
I.B. TAURIS
The Politics of Crime in Turkey
Neoliberalism, Police and the Urban Poor
Zeynep Gönen

Zeynep Gönen is an independent researcher, having worked as a lecturer in universities in Turkey and the US. She has a Ph.D. in Sociology from Binghamton University, New York, where her thesis received two awards. Her work has been published in the journals *Critical Criminology* and *Praksis*, and she currently works as an editor at Izmir Mediterranean Academy.

'What Zeynep Gönen provides in this compact work is a critical look into the motivations, practices and outcomes of policing in contemporary Turkey. She does so with a strong grasp of the contemporary theories and critiques that have helped shape law enforcement in modern global cities. Practitioners will appreciate her "on-the-ground" insights into the challenges and shortcomings of policing one of Turkey's largest urban centres. Scholars of Turkish society and culture will gain much from her survey of the local and national politics that influence how crime and the rights of citizens are perceived in the city of Izmir. As a work solidly grounded and researched, it is a welcome contribution to the field.'

Ryan Gingeras, Associate Professor,
Department of National Security Affairs,
Naval Postgraduate School

'*The Politics of Crime in Turkey* is a remarkable achievement: while focused on innovations in Turkey, it illuminates with considerable skill and subtlety the new forms of neoliberal policing that are rapidly spreading around the world. Gönen achieves here what many attempt but few attain: a theoretically and historically informed account constructed from painstaking local, ethnographic research. Most incisive is the sharp attention to the reconfiguration of the state and communities as policing practices were radically transformed – a process now stretching across Asia, Latin America and Asia. Students and scholars of crime and policing will learn much from, and be much challenged by, this singular text.'

William G. Martin, Professor, Sociology Department,
Binghamton University

THE POLITICS OF CRIME IN TURKEY

Neoliberalism, Police and the Urban Poor

Zeynep Gönen

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For Doğu and Uzay

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFIS	Automated Fingerprint Information System
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)
CMUK	Ceza Muhakemeleri Usulü Kanunu (Law on Criminal Procedure)
Dev-Genç	Devrimci Gençlik (Revolutionary Youth)
Dev Sol/ DHKP-C	Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front)
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
EGM	Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü (General Directorate of Security)
EM-REMO	Emniyet Reorganizasyon ve Modernizasyon Kanunu (Re-organization and Modernization Project of the General Directorate of Security)
GBT	Genel Bilgi Tarama (General Information Gathering)
GIS	Geographical Information System
GPS	Global Positioning System
HUNEE	Hacettepe Üniversitesi Nüfus Etütleri Enstitüsü (Hacettepe University Population Studies Institute)
İHD	İnsan Hakları Derneği (Human Rights Association)

KİHBİ/GBT	Smuggling Intelligence, Operation, Intelligence Gathering
MGK	Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (National Security Council)
MOBESE	Mobil Elektronik Sistem Entegrasyonu (Mobile Electronic System Integration)
NYPD	New York Police Department
OHAL	Olağanüstü Hal (State of Emergency)
PKK	Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers' Party)
Pol-Der	Polis Derneği (Police Association)
POLNET	Police Computer Network and Information System
PVSK	Polis Vazife ve Salahiyetleri Kanunu (Police Rights and Duties Act)
SAM	Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (Strategic Research Centre)
SWAT	The Special Weapons and Tactics
TBMM	Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Turkish Parliament)
TİHV	Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı (Human Rights Foundation of Turkey)
TNP	Turkish National Police
TOKİ	Toplu Konut İdaresi (Mass Housing Agency)
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

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INTRODUCTION

In 1970, the prison population in Turkey was a little more than 56,000. Within three decades it increased threefold and reached 165,000. The general population only doubled during this same period. The incarceration rate rose from 157 per 100,000 people in 1970 to 204 in 2014. There are variations inbetween: in 1990, it was 81, and in 2000 the rate was only 73. From the year 2000 onwards, it rose steadily, and as of 2015 the rate of imprisonment was 222. A prison construction boom has also occurred in this last decade: between 2006 and 2015, 91 new prisons were constructed and 32 new buildings were added to the old penal institutions. Altogether they have a capacity of holding 167,620 people.[1] Among the newly constructed prisons, one stands out as being the largest penal complex in Europe: Silivri. Silivri Campus – as it is officially called – is like a town in itself. It consists of nine different prisons, a shopping centre, childcare, classrooms, courtrooms, a barber, 2,592 security cameras and 2,000 personnel. Turkey also has the largest courthouse in Europe. Built in 2011, the Istanbul Justice Palace can hear up to 326 cases at a time. In fact, Turkey has the largest courthouse in the world; Istanbul's Anatolian Justice Palace is also the largest public building in Turkey since its opening in 2012.[2] Since 2002, more than 130 new 'justice palaces' have been built in cities across Turkey.[3] The Turkish police was also reinforced with new technologies, more personnel, new units, as well as an astounding

number of new private security firms that complement its operations. Today there are 238,568 private security guards and about 270,000 police personnel compared to only 20,000 in 1970.[4]

If not unprecedented, these figures are indicative of a quantitative trend for more security and penal resources in the repertoire of the Turkish state, aggregating within the last couple of decades. Is this a response to a growing crime rate? Did the Turkish state construct new penal and justice complexes and add to its security personnel to respond to an increasing criminality? Or are there other political, economic or social forces that can account for this growth? Throughout this book, I delve into these questions and offer an understanding of the crime issue and responses to it in Turkey. I do not take a criminological framework to find a direct link between crimes and their policing and punishment, but instead try to understand politics of crime and processes of criminalization that complicate this simple link. Crimes and the responses to them, I argue, are always a question of politics. In turn, I aim to decipher and make sense of a new politics of crime and new processes of criminalization that have been under construction since the 1990s, which can be placed among the sources of the quantitative – and qualitative, as will be shown – trends listed above.

I define crime both as an ideology and as a socio-political relation. The former calls for a reading that unveils discursive processes, while the latter looks at the practices of the state as central in the production of crime. Crime as an ideology decontextualizes an act and its subjects, and hides the social and political processes within which it takes place. Thus, it depoliticizes the conflicts, inequalities and contradictions, which are constitutive of what is defined as crime. As an ideology, crime is also a discursive tool to define and distinguish groups of people as dangerous others, and thus it is a marginalizing discourse that legitimizes particular forms of state intervention, especially through criminal justice institutions.

Crime as a socio-political relation, on the other hand, re-contextualizes the subject in 'the social forces and contradictions accumulating within it (rather than simply in terms of the danger to ordinary folks), or in terms of the wider historical context in

which it occurs (i.e. in terms of a historical conjuncture, not just a date on the calendar).'[5] It is only through such a contextualized reading that 'the whole terrain of the problem changes in character.'[6] Crime is a social construct, as well as a political question – one that belongs to the sphere of the state and its institutions, including the police, law and prisons. Crime does not take shape in isolation but always in relation to these institutions; its meaning is accessible only through an analysis of the socio-political configurations within which it takes place.

In examining politics of crime and criminalization, I am not interested in all of the security and penal responses but instead one in particular: the police. In order to untangle the subject matter, I focus on crime discourses and police practices. Through their examination, I find that the new politics of crime distinguishes spatially and ethno-racially marked and gendered urban poor populations as 'dangerous criminals' to be controlled. In turn, this materializes in the criminalization of the urban poor, who are rendered 'undesirable' by the new arrangements in the political economy of the neoliberal Turkey. The new politics of crime corresponds to the social regulatory framework of the neoliberal era in which the urban poor are criminalized, and then managed through an expanded and diversified penal/security state. But these are made possible with strong discursive forms of crime. As I show through this book, the penal responses to poverty and disorder are legitimized through the ideological constitution of fear and police discourses that highlight a battle against crime in demographically, economically and politically volatile urban contexts.

At the centre of the book is urban crime and the public order policing that deals with the crimes of the urban poor: theft, mugging, vandalism, drugs, among a host of misdemeanours and felonies. The book traces the recent restructuring of the Izmir Public Order Police, launched in 2006 by the new police chief Hüseyin Çapkın to address the rise in urban crime in Izmir. At that time, the Izmir Public Order Police began to introduce new strategies and technologies, thereby transforming itself into a professionalized and effective organization against 'criminals'. This book demonstrates

that the transformation has rested on a deliberate strategy of profiling and criminalization of the ethno-racially differentiated and gendered urban poor populations, especially Kurdish migrants and Roma people. Claiming to institute a proactive/preventive policing strategy, the Izmir police have expanded their territorial control over the urban space, while specifically targeting the poor segments and populations in the city, and carefully distinguishing them from the 'respectable' and 'innocent' citizens. This was ensured through a strategy of 'harassment' of suspects, or 'target populations' in the words of Izmir police, who have the potential to commit crimes. Moreover, the introduction of new techniques of control, that evaluate police performance, and technologies, that oversee police practices in the streets, gave legitimacy to the police forces and increased its effectiveness.

This book provides not only an analysis of the new policing but also a perspective from below, from a neighbourhood with potential 'target populations' where policing – and criminalization – practices of the Izmir Public Order Police can be decoded. In this field study, the 'target populations' of the new policing, especially young Kurdish men, describe their experiences and help decipher the transformation of the police in connection to their historical and structural relations with state violence. This historical imagination of the residents and their neighbourhood, which is being reconfigured through neoliberal urban processes, allows for an examination of the particular ways in which neoliberal state and subject formation take place in Turkey.

In what follows, I link the transformation of the Izmir police to the ideologies that associated migrants in the cities with crime and disorder. These neoliberal crime ideologies not only criminalized segments of the urban poor but also offered legitimization mechanisms for a police organization in crisis. I argue that in order to respond to its crisis, the police organization was reinforced as a crime-fighting agency against common crimes that were allegedly threatening the neoliberal order, the city and its 'respectable citizens'. The restructuring of the Izmir Public Order Police is understood within the larger social ordering project of neoliberalism for which

'dangerous classes' and 'dangerous places' are to be eliminated from society, while ensuring the security for the 'respectable citizens' through new practices of control.

The recent restructuring of the Izmir police also takes place within a longer history of the expansion of the penal state and police power experienced both in Turkey and abroad. Globally, since the 1970s and 1980s, the capitalist state has undergone a restructuring process; while its welfare functions have been substantially rolled back, penal/security mechanisms and practices have gradually become more diversified and expansive in their scope. As it has been argued, such a restructuring of the state indicates a new social regulatory arrangement: namely, that marginalized segments of the labouring populations are increasingly subjected to the coercive institutions and practices of the state. The neoliberal era has been marked by growing poverty and, in turn, segments of the urban poor who can no longer be fully integrated into the labour market or the social safety institutions of the welfare state have become increasingly surplus, and hence regulated and managed through the penal apparatus of the state.[7]

Nevertheless, the case of Turkey complicates the observed shift from the welfare to penal state, which has mostly been the case for core capitalist countries. The new state formations, discerned through the Izmir police, are in continuity with a long history of authoritarian state practices in Turkey. Instituting neoliberalism and its maintenance in Turkey has been made possible by 'the regime of September 12', which emerged from the coup d'état of 12 September 1980. Reinforcing the national security state, 'the regime of September 12' expanded both legal and extra-legal state violence against political dissidents and the working classes. Empowering capital against labour, the state engaged in a thorough restructuring of the national economy. Moreover, the post-1980 period in Turkey was also shaped by the Kurdish question and the 'war on terror'. Resisting ethno-racial repression, Kurds became an 'internal threat' against which the state consolidated its penal/security apparatus. Thus, the restructuring of the Izmir police, I argue, represents both a shift and continuity in the Turkish state's authoritarian regulatory arrangements since the 1980s.

New mechanisms and strategies of control that are being instituted through the police organization in Izmir are located in the same trajectory with these penal/security arrangements and authoritarian mechanisms of the Turkish state. However, while the state in Turkey has been utilizing force and coercion in order to manage its organized working class populations and political dissidents, since the late 1990s it has incorporated a new strategy into its regulatory framework. According to this strategy, control of marginalized segments of labouring poor in urban areas takes place through an aggressive politics of criminalization and policing. These new forms of policing and regulation of the urban poor combines not only the elimination of welfare state, but also the authoritarian practices and institutions of the state which are configured in response to social unrest.

In summary, this book is about common crimes and their policing, yet the perspective it takes understands them as historically produced processes and not simply as actions and reactions within a legal-institutional framework. The focus is on the social and political meanings of common crimes and police strategies. In defining crime as a political question, I try to overcome and replace the questions of criminology, the classical terrain in which the subject of crime belongs. Criminology, traditionally, tries to explain what crime is, who the criminal is, and how crime can be prevented. By contrast, the study of the politics of crime tries to 'identify the *forces that determine how, why and with what consequences societies choose to deal with crime and criminals as they do*.'[8] In turn, I aim to understand how and through what kind of processes do particular crimes start to constitute a danger to society? What are the historical and social relations that underpin these processes? Similarly, how can the police be seen not simply as a crime-fighting agency, but also as a political organ and a regulatory institution? How can we trace the dimensions of a contemporary (neoliberal) politics of crime? What are the objects and effects of it? And in which historical political context can we locate the current wave of criminalization and policing of segments of the urban poor in Turkey?

In order to answer these questions, I borrow from two traditions that can complement each other: Marxist and Foucauldian perspectives.

Crime as a social relation is addressed through the works of Marxist scholars who critique the ahistorical conceptualization of crime in the criminological literature. Marxists radical criminologists describe the class dimensions of the law, state and police that could help construct a conception of politics of crime as a part of the social regulation of the labouring populations under capitalism. The Foucauldian analysis, on the other hand, is quite effective in developing a conceptualization of the regulation assemblage. From his analysis of the police, the regulatory functions and operations of them, as a part and reflection of the state, can be discovered. Adherents of Foucault argue that the police are part of a complex system of surveillance, control, discipline and management of populations. Supplementing the Marxist and Foucauldian analysis of crime with historical studies from different times and places, can help us to further understand the criminalization processes. A comparative reading of these studies allows for an understanding of the ethno-racial and gendered dimensions of crime and policing, thus exposing criminalization as a process of subject formation and subjection.

This book offers a perspective from a semi-peripheral country and, in this way, it contributes to the contemporary literature on criminalization and policing, which has largely dealt with the experience of core capitalist countries. The case it presents elaborates on the regulation of the urban poor, gendered and marked both spatially and ethno-racially, in a semi-peripheral state that historically relied heavily on authoritarian techniques of control.[9] While the neoliberal transformations promise to democratize the semi-peripheral state, this book shows that they do not eliminate but instead revise the authoritarian regulatory methods.

Time and Place

It is necessary both to contextualize the subject matter of this book, and to locate it in the history and larger socio-structural processes within which it takes place. As stated above, the criminalization and new politics of crime, which will be elaborated on through the case of Izmir, can be located in the longer history of neoliberalism and the

restructuring of the Turkish state dating back to the 1980s. Neoliberalism and the history of the Kurdish question has fundamentally affected the formation of coercive state practices and structural violence over the labouring populations and ethno-racial minorities. This contextualization is indispensible to make sense of the social relations of crime and processes of criminalization in contemporary cities across Turkey.

Since the 1980s, neoliberalism has shaped processes of capitalist accumulation and the state in Turkey in conjunction with transformations in the global political economy. As in the other geographies of the South, the neoliberal transformation of Turkey has been put in place through IMF and World Bank-led Structural Adjustment Programs. The neoliberal restructuring of the economy replaced the developmentalist import substitution industrialization regime with an export orientation. These transformations in Turkey were made possible because of a violent military coup and an interim regime (1980–3) during which political opposition, and working class and left-wing movements were successfully repressed. The 1980 coup and its varied institutions are considered to be effective strokes in the consolidation of neoliberalism and the interests of a more powerful and organized capitalist class in Turkey.[10]

The economic transformations were put in effect mainly by the Motherland Party (MP), 'democratically' elected at the end of the interim period. During the two terms of MP rule (1983–7 and 1987–91) social expenditures were drastically cut, and economic deregulation and the removal of trade barriers took place. Agricultural deregulation erased government support through pricing, while the elimination of subsidies and loans destroyed rural economies and created dependence on agricultural imports from the core capitalist countries. The effects of neoliberalism were very disillusioning indeed. The control of the working classes as well as deregulation of the labour market reduced the power and living standards of labour. Growing regional and class inequalities, poverty, unemployment, a large reduction in real wages, the destruction of social safety nets and an expanding informal sector for the labouring populations were setting the background for the thriving luxurious

lifestyles, new consumption and leisure patterns of the rich urban populations.[11]

Once an important trade port and urban industrial centre, Izmir also has been undergoing a steady economic decline, especially since the 1990s. As a trade port, Izmir has a long history as a vibrant economic centre. For centuries its geographical position provided it with a strategically important role in connecting the trade routes to its agricultural hinterland. After the 1950s, it emerged as an important industrial centre as a result of developmentalist state policies that aimed to increase the industrial capacity of the national economy. The development of new industries transformed Izmir from a commercial city into an industrial one with numerous medium and large-scale plants, employing the labour of a growing urban working class.[12]

The economic opportunities provided by the new industries, the sustained growth in agriculture due to mechanization, as well as the further rise of the commercial sector drew increasing numbers of migrants from different parts of Turkey to cities like Izmir. The new industries were especially in need of a cheap labour force, which was going to be filled by the migrants. The influx of working class emigrants transformed the city both economically and socially. The population of Izmir rose from 359,000 in 1950 to more than one million in 1980.[13] The urban geography also changed rapidly: migrants constructed shantytowns and new neighbourhoods on state-owned land particularly in areas close to industrial facilities.[14] By the end of the 1970s, 240,000 homes were constructed, extending from the centre of the city towards its periphery. The number of residents in the shantytowns composed 40 per cent of the total population of Izmir.[15]

The post-1980s, however, reversed the upward trend in economic growth and employment opportunities as neoliberal economic policies started to take hold. The removal of protection and incentives for industrial firms in line with the free-market ideology of neoliberalism reshaped the urban economies and economic life in general. By abandoning Keynesian developmentalist state policies, Izmir's industries were exposed to competition with cheap imports,

resulting in an extensive downsizing of the industrial sector.[16] Izmir thus transformed into a post-industrial city, with an emphasis on the service sector and an expanded informal economy.

The experience of neoliberal transformations was not limited to the economy; it was political, ideological and cultural as well. Various nationwide institutions, along with the laws, constitution and guidelines of this regime have survived in the present. In turn, the neoliberal regime in Turkey was equipped with a powerful state apparatus and ideological tools, as well as the vigorous outside support of the EU and the US, in the pursuit of its economic, political and social transformation.[17] Since the 1980s, working-class movements and left-wing politics were violently repressed through newly invented forms of criminality and punishment. In this process, prisons and policing were joined to the old and new military organs and tools of the state of exception, and new disciplinary institutions were designed to govern everyday life more strictly and completely. İmset lists the figures that speak to the scale of state terrorism during the 1980 military regime:

> A total of 650,000 people were detained and most suspects were either beaten or tortured. Over 500 people died while under detention as a result of torture; 85,000 people were placed on trial mainly in relation to thought crimes by association; 1,683,000 people were officially listed in police files as suspects; 348,000 Turks and Kurds were banned from travelling abroad; 15,509 people were fired from their jobs for political reasons; 114,000 books were seized and burned; 937 films were banned; 2,729 writers, translators, journalists and actors were put on trial for expressing their opinions.[18]

Since the military coup, the state in Turkey has amassed its penal/security organs for the maintenance of the neoliberal order against its 'internal and external enemies'. The ideologies about the omnipresent 'internal/external enemies' reinforced the legitimacy of authoritarian state practices, and the regime's Law (understood as the legal system, police, courts, prisons, and so on). At the same time,

the security organs and criminal justice institutions were deeply politicized, powerfully situating themselves and consolidating against these 'enemies'.

The liberal ideology defines the authoritarian practices of the Turkish state as a traditional lineage that the republic inherited from the Ottoman Empire. The powerful state apparatus, according to this ideology, is not a historically reproduced and transformed category but a remnant of the past as embodied in an autonomous military organization. The military character of the state was associated with this supposed autonomy of the Turkish Armed Forces, which rests its power on the protection of the Kemalist regime. However, such an analysis does not recognize the formation of authoritarianism and the omnipresence of the military in the politics of Turkey, which is the product of a historical process of formation and reproduction of capitalist relations. Savran, for instance, refutes analyses that delineate the military as an organ independent from the capitalist classes in Turkey.[19] On the contrary, he emphasizes the cooperation and interdependence between the military and the capitalist regime. In his analysis of the military coups in 1960, 1971 and 1980, the historical processes of class struggle are central.[20] In spite of the belief that the military is an autonomous organization, Savran explains, it acted in cooperation with particular sectors of capital in the institutionalization of first the developmentalist and subsequently the neoliberal economy.[21]

Savran argues that military coups in Turkey were about the formation of capitalist relations and the state's response to class struggle.[22] The 1960 coup, while it seemingly gave democratic rights to labour was nonetheless very much a result of internal struggle among the different forms of capital. The 1961 constitution partially extended the democratic rights of labour but also took precautions against particular segments of capital.[23] Labour and working class struggles continued to escalate during the 1960–80 period despite the military coup in 1971. However, with the 1980 coup the political unrest of the period was crushed, and from then on finance capital increasingly gained the upper hand on industrial capital. The authoritarianism was not a product of a long

history of state power continuing from the Ottoman period, as many liberals contend, but was intimately linked to processes of capitalist relations and class struggle. The Turkish state and its Law were products of these, rather than some powerful remnants of the past.

The history of military coups in Turkey has earned it the description of a national security state. While the security state has been consolidated through this long history of authoritarianism against its 'enemies' within Turkey, the present is largely located within the regime instituted by the 1980 coup, namely 'the regime of September 12'. Turkey's neoliberal regime and its corollary state apparatus was instituted by the coup. Among this regime's practices of order, punishment and policing have been crucial, especially in terms of controlling political dissidence. Various forms and practices of violence have been engrained in its institutions. But the Law in its reproduction of injustice has been central to the nature of the Turkish state even after the formation of formal democracy. The authoritarianism, moreover, is not simply a product of the legal power of the military, its legally folded actions and the military coups. In other words, the law is not only formal, but also informal and extra-legal. Agamben's exposition of the state of exception as a permanent and integral part of the state's operations is quite useful for understanding the authoritarian practices of the Turkish state. Drawing on Benjamin and Schmitt, Agamben defines the state of exception as integral to sovereign power and not outside it: 'The violence exercised in the state of exception clearly neither preserves nor simply posits law, but rather conserves it in suspending it and posits it in excepting itself from it.'[24] The state of exception is formative of the law (as well as the Law), not an externality or an exception in this sense. One of the more important themes in debates about the state in Turkey focuses precisely on extra-legal practices and the presence of a 'state-within-the-state'.[25] While operating ideologically against different subjects through its history, 'state-within-the state', which is a composition of non-state and state actors with protection from the politicians, eliminated, repressed and dispersed its 'enemies'.

The problems posed by working class and leftist social movements were very much at the centre of the 1980 coup. However, the new regime was concerned with much more than these movements and the social unrest they generated. Historically inhabiting the underdeveloped regions of Turkey's geography, and systematically excluded from the developmentalist state and industrialization processes, Kurdish populations, who intensified their struggle after the 1960s constituted a problem for the state. The coup and its Kemalist ideology eagerly repressed the Kurdish people as Kurds resisted the project of Turkification since before the formation of the Turkish Republic. While the Turkification project of Kemalism since the 1920s refused to incorporate the Kurdish people into the republican power structures, the state repressed any political demands of the Kurds.[26] Throughout this period, the state utilized various violent practices of ethno-racial repression of the Kurdish people. The Turkish Republic, which was built on Turkish nationalism, had long disregarded any ethnic identity or ignored any demands from ethnic identities.[27] After the 1980 coup, Kurdish politics and culture were penalized in a heavy and systematic manner. Political and cultural expressions of the Kurdish people were eliminated through the enactment of various laws. The Kurdish language was banned. Kurdish political parties, newspapers, and publishing houses were closed.[28] Guerrilla resistance emerged in 1984 by the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, or Kurdistan Workers' Party)[29] as a response to oppression of the Kurdish people and elimination of legal political venues by the military coup. The war against the PKK – or the 'war on terror' – provided the pretext for further militarizing the dynamics and techniques of repression and consolidating authoritarian state power.

The war against the PKK has further consolidated and shaped the Turkish authoritarian state, and the 'state-within-the state'. The war in the Kurdish region has been indispensible in the production of antidemocratic, authoritarian practices and state formation in Turkey. The war itself naturally brought forward repression and violence on the Kurdish populations. From 1987 to 2002, OHAL (State of Emergency) was established in the Kurdish region. It maintained a

regime in which torture, extra-judicial killings and disappearances were abundant, and the authoritarian law ruled the everyday and political lives of Kurdish people.[30] OHAL amplified the extra-legality and violence alongside and within the varied organizations of the national security state.[31] The army, militarized police, extra-legal organs of the state (most importantly JITEM, an paramilitary organ whose existence has been well-known yet insistently denied by military officials), as well as state-organized civil vigilantism, whose recruits were also Kurds, have been integral to the war on and repression of the Kurdish people and their social movements.

During the 1990s, the effects of the exacerbated war in the Kurdish region started to spill over to Turkey's western cities. The widespread destruction of Kurdish villages during the war and the already weak local and regional economies forced many Kurds from their lands to the cities between the years 1986 and 1995. According to estimates, between 950,000 and 1.2 million Kurds were forced to migrate.[32] Cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Diyarbakır, Adana, Mersin and Bursa constituted the main destinations of Kurds in search for job opportunities and a livelihood.[33] Those who migrated had experienced the war, and the pain and violence that came with it. Their objective conditions and subjective positions in the cities, in which they arrived, reflected this.[34]

At this time, Turkey's western cities received the large numbers of Kurdish people who could no longer be integrated into the neoliberal urban economies, especially in the formal sector. The neoliberalization of the urban economies had been transforming the labour market to the disadvantage of the organized working classes. The conditions of the working classes in the cities in parallel to their deteriorating position in the economy had been gradually declining. Poverty and marginalization became the rule for the newcomers. In contrast to the former generation of migrants, the new Kurdish migrants did not find an easy entry into urban economic life. Formally integrated through *gecekondu*-ization, migrants in the 1990s did not have opportunities to construct shanties on their own, and become a part of formal labour market, but instead became renters, while

constituting the cheap and exploitable labour pool for the informal sector and the precarious jobs. The war and forced migration, though conducted on the basis of nationalist politics, presented the neoliberal urban economies with an exploitable and cheap labour force. Kurdish migrants have constituted the reserve army of labour for the informal economy of Turkey's industrial centres.[35]

In this process, Kurdish migrants have radically changed the cityscape and urban processes in Izmir. Even though neoliberal restructuring has resulted in economic decline and stagnation of the industrial sector, migrants continued to arrive in the city in search of security and livelihood. Yet, Kurdish migrants could hardly be integrated into the shrinking formal labour market and remained on the fringes of the Izmir's informal economy. For the native populations of the cities, especially the middle classes, Kurdish migrants constituted a threat, both political and criminal. Izmir's middle classes articulated their anxiety as a reaction to the city's poor migrants by defining themselves as secular Kemalist nationalists. While the reaction of secularism was against the governing Islamist party, the local 'others', according to Izmir's native populations (*İzmirli*), included conservative Islamists and Kurdish migrants because of the supposed threat they posed to the modern order in the city.[36] As Kurdish migrants became more visible in the urban landscape, they were regarded as 'inferior', 'ignorant', 'peasants', or worse, outright 'terrorists', 'invading' the city and living in it 'by ill-gotten gains', as revealed in Saraçoğlu's study on the attitudes of middle-class *Izmirlis*.[37] In turn, in Izmir, and in other big cities, the ethno-racially differentiated urban poor who had been victimized by the neoliberal project started to constitute what were construed as the 'dangerous populations'. Urban crime discourses were central to the construction of the dangerousness and racialization of these populations.

In sum, the historical structural context of criminalization and policing in contemporary urban Turkey has been shaped by two important sources: neoliberal economic and political transformations and the post-1984 Kurdish question. In turn, the dynamics of urban poverty, urban economies, and Kurdish migration as well

as the history of the making and re-making of authoritarian state practices, especially 'the regime of September 12' draws the contours of crime and their policing in contemporary Izmir and other large cities in Turkey.

On Methods and Organization

There are two analytical dimensions to this book: ideology and practice, both of which are constitutive elements of the neoliberal politics of crime. Their analysis helps decipher the processes of criminalization and the transformation of the state in Turkey. However, there are multiple layers through which they are investigated. Different time scales are taken into account at both micro and macro layers, from the neighbourhood to the national level, from the present time to the longer history of neoliberalism, the state and the Kurdish question. The framework and perspective that I draw in Chapter 1 tries to coherently bring together these different layers and analytical dimensions in its analysis.

The framework of this book necessitated the utilization of different methods and a reliance on different types of sources, which includes archival data, ethnographic data, institutional analysis, interviews, statistics, and human rights files among others. While this places the book in danger of being methodologically eclectic, a multi-layered analysis would not be possible without resorting to these different kinds of sources.

The Turkish National Police (TNP) has been undergoing a transformation for some time, but the type of thorough and deliberate restructuring mentioned in this book, has been more or less specific to Izmir at the time of research.[38] To understand the restructuring of the Izmir police, I have conducted interviews with police officials in Izmir, especially high-level captains in the Public Order Department, in April and May of 2008. With the approval of the Izmir Police Department, I have participated in two meetings, regularly held at new subdivisions of the Public Order Police. There I could observe and note discussions. The Izmir Police Department also provided me with documents that describe the new methods,