



**CIVIL
SOCIETY
AND THE STATE
IN
LEFT-LED
LATIN
AMERICA**

Challenges and
Limitations to
Democratization

EDITED BY
BARRY CANNON AND PEADAR KIRBY

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Civil society and the state in left-led Latin America

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Abbreviations

ACES	Asamblea Coordinadora de Estudiantes Secundarios (Coordinating Assembly of Secondary Students)
ALBA-TCP	Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América – Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – People’s Trade Agreement)
ANEP	Asociación Nacional de Empresas Privados (National Private Enterprise Association)
AP	Alianza País (País Alliance)
APG	Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní (Guarani People’s Alliance)
ARENA	Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Nationalist Republican Alliance)
CAFTA	Central American Free Trade Agreement
CAP	Consejo Asesor Presidencial para la Calidad de la Educación (Presidential Advisory Council for the Quality of Education)
CCER	Coordinadora Civil (Civil Coordinator)
CCSC	Consejo Consultivo de la Sociedad Civil (Civil Society Consultative Council)
CCSCS	Comité Coordinadora de la Confederación de Sindicatos del Cono Sur (Coordinating Committee of Southern Cone Trade Union Confederations)
CFP	Concentración de Fuerzas Populares (Concentration of People’s Forces)
CGT	Confederación General de Trabajo (General Labour Confederation)
CNPC	China National Petroleum Corporation
COCHILCO	Comisión Chilena del Cobre (Chilean Copper Commission)
CODELCO	Corporación Nacional del Cobre (National Copper Corporation)
COMIBOL	Corporación Minera de Bolivia (Bolivian Mining Corporation)
COMISEC	Comisión Sectorial del Mercosur (Mercosur Sectoral Commission)
CONAF	Corporación Nacional Forestal (National Forestry Corporation)

CONAIE	Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de Ecuador (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador)
CONAMAQ	Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu (National Council of Ayllus and Markas of the Qullasuyu)
CONFECH	Confederación de Estudiantes Chilenos (Chilean Students' Confederation)
CONPES	Consejo Nacional de Planificación Económica y Social (National Economic and Social Planning Council)
CPCs	Consejos de Poder Ciudadano (Citizen Power Councils)
CRUCH	Consejos de Rectores de las Universidades Chilenas (Chilean Council of University Rectors)
CSO	civil society organization
CTA	Confederación de Trabajadores Argentina (Argentine Workers' Confederation)
CTC	Confederación de los Trabajadores del Cobre (Copper Workers' Confederation)
CUT	Central Única de los Trabajadores del Chile (Worker's United Centre of Chile)
DGA	Dirección General de Aguas (Water Directorate)
DOT	Dirección del Trabajo (Labour Directorate)
EIA	environmental impact assessment
EU	European Union
FDI	foreign direct investment
FEI	Federación Ecuatoriana de Indígenas (Federation of Ecuadorian Indigenous)
FMC	Federación Minera de Chile (Chilean Miners Federation)
FMLN	Frente Faribundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Faribundo Martí Front for National Liberation)
FNRP	Frente Nacional de Resistencia Popular (National Popular Resistance Front)
FOSDEH	Foro Social de Deuda Externa y Desarrollo de Honduras (Social Forum on External Debt and Development of Honduras)
FSLN	Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista Front for National Liberation)
FTA	free trade agreement
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
FTC	Federación de los Trabajadores del Cobre (Copper Workers' Federation)
FUSADES	Fundación Salvadoreña por el Desarrollo Económico y Social (Salvadorean Foundation for Economic and Social Development)
GANa	Gran Alianza por la Unidad Nacional (Grand National Unity Alliance)

GSL	Governança Solidária Local (Local Solidarity Governance)
HIPC	heavily indebted poor countries
HSA	Hemispheric Social Alliance (Alianza Social Continental)
ICMM	International Council on Mining and Metals
IFIs	international financial institutions
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INDAP	Instituto de Desarrollo Agropecuario (Institute for Farming Development)
INGO	international non-governmental organization
ISEN	Instituto del Servicio Exterior de la Nación (National Foreign Service Institute)
ISI	import substitution industrialization
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
LGBT	lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender
LOC	left-of-centre
LOCE	Ley Orgánica Constitucional de Enseñanza (Organic Constitutional Law on Education)
MAS	Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement towards Socialism)
Mercosur	Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common Market)
MNCs/TNCs	multi-/transnational corporations
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NGO	non-governmental organization
OAS	Organization of American States
OCMAL	Observatory of Latin American Mining Conflicts
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PB	participatory budgeting
PBC	Participative Budgeting Council (Conselho de Orçamento Participativo)
PCMLE	Partido Comunista Marxista-Leninista de Ecuador (Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Ecuador)
PDT	Partido Democrático Trabalhista (Worker's Democratic Party)
PDVSA	Petroleos de Venezuela SA (Venezuelan Oil Ltd)
PIT-CNT	Plenario Intersindical de Trabajadores – Convención Nacional de Trabajadores (Cross-Union Workers' Plenary – National Convention of Workers)
PMDB	Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party)

PPP	private–public partnership
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PT	Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party)
REIPS	Representación Especial para la Integración Regional y la Participación Social (Special Representation for Regional Integration and Social Participation)
RN	Renovación Nacional (National Renovation)
SEM	Sistema Educativo de Mercosur (Mercosur Education System)
SENPLADES	Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo (National Secretariat of Planning and Development)
SONAMI	Sociedad Nacional de Minería (National Mining Society)
UDI	Union Democrática Independiente (Independent Democratic Union)
UNDRIP	United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
YPFB	Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos (Bolivian National Oil Company)

Introduction

1 | Globalization, democratization and state-civil society relations in left-led Latin America

PEADAR KIRBY AND BARRY CANNON

An insightful point made by Venezuelan sociologist Edgardo Lander about the state-civil society relationship in Venezuela under the presidency of Hugo Chávez offers a useful starting point for considering this relationship in countries governed by the new left in Latin America. Speaking about the impact of *chavismo* on Venezuelan civil society, Lander commented that ‘the social mobilisation set in train by Chávez’s assumption of power has awakened the majorities from their apathy. They feel themselves owners of the country. Millions of people, previously submissive, want to make their opinions known. And they do so in the *consejos comunales*, the water committees, the open spaces for debating health and education policies.’ However, Lander added that the Venezuelan political process is ‘marked by a profound schizophrenia’ as ‘the mobilisation was sparked off by the state and depends strongly on the state’. By way of example, he mentioned that the *consejos comunales*, the ‘touchstone of the new political process’, tend to take seriously all the proposals put forward by the president. ‘But, what happens when amid an intense debate the members of the *consejos* turn on the TV and see the President announcing that he has made a decision on the question being debated by them? Isn’t it natural that they would feel themselves mere extras?’ (Martins 2010).

One of the major characteristics of the new left governments in the region which is widely referred to in the literature is their commitment to deepening democracy (Lievesley and Ludlam 2009; Panizza 2009). For example, Rodríguez-Garavito et al. (2008: 30) write that ‘an emerging front on the agenda of the left is the articulation between local participatory democracy and representative democracy at the national level’. Yet, as Lievesley has pointed out, the victory of left-wing parties, while a reflection of the strength of struggle in the continent, also introduces a tension as the governments that have emerged as a result ‘have sought to give this struggle a “state form” as a way of defusing it’ (Lievesley 2009: 34). The example given by Lander from

Venezuela illustrates this tension in a pointed way. ‘It is very difficult for social movements – which aspire to be non-hierarchical – to deal with the power of the state,’ comments Lievesley (*ibid.*: 34).

These opening observations, then, map the context for consideration of the questions being addressed in this book. While the primary concern is to gain a fuller picture of how the relationship between states led by governments of the new left and civil society in these countries is changing, this relationship is placed in the wider context of how these states insert themselves into the global economic order, what today we call globalization. Furthermore, since Latin America is a region with a troubled history of democratization, the way in which the state–civil society relationship develops has major implications for the shape and quality of democracy as it evolves in the region. For this reason, the book situates itself in the literature on Latin American democratization and will, in the concluding chapter, relate the conclusions it draws from the book’s contributors to this larger question. This opening chapter undertakes two tasks. First, it discusses and elaborates its understanding of the relationship between the different variables that frame the book. This begins by situating the book in the literature on Latin American democratization before going on to discuss what it means for both state and civil society. The theoretical discussion then turns to globalization, discussing both its meaning and how it provides an essential context to take into account in understanding the shape of state–civil society relationships. The first section closes with a discussion of the emergence of the Latin American new left. The second task of this introductory chapter is to introduce the contents of the book and its division into three sections; this is done in the second section.

Situating this book and its approach

Whither Latin American democratization? While the emergence of left and left-of-centre governments in Latin America – the so-called ‘new left’ – has been attracting much academic attention (Sader 2011; Philip and Panizza 2011; Weyland et al. 2010; Panizza 2009; Lievesley and Ludlam 2009; Rodríguez-Garavito et al. 2008; Castañeda and Morales 2008; Stolowicz 2008) it is surprising that little of this literature places the phenomenon within democratization theory, particularly transition theory, or ‘transitology’, which held great sway over much political science analysis of Latin America (Diamond et al. 1999; O’Donnell et al. 1986; Linz and Valenzuela 1996; Mainwaring et al. 1992). Here we offer a critical review of transition theory in order to foreground the impor-

tance of a relational analysis of civil society and the state for understanding processes of both democratization and de-democratization.

Grugel identifies three types of democratization theories: modernization, historical sociology and transition theory, or ‘transitology’, but it is the last of these which is most pertinent to Latin America (Grugel 2002: 46). ‘Transitology’ sees democratization as a process, led by cost–benefit calculations on the part of key actors, and it has been subject to two major critiques. First, the very concepts of ‘transition’ and ‘democratization’ were held to be inherently teleological in their assumptions (Whitehead 2002: 5), with a pronounced institutionalist and electoralist bias in what was deemed to be the ultimate democratic end-point (Grugel 2002: 61). Secondly, ‘transitologists’ were said to be concentrating too much on elite bargaining and procedural and institutional definitions of democracy, leading to difficulties in explaining the varying outcomes of democratization processes, resulting in conceptual stretching by analysts. Instead, it has been argued that democratization needs to be viewed within a wide-angle, long-term analytical perspective, perhaps from when it was first conceived in Ancient Greece, but certainly since the Enlightenment. Democratization is not seen as a unidirectional process; rather polities can experience periods of democratization and de-democratization – that is, the ‘expansion and contraction of popular rule’. Therefore, all political systems – be they established ‘democracies’ in the ‘West’ or ‘authoritarian’ regimes elsewhere – ‘exhibit to greater or lesser degrees democratic and autocratic traits’ (Nef and Reiter 2009: 3, 4). To echo Barrett et al., ‘it may be more appropriate to speak of democratisation as an ongoing, dynamic process than of democracy as a final end state’ (Barrett et al. 2008: 29).

To overcome the focus on elite bargaining and procedural definitions of democracy, Grugel recommends focusing on the interaction between state and civil society within the context of globalization. She argues that, for democratization to occur, the state has to undergo ‘a substantive transformation in its operations and its representativeness’, to give it the capacity to deliver ‘better, more secure lives’ for citizens. Furthermore, a shift in the power balance in civil society must take place to facilitate this transformation of the state. Finally, attention must be paid to globalization’s impact on these processes in each state (Grugel 2002: 65–7). All these three factors will have an impact on the depth and quality of different democratization processes, she states.

State and civil society Understanding the state in this context requires

a focus on two aspects. The first is the mainstream political science view of the state as a centralized system of rule, with a set of coercive and legal institutions, and a monopoly on force, all operating within a defined territory (Sørensen 2004: 14), though it is not necessary that it be democratic. However, more pertinent for understanding the state in Latin America is a more political economy focus on 'the national specific form of capital accumulation and its corresponding political regime' (Soederberg 2005: 170); by the latter is meant the specific institutional features that the state develops to service its regime of capital accumulation, namely how it seeks to create the resources to achieve development. Therefore, the actual institutional features identified in the first element are influenced by the specific regime of capital accumulation that the state adopts.

Turning to definitions of civil society we find less agreement. While there is an emphasis on the importance of civil society in the democratization literature (Diamond et al. 1999; Putnam 1993; Grugel 2002), it is not always realized just how contested is the concept. At least four different perspectives can be identified among analysts of civil society. First, liberal perspectives see civil society as separate from state and market, having a watchdog role towards the former and an unproblematized relationship with the latter (Diamond 1999). Secondly, an 'alternative' neo-Gramscian perspective, emerging from sectors of civil society, sees it as a realm of struggle riven by inequalities, aimed at transforming the state to benefit the less privileged (Howell and Pearce 2001). Thirdly, some argue that both these neglect what has been called an 'uncivil society' of criminal or clandestine groups such as gangs, terrorist organizations, or racist or xenophobic groups, among others (Keane 2004). This is particularly resonant in parts of Latin America, where levels of criminality and violence among non-state actors are among the highest in the world. Fourthly, and finally, some put forward a perspective denying the validity of civil society as an explanatory concept (Carothers and Barndt 1999) or from a more Marxist perspective questioning its separation from the state (Fraser 1993) or from the state and the market (Wood 2001). Indeed, Meiksins Wood questions the liberal dichotomy of the state as an agent of oppression and civil society that of liberation (Meiksins Wood 1990).

For the purposes of this book Nancy Fraser's (1993) concept of 'strong publics' is particularly helpful. Characterized by 'a strong associational dynamic and a commitment to inclusive, critical debate', they are distinguished from a 'weak public' of liberal thinking, stressing the separation of civil society and the state and giving the former 'a mere

opinion forming and watchdog role' (Howell and Pearce 2001: 7). They move beyond consideration of civil society in the context of democratization to considering the dynamics of how civil society relates to the market. In this context, they see a strong public as constituting 'the realm of emancipation, of alternative imaginations of economic and social relations, and of ideological contest' (ibid.: 8). The concluding chapter of this book will assess to what extent the shaping of civil society under the new left governments of Latin America can be said to be resulting in the emergence of 'strong publics'.

Pearce helps locate the roots of how civil society developed in Latin America in an exploration of the trajectory of democratization since independence. She identifies a bifurcated republican identity in Latin America, between classic liberal republicanism inspired by a belief in individual liberty and a Rousseauian radical republicanism based on belief in the 'common good' (Pearce 2004). Struggles between these two types of republicanism shaped the contours of both state and civil society in the region throughout post-colonial Latin American history. From elite-based civil society organizations of the nineteenth century to the top-down inclusion of popular sectors during the populist era; the authoritarian counter-revolution of the 1970s, with its attempted eradication of progressive civil society groups; the renaissance of social movements emerging in reaction to this repression; and the rebirth of 'civil society' as a concept in the democratic transitions of the 1980s; in each of these eras it can be argued that distinct groups were favoured over others by national states – and by foreign states through development cooperation or other aid – as the 'actually existing civil society'. This indicates how the conception and constitution of civil society in any given polity are shaped by the ideology, power configuration, class sectors and political context dominant in that polity. 'Civil society' therefore is not a fixed entity, with established permanent features, but rather an 'empty signifier' over which struggles take place among the contending social forces for its appropriation and definition. Actually existing 'civil society', we contend here, is formed dialectically by the struggles between these different social, political and institutional forces. A further dimension to be highlighted is that the relationship between state and civil society that this account points to is therefore a dialectical one as both mutually help to constitute the other. Pearce's account draws attention to examples of how the state in Latin America helped constitute different forms of civil society at different periods; however, neither can it be forgotten that civil society struggles also helped shape the state in different ways at different times.

This is particularly important at the present moment in Latin America. As Silva convincingly demonstrates in his detailed examination of the emergence of civil society movements in Latin America challenging neoliberalism, the new left governments of the region are to an extent the result of civil society struggles (Silva 2009). Yet, as the opening insights from Lander indicate, having come to power these new left governments are developing their own forms of relating to civil society; a major purpose of this book is to identify in more detail what these forms are and what the results will be for the quality of the region's democracies. This analysis therefore concludes that it is necessary not only to take account of who controls the state, or to analyse who constitutes civil society and what impact the existing correlation of forces within civil society has on the state and its actions, but also to focus on how both state and civil society help to mutually constitute one another in an ongoing and dynamic process. Moreover, we argue that these findings must be put within the context of globalization in order accurately to assess some of the constraining features that help shape state-civil society relationships.

Achieving development in a globalized world The term globalization is used here as a label for intensifying processes of transnational interconnectedness across a range of spheres such as the economic, the social, the political, the cultural and the communicational, though the uneven nature of these processes is acknowledged. Neither does its use imply that globalization itself has agency; rather, it acts as a shorthand for processes of change where agency can be determined only through empirical examination (see Kirby 2006: ch. 4).

There is an emerging consensus that globalization is not leading to the demise of the state but rather that the state is changing under the pressures, opportunities and constraints that it presents. As Sørensen summarized it, 'instead of getting locked into the "state losing" or "state winning" contest, there is a more attractive position: namely, the idea of "state transformation" which is open to changes in both directions' (Sørensen 2004: 22). Latin America has over recent years offered a particularly interesting test of the much-vaunted claim that globalization is restricting the room for manoeuvre open to states. It is the one region of the world in which governments have come to power that are rhetorically very critical of neoliberalism (and in some cases of globalization) and proclaim themselves committed to moving into a post-neoliberal paradigm or model of development.

While debates continue about the extent to which the Latin American

new left governments are breaking with neoliberalism and moving into a post-neoliberalism (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012; Weyland et al. 2010), it is widely recognized that some key elements of the global economic situation have favoured the success of these governments. This has largely been due to the emergence of China and its voracious appetite for the region's natural resources. As Kingstone writes:

With Chinese average growth rates around 9 per cent per year even through the 2008–2009 crisis, Latin America boomed as a commodity exporter. Countries such as Brazil saw trade surpluses for the first time in modern history. China quickly became the largest or second largest export market for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and Peru, among others. China's appetite for Latin American primary goods pushed regional growth rates and China's continued role as a consumer of commodities shielded Latin America from the worst effects of the crisis. (Kingstone 2011: 110)

However, this favourable situation serves to distract from the region's failure to transform the productive bases of its economy. Feinberg reminds us that 'despite undeniable progress, as measured by absolute indicators, Latin America is losing ground in the global competitiveness sweepstakes' (Feinberg 2008: 155) while the region's economies remain characterized 'by low labour productivity, low institutional capabilities and dependency on commodity exports' (Panizza 2009: 224). For, as Amsden writes, 'Latin America has been unable to exercise its skills to survive in a high-tech world. Growth has taken the form of spurts and slumps, but on average, as Latin America has followed its northern leader down the path of liberalisation, its growth in income, employment, regional trade, and technology has stagnated' (Amsden 2007: 147; for evidence, see Urquidi 2005). Furthermore, the role of China is a double-edged sword for Latin America since low-cost Chinese manufactured exports displace similar Latin American goods not only in markets such as the USA but even within the region itself. This, then, highlights one of the great challenges facing the new left governments, how to lay the foundations for an upgrading of the productive economy resulting in well-paid jobs in the modern sector of the economy. With the possible exception of Brazil, there is little evidence to show that the new left is laying the foundations for a high-tech road to development and, as Paus argues, the external circumstances are not particularly favourable for the endeavour (Paus 2009).

This situation therefore highlights the importance of the extractive

sectors of Latin American economies to their continued economic success. And, as recognized by many analysts (see Weyland et al. 2010), the natural resource base of different countries configures differently their strategic room for manoeuvre in the global economic environment. While each country is distinctive (see Orjuela 2007 on the complexity and ambiguity of the Latin American left), two groupings can be identified – Chile, Brazil and Uruguay on the one hand and Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador on the other, with Argentina falling somewhere in between. It is recognized that this division coincides with the much-criticized division into ‘good left’ and ‘bad left’ made by Castañeda (2006), but such a normative division is not intended here.

In examining the cases of Chile, Uruguay and Brazil, what distinguishes them is their lack of the clear comparative advantage that oil and natural gas offer the second group. Therefore the insertion of each into the international marketplace is contingent on maintaining the favour of the markets (investors, buyers) and of generating competitive conditions for the sale of largely primary commodities to overseas markets (this is less overriding for Brazil because of the size of its internal market).

However, owing largely to the room for manoeuvre given them by international demand for the oil and natural gas reserves they control, Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador have been able to shape a much more interventionist state. It needs to be remembered that it was partly Chávez’s oil policy when he first took office that helped create this situation. By reversing the previous Caldera’s administration’s steady liberalization of the oil industry (with a view to eventual privatization, it was believed) and by strengthening oil prices through an active international diplomacy of coordinating production among the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Chávez laid the foundations for the large increase in oil revenue that has funded his extensive social programmes. This illustrates the implications of resource endowment and consequent power in the marketplace for state–civil society relations. Finally, the Argentine case stands somewhat apart from this neat typology. Its natural resource endowments are modest compared to the three cases just covered, yet it has shown its willingness to assert the authority of the state over markets in a way that bears more similarity to the second group of countries. As Grugel and Ruggirozzi put it: ‘This new role for the state undoubtedly challenges assumptions about a global trend towards policy convergence and the triumph of neo-classical economics based on an extreme interpretation of globalisation and global markets’ (Grugel and Ruggirozzi 2007: 100).

The emergence of the new left The wave of left-wing and left-of-centre governments elected in Latin America since 1998 needs to be put into the context of the difficulties being faced by the neoliberal project as growth faltered and the challenge of civil society on the streets grew stronger, overthrowing presidents in Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina and Peru. It was marked by the weakening of parties that had been dominant in some countries (most notably Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia) and the growing appeal of candidates from outside the political system, most famously Hugo Chávez, who was first elected president of Venezuela in 1998. At the time fears were being expressed, as Benavente and Jaraquemada put it, of ‘a profound crisis of governability in Latin America for which no viable institutional solutions are apparent’ (Benavente and Jaraquemada 2002: 7). The strength of civil society activism was growing while states were finding it harder to defend a neoliberal project that was not delivering growth or social equity. However, few foresaw in 2002 the wave of new left governments that were to be the result of this new phase in civil society–state interaction. Instead, Chávez was a lone voice, and one who looked very vulnerable as the April 2002 coup against him seemed to confirm.

The emergence of the new left opens with the election of Lula as president of Brazil in October 2002. As Panizza puts it, his election ‘invoked the image of a radical turn in the country’s politics, perhaps comparable only to the triumph of Chile’s Unidad Popular in 1970’ (Panizza 2009: 211). It marked, therefore, a major symbolic change in the politics of the region, perhaps best characterized as moving beyond the discredited neoliberal project that had dominated the previous one and a half to two decades, though it was far less clear what was going to replace it. Lula’s election opened a phase in which over ten countries were ruled by presidents and parties of the new left by the end of the decade (though it remains to be seen if the victory of the right in the Chilean elections of late 2009 marks the end of this phase). The wave of new left governments is listed in Table 1.1.

What united this disparate group was a discourse very critical of neoliberalism and a pledge to improve the living standards of the poor through active and well-resourced social programmes. But more important than the actual mechanisms used (which were far from radical and which in many cases built on programmes inherited from previous governments) was the symbolic importance of leaders of the left taking state power. This marked a new relationship between civil society and the state in which both saw one another as allies in a common struggle. In this trajectory, it is accurate to ascribe an

TABLE 1.1 Latin America's 'new left', 1998–2011

Year	Country	President	Re-election	President
1999	Venezuela	Hugo Chávez	2000, 2006	Hugo Chávez
2000	Chile	Ricardo Lagos	2006	Michelle Bachelet (to 2010)
2003	Brazil	Lula da Silva	2007, 2011	Dilma Rousseff
2003	Argentina	Néstor Kirchner	2007, 2011	Cristina Fernández de Kirchner
2005	Uruguay	Tabaré Vázquez	2010	José Mujica
2006	Bolivia	Evo Morales	2009	Evo Morales
2006	Nicaragua	Daniel Ortega	2011	Daniel Ortega
2007	Ecuador	Rafael Correa	2009	Rafael Correa
2008	Paraguay	Fernando Lugo		
2008	Guatemala	Álvaro Colom		
2009	El Salvador	Mauricio Funes		
2011	Peru	Ollanta Humala		

important role to civil society activism, which generated a discourse critical of the neoliberal project, built movements to challenge it, and provided many of the leading figures that were to win state power. However, the account here also suggests that this activism on its own was not sufficient but that it interacted with the structural and discursive conditions that gradually saw the weakening of the neoliberal project. This helped create the conditions for the success of the new left. With the left winning state power, however, a new phase opens for civil society–state relations. This has two aspects. Panizza draws attention to the first when he writes of the complex dilemmas faced by the left associated with both the sustainability and the quality of democracy, which requires ‘a balance between conflict and accommodation that creates the political space for the popular sectors to advance their rights, while avoiding the extreme polarisation that has led to democratic breakdowns in the past’ (ibid.: 198). The second, however, is that the new left governments are committed to a project of more radical democratization, making the state more responsive to popular needs and engaging with an active citizenry in doing this (as is illustrated by the example from Venezuela with which this chapter opens). In many countries of Latin America, with relatively weak states and with a mobilized citizenry, this is going to be a tight balancing act to achieve.

How this book addresses these issues

The chapters in this book examine in empirical detail a range of issues in most of the countries ruled by new left governments in Latin America. The book is divided into three sections. The first consists of case studies of Venezuela, Argentina, Central America, Ecuador, Brazil and Chile, examining different aspects of state–civil society relationships and of these countries’ insertion into the global economy. Recognizing the importance of extractive industries for economic growth and development throughout the region, the second section examines how this is impacting on state–civil society relationships in the region as a whole and in a number of countries. The third section turns the focus to ways in which at international levels new forms of participative state–civil society relations have been and are being promoted. The final chapter draws conclusions about the factors promoting and constraining the development of ‘strong publics’ and the extent to which these are deepening democratization.

Section One begins with a survey of the rationale behind changing state–civil society relationships in Venezuela, arguably the most radical