousness for the Nationalists while dismissing the *other* as anti-Spanish and finally, and entirely without irony, it advocates censorship in the name of freedom of the press.

Most ideologists have recognized the necessity of revising or falsifying history in order to prove or support an official version of events. Ernest Gellner asserted in his article 'Nationalism and High Cultures' that nationalism 'is not the awakening of an old, latent, dormant force, though that is how it does indeed present itself'.⁵² He continued: 'Nationalism uses the pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures or cultural wealth, though it uses them very

⁵⁰ Gabriel Arias Salgado, *Textos de doctrina y política española de la información*, 6th edn, 3 vols (Madrid: MIT, 1960), I, p. 137.

⁵¹ Ley 22 abril 1938, de Prensa, p. 6915.

⁵² Gellner, 'Nationalism and High Cultures', in *Nationalism*, pp. 63–70 (pp. 63–4).