THE DARDANELLES
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR C. E. CALLWELL, R.C.B.
# CONTENTS

## CHAPTER I

**THE INITIATION OF THE CAMPAIGN**

The entry of the Ottoman Empire into the European War—The objects to be gained by success in the Dardanelles—The strategical and tactical problem to be solved—The pitfall of warships against coast defences—Application of military force generally necessary when coast defences have to be reduced—The minor operations against the Dardanelles in 1914—The Russian appeal for aid—Means at disposal for bringing pressure upon Turkey—Methods by which pressure could have been brought to bear upon Turkey at this time—The decision to attack the Dardanelles—Preparations for the enterprise

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapters</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>1-13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER II

**THE NAVAL ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE DARDANELLES**

The naval forces assembled for the undertaking—The task—The attacks on the outer forts—Comments—Operations to the middle of March—The early attacks upon the defences of the Narrows—Comments—Need for military assistance becoming apparent—The attack of the 18th of March—Comments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapters</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>14-26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER III

**THE ORGANISATION OF THE MILITARY EXPEDITION**

The concentration of troops for the defence of Egypt—First steps towards utilising military force in the Dardanelles campaign—Comments—Weather conditions in the Aegean—The development of the military plans—The delay in employing the military forces detailed—The reorganisation of the Military Expeditionary Force at Alexandria—Promises of Russian co-operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapters</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>27-37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE DARDANELLES

CHAPTER IV

THE MILITARY PROBLEM PRESENTED BY THE DARDANELLES

Alternatives to actually attacking the Gallipoli Peninsula—Operations on the European side—Question of operations on the Asiatic side—The disposition of the Turkish forces in the middle of March—The Gallipoli Peninsula the obvious military objective—The disadvantages of selecting the peninsula as objective—Sir I. Hamilton's decision to attack the peninsula—The strategical and tactical problem presented by the peninsula—Sir Ian Hamilton's plan—The tactical problem that arises in the case of a military landing in face of opposition—Ought the land campaign to have been abandoned at the last moment? 38-57

CHAPTER V

THE LANDING

The opening scene of the enterprise favoured by good weather—The general plan of attack—Turkish preparations and the distribution of the defending forces—Marshal Liman von Sanders' first dispositions—The distribution of the attacking force at Helles—The landing at Beach Y—Comments—The landing at Beach X—The landing at Beach W—Comments on the fight for W Beach—The landing at Beach S—The landing at Beach V—Comments on the landing on V Beach—The camber east of Sedi-el-Bahr—Some observations on the landings at Helles—The landing at Kum Kale—The feint in the Gulf of Saros—The general scheme for the Anzac landing—The approach—The landing—Comments—The question of landing at dawn—Merits of landing at a topographically inconvenient spot—The importance of making good as much ground as possible at once—The value of portable artillery on these occasions—Partially trained troops—Conclusion 58-105

CHAPTER VI

THE CONSOLIDATION AT HELLES AND ANZAC

The situation at Helles on the morning of the 26th—The advance from V Beach—Reinforcements landed at V Beach—Turkish dispositions with respect to Helles—The withdrawal from Kum Kale—The operations at Helles on the 27th—The situation at Helles on the night of the 26th—The position at Anzac on the morning of the 26th—The 26th and 27th at Anzac—The situation at Anzac on the night of the 26th as compared with that at Helles—The fighting qualities of the Turks—Sir I. Hamilton's division of his forces—Boat accommodation and beach space available—Possibilities at Helles—The question of Kum Kale—Possibilities north of Gaba Tepe—Conclusion 106-131
CONTENTS

CHAPTER VII

THE GENERAL STRATEGICAL SITUATION PRODUCED BY THE LANDINGS

The Expeditionary Force definitely committed to a certain plan—
Turkish communications with, and in, the Gallipoli Peninsula—
Ottoman powers of concentration—The Allies' power to threaten
descents upon other portions of the coast, and its consequences—
Possibilities of severing the Turkish communications—The bases
of the Allies—The Allies' communications—The Allies' powers of
concentration—Question of drafts—The withdrawal of the Russian
Expeditionary Force from Odessa . . . . . 132–146

CHAPTER VIII

THE FIRST THREE MONTHS AT HELLES

The topographical conditions of the Helles area—Sir I. Hamilton's
difficulty—The action of the 28th April—From the 29th of
April to the 5th of May—The struggle of the 6th–8th of May—
From the 15th of May to the 4th of June—From the 5th to the
cold of June—The month of July—Comments . . . 147–165

CHAPTER IX

THE FIRST THREE MONTHS AT ANZAC

The topographical features of the Anzac area—Events during the
first few days after the 27th—The great Turkish attack upon
Anzac—From the 25th of May to the end of July—Comments—
Ought the fleet to have given more assistance with its artillery than
it did after May . . . . . . . . . . . 166–181

CHAPTER X

POSSIBILITIES OF SUCCESS

The impossibility of achieving the object with the forces available—The
reinforcements—Sir I. Hamilton's appreciation—Comments—The
Expeditionary Force's weakness in artillery—Aviation—The naval
position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182–191

CHAPTER XI

THE GREAT EFFORT OF EARLY AUGUST

Sir I. Hamilton's plan in outline—The Turkish disposition of force
at the beginning of August—The combat at Helles—The opera-
tions from Anzac—Preparations—The frontal attacks from the
Anzac position—The start of the attack upon Sari Bair—The fight
for Sari Bair from the 8th to the 10th—Observations on General
Birdwood's operations from the 6th to the 10th—Operations at
Suvla Bay—Special conditions of the landings—The orders for
the IXth Corps—The landings—Operations on the 7th after
8 a.m.—Comments on the first twenty-four hours of the Suvla
operations—The events of the 8th—Sir I. Hamilton's direct
intervention—Comments—The events of the 9th and 10th—The
splitting up of the 10th Division—Conclusion . . . . 192–240
THE DARDANELLES

CHAPTER XII

THE CLOSE OF THE AUGUST OFFENSIVE

The situation on the 11th of August—Operations from the 12th to the 16th—Sir I. Hamilton's request for large reinforcements—From the 17th to the 20th of August—The battle of the 21st of August—From the 22nd of August to the end of the month—Review of the August offensive as a whole

241-255

CHAPTER XIII

THE THREE AUTUMN MONTHS

The situation at the beginning of September—An uneventful period in the peninsula from the tactical point of view—The blizzard of the 27th of November—The Balkan situation between April and October—The effect of the overthrow of Serbia on the Dardanelles campaign—Sir I. Hamilton relieved by Sir C. Monro—General Monro's instructions and his conclusions—Government indecision—Lord Kitchener proceeds to the Aegean—Partial withdrawal ordered—The sailors' insistence on the retention of Helles—General Monro's digest of the communications situation at the peninsula

256-275

CHAPTER XIV

THE EVACUATION OF ANZAC AND SULVA

General Monro's instructions to General Birdwood—General Birdwood's general plan—From the 16th to the 18th of December—The final evacuation of Anzac—Comments on the final evacuation of Anzac—The final evacuation of Suvla—The withdrawal of the left sector of the Suvla force—The withdrawal of the right sector of the Suvla force—Comments on the evacuation of the Suvla area—The German account

276-304

CHAPTER XV

THE EVACUATION OF HELLES

The decision to withdraw from Helles—The problem—The situation on the 28th of December—General Monro's instructions with regard to the carrying out of the evacuation—The preliminary stage of the operation—The unfavourable weather—Change of plan as to the final evacuation—Events of the 7th—The situation on the 8th—The final evacuation—The German version—Comments on the operation

305-331
CONTENTS

CHAPTER XVI

SOME OUTSTANDING LESSONS OF THE CAMPAIGN

The vital necessity of exhaustive examination of the conditions before embarking on a warlike adventure, and of evolving a comprehensive plan of campaign for its conduct—The great size of modern armies tends to impair the effectiveness of amphibious forms of war—An advanced base needed in case of a maritime descent upon an enemy's shores—The influence of the submarine upon undertakings of the Dardanelles type—Comparative ineffectiveness of boardship gunfire against shore targets—Vital importance in the case of a maritime descent upon hostile territory of securing a large area immediately on landing—Reserves to replace wastage must be provided on the spot in the case of distant campaigns—Conclusion . . . 332-347

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I. List of authorities consulted . . . . . . 348
APPENDIX II. Order of battle of the Expeditionary Force . . 350
APPENDIX III. The arrangements made with regard to water for the Suvla landing . . . . . . . 355
APPENDIX IV. Marshal Liman von Sanders' views and statements . 357
THE DARDANELLES
CAMPAIGNS AND THEIR LESSONS.

Tirah, 1897. By Colonel Sir C. E. Callwell, C.B., etc. 5s. net. With maps.

Bohemia, 1866. By Major Neil Malcolm. 5s. net. With maps.

The Campaign of Liao-Yang. By Major H. Rowan Robinson. 6s. 6d. net. With maps.

The Marne Campaign. By Lieut.-Col. F. E. Whitton. With coloured maps. 10s. 6d. net.

Other volumes in preparation.
THE
DARDANELLES

BY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR C. E. CALLWELL, K.C.B.

WITH MAPS

The Naval & Military Press Ltd

Reproduced by kind permission of the Central Library,
Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst
INTRODUCTION

The contest for the control of the Dardanelles in 1915 brought about a struggle by sea and land which was in the main conducted quite independently of occurrences in other theatres of the Great War. That being so, it can in a military and naval sense be treated as a distinct incident in the world-wide disturbance. It constituted a campaign by itself. Its course, nevertheless, was appreciably affected by belligerent events elsewhere, by the military situation in Western Europe on various dates—by the progress of the conflict on the western and south-eastern borders of Russia, for instance, by acute strategical developments in Serbia, and even by martial proceedings in the vicinity of the Nile Delta and in Mesopotamia. Such influence as the conditions in distant regions exerted over the fight for the Straits took, however, almost entirely the form of diverting to other fields military and naval resources which, but for this, might have been profitably employed in and about the Gallipoli Peninsula.

It was the Allies who especially suffered in this respect, and they suffered particularly on land. For, lack of troops and munitions was unquestionably one cause of their failure to wrest domination of the Hellespont out of the hands of the Turk. But the inadequacy of the means in respect to men and munitions placed at his disposal, which so shackled Sir I. Hamilton, were primarily—if not indeed wholly—due to the fact that men and munitions were urgently needed in other theatres of war and especially in France and Flanders. To go into the question as to whether the policy adopted in this matter by the Governments concerned was right or was wrong, would manifestly be inappropriate in a volume that only pretends to deal with one particular campaign of the
World War. To become immersed in such comprehensive problems would involve a strategical disquisition concerning the Homeric struggle as a whole. So, when mentioning the relative weakness of the Allies' military forces committed to the Dardanelles enterprise, and the failure of the responsible rulers to despatch the reinforcements and the war material that were called for if the undertaking was to be successful, it will simply be assumed that the reinforcements and the war material could not be provided. The question whether they ought or ought not to have been provided will not be debated.

To review a campaign at a stage when the available information concerning it is derived entirely, or almost entirely, from one only of the two contending sides, must ever be unsatisfying. We unfortunately are at present almost wholly dependent for information as to what occurred upon documents and works emanating from the Entente side. No detailed accounts of the operations are to hand from Teutonic nor yet from Turkish sources. The three published German brochures which do deal with the campaign—their titles are given in Appendix I—are unconvincing and superficial efforts, and they manifestly were written with an eye to their effect upon the general public in Germany, while doing full justice to the valour and grit of the Turks. As Marehal Liman von Sanders observes in a signed Preface, dated the 15th of July, 1916, to one of them, "Only when there shall no longer be need to conceal anything can the truth as to facts and numbers be told. Any narrative of the Dardanelles struggles written to-day for the benefit of friends at home can only serve to throw a passing light over what occurred, for it will not be possible to deal with events exhaustively." Some of the statements in these unpretentious works do, however, bear an almost unmistakable stamp of truth, and these add somewhat to our restricted knowledge of what went on in and behind the Ottoman lines. For all practical purposes, however, this volume is to be regarded as written from the Allies' point of view, and Germans and Turks are throughout called the enemy in its pages.
INTRODUCTION

The following chapters do not pretend to furnish a history of the great adventure. They concern themselves especially with the broad strategical aspect of the operations, and with certain phases of the fighting that illustrate unwonted classes of tactical work and that throw light upon the art of conducting amphibious warfare. Thus, the naval attempt to force the Straits without military aid is treated in some detail. The famous landing on the shores of the Gallipoli Peninsula on the 25th of April is dealt with fairly exhaustively. The successful evacuation some nine months later of the sea-girt patch of Turkish territory which had been the scene of so much heroism and so much bloodshed, is discussed at length in so far as information as to that most memorable operation of war is forthcoming. On the other hand, some of the principal combats, combats that involved furious fighting and that gave rise to serious losses in the ranks of the contending forces, are dismissed briefly because their story suggests no special lessons concerning the art of war. This applies to the protracted contest at the Helles end of the peninsula after the landings had been made good, and to the sanguinary affrays which took place in the month of August for the possession of the Sari Bair mountain mass. The work is in fact designed to be a study of certain phases of the campaign rather than as a formal record of its course, and such comments and deductions as are sprinkled through its pages are meant to be suggestive rather than didactic, seeing that the majority of the problems discussed are in reality matters admitting of considerable diversity of opinion.

The author's special acknowledgments are due to Scout Fred Giles of the 1st City of Westminster Troop for his invaluable and skilled aid in preparing the maps and plans to illustrate the text. A list of the authorities consulted is given in Appendix I. Some valuable unpublished information has also been at his disposal. The campaign has given rise to a number of interesting and instructive works to supplement official reports. The late Mr. Schuler's account of the Anzac operations gives a most graphic description of the services performed by the troops from
the Antipodes, alike in battle and in making possible their stay in a singularly unsatisfactory tactical position. Major Cooper's story of the doings of the 10th Division is so informative as to make one regret the short stay of his division in the peninsula. Even a less remarkable and dramatic series of operations than those executed by the Allies in their immortal gamble for possession of the Hellespont would inevitably provide attractive reading in the hands of Mr. Masefield. The virtues that have been claimed for "words of an eye-witness" are to be found in ample measure in the Gallipoli Diary kept by Major Gillam, who saw the business through from start to finish with the famous 29th Division, and in the fascinating pages of A Naval Adventure. Mr. Nevinson's The Dardanelles Campaign provides a complete history of the operations and of the events leading up to the initiation of the attack upon the Straits, by one who was on the spot during some of the most dramatic incidents of the struggle and who remained with the Expeditionary Force to the very end. Mr. Morgenthau, Mr. Granville Fortescue and Mr. Schreiner have placed it beyond doubt that the batteries barring passage through the Straits only suffered limited damage from the heavy bombardments to which they were subjected by the attacking fleet.
**LIST OF MAPS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I.</th>
<th>The Helles Area (with insets of Lemnos and Imbros)</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>The Landings on &quot;V&quot; and &quot;W&quot; Beaches</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>Kum Kale</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>Anzac</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>The Anzac and Suvla Areas</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.</td>
<td>Evacuation of the Left Suvla Sector</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII.</td>
<td>The Dardanelles</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII.</td>
<td>General Map</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CAMPAIGNS AND THEIR LESSONS

THE DARDANELLES

CHAPTER I

THE INITIATION OF THE CAMPAIGN

The entry of the Ottoman Empire into the European War.—Although Turkey delayed acts of war against the Allies until the 31st of October, 1914, two months after the commencement of the European conflict, it had been patent to the world for some weeks previously that hostilities were imminent. The unopposed entry of the German battle-cruiser Goeben and her consort, the cruiser Breslau, into the Dardanelles, had clearly indicated the existence of a definite, if secret, understanding between the Central Powers and the Sublime Porte, and had made it certain that the Ottoman Empire intended to take sides against the Entente sooner or later. That being the case, the question of a possible attack upon the Dardanelles, as a preliminary to securing mastery over the maritime route from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea and to dealing Turkey simultaneously a staggering blow, had not escaped the attention of the British Admiralty and War Office. The objects to be achieved by the successful execution of such an enterprise were so manifest, the consequences of a military triumph in this quarter were bound to be so far-reaching, that no special knowledge of the factors was indeed required to enable the importance of the matter to be realised.1

The objects to be gained by success in the Dardanelles.—It is only proposed to deal with the actual Dardanelles campaign in this volume. At the same time it is indispensable, if a correct

1 Maps VII and VIII at the end of the volume illustrate Chapters I to IV.
THE DARDANELLES

appreciation of the circumstances attending the initiation and prosecution of the venture is to be arrived at, that there should be no misunderstanding as to the scope of the undertaking as originally designed. By those responsible for setting the campaign in motion, the conquest of the Hellespont was rightly regarded as merely a preliminary to further combinations of war. The real objective that they had in view was Constantinople and the Bosphorus—especially the latter. For they realised that the acquisition of this remarkable maritime defile by British, French, and Russian naval and military forces would assure to Russia the means both of exporting the agricultural produce which she possessed in abundance and of importing the war material of which she stood sorely in need, would effect a cleavage of the Sultan's dominions into two parts, and would set up an insuperable barrier against that Teutonic pressure towards the east of which signs had been apparent even before the dramatic events of August, 1914, provided Germany with an opportunity for gratifying her Oriental ambitions. The fall of Constantinople would exercise a tremendous moral effect throughout Turkey and the whole Mahomedan world. So daring and decisive a stroke delivered by the forces of the Entente could, moreover, hardly fail to secure an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards the Allies on the part of the Balkan States, and it might well induce all those kingdoms definitely to make common cause with belligerents who had given a demonstration so convincing of their fighting potentialities and of their capacity for conducting war. As it turned out, the project in reality never got beyond its introductory stage. The attempt to win the Dardanelles, first by naval effort and afterwards by the superposition of a military expedition on a great scale upon the original operation, came to naught. Hence it has followed that the enterprise, in spite of what was contemplated to start with, has come to be looked upon merely as a campaign undertaken for the mastery of those Straits.

The inception and the conduct of the adventure have provoked bitter controversy. But by no person of intelligence has it ever been suggested that the game would not have been worth the candle had the means for playing it effectively been available and had it been played with skill. A project, which had everything to commend it in itself, failed for all practical purposes at the
outset owing to faulty strategical and tactical conceptions as to how it ought to be executed, and owing to its being embarked on and carried out with insufficient fighting forces. Under the circumstances, it remains open to question whether the objects aimed at would have been gained even if the preliminary stage—the conquest of the Dardanelles—had been successfully passed. But that remains a matter of conjecture, seeing that the campaign for the Bosphorus and Constantinople broke down at the start.

The strategical and tactical problem to be solved.—The Franco-British naval forces possessed complete command of the Ægean at the end of October, 1914, but this circumstance in reality conferred no special liberty of action upon them in respect to operations to be undertaken for the conquest of the Bosphorus. In view of the considerable Turkish military forces gathered around the capital of their country, of the absence of communications alike in Thrace and in Anatolia, and of the lack of ports well adapted to act as bases for a land campaign on an important scale, the only suitable avenue to the objective ran through the Dardanelles. That great waterway joining the Sea of Marmora to the Ægean must be mastered somehow if the straits connecting the Sea of Marmora with the Black Sea were to be won. Command of the Sea of Marmora had to be established if the further operations were to be prosecuted with vigour and were to be brought to a triumphant conclusion. It was necessary for the Allied fleet to reach this middle water-area via the Dardanelles, and consequently the first problem that presented itself was how this was to be accomplished.

But the mere appearance of the Allied flags in the Marmora would not in itself give their navies permanent control of its waters; the communications of the fleet after it had passed the lower straits must give no cause for anxiety if the operations were to be continued. Moreover, in the event of military effort being needed to compass the downfall of Constantinople and to succour the warships in mastering the Bosphorus—and military effort inevitably would be needed—unopposed navigation of the Dardanelles for transports must be regarded as a sine qua non. But the Dardanelles were effectively fortified, and they were furthermore eminently adapted by nature for confronting attack on the part of hostile ships of war. Topographical conditions provided elevated
sites for batteries to dominate the channel. Its lack of breadth, its length and its winding character all favoured defence. The existence of a well-defined current flowing down from the Sea of Marmora inevitably offered encouragement to the Turk. It was a case where nature, supplemented by art, created in some respects an almost ideal maritime defile. But, on the other hand, the fact that the region forming the European side of the famous straits represented merely a narrow peninsula, tacked on to the mainland of Thrace by the still narrower isthmus of Bulair, was not without encouragement to a commander of amphibious forces engaged on devising schemes for conquering the passage, and this geographical phenomenon seemed to point unmistakably to the means by which success might be achieved should adequate land and sea forces be available.

A British fleet had mastered the Hellespont on a former occasion, flouting the Crescent. That event had occurred in 1807, when Sir John Duckworth forced the pass at the head of a formidable squadron of two and three deckers—in itself a memorable feat of arms and of sailorship. But the intruders did not tarry long in the Sea of Marmora. The impossibility of provisioning his ships while hostile batteries that remained unimpaired in their powers of doing mischief could play upon the narrow channel which constituted his sole line of communications, constrained Duckworth to retire; and in its transit down the Dardanelles his armament was handled somewhat roughly. For the enterprise to have turned out a profitable one in 1807 it had been essential that those straits should not merely have been forced, but that they should also have been subsequently held. In this important respect the broad strategical features of the problem had undergone no transformation when the possibility of pushing an armament from the Aegean into the Sea of Marmora came to be considered in the autumn of 1914.

The problem had, as it happened, been carefully examined by the British Admiralty and War Office some years earlier. A memorandum had been drawn up in 1906 by the General Staff, in which there occurred a passage that clearly indicates the conclusion which expert sailors and soldiers had then come to as to the expediency of attempting to force the Dardanelles by ships alone. "Military opinion," runs this passage, "looking at the
question from the point of view of coast defence, will be in entire
agreement with the naval view that unaided action by the fleet,
bearing in mind the risk involved, is much to be deprecated.”
The memorandum, moreover, took a discouraging view of the
prospects of conjunct naval and military operations for securing
possession of the Straits. The position taken up in the document
was that a purely naval attack would not be justifiable under any
circumstances, while an amphibious undertaking was bound to
prove a most difficult and dangerous operation of war.

The pitting of warships against coast defences.—For many years
preceding the outbreak of the European War, sailors and soldiers
had agreed that for warships to attack coast fortresses was in
principle a mistake. This, needless to say, presupposes that the
fortresses are reasonably well armed and equipped for the fray.
Weak or ill-manned batteries can naturally be vanquished readily
enough by an efficient fleet. Of comparatively recent years, for
instance, a British squadron has overcome coast defences at
Alexandria, a few American vessels have disposed of the fortifica-
tions that protected the harbour of Manila, and Italian battleships
and cruisers have destroyed shore batteries at Tripoli as a prelude
to the disembarkation in the harbour of an accompanying expedi-
tionary force; but in none of these cases were the works capable
of offering a serious resistance. The failure of the naval attack
upon Sebastopol, on the other hand, and the damage sustained
by the Italian squadron which assailed the defences of Lissa in
1866, serve as examples of warships being virtually beaten off in
ill-advised undertakings against land fortifications.

Occasions no doubt will arise from time to time in war where
floating forces have no option and are obliged to throw down the
guamlet to shore defences that are strong enough to give a good
account of themselves—Blake’s daring assault upon the Porto
Farina batteries which sheltered the corsair flotilla that he meant
to destroy, and Nelson’s intrepid action at Copenhagen, can be
cited as instances. But most experts declare that such ventures
are to be avoided if it is possible. The justifiable disinclination of
sailors to risk their ships on such unpromising enterprises has
been well illustrated within the last few years by the refusal of
Admiral Shafter to attempt to force his way into the harbour of
Santiago de Cuba, and by the non-committal attitude so rigidly
preserved by the Japanese naval authorities with regard to the coast batteries that protected Port Arthur during the prolonged operations undertaken for the capture of that stronghold from the Russians.

The Dardanelles presented the case of a narrow channel that was more or less fringed with works furnished with heavy ordnance. Up to the time of the introduction of mines and torpedoes, warships often succeeded in running past efficient defences protecting channels and rivers, without incurring much injury—as Duckworth did on the occasion quoted above. Farragut was in his element in such work in the days of the War of Secession. But submarine devices have rendered enterprises of this kind incomparably more difficult for floating forces to carry through successfully than they were a few decades ago. The essence of a running past operation is that the ships engaged on the venture should proceed rapidly through the defile, bringing so intense and violent a fire to bear upon the defending batteries that the gun detachments in these are driven from their emplacements. But the mine and the torpedo have vastly increased the risks inseparable from a resort to such uncompromising tactics. Indeed, if these engines of destruction are skilfully employed by the defenders, and if they are available in sufficient quantities, rushing a channel so protected may be wholly out of the question. To attempt the feat may mean the destruction of the entire flotilla.

Application of military force generally necessary when coast defences have to be reduced.—Seeing that it is in general objectionable to oppose warships against coast defences, but that circumstances in time of war may render imperative the reduction of the works, the duty of dealing with them usually falls upon land forces. Records of past campaigns will produce a dozen examples of the fall of maritime fortresses brought about by the action of soldiers, against one example of the task having been accomplished by sailors. The conquest of Port Arthur in 1895 was achieved by the military, and history repeated itself when the same great place of arms was again assailed in 1905. The coast batteries of Prevesa and of Salonika were dealt with from the land, and not from the sea, side in the Balkan War of 1912. It was the United States army and not the navy that overcame Santiago. Sebastopol fell to military force. When this country
felt itself called upon to attack Copenhagen so as to gain possession of the Danish fleet seven years after Nelson’s exploit, the method adopted was to land troops in the vicinity of the place. It indeed is hardly too much to say that a purely naval attack upon reasonably efficient coast defences would in practice never take place were it not for the difficulty that so often presents itself in conveying troops to the locality. For, in the nature of things, an enemy’s maritime fortress will probably be too remote to permit of the army intended for its reduction marching thither from its own territory.

On broad strategical principles, therefore, attack upon the Dardanelles presented itself in 1914 as an operation that ought not to be undertaken without military assistance, if it was undertaken at all. This had been fully recognised by the British naval and military authorities in 1906. It continued to be recognised during the early months of the European War, and, had the question received that close and detailed examination by sailors and soldiers in consultation that the case demanded when it was suddenly brought into prominence in the early days of 1915, it is difficult to believe that any other verdict would have been given.

The minor operations against the Dardanelles in 1914.—A combined British and French squadron bombarded the batteries at the mouth of the Dardanelles on the 3rd of November, the ships firing at long range for a few minutes. The works replied, and from their feeble performance it was possible to deduce the capabilities of the Turkish guns. Nothing further worthy of note happened after this affair till the 13th of December, when a British submarine proceeded up the Straits and succeeded in sinking an old Turkish battleship—a very fine feat of arms in view of the rows of minefields under which the vessel had to pass. There was, however, no intention of undertaking serious operations in this quarter until the early days of January. Then, however, matters were unexpectedly brought to a head.

The Russian appeal for aid.—On the 2nd of January a telegram was received at the British War Office from Russia containing a request that a demonstration of some kind should be made against Turkey, so as to relieve the very serious pressure that was being put upon the Russian forces in Transcaucasia by a superior Ottoman army at the moment. To this Lord Kitchener, the War
Minister, sent a reply promising compliance, at the same time expressing doubts whether a demonstration would achieve the object in view. But an appeal of this kind from an Ally who had risked and encountered a disaster four months before in a loyal effort to afford assistance indirectly to the Franco-British armies when these were in serious straits in France, could not possibly be disregarded, and the British Government felt itself bound to consider very seriously what form of demonstration, that could be regarded as feasible, would be likely to draw Turkish troops away from the theatre of war in Armenia. It may not, however, be out of place to observe here that, thanks to masterly leadership and to a display of rare martial qualities on the part of the soldiery, the Russian forces at the threatened point had by their own unaided grit and skill relieved the pressure of the enemy upon them before any action was taken to help them from the side of the Mediterranean.

Means at disposal for bringing pressure upon Turkey at this time.—The aggregate of warships of the Allies gathered in the Mediterranean at this juncture represented force sufficient to maintain a virtually undisputed command of those waters, always provided that no new enemy disposing of maritime resources should intervene. The demands made upon it by its duties in connection with keeping careful guard over the respectable and well-handled Austro-Hungarian marine in the Adriatic, and by its responsibilities in connection with ensuring a rigid blockade of the Ottoman coast and watching the Dardanelles, however, practically absorbed its whole fighting capabilities. There was little margin left in hand justifying its embarking on adventures that might weaken it. For it to have committed itself to a serious attack upon the formidable defences of the Hellespont at the moment when Russia called for aid, would have been to impose a greater strain upon the squadrons of which it was composed than these might have been able to endure.

Nor had the Allies at this time adequate military forces available in the Near East, or capable of being promptly despatched thither, to justify their undertaking a land campaign against Turkey designed on an ambitious scale. To have detached troops from the theatre of war in France and Flanders in the midwinter of 1914–15 was out of the question, and not more than a few
thousand adequately trained and fully equipped units could have been found elsewhere for the task. It is true that the need of defending Egypt against threatened Ottoman attack from the side of Syria had brought about the assemblage of a numerically considerable army in the Nile Delta. India had sent its quota of regulars, and Territorial units had been despatched from home. These troops had been, and were being, supplemented by considerable forces drawn from Australia and New Zealand for which the country afforded favourable training ground in good climatic conditions. But it was not an army that could have provided at the moment a serviceable fighting force on the scale qualifying it to launch out on extensive operations. For it consisted largely of depots, it was weak in organised artillery formations, and it included many corps, made up of exceptionally fine material but of material that still needed welding into shape. So it came about that at the juncture when the British Government was called upon to take some step calculated to afford succour to the Russian troops in Armenia, those responsible had neither the requisite naval forces nor the requisite military forces at their disposal for dealing the Ottoman Empire a telling blow forthwith.

**Methods by which pressure could have been brought to bear upon Turkey at this time.**—Leaving the question of insufficiency of land and sea forces for making an effort out of consideration, it may be stated at once that an attack upon the Dardanelles as a prelude to threatening Constantinople and the Bosphorus offered by far the most effective means of bringing pressure to bear upon Turkey, when Russia asked for aid. For, so long as the Sublime Porte entertained any solicitude concerning the safety of the approaches to the Golden Horn, great Ottoman forces were automatically fettered to this part of the empire. The moment, moreover, that the Allies should embark upon any enterprise directed against those approaches, summonses would assuredly go out to commanders in distant provinces to despatch reinforcements to the threatened point, and the Sultan’s lieutenants in Armenia would be called upon with the rest to make sacrifices. There is, however, one feature in connection with the strategical situation here involved which must not be overlooked. So long as they were merely more or less directly threatened, the Dardanelles and Constantinople placed a trump card in the hands of the Allies. Without risking
a ship or a soldier, the Entente Powers could keep great Turkish forces occupied. Rarely does it occur in war that geographical and strategical conditions offer a belligerent such facilities for exercising “bluff,” as the situation in the Near East and the Levant presented in the opening days of 1915. “He that commands the sea,” as Bacon observed, “is at great liberty, and may take as much or as little of the war as he will.” The naval forces of the Entente dominated the Ægean. Swarms of British and Australasian and Indian soldiers were concentrated in Egypt. Any rumour skilfully propagated in the bazaars of Cairo and of Alexandria as to a contemplated venture against the seat of the Caliph was sure to echo ere long in the streets of Stambul. The islands of Tenedos and Imbros and Lemnos were available, inviting detachments to set foot on land that must excite remark. A bombardment of somewhat more vertebrate character than that inflicted upon the outer defences of the Dardanelles on the 3rd of November, would give just that colour to stories of tremendous impending events that would ensure their causing panic in Constantinople. Nor should it be forgotten that a threat of this kind could be always repeated at later stages of the war if desired, and that it would only cease to be an asset in the hands of the Allies if the operation was undertaken in reality—and failed.

But it must not be supposed that there was no other way of affording some relief to the Russian troops in Transcaucasia, than by demonstrations or operations directed against the Turkish capital. The nearest point on the Ottoman coast to those rugged uplands east of Erzerum where the Tsar’s forces were hard pressed happens to be the Gulf of Alexandretta, and the littoral of this gulf was in 1915 of great importance to the communications of Ottoman forces on the warpath in Mesopotamia and Palestine. Turkish garrisons in this region were known to be small. The shore provides satisfactory facilities for effecting landings and for setting on foot a suitable military base. Enough serviceable troops were to be found in Egypt, after providing for its security, to permit of an expeditionary force being detached, adequate for the purpose, should it be decided to undertake such an operation. Transports to convey the armament to the scene of action could have been very rapidly got together, seeing that ships were constantly steaming into Suez with contingents from India and
Australasia. Another merit that could be claimed for an undertaking directed against Alexandretta and its environs, was that such a project could readily be combined with demonstrations directed against the Hellespont. There was in fact undoubtedly much to be said in its favour. Dealing as this volume does merely with the Dardanelles campaign, it would be inappropriate to further discuss in it the possibilities offered by enterprises to be undertaken against other portions of the Ottoman Empire. But it has been necessary to point out that the course actually adopted, that of concentrating effort upon a scheme involving a hazardous operation of war of the first class, was not the only one that was open to her Allies when Russia in early January, 1915, appealed to them for succour.

The decision to attack the Dardanelles.—It was on the 3rd of January that the British Admiralty invited Admiral Carden, who was in command of the British naval forces in the Mediterranean, to report whether he regarded forcing the Dardanelles by ships alone as a practicable operation. He replied two days later that he did not think that the straits could be rushed, but he added that in his opinion they might be forced by extended operations with a large number of ships. A method of proceeding such as the Admiral here suggested had never been seriously considered before in this particular connection, and the proposal consequently attracted much attention. It was exhaustively considered by the naval experts in London and gained a certain measure of approval from them, one great merit claimed for the plan being that the undertaking could always be abandoned without difficulty should the task prove to be too formidable from experiences gained in its opening stages. The General Staff in London, on the other hand, who had examined this problem very thoroughly in 1906 as a more or less academic question, were not called upon to give a considered opinion now that the question had become a practical one. The War Council, which governed the general conduct of the operations, was favourably impressed with Admiral Carden's plan. The idea that the project could be given up after having once started seems to have carried weight with this body, and on the 13th of January a decision was arrived at couched in these quaint terms: “The Admiralty should prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula, with Constantinople
as its objective.” Thus came to be launched an undertaking which, whatever may be said concerning its expediency and concerning the prospects of success that it involved in theory, brought about one of the most remarkable campaigns recorded in the history of war.

Preparations for the enterprise.—Steps were straightway taken to augment the Allied naval forces in the Mediterranean, and to get together a fleet composed of the class of vessel considered to be particularly well adapted for trying conclusions with the Turkish coast batteries. It was adjudged inadvisable to detach any considerable number of battleships or battle-cruisers of the most modern type from home waters, in view of the heavy responsibilities that the strategical situation imposed upon the Grand Fleet. But the Admiralty had at their disposal several semi-obsolete battleships, as well as one or two others of somewhat superior class but scarcely a match for German Dreadnoughts, which seemed admirably suited for carrying out the work in hand. All of these mounted heavy ordnance superior to the guns that were known to be emplaced in the Turkish batteries, and even if vessels of this type were to meet with mishap in the Hellespont, their loss would not jeopardise the well-established domination of the Allies’ navies over those of the enemy outside of the Mediterranean. So a number of these battleships were despatched to Malta and the Ægean from home waters, and the French also managed to allot some analogous units to augment Admiral Carden’s fleet. Flotillas of mine-sweepers and other small craft, adjudged to be suitable for the work in hand, were got together. By the middle of February the imposing armada that had been designated to carry the operation through had, with the exception of a very few vessels still on the way, assembled in the vicinity of the Dardanelles, and only favourable weather was now needed to begin.

The decision that had been arrived at by the War Council in London on the 13th of January was confirmed by another decision to the same effect, arrived at on the 28th of the month, which finally committed the Allies to an attack upon the Straits by naval force alone. But although these decisions specifically imposed the duty of winning the avenue to the Sea of Marmora upon the fleet, it appears always to have been realised in a vague sort
of way that a certain amount of assistance on the part of bodies of troops might become indispensable even during the process of forcing the Dardanelles. The subsequent programme would in any case demand the presence of an army of some kind. Moreover, just at this juncture, there occurred a military incident which appreciably altered the situation in so far as troops were concerned. For an Ottoman expedition against the Suez Canal, after successfully traversing the inhospitable region that lies between the canal and Palestine, met with signal discomfiture at the hands of the defending troops, and fled eastwards in disorder. All anxiety as to Egypt was thus for the time being at an end, the bulk of the forces assembled in and about the Nile Delta became available for service elsewhere, and the nucleus of an army to share in the impending combinations for the reduction of Constantinople was found to be available at no great distance from the scene of coming action. The despatch of troops from the United Kingdom had also received a certain amount of consideration.

But it will be convenient to defer recording the genesis of the military expedition, and to postpone indicating the organisation and the disposition of the land forces that took part in it, until the arrangements for active intervention by British and French soldiers in the campaign come to be dealt with in Chapter III. In any case it cannot, in the interests of historical accuracy and of placing a correct interpretation on the striking lessons which the opening phases of the Dardanelles affair teach, be too strongly insisted upon that, at the date when the operations started, trust was still officially being placed in ships, unaided by military force, to secure the Straits.
CHAPTER II

THE NAVAL ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE STRAITS

The naval forces assembled for the undertaking.—A powerful fleet had been assembled in the Ægean in view of the operations that were to take place. It included Queen Elizabeth with her eight 15-inch guns, the most formidable fighting ship in commission at the moment, and included Inflexible with eight 12-inch guns, a vessel classed as a battle-cruiser but which for the work in hand can more conveniently be regarded as a battleship. The remainder of the battleships were for the most part out of date for a fleet action against vessels of the most modern type; but the majority of them mounted four 12-inch guns—Agamemnon and Lord Nelson being further furnished with ten 9-2-inch guns—and all of them carried a serviceable secondary armament. There were furthermore a number of cruisers, and an adequate flotilla of destroyers, mine-sweepers, and other small craft had also been got together. The majority of the ships were British; but the fleet included a squadron of French battleships, and a Russian cruiser arrived during the operations. The whole armada was under command of Admiral Carden. The islands of Tenedos, Imbros and Lemnos had been occupied, the latter providing the naval forces with a magnificent, if entirely undeveloped, harbour in the great land-locked inlet of Mudros. Large supplies of naval stores of all kinds and of ammunition had been collected, arrangements for aerial observation had been made, and elaborate “squared” maps on a large scale had been prepared to assist the gunnery experts in the allocation of targets and in the control of indirect fire.

Information as to the details and armament of the coast defences protecting the Straits at the disposal of the assailants was upon the whole sufficient, and it proved to be generally accurate when the operations began. There was naturally some uncertainty as to the position of hostile minefields, as to the resources of the
THE TASK OF THE FLEET

Turks in respect to drifting mines, torpedo tubes and so forth, and also as to the reserves of ammunition accumulated in the forts. Still, the naval authorities had sufficient knowledge of the kind of opposition that they would have to cope with, to enable them to frame their plans with some measure of confidence, and to prepare a detailed programme of the operations contemplated in advance.

The task.—For practical purposes, the operation about to be embarked upon can be divided into three stages. Each stage could be more or less definitely foreseen and could therefore be effectively provided for. To start with, the batteries at the entrance to the Dardanelles had to be rendered innocuous before the fleet could enter the Straits. Then there were extensive minefields, and also some batteries, that must be disposed of before the assailants could act effectively against the defences of the Narrows. When these two preliminary obstacles to progress had been overcome would come the real trial of strength—the destruction of the batteries in the Narrows and the clearing away of the minefields with which this defile was sown.

Assuming that all three stages were got through successfully and without suffering so great loss as to cripple the naval fighting forces, there would still remain the problem of guarding the communications of the fleet when this passed on into the Sea of Marmora. Military forces were, however, assembling in the Aegean and in Egypt, and it was reasonably certain that by the time that the sailors had forced the passage of the Straits there would be soldiers available who might possibly be able to secure their communications. Inasmuch as the naval attack failed when it arrived at the third stage, this question of the communications never arose, and it is therefore unnecessary to speculate concerning a portion of the programme which, if the truth must be told, had received little scrupulous consideration at the moment when the die was cast.

The attacks on the outer forts.—The attempt to force the passage of the Straits by naval power unaided commenced on the 19th of February. On that day the batteries and works guarding the entrance to the waterway were assailed by a fleet of eight battleships (five British and three French), mounting forty-six guns of 9-2-inch calibre and upwards, of which thirty were 12-inch pieces.
The defences were not of a formidable kind. They consisted on the European side in the main of a modern earthen battery at Cape Helles equipped with two 9.2-inch guns, and of the old-fashioned fort of Sedd-el-Bahr with six 10-inch and two 6-inch guns. On the Asiatic side the battleships were confronted by the old works at Kum Kale, which boasted of four 10.2-inch guns, and by a modern earthen battery mounting two 9.2-inch guns near Yeni Shehr. The Sedd-el-Bahr and Kum Kale forts, low-lying and rather conspicuous, offered excellent targets to the ships' guns; the two 9.2-inch batteries had both some little command and with their respectable armament had to be more seriously considered. But the assailants enjoyed the great advantage of having ample sea-room for manœuvring, with deep water fairly close in, and of feeling no solicitude with regard to mines or torpedoes. The ships' guns out-ranged those on shore, and the fact is that this preliminary part of Admiral Carden's task represented as simple a problem as a naval armament can fairly expect to be called upon to solve when it is a case of attacking shore defences worthy of any consideration at all.

A morning bombardment at long range took place which seemed from the decks of the attacking vessels to have done a good deal of damage. Operations were resumed in the afternoon, but it was then found that the destruction wrought in the works had hardly been so great as had been supposed; six battleships, however, steamed in to comparatively short range, and by the evening all the batteries except the 9.2-inch one at Yeni Shehr had become mute. No ship was hit, although in the afternoon the attacking vessels had been well within range of the shore artillery; for the Turkish gunnery was very eccentric throughout. A fresh bombardment was initiated next morning; but bad weather came on, so operations had to be suspended until the 25th. When work began on that day it was speedily discovered that the defences had by no means been definitively placed out of action by the cannonade of the 19th. For it took an hour and a half to silence the 9.2-inch battery on Cape Helles, Queen Elizabeth eventually accomplishing this feat when lying a long way out. The works on the Asiatic side also gave appreciable trouble, the gunnery from the land being more effective on this occasion than it had been on the first day, although actually doing little damage.
THE DISCOURAGING START

Before dark, however, all firing from the shore had ceased, in spite of some of the ships being close in and offering most tempting targets, and the operation of destroying the defences at the entrance to the Straits by bombardment had been brought to a successful conclusion. Ten battleships took part in this second attack.

Comments.—This prologue to what was recognised on all hands to be a decidedly hazardous operation of war, had admirably illustrated the difficulties under which a fleet of warships labours when it endeavours to overcome the resistance of coast defences. The combat had been almost ludicrously one-sided. It had been a case of target practice for the ships and not a battle. The Turkish gunnery had been virtually innocuous when the attacking vessels closed in to ranges well within the scope of the shore guns, and it had always been possible to bring fire to bear from the sea at ranges which the shore guns could not compass. And yet it had been found by no means easy to silence the coast artillery. The first day's cannonade had served to show that a shore battery must not be assumed to have been silenced simply because it ceases fire. It is indeed very difficult for the sailors to ascertain if they have really put the work out of action or not, unless it has been observed that the guns of the battery have been hit, or unless the air service can report that the battery is abandoned. The attacks on the outer forts afforded upon the whole but scanty encouragement to naval men, who fully realised that these ill-contested affairs could only be regarded as preliminary skirmishes. The results of long-range bombardment had upon the whole proved disappointing. It had been a little disquieting to find the shore defences so lively on the second day, after they had been well battered six days earlier. The truth is—and it is a truth that was well known before the Dardanelles venture was decided upon—that it is one thing for ships' guns to drive coast gunners from their guns for the time being, and that it is quite another thing to render the armament of the coast batteries permanently harmless.

Operations to the middle of March.—The mine-sweepers got to work as soon as darkness fell on the 25th and were little interfered with from the shore. They had soon cleared away the minefields actually barring the entrance to the Straits, and before morning had opened a route for the bigger ships to a point four miles within the channel. Next day three battleships entered the lower
reach of the Dardanelles and engaged some batteries on the Asiatic shore, while landing-parties completed the destruction of the forts on the European side. The ammunition was blown up and the guns, the majority of which were found to be intact, were demolished; there was no opposition. Then came two more days of bad weather. But from the 1st to the 4th of March warships each day steamed into the Straits and bombarded batteries near Kephaz Point without result. The sweepers, moreover, during the dark hours cleared another four miles to the front, opening a way for battleships to advance to within two miles of Kephaz Point. During their efforts to accomplish this, and on subsequent nights, the vessels were subjected to a good deal of annoyance from concealed field guns and howitzers, the enemy searchlights being very effective, and it was made evident that this type of artillery was likely to exert a considerable influence over the further progress of the undertaking to which Admiral Carden was committed. As it had been observed that the Turks were maintaining a grip upon the ruined works about the mouth of the Straits, landing-parties were put ashore on the 4th both at Sedd-el-Bahr and Kum Kale. The task was accomplished with little trouble on the European side; but on the opposite shore the enemy offered a stubborn resistance and the landing troops were hustled back into their boats, suffering appreciable loss. Still, this did not much affect the situation in respect to long-range attack upon the defences of the Narrows, an operation which had been rendered practicable by the success of the small craft in clearing the channel up to within about 10,000 yards of Chanak.

The early attacks upon the defences of the Narrows.—The batteries and works about the Narrows were from every point of view far more formidable to an attacking fleet than those about the entrance to the Straits. As will be noted on Map VII, a sharp kink occurs in the waterway at the point where this contracts into a defile. The consequence is that the defence works for practical purposes divided themselves into two groups—those which bore down the long reach below the angle, and those which guarded the channel above the angle. The lower group comprised several batteries terraced on the southern slopes of the Khilid Bahr plateau or nestling at its foot, and two on the Asiatic
EAKLY ATTACKS ON THE NARROWS

side about Chanak; their armament included a number of guns of heavy calibre, and, in view of the lack of sea-room and of manoeuvring space at the disposal of an attacking squadron, their destruction by ships' guns was bound to be a work of difficulty. The channel was mined, there was every reason to believe that the defenders had torpedo-tubes at their disposal, and the floating forces had to face the perils created by drifting mines dropping down the channel with the current.

Operations began on the 5th. On that day Queen Elizabeth, accompanied by two other battleships, repaired to the outer side of the Gallipoli Peninsula, and from thence her 15-inch guns were brought to bear upon three of the Khilid Bahr batteries in succession, using indirect fire under control of aeroplanes, a form of observation still in its infancy. A magazine was blown up in one battery and the others were damaged, but the effect was in reality small; hidden howitzers that opened a harmless fire upon the vessels could not be properly located. Next day Queen Elizabeth resumed, making the batteries near Chanak her target, but the result of this bombardment was disappointing; in the meantime five battleships within the Straits were engaging the batteries near Kephez Point and one opposite, and were fired at from one of the batteries on the Khilid Bahr slopes which Queen Elizabeth had dealt with the previous day. Much had been expected from the indirect fire from outside the peninsula by the most powerful guns afloat, but the results had not come up to expectations, and were in reality even smaller than was supposed in the fleet, and the plan was consequently abandoned during subsequent operations.

On the 7th several battleships continued the attack from within the Straits. Two of them, Agamemnon and Lord Nelson, which had modern guns, bombarded the Khilid Bahr batteries at long range, while the remainder moved further up the channel and engaged the batteries lower down and the concealed mobile guns. The Khilid Bahr batteries returned the fire for a short time, but ceased after discharging a few rounds. Next day Queen Elizabeth steamed in and engaged the batteries of the Narrows at very long range, while six other vessels moved further up; but the weather on this occasion was not favourable. It was noticeable that even the big armoured ships during these opera-
tions suffered some annoyance from the field guns and howitzers, which almost invariably proved quite irrepressible. On this day, moreover, some of the permanent batteries replied with spirit, if not very effectively, and information since come to hand goes to show that the shore defences had suffered very little from all this expenditure of ammunition. It was becoming apparent indeed that the complete destruction of the main defences by gun fire must form an extremely troublesome operation, the fire of concealed artillery was interfering a good deal with mine-sweeping operations, and a lull of some days took place. The small craft, however, continued their labour night after night intent on methodically clearing away the minefields up to and above Kephez Point, but their progress was much slower than it had been when working in wider portions. The craft were insufficient, the crews inexperienced, and interruptions from shell-fire frequent.

Comments.—The operations up to date had served to illustrate at once the advantages and the disadvantages of the system of deliberate, steady progress which was the basis of Admiral Carden's plan. Its advantages displayed themselves in the broad fact that the fleet had forced its way well within the Straits and had strenuously battered the defences on Khibid Bahr and about Chanak, without suffering any loss to speak of; for not one of the bigger vessels had been put out of action, and, considering the hazardous nature of their task and the resolution displayed by the crews, the mine-sweepers and other small craft had sustained no very appreciable damage. But against this had to be set the fact that batteries which had been silenced one day kept manifesting a disconcerting tendency to come to life again on the morrow.\(^1\) There were, moreover, indications that the Turks were gaining valuable experience in respect to employing their movable armament, and it was becoming apparent that this armament was being reinforced. Clearing away the mines was proving more difficult than had been anticipated. The fleet's ammunition supply was beginning to cause anxiety. It was, moreover, not unreasonable to suppose that the defenders would be developing their defensive system about Chanak and Khibid Bahr, that they were

\(^1\) "The experience of the Triumph at Tsingtau was valuable. She had learnt to distrust silenced forts." *With the Fleet in the Dardanelles* by the Rev. H. W. Price. (Triumph had participated with the Japanese in taking Tsingtau.)
accumulating means of resistance, and that they were gathering together drift-mines, ready to enlarge these engines of destruction when a really favourable opportunity offered itself. There is reason to believe that within the main defences the artillery officers were purposely withholding their fire for fear of running short of ammunition, and so as to reserve this until the attacking ships should press forward to closer range than they yet had attempted. Whether the comparative ineffectiveness of the Turkish gunnery was due to lack of training, or to lack of the requisite adjuncts for ensuring good practice, or to the damage that the batteries had suffered and were suffering, is doubtful—all three factors probably contributed to bring about the result—but for so far the attacking fleet had encountered little hurt from the shore artillery.

Need for military assistance becoming apparent.—It is not quite clear why a hull of several days should have occurred after the 8th, except on the grounds of shortage of ammunition or because it was hoped that a channel through the minefields would be swept up to within short range of Khalid Bahr and Chanak before resuming. The weather, if not ideal, would not seem to have been such as to prohibit a continuation of the bombardment within the Straits. It was obviously desirable to give the Turks no opportunities for repairing the ravages that their defence works had undergone. It almost looks as if the naval authorities on the spot had come to recognise that military assistance in some form or other was imperatively called for if the venture was to prove successful. To anticipate the record of military events that are to be dealt with in the next chapter, it may be here mentioned that considerable bodies of troops had already arrived at the island of Lemnos, that more were known to be available in Egypt, that the despatch of additional forces from home had been engaging the attention of the Government in London even before the naval operations started on the 19th of February, and that Sir Ian Hamilton had been selected to command the army on the 11th of March. Sir Ian left home on the 13th and arrived at Lemnos on the 17th. It is quite true that there was at this time no intention to employ military forces in or about the Dardanelles except in an auxiliary capacity to the fleet. Still, military co-operation was in the air, the idea of bolstering up the original scheme for forcing the passage of the Dardanelles by adopting the device of bringing troops into
play probably exercised its influence on naval counsels, and in any case three weeks' experience of the deliberate method of attack suggested that, if the way was ever to be won by the fleet unaided, the operations would have to assume a more resolute character than had signalised them hitherto.

The attack of the 18th of March.—We know from the Report of the Dardanelles Commission that a telegram was despatched from the Admiralty to Admiral Carden on the 11th in which it was suggested for his consideration, "that a point has now been reached when it is necessary to choose favourable weather-conditions to overwhelm forts of the Narrows at decisive range, by bringing to bear upon them the fire of the largest possible number of guns, great and small." To this the Admiral replied on the 13th, "I consider that the stage when vigorous sustained action is necessary for success has now been reached. I am of opinion that, in order to ensure my communications line immediately fleet enters the Sea of Marmora, military operations on a large scale should be opened at once." Admiral Carden was, however, obliged to resign on account of ill-health on the 16th, and was succeeded by Admiral de Robeck, previously second-in-command. On the 17th the new naval chief met Sir I. Hamilton and intimated that he proposed, if the weather proved propitious, to make a general attack on the Narrows on the morrow, and, as it turned out, the 18th proved to be a day admirably suited for the operations that were contemplated.

At about 11 a.m., favoured by clear atmosphere and an unruffled calm, the four most powerful battleships of the fleet steamed up to within long range of the Narrows and engaged the batteries there, while two other battleships, cruising further ahead, busied themselves with the works about Kephez Point opposite. Then four French battleships, passing through this group of ships and steaming forward to within a couple of miles of Kephez Point, opened a heavy fire on the defences of the Narrows, which was returned. The batteries, however, ceased firing after an hour, whereupon a fresh squadron, consisting of six British battleships, moved up the Straits to relieve the French quartette. The manoeuvre of substituting one set of ships for another in front line, however, obliged the attacking fleet practically to suspend the cannonade for the time being, and this encouraged the batteries in the
THE 18th OF MARCH

Narrows to open fire afresh. Nor had the French squadron come unscathed through the contest, for all four ships were more or less damaged, and then, just when its troubles appeared to be over for the day, it met serious misfortunes. For Gaulois was holed by shell-fire; and while steaming down channel in Erenkeui Bay, Bouvet struck a drifting mine with the result that she sank within a few minutes, losing the greater part of her crew. Gaulois was found to be so seriously injured that she had to be run ashore on Rabbit Island to save her from sinking, Suffren, holed by shell, had to be docked, and Charlemagne was badly damaged. The Turks, realising that this was a formidable attack and that there were many warships in the fairway, were letting loose drift-mines to float down with the current. Inflexible, which was the most powerful unit in the fleet next to Queen Elizabeth, struck one, after having already been somewhat knocked about by hostile shell, and ran risk of foundering, but she succeeded in withdrawing out of action and in making Tenedos, and was eventually sent to Malta. Another secured a victim in Irresistible; this vessel remained above water long enough to permit of the escape of practically all her complement. A little later in the afternoon Ocean also fouled a mine, and in her case also most of the crew were got off under heavy fire before she went to the bottom. All this time the shore batteries were maintaining a creditable fight with the fleet, and the mobile guns of the defence were hard at work. In spite of the contretemps the battleships continued their bombardment as long as the light admitted. Then they steamed back out of the Straits, having failed to establish a decisive superiority over the defences that they had undertaken to crush.

The great attack by sixteen battleships upon the Narrows had in fact met with discomfiture. The defences had suffered but, as we now know, not heavily; and a detail in the combat had been that the shore guns had kept up a more effective fire than they had on any previous day since the operations commenced. For the first time the battle fleet had encountered mines, and it had suffered severely

1 This island is not shown on Map VII or Map VIII. It lies to the north of Tenedos and about half-way between that island and the mouth of the Dardanelles. In the later stages of the campaign monitors used to lie behind it ready to issue out and engage Turkish land batteries on the Asiatic side of the Straits that were firing on the troops about the extremity of the Gallipoli Peninsula.