


# REGION-BUILDING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

PROGRESS,  
PROBLEMS AND  
PROSPECTS



EDITED BY  
**CHRIS SAUNDERS,  
GWINYAYI A. DZINESA  
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# **Region-building in southern Africa**

Progress, problems and prospects

edited by Chris Saunders, Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa  
and Dawn Nagar



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## Abbreviations and acronyms

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific
AFRICOM	Africa Command (United States)
AGOA	Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (United States)
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ANC	African National Congress
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
ASF	African Stand-by Force
AU	African Union
BLNS	Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland
BNC	Bi-National Commission
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India, China
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CCI	Climate Change Initiative
CCR	Centre for Conflict Resolution
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CRP	common revenue pool
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa
DFI	development finance institution
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC	East African Community
EC	European Commission
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECF	Electoral Commissions' Forum
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEC	European Economic Community
EISA	Electoral Institute of Southern Africa
EMB	electoral management body
EPA	economic partnership agreement
EU	European Union
FAFS	Framework for African Food Security
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization (United Nations)
FDI	foreign direct investment
FLS	Frontline States
FOCAC	Forum on China–Africa Cooperation
FRELIMO	Mozambique Liberation Front

FTA	free trade area/agreement
GAD	Declaration on Gender and Development (SADC)
GDP	gross domestic product
GEC	global environmental change
GHG	greenhouse gas
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IDC	Industrial Development Corporation
IEPA	interim economic partnership agreement
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change (Zimbabwe)/Maputo Development Corridor
MDG	United Nations Millennium Development Goal
MFN	most favoured nation
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Congo (later MONUSCO, UN Stabilization Mission in the Congo)
MPLA	Popular Liberation Movement (Angola)
MW	megawatt
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	non-governmental organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OPDSC	Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SADC)
PEMMO	Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (George W. Bush, Jr)
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSC	Peace and Security Council (African Union)
RDF	revenue distribution formula
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme (South Africa)
REC	regional economic community
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (SADC)
RPTC	Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCBRIG	SADC Stand-by Brigade
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SADC-PF	SADC Parliamentary Forum
SADCSF	SADC Stand-by Force
SAMP	Southern African Migration Project
SADF	South African Defence Force
SAPP	Southern African Power Pool

SDI	Spatial Development Initiative
SHIRBRIG	Standby High-Readiness Brigade (UN)
SIPO	Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SADC)
SPA	SADC Programme of Action
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organization
TB	tuberculosis
TDCA	Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement
UN	United Nations
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNTAG	United Nations Transitional Assistance Group
WFP	World Food Programme (United Nations)
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front

## Acknowledgements

This volume is one of the products of a four-year project on 'Peace-building in Africa' undertaken by the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), in Cape Town, South Africa. Most of the chapters are based on papers presented at a policy seminar organized by CCR in Cape Town in February 2010, which explored the various processes involved in region-building in southern Africa, from organizations and institutions to issues of regional integration and human and military security. We would like to thank all those who participated at the seminar; their comments were tremendously helpful in shaping this publication. One of the sessions at the seminar, on how to turn the papers delivered there into a book, was chaired by the former publisher of the University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, Glenn Cowley. His lively interest in all of CCR's work made his sudden death in May 2011 the more shocking for those of us who knew him. We are certain that he would have welcomed the publication of this volume.

This is not the first book to be published on region-building in southern Africa, but it is perhaps the most wide-ranging in terms of the topics it addresses, as well as in its pan-African approach, with authors from South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia and Zimbabwe, along with two British scholars. We thank them all for responding to our queries so promptly and efficiently.

We would like to convey particular thanks to Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director of CCR, for his guidance, enthusiasm and perseverance throughout the time it took to prepare this publication. We would also like to thank Jason Cook for his help in copy-editing the book, and our colleagues at CCR for their support and administrative assistance. Margie Struthers, the Centre's librarian, was always helpful in acquiring necessary source material.

We are grateful to all the contributors for their commitment to this project, and we thank Zed Books, and Ken Barlow in particular, for agreeing to publish this volume. We hope it may promote a lively debate on how region-building can be furthered in southern Africa and beyond.

*Chris Saunders, Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa and Dawn Nagar*  
*August 2011*

## Foreword

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), in Cape Town, South Africa, is pleased to be publishing this unique volume on *Region-building in Southern Africa*. The book is based largely on strong and diverse pan-African perspectives, involving both scholars and a few scholar-practitioners, including a former Executive Secretary of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Kaire Mbuende.

Region-building is commonly defined as the effort by states in a common region to cooperate in ways that enhance their political, socio-economic, security and cultural integration. South Africa's role is central to any debates on region-building in southern Africa. Apartheid South Africa used its military strength aggressively to subdue its neighbours through a destructive policy of military destabilization that resulted in about a million deaths and cost southern Africa an estimated \$60 billion in damages in the 1980s alone. The country currently accounts for about 80 per cent of the region's economic strength, and its corporations and franchises are ubiquitous across southern Africa. South Africa is potentially the dominant actor in both SADC and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). Its Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) – historically used to support South African firms investing abroad – can, however, now play a potentially developmental role in the subregion, as can initiatives such as the Maputo Trade Corridor with Mozambique and the Southern Africa Power Pool. South Africa has contributed to peacemaking efforts in Lesotho, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – a SADC member since 1997 – and is expected to play a leading role in the Southern African Brigade of an evolving African Stand-by Force (ASF). The country's past history of aggressive hegemonic dominance has, however, made its post-apartheid leaders cautious about appearing to impose their will on weaker neighbours.

The Southern African Customs Union, established in 1910 between South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (and now involving Namibia), symbolized Pretoria's mercantilist approach towards its neighbours. Through SACU, South Africa promoted one-sided trade deals while restricting access to its own markets. This was a customs union that distributed its rewards unevenly. Agricultural products, vital for other SACU members, were excluded from tariff-free trade.

Pretoria unilaterally determined the union's tariffs and was responsible for administering all duties. Far from promoting industrial development within SACU, South Africa often obstructed the industrialization efforts of other members. For over a century, South Africa's mines, farms and industry also attracted hundreds of thousands of workers from neighbouring countries, becoming a major source of revenue for Mozambique, Malawi and Lesotho. Xenophobic attacks in South Africa against foreigners, largely from southern Africa, in May 2008, resulted in sixty-two deaths and about 100,000 displaced persons, again underlining the need for genuine region-building in southern Africa.

More positively, South Africa agreed to restructure SACU to render greater benefits to its other members, and to democratize decision-making. By 2004, the SACU headquarters was moved from South Africa's Department of Trade and Industry to an independent secretariat in Namibia. Policy-makers in Tshwane (formerly Pretoria) are now increasingly conscious of the need to promote investment and industrialization policies that benefit their neighbours. However, the divisions that occurred within SACU in 2008/09 over the European Union's (EU) economic partnership agreements (EPAs) are a clear sign that all is not well with the region-building project in southern Africa. The political and economic roles of China and the United States in the broader southern African region will also need to be closely watched. Prospects for a wider free trade area have, however, been boosted by an agreement in 2011 between SADC, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC) which seeks to accelerate the establishment of a free trade area.

Governance and electoral challenges also remain in southern African countries such as Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Madagascar (suspended from SADC in March 2009 after an unconstitutional change of government), which will need to be urgently addressed if the region is to be stable. Southern Africa is the region of the world most badly affected by the HIV/AIDS pandemic; it continues to suffer droughts – linked also to issues of climate change – that have threatened food security; and despite some progress, the region continues to experience violence against women and challenges of gender inequality that must be addressed if region-building efforts are to progress in southern Africa. All the issues raised in this foreword are discussed in greater detail in this rich volume.

The Cape Town-based Centre for Conflict Resolution has established itself as one of the most internationally recognized think tanks in Africa. Having published ten previous books on topics as diverse as South Africa in Africa; Nigeria's foreign policy; China in Africa; the African Union and

its institutions; the United Nations and Africa; Africa's human rights architecture; transitional justice in Africa; and HIV/AIDS and society in South Africa, the Centre is pleased to be publishing this unique collection on *Region-building in Southern Africa*, which builds on the Centre's well-received 2007 publication, *South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era*, as well as a 2012 publication, *The EU and Africa: From Eurafrique to Afro-Europa*.

Between 2004 and 2011, CCR held ten policy seminars in South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho and Tanzania, which focused on: South Africa's role in Africa; the South African, Namibian and Tanzanian chairs of the SADC Security Organ; HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa; strengthening the SADC Secretariat; civil society's contribution to security and governance in southern Africa; security and development in southern Africa; governments, traditional leaders and civil society in southern Africa; building peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; region-building in southern Africa; and state-building in Zimbabwe. Ten policy reports and three books (on South Africa in Africa, HIV/AIDS and society in South Africa, as well as this volume) have been produced from this work. I would like to thank all my colleagues at CCR who worked tirelessly on these projects, particularly Dawn Nagar, Elizabeth Otitodun and Angela Ndinga-Muvumba. I would also like to thank the three co-editors of this book, Chris Saunders, Gwinyayi Dzinesa and Dawn Nagar, for their tireless efforts in coordinating the nineteen pan-African authors of these sixteen chapters.

The current SADC Executive Secretary, Tomaz Augusto Salomão; former SADC Executive Secretaries Kaire Mbuende and Simba Makoni; director of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC), Tanki Mothae; head of the SADC gender unit, Magdeline Mathiba-Madibela; head of the SADC HIV/AIDS unit, Antonica Hembe; head of the Planning Element of the SADC Brigade, General Lancaster Bottoman; Namibia's defence minister, General Charles 'Ho Chi Minh' Namoloh; chief of staff of Namibia's Defence Force, General Charles Shalumbu; HIV/AIDS Coordinator at the Namibian defence ministry, Colonel Marianne Muvangua; professor at the University of Namibia, André du Pisani; South Africa's Special Representative to the Great Lakes region, Welile Nhlapo; director-general in South Africa's Department of Military Veterans, Tsepe Motumi; former Director-General of Human Resources Management in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), General Solly Mollo; former chief of the Botswana Defence Force, General Louis Fischer; and chief of Mozambique's Defence Force, General Paulino Macaringue – all contributed substantially to these efforts, and we are grateful for their time. We also thank all the scholars,

policy-makers and civil society activists who have worked with us in seeking to build a more peaceful southern Africa over the last decade. In the same period, CCR's regional training programme has also worked to strengthen the conflict management capacity of government and civil society actors in Lesotho and Swaziland, and we are thankful for its rich practical insights into this research project.

This book thus builds on vast research, policy development and capacity-building experiences. It assesses southern Africa's contemporary region-building challenges, highlighting cases and actors such as South Africa, Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and the DRC. Attention is also paid to the four key priorities of the SADC Secretariat: military security; food security; HIV/AIDS; and governance. Though much literature exists on southern Africa's regional challenges, few comprehensive studies have yet addressed the broad spectrum of region-building challenges in post-apartheid southern Africa. We are particularly proud that a diverse team of scholars and policy intellectuals, including three southern African co-editors, have produced this volume.

Finally, I wish to thank the main funders of CCR's Africa Programme – the governments of Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden – who provided the support for the publication of this book, and for supporting all the policy seminars, reports and policy briefs on southern Africa's region-building and peace-building challenges that we have produced over the last decade. I also thank the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) for supporting the Centre's work in Lesotho and Swaziland.

*Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution,  
Cape Town, South Africa*





# Introduction

Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa, Dawn Nagar  
and Chris Saunders

Region-building, which takes many different forms, may be defined in different ways. While some see it as ‘the adoption of a regional project by a formal regional economic organization designed to enhance the political, economic, social, cultural, and security integration and/or cooperation of member states’,<sup>1</sup> it is, more broadly, a process in which states and/or non-state actors cooperate in some way in a given region. Since the Second World War there have been many experiments in regional integration in different parts of the world, in which attempts have been made to harmonize policies among states and align state activities to accelerate regional development and to deal with regional challenges, whether political, economic or concerning security in one form or other.<sup>2</sup> This volume considers experiments of this kind carried out in southern Africa, the reasons for them, and why success has been so limited. Most of the sixteen chapters that follow were first presented as papers at a research and policy seminar held by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town, South Africa, in February 2010.<sup>3</sup> They were subsequently revised and updated, and further papers were commissioned to expand the scope of this volume, whose authors are mostly African-based specialists.

Relatively little has been published to date on region-building in southern Africa. The single most substantial volume, Margaret C. Lee’s *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa*, was published in 2003. Gabriel Oosthuizen’s *The Southern African Development Community: The Organisation, Its Policies and Prospects* is a useful factual compilation of material about SADC, but was published in 2006.<sup>4</sup> A number of Nordic scholars have written about the region; their books include Bertil Oden, *Southern Africa After Apartheid*; Lennart Petersson, *Post-Apartheid Southern Africa*; and Fredrik Soderbaum’s sociological account entitled *The Political Economy of Regionalism: The Case of Southern Africa*.<sup>5</sup> Other work focuses not on region-building as such but on South Africa and the region: David Simon (ed.), *South Africa in Southern Africa: Reconfiguring the Region*; Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg (eds), *From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges*; and Adekeye Adebajo, Adebayo Adedeji and Chris Landsberg (eds), *South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era*.<sup>6</sup> *From Cape to Congo*, which is perhaps the

closest to the present book, grew out of a seminar held in 2000; the present book not only presents an update, a decade later, but addresses many new topics, such as the impact of food security, migration and climate change on the region and the role of development financial institutions in southern African region-building efforts.

### **Regionalism: a conceptual and empirical assessment**

Theories relating to regional integration in Europe, and experience there, may provide lessons for region-building in southern Africa, if carefully applied to a very different context. In Europe, regional integration evolved from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) of 1951 into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, and then into the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which formally inaugurated the European Union (EU).<sup>7</sup> The initial aim was merely to provide a framework within which to produce and market coal and steel across Europe, prevent competition and ultimately jointly regulate and end tariffs and border controls. In fostering transnational interdependence in one area, the ECSC in turn created the possibility of interdependence in others.<sup>8</sup>

Between 1958 and 1964, the European integration experience provided Ernst Haas with the framework for his theory of 'neo-functionalism', which rejected the artificial separation of politics from economics and argued that transborder exchanges and cooperation in technical areas would increase transnational interdependence, in turn creating functional spillovers and leading to a free trade area, a customs union, a single market, a common currency and an economic and political union.<sup>9</sup> As we will see in this volume, in southern Africa the spillover effects of regional cooperation have been limited, owing to lack of adequate economic and political government structures, institutions and policies. An audit report of the African Union (AU) in 2007, chaired by Adebayo Adedeji, executive secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) between 1975 and 1991, highlighted the many capacity challenges that African states still face, including funding and human resource problems, as well as inadequate planning. In general, regional integration requires strengthening the capacity of states to fulfil their core functions.

In southern Africa, market integration efforts have attempted to expand the region's 'periphery' by strengthening weaker economies through robust trade and market integration efforts. These have been relatively unsuccessful to date, as evidenced by South Africa's outward-looking trading patterns – though the country accounts for 70 per cent of overall trade in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), about 90 per cent of South Africa's trade is conducted outside the region.<sup>10</sup> As Andre Gunder Frank suggests, the core can be a major obstacle to regional integration when it begins feeding off the periphery in its imbalance of trade.<sup>11</sup> Yet South Africa should provide

leadership in region-building efforts in southern Africa. Charles Kindleberger defines hegemonic stability as strong leadership and responsibility by a single dominant state, and Robert Keohane's theory of 'hegemonic power' asserts that a single state can be dominant yet simultaneously and freely establishing and maintaining the norms and rules of a liberal economic order.<sup>12</sup>

Before the advent of African independence, such leaders as Côte d'Ivoire's Félix Houphouët-Boigny, Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta and Senegal's Léopold Senghor believed that economic integration should precede political integration.<sup>13</sup> Other leaders, most notably Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah, pushed for federalist political integration in the form of a 'United States of Africa'. During the struggle for political independence, African continental unity and regional cooperation was a strategy for combating foreign dependence and underdevelopment. In the late 1950s, scholars of regionalism identified six key stages critical to integration: a preferential trade area, a free trade area, a customs union, a common market, an economic union and a common monetary zone. (See Khadiagala in this volume.) When African states became independent, however, their leaders wanted to preserve their independence and adopt an incremental process to regional integration as a stepping stone towards eventual continental unity.<sup>14</sup> The Ghana–Guinea–Mali Union, formed in 1958, lasted only three years,<sup>15</sup> and as the number of independent African states grew from 1960, leaders found it difficult to implement economic and political integration. The UN's Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), founded in 1958 to support Africa's regional integration efforts, helped to establish several regional economic communities (RECs).<sup>16</sup> These, it was hoped, would boost trade and investment and provide greater economies of scale, while allowing for freer movement of resources and people, greater cooperation, peace and security, and improved bargaining power. These regional groupings included the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of the Great Lakes, the East African Community (EAC), and the Eastern and Southern African Preferential Trade Area (PTA), which later became the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).<sup>17</sup>

Though the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had been created in May 1963 primarily to accelerate political liberation, particularly in southern Africa, in 1991 it took on the challenge of regional integration by adopting the Abuja Treaty, which recognized the coordination, harmonization and integration of Africa's RECs as a prerequisite to their serving as building blocks for the creation of an African Common Market by 2028. Similar to Europe's 1957 Treaty of Rome, the Abuja Treaty followed the gradualist approach to integration adopted by the UN's ECA, and regarded the subregional bodies as the building blocks for the functional integration of the continent. The 2007 audit report of the AU, the successor to the OAU in 2002, reaffirmed the Abuja Treaty as the

blueprint for regional economic cooperation and the road map for integration efforts on the continent.<sup>18</sup>

The AU's Assembly of Heads of State and Government meeting in Banjul, Gambia, in July 2006 officially recognized eight RECs: the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), COMESA, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the East African Community, the Economic Community of Central African States, the Economic Community of West African States, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and SADC.<sup>19</sup> While regional integration seeks to strengthen the capacity of states to fulfil their core functions, each of Africa's RECs has its own interests and agendas, which obstruct effective cooperation within and between these bodies. The fact that most African states belong to more than one regional economic grouping continues to hinder the implementation of key political and economic processes, such as trade agreements, at the subregional level.<sup>20</sup>

### **Regional integration: the case of southern Africa**

Southern Africa has a long history of regional cooperation, though there have been many different ideas about what the region should comprise. Though southern Africa has never been united politically, certain commonalities underpin its region-building project. One is a history of colonialism, for though different European colonial powers were involved – Britain, Germany and Portugal – the entire region was subject to a form of colonial rule until the 1960s. Struggles against colonialism and white settler rule were to some extent interlinked across the region. Because of its relatively advanced economy, what is now South Africa has long attracted migrant workers from elsewhere in the region, and, since the gold and diamond revolution in the late nineteenth century, which attracted colonial buccaneers such as Cecil Rhodes, arguments for region-building have been advanced based on ideas of having a larger market, integrating means of transport and imposing common tariffs and customs. The creation of the Union of South Africa from four territories in 1910 was, in a sense, a region-building project, and the makers of the Union expected at the time that the new entity would in time come to embrace other parts of southern Africa. Certainly it was anticipated that the three British High Commission territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland would be incorporated into the Union of South Africa. In 1910 these three states, together with South Africa, formed the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), now the oldest such union in the developing world. The incorporation of the British territories into the Union never happened, because of the racist policies of the Union government, and because, for the same reason, what had been German South West Africa, which South Africa seized in 1915 and then occupied, was never formally incorporated into South Africa.<sup>21</sup> When South African occupation of that de facto colony finally ended

in March 1990, and it became the independent country of Namibia, the country joined SACU as its fifth member. (See Gibb in this volume.)

A number of other attempts at region-building have been made. The British formed the Central African Federation in the early 1950s as a counterweight to apartheid South Africa, and thirty years later, in 1979, the apartheid government of Pieter Willem Botha in South Africa, then in the process of granting nominal 'independence' to four South African Bantustans (Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Venda), proposed the idea of a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), an idea that never came to fruition because of its apartheid origins. Much more significant, the independent southern African states that were opposed to apartheid South Africa came together as the Frontline States (FLS) from the mid-1970s. After the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, the FLS formed with that country the more formal Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), composed of nine states: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. (See Khadiagala and Mbuende in this volume.) SADCC aimed to coordinate action against the apartheid regime, then destabilizing the region through attacks on neighbouring countries, which the Botha government claimed were harbouring guerrillas of the region's liberation movements. An estimated one million deaths and \$60 billion of damages resulted from these policies in the 1980s.<sup>22</sup>

The era of destabilization ended in the late 1980s. As South Africa, which had the largest and most industrialized economy in the region, moved from apartheid to democracy beginning in 1990, SADCC restructured itself and, in August 1992 in Windhoek, established SADC, which South Africa joined after its first democratic election in 1994. (South Africa might also have joined the larger Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, but chose not to, in part because of its debt to the former FLS and in part because there was a perception at the time that COMESA was too large and unwieldy.)<sup>23</sup> Under President Nelson Mandela (1994–99) and his successors Thabo Mbeki (1999–2008) and Jacob Zuma (2009– ), South Africa has played an active role in promoting subregional stability and development. Meanwhile, SADC was greatly enlarged in size with the addition to its membership of the sprawling Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1997. Though endowed with great mineral wealth, the Congo remains both extremely poor and conflict-prone. Other SADC states – Angola, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe – have been involved in the DRC, both militarily and as peacemakers, aided in the latter role by a 20,000-strong UN mission.

Unlike the EU, SADC has added new members without imposing any tests of readiness for membership. It has grown to fifteen states, though at the time of writing in 2011, Madagascar was suspended from the organization because of the unconstitutional way in which the military-dominated government

there, under President Andry Rajoelina, came to power. But SADC essentially encompasses the entire southern half of the African continent, as well as island-states off the East African coast: Mauritius has played a leading role in SADC, while Seychelles rejoined the organization in 2008. One of the major tasks of the organization has been to bring stability to the region as a whole, but the autocratic regimes in a number of its member states, such as Zimbabwe and Swaziland, have not been effectively challenged, and SADC has failed to link development, its main goal, with democracy. (See especially Matlosa in this volume.)

### **SADC's developmental framework**

With an expanded mandate for greater economic and political integration of the subregion, SADC was committed to the creation of 'a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity and provide for mutual peace and security'.<sup>24</sup> (See Landsberg in this volume.) SADC placed great emphasis on integrating markets within the subregion and strengthening economic ties between SADC member states and external actors. This 'new regionalism' meant the removal of some trade barriers and greater movement of goods, people and capital across national borders. A range of multinational corporations – mainly South African-based – were able to develop new markets. But open or 'neoliberal regionalism' differs from 'development regionalism', which speaks to the role of the state and its intervention in markets to promote national development agendas, yet at the same time can serve as a vehicle to achieve global competitiveness. As a number of chapters in this volume show, developmental integration still has a long way to go in southern Africa. The economies of most of the states in the region remain weak, and there are inherited divisions that work against united action, while institutional capacity is lacking for both national and supranational entities. And the benefits of regionalism have come at a price: increased migration has, for example, created new challenges, such as the wave of xenophobic attacks in South Africa in 2008, which resulted in sixty-two deaths and over 100,000 displaced persons.<sup>25</sup> (See Nyamnjoh and Mususa in this volume.)

Effective regional integration requires democratic governance, political will and visionary leadership. National political and economic policies have to be aligned with regional agendas.<sup>26</sup> SADC's fifteen members have instead seen limited results in generating internal wealth and in tackling poverty and diseases such as HIV/AIDS. (See Dzinesa and Drimie and Gandure in this volume.) Though a regional free trade area (FTA) was established in 2008, southern Africa's 'periphery' remains heavily dependent on the 'core'. As mentioned earlier, South Africa, the regional hegemon, is responsible for 70 per cent of southern Africa's overall trade.<sup>27</sup> While the 'new regionalism' agenda emphasizes the need to build intra-regional trade in order to compete in the global

marketplace, unilateral actions have worked against that agenda, such as the bilateral preferential trade agreement between Namibia and Zimbabwe that entered into force in 1992, the Europe–South Africa Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) of 1999, and the recent interim economic partnership agreements (IEPAs) signed with the European Union by Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique, but not South Africa and Namibia, in June 2009.<sup>28</sup> The TDCA, which offered trade and tariff preferences for EU goods entering South Africa, was seen by other SADC countries as a major threat to regional development and the chances of success for a SADC free trade area.<sup>29</sup>

SADC aims at both production integration – based on what particular countries can best produce, and under what conditions – and market integration. But three of its members (Angola, the DRC and Seychelles) are not yet part of the free trade area, introduced in 2008, while eight SADC member states – the DRC, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe – also belong to COMESA. Angola and the DRC are members of the Economic Community of Central African States, Mauritius is part of the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), and Tanzania belongs to the EAC. The SADC member states that belong to other RECs are subject to various negotiation protocols, which makes implementing such protocols difficult.<sup>30</sup>

SADC countries plan to eliminate barriers to trade in goods and services, establish a common external system of tariffs, and redistribute tariff revenues among themselves. A monetary union could bring real advantages to the southern African subregion and would, among other things, reduce the transaction costs associated with trading goods and services between countries using different currencies. In 1986 a common monetary area (CMA) agreement was signed by Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland, while Namibia joined the CMA after it became independent in 1990.<sup>31</sup> But SADC still needs to create both the institutional capacity and the conditions for currency convergence among its fifteen members. The customs union, which was to begin in 2010, has not been achieved, and now the plan is that a common market for SADC's 257 million people is to be created by 2015, a monetary union by 2016, and a common currency by 2018. And southern Africa's regional integration efforts have to date produced little real trade liberalization within SADC. Where strong trade links exist, they have generally been created by strong bilateral deals with South Africa, such as those agreed by Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe in 2000.<sup>32</sup> Though in February 2010 SADC urged its members to strengthen the free trade area, talks had begun in October 2008 between SADC, COMESA and the EAC, in Kampala, Uganda, on forming a tripartite free trade area, and the idea was pushed strongly by President Zuma of South Africa in 2011. Such a tripartite free trade area would cover twenty-six states and more than half of the entire continent, but whether the three regional organizations will be able to work together effectively remains to be seen.



While South Africa's economy continues to dominate the subregion, this is not reflected in a comparable level of trade with southern Africa. In 2010, South Africa's exports to Asia were R19.5 billion; to the European Union more than R16 billion, and to China and America more than R7 billion. But South Africa's total trade with other SADC countries amounted to less than R6 billion, and its imports from SADC countries were worth only R2.3 billion.<sup>33</sup> South Africa accounted for 70 per cent of all foreign direct investment in southern Africa, although external investment in Angola and the DRC has risen rapidly as a result of trade with China. (See Nagar, le Pere in this volume.) South Africa's trade patterns therefore provide little relative benefit to other SADC member states. Other factors that have hindered regional integration in southern Africa have included conflicts, such as those in Angola and Mozambique from the 1970s, apartheid South Africa's military destabilization of the region, especially in the 1980s, and the war in the DRC from 1996, which has constrained that country from joining SADC's free trade area. High levels of crime in South Africa have also deterred foreign direct investment into the country and neighbouring states. It is abundantly clear that SADC's economic goals can be realized only when the southern African subregion achieves peace and security.

### **Politics, security and governance**

As Africa's RECs have evolved, they have begun to tackle such issues as 'good governance', peace and security, gender, food security, HIV/AIDS and climate change. Democratic governance, for example, plays a critical role in economic development and region-building, and southern Africa is confronted with on-going governance challenges that include the need to consolidate democracy, weak electoral and oversight processes, and tensions around political power-sharing. (See Matlosa in this volume.) The absence of peace, security and stability has had deleterious consequences for region-building in Africa. For example, the conflict in the Great Lakes brought region-building in ECCAS to a standstill. The civil war in the DRC in the late 1990s was particularly divisive, as were conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi in the same period. Wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire slowed region-building in the ECOWAS region. Sudan's protracted north-south wars, the destructive conflict in the country's western Darfur region, the Ethiopia-Eritrea war of 1998-2000 and persistent conflict in Somalia have also had adverse impacts on region-building in eastern Africa.<sup>34</sup> In SADC, instability during the apartheid era, prolonged conflict in Angola and the DRC, and an attempted coup d'état in Lesotho in 1998, followed by a military intervention by South Africa and Botswana, adversely impacted regional integration.

Against such a background, most RECs have incorporated peace and security into their constitutive instruments and have a clear mandate to resolve conflicts

and keep the peace in their regions. This is in line with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter of 1945, which encourages the peaceful settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements. The AU's fifteen-member Peace and Security Council (PSC) also seeks to build a continental peace and security architecture that not only focuses on military deployment, but also involves preventive deployment of effective mediation strategies as well as early response systems. Africa's five subregions (Southern, Central, Eastern, North and West) are currently engaged in establishing stand-by brigades as part of the AU's 15,000-strong Standby Force. (The AU seems to think it is ready!) The force will consist of stand-by brigades from all five African subregions, and will undertake traditional peacekeeping operations as well as observer missions and peace-building activities. SADC is in the process of creating a Southern Africa Stand-by Brigade (SADCBRIG) to engage in multidimensional UN and AU peacekeeping operations.<sup>35</sup> (See Saunders in this volume.)

Gender issues play a significant role within the frameworks of the RECs, which recognize how gender inequality adversely impacts region-building efforts. The Abuja Treaty of 1991 requires member states to establish and harmonize policies and mechanisms for the full participation of African women in development by improving their economic, social and cultural conditions.<sup>36</sup> Achieving gender equality is enshrined in the treaties, protocols and constitutions of Africa's RECs. Several RECs, such as SADC and ECOWAS, have also established gender units to promote gender equality and ensure implementation of the various international, continental and regional conventions on gender equality. For example, the COMESA Treaty has an entire chapter dedicated to women's issues,<sup>37</sup> and the organization adopted a gender policy in 2005. The ECOWAS Treaty calls upon member states to establish and harmonize policies and mechanisms for enhancing women's economic, social and cultural conditions. The treaties that established the EAC and IGAD also provide for regional cooperation on gender matters. SADC recognizes that the mainstreaming of gender issues into its legal framework is important for sustainable regional development. (See Otitodun and Porter in this volume.) It established a gender unit in 1998 and has adopted instruments such as the 2008 Protocol on Gender and Development.

The devastating HIV/AIDS pandemic is one of the pervasive threats to region-building in southern Africa, the worst-affected region in the world and home to 35 per cent of all people living with HIV/AIDS worldwide and 32 per cent of new HIV infections and AIDS-related deaths worldwide. (See Dzinesa in this volume.) Region-building initiatives can have a twofold impact on HIV/AIDS. First, since the pandemic transcends borders, it can be accelerated by the population mobility facilitated by regional integration. Secondly, and conversely, region-building can also contribute to controlling HIV/AIDS through the coordination of policies across countries, harmonization of responses, and

pooling and scaling of resources. Global resources in the fight against HIV/AIDS have supported regional initiatives, and Africa's RECs have mainstreamed health issues into their priority programmes. SADC was the first organization to adopt a protocol on health and formulate a substantive, normative HIV/AIDS framework. These initiatives and protocols have resonated with continental and global instruments and mechanisms to combat the impact of HIV/AIDS, such as the 2001 Abuja framework to combat HIV/AIDS and related opportunistic infections; the SADC HIV/AIDS Strategic Framework and Plan of Action: 2003–2007, adopted in Maseru, Lesotho, in July 2003;<sup>38</sup> and the 2006 Brazzaville commitment to upscale universal access to HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, care and support.

There is a growing recognition that climate change will negatively affect all of Africa's economic sectors and will therefore present unique challenges for region-building and sustainable development on the continent.<sup>39</sup> This has made it imperative for Africa's RECs, such as SADC, to integrate strategies to combat the negative impacts of climate change on their resources, livelihoods and economies into national decision-making processes. African countries are promoting the 2009 'African Common Position on Climate Change', which seeks predictable and reliable funding to fight development challenges posed by the impacts of climate change.<sup>40</sup> Some RECs have developed policy frameworks to combat climate change and its adverse impact. (See Simon in this volume.) African countries have also increasingly recognized that efficient and effective region-building cannot be exclusively driven by governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Private sector and development finance institutions (DFIs), such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), have been constructive partners in strengthening development and region-building. DFIs, for example, have been important providers of human capital as well as technical and financial support for the implementation of projects that promote regional development and region-building, such as construction of infrastructure. (See Monyae in this volume.) Some RECs, such as the East African Community, have specific protocols on the role of the private sector in region-building. In West Africa, Ecobank Transnational Incorporated (ETI) has funded region-building schemes and currently has a presence in eighteen countries, with a network of over 320 branches and offices established between 2000 and 2010.<sup>41</sup>

### **International links and key trade partners**

External actors, such as the United States, China and the EU, have played important roles in supporting, or sometimes undermining, region-building in Africa through security, political and trade relationships with the RECs. The US Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of 2000 aimed to boost trade between Africa and the USA,<sup>42</sup> but has been criticized for being too focused

on oil exports from African countries. External actors such as the USA can potentially play a critical role in supporting efforts towards development, and Washington stands to gain from engagement with SADC, with which it has been negotiating a free trade accord. The USA believes that investing in African national armies and subregional organizations would help prevent, manage and resolve conflicts and thereby 'reduce pressure on US forces to conduct reactive combatant evacuation and humanitarian relief operations'.<sup>43</sup> Building partnership capacity is a key goal of American military strategy in Africa, and is consequently a key mandate for the US Africa Command (AFRICOM).<sup>44</sup> The USA supports development of the African Stand-by Force (ASF), but its anti-terrorism activities have been criticized for violating civil liberties in African countries, such as in Djibouti, where 1,200 US troops have been deployed. While AFRICOM is perceived, in some American quarters, as building partnership capacity, some key SADC states and civil society activists see it as an example of American military expansionism in the name of the 'war on terror' waged under the administration of George W. Bush between 2001 and 2008. It is important, therefore, to monitor the development of AFRICOM in order to safeguard the interests of Africa's subregions, including southern Africa. (See Ngwenya in this volume.)

China proposed creation of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC),<sup>45</sup> which was established in October 2000 and began as a triennial ministerial conference that aimed to provide a mechanism for collective consultation, dialogue and pragmatic cooperation between China and African countries. While Beijing has a structured, long-term view of engaging Africa at FOCAC, Africa has yet to develop a coherent multilateral response to the initiative. Analysts have stressed the need for the AU and Africa's RECs to adopt appropriate policies, strategies and responses to engaging China more effectively, in order to ensure that this partnership promotes effective region-building on the continent.<sup>46</sup> (See le Pere in this volume.)

The EU has sought to devise a comprehensive, integrated and long-term framework for its relations with Africa, including the continent's regional organizations. In December 2005, Brussels adopted a strategic document entitled 'The EU and Africa: towards a strategic partnership'.<sup>47</sup> This document – based on the four pillars of 'good governance'; peace and security; trade; and health, education and a safe environment – sought to support Africa's efforts to achieve the UN Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty by 2015, and to establish the practical modalities for an ongoing partnership between Africa and Europe. The policy was one-sided, however, having been developed and refined within the EU Commission in Brussels with little or no input from partner states in Africa.<sup>48</sup> In consultation with the AU, this document was later amended into a joint strategy and action plan, with substantial follow-up and monitoring mechanisms duly approved

at the EU–Africa summit in Lisbon, Portugal, in December 2007. Central to the debates on EU–southern Africa relations is the fate of SACU. In 2011, this relationship hung in the balance as a result of the IEPAs. (See Gibb, Qobo in this volume.) SACU members remain divided on the question: South Africa and Namibia oppose IEPAs with the EU, while Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho have signed them for fear of losing out on EU aid and market access. Such divisions could have negative and pernicious implications for region-building in southern Africa.<sup>49</sup>

### **Structure of the book**

*Historical legacy* Part One of this book provides background to current issues in region-building in southern Africa. Kenyan scholar Gilbert Khadiagala provides a historical overview of the Frontline States and then the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, and identifies two legacies of the latter – first a state-centric and highly individualized regionalism, and secondly a sector-led coordination approach defined as ‘decolonization-driven regionalism’ that promotes infrastructural development through Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs). An example of the latter is the transport corridors used as a means of promoting regional integration to mitigate the effects of economic dependence on apartheid South Africa. Khadiagala discusses the impact of these legacies on SADC and its efforts to build autonomous institutions, and concludes with recommendations for a new phase of regionalism, involving both market and economic integration and security efforts, that can forge a common identity and help in peace-building, peacemaking and conflict resolution efforts in southern Africa.

Kaire Mbuende, a Namibian technocrat who was SADC Executive Secretary between 1994 and 1999, provides an insider perspective on the creation of SADC and its *raison d’être*, including mediation processes and shuttle diplomacy practices. Mbuende analyses the genesis of regional integration in southern Africa and the development of an agenda of three pillars: political cooperation, functional cooperation and market integration. This made southern Africa’s regional integration agenda complex and difficult to manage. The author discusses the importance of a peaceful and secure state for creating viable markets and attracting foreign direct investment, which is critical to achieving regional development in southern Africa. He elaborates on SADC’s institutional architecture as its economic and security practices evolved. Mbuende claims that southern Africa’s regional integration efforts are unique, for SADC has embarked on a complex regional integration process that includes political, economic, social and cultural aspects. Successful integration will depend on the contributions of governments, institutions and non-state actors, but the multiplicity of commitments under the various multiple trade integration schemes have worked against a SADC trade regime. Mbuende concludes by

suggesting that SADC should take bold steps to advance its market integration strategy and become less dependent on external donor support.

*Governance and military security* In Part Two we turn to governance and military security perspectives. South African scholar Chris Landsberg shows the key role of the heads of state summits and the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC), but finds the SADC Secretariat to be overwhelmed and therefore not as effective as it might be. He advances suggestions as to how the SADC Tribunal could be strengthened, and argues for civil society to play a more important role in region-building and outlines the institutional architecture of SADC. In the next chapter, Lesotho academic Khabele Matlosa is concerned mainly with governance and electoral issues. As Matlosa points out, the holding of elections does not necessarily mean that a democratic regime is in place; few SADC countries are effective liberal democracies. South African historian Chris Saunders then discusses the UN's peacekeeping involvement in four SADC countries – Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and the DRC – traces the development of the idea of creating a SADC Stand-by Force, as part of a continental African Stand-by Force, and considers how the SADC force might be used. Elizabeth Otitodun and Antonia Porter, a South African and a British analyst respectively, then highlight in their joint chapter the importance of mainstreaming gender into peace-building and region-building processes. They outline the evolving regional and international gender architecture, and specifically the problems and progress of and prospects for promoting gender equality in the region through the implementation of SADC, continental and international gender instruments. They argue that, while progress has been made, greater political will is required if the gaps in implementing the region's gender instruments are to be filled. Employing the cases of Angola and the DRC – countries that have recently experienced prolonged conflict – they demonstrate how women have played important peace-building roles.

*Economic integration* Part Three of the volume considers economic integration. Dawn Nagar, a South African analyst, first discusses SADC's resource-led development strategy, which involves SDIs and the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP). Through a detailed analysis of SAPP, the author identifies a number of areas of concern, such as the profound imbalance between supply and demand in the region's electricity grid for its twelve SADC member states; the hegemonic position of South Africa as the largest consumer of electricity and the dominance of its parastatal power utility, Eskom; and the DRC's abandonment of an electricity project that could have benefited the region but which failed to secure a partnership owing to South Africa's hegemonic position and a multibillion-dollar agreement with China. Nagar further assesses SADC's

free trade area, the hegemonic position of South Africa and its skewed trade patterns within the region, and the role of powerful multinational corporations. The author discusses SADC's Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) of 2003, which seeks economic growth and development within the region but has been unable to address how members with relatively large manufacturing sectors, such as South Africa and Mauritius, can use their comparative advantage effectively for region-building.

British academic Richard Gibb then discusses the Southern African Customs Union and the pressure exerted by South Africa on the four other SACU members – Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland – in wanting to restructure several strategic elements underpinning the arrangement. He explains the importance of regionalism as a mechanism to integrate smaller markets by creating larger ones that are more successful within the global economy. He believes that regionalism should be viewed in terms of both security and politics as much as economics and trade. SACU's asymmetrical imbalance of trade leaves South Africa with a multibillion-dollar regional trading surplus, and Gibb notes that South Africa now wants to renegotiate SACU's distribution formula, which would seriously disadvantage its poorer members. This poses a threat to the continued existence of SACU itself, though South Africa has said that it aims to enlarge SACU by bringing other SADC countries into the Union. South Africa's trade with its SACU partners remains a relatively minor component of its overall trade, however: in 2007/08, SACU imports constituted only 2 per cent of South Africa's total imports, and over 91 per cent of SACU's gross domestic product was produced in South Africa. By contrast, SACU payments accounted for over 60 per cent of Lesotho's government revenue in 2008. SACU therefore raises the question of how a semi-developed state, South Africa, can best be integrated with relatively poor and much less economically developed countries. Gibb notes, however, that SACU should not be seen as only an economic and technical issue, for regionalism is as much a political and social process as an economic one. SACU forms a core to the building of a larger regionalism in southern Africa, since all its member states belong to SADC.

Finally, David Monyae, a South African scholar, focuses on institutions that are rarely explored in region-building debates. He considers development finance institutions as important actors in region-building in southern Africa through infrastructure development. Lack of infrastructure has hindered economic growth and development in the region and can fuel conflicts and tensions. Monyae focuses on the roles of two South African DFIs, the Development Bank of Southern Africa and the Industrial Development Corporation, in promoting infrastructure development in southern Africa and the rest of Africa. He argues that South African DFIs could potentially become key vehicles in the implementation of the country's foreign policy objectives to contribute to economic development and integration in southern Africa.



*Human security* Part Four of the volume is concerned with human security issues. Scott Drimie, a South African scholar, and Sithabiso Gandure, a Zimbabwean analyst, together assess southern Africa's chronic food and nutrition insecurity and SADC's response to this situation. They maintain that food security is the cornerstone of human security and suggest that food insecurity presents a major threat to peace and security efforts in southern Africa. They conclude that SADC's responses to food insecurity have remained static, making it critical for southern African governments to deliver on their commitments to implement declarations in various SADC protocols and agreements in order to address this crisis. Zimbabwean scholar Gwinyayi Dzinesa then provides in his chapter a critical assessment of the nexus between the HIV/AIDS pandemic and human security. He observes that southern Africa remains the 'global epicentre of HIV/AIDS' and that the pandemic has wrought devastation on human security in the region. He observes that while SADC's evolving harmonized policy and institutional framework for HIV/AIDS is commendable, its effective implementation at the national level remains uneven. Dzinesa contends that other SADC sectors can draw lessons from the progress made by SADC militaries – a sector particularly vulnerable to the pandemic, with estimates of 20–60 per cent infection rates – in developing regional minimum standards for the harmonized control of HIV/AIDS among security sectors. The chapter commends the growing engagement of civil society in the region's human security agenda and fight against the pandemic.

The joint chapter by Cameroonian scholar Francis Nyamnjoh and South African Patience Mususa scrutinizes the causes of the xenophobic attacks in South Africa in May 2008, which resulted in sixty-two deaths and over 100,000 displaced, and the discourse of the 'foreigner' in relation to the experiences of migrants in southern Africa. The authors suggest that the major political and economic transitions that southern Africa has experienced in the past are likely to recur and create similar conflicts in contemporary patterns and trends of migration. They assess the different responses by governments to xenophobia in the region, particularly in South Africa, and contend that SADC's official discourse of deeper integration through regional free movement of people is undercut by calls for tighter immigration controls by its member states. Finally, David Simon, a United Kingdom-based South African scholar, examines the challenges for region-building in southern Africa posed by climate or global environmental change. He evaluates the engagement of both SADC and COMESA with such issues and concludes that they are in the early stages of addressing climate change challenges and must necessarily mainstream their responses effectively into their integration and region-building agendas.

*External actors* Part Five of the book concerns external actors. South African economist Mzukisi Qobo contends that the EU's economic hegemony,



entrenched through massive financial assistance, has effectively locked SADC into Brussels' sphere of influence. He argues that the changing global geopolitical landscape, including the rise of emerging powers such as China, India and Brazil, has prompted the EU to consolidate its sphere of influence to gain competitive advantage and increase its global market share relative to these rising powers. Finalizing an economic partnership agreement (EPA) with southern Africa is a key part of this calculation. EPAs are therefore not instruments for deepening regional integration and delivering development outcomes, but rather commercial strategies that address the EU's internal constraints and respond to the new wave of globalization driven in part by the emerging powers. Nomfundo Ngwenya, a South African international relations specialist, argues in her chapter that US policy towards southern Africa has been consistent across various administrations since the end of the Cold War in 1991, though George W. Bush had a special input in providing funds to tackle HIV/AIDS between 2001 and 2008. The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act of 2000 has helped boost trade with the region, but in future the USA is likely to focus attention on the two leading economic powers in the region, South Africa and Angola, the latter being the source of about 7 per cent of US oil. Finally, South African scholar Garth le Pere considers the role of China in relation to region-building in southern Africa. He traces the development of links between an economically resurgent China and a number of SADC states, especially Angola, which supplies China with a significant share of its oil requirements, but also including such mineral-rich countries as South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In 2000 the China–South Africa Bi-National Commission was established, by 2010 China had become South Africa's largest bilateral trading partner, and in 2011 South Africa formally joined the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) group of countries, in large part because of its role in SADC.

### **Problems and challenges**

From its inception, SADC has been the most important regional organization in southern Africa. It has constructed an elaborate structure to deal with economic, political and security issues (see Landsberg, Mbuende in this volume) and is recognized by the African Union as one of its eight constituent regional economic communities. Regional economic integration is seen as essential for economic growth in an era of ever-increasing globalization. Many of the chapters in this book concern aspects of the work of SADC, which aims at a regional free trade area, customs union and monetary union (see Nagar in this volume) and has organized a stand-by military force, one of five that are to constitute a continental African force. (See Saunders in this volume.) SADC's Secretariat is now housed in a large new building in Gaborone, Botswana, which formally opened in November 2010, but many of

SADC's ambitious plans and goals remain unimplemented. The organization drew up its Principles and Guidelines for Governing Democratic Elections in 2004, for example, but failed to ensure they were followed in Zimbabwe during polls in 2008. SADC's mediation efforts have had only limited success. While South Africa's Thabo Mbeki helped produce a Global Political Agreement in Zimbabwe in 2008, providing for a coalition government, the mediation efforts of the former president of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, to try to restore constitutional normality in Madagascar, had by April 2011 achieved nothing, for the government of Andry Rajoelina remained in power. In 2010, SADC's Tribunal was in effect suspended, after it had handed down judgments that the government of Zimbabwe did not like.<sup>50</sup>

It is relatively easy to be critical of the region-building attempts that have been made to date in southern Africa. Some will argue that, to be effective, region-building should begin with a relatively small unit and work outward, and that an organization such as SADC cannot deal with the vast problems of poverty, underdevelopment and gross inequalities that plague so much of the region, whose peoples remain divided. New problems are looming, such as the impact of climate change (see Simon in this volume), which will likely add to food insecurity and may also produce further conflicts. SADC remains very dependent on donor support (over 70 per cent of its funds), especially from the EU, and if this is cut back severely, the entire region-building project may be placed in jeopardy. The member states of SADC have not yet shown any appetite for surrendering any sovereignty to the regional body, which has proved unable to deal successfully with crises in Madagascar and Zimbabwe. Many of the key states in the SADC region are, in 2011, still governed by parties that led armed struggles against colonialism and apartheid, and their leaders remain united in part because of that past history of solidarity. But, in time, a new post-liberation-struggle leadership will emerge, one without these past ties. South Africa remains the regional hegemon, with vast wealth relative to many of its neighbours. And region-building is inevitably shaped in part by outside forces and agents. (See Ngwenya, Qobo, le Pere in this volume.) An estimated 77 per cent of SADC's trade continues to take place with countries from outside the region.<sup>51</sup>

There is ample evidence in the chapters that follow, however, that it would be wrong to be too pessimistic about the prospects for region-building in southern Africa. Numerous organizations in both civil society and government are working to bring the peoples of the region together – ranging from SADC and the SADC Parliamentary Forum, to SACU, the Development Bank of Southern Africa and the Industrial Development Corporation. As this process continues, a sense of regional identity among the peoples of southern Africa will develop. SADC's Spatial Development Initiatives, such as the cross-border transport corridors it has promoted, and its Power Pool (see Nagar in this volume),

have brought significant economic benefits to its 257 million inhabitants, and the organization has aided the creation of trans-frontier conservation areas to preserve wildlife and prevent environmental degradation.<sup>52</sup> South Africa's DBSA and IDC continue to finance developmental projects in many countries of the region. (See Monyae in this volume.)

This book, then, written mostly by African authors, reflects the state of play regarding regionalism in southern Africa in early 2011. It analyses both the challenges that face the region-building project in southern Africa and how the region is responding to these challenges, and suggests lessons not only for other regions of Africa, but also for region-building elsewhere in the world.

## Notes

1 Margaret C. Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), p. 8.

2 John Akokpari, 'Dilemmas of regional integration and development in Africa', in John Akokpari, Angela Ndinga-Muvumba and Tim Murithi (eds), *The African Union and Its Institutions* (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2008), p. 87.

3 See Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), 'Building peace in southern Africa', Seminar report, Cape Town, 25–26 February 2010.

4 Lee, *Political Economy*; Gabriel Oosthuizen, *The Southern African Development Community: The Organisation, Its policies and Prospects* (Institute for Global Dialogue, 2006). Other relevant publications, produced by institutions in South Africa, include Christopher Clapham et al., *Regional Integration in Southern Africa: Comparative International Perspectives* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2001); Talitha Bertelsman-Scott and Peter Draper, *Regional Integration and Economic Partnership Agreements. Southern Africa at the Crossroads* (Johannesburg: SAIIA, 2006); and W. Carlsnaes and Philip Nel (eds), *In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy After Apartheid* (Midrand, South Africa: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2006). Jörgen Vogt, *Die regionale Integration des südlichen Afrikas: unter besonderer Betrachtung der Southern African development community (SADC)* (*Schriften zur Europäischen*

*Integration und internationalen Wirtschaftsordnung*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007) is not available anywhere in southern Africa.

5 Bertil Oden, *Southern Africa after Apartheid* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 1993); Lennart Petersson, *Post-Apartheid Southern Africa* (Routledge, 1998); Fredrik Soderbaum, *The Political Economy of Regionalism: The Case of Southern Africa* (London: Palgrave, 2004).

6 David Simon (ed.), *South Africa in Southern Africa: Reconfiguring the Region* (Oxford: James Currey, 1998); Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg (eds), *From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003); Adekeye Adebajo, Adebayo Adedeji and Chris Landsberg (eds), *South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era* (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2007); W. Carlsnaes and Philip Nel (eds), *In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy After Apartheid* (Midrand, South Africa: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2006).

7 John Pinder and Simon Usherwood, *The European Union: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). See also Anne Deighton, 'The Remaking of Europe', in Michael Howard and William Roger Louis (eds), *The Oxford History of the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Chris Hill and Michael Smith, *International Relations and the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Anand Menon,

Europe: *The State of the Union* (London: Atlantic, 2008).

8 Harry Stephan and Angus Fane Hervey, 'New regionalism in southern Africa: functional developmentalism and the southern African power pool', *Politeia*, 27(3), 2008.

9 Ibid.

10 South African Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), 'A South African trade policy and strategy framework', May 2010, pp. 69–71, [www.dti.gov.za/TPSF.pdf](http://www.dti.gov.za/TPSF.pdf).

11 See the discussion on modern world systems in Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 67–9.

12 See the discussion of hegemonic stability in Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, p. 72. See also the discussion on Robert Keohane and Robert Gilpin in Harry Stephan et al., 'Two-level games and the Africa dilemma', in Stephan et al., *The Scramble for Africa in the 21st Century: A View from the South* (Cape Town: Renaissance), p. 225.

13 John Akokpari, 'Dilemmas of regional integration and development in Africa', in Akokpari, Ndinga-Muvumba, and Murithi, *The African Union and Its Institutions*, p. 87; Guy Martin, *African World Politics: A Pan-African Perspective* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2002), pp. 125–7.

14 Immanuel Wallerstein, *Africa: The Politics of Independence and Unity* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005).

15 Samuel Kingsley Botwe Asante in collaboration with David Chanaiwa, 'Pan-Africanism and regional integration', in Ali A. Mazrui and C. Wondji (eds), *General History of Africa*, vol. 8: *Africa Since 1935* (Oxford: James Currey, 1999), pp. 725–7.

16 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 'Institutions and regional integration in Africa', 2005, [www.uneca.org/aria2/chap2.pdf](http://www.uneca.org/aria2/chap2.pdf).

17 Adebayo Adedeji, 'Comparative strategies of economic decolonization in Africa', in Mazrui and Wondji, *General History of Africa*, vol. 8, p. 413.

18 African Union (AU), 'Audit report', 2010, [europafrica.net/key-documents](http://europafrica.net/key-documents).

19 CCR, 'Adedeji at 80: moving Africa from rhetoric to action', Policy brief, Ijebu-Ode, Nigeria, 18–20 December 2007, p. 3.

20 In AU terminology the southern African region is a subregion. Here the term subregion is used interchangeably with region.

21 The boundaries of South Africa today therefore remain virtually the same as those of 1910. On the attempts at enlarging South Africa, and the failure of those attempts, see especially Ronald Hyam, *The Failure of South African Expansion, 1908–1948* (London: Macmillan, 1972). See also Martin Chanock, *Unconsummated Union* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997).

22 Adebayo Adedeji, 'Within or apart?', in Adedeji (ed.), *South Africa in Africa: Within or Apart?* (London: Zed Books, 1996), p. 9.

23 Cecilia Hull and Markus Derblom, *Abandoning Frontline Trenches? Capabilities for Peace and Security in the SADC Region* (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2009), p. 28.

24 SADC was established under Article 2 of the SADC Treaty by member states represented by their respective heads of state and government. See [www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/119](http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/119).

25 Patrick Bond, 'First class failure', *BBC Focus on Africa*, October–December 2010, p. 26.

26 Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, p. 11. Gilpin concludes that markets are a means to achieve and exercise power, and that the state can be used, or is used, to obtain wealth; hence 'the state and the market interact to influence the distribution of power and wealth in international relations'.

27 John Friedmann, *A General Theory of Polarized Development*, 1972, cited in Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, p. 21. See also the discussion on modern world systems in Gilpin, *ibid.*, pp. 67–9.

28 See Qobo in this volume. See also Brendan Vickers, 'SADC's international trade relations', in Charles Harvey (ed.), *Proceedings of the 2009 FOPRISA Annual Conference* (Gaborone: Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis, 2010), p. 143.

29 Guy Martin, 'African regional cooperation and integration' in Martin, *African World Politics*.

30 Jonathan Mayuyuka Kaunda and Farai Zizhou, 'Furthering southern African integration', in *Proceedings of the 2008 FOPRISA Annual Conference* (Gaborone: Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis, 2009), pp. 33–4.

31 The CMA agreement provides fixed exchange rates among its members, a common bloc for intra-regional capital accounts and financial transfers, and use of the South African rand as a common currency. The South African Reserve Bank sets interest rates for the CMA.

32 Lee, *Political Economy of Regionalism*, pp. 114–35.

33 South African Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), 'A South African trade policy and strategy framework', May 2010, pp. 69–71, [www.dti.gov.za/TPSF.pdf](http://www.dti.gov.za/TPSF.pdf). See also [www.thedti.gov.za/econdb/raportt/rapcont.html](http://www.thedti.gov.za/econdb/raportt/rapcont.html); and [www.thedti.gov.za/econdb/raportt/rapregi.html](http://www.thedti.gov.za/econdb/raportt/rapregi.html).

34 See CCR, 'Stabilising Sudan: domestic, sub-regional, and extra-regional challenges', Seminar report, Cape Town, 23/24 August 2010.

35 AU, 'Roadmap for the operationalisation of the African Standby Force', Experts' Meeting on the Relationship Between the AU and the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, EXP/AU-Recs/ASF/4(I), Addis Ababa, 22/23 March 2005.

36 Adebayo Adedeji, 'ECOWAS: a retrospective journey', in Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid (eds), *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), p. 40.

37 See [about.comesa.int/attachments/comesa\\_treaty\\_en.pdf](http://about.comesa.int/attachments/comesa_treaty_en.pdf).

38 CCR, 'HIV/AIDS and militaries in Africa', Seminar report, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, November 2007, p. 9.

39 United Nations and AU Commission, 'Report on climate change and development in Africa', 2010, [www.uneca.org/cfm/2010/documents/English/Report-onClimateChange-andDevelopment-inAfrica.pdf](http://www.uneca.org/cfm/2010/documents/English/Report-onClimateChange-andDevelopment-inAfrica.pdf).

40 See AU, 'AU Assembly decision on the African Common Position on Climate Change', Assembly/AU/Dec.236(XII), 2009, [www.africa-union.org/root/ua/conferences/2009/jan/summit\\_jan\\_2009/doc/conference/assembly%20au%20dec%20%202008-240%20\(xii\).pdf](http://www.africa-union.org/root/ua/conferences/2009/jan/summit_jan_2009/doc/conference/assembly%20au%20dec%20%202008-240%20(xii).pdf).

41 The eighteen countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central Africa, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, São Tomé, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo, and there are plans to establish a presence in East and southern Africa. See the Ecobank website, [www.firstglobalselect.com/scripts/cgiip.wsc/globalone/htm/quote\\_and\\_news.r?pisharetype-id=17780](http://www.firstglobalselect.com/scripts/cgiip.wsc/globalone/htm/quote_and_news.r?pisharetype-id=17780).

42 The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act was signed into law on 18 May 2000. See the AGOA website, [www.agoa.gov](http://www.agoa.gov).

43 Jendayi Frazer, 'The United States', in Baregu and Landsberg, *From Cape to Congo*, p. 278.

44 According to AFRICOM's mission statement: 'United States Africa Command, in concert with other US government agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of US foreign policy.' See [www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp](http://www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp).

45 See Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu (eds), *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China* (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008).

46 See Ampiah and Naidu, *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon?*