

BAILLIE-KI-PALTAN

BEING

A History of the 2nd
Battalion, Madras Pioneers

1759–1930

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL H. F. MURLAND

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PREFACE.

The records of the old IV Pioneers covering the period up to 1903 were originally published for private circulation in 1922, and have now, at the request of the Commandant and Officers of the Regiment, been revised, and brought up to the year 1930.

Since the publication of the original edition, much additional information has been forthcoming, and it has been found necessary to re-write the greater part of the history.

This battalion of the old Coast Army is, with two nearly contemporaneous exceptions, the oldest regiment in India, having had an uninterrupted history of upwards of 170 years, and I think that its records may well be left to speak for themselves.

H. F. M.

Preface to the Edition of 1922.

This compilation is an attempt to place on record as much as has so far been traced of the history of the IV Madras Pioneers (now the 64th Pioneers). The original records having most unfortunately been lost, the narrative is necessarily very incomplete, and while there are, of course, numerous histories extant of the various campaigns in which the regiment took part, it is altogether impossible to reproduce the atmosphere, or replace the personal element, which only a contemporary account can supply.

The objection may be raised that a great deal has been included which has no direct connection with the regiment, and that such extraneous matter as the disaster to Colonel Baillie in 1780 might well be omitted. The whole aim, however, of printing these records has been to assemble as many facts as possible, however loosely strung together, which may have even a slight connection with the regiment or may seem to possess any interest for those serving with it, and to put them in print in the hope that some better qualified person with access to the military records of Fort St. George may one day supplement what is here recorded, and produce a connected story worthy of the subject.

If the dryness of this chronicle should lead anyone to imagine that the subject is necessarily a dull one, the shortcomings of the compiler are entirely responsible. A narrative of our early struggles in India must always possess an interest for those who have any connection with the country where these stirring events took place.

H. F. M.

MAPS AND PLANS.

General Map of India

Plan of the Battle of Porto Novo (1781)

Plan of the Battle of Pullalur (1781)

Plan of the Battle of Sholinghur (1781)

Plan of the Action near Virakanellur (1781)

Plan of Hyder's Attack on 13th January 1782

Plan of the Battle of Arni (1782)

Map illustrating the Mysore Wars

Plan of the Battle of Assaye (1803)

Plan of the Battle of Argaum (1803)

Map illustrating the Campaign of 1803

Map showing part of Coorg

Map of the Chin Hills

Map showing part of Mesopotamia

Map of Country between Shaikh Saad and Shumran Bend

Map showing the position of the Harnai Railway

Map showing part of Hkamti Long

Besides, numerous maps and plans in the text.

Battle Honours.

The following are the battle honours of the Corps of Madras Pioneers, after the re-organisation in 1929, when the three Madras Pioneer Battalions, *viz.*, 1st (later the 61st [K.G.O.] Pioneers), 4th (later the 64th Pioneers), and 21st (later the 81st Pioneers) were united in one Corps.

“ *Sholinghur.* ”

“ *Carnatic.* ” “ *Mysore.* ” “ *Scringapatam.* ”

The Plume of the Prince of Wales.

The Royal and Imperial Cypher.

The Elephant.

“ *Assaye.* ” “ *Seetabuldee.* ” “ *Nagpore.* ”

 “ *Ava.* ” “ *Pegu.* ”

“ *Central India.* ” “ *Afghanistan 1878—80.* ”

 “ *Burma 1885—87.* ”

“ *Punjab Frontier.* ” “ *Tirah.* ”

“ *China 1900.* ” “ *Afghanistan 1919.* ”

The Great War.

“ *Kut Al Amara 1917.* ” “ *Baghdad.* ”

 “ *Mesopotamia 1916—18.* ”


“ *Persia 1918.* ” “ *N. W. Frontier, India, 1915.* ”

 “ *Baluchistan 1918.* ”


“ *Kilimanjaro.* ” “ *E. Africa 1914—18.* ”

*The 2nd Battalion was granted an Honorary Colour for the
Battle of Assaye.*






SKETCH MAP
OF INDIA.




THE BATTLE OF POLLILORE.



REFERENCES.

- A English Army on the march in the morning.
- B Advanced Guard when fired upon.
- C The Topc, occupied by the Advanced Guard.
- D Col. Pearse's First Position.
- E First Line First Position.
- F do Second Position.
- G First Line Third Position.
- H Col. Owen's march to the left.
- I 2nd Bde. advances on Pollilore.
- K First Line Cannonading the fugitives
- L Col. Pearse's First advance.
- M Col. Pearse in pursuit of the enemy and his Camp that night.
- N Hyder's Position.
- O Tippoo's Corps.
- P English Camp that night.
- Q Flying enemy.
- R Place where Col. Baillie was defeated.
- S Tree where Sir Eyre Coote reconnoitred the Enemy.

THE BATTLE OF SHOLANGUR.



REFERENCES.

- A Route and position taken by 2nd Bde. in morning.
- B First position of Army formed for action.
- C Second position of line advancing irregularly.
- D Third position of line advancing.
- E Fourth and last position, with.
- F Enemy's Cavalry charging.
- G Enemy's Grand line of Infantry.
- H Advanced Corps of Enemy who began attack.
- J Tippoo's corps charging line and cannonading left flank and baggage.
- K 2nd Brigade cannonading retreating Enemy at sunset.


ROUGH SKETCH OF THE ENGAGEMENT AT THE PASS OF VERACUNDALLOOR.



REFERENCES.

- A Encampment of the Detachment.
- B Plouquet, with one Company on.
- C A little Fort on a Rock.
- D Cavalry, ordered to retire early, as being too few to be of Service.
- E Broken down walls of loose Stones.
- F First appearance of Enemy, whence they advanced rapidly by G to H.
- I Enemy's Cavalry advancing to plunder baggage.
- K Our march towards the Pass.
- L Battalion formed to cover the rear.
- M Bn. and Guns posted to defend the Pass.
- N The same Bn. retreating, abandoning one gun.
- O Eur. Grenis. and 21st Bn. going back to retake gun.
- P Large bodies of Horse charging line & impeding retreat.
- Q Parties of Horse that entered the Pass by another route and attacked briskly on all sides.
- R Two guns of the enemy that enfiladed the line of March.


HYDER'S ATTACK, ON THE 13th JANUARY 1782, ON SIR EYRE COOTE.



REFERENCES.

- A Entangled position of the British troops upon their march when first attacked in the morass.
- B Position of the Enemy's line and Guns.
- C The British formed in order of battle, after crossing the morass.
- D The British Army continues the route to Madras.

THE BATTLE OF ARNE.



REFERENCES.

- A The British Army upon its march.
 - B First guns opened upon our rear.
 - C Retrograde motion of the Army in forming the line.
 - D Advance and order of battle of the enemy.
 - E Succour thrown into Arne during the action.
 - F Rally of the enemy to renew the Cannonade on G
 - G The British line halted until the Baggage came up.
 - H The Grens. and 73rd Regt. in rapid pursuit of the enemy, take 7 tumbrils in the river, while at I
 - I A Battn. of Bengal Sepoys seizes a gun in the river, both afterwards Cannonading.
 - J
 - K The Battn. which had abandoned them.
 - L Halt of the Army.
 - M Camp before Arne after the battle.
 - N Route back to Madras.
- ← Retreat of the enemy.

MAP ILLUSTRATING THE MYSORE WARS.

SCALE ONE INCH=20 MILES.

77°

78°

79° DAMASHERUVU





77°


78°

79°

Scale 2 Inches = 1 Mile.



PLAN OF THE
BATTLE OF ASSAYE



PLAN OF THE
BATTLE OF ARGUUM.
AFTER
COL. WELSH.

Col. Stevenson's 1st 2nd. 1st 4th. Force

Genl. Wellesley's Army

Our line drawn up during the cannonade

Enemy advancing to charge us

Infantry and Guns

Our present Camp

Bhonsia's Cavalry

Our line formed at the end of the Action

Col. Lang's Corps

ARGAUM VILLAGE

Topes

Line of Enemy's Retreat

Sindhia's Cavalry

Sindhia's Cavalry


Our Cavalry

SIRSONY


1st 3rd. 74th. 78th. P. 12. 10. Picquets

MAP ILLUSTRATING
THE CAMPAIGN OF
1803.

Scale 32 Miles = 1 Inch
10 0 10 20 30 40 50 Miles




© AHMEDNAGAR



MAP OF PART OF
COORG
TO ILLUSTRATE THE
WAR OF 1834.

SKETCH MAP
OF THE
CHIN HILLS.

Scale of Miles.
1 Inch = 32 Miles.
10 5 0 10 20 30 40



LUSHAI HILLS

CHIN HILLS

KALAY

SHWEBO

MANDALAY

PAKOKKU

MYINGAN

Kaladan River

MANIPUR

Kubo Valley

Yu River

Chunwin River

Kyau River

Taw River

Mu River

IRAWADDY RIVER

Manipur River

Fort White

Fort Tregear

KINDAT

MONYWA

PAKOKKU

Fort Haka

Naring

PAKOKKU

MONYWA

PAKOKKU

MYINGAN

MANIPUR

Kubo Valley

Yu River

Chunwin River

Kyau River

Taw River

Mu River

IRAWADDY RIVER

Manipur River

Fort White

Fort Tregear

KINDAT

MONYWA

PAKOKKU

MYINGAN

Fort Haka

Naring

PAKOKKU

MONYWA


PAKOKKU


MYINGAN

MAP OF PART OF MESOPOTAMIA.



MAP OF COUNTRY BETWEEN SHAIKH SAAD AND SHUMRAN BEND.






64 th. PIONEERS 1914-15.
HKAMTI LONG.

To Putao 49 Miles

- REFERENCES.
 EXISTING TRACKS -----
 NEW MULE ROAD - - - - -
 RATION DEPOTS R.



Introductory Note.

In 1744, war having been declared between England and France, the British, who had been established on the Coast of Coromandel, since 1639, found themselves unsupplied with any means of defence and, in September 1746, the town of Madras felt an easy prey to a French force under La Bourdonnais despatched from Pondicherry. The Government of Madras, thus left with only Fort St. David to represent the possessions of the Company in the Carnatic, hastily began to raise troops, and thus commenced the history of the Madras Army.

It may be noted that, though this was the first effort made by the British to form into disciplined bodies the raw material which was so abundantly available, the French had already made a commencement some few years before as, in 1739, when Pondicherry was threatened by the Mahrattas, the Governor, Dumas, armed and trained in the European manner some four or five thousand Muhammadans and, in the words of Fortescue, "thus was conceived, in danger and emergency, the embryo, now grown to such mighty manhood, of a Sepoy Army."

The first parties of sepoys raised were formed into irregular bodies, each under the command of a native chief of its own, which were entirely without discipline and armed with almost every weapon known to history. The composition of these bodies was of the most mixed description and it was not until 1758, when men were urgently required, that it occurred to Government to enlist the men of the Carnatic.

These early representatives of the Madras Army were called Peons, and were at first of little use, but, as the result of careful selection of the officers under whom they were placed, and constant service in the field, they rapidly improved, and Major Stringer Lawrence, who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief in January 1748, testified to their good conduct throughout the severe fighting against the French at Cuddalore in 1748, and round Trichinopoly in 1753, while their devotion during the siege of Arcot in 1751 has been described in the vivid pages of Macaulay.

In 1756, when Calcutta had been taken by the Nawab, the Madras Government, which had sent all the troops who could possibly be spared to assist the Government of Bengal, found itself faced with a war against the French, and without troops to meet the emergency. Fort St. David was captured on the 2nd June 1758, and the French then advanced to besiege Madras, which had been restored to the British in 1749, by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.

In August 1758, the Sepoys were formed into regular companies of 100 men each, with a due proportion of Native Officers, Havildars and Naicks, and, on the 4th December of that year, it was resolved by Government that these independent companies (which were known by the names of their Native Commandants) should be formed into four battalions, with an European subaltern

to each, and a captain to command the whole. Two battalions are shown as forming part of the garrison of Fort St. George on the 18th December, but without any remark to show how they were officered, and the following entry, **1759.** from the diary of the siege of Madras, dated the 12th January 1759, appears to show that it was from that date that these battalions were definitely formed, and placed under the command of a British Officer:—

“ It being found impracticable to maintain that Order and regularity amongst the Sepoys under their own Commandants as the Nature of the Service requires, and as there is reason to believe they may be made more usefull by being put under the command of a Carefull European Officer, Lieutenant Charles Todd is therefore appointed to that Command. ”

Part I.

CHAPTER I.


THE 5th BATTALION COAST SEPOYS.

September 1759—15th June 1769.

Affairs in the Carnatic.

1748—1759.

Before commencing the records of the regiment it would appear necessary to give a short account of the political situation in the Carnatic. The following two genealogical tables will make it easier to understand the relationships of the various persons who claimed to be Nawab of the Carnatic or Subadar of the Dekkan.



On the 24th March 1748, Nizam-ul-Mulk, who held the Subadarship of the Dekkan under the King of Delhi, died, and the succession was claimed by Muzaffar Jang (otherwise called Hidayat Mohiyuddin). His cause was espoused by Chanda Sahib (Husain Dost Khan), a claimant to the Nawabship of the Carnatic, who, obtaining from M. Dupleix, head of the French settlements in the Carnatic, the assistance of some French troops under M. D'Auteuil, defeated and slew Anwar-ud-Din at the battle of Ambur on the 23rd July 1749. Mahomed Ali, son of Anwar-ud-Din, escaped and took refuge in Trichinopoly, until he was joined by Nazir Jang, who had marched from the north, and Major Stringer Lawrence with a British detachment of 600 men. The rival forces were about to fight when a mutiny amongst his French officers compelled Muzaffar Jang to throw himself upon the mercy of Nazir Jang, and his army dispersed, whilst Chanda Sahib retreated with the French to Pondicherry.

In 1750, the French under M. Bussy* defeated Mahomed Ali, whom the British, disgusted with his prevarications, had abandoned, and captured the fortress of Gingee. On the 5th December, Nazir Jang was slain near Gingee, and Muzaffar Jang was proclaimed Subadar of the Dekkan, whereupon Mohamed Ali fled to Trichinopoly. In January 1751, a conspiracy in his army caused the death of Muzaffar Jang, and Salabat Jang was elevated in his place. In February, Trichinopoly was closely besieged by Chanda Sahib, and the siege was only raised by the capture, and historical defence, of Arcot by Captain Clive, and with the assistance of 1,000 Mahratta horsemen sent by Morari Rao.

In February 1752, induced by the promises of Mahomed Ali, Nanjaraj, the Dewan of Mysore, arrived at Trichinopoly from Seringapatam, and was followed by Morari Rao from Gooty, and the Rajah of Tanjore. On the 15th March, Stringer Lawrence arrived from England, as the first Commander-in-Chief in India, and superseded Clive, who had just inflicted a severe defeat on the enemy. A detachment under Clive defeated and captured D'Auteuil, and Chanda Sahib, deserted by his followers, surrendered himself to Monaji, the Tanjore General, by whom he was treacherously murdered. The French army then surrendered to Lawrence.

Dupleix now conferred the office of Nawab on Riza Sahib and prepared to support him with troops, but the French were completely defeated by Lawrence at Bahur, and shortly afterwards Clive reduced the French garrisons at Covelong and Chingleput, but was then compelled by ill-health to return to England. Meanwhile Mahomed Ali and Nanjaraj had fallen out, and the latter was attacked, on the 23rd December 1752, by Captain Dalton, who was commanding at Trichinopoly, but after a temporary success the latter was forced to withdraw, and by March 1753 Trichinopoly was completely blockaded.

While these events were passing, Salabat Jang had, with the permission of the Moghal, entered Aurungabad in October 1752, and procured the death of his brother Ghazi-ud-din, by poison. Dupleix, finding that the appointment of Riza Sahib had not been productive of any advantage, transferred the office of Nawab to Murtaza Khan of Vellore, and early in January 1753, prepared a strong force, which included the horsemen of Morari Rao, to wage war against the British and Mahomed Ali.

Space will not permit of even a brief resumé of the struggle for Trichinopoly, which lasted for the next two years, and which covered the name of Stringer Lawrence with glory. On one occasion (26th June 1753), with only 1,000 men, he won a brilliant victory over 30,000 French and Mysoreans, which showed the quality of the material from which the Madras Army was subsequently to be formed.

In January 1755, a treaty was concluded between Mr. Saunders (Governor of Madras, 1750-55) and M. Godeheu, who had superseded Dupleix on the

* Charles Joseph Palissier, Marquis de Bussy Castelnau (1718-85). He was absent from India between 1760 and 1782, when he returned, and died at Pondicherry in 1785.

2nd August 1754. Nanjaraj refused to be bound by this treaty and continued to make efforts against Trichinopoly, but was compelled to withdraw by the advance on Mysore of Salabat Jang's army. He returned too late to avert the capitulation of Seringapatam, from which Salabat Jang withdrew, after exacting his arrears of revenue as Subadar of the Dekkan.

In 1756, war was once more declared against the French, but nothing of importance occurred in the South during this year, the British reinforcements intended for the Carnatic being diverted to Bengal, owing to the loss of Calcutta, and the dreadful massacre of the Black Hole.

In the meantime, Mahphuz Khan, the elder brother of Mahomed Ali, who had been living at Fort St. David under the protection of the British, compromised with Mahomed Ali for the Government of Madura and Tinnevely. Haidar Ali was now (1757) making himself felt as the chief power in Mysore, and Mahphuz Khan displayed his French sympathies by soliciting his aid to expel the British from those provinces. Haidar accordingly marched South, but was completely defeated at the Nattam Pass by Mahomed Yusuf, Commandant of the English Sepoys, who were marching from Trichinopoly to Madura. In this year, Salabat Jang, whose authority was upheld by a French detachment under Bussy, succeeded in counteracting the intrigues of his brothers Basalat Jang and Nizam Ali, and the latter was compelled to flee to Burhanpur.

In 1758, the position of affairs was most serious for the British on the Coast. Not only were all the brothers of Mahomed Ali—Mahphuz Khan, Najib-ulla, and Abdul Wahab Khan—conspiring against the British, but on the 28th April, Lally arrived from France with a powerful force, and the danger of the position was quickly shown by the fall of Fort St. David on the 2nd June. Lally next turned his attention to Tanjore, but the descent of a British squadron on Karikal, after a favourable action with the French squadron, caused him speedily to retreat to Pondicherry. On the 12th December, he moved against Madras, and opened the siege of Fort St. George on the 17th but, owing to scarcity of supplies, and the operations of small bodies of troops on his lines of communications, he was obliged to raise the siege on the 17th February 1759.

Meanwhile a force sent from Bengal into the Northern Circars, under Colonel Forde, had captured Masulipatam, by a brilliant feat of arms, on the 7th April 1758, and compelled Salabat Jang to make a treaty by which the French were to be expelled from the Dekkan. This treaty was, however, vitiated by subsequent disagreements. The French now once more changed their policy, and Lally appointed Riza Sahib to be Nawab of the Carnatic.

When Colonel Lawrence, whose health had again become impaired, proceeded to England in 1759, Major Brereton succeeded him and carried out his operations with considerable skill, but in September failed with great loss to capture Wandiwash.

This brings us up to the date when the regiment was raised, and it is hoped that enough has been written to furnish a key to the succeeding narrative.

1759.

The Formation of the Battalion.

When the siege of Fort St. George was raised, on the 17th February 1759, Government once more turned its attention to the condition of its Sepoys, and three members of the Select Committee—Major Stringer Lawrence, Charles Bouchier and John Pybus—drew up a scheme, which was sanctioned in September 1759, for the formation of a sepoy force of 7,000 men, organised in seven battalions, and disposed as follows:—

Madras	..	2 Battalions.
Trichinopoly	..	2 Battalions.
Conjeeveram	..	2 Battalions.
Chingleput	..	1 Battalion.

Two battalions being already in existence, five battalions were formed at once, in compliance with this order, and it is with the third of these, that is to say, the 5th Battalion (which later became the 4th) that we have now to deal. Other battalions were raised shortly afterwards, and by February 1767, the number had risen to sixteen.

The 5th Battalion of Coast Sepoys, thus raised, in accordance with the orders of Government, in September 1759, was probably one of the two battalions raised for service at Trichinopoly, in view of the fact that it is shortly afterwards found stationed at that place. As first raised, the battalion was composed of nine companies, each 115 strong, and including one Grenadier Company.

As regards the officer by whom the battalion was raised, it might be supposed that it was Captain Baillie, from the fact that the old name of the regiment, by which it is still known to old sepoy, is "*Baillie-Ki-Paltan*." It appears, however, from the records, that Lieutenant William Baillie only transferred from H. M. 89th Highland Regiment to the Company's service in 1764, on the departure to England of the King's troops serving in Madras, and as, further, it is known that the Officer Commanding the battalion in the earlier campaigns of 1761-64 was Captain George Airey, an officer who entered the Company's service as an Ensign on the 26th March 1754, it seems highly probable that the latter officer originally raised the battalion.

The name "*Baillie-Ki-Paltan*" probably arose from the fact that that officer commanded the battalion from 1765 to 1771, which was a long period for those times, and the association of his name with the regiment was no doubt confirmed by the melancholy disaster with which his name was connected in later years.

1759-61.

Coote's Campaign in the Carnatic.

Immediately after the formation of the six battalions of which the establishment was now composed, the army was ordered into the field to take part in the operations against the French. Whilst there had been no time for them to be properly drilled and disciplined and they consequently played but a minor part in this campaign, it would not seem proper to omit all mention of events at which the new battalions were present, even though it be not possible to trace the movements of any individual corps.

Colonel Coote, who had been appointed to the command of the army in the Carnatic, arrived at Madras on the 27th October 1759, and joined the troops, who were in cantonments for the rains at Conjeeveram, on the 21st November.


His arrival at once put a better complexion on the state of affairs. On the 25th November, he marched towards Arcot, with a view to deceiving the French as to his intentions, while on the same day he detached Major Brereton towards Wandiwash. Brereton captured the petta at Wandiwash by assault on the 27th November, and Coote, who had seen nothing of the enemy in the neighbourhood of Arcot, made a forced march and joined Brereton on the 28th. On the 30th, the fort was delivered up without the necessity of assaulting it, the casualties of the British during the short siege only amounting to 5 men wounded.

As the French, who were at Settupati, had made no attempt to interfere with his movements, Coote next resolved to attack Karunguli, another strong fort, which was commanded by Colonel O'Kenelly, an Irishman in Lally's regiment. On the 4th December, the petta was occupied, and Coote opened fire on the fort on the 6th. On the 10th, the garrison surrendered, the French marching out with their arms, whilst the sepoy were disarmed and set free. The British loss was only one officer and three men killed.

The loss of these places showed Lally the necessity of concentrating his forces and accordingly he called in all his detachments and assembled his army at Arcot. Early in January 1760, Coote also arrived in the neighbourhood of Arcot, and both sides occupied themselves for some time in bidding against each other for the services of Morari Rao who, with a horde of Mahratta horsemen, was ravaging the whole country.* In this competition the French were successful, and the Mahrattas, to the number of about 3,000, joined the French camp.

On the 10th January 1760, Lally marched from Arcot and moved in the direction of Tiruvattur but, halting before he reached that place, he made a sudden

* These freebooters were conducting their operations with so much success that cattle were sold at the time at the rate of seven or eight for a rupee!



dash on Conjeeveram, hoping to seize large supplies for his army. Being disappointed, however, in this expectation, he marched to Tiruvattur, where he arrived on the 13th January:

Meanwhile Coote, on observing Lally's movements from Arcot, sent his baggage to Kaveripakkam on the 11th January, and marched some distance along the Palar river, but, on receiving the news of Lally's advance on Conjeeveram, he hastened to that place, where he arrived on the 13th January after the French had withdrawn to Tiruvattur.

On arrival at Tiruvattur, Lally, contrary to—or perhaps because of—the advice of Bussy, with whom he was on very bad terms, decided to keep the attention of the British Commander occupied with part of his army while he attempted to capture Wandiwash with the remainder. He marched, therefore, with a detachment on the 14th January, leaving Bussy with the main body at Tiruvattur, and reached Wandiwash on the same day, where he at once occupied the petta and began to prepare batteries to reduce the fort.

On the 15th January, Coote moved from Conjeeveram towards Wandiwash and camped at Uttaranmerur on the 17th. His intention was to wait until Lally was committed to the siege, so that he could have his choice of attacking either the troops employed on the siege or the covering force. Bussy saw through this design but his advice to Lally to desist from the siege and keep his force together was in vain. On the 17th January, Lally heard of Coote's movements from Bussy, but would not at first believe him. Eventually, however, he gave Bussy a free hand, and the latter at once joined him before Wandiwash. Batteries were opened against the fort on the 20th January, and on the 21st, Coote marched from Uttaranmerur with his cavalry to make a reconnaissance. On learning from Captain Sherlocke, commanding at Wandiwash, that the main rampart was breached, he ordered his infantry to march at once, sending the baggage to Karunguli, and his force was assembled at Irumbedu, 7 miles from Wandiwash, on the night of the 21st.

At sunrise on the 22nd, Coote marched on Wandiwash, and soon came in touch with the enemy's cavalry, who were quickly driven off, mainly by a detachment of sepoy. Coote then proceeded to form up his army. This consisted of 1,900 Europeans, of whom 80 were cavalry, 2,100 Sepoys, 1,250 Native cavalry, and 26 field pieces, and was formed up in three lines. In the first line were Coote's and Draper's Regiments and the Company's two European battalions, with 1,800 Sepoys equally divided on either flank of the Europeans; in the 2nd line were the 300 grenadiers of the army, with 200 Sepoys on either flank; and in the 3rd line were all the cavalry. Lally's force consisted of 2,200 Europeans and 10,300 Sepoys.

It is not intended to give here a detailed account of the brilliant and decisive victory which Coote now proceeded to gain over the combined forces of Lally and Bussy. The brunt of the fighting passed entirely between the Europeans of both armies, and after the cannonade commenced the native troops took no part in the battle. When it was over, Orme tells us that “ the Commandants of the English

Sepoys complimenting Colonel Coote on his victory thanked him for the sight of such a battle as they had never seen."

Twenty-four pieces of cannon were taken, besides large quantities of ammunition and stores, and the French lost 200 Europeans killed, besides 160 taken prisoner. Amongst the latter was Bussy who, on being led to the second line, asked who the troops he saw were. "On being answered 200 grenadiers, the best men in the army, who had not fired a shot; he clasped his hands in surprize and admiration, and said not a word." He was permitted by Coote to proceed to Pondicherry on parole.

In the British army 63 Europeans were killed and 124 wounded, while the Sepoys had only 22 killed and 47 wounded, and those mostly in the cavalry. In Madras the victory caused "joy almost equal to that of Calcutta on the victory of Plassey."

From Wandiwash, the French fled through Settupatti to Gingee, and shortly afterwards retreated to Pondicherry. This town was first occupied by the French, under François Martin, in 1674. It was taken by the Dutch in 1693, but restored to France in 1697 by the Treaty of Ryswick, when Martin was again sent out as Governor. He died in 1706, and after a period of misfortunes, the trade of Pondicherry revived about 1725, under Beauvallier de Courchant. Joseph François Dupleix (1679-1754) was at Chandernagore in 1730, and Pondicherry was governed in succession by Lenoir and Dumas, but Dupleix succeeded the latter in 1741. It was unsuccessfully besieged by the British, under Admiral Boscawen, in 1748.

Coote, who had to await the arrival of his baggage, marched to Settupatti, which surrendered to him on the 29th January 1760, and on the 5th February, commenced the siege of Arcot, which fell on the 10th. On the 29th February, Tiruvannamalai capitulated to a detachment under Captain Stephen Smith, and Coote marched to Perumukkal ("Permacoil") which, after an unsuccessful assault had been made, surrendered on the 4th March. On this occasion the Sepoys, who lost 40 killed and 70 wounded, displayed great resolution. "These troops," says Orme, "had never behaved so well." On the 7th March, Coote reconnoitred the outskirts of Pondicherry, and on the 12th, received the surrender of the fort of Alamparva.

**Further
Success-
es.**

On the 4th April, Villupuram was taken by a detachment of Sepoys under Captain Wood, and on the 5th, Karikal surrendered to an expedition sent by sea under the command of Major Monson, who was temporarily in command owing to Coote's illness. The Nawab of Arcot, who had been escorted from Trichinopoly by Captain Joseph Smith, was present with Major Monson. On the 16th April, Vanur ("Valdore") surrendered to Coote, who had resumed command of the main army, and on the 19th Chillambaram fell to Monson, who joined Coote on the 3rd May.

Lally now sent to solicit the aid of Haidar Ali, who ordered Makhdum Ali, then engaged in the conquest of the Baramahal, to proceed to Pondicherry, and that chief accordingly marched to Tayaga-durgam, which with Gingee was the sole place of importance left to the French in the province of Arcot, and thence to Pondicherry, where a treaty was ratified with the French on the 27th June 1760. This alliance came as a great surprise to the Madras Government, and the surprise was not rendered any more agreeable by what followed.

**Haidar
Ali joins
the
French.**

On the 17th July, a force under Major Moore, which had been detached by Coote to oppose Makhdum Ali, fell in with the whole Mysore army near Tiruvadi, and was completely routed, the remnants of the force taking refuge in the fort at Tiruvadi. This disaster was counterbalanced by Coote's capture of the fort of Villenur, just as Lally was marching out from Pondicherry to relieve it. The Sepoys behaved very well on this occasion. Orme says that of all his successes Coote deemed this the most fortunate, because least expected—

“When the English colours were raised on the rampart.....the change was received with the curses of every man in the French army. All the line stopped involuntarily and at once, stricken by horror; and Mr. Lally, more confounded than any, immediately ordered the whole to retreat under the guns of Ariancopang.”

On the 31st July, Coote was reinforced by 600 men from England, which brought his force up to a strength of 2,000 Europeans and 6,000 Sepoys, and in August he settled down in a position between Perambai and Villenur.

The “bound-hedge” of Pondicherry, enclosing an area of about seven square miles, extended in a curve of fifteen miles round the town, and was strengthened by four large redoubts, called respectively, from north to south, Madras, Valdore, Villenur and Ariankuppam (or “Ariancopang”). Coote decided that before attacking these defences it was necessary first to capture the fort of Ariankuppam, which was separated from Pondicherry by the river, and, to assist this project, a force of 400 marines was landed at Cuddalore from the fleet on the 27th August. The plan was abandoned owing to the protests of Major Monson, but Lally heard of the intention and resolved to surprise the British camp. The attempt was made on the 4th September, but failed with considerable loss to the French, M. D'Auteuil being among the prisoners.

**Blockade
of Pondi-
cherry.**

News now arrived from England that Major Monson had been appointed Lieutenant-Colonel, with prior date to Colonel Coote, so the latter went to Madras, intending to return to Bengal.

On the 8th September, Monson attacked the Valdore and Villenur redoubts, and both were taken, with a loss of 115 Europeans killed and wounded, the Sepoys having very few casualties. Monson had his leg broken during the attack. The attack on the Villenur redoubt, which was held by the regiments of Lovaine and Lally with ten pieces of cannon, was entirely composed of Company's troops, and was commanded by Joseph Smith, now a Major, and senior officer

of the Company's troops on the Coast, of whom Orme says, "wherever he commanded, affection to the man conspired with duty to the officer." An attempt made by the French on the following day to re-capture the redoubts was nearly successful, Monson's successor, Major Robert Gordon, being an officer "whose talents were inadequate to the general command." On the 13th September, the French withdrew from the Ariankuppam redoubt, after partially blowing it up.

Colonel Coote, who had not yet left Madras, now consented to resume the command, and rejoined the camp on the 20th September 1760. On the 1st October, the Madras redoubt, the last of the four still in the hands of the French, was taken by Coote and Joseph Smith. The French re-captured it the same night but "Subahdar Coven Naig" formed up the Sepoys who had been driven out, and re-took it with great gallantry soon afterwards.

In October, Coote allowed the French to send their women and children to the Dutch and Danish settlements. Little was done during this and the succeeding month, owing to heavy rain. On the 27th November, Lally turned all the natives out of Pondicherry, to the number of 1,400. Coote refused to let them through his lines, and they remained between the two forces for eight days, without other food than the roots of grass, when Coote, seeing that Lally was inflexible, let them go.

Throughout December, a cannonade had been kept up against the walls, chiefly with the object of wearing down the garrison, which was reduced to a pound of rice a day for each man, with meat only very occasionally. Heavy rain frequently interrupted the bombardment, and on the 30th December, a storm of great violence wreaked destruction among the ships of the fleet, and caused great damage on shore. The fleet was, however, able to resume the blockade before Lally could obtain any supplies from outside.

On the 5th January 1761, a redoubt called St. Thomas, erected by Lally opposite that of Ariankuppam, was captured, but lost again on the 6th. The Governor of Madras, Mr. Pigot, arrived on the 9th, and by this time the Nawab, by a promise of 20 lakhs of rupees, had succeeded in winning over the Mahrattas, with whom Lally was negotiating, thus depriving the French of their last hope of assistance from outside.

On the 10th January, fresh batteries were opened, and trenches were commenced on the 13th. On the 16th, Lally surrendered, and the garrison of 1,100, who showed strong evidences of their privations, laid down their arms. The British flag was hoisted on Pondicherry on the following day, under a salute of 1,000 guns. Great quantities of arms and ammunition were taken, besides 500 pieces of cannon and 100 "mortars and

Fall of
Pondicherry.

howits." Lally* was sent off to Madras, his departure being witnessed by his officers, who took the opportunity of displaying the hatred they felt for him—

"A hue was set up by the whole assembly, hisses, pointing, threats, and every abusive name; but the escort prevented violence."

Dubois, Commissary of the French King, was less fortunate. On meeting with a similar reception, he challenged his detractors—

"One Defer stepped out, they drew, and the second pass laid Dubois dead, who was 60 years of age, short-sighted, and always wore spectacles. No one would assist his servants to remove and bury the corpse."

The fortifications of Pondicherry were demolished and orders were given for the reduction of the remaining French settlements in India. On the 4th February, Tayaga-durgam capitulated to Major Preston, and on the 9th Mahé fell to Major Hector Munro, while the surrender of Gingee to Captain Stephen Smith on the 5th April "left not a single ensign of the French nation avowed by the authority of its Government in any part of India."

As we have seen, the new Sepoy battalions had behaved very well during this campaign and, whether actively engaged or not, they were present at many brilliant demonstrations of how war should be conducted—a lesson by which they were not slow to profit in later years. Towards the end of 1761, the gradual growth of discipline began to become evident and, animated by the example of their officers, they grew more confident, and were soon able to take their place in the ranks with the Europeans.

* The fall of Pondicherry marked the close of a remarkable career. On his return to France the public indignation against Lally resulted in a trial for high treason. With his usual indiscretion and intemperance he treated his judge with haughtiness and contempt. After a trial lasting 18 months he was moved to the Bastille. "Here in the morning of the 9th May 1766, his sentence was read to him; he threw up his hands to heaven, and exclaimed, Is this the reward of 45 years service? and snatching a pair of compasses, which lay with maps on his table, struck it to his breast, but it did not pierce to his heart; he then gave loose to every execration against his judges and accusers. His scaffold was prepared, and his execution appointed for the same afternoon: to prevent him from speaking to the spectators, a large gag was put into his mouth before he was taken out of prison, when he was carried in a common cart, and beheaded on the Greve. He perished in the 65th year of his age"

It may not be generally known that this celebrated French General, Thomas Arthur, Count Lally de Tollendal (1700-1766), was an Irishman, being a son of Sir Gerard O'Lally of Tullindally near Tuam. I have seen an account of him which states that his name was merely a corruption of "O'Mullaly," but I believe this to be incorrect. He distinguished himself greatly at the battle of Fontenoy.

1761.

Capture of Vellore.

The first occasion on which we find the 5th Battalion of Coast Sepoys mentioned by name as taking part in operations in the field, was in 1761, when six companies of the regiment, 601 strong, were employed with the force sent against Vellore in that year.

On the fall of Pondicherry, on the 16th January 1761, the Government of Madras applied to the Nawab of the Carnatic for 50 lakhs of rupees, to meet the expenses of the campaign. The Nawab, himself in equal difficulties, was unable to pay this amount, but requested that assistance might be given to him to force certain of his tributaries to discharge the arrears of revenue which he stated were due to him. To this the Madras Government agreed, and began to make preparations accordingly.

In September 1761, a force was assembled at Arcot, under the command of Colonel John Caillaud, who in the previous year had been commanding the army in Bengal, and with 2nd Captain Smith* in command of the native troops. The force advanced on Vellore, where it arrived on the 28th September, and waited for stores. Negotiations were opened with the Killadar, Mortiz Ali Khan, but no settlement could be arrived at, and the Killadar withdrew to the Fort on the 12th October.

On the 13th October, the batteries opened fire at a distance of 400 yards, and the trenches were commenced. On the 16th, the wall was breached and a sap run up to the ditch in order to fill it in, this operation entailing a loss of 2 officers and 20 men wounded. On the same day, the Killadar's family was captured while trying to escape from the fort. Operations in the ditch were continued from the 17th to the 20th October, and on the 22nd, the petta was stormed and captured with little resistance. It was then discovered that the chief obstacle to taking the fort was the breadth and depth of the ditch and a successful attempt was made to drain it partially, the water having been lowered a foot by the 17th November.

* *2nd Captain Smith.*—When the five fresh battalions were raised in 1759, the seven battalions then existing were each placed under the command of a Subaltern, and three Captains were appointed over the whole—one to reside at Madras, one in the field, and one at Trichinopoly. In accordance with this order, Captain Charles Tod (or Todd) (who had raised the first two battalions) was placed in command at Madras; Captain Stephen Smith was appointed Second Captain; and Captain Richard Smith was given the command at Trichinopoly. From this it seems clear that the 2nd Captain Smith mentioned above was Stephen Smith. Richard Smith, originally a Purser's mate, became a Captain and A.D.C. to Stringer Lawrence in 1758, and a Major in 1762.

On the 16th November, Captain Leigh, the only Engineer officer, was killed, but Major Call arrived on the 4th December, and two others on the 10th. The enemy had meanwhile destroyed the gallery which had been constructed over the ditch, but on the 4th December, the Killadar expressed a desire to come to terms, and on the 11th, he determined to give up the fort to the Nawab, and sent Vakils to Arcot. The attack was, however, carried on, and it was decided to fill in the ditch uncovered, a passage to the foot of the breach being completed by the 24th December. On the 26th, the Killadar gave in and surrendered, and the operations were concluded.

I have not been able to discover what the casualties of the regiment were.

In November 1761, Major-General Lawrence returned from England, and resumed the Command-in-Chief of the Army.

1762.

Early in 1762, the force under Colonel Caillaud moved against Nellore and in February, captured the fort. No returns have been found, but presumably the same six companies of the 5th Battalion were engaged in this operation.

The request of the Nawab having thus been complied with, the districts of Vellore and Nellore were handed over to him, and a division was made of the revenue between him and the Company.

In June 1762, news arrived in Madras that war had been declared against Spain, and on the 1st August following, a force was despatched against Manilla which included a party of 650 sepoys made up from different battalions. On the departure of this expedition, the 5th Battalion was detailed to form part of the garrison of Trichinopoly, where 500 of the 1,100 French prisoners then in the hands of the British were confined.

About the end of this year, Mahomed Yusuf Khan, ruler of Madura and Tinnevely, broke out in open rebellion, but no steps were taken against him until the following year.

1763—1764.

The Campaign against Mahomed Yusuf.

Before entering on an account of the campaign against Mahomed Yusuf it will be as well to trace a rough outline of the previous history and services of that remarkable man, who gave the Madras Government such cause for anxiety during the next two years.

Mahomed Yusuf Khan first took service with the British in 1752, when he enlisted under Clive. During 1754 and 1755, he frequently distinguished himself and in Orme's History his services in escorting convoys to Trichinopoly in the former year are thus referred to:

"In this service they were much assisted by the activity and vigilance of Mohomed Issoof, an excellent partizan whose merit had raised him from a Captain of a Company, to be Commander-in-Chief of all the sepoys in the English service, into which he first enlisted under Captain Clive, a little before the battle of Covepauk (in February 1752). He was a brave and resolute man, and cool and wary in action, and capable of stratagem; he constantly procured intelligence of the enemy's motions, and having a perfect knowledge of the country, planned the marches of the convoys so well, that by constantly changing the roads, and the time of bringing the provisions out of the woods, not one of them was intercepted for three months."

In April 1754, he fell under suspicion of plotting with the Mysoreans, but succeeded in clearing his name and, consequent on a strong letter of recommendation from Major Lawrence, Government granted him a commission as Commandant of all the sepoys in the Company's service. Early in the following year he was presented with a gold medal bearing the arms of the Company on one side and on the other the following inscription:—

"To Mahomed Isouf Cawn Behauder, Commander of the Honourable English Company's Sepoys, this medal is given by the Honorable the Governor and Council of Fort St. George as a reward to courage, and to preserve to posterity the name of a brave soldier, a skilful officer, and a faithful servant."

In 1756, Mahomed Yusuf was ordered to assist Mahfuz Khan, brother of the Nawab of the Carnatic, who was in charge of the districts of Madura and Tinnevely, with a party of sepoys, and took part in numerous engagements with the Polygars, while in November 1757, he defeated the redoubtable Haidar Ali at the Nattam Pass. Towards the end of 1758, he was recalled to Madras and did good service in cutting up convoys on their way to Lally's camp when the latter was before Madras.

In 1759, he took part in the action at the Mount between Caillaud and Lally Tollendal on the 9th February, and also in the successful assault on Conjeeveram in the following April. In May, Government having persuaded the Nawab to allow him to rent the districts of Madura and Tinnevely, he returned to Madura and renewed his operations against the Polygars of those districts.

In December 1760, a force under his orders drove back the Mysoreans, who had advanced from Dindigul and taken a number of forts in the neighbourhood of Madura.

In 1761 and 1762, Government again succeeded in procuring for him a further lease of the two districts from the unwilling Nawab, who looked upon Mahomed Yusuf with the greatest suspicion. As early as 1756, Captain Caillaud had expressed an opinion to the effect that Mahomed Yusuf was harbouring the design of making himself an independent ruler, but these suspicions seem to have subsequently disappeared.

In July 1762, however, a report was received from Captain Preston, who was commanding at Trichinopoly, that Mahomed Yusuf was purchasing arms in great numbers, and was making further additions to his already large force of 6,000 sepoy and 300 horse; also that some thousands of workmen were employed in strengthening the fortifications of Madura. Further, towards the end of that year news was received that Mahomed Yusuf had commenced operations against the King of Travancore, and had begun to raise additional troops in Tanjore.

On receipt of this information, Government, now thoroughly alive to the danger of permitting this display of independence, ordered Mahomed Yusuf to return to Madras at once, but instead of complying with this order, he hoisted French colours on all the forts in his possession.

This occurred in February 1763, and in June Government issued orders for a force to be assembled for the subjugation of this unruly officer.

At the commencement of hostilities against Mahomed Yusuf the force at the disposal of that officer in Madura was estimated at 5,000 Sepoys, 7,000 Colliers, 1,700 Black Horse, 200 Europeans, 12 Field Pieces and 2 Howitzers, while he also had under his command in other places some 5,000 Sepoys and 8,000 Colliers, besides a few Horse.

The British force which assembled at Trichinopoly, under the command of Colonel Monson, was altogether 9,913 strong, including the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 9th Battalions of Coast Sepoys, of which the 5th Battalion was commanded by Captain George Airey.

On the 2nd August, Colonel Monson commenced his march, while on the 6th Major Preston, the 2nd-in-Command, who had been sent on in advance, encamped 15 miles from Madura. On the 11th, the first encounter took place with the enemy, when a reconnoitring party was driven in by a greatly superior force with a loss of 150 sepoy killed and wounded and 40 missing, and 200 stand of arms captured. The enemy also lost heavily. On the 20th, one of the outer forts was captured and on the 23rd, the rebels abandoned Tirumbur and the Vallichinattam and Onnasatram forts. On the 28th, Monson advanced from Tirumbur and found Mahomed Yusuf encamped under the walls of Madura, and about the same date Mr. West with 2,000 of the Nawab's troops occupied the Nattam Pass.

On the 2nd September, when the British force was encamped at Teppakulam in the suburbs of Madura, Monson went out in person with the European cavalry, two or three hundred black horse, a battalion of sepoys, a European picket and two guns, with a view to reconnoitring the west of the fort, but was driven in by a superior force with considerable loss, Lieutenant Stevenson being killed, Captain Donald Campbell wounded and taken prisoner, and 15 European cavalry killed and wounded.

During September, great difficulty was experienced owing to the monsoon floods but, on the 24th, fire was at last opened on the fort. However, after five days it was found that practically no impression had been made and on the 27th October, it was decided that owing to the shortage of ammunition it was useless to continue the siege. On the 3rd November, Monson reconnoitred the ditch and finally decided to raise the siege, and on the 5th, after a vain attempt at negotiation with Mahomed Yusuf, the force began to fall back on Tirumbur, about six miles East of Madura. On the 18th November, Colonel Monson went to Trichinopoly, leaving Major Preston in command.

No precise record of the casualties during these operations has so far been discovered, but they appear to have been heavy, and Vibart records that, on the 24th October alone, 84 wounded sepoys arrived in Trichinopoly.

Owing to the refusal of the 96th Regiment to march, Major Preston was compelled to remain at Tirumbur throughout the month of December, but on the 29th of that month he moved to Audakotavam near the Teppakulam.

Early in 1764, Mahomed Yusuf opened negotiations with the Government, and expressed regret for his former conduct, and on the 12th January he was offered security for his life and property on terms which included the surrender of Madura, and all other forts and arms in his possession, and payment of arrears due. These terms were refused, and operations were accordingly recommenced.

In the meantime Mahomed Yusuf repaired the fortifications of Madura, keeping 3,000 men continually at work and, by the 15th January 1764, the place was completely restored.

On the 26th January 1764, Major Charles Campbell, the senior officer of the Company's troops, was appointed to the command, and took over from Major Preston on the 13th February, the latter taking command of the strong fort of Sikandarmalai, some 6 miles south on the road to Tinnevely. On the 26th February, a Monsieur Riquet, commanding the French Hussars, deserted to the British with 41 of his men.

**Second
Siege of
Madura.**

By the 2nd March, Madura was completely invested and one or two minor forts in the neighbourhood had been captured, and shortly afterwards Captain Hart took Chinampetta by storm, with a loss of Ensign Carty killed and 15 men wounded. About the same time three Lieutenants—Hunterman, Ward and Philips—were dismissed the service for “unreasonable and unmilitary” conduct, of which we are not given the particulars.

On the 27th March, Captain Fitzgerald, whilst reconnoitring towards the Teppakulam, was charged by Mahomed Yusuf's Horse, and routed them with a loss on the British side of 5 European troopers, 10 natives and 15 horses killed and wounded.

Meanwhile Preston, who had marched towards Palamcotta on the 16th March, captured Sundavandi, and on the 5th April, reached Ganigudam, when he was ordered to return to Madura by the 20th April, leaving a detachment before Palamcotta. On his return to Madura, Campbell attacked one of the redoubts and took it with trifling loss, but was forced to abandon it as it was too near the fort to be held.

On the 29th April, at noon, five redoubts were stormed by Campbell on one side and Preston on the other, with a loss of 34 Europeans and 30 Sepoys killed and wounded. The enemy lost heavily and five guns were captured. The siege was now undertaken in earnest, and by the 10th June the batteries were ready to open on the fort.

On the 14th June, the enemy made a sally, but were repulsed with a loss of Captain Smith, Lieutenant Maitland and 4 Europeans killed, and 10 wounded. On the 16th, Lieutenant Whithear and 2 Europeans were killed and 5 wounded. On the 20th, the mines for blowing in the counterscarp of the ditch were sprung, and the fausse braye was then breached, Mr. Hamilton (Engineers) being killed on this day and Ensign Bowman wounded. It was expected that the place would be stormed on the 22nd, but the assault was postponed till the 26th, owing to heavy rain. Between the 22nd and 24th, 8 Europeans were killed and 2 officers and 13 men wounded.

Early on the morning of the 26th, the assault was delivered in three divisions, but all three attacks were repulsed with loss. The right attack was led by Major Preston, who was mortally wounded, and the left by Major Wood, while the centre, of which the 5th Battalion appears to have formed part, was presumably commanded by Major Campbell himself. The failure of the assault was due to the heavy rain of the preceding few days, which had made the ditch so wet and muddy that it was extremely difficult to cross, and in traversing it all the ammunition was rendered useless so that, though the troops pushed on and in many places succeeded in getting to the top of the tower, they only had their bayonets to depend on, which were of little use against the long pikes of the enemy who, hurling down quantities of stones, grenades and shells, had so much the advantage that it was found impossible to ascend the breach.

Besides Major Preston, the attackers lost Captain Bullock and Ensign Vashan killed, and Captains Kirkpatrick and Fitzgerald, and Lieutenants Wear, Owen, MacDonald and Bruce wounded. 150 Europeans and 50 sepoy were also killed and wounded, and many men were injured by stones.

Owing to heavy rain, it was decided not to attempt another assault, but to endeavour to reduce the place by investing it closely. On the 19th July, Lieutenant Robert Kelly took Varadagiri, which commanded several passes into Travancore. By the 5th August, the garrison of Madura was beginning to suffer from want and, in September, Mahomed Yusuf made several attempts to come to terms, but refused the conditions imposed. On the 13th October, a letter was received from Monsieur Marchand to say that he had made Mahomed Yusuf a prisoner and offering to give up the fort. Accordingly, at 6 p.m. on the 14th October, Madura was handed over and Mahomed Yusuf and his family were taken prisoners. On the day following—to the great discredit of the British—Mahomed Yusuf was hanged as a rebel by order of the Nawab. On the 18th October, Campbell set out for Palamcotta, leaving Wood in command at Madura, and on the 23rd, Palamcotta was surrendered, which closed the campaign, Campbell then returning to Madura.

It is to be regretted that the close of this campaign was sullied by the execution of a brave enemy. Recent research tends to show that Mahomed Yusuf was as much sinned against as sinning, and Colonel W. Fullarton, one of the ablest commanders the Carnatic has seen, bears witness to the excellence of his administration in these words:—

“While he ruled those provinces his whole administration denoted vigour and effect: his justice was unquestioned—his word unalterable,—his measures were happily combined and firmly executed;—the guilty had no refuge from punishment.....On comparing the state of that country with his conduct and remarks, I found that wisdom, vigour and integrity were never more conspicuous in any person of whatever climate or complexion.”

So far no casualty lists of these campaigns have come to light, so it is not possible to say what were the losses of the 5th Battalion. They must, however, from the nature of the fighting, have been considerable.

With regard to the *Colleries* mentioned above, these were of the caste now known as “Kallars,” who are a caste of thieves, formerly engaged in stealing cattle. The following contemporary extracts concerning them may be of interest. Orme says:—

“These are a people who, under several petty chiefs, inhabit the woods between Trichinopoly and Cape Comorin: their name in their own language signifies Thieves, and justly describes their general character, which however has differences in different parts of the country. Those to the north of Madura are almost savage: their weapon is a pike 18 feet long, with which they creep along the ground, and use it with great address in ambuscades; but the principal service they render to an army is by stealing or killing the horses of the enemy’s camp.”

He also gives the following amusing illustration of their character:—

“When booty is the object, they regard danger and death with indifference, of which the English officers themselves saw a very striking example, whilst they were besieging the French and Chundasahab in Seringapatam. Of the party of Colleries employed at that time by the English to steal the enemy’s horses, two brothers were taken up and convicted of having stolen, at different times, all the horses belonging to Major Lawrence and Captain Clive; the prisoners did not deny the fact; but being told that they were to be

hanged, one of them offered to go and bring back the horses in two days, whilst the other remained in prison, provided that both should be pardoned. This proposal being agreed to, one of them was released; but not appearing in the stipulated time, Major Lawrence ordered the other Colliery to be brought before him, and asked him the reason why his brother had not returned, bidding the prisoner prepare for death if the horses were not produced before the next evening; to this the Colliery with great composure replied, that he was surprised the English should be so weak as to imagine that he or his brother ever had any intentions of restoring so valuable a booty, which would make the fortunes of their whole family; seeing they had it in their power to retain it, at no greater expence than his single life, which had often been hazarded for a single meal; he added, that the English could not blame them for having contrived the escape of one of the two, when both, if unavoidable, would willingly have died rather than restore the horses. The man uttered this ridiculous apology with the appearance of so much indifference to the fate that threatened him, that it moved both the laughter and compassion of the audience; and Captain Clive interceding with Major Lawrence, he was dismissed without any punishment."

Mr. T. Turnbull, writing of them in 1817, says:—

"The Collieries are said to be in general a brave people, expert in the use of the lance, and in throwing the curved stick called the *vullarce tadce*."

1765.

From the end of 1764 till June 1767, detachments of the army were employed in reducing to submission the Polygar Chiefs of the Central and Southern Carnatic, but I have not found it possible to discover what part, if any, the regiment took in these operations.

In November 1765, the ten Native Battalions were reorganised, each battalion being placed under the command of a Captain, and having a Lieutenant and an Ensign in addition. It is probable that on this occasion Captain Baillie was given command of the 5th Battalion.

1766.

In April 1766, Major-General Lawrence retired, and was succeeded as Commander-in-Chief by Brigadier-General Caillaud.

Early in this year, the King of Delhi having granted the Northern Circars to the British, a force was sent under Caillaud to take possession of those districts, which were then held by the Nizam. The latter threatened to retaliate by invading the Carnatic. The Madras Government, alarmed at this, deputed General Caillaud to negotiate. Eventually, on the 12th November, the Nizam agreed to cede the disputed territory, with the exception of Guntur, in consideration of an annual tribute and the assistance of a detachment of troops who, it was tacitly understood, were to support the Nizam in an attack on Haidar Ali.

In September of this year Colonel Joseph Smith arrived from England, and early in 1767, he became Commander-in-Chief in place of General Caillaud, who had resigned. This Joseph Smith was a son of Joseph Smith, a former Gunner of Fort St. George. He became an Ensign on the 3rd October 1749; Captain in 1754; and Major in 1760.

1767.

The Campaign against Haidar Ali.

In order to carry out the recent arrangement made with the Nizam by General Caillaud, Colonel Smith was selected to proceed to Haidarabad and arrange the details of the co-operation, and on the 20th January 1767, an agreement was made by which a British force was to assemble on the River Kistna, and march with the Nizam's army against Bangalore. A detachment was accordingly assembled, consisting of some 750 Europeans and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 8th Battalions of Coast Sepoys, of which the 5th Battalion, under Captain William Baillie, had marched from Vellore.

The ostensible plan of campaign was that Nizam Ali, in conjunction with Mahadeo Rao and the Mahratta Army, assisted by the British force, was to invade Mysore and attack Haidar Ali, but in March 1767, the latter bought off the Mahrattas, who evacuated Kolar on the 11th May and moved towards Poona.

Meanwhile Nizam Ali, who had been joined by Colonel Smith's force, was approaching the Mysore frontier, and was continually being incited by Haidar to join him in an attack on the British and Mahomed Ali. Colonel Smith soon began to perceive that treachery was intended, and his suspicions were confirmed when the army entered Mysore in May, and he found that Nizam Ali accorded it the treatment of a friendly country.

All his warnings, however, were disregarded by the Council at Madras, and at length the British Army moved towards its own frontier and, having joined a small force which had moved westward from Madras, endeavoured to strengthen the frontier by occupying various places in the Baramahal, including the mud forts of Vaniyambadi, Kaveripatnam and Tirupatur, which were placed under the command of Major Bonjour.

An attempt was also made to take the strong fort of Krishnagiri, but the assault was repulsed with loss on the 3rd June. On this occasion Krishnagiri was defended by a German adventurer named Constantin, "a native of Andernac on the Rhine, in the electorate of Cologn," and being the first German to whom I have found reference at this early date in South India, it is of interest to read what the author of "*The History of Ayder Ali Khan (1784)*" has to say about him:—

"He came to India with Ficher's troop in 1754; and married a Portuguese, by whom he had a very beautiful daughter; he was serjeant when M. Hughel commanded the Europeans in Ayder's army. The officers discovered that, together with his wife, he was in treaty with the Nabob about selling his daughter: they regarded this transaction as an infamous piece of business, that would disgrace all the Europeans in the army. M. Hughel sent for him, to enquire concerning the design laid to his charge, which he denied. A young officer in the army offered to espouse the girl; and the father received the proposal with gratitude. M. Hughel, in favour of the marriage, at

the same time promoted the father; but that very night the parents sold their daughter to Ayder, for fifty thousand rupees; and Ayder sent them into the country of Benguelour. Constantin has ever since that time lived at a distance from the army. After the brave defence of the fortress of Krishnagiri, the inhabitants of the flat country brought their most valuable effects, and deposited them in the place for security: he opened the boxes and cabinets, taking out the richest property, to a vast amount, and escaped to Goa; from whence he went to Bombay, and afterwards to Europe. Ayder's French surgeon affirms that the girl has since told him that she esteemed herself fortunate in being sold to the Nabob; as her father and mother might have made a more shameful traffic with her, if she had staid with them."

Towards the end of May, Nizam Ali, followed by Haidar at a distance of two days' march, approached the Baramahal, and everyone, with the exception of the fatuous Madras Council, was well aware that the two forces were on the point of combining in an attack on the British army, which had stationed itself in occupation of the passes which gave ingress to the Carnatic by the Baramahal.

At the time when General Smith commenced to withdraw to the Carnatic, he left Captain Baillie and three battalions (presumably including Baillie's own battalion, the 5th) with the Nizam. These battalions were greatly in arrear of pay, and it was feared that either Haidar or Nizam Ali would endeavour to persuade them to mutiny, so General Smith sent a detachment under Captain Cosby to take a sum of money to Captain Baillie's camp. The detachment carried out this service successfully, marching 350 miles in 13 days, including two days' halt at Baillie's camp. On coming to an agreement with Haidar, Nizam Ali permitted Baillie's battalions to withdraw unmolested.

1767.

The Campaign against Haidar Ali and Nizam Ali

At the opening of the campaign, Colonel Smith's forces consisted of 16 guns, 30 European Cavalry, and 100 of the Nawab's irregular horse, who were a greater danger to their friends than to their foes, with 800 European and 5,000 Native Infantry, including the 5th Battalion.

Nizam Ali had 30,000 Cavalry, 10,000 Infantry and 60 guns; and Haidar's army consisted of 12,860 Cavalry, 18,000 Infantry and 49 guns.

Hostilities were commenced on the 25th August, when a force of cavalry under Makhdum Ali, Haidar's brother-in-law, swooped down through one of the passes near Krishnagiri which was unguarded by, and indeed unknown to, the British, and drove off the majority of the cattle of the army, causing at the same time considerable loss to Colonel Smith's cavalry, which had moved out from his camp at Kakankarai. The loss of his cattle so crippled Colonel Smith's force that he was unable to move till the 28th and in the meantime Haidar besieged and captured Kaveripatnam, which was defended with great gallantry by Captain McKain and two companies of the 3rd Battalion who, after repulsing two assaults by Haidar's best troops, was forced to capitulate on the 27th.

On the 30th August, Colonel Smith reached Singarapet, to which place he had marched with the object of effecting a junction with a British corps, under Colonel Wood, which was on its way from Trichinopoly, and had received orders to await him at Tiruvannamalai. Urged by the reproaches of Nizam Ali, Haidar now began to press upon the British rearguard which, on the 31st August, was passing along a narrow forest road, but on the 1st and 2nd September, the country became more open, and the column was continually attacked by parties of horse while the camp by night was assailed by flights of rockets.

The next day's march was in a south-easterly direction, and traversed a defile between hills, with a fordable river crossing the road obliquely at its entrance. Colonel Smith did not move at his usual hour, but waited until noon when, having kept his tents standing as long as possible with a view to deceiving the enemy as to his intentions, he sent forward his baggage as rapidly as possible, and followed himself with the main body.


**The
Battle of
Chengam,
Septem-
ber 3rd*,
1767.**

The order of march was, firstly a battalion of sepoy in column of companies, then the Nawab's cavalry which, as stated before, was quite useless, and then the baggage, protected by a battalion of sepoy in column of files on either

* Colonel Wilson, following Colonel Smith, says the 2nd September. Wilks gives the 3rd and thought Smith had made a mistake, and Fortescue and Vibart follow him.

flank: at a short distance behind, the main body followed, with the flank companies forming a rearguard.

DIAGRAM OF THE BATTLE OF CHENGAM.



Haidar, who perceived that the main object of the British was to get their baggage safely through the defile, moved from the west on a hill, or rather a series of hills, which commanded the road and which, with a village at its foot, was the key of the pass, and was already occupied by a force of Nizam Ali's under the command of Rakhun-ud-Daulah, his Prime Minister, and a few Mysore troops. One of the advanced corps (the 6th Battalion), commanded by Captain Cosby, was ordered to clear this village, which was accordingly carried at the point of the bayonet. Finding himself annoyed from the hill, Captain Cosby proceeded to drive the enemy from the hill itself, while the advance guard pursued its way and cleared the pass. Observing from the top of this hill the rapid approach of Haidar's army, Captain Cosby reported it to Major Bonjour, commanding the advance guard, and asked leave to call up the leading corps of the main body under Captain Cowley (1st Battalion), to occupy the hill before he left it to rejoin the advance guard, a suggestion which was approved and which contributed largely to the success of the day.

Meanwhile Colonel Smith, on receiving a report from Captain Cosby, perceived the necessity of haste and, disregarding the fire of the rapidly-advancing enemy, pushed on until the head of his column reached the corps on the hill, when he faced to the right and confronted Haidar, who now saw, when too late, his mistake in not forestalling his enemy on the hill. Nevertheless he made several determined attacks in mass, himself on foot at the head of his best troops, but was unable to dislodge the British sepoy, and suffered enormous losses, his killed alone being estimated at 2,000 and he himself being slightly wounded, while Colonel Smith's casualties only amounted to 170 killed and wounded. The confederates, foiled in the attempt to take the hill, now kept up a heavy but ill-aimed fire of musketry and guns and made a further endeavour to break through the line by working through the woods on their left, but without success.

Meanwhile the British rearguard had been long delayed by the two last guns, which had been attacked by the enemy while crossing the river, but on its arrival and junction with the main body, the whole line, led by the Grenadier Battalion, which, as was usual at that time, had been formed by taking two companies from each of the six battalions present, and was commanded by Captain Baillie of the 5th Battalion, moved forward and completely routed the immense army of the confederates. The enemy were pursued till sunset and abandoned two guns which, however, Colonel Smith was unable to carry off. In the fighting on this day Captain Baillie and the Grenadier companies of the 5th Battalion distinguished themselves greatly and the remainder of the battalion, with the other battalions engaged, in Colonel Smith's words "performed their duty to the utmost in the posts they were stationed in."

Unfortunately during the action the enemy's cavalry had broken in on the baggage and captured the whole of the supplies of rice, and Colonel Smith found himself in the unpleasant position of having to march forthwith, lest the enemy might again intercept his march while his army was starving.

Except for a halt of two hours after midnight, the retreat was continued throughout the night, and for the greater part of the following day, and when the army reached Tiruvannamalai they had, in the quaint wording of Colonel Smith's report, "Marched 27 hours without the least refreshment for man or beast who were never unloaded in the midst of this fatigue, the troops were chearfull though extenuated, and I can, with the utmost pleasure assure the Honourable Board that during the action every corps of sepoy behaved with a regularity scarce to be expected, and with as much firmness as could be wished."

It will be seen from the above that the sepoy battalions might now be said to have "found themselves," and in the battle of Chengam the Madras Army really received its baptism of fire as, though it had been engaged in minor operations for some years previously, it was not until this battle that it was called on not only to fight, but to manœuvre as a disciplined force, and as Wilson justly points out, in this and in the succeeding battle at Tiruvannamalai the close fighting was done entirely by sepoy.

It is of interest to note that Colonel Wilks records, on the 7th September, one of the rare instances* known in India of the desertion of a British Officer, a Lieutenant Hitchcock, and goes on to state that "the army afterwards learned with delight that the traitor was suspected, and sent to prison, where he lingered in infamy, and died unpitied."

On his arrival at Tiruvannamalai, Colonel Smith found to his disgust that, in spite of the reiterated declarations of Mahomed Ali that there were ample supplies in that place, there was not a single grain of rice, and only a small supply of paddy.

On the 8th September, Smith was joined by Colonel Wood, unmolested by the allies, who were busied in mutual recriminations over the results of their late unsuccessful engagement. Wood's force consisted of 540 Europeans, parts of the 7th, 10th and 11th Sepoy Battalions, and 8 guns. Soon after his arrival, the army was compelled by scarcity of provisions to proceed to the eastward, whence it returned on the 14th in time to prevent an attack by the enemy on Tiruvannamalai, where the stores and sick had been left, and drove off with some loss a corps of 10,000 horse which, with the battering guns, encamped some six miles N. W. of the British position.

Colonel Smith now deemed himself sufficiently strong to act on the offensive and moved out to attack the enemy on the 15th, but found them unapproachable owing to a large morass, and was compelled to return to Tiruvannamalai, for food, on the 16th.

The rains were now approaching and, as the army found itself in the unfortunate position of being compelled to forage for supplies within a short radius round Tiruvannamalai, not being able to move far owing to the hospital and stores being unguarded in that place, it was decided by a Council of War that the stores should be moved to Chittapet, a place of some strength garrisoned by the Nawab, while the army went into cantonments at Arcot or Vellore, where supplies were more plentiful. This, however, did not coincide with the views of the Madras Council, who wished Colonel Smith to remain in the neighbourhood of Tiruvannamalai, which he accordingly did.


Meanwhile the intention of the confederates, who were aware of the straits to which the British army was reduced, was to wait until the enemy was weakened by want and then make an attack. This plan was, however, frustrated owing to fortunate finds by the British of subterranean stores of grain which, with further reinforcements from Madras, placed Colonel Smith in even stronger condition than before. His army now consisted of 34 guns, 1,400 European and 9,000 Native Infantry, 30 European Cavalry, and 1,500 of the Nawab's very indifferent horse. With this force the 5th Battalion of Coast Sepoys was still serving.

* Another case had occurred in 1761 when a Captain Coulson disappeared with a small party of 50 sepoy, and was supposed to have taken service with Haïdar.

Nizam Ali, who had become wearied of these operations, now insisted on greater activity, and accordingly a strong force, accompanied by 16 guns, was moved forward to a position in front of Colonel Smith's left, on which a cannonade was opened. This position was covered by an impassable morass in which Haidar hoped that the British would become entangled under the fire of his guns and musketry. Colonel Smith, who was unaware of this morass, moved forward his left which was, of course, at once checked by that obstacle, but its nature could now be more closely observed, and Colonel Smith saw that while it extended indefinitely to his left, it appeared only to extend on his right as far as the foot of a hill, behind which was stationed a large part of the allied army, and he decided to move to his right and endeavour to get round the enemy's left flank.

The Battle of Tiruvannamalai, September 26th, 1767.

DIAGRAM OF THE BATTLE OF TIRUVANNAMALAI.



The direction on which he was now moving was north-east, and the confederates, who were still labouring under the delusion that the British troops were reduced to the last extremity for want of food, at once jumped to the conclusion that they were retreating on Arcot, and accordingly moved hastily forward to fall upon their flank and rear. To their mutual surprise, the two forces suddenly met and almost ran into each other on rounding the hill. The confederates made a hurried movement to occupy the hill, but Captain Cook's (8th) Battalion got there before the enemy and driving them back from the summit, secured a point of support for the left of the line.

A large body of the enemy's best infantry was moved forward to occupy a strong position among some rocks on the plain, but before they were fully in occupation Captain Cook's (8th), Baillie's (5th), and Cosby's (6th) Battalions, who were much inferior to the enemy in number, were pushed forward and, in Colonel Smith's words, "advanced with such rapidity, and gave so brisk a fire that the

enemy's sepoys could not stand it, but were obliged to quit their posts and run." The left of the British Army now rested on this point, the line deploying opposite the main masses of the enemy, who had occupied a hill from which they commanded the British, and annoyed them considerably with their guns. Immense bodies of cavalry, with sepoys in the intervals, formed a crescent which seemed about to envelop Colonel Smith's inferior force, but no order to charge was given to them, while the British Artillery caused great destruction in their ranks. The cause of this inaction was that Haidar, with his chiefs, was completely disconcerted by the failure of his original plan, and the majority of his guns were still in their old positions on his right, where they were useless.

The tremendous disparity in numbers did not shake the courage of the sepoy battalions and, as Colonel Smith says, "did not prevent our men from marching on with a firmness that will ever do them honour, for, notwithstanding all efforts from cannon, musketry, rockets and horse, they could not discompose our lines."

The steady fire of the British was most effective, and though the infantry and guns continued to maintain their ground, the cavalry fled in disorder, and Haidar, who from the first had realized that the battle was lost, and now saw the firm advance of Colonel Smith, began to draw off his cannon and begged Nizam Ali to do the same. The latter, however, who did not see so clearly as his ally the dangerous position of affairs, refused to do so until it was almost too late, and the utmost efforts were necessary to save them. Darkness now fell, and the British were compelled to halt, having driven the enemy off the ground and taken nine cannon.

The following extract from Colonel Smith's report testifies to the gallantry with which this action was fought, and shows that the disciplined valour of the Madras sepoy, first displayed at Chengam, was now firmly established:—

"It is now my duty and my happiness to pay a just tribute to merit: Seconded as I was by Field officers, who conducted themselves so as to deserve everlasting honour, I have been enabled to obey your commands and drive the most formidable enemy that ever attacked us out of the Carnatic. I cannot omit giving great applause to the inferior officers, who executed with the greatest spirit and gallantry every order they received. Their zeal and bravery will, I am confident, ensure them your protection and favour on every occasion. The soldiers' steadiness at this critical conjuncture was so remarkable (and many of them recruits too) that I am firmly of opinion every man would have sacrificed his life or have conquered. Your officers of sepoys and their Battalions deserve more praise than I can express, for I never saw men behave with more resolution and intrepidity than those I have the honour to command. Those who distinguished themselves most conspicuously were the 1st, the 5th commanded by Lieutenant Bowman (as Captain Baillie commanded the Sepoy Corps of Grenadiers), the 6th and 8th Battalions. . . ."

During the night, Nizam Ali fled to the west through the pass of Singarapet, leaving his army to look after itself, and Haidar made arrangements for the withdrawal of his forces, which were well on their march before the disorganised army of his ally was ready to start. Colonel Smith arranged for a midnight attack on the enemy's camp, to be led by the Grenadier companies under Major Fitzgerald, and

followed up by the remainder of the army, but the guide, who was a spy of Haidar's, led them to an impassable swamp, and they were compelled to return to camp.

At daybreak on the 27th, a fresh start was made and, on ascending the hill to their front, the pleasing spectacle presented itself to them of the whole confederate army in full retreat along the road. Following up as rapidly as possible, the British army soon converted the retreat into a rout and added to their spoils no less than 41 guns, 14 more being subsequently found concealed in the jungle. The operations of the day only ended when the troops were exhausted, and Colonel Smith was unable to continue the pursuit on the day following owing to the unfortunate necessity of retiring to procure supplies.

In this important victory the British only lost 150 men killed and wounded, the losses of the enemy amounting to 4,000, together with 64 guns and a large quantity of stores of every kind except rice, which the British army required more than anything else. One of the first results of the victory was the hasty withdrawal of Tippu Sultan, then plundering in the outskirts of Madras, who hastened to join his father.

Colonel Smith now proceeded to Madras to endeavour to make some arrangement for the more efficient provisioning of his army in future, after cantoning his forces at Vellore, Conjeeveram, Wandiwash, and Trichinopoly. In selecting these places he made a great mistake in having his detachments so far apart, though the blame should be placed rather on the shoulders of the Council of Madras than on his, as that wretched body made no attempt whatever to assist the army with provisions or transport, and it was in consequence impossible to maintain a large body of men in any one place.

Haidar, who, with Nizam Ali, had established his army at "Calaimuttoor"* in the Baramahal, was not slow to take advantage of this dispersion. On the 5th November, he took Tirupattur, and on the 7th, Vaniyambadi, thence proceeding to Ambur on the 10th. Here he compelled Captain Calvert, who was in command, to withdraw from the lower fort on the 15th but, after a siege lasting 26 days, was forced to retire on the 6th December, on the approach of the British army under Colonel Smith, who had been compelled by Haidar's activity to withdraw his forces from cantonments.

The whole of the British army was assembled at Vellore, with the exception of Colonel Wood's division at Trichinopoly, which was ordered to Tiruvannamalai so as to enter the Baramahal by the pass of Singarapet. On the 7th December, Colonel Smith reached Ambur and moved off in pursuit of Haidar whom he found on the following day at Vaniyambadi, Nizam Ali having moved further to the south. After offering but a slight resistance, Haidar retreated and the British followed as far as Tirupattur, but were then compelled to halt—as usual, owing to want of supplies. The confederates retired on Kaveripatnam and Colonel Smith,

* This I believe to have been the village of Mattur.

having effected a junction with Colonel Wood, proceeded to that place, which, however, he found too strong to attack.

A rising in Malabar, and operations by the Bengal Army towards Haidarabad now caused the confederate armies to break up, and on the 14th December, Haidar despatched his guns and baggage to the west, Nizam Ali's army withdrawing on the 18th. Whilst these arrangements were being carried out, they were covered by active operations on Colonel Smith's supply columns.

Against one of these columns, escorted by the 1st Battalion, under Captain R. V. Fitzgerald, which was expected from Tiruvannamalai by the pass of Singarapet, Haider moved in person on the 29th December, with 4,000 select horse, 2,000 infantry, and 5 guns, confident of obtaining an easy conquest over a single battalion without guns and hampered by a large convoy. Colonel Smith, however, had strengthened the escort by a reinforcement under Major Thomas Fitzgerald of 500 horse, the Grenadier Companies of the 1st and 2nd Regiments, and the 5th Battalion of Coast Sepoys, with two guns. Haidar being unaware of this, attacked with great energy and, charging in person at the head of his cavalry, was received with a most unexpectedly hot fire, had his horse shot under him, and received a bullet through his turban, his force being driven off with loss. The fact that many of his best officers perished evinced an effort of more than usual determination, and the repulse was most creditable to Major Fitzgerald, who commanded the united detachments, and the small force under him.

As regards the part played by the 5th Battalion in this sharp engagement, Major Fitzgerald says in his despatches:—

“HYDER NAIGUE, judging that disappointing the army of this supply would benefit him in proportion to the distress it would be attended with to us, moved in person with the flower of his troops to intercept it. About 5 yesterday evening he attacked us with more resolution than I ever saw his men show on any occasion.....His horse made a most resolute charge on the 5th Battalion which stood firm on its ground.....”

This campaign was brought to an end by a treaty between Nizam Ali and the British on the 23rd February 1768, Mahomed Ali also being included in the negotiations, and Haidar with his main army proceeded to the West Coast, where events which do not come within the scope of this narrative demanded his attention.

1768.

Renewal of the Campaign Against Haidar Ali.

On the departure of Haidar, the British army was formed into two divisions, that under Colonel Smith, which included the 5th Battalion, proceeding to Kaveripatnam, and thence northwards to Palikondai near Vellore, returning at the instance of the ever-interfering Council to waste valuable time in the blockade of Krishnagiri, which was surrendered on the 2nd May. Meanwhile the second division under Colonel Wood was engaged in reducing the numerous forts in the provinces of Salem, Erode, Coimbatore and Dindigul, of which Dharmapuri and Erode were taken by assault while Tenkaraikottai, Salem, Attur, Namakkal, Satyamangalam, Danayakankota, Gajalahatti, Kaveripuram, Coimbatore, Palghat, Dharapuram, Aravakurichi and Dindigul surrendered.

Colonel Smith was now afflicted by the addition to his force not only of two members of Council, Messrs. Call and Mackay, but also of the Nawab, a most objectionable arrangement which was bound to cause dissensions in the councils of the army. Call was a Colonel in the Engineers, who held the contract for the supplies and transport of the army, in the profits of which all the other members of Council, except the Governor, had a share. The first action of these Field Deputies was to insist on an escort of 200 Europeans and 5 battalions of sepoy, with a large proportion of artillery, which seriously weakened Smith's army.

On the 8th June, Colonel Donald Campbell, with the advanced division of the army, which included a detachment of the 5th Battalion, moved from Krishnagiri and ascended the pass of Budikota, and on the 16th of that month, reduced the mud fort of Venkatagiri-Kota three marches to the northward. Sending back a detachment to open up the road to Vellore, which accomplished its object by the capture of the rock of Peddanayakandurgam at the pass of that name, he then proceeded another two marches to the north and occupied the lower fort on the droog of Mulbagal, but found that the rock was too strong for its capture to be attempted by open assault. The provincial commander, however,—Jafar Husain Khan,—who was in occupation of the rock, opened secret negotiations for its surrender, but as the garrison remained faithful to Haidar, this had to be accomplished by treachery.

Colonel Campbell accordingly moved off to Kolar, leaving a detachment at Mulbagal and, on the 23rd June, Captain Mathews (16th Bn.), disguised as a Subadar, with two companies of sepoy, gained access to the upper fort under the pretence that they were a party of recruits for Haidar's army, and attained their object without bloodshed, the garrison being too much surprised to offer any resistance. On the same day Colonel Campbell reached Kolar and carried forward regular approaches against that place, the garrison surrendering at discretion on the 28th June.

Makhdum Sahib was now reported to be at Bagalur, some 18 miles to the south-west, and Captain Cosby (6th Bn.) was sent with a detachment which inflicted some slight loss on him, but it was found useless to pursue his active horse.

Colonel Campbell having rejoined Colonel Smith's force at Araleri, on the 3rd July, the combined force, with which the whole of the 5th Battalion **Hosur.** was now serving, moved on Hosur by way of Bagalur, and besieged that place, which fell on the 11th, a detachment under Cosby subsequently taking possession of Anekal and Denkani-Kota. The usual difficulties of supply detained the army at Hosur for some time, and meanwhile negotiations were opened with Morari Rao which resulted in that chief supplying a force of 3,000 horse and 2,000 irregular infantry, the two forces effecting a junction at Hoskote, two marches to the north, on the 4th August. On the same day Haidar returned to Bangalore, and on the 9th, his light horse commenced to harass the British camp. On the night of the 22nd, a sudden attack was made on Morari Rao's camp which was some distance from that of the British, but after confused fighting the enemy sustained a repulse.

The division of Colonel Wood was now ascending from the Baramahal and on the 3rd September, Haidar made a move towards the south with a view to cutting him off. Colonel Smith expected that Colonel Wood would reach Budikota on the 5th September, and move towards Malur on the 6th but, rendered anxious by his ignorance of Haidar's movements, left his baggage at Malur on the 5th and on the 6th marched on Budikota, having with him the 1st and 2nd European regiments, the 1st, 3rd and 5th battalions of Coast Sepoys, and Achmuty's Bengal battalion. Colonel Wood's route led through a long defile, the direction of which lay north-west for some miles and then turned due west at a comparatively open spot where another road led off to the north-east. Haidar, expecting Colonel Smith to await reinforcements at Malur, had taken up a position to the north-east of this spot with the intention of enfilading Colonel Wood's column on the march, his own retreat in case of failure being open to the north-east. Early in the morning Colonel Smith sent out scouts to the tops of the hills which lay between him and Haidar, who reported to him that both Haidar's and Colonel Wood's forces were in sight, moving in the directions described. Perceiving that he could reach the angle of the defile before Haidar, Colonel Smith sent messengers to Colonel Wood informing him of his intentions and was just arriving at his objective when, to his indignation, and to the surprise of Haidar, who at once retired, a regular *feu-de-joie* was heard in the defile, which Colonel Wood had had the folly to fire on receiving the news of Colonel Smith's approach. A pursuit of Haidar was commenced, but it was too late and had no result. Colonel Smith having in no measured terms given Colonel Wood his opinion of his idiotic conduct, the latter resigned his command, and his division, now placed under Colonel Lang, was ordered to continue the pursuit in the direction of Betamangalam, while Colonel Smith was to move to Kolar. Finding, however, that Haidar got more and more distant, the pursuit was given up, and the British army returned to Kolar, leaving a garrison at Murgamalai two marches to the north.

Haidar now opened negotiations with the British, offering to pay ten lakhs of rupees and to cede the Baramahal, but these terms were foolishly refused by the Madras Government, and the campaign was continued.

In October Haidar recaptured Mulbagal, thanks to the Field Deputies who, in Colonel Smith's absence, had removed the regular garrison and left **Mulbagal.** only a company of Mahomed Ali's, and on the 3rd of that month Colonel Wood, who had resumed his command in September, hastened there, and occupied the lower fort, but was beaten off with loss in an attempt to storm the rock. On the next day some of the enemy's troops appeared and Colonel Wood, who marched out against them with a small force, found himself opposed by Haidar's whole army and, after fighting of the most desperate description, was only saved by a stratagem of Captain Brooke's* by which the enemy were led to believe that Colonel Smith, for whose name they now had considerable respect, had arrived with his division. In this action the British lost 8 officers and 229 rank and file killed and wounded, while the enemy lost over 1,000. Colonel Wood sent messengers to Colonel Smith, then at Kolar, who, marching on the 6th October, arrived near Mulbagal on the 7th, when Haidar withdrew his army. On the 14th, the two divisions moved northwards, and spent the remainder of the month in vain endeavours to force Haidar to a general action.

On the 5th November, Haidar appeared at Kolar and cannonaded the pettah but, finding Colonel Campbell on the alert, retired two days later. This news, however, compelled Colonel Smith to return to Kolar on the 8th, whence he was summoned on the 14th, ostensibly to assist in the deliberations of the Council but really, according to the belief of the time, to give Colonel Wood an opportunity of distinguishing himself in the field. The 5th battalion had served with the division of Colonel Smith throughout the operations just described, but it has not yet been discovered what part they played in those which will now be briefly traced, though it seems highly probable that they formed part of the force under Major Fitzgerald.

On the 16th November, Colonel Wood, now—to the misfortune of the Army—reinstated in command of a division, marched to the relief of Hosur, **Bagalur.** which Haidar had commenced to besiege, the rest of the Army remaining at Venkatagiri-Kota under the command of Major Fitzgerald. Bagalur was reached on the 17th, and in the pettah of that place the baggage and stores were left, besides two 18-pounders and Colonel Wood then moved to Hosur, where he arrived on the 18th, too late to make a night attack on the enemy as he had proposed. On the previous evening Haidar had withdrawn his troops from the siege and, waiting until he saw Colonel Wood's force entering Hosur, moved round in his rear and marched to Bagalur where he succeeded in capturing the two 18-pounders and a quantity of stores, besides inflicting considerable loss on the detachment under Captain Alexander (Nawab's troops) to whom the baggage had been entrusted. He then got safely away before Colonel Wood's hasty return from Hosur.

* This officer belonged to the Bengal Battalion, and was afterwards Governor of St. Helena.

On the 20th, Colonel Wood again marched to Hosur, where he left some provisions, and on the next day marched back again through Bagalur to Araleri, which lies between Bagalur and Kolar. On the 22nd, Haidar suddenly reappeared and opened a cannonade from twelve heavy guns which Colonel Wood sustained without making the least attempt to attack the enemy, and suffered a loss in consequence of 1 Captain, 6 Subalterns, 20 Europeans and 200 Sepoys, killed and wounded. During the night Colonel Wood marched again, severely harassed by the enemy, who renewed their attacks in the morning, but just as it was becoming probable that he would suffer a disaster which would make his previous misfortunes appear trifling, the arrival of Major Fitzgerald, who had hastened by forced marches from Venkatagiri-Kota, compelled the enemy, who imagined that it was Colonel Smith's force and had no desire to encounter that energetic officer, to retire to the south-east. Colonel Wood was now so despondent, and his troops so disheartened, that nothing could be done, and Major Fitzgerald made representations to the Commander-in-Chief which resulted in orders being sent for Colonel Wood to proceed to Madras under arrest, his successor, Colonel Ross Lang, assuming the command early in December. It may be added that Colonel Wood, who, as Fortescue says, "did indeed display an incompetence worthy of his patrons," was tried in 1769 for misappropriation and misconduct in the field, and cashiered.

The position of affairs now began to look threatening for the British. Fazal-ulla-Khan, who had been ordered by Haidar to move from Seringapatam with a large army, descended the passes of Kaveripuram and Gajalhatti in the middle of November, and rapidly captured the latter place and numerous others, while Coimbatore fell by treachery, on the 29th of the month. On the 6th December, Haidar himself descended into the Baramahal by the pass of Palakodu, and thence proceeded southwards through the pass of Toppur.

Apprised of these events, Colonel Lang despatched Major Fitzgerald in that direction with a division "composed of the best troops of the army," which marched on the 10th December. The 5th was one of the five select battalions of sepoy included in this force. Colonel Lang himself remained at Venkatagiri-Kota with very few troops while Major Fitzgerald followed Haidar as rapidly as possible, but had the misfortune to be invariably one day too late. Haidar in consequence retook in rapid succession all the forts held by the weak British detachments with which, in his folly, Colonel Wood had garrisoned them, including Dharmapuri, Tenkarai-Kottai, Omalur, Salem, and Namakkal. As Major Fitzgerald approached the Kaveri he learnt that Haidar was about to cross that river to the east of Karur and intended to march on Trichinopoly and Tanjore, leaving Fazal-ulla to invest Karur and Erode. Knowing that the latter place had a good garrison whereas Trichinopoly was almost defenceless, Fitzgerald decided to march to protect Trichinopoly, but Haidar, perceiving this movement, proceeded in the opposite direction, took Karur on the 19th December, and after meeting and almost annihilating a detachment under Captain Eccles Nixon, invested Erode, which was surrendered on the 25th by Captain Orton, under

disgraceful circumstances. Captain Orton, it may be remarked, was subsequently tried and cashiered. Haidar next moved on Kaveripuram,* where Captain Faisan was forced to capitulate after a fine defence and was, in defiance of the terms of surrender, sent to the dungeons of Seringapatam, together with the garrison of Erode. The fall of the latter place on the 31st December closed the events of the year.

* Wilks says Kaveripuram; Vibart says Kaveripatnam; the former is probably correct.

1769.

Conclusion of the War with Haidar Ali.

Fazal-ulla-Khan was now sent to Dindigul to operate against the provinces of Madura and Tinnevely, while Haidar crossed the Kaveri and marched eastwards. Major Fitzgerald, who was at Mansurpet near Madura, marched northwards to intercept Haidar and oppose his advance on Madras, but the latter, turning first north-east and then south-east, eluded him and marched down the Coleroon, exacting a tribute of four lakhs from the Raja of Tanjore. He then returned to the tract which Fitzgerald, for want of provisions, had had to abandon and retire on Cuddalore.

The command of the army was resumed by Colonel Smith at Chittapet on the 1st February 1769, and the pursuit of Haidar was recommenced, but the Madras Government opened negotiations for peace, and sent Captain Brooke to interview Haidar, who, however, refused the terms offered. Further negotiations resulted in a twelve days truce, from the 22nd February, but on the 6th March, hostilities were once more renewed. After much manœuvring on both sides, Haidar, who was hard pressed and feared that he might be forced to fight a general action with disastrous consequences, resolved to attempt to bring the war to a favourable conclusion by a bold stroke and, on the 29th March, he suddenly appeared with 6,000 horse and 200 foot within five miles of Madras, having marched 130 miles in three and a half days, and demanded that Mr. Josias Du Pre, one of the Members of Council, should be sent to him to negotiate terms of peace.

By this time, Colonel Smith was rapidly approaching in pursuit of Haidar and, on the 31st March, reached Vandalur, within 12 miles of the Mount, but the Council, at the instance of Haidar, and fearing an attack on the Black Town, strictly forbade him to come within 25 miles of Madras, and on the 2nd April*, a treaty was finally concluded. The terms of the treaty do not appear to have been disadvantageous to the British, but the circumstances under which it was made gave it the appearance of having been "dictated at the gates of Madras," and caused great dissatisfaction.

While the negotiations were pending, Colonel Lang appears to have missed a fine opportunity of striking an effective blow at the enemy, by failing to make an attack on the crowded masses of Haidar's main army, when they were entangled in the passes of Attur and Chengam.

The 5th Battalion of Coast Sepoys, which had, as has been seen, played a prominent part in the events of the preceding two years, was, on the 16th June 1759, when the native troops were divided into "Carnatic" and "Circar" battalions, re-named the 5th Carnatic Battalion, and appears to have spent the remainder of that year, after peace had been concluded, in garrison at Trichinopoly.

* Colonel Wilson gives the 3rd April, but Vibart says the 2nd.