CORRESPONDENCE OF MAJOR GENERAL EMORY UPTON

Volume 2, 1875–1881

Edited by Salvatore G. Cilella Jr.

Voices of the Civil War • Michael P. Gray, series editor

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The University of Tennessee Press / Knoxville

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Upton, Emory, 1839–1881, author. | Cilella, Salvatore G., editor.
Title: Correspondence of Major General Emory Upton / edited by Salvatore G. Cilella Jr.
Description: First edition. | Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 2017. | Series: Voices of the Civil War | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Description based on print version record and CIP data provided by publisher; resource not viewed.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016053766 (print) | LCCN 2017011693 (ebook) | ISBN 9781621903383 (pdf, vol. 1) | ISBN 9781621903451 (pdf, vol. 2) | ISBN 9781621903376 (printed case, vol. 1: alk. paper) | ISBN 9781621903444 (printed case, vol. 2: alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Upton, Emory, 1839-1881—Correspondence. | United States—History—Civil War, 1861-1865—Personal narratives. | United States—History—Civil War, 1861-1865—Campaigns. | Generals—United States—Correspondence.
Classification: LCC E181.U73 (ebook) | LCC E181.U73 A4 2017 (print) | DDC 973.7/8092 [B] —dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016053766

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FOREWORD

The Voices of the Civil War series strives to bring to its readership primary source subjects that embrace the "Long Civil War." Our recent publication, *Memoirs of Lieut.-General Winfield Scott*, brings breadth in decades leading up to the conflict. Scott's service spanned from the War of 1812 into the Mexican-American War and culminated with the Civil War. Although "Old Fuss and Feathers" had resigned in 1861, his military acumen remained sharp, demonstrated with his Anaconda Plan that contributed to overall Union victory; the general plied his craft in the field, taught it in the classroom at West Point, and wrote extensively on the tactics he employed during a long and distinguished career. This new two-volume collection, *Correspondence of Major General Emory Upton*, painstakingly researched and expertly edited by Salvatore G. Cilella Jr., exemplifies our mission in broadening the context of the war through contemporary voices outside the traditional war year parameters of 1861 through 1865. Indeed, Upton's correspondence forges into post-bellum America and advances studies of the "Long War" since Upton's innovations were practiced well into the twentieth century.

As Winfield Scott's career ended within the war's first year, a young Emory Upton's ascension had begun. Scott even contributed in Upton's rise, as after the firing on Fort Sumter the old general approved the cadet Upton's May graduating class so they might assist in ending hostilities. Much like his forbearer, Emory Upton would become a recognized warrior, teacher, and scholar; both men deeply contemplated military doctrine and wrote army manuals, although Upton diverged from Scott by being a much more progressive advocate in military reform, whereas Scott dabbled in a career Upton disdained—politics. Scott and Upton also share an under-appreciation in scholarship by historians despite being highly revered in their day. As Professor Timothy D. Johnson has done with the series volume on Scott, Salvatore Cilella helps correct the neglect in scholarship on Upton by bringing him back to the forefront with this magnificent collection. Cilella's dogged research pieces together a life that had been separated in numerous archives, historical societies, libraries, and other holdings. The introduction and chapter summaries afford the reader background knowledge in setting the stage, and he also brings an objective editor's touch in examining Upton. Meticulous notes critique the small number of both dated as well as modern biographies.

Simply one volume could not encompass the wealth of correspondence of this trans-generational figure essential in the study of the Civil War. Thus, the work is divided; the first volume covers Upton's military schooling, the Civil War, and his superintendency at West Point to 1875; the second volume focuses primarily on Upton's once in a life time worldwide tour. Commissioned by Army Commanding General William T. Sherman to the study of militaries of Asia and Europe in order to evaluate the United States under a larger lens, Upton's conclusions are illuminating, and his military assessment of other countries is poignant even in the present day.

Born near Batavia in 1839, Emory Upton was reared in western New York's "Burnt Over District," one of the more inspirational places of the nineteenth century. His childhood farm was nestled along the transcendental center of revivals in religion, politics, society, and culture. Ante-bellum visionaries in the area sought reform and consolation in temperance, abolition, egalitarian rights, and Utopian societies. Upton, through familial connections, followed one of the "fathers" of the Second Great Awakening, Charles Grandison Finney, to Ohio in order to study under him while at Oberlin College. Young Upton had a brief stint at Oberlin, but it was nonetheless influential as it prepared him for his dream of being admitted into West Point. At West Point, Upton's letters called for a more spiritual and united country, while indicating disdain for Mormonism, intemperance, political corruption, and slavery. Upton's hate towards the latter had been cultivated at home and at Oberlin, where he openly declared himself an abolitionist, although such admittance put him at odds with some of his fellow classmates at West Point. Words turned into violence, culminating in an epic fight between Upton and South Carolinian Wade Hampton Gibbes. When Gibbes' native state left the Union, Southern cadets followed. The Civil War would offer young cadets on both sides advancement beyond West Point, but the cost would be dear. Consequently, Upton graduated eighth in the May class of 1861 but would prove himself to be ranked much higher as a leader in battle. Indeed, the young officer looked every bit the part of a soldier as he stood at nearly six feet with an athletic frame that exuded both confidence and arrogance. Upton concealed a double action Adams Dean revolver in his frock, but would eventually graduate to a Colt .45, his last weapon of choice.

Emory Upton first served as an artillery officer, reputedly having orders to fire the first salvos in the opening cannonade that led to Bull Run. The twenty-one-year-old Lieutenant also received a wound at that opening battle in Virginia, the first of three times he was injured in action. The resilient New Yorker also saw action during the Peninsula and Maryland campaigns, and, as a result, his praiseworthy service coupled by military connections led him to be promoted to command the 121st New York Volunteers. At this point, his next climb up the military ladder crossed into service with the infantry. The new colonel was at Fredericksburg, and fortunately for him, his flank avoided the assaults up

Marye's Heights. But, Upton did take part in Burnside's Mud March. Upton saw action at Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, and the Wilderness—he was seemingly in every major battle in the eastern theater—but his trajectory changed in history forever with the Overland Campaign at Spotsylvania in 1864. It was there, at what Confederates thought was an impenetrable entrenchment known as the Mule Shoe salient, that the twenty-four-year-old Upton fearlessly led an "innovative" Union attack by guiding a compact, rushing columnar bayonet charge. Speed, maneuverability, and surprise was its intention. With orders not to stop and fire during the main rush, the columnar kept their weapons loaded for reserve until the final breach was made into the enemy line. The breakthrough was complete and prisoners were taken, but unfortunately for Upton miscommunication in troop support required to hold the captured ground doomed their efforts, and the men wavered back. Upton, who was on horseback, suffered a wound in the assault, but he was not totally disheartened, eventually being promoted to brigadier general by Ulysses Grant for his leadership and bravery. Two days after Upton's charge, Grant, with better support and coordination, supervised a similar assault at the Bloody Angle with more success. The new maneuver would further evolve, becoming a cross-generational tactic, and while Upton never claimed to invent the rushing columnar assault, he was one of the first to lead it to success. Some historians claim this was a defining moment of the Civil War, a prime example of its transformation into modern warfare. Rushing through "no man's land" and breaking through entrenchments in Civil-War Virginia would be utilized in European battlefields during the Great War in places such as Marne, Verdun, and the Somme.

From the fall of 1864 through the summer of 1865, Upton took on new challenges and a new branch of service when he relocated to the cavalry. Under the command of Phillip Sheridan, Upton was tasked with forcing Jubal Early out of the Shenandoah Valley. At the Battle of Winchester, Upton was severely injured in the leg; after his recovery he was reassigned to the Western theater. There, he led a division in Wilson's raid in Alabama and Georgia. Again Upton's influence on modern warfare can be seen in his targeting Southern factories and especially iron furnaces. Utilizing Spencer repeating rifles and quick, guerilla-style strikes throughout his Western Theater raids, Upton distinguished himself with his ability to adopt technology, stress the importance of firepower, and remain mobile. As the Civil War drew to a close, the capture of high profile Confederate officials became a priority. Upton was called to help track down the Confederate cabinet, including Jefferson Davis. At the end of hostilities, Major General Emory Upton focused on his writing and application of arms. His 1867 *Manual of Tactics* was accepted as the standard for the military of the day, drawing from his experiences during the Civil War, especially changes in his "system of fours," an aggressive use of an independent fighting unit that would resemble the more modern day squad. He also celebrated his first and only marriage. But, like so

many things in Upton's personal life, his marriage was short lived, losing his new bride in 1870 after only two years of marriage. That same year, he rededicated himself to West Point, guiding the military school from 1870–1875 as commandant of cadets. During his tenure, he had to discipline students, attempt to acclimate African-Americans cadets, and conduct a prominent faculty search after the high-profile suicide of Professor Dennis Hart Mahan, who threw himself into a paddle-wheeler on the Hudson River.

The second volume of *Correspondence of Major-General Emory Upton* delves into his communiqués from 1875 until his death in 1881. This volume highlights Upton's travels as he toured the globe, and the reader gains a wealth of social, cultural, and military perspectives from Upton's point of view. The international trip was initiated at the request of the Commanding General of the US Army William T. Sherman, who asked Upton to leave his post at West Point in order to observe various militaries in Asia and Europe. He spent a year and a half in his pilgrimage of Asia, visiting Japan, China, India, Afghanistan, Persia, and Turkey; he then ventured off to Europe, including visits to various cities such as Messina, Palermo, Rome, Florence, Sicily, Geneva, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, and Hanover. It was an extraordinary experience as Upton gained a global perspective on the operational, strategic, and tactical levels from armies across the world. In his 1877 official report, Upton indicated the "unpreparedness" of the United States should international war occur, a sentiment undoubtedly heightened considering his views on the necessity of a strong standing army. Upton was Eurocentric in his evaluation, with subtle overtones of prejudice against non-Christian values in Asia. In Europe, Upton saw the French military becoming more obsolete, while in Germany the Prussian military model was on the rise. He specifically feared potential threats by England, Spain, and Mexico. With his report to Sherman finalized in 1877, Upton moved on to other writing projects and reform endeavors.

In 1878, Upton hoped to transfer his writings into tangible reforms. With the help of Ohio Representative James Garfield, they attempted to legislate many of the changes that Upton advocated. Their assault was also backed by Senator Ambrose Burnside, with the final proposed bill bearing his name. The Burnside Bill, mined from Upton's world report, called for sweeping changes in the military and encouraged radical changes in the army, such as reorganization with expansible volunteer militia that would augment a strong standing army, quick promotion for young officers who showed potential, evaluations of such promotions, and military oversight by a general staff. The Burnside Bill was defeated in 1879, however, due in part to Republicans demurring over funding concerns in an era of costly Civil War pensions and in part to the recalcitrance of Democrats who were still jaded by army occupation in the South. But, in time, portions of Upton's recommendations would be undertaken and can still be seen in America's modern military machine. In the meantime, Upton had been diligently working on his *History of American Military Policy of the United States*, where he

detailed tactics, strategy, and operational efforts in trying to better the United States' army model and heavily criticizing over-controlling politicos. By 1880, Upton went back to teaching, heading to Virginia's Fortress Monroe where he supervised artillery training, coming full circle in teaching in the branch where he had started his career. He was then stationed in San Francisco at the rank of Colonel in the 4th Artillery. At the Presidio, with intensifying pain from then-inexplicable headaches, Upton plummeted into depression. On the night of March 14, 1881, he put his Colt revolver to his head and pulled the trigger—he was just forty-one years old.

Emory Upton became the most prominent military reformer of his day, leading a crusade he never would fully realize. With the same vehemence espoused by zealots born from the Burnt Over District, he became an intellectual visionary in his own right. But even more so, he demonstrated that he was a Civil War soldier ahead of his time—he not only philosophized on thought provoking advancement in tactics, he practiced them, exhibited at the Mule Shoe and Wilson's Raid. His "system of fours" bore resemblance to the squads of modern warfare, and his volunteer militia in an expansible army was a forerunner to the Army Reserve Corps. Fortunately, his *Military Policy of the United States* was published posthumously in 1904 after it fell into the hands of Secretary of War Elihu Root. That publication further cemented a legacy that was comparable to other prodigious if not provocative American military minds, such as Alfred Thayer Mahan on the sea or Billy Mitchell in the air. Posterity has also placed him in the conversation with well-known European military thinkers, namely Karl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini. Upton, using the Civil War as his platform, commanded at the division, brigade, and regimental levels, in three branches of service, and was injured three times in action; his intrinsic leadership skills and intuition in battle counters him taking his own life. Though he died too young, an Uptonian spirit carried his legacy into a new century of warfare.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Over the past several years, I have become indebted to several dedicated archivists and fellow historians. Susan Conklin, Genesee County historian and records management officer, and Judy A. Stiles, research assistant and genealogist at the Genesee County History Department in Batavia, New York, dragged out Upton photographs, genealogical charts, and histories that proved invaluable. Their trove contains hidden treasures of original source material on Emory Upton and his extended family. Thanks also to Patrick Weissend, former director of the Holland Land Office Museum, Jeffrey Donohue, current director of the museum, and Ashley Bateman, Donohue's assistant, for access to seventy-five "new" Upton letters. The Holland Land Office Museum also owns Upton's cadet uniform, as well as his saddle, the trunk he used on his world tour, and a calling card case presented to him by General Grant. The Upton homestead still stands in West Batavia, appropriately located on Upton Road, just off State Route 33 West.

Patrick Kerwin of the Library of Congress led me through the Upton letters in the William T. Sherman Papers, James A. Garfield Papers, William Conant Church Papers, John Schofield Papers, Fred Sanborn Papers, E. N. Gilpin Papers, Adam Badeau Correspondence, Thomas Jenckes Papers, and James H. Wilson Papers. Kerwin also provided access to one letter Upton wrote to Colonel Daggett of the 5th Maine.

Nearly all of Upton's correspondence in the National Archives is in his personnel file. Archivists Deanne Blanton, Dennis Edelin, and Rebecca Sharp helped me navigate the subtleties of the paper and microfilm resources in the archives.

I am grateful to my wife's cousins Gen and Mike Timpane for generous use of their condo in Arlington, Virginia, making travel into Washington easy and affordable. And above all else, I am obligated to my wife, Marifred, for reading, gently correcting and, in the end, improving my writing.

I am indebted to Ed Richi, curator of printed materials, for his help with the Delaware Historical Society's James Harrison Wilson Papers, which contain Upton letters.

Upton's extensive correspondence with Henry A. DuPont is in the Hagley Museum and Library in Wilmington, Delaware. Reference librarian Lucas Clawson scanned all of Upton's letters to DuPont.

The Throop and Martin Family Papers at Princeton University Library hold much important material related to Emily Martin and her extended family, including several letters Upton wrote to Emily from December 1868 until her death on March 30, 1869. They speak volumes to Upton's humanity and his love for his wife—qualities unseen in most accounts of his life and accomplishments. This correspondence is so extensive that it deserves a separate volume—Upton wrote to Emily almost daily over an eight-month period. Thanks to Anna Lee Pauls for providing scans of the Martin papers.

I am beholden to special collections librarian Thomas Mullusky, curator and collection director Sandra Trenholm, and office manager Maribel Diaz at the New-York Historical Society's Gilder Lehrman Collection for providing copies of the Upton-Martin nuptials. In the New York State Library, archivists Monica Gray and Jack McPeters, researcher Coreen Hollenbeck, and former archivist Bob Arnold helped me navigate the adjutant general's correspondence dating from 1862 to 1866.

West Point holds Upton's papers from his time as a cadet and as commandant of cadets in its archives, manuscript collection, and museum. Thanks to Suzanne Christoff, associate director for special collections and archives, Susan Lintelmann, curator of manuscripts, and Alicia Mauldin, manuscript archivist, for pointing me in the right direction and patiently answering my questions. Reference librarian Alan Aimone shared his large collection of eclectic academy materials gathered over the years. At the museum, I am indebted to Les Jensen, military curator, Gary Hood, art curator, and Marlana Cook, registrar, for providing photocopies and scans of letters donated by the Upton family.

The US Army Heritage and Education Center (USAHEC) has Upton materials, as do the New York Public Library, the Massachusetts Historical Society, the University of Chicago, and the University of Iowa. Thanks to Wiley Sword of Atlanta for sharing a letter written after the Battle of Salem Church in which Upton discusses new recruits for the 121st New York Volunteers. Other Upton letters remain in private hands and occasionally come up for sale.

Others who generously gave their time were Paul A. Cimbala, professor, Fordham University History Department; Christine Colburn, reader services manager, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago; Perry Frohne of Oshkosh, Wisconsin, and Michael Medhurst of Overland Park, Kansas, dealers extraordinaire; Kelly Frost, research librarian, Newberry Library; Catherine Hanson, reference librarian, California State Library; Meg Henderson, senior library associate, and Dr. John Marszalek, executive director and managing editor, Ulysses S. Grant Association, Mississippi State University; Kathryn Hodson, Special Collections Department manager, University of Iowa Library; Keith Knox, Kentucky Department for Libraries and Archives; Debbie Lyons and Ann Marie Schlindweir, Blasco Public Library; Helen Mathews, librarian, Kenan Archives, Atlanta History Center; Tal Nadan, reference archivist, Manu-

scripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library; James Prichard, reference desk, Special Collections, The Filson Historical Society; Ted Reilly, archivist, New-York Historical Society; and Robert Zabawa, autograph dealer, Hilton Head, South Carolina.

Thanks also to Michigan congressman (Sixth US Congressional District) and Upton descendant Fred Upton and his relative Dr. Ed Atwood of St. Joseph, Michigan. Dr. Atwood shared some family stories with me, particularly the tale of the standoff with Cadet Gibbes of South Carolina.

Finally, I want to thank UT Press and acquisitions editor Thomas Wells, who believed in this project from the beginning and vigorously promoted the final two-volume product.

INTRODUCTION

I. A Professional Soldier's Life

According to Henry David Thoreau, "Most men live lives of quiet desperation and go to the grave with the song still in them." Not Emory Upton. In only forty-two years, Upton experienced action and responsibilities denied most men enjoying much longer lives. But who exactly was Emory Upton, and why should we care about what he wrote? Upton's biographer Peter Smith Michie perhaps best answers these questions: "The pages of his life's history lie open before us. His letters as a boy, as a military student, an active soldier, and a traveler in foreign lands, are happily preserved and not one being written for the public eye, they give us an insight into his real nature and all record a clean, pure, and spotless life."[1]

Upton's people were Yankees, strict Methodists, likely Whigs, and descendants of Scotch Presbyterians who had settled near Salem, Massachusetts, in the seventeenth century. New Hampshire native Daniel Upton married Electa Randall of Danville, Vermont, in Stafford, Genesee County, New York, on September 30, 1821. They settled in the "unbroken forest" of the town of Batavia. Within a year, Electa had the first of her thirteen children born between 1822 and 1846. Emory, the tenth child and sixth son, was born on August 27, 1839. Nearly every one of Emory Upton's siblings is mentioned in his letters.[2]

Upton stood "five feet eleven, blonde and blue-eyed," weighing "170 pounds, always in perfect condition." James Wilson calls his life "a tour de force of heroic action." He never "wasted a word in conversation and never was interested in anything but his profession." Upton's brothers "were tall, blonde, strong, active men of nervous-sanguine temperament, quick perceptions, quick actions, logical, forensic disposition, high ideals, forward looking habit and Christian life." Napoleon's biography convinced Upton that a soldier's destiny awaited him, and his view of the world and devotion to sacrifice and the greater good made him a quality soldier and astute officer.[3]

Upton finished eighth in a class of forty-five upon graduating from West Point in May 1861, only a month after the outbreak of the Civil War. He served as a twenty-one-year-old second lieutenant in the Fourth United States Artillery at the First Battle of Bull Run. Through his good record during the Peninsular

Campaign and Antietam and his friendship with fellow New Yorker Maj. Gen. Henry Slocum, Upton received his first regimental command. The 121st New York Volunteer Infantry, recruited in the summer of 1862, answered Lincoln's call for three hundred thousand volunteers. New York governor Edwin Morgan recruited US congressman Richard Franchot to raise a regiment of one thousand men, and he did so in sixty days. The regiment joined the newly formed Sixth Corps. Ineptly leading his raw troops into the field, Franchot realized his limitations and resigned in September 1862, returning to Congress. Newly minted Colonel Upton assumed his responsibilities in October 1862, drilling and training the 121st into a fit and fighting infantry unit. Within a year, the men of the proud regiment called themselves "Upton's Regulars." Northern newspapers referred to them by the same name.

Emory Upton's letters reveal a multifaceted individual. A caring family man, he was at once flawed and brilliant, vain and humble, and he suffered, rejoiced, and laughed. Before the Battle of Fredericksburg, Upton slept with his men in a windswept, frozen field. Although his practical nature drew him to useful disciplines, he insisted on martial music on the intense forced march to Gettysburg in order to maintain his troops' morale.

At Fredericksburg on the army's left flank, the 121st was not involved in the suicidal assaults on Marye's Heights. It survived Burnside's Mud March in January 1863 and the ruinous winter camp of 1862–63. The regiment suffered its highest casualties during the Chancellorsville Campaign at Salem Church on Sunday, May 3, 1863. In a disastrous frontal assault on Confederate infantry entrenched just beyond the church, the 121st lost nearly half its able-bodied men available for combat. The outfit left New York numbering one thousand strong; disease and desertions cut it in half. It entered the engagement at Salem Church with 453 men. Casualties cut the regiment in half again. Upton's brother Henry, who joined his command, was seriously wounded.

At Gettysburg, the 121st and most of the Sixth Corps were held in reserve. There, Upton received a promotion to brigade commander, and for several months, without the benefit of being promoted to brigadier general, he served as both regimental and brigade commander. On November 8, 1863, he led a brilliant twilight raid at Rappahannock Station. For this endeavor, he was made brevet major of volunteers. During the Overland Campaign, Upton participated in the Battle of the Wilderness on May 5, 1864. He led an innovative attack on the Confederate salient with an assaulting column of twelve regiments (including the 121st New York) at Spotsylvania on May 10. The attacking column was not supported, forcing Upton to retreat after penetrating the Confederate lines. He did not invent the columnar attack; he successfully executed it. He was made brevet Lieutenant Colonel in the Regular Army for the Overland Campaign.

Upton's brigade was engaged at Cold Harbor on June 1 but not during the disastrous assault on June 3. The generals leading the army during the battle en-

raged him with their inept leadership. With the rest of the Union soldiers, Upton and his brigade settled down at Petersburg until Grant ordered the Sixth Corps on troopships to Washington to repel Jubal Early's threat in midsummer.

Once that threat was deflected, Grant sent the Sixth Corps to the Shenandoah Valley. There, while commanding a division of infantry at the Battle of Opequan Creek (Winchester), Upton suffered a severe leg wound on September 19, 1864. He was carted off the field still giving orders to his troops during the eventual Federal victory. That day he was brevetted colonel in the regular army for gallant and meritorious services, and brevet major general of volunteers. Upton's infantry experience confirmed his reservations about and deepened his dislike of politicians and their interference in the war.

As he recuperated, Upton took command of the Fourth Cavalry Division under Maj. Gen. James H. Wilson during closing operations in Alabama and Georgia in February 1865. Wilson deployed 13,500 men "to destroy the Confederate ability to make war from the Southwest."[4] Upton led victorious Union cavalry troops capturing Selma, Alabama, and Columbus, Georgia, and participating in the hunt for Jefferson Davis as Davis and his entourage fled west. "Upton's dazzling career as a writer and proponent of a modern army for the United States," Stephen Ambrose wrote, "has obscured his important experience as a Civil War officer, which strongly influenced his later contributions."[5]

By war's end Upton had been wounded three times and had served in all three branches of the army. In a reduced postwar army, he was commissioned a captain in the Fifth Regiment of Artillery on February 22, 1865, and brevetted brigadier general, United States Army on March 13, 1865, for gallant service at Selma. He also received the brevet of major general, United States Army for services in the field during the war. In July and August 1865, Upton commanded the First Cavalry Division in the District of East Tennessee, and he was a commander in the District of Colorado from August 22, 1865, until April 30, 1866, when he was mustered out of volunteer service. In the reorganization he became lieutenant colonel, Twenty-fifth US Infantry on July 28, 1866.

By 1867, Upton's *Manual of Tactics* was officially adopted by the military, setting off an immediate firestorm from the old guard. *Army Navy Journal* editor William Conant Church gave free rein on his pages to wide-ranging conversations over the new rules. "Exceedingly interested" in the debate, Upton nevertheless rose above it. Upton was so convinced that his system was correct that he refused to rebut his critics.

On February 19, 1868, Upton married Emily Martin, a frail young woman from upstate New York who died two years later on March 30, 1870. Upton never remarried. Instead he re-dedicated himself to the military. On July 1, 1870, he became commandant of cadets at West Point, a post he held for five years. He also served as a member of a "board to assimilate the tactics" in 1873, when the army accepted his infantry system, modified for artillery and cavalry.

During his tenure, Upton dealt with three "crises" involving cadets. The first involved misconduct by three students in the first class and several members of the fourth-year class who resorted to vigilante justice. It received widespread attention, including a congressional investigation. The second involved James Webster Smith of Connecticut, the first black cadet, who began his school year on July 1, 1870, just as Upton arrived. For the next four years, Smith proved "troublesome." Several "incidents" in 1870 and 1871 led to his dismissal in 1874. In the third case, Henry Flipper, the remaining black cadet at the academy, complained that, based on caste rather than race, he was shunned by his classmates. Reportedly, Upton was the only officer who counseled Flipper when he thought Flipper would leave school. This action impressed the young cadet. Upton never mentions either Smith or Flipper in any extant correspondence.[6]

On June 30, 1875, at the behest of General of the Army William T. Sherman, Upton left West Point and spent the next eighteen months on a world tour observing the training and tactics of Asian and European armies. The previous September, Sherman had visited the academy and suggested to Upton that a "military tour through Asia" might be beneficial "to the service." According to Upton, the object of the tour was to observe the armies and report his findings to "the Government in an official report." Sherman was not interested in European armies—they were over studied. Sherman was more concerned with Asia. He asked Upton "to spend as much time as possible in Calcutta." As a result, Upton spent more time in Asia, particularly India, than he did anywhere else. He spent four weeks each in Japan, China, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Serbia, and Germany; six weeks in Persia, mostly on horseback traversing the difficult terrain; and three weeks in France and Great Britain. Perhaps because of Sherman's directions, there are far fewer letters from Europe. There is no correspondence to Sherman during Upton's entire trip.[7]

The tour was enlightening and revealing. Upton was able to understand different tactics and strategies and changing technology on military operations. He also realized the inadequacy of American military policy and preparations for a major war. Although he diligently studied before his long trip, Upton possessed no in-depth expertise regarding each nation's traditions and cultures—particularly the Asian nations. His education, like most Americans', was Eurocentric. Although he touched on political matters in each country, Upton was most comfortable when he was reporting on the armies' tactics and strategies.[8]

Upon returning to the States, Upton served as superintendent of artillery training at Fort Monroe from 1877 to 1880. He published his report on the armies in 1878. Upton had planned a longer manuscript containing a history of the American military. But for a host of reasons, he decided to publish the history separately. It wasn't until 1904 that Secretary of War Elihu Root published Upton's manuscript as *The Military Policy of the United States*. Upton became colonel of the Fourth Artillery at the Presidio in 1880. He committed suicide on March 14, 1881.

Upton's contemporaries and modern historians have molded our understanding of his personal and professional life. In 1885, just four years after Upton's death, West Pointer Peter Smith Michie published his elegiac *Life and Letters of Emory Upton*.[9] The work repeats a tale from the Reverend Father O'Reilly, a friend of Upton's at Oberlin. According to Michie, O'Reilly described Upton's quirks of sleeping without a pillow, avoiding nuts that might ruin his teeth, and eschewing any habit that might prove detrimental to his admittance to West Point. O'Reilly also noted Upton's poor handwriting, fear of public speaking, simultaneous opposition to slavery and silence on abolition, abstention from sex and profane language, and dislike of art and music (and anything deemed impractical).[10]

In his introduction to Michie's work, General Wilson describes Upton as a man with no flaws, a loyal, honest, sincere, obedient, "pure and upright," modest, unassuming, and "god fearing [*sic*] Christian." These words began the branding of the man who came to be known as an innovative tactician and shaper of American military policy. Wilson effusively refers to Upton as the equal or better of obscure military thinkers such as Louis Lazare Hoche, a late-eighteenth-century French Revolutionary; Louis Charles Antoine Desaix, another French general and military leader; and Mikhail Dmitirevich Skobelev, a hero of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78. Wilson ends his eulogy as follows: "He was a credit to the State and family, which gave him his birth, to the Military Academy which educated him, and to the Army in which he served. So long as the Union has such soldiers as he to defend it, it will be perpetual." Equally lavish in his memoirs, Wilson calls Upton "an incomparable soldier," stating, "With three years of unbroken success he had become widely known as one of the most accomplished and aggressive soldiers of his time."[11]

A review of Michie's biography in the periodical *Science* endorsed Upton's "sanctification." The reviewer predicted, "Upton's name, as years roll by, will be honored more and more as one of the greatest tacticians of modern times." In an analogy from which Upton would have recoiled, the reviewer compared him to Stonewall Jackson, who also "developed a religious life of the purest and most lofty type." Moreover, the reviewer predicted that not only scholars but "all students of history," including statesmen, would benefit from Michie's life of Upton.

Another review called Upton a "raw, awkward, freckle faced, sober, solemn country lad . . . as far as possible from the ideal gay, light-hearted, dashing cadet." That reviewer likened Upton to Charles George "Chinese" Gordon, the heromartyr and zealous religious fanatic of the Battle of Khartoum. One historian blamed Upton's lack of humor on his early years "growing up in the Burned Over District of upstate New York, noted for its religious and reforming zeal." According to this scholar, "He [Upton] had no amusements, which obviously contributed to his productivity."[12]

Eighty years later, American historian Stephen Ambrose penned a biography of Upton entitled *Upton and the Army*, published by Louisiana State University

Press in 1964 and still in print. Ambrose borrowed liberally from Michie's biography. David Fitzpatrick's recent articles and 1996 dissertation, "Emory Upton: The Misunderstood Reformer," are the most thoughtful and critically informed treatises on Upton. Ambrose, Fitzpatrick, and other recent writers rely heavily on Michie's transcriptions of Upton's letters.[13]

II. Upton's Intellectual Legacy

Today's average American citizen has never heard of Emory Upton. That was not so during and immediately after Upton's life. Between Upton's death in 1881 and the twentieth century, military policy was fiercely debated in the military and the popular press, and Upton's ideas were often central to the arguments. His letters and writings provoked a wide range of discussion over military and, inevitably, civilian issues.

Upton offered solutions to army problems in existence since the country's inception: the need for professionalism, military readiness, more formal education for officers, early retirement, and a clear understanding of the chain of command. As a result, writers have chosen bits and pieces of Uptonian philosophy to either attack him or advance a specific agenda. The literature is copious, and for nearly every reform Upton proposed to modernize the army, a critic or supporter has either rebutted or defended the position. In the effort to understand Upton's impact on American military policy, historians have placed him against the benchmarks of two major European military thinkers—Prussian major general Karl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) and Swiss general Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779–1869).

During Upton's time at West Point, Jomini was taught but Clausewitz was not. Their philosophies of war, like Upton's, are complex, and reducing them to a mere few phrases does not do them justice. In relation to Upton, however, it is sufficient to say that Jomini believed that war was an art and not a science. Yet the vagaries and unknowns in the heat of battle depended on the courage and stamina of the participants—a heroic leader in a moment of dire circumstances could win the day. The American army of the last quarter of the nineteenth century was Jominian in spirit. As one historian remarks, in order to "accomplish Upton's reforms, the Government [*sic*] and officer corps had to plan for the long term commitments of men and resources, and this ran counter to the popular confidence in improvisation and heroics, so much a part of the American militia tradition and myth."[14]

Jomini advocated a superior force on a critical point at a critical time, a position with which General Sherman agreed. Jomini also insisted that war "could best be understood in terms of geometric angles and algebraic formulas," a position that Sherman found wanting. Sherman told West Point's 1869 graduating class, "There exist many good men who honestly believe that one may, by the aid

of modern science, sit in comfort and ease in his office chair, and with little blocks of wood to represent men, or even with figures and algebraic symbols, master the great game of war. I think this is an insidious and dangerous mistake." Fast-forward one hundred years to the era of the Johnson-McNamara "micromanagement" of the Vietnam War. One writer characterizes the duo as "the ultimate Jominians" who "never . . . heard of Jomini . . . pursued Jomini's mathematical approach to the war in Vietnam—to the point of disaster."[15]

Clausewitz firmly believed that war was an extension of politics—a position that Upton ignored. Clausewitz's explicit position variously states that "war is not a separate thing in itself but it is merely a special violent phase of human politics," or that "war is the continuation of state policy by other means." Clausewitz, translated into English in 1873, believed in the "trinity"—the people, the commander and his army, and the government. Missing one of those elements was disastrous to any military adventure.[16]

Upton's writings indicate that he was not aware of Clausewitz's trinity. He never cited Clausewitz in his books or letters. Upton's critics have interpreted his resolve for a professional army requiring an officer corps separate from the general public and not part of normal social intercourse. According to his detractors, Upton's concept of a professional army implied that peace was a separate entity from war—a concept foreign to Clausewitz. Upton's expansible army concept called for peacetime armies and wartime armies.[17]

From the beginning, the American founders grappled with the notion of a large standing army in peacetime. Washington and Hamilton tried to persuade the early Congresses, once under the Articles of Confederation and later under the new Constitution, to provide for the nation's defense by nationalizing the states' militias. Militias had exasperated Washington during the war. He stated that he merely wanted a good army, not necessarily a large one. Washington's and Hamilton's efforts culminated in the Militia Act of 1792, which gave the federal government very little command and control of volunteers, ceding that to the states. The 1792 act would vex military leaders until the Militia Act of 1903 superseded it, establishing the National Guard, finally nationalizing the concept of the volunteer soldier, and, in effect, relegating the militia to the states.

Historians have lumped army reform into the "right"—Hamilton, Calhoun, Upton, and Germans—and the "left"—Jefferson, Logan/Palmer, and the Swiss. Hamilton's vision of a large standing army was largely a product of his time during the quasi war with France. He, like his mentor, Washington, despised the militia. And, according to one recent scholar, an army led by Alexander Hamilton would assure its commander of greater things—like the presidency. John C. Calhoun advocated the notion of an expansible army that Upton adopted and modified. On the "left," Jefferson, civil war general John Logan and Gen. John McAuley Palmer (1870–1955) championed a democratic volunteer army that won the Revolution, the Civil War, and World Wars I and II. But military reform

was much more complex than two ideological camps. As one historian succinctly summarized the issues, our founding generation saw a standing army as "a menace to governmental institutions, but the reformers of the 1870's and 1880's [*sic*] were prepared to *accept* and *use* the army for *national* needs." They were less concerned about "military coups or dictatorships, about checks and balances, and more about such topics as efficiency, military education, and national prestige."[18]

As America began preparations to join the fighting in World War I, Upton's ghost was resurrected not only in the military press but also in the academic and popular presses. Columbia University published a limited series of papers by its professors under the general title *Columbia War Papers*. The pamphlets were devoted to the "problems and duties of American citizens in meeting the national needs in the present world conflict." The various papers carried quaint titles; many were concerned with the food supply, such as "Enlistment for the Farm," "City Gardens," "Bread Bullets," and "Farmers and Speculators." Others dealt with titles such as: "German Subjects within our Gates," "How to Finance the War," and "Why Should We Have Universal Military Service?" (pamphlet number thirteen). The last paper is compiled from the writings of Munroe Smith, Franklin H. Giddings, Frederic Louis Huidekoper, and Gen. Emory Upton.[19]

Using Huidekoper and Upton, Smith and Giddings argue that the only way to win the war is with a universal draft. The untrained volunteers, whom Upton argued against, were referred to as "other methods," producing "waste and inefficiency" which "[can] no longer be endured." Using Upton's arguments in *Military Policy of the United States*, the authors reason that America was to "make the citizen's fitness for service, rather than his impulse to serve, the measure of his obligation to his country." The authors agree that this notion ran counter to a long tradition of the citizen soldier, but they appealed to "every humane person who wants to minimize suffering by bringing the war to a speedy and successful end."[20]

Brig. Gen. John Henry Parker, a West Point man who made his reputation in command of the Gatling Gun Detachment of the Fifth Corps in the Spanish-American War, published *Trained Citizen Soldiery: A Solution of General Upton's Problem* in 1916. In this work, Parker paid homage to Upton, calling him "the most brilliant mind [the] military system has ever produced." But for Parker, Upton's "suggestions" were "too vague for practical use." One of Upton's recommendations was a living wage paid to the officer and the soldier. Parker thought that paying soldiers a living wage comparable to their civilian equivalent was a slippery slope to a mercenary army. Every American man is obligated to serve his country and be paid enough to live "decently." He proposed universal registration for able-bodied men between eighteen and forty-five years old. Parker endorsed the outmoded idea of paying for substitutes, but he abhorred the practice of paying draftees a bounty. He went further, advocating barring draftees from promotion and pension. The concluding chapter, entitled "Legislation," contains

Parker's version of a bill that would put his recommendations into law. There is no evidence that his ideas gained any traction with serious military strategists.[21]

As America prepared to go to war in Europe in 1916, a major in the Fifth New Jersey Infantry took issue with Edward Higginson of Boston, who wrote the *New York Times* wondering why the local militia was being called the National Guard. Maj. John Loveland told Higginson that the answer was "plain." Loveland declared that if Higginson had only read Upton's *Military Policy of the United States* and "Washington's state papers and letters in the early days of the nation, [would have seen] that the word 'militia' was almost a term of reproach." Similarly, "Where Upton Made His Big Mistake," a 1930 article in the *Infantry Journal* by Lieut. Col. R. M. Cheseldine of the Ohio National Guard, roundly criticized Upton for his negative views of the militia.[22]

Loveland's short retort indicates that he understood what many of Upton's detractors did not. Many of Upton's critics accused him of dismissing the volunteer army that saved the Union from 1861 to 1865 and, in fact, helped him achieve much of his military fame. Loveland told Higginson "No one doubts the patriotism, courage and willingness of the average citizen." Upton, Upton's admirers, and Loveland were not criticizing the volunteer soldier's love of country. They were criticizing his training by incompetent leaders and the interference in his duties by state politicians who controlled so many aspects of the military until the Civil War. Loveland stated that the National Guard was now better recruited, trained, and organized than the worthless militias of George Washington's time. Besides, with the National Defense Act of 1916, the militia was no longer under the states' control. In his *Bunker Hill to Bastogne*, historian Briton Busch pointed out that the Uptonians had scored a victory. The new force was called the National Guard and was under federal regulation.[23]

III. Modern Scholarship

In recent times, Upton has drawn the most attention from the military establishment. The major challenge facing the modern military scholar has been understanding Upton's views on any particular subject. At certain points, for example, Upton advocated eliminating the militia; then he decided that the Constitution prevailed. His views on a standing army probably provoked the most controversy. Upton's seeming embrace of the German staff system and army recruitment raised a firestorm of criticism. The quest for clarity on his views is marred by the fact that military history fell out of favor "around the turn of the twentieth century," when, according to a few modern scholars, it became "divorced from general American history and became the province of military professionals and gifted amateur historians with military interests."[24]

Modern military writers tend to categorize civilian and military leaders in either the Clausewitz or Jomini camps—whether or not these leaders were aware

of the two military theorists. In the autumn of 2003, Robert Cassidy hedged his bets in an article on the "Uptonian Paradox," arguing that Upton's influence and the Civil War caused a "fusion of Jomini and Clausewitz" and the "embrace of the Prussian-German military system as the ideal." Upton's insistence on a strict separation of military and civilian functions "imbued these ideas in the profession through institutions and journals. One result was that anything outside the core paradigm came to be viewed as aberrant and ephemeral." Cassidy does not imply that the current military's taste for large wars and lack of appreciation for smaller guerilla engagements like Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan will lead to the overthrow of its civilian leaders. Rather, Cassidy asserts that the military will tell the civilian masters which war it will fight and in what manner. He insists that this was "first manifested by Upton . . . and the first translation of Clausewitz."[25]

A plethora of recent professional articles invokes Upton. For example, in 2007 the Institute of Land Warfare in Arlington, Virginia, published a white paper entitled *The Texas Militia: National and Local Implications* that recaps Upton's efforts for militia reform and supports the continued need for state militias to handle statewide emergencies. Upton would have agreed with this position. As a new president took office in 2008, the Washington-based Center for Defense Information published *America's Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Reform for President Obama and the New Congress*. The first chapter traces the military's modern-day issues to the Founding Fathers and emphasizes Upton's attempts to professionalize the army. In 2003, the US Army War College's *Parameters* journal published "Prophet or Praetorians? The Uptonion Paradox and the Powell Corollary," which addresses the nexus of politics and war as espoused by Clausewitz. The article clearly delineates the paradox between a large Uptonian professional army established by the United States and the need for small mobile units arrayed to fight smaller counterinsurgency wars such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Military analyst Mackubin Thomas Owens, writing in 1985 about yet another Joint Chiefs of Staff reorganization, resurrects Upton's ghost as a precaution to those who do not understand the attempted reforms of the past and, therefore, will be doomed to repeat them. Writing in the *Wall Street Journal* in 2007 and the *Weekly Standard* in 2009, Owens declares that the army that entered Iraq "was still Emory Upton's army." He writes, "While the Army returned to constabulary duties after World War I, Upton's spirit now permeated the professional Army culture." According to Owens, World War II "vindicated Upton's vision" that continued through the Cold War, but the arrival of General Petraeus suggested a sea change for the army's way of doing business.[26]

Modern scholarship can arguably be traced to William A. Ganoe's *The History of the United States Army*, published in 1924. In his book Ganoe, a West Point graduate, focuses on six iconic figures in American military history: George Washington, Frederick von Steuben, Sylvanus Thayer, Winfield Scott, Emory Upton, and Arthur Wagner. Washington and Scott may have been household

names when the book appeared, but the others were not. The thrust of seven of his thirteen chapters echoes Ganoe's description of the last twenty-five years of the nineteenth century as the "Dark Ages"—a period he attributes to Upton and his disciples.

Upton critic and Harvard political scientist Samuel P. Huntington published *The Soldier and the State* in 1957. He argues that Upton's professional army officer became officially separated from society in the minds of military thinkers and writers. Prior to the Civil War, the army and the populace were in conservative harmony, but after the war they diverged. The general population became more liberal, while the army retreated into a conservative defensive position ready for any conflict, large or small. In a grand generalization, Huntington asserts that the army desired a bright, clear line between the military and politics. Like Upton, many officers thought that most politicians were corrupt and inherently evil. Although Huntington considered Upton an important military thinker, he still made a compelling case for the army's alienation from society in general.[27] The "professional army–isolated army" notion can be traced to Ganoe. Although Ganoe did not emphasize army officers' isolation, "he certainly talked of the tribulations of the army and society's general lack of interest."[28] Another historian argues that Huntington has "largely defined the academic debate on military professionalism and civil-military relations" for the last generation.[29]

Fitzpatrick comments, "Though Huntington is correct that Upton, to some degree, appreciated the manner in which certain decisions rested with India's civilian leadership, this was true primarily because Upton wanted to fix blame on politicians, not the military, for the military's actions in the civil sphere." Moreover, Upton also admired the manner in which the military operated semi-independently of civil authority and could intrude, if militarily justifiable, in civil affairs. Upton was not impressed by a military that was "a tool of the state."[30]

Russell Weigley, in his 1962 *Towards an American Army: American Military Thought from Washington to Marshall,* forcefully argues that Upton saw the lack of a standing professional army as a greater danger to a democracy than having no army or an ill-equipped, ill-trained militia. Traditionally, America had been leery of the concept of a standing professional army. But as Russell Weigley declares, the concept of the citizen soldier died with the Civil War. "Not a standing army, but the want of it, endangered democracy," Upton asserted. Weigley devotes half of *Towards an American Army* to the pall he believed Upton cast over the military well into the twentieth century. His characterization of Upton and his followers is gloomy and foreboding, thus following Ganoe's lead. Weigley incorrectly states that Upton had a brain tumor that hindered his ability to think clearly. Although Upton did not have a brain tumor, one cannot dismiss the pain and suffering he endured, regardless of the source. But by flatly pronouncing his medical diagnosis, Weigley hints that Upton was mentally unbalanced and on the verge of a breakdown. Upton's suicide was a logical conclusion based on such

an assumption.[31] In his 1967 *History of the United States Army,* Weigley blames Upton for inflicting lasting harm on current military thought by "demanding that the national institutions be adjusted to purely military expediency," rather than "shaping military institutions that would serve both military and national purposes."[32]

Though the Huntington and Weigley theses have prevailed for a half century, William B. Skelton and David Fitzpatrick have been in the forefront of challenging them. Both scholars have rehabilitated Upton's image with solid, insightful scholarship. Skelton's excellent treatise looks closely at antebellum civil-military relations and finds Huntington's analysis wanting. Skelton never mentions Upton. He attacks Huntington's position that a "Liberal Society" was directly opposed to the professional army and had acted as brake on a professional standing army. According to Huntington, it wasn't until the last half of the nineteenth century that army reformers like Upton isolated themselves from the pervasive hold of the liberal majority and found refuge in the military itself and in foreign armies, particularly Germany's. Skelton rebuts that conceit with ample evidence that "the key steps in the formation of the American profession of arms occurred a half century earlier than Huntington believed." Huntington saw the "liberalism" of the first half of the nineteenth century as inimical to military professionalism. Not so, Skelton argues. The military of the first half of the century was actually in isolation from "liberalism" through various social and professional channels, fixation on the French military system, and willingness to separate the military power from inevitable political storms.[33]

Fitzpatrick, on the other hand, has almost single-handedly rehabilitated the dour image of Upton offered by the Huntington-Weigley school of military history. First in his 1996 doctoral dissertation, "Emory Upton: the Misunderstood Reformer," then in his 2001 article "Emory Upton and the Citizen Soldier," and most recently in his 2013 article "Emory Upton and the Army of a Democracy," Fitzpatrick emphasizes Upton's patriotic impulses to strengthen the army to which he had given his life. Contrary to military history gospel of the past fifty years, Fitzpatrick argues (and Upton's letters bear him out) "Upton did not advocate an army organization that rejected the militia and volunteer experience, but rather one that built upon it, and one that he believed improved on it." Upton was confident that he could mold a fighting unit out of raw recruits using his experience as a regimental commander of the 121st New York Volunteers in 1862–63.[34]

The arguments over Upton's views of professionalism and a large standing army continue to prompt debate. In his 2003 *The War Within the Union High Command: Politics and Generalship During the Civil War,* Thomas Goss argues that Upton became the "self-appointed spokesman for the regular army," and "one of the foremost advocates for the professionalism of the officer corps" with a "reliance on an enlarged regular army." This generalization was the focus of historians until recently.[35]

In his 1981 *Military Review* article, Maj. Wallace Walker wonders whether the new all-volunteer army "made the armed services less socially representative and therefore complicated civilian control." He concludes by calling for modernization after Vietnam but continued containment of the Soviet threat. Echoing Weigley, Walker states, "The professional penchant for aloofness and brooding pessimism reflected by the writings of Upton over a century ago, and still evident today, will no doubt complicate the essential relationships which must be maintained" by the army and its civilian counterparts.[36]

Historian Samuel Watson admonishes today's historians, military theorists, and students of the late nineteenth century to get "beyond hyperbole about endless fears of standing armies." He argues that each incident of the military stepping beyond its boundaries must be viewed individually and within the context of the times. A confrontation between military leaders during or just after the Civil War cannot be compared to later points of friction during World War I or World War II. Fitzpatrick, in concluding that Upton remains a "Misunderstood Reformer," also argues strongly for examining Upton, his reforms, and the army all through the lens of nineteenth-century America and the world. Additionally, as one prominent military historian points out, Upton's reform suggestions took place in the context of an industrial and managerial revolution. Apparently these contexts have been ignored by many of Upton's critics.[37]

Johns Hopkins University professor Eliot A. Cohen argues that the demobilization following the end of the Cold War and the successful First Gulf War was a return to "Uptonian Hunker," a condition he describes as a turning inward by the military. Cohen believes that the only lesson Upton took away from his Civil War experiences was the fact that the "relationship between the United States and its Army" was insidious and had to be reformed. According to Cohen, Upton believed that American military policy was affected by irresponsible "legislative authority," a "democratic neglect of the armed forces," "irrational antimilitary prejudice," and "civilian interference" in "military operations." This is reading Upton in the extreme and much along the lines of the Huntington-Weigley camp. David Fitzpatrick concludes that most historians who consider Upton detrimental to the armed services do not consider Upton's original idea to write only one book about army policies and his trip abroad. These scholars also ignore published and unpublished correspondence that is now included in this book.[38]

What was perhaps Upton's most controversial proposal regarded professional army regulars. He was dismayed by the misdirection from politicians running the war and the blunders by politically appointed commanders of ill-trained volunteers. Although Upton praised militias, describing them as saviors of the nation, he believed in the republic, not the raw mob rule he witnessed during the war. He believed in federalizing the militia when necessary, not eliminating it. According to one recent historian, Upton's emphasis of the regular army over the militia endeared him to the officer corps, "especially the progressive minded who

wrote for them and read the professional journals." In every command he held during the Civil War, Upton was appalled by raw recruits' lack of discipline and training. If only twenty thousand regulars had been available at First Bull Run, he argued, the Confederates would have been "routed." These more experienced soldiers would have "settled the question of military resistance, and relieved us from the pain and suspense of four years of war." Unfortunately, that naïve statement focused only on manpower and not on any of the myriad of factors involved in armed conflict. As Walter Millis points out, such an assumption ignores the alteration of "one factor in a complex military-political equation while leaving all others unchanged."[39]

Professionalization of the officer corps slowly morphed into the notion that the group was antidemocratic and isolating the army from the general population. This concept, along with Upton's desire to emulate the German General Staff, set off alarm bells among those who thought his ideas threatened democracy. Civilian control of the American military has been a bedrock concept since the American Revolution. But as Fitzpatrick argues, the Burnside Bill's "alleged 'Prussian' nature went virtually unnoticed by politicians."[40]

Historian John Gates rebuts Huntington in "The Alleged Isolation of U.S. Army Officers in the Late Nineteenth Century," a 1980 article in *Parameters*. Using hard data from the adjutant general's reports over a thirty-year period, Gates disproves Huntington's isolation thesis. His research shows that the frontier did not isolate American soldiers from the urban populace. Edward Coffman stretches Upton's supposed isolation a bit too far when he contends that Upton was not isolated at all because of his connection with the powerful DuPont family. He weakly attributes this nugget of historical detail to Stephen Ambrose's *Upton and the Army*, which clearly shows that "however parochial his theories may have been, Upton was not isolated socially or physically from civilians."[41]

In a centennial assessment of Emory Upton, Maj. Andrew Bacevich argues that the notion of military-civilian segregation was fiction. He cites the number of outstanding military leaders who, during the 1920s and 1930s, effectively performed major civilian tasks in service to their country. According to Bacevich, these examples refute "Huntington's conclusion regarding the 'isolation forced upon the Military' during this period (1875–1900) 'by the hostility of a liberal society.'"[42]

IV. The Correspondence

Between 1852, when he wrote his first childlike letter that his sister kept, and 1881, when he wrote his final letter before committing suicide, Emory Upton produced countless letters, orders, reports, and articles, as well as three books. He addressed his family, future presidents, renowned Civil War generals, and former army comrades.

Upton's original letters in the Holland Land Office Museum (HLOM) and the Genesee County History Department (GCHD) reveal neither an angelic cadet nor a miscreant. Rather, he was a normal American youth away at school. Fitzpatrick's "Emory Upton: The Misunderstood Reformer" intimates Upton's humanity. Upton received demerits for "minor offenses such as 'trifling in ranks,' 'laughing in ranks,' and 'late at roll call.'" The "Register of Punishments" in the US Military Academy Archives reveals that authorities confined Upton to quarters in April 1861 for being at the "off limits" North Dock and in September 1860 for "visiting the wards of the hospital without permission." In the "Register of Delinquencies," Upton's list of offenses fills two single-spaced, oversized pages covering five years. Fitzpatrick concludes: "He was also not above committing more serious offenses such as throwing a snowball in the mess hall . . . perhaps this is also indicative of the possibility that he was not as humorless as is often thought."[43]

Close comparison of Upton's original letters with Michie's publication reveals the biographer's prejudice and motivation to paint Upton as a noble figure. Michie and, to a certain degree, Wilson managed to wring out much of Upton's humanity in an effort to portray him as pure and untainted by the world around him. As late as 1918, Wilson, in an interview with the *New York Times,* called Upton a "saint." He depicted Upton as one who "never knew a woman intimately until he was married, three years after the war, never drank liquor, never tasted tobacco, never used a profane word." He allowed that Upton "was pure" but not a "prude."[44]

On the contrary, Upton's letters reveal a man with a sense of humor and a clear attraction to the females in his life. A few allude to "beautiful young women" in or near his encampment. He mentions "receptions" where he mingled with the best and brightest of both sexes. Occasionally, he exhibits a flash of humor at unexpected moments. Writing from Bandar Abbas, Persia, on February 20, 1876, he humorously described the shah: "He wore a turban, a gray gown extending from his head to his feet, a white under-garment [*sic*] richly embroidered, and sandals. His bare feet were too large to enable us with truth, to quote the couplet 'Its little feet beneath its petticoat, like little mice stole in and out as if to fear the light' so I allowed my vision to quit this portion of his person in order to concentrate on his face which is said to be the handsomest in Asia, an exaggeration, I think at least a compliment only to kingly vanity."[45]

If Upton wrote from Oberlin, those letters remain missing. Most letters are to his sisters Maria or Sara, and a few are to his other siblings and his parents. In the infantry, Upton realized the incompetence of many of the army's commanders and the heavy political hand on the military, which he blamed for the substantial loss of men and matériel that haunted him the rest of his life. As James Wilson writes, Upton "saw much to condemn in the daily operations of the army, and the reader will not fail to note that his active mind poured itself out in criticism in his letters to his sister." Many of the letters and short notes are

included here because they have never been published. Other correspondence has been selected to counterbalance Michie, Wilson, Ambrose, and others. With a few exceptions—Upton's recollections of the Battles of Gettysburg and Spotsylvania—the letters appear in chronological order as written.[46]

After the war, Upton continued writing to his family. He added several well-known correspondents including Congressman James A. Garfield, a former general and eventual president. Michie included several letters to Upton's classmate Henry DuPont. He did not include letters to General Sherman or to James H. Wilson, with whom Upton exchanged nearly forty letters between 1867 and 1878. To date, no letters to General Grant have surfaced. Perhaps Michie's loyalty to both Grant and Upton precluded him from casting any unfavorable light on either of them. David Fitzpatrick believes that many of the "missing" letters (which have now come to light in the collections of the HLOM) might be "critical of Grant." So far, they have not proven so.[47]

While writing *Life and Letters*, Michie obtained access to letters Upton penned to his family. In 2005, the family donated seventy-five original letters to the HLOM. Transcripts of some of these letters, and of additional ones, are held nearby in the collections of the GCHD. Originals in both collections provide a more complete picture of Emory Upton. Many missives bear Michie's or Sara Upton's marginal notes in blue pencil. Michie's notations appear to be directions to the printer or to the transcriber of Upton's handwriting. Sara's are directions to Michie as to what she thought he ought to publish. James Wilson characterized the letters as written with "utmost freedom and unconsciousness . . . without the slightest expectation on his [Upton's] part that they would ever be collected or printed."[48]

In *Life and Letters*, Michie took liberties with Upton's correspondence. Annotations from Upton's sister Maria gave Michie carte blanche: "This letter illustrates his studious habits early formed, and his sister's appreciation of his privileges at West Point. Many of his letters can be used at your discretion." Another annotation from Sara Upton read, "This is confidential with you, Prof. M." *Life and Letters* never identifies Upton's correspondents, merely substituting the salutation "Dear Sister" or "Dear Brother." However, in introducing Upton's early West Point letters, Michie states that "extracts . . . to sister Maria give a reasonably true exhibit" of his training. Some of the transcribed letters in the GCHD add a first initial. Originals in the HLOM carry a full salutation. Most are addressed to Maria, and a few are written to Upton's sister-in-law Julia. Michie's work omits personal names for privacy, perhaps at the family's request. Sara probably typed the transcripts in the possession of the GCHD. They are double-spaced and comprise twenty-nine legal-sized pages. Comparisons to the originals at the HLOM verify that the transcripts are accurate and were obviously used by Michie. They were either returned to the family after publication, or they represent Sara's copies of the letters.[49]

Sara admitted that she had some difficulty with Upton's "long letters" and "often found it difficult to copy them" and attend to her other duties. At the same time, she confirmed her role as the keeper of Emory Upton's legacy, telling him, "You would smile if you could see how carefully I keep the originals in my possession. No sister would more carefully guard his hoarded treasures than I do your writings." [50]

Perhaps one of Michie's most egregious edits appears in Upton's September 2, 1864, letter with the salutation "My dear sister." Writing after the Overland Campaign, Upton has no harsh words for his Commander, U.S. Grant, but he states, "Meade and Burnside are stumbling blocks of too great magnitude to permit brilliant execution of any movement in which they may be implicated. I heartily wish they might be relieved." Michie's work omits the reference to Meade and Burnside, using instead "Others I could mention are stumbling blocks." Upton's original letter reveals that he was not above criticizing fellow West Pointers and the war effort. Michie's amendment exposes his bias toward portraying Upton as the warrior hero.

One letter that Michie did not have at his disposal is a November 13, 1863, missive describing the Battle of Rappahannock Station. A note at the bottom of the GCHD transcripts, presumably from Sara, states, "Prof. M. I have just discovered that the lost letter is a brief account of a battle given in full in the following letter but is the same substantially." On the upper right-hand corner of Upton's original letter in the HLOM collections, dated November 15, 1863, and written after Rappahannock Station, an annotation appears in which either Michie instructs the printer or Sara directs Michie to "copy entire letter." And on Upton's poignant letter written the day after the Battle of Gettysburg, heavy blue lines—Michie's or Sara's—are evident on both sides of the paper.[51]

Michie wrote Upton's biography to entice youths contemplating a military career. He believed that this goal gave him license to omit "much that was purely family interest." Yet these omissions reduce Upton's humanity. Michie also believed that Upton's military policy warranted a "wider publication." During a period when the US Military Academy and the US Army were under intense scrutiny, Michie and Wilson had obvious incentives to portray Upton and his relationship with both institutions in the best light possible.[52]

Upton's handwriting is the bane of scholars, and it was for his contemporaries as well. Brothers Ebenezer and Tom Gilpin, who were with Upton during the last days of the war, commented on his handwriting years later. In an 1878 letter to Tom, Ebenezer wrote that he has visited their former commander at Fort Monroe, and that Upton had written him thereafter. Enclosing Upton's letter, Ebenezer included the following warning for his brother: "You will see his chirography has not improved, since the time you tried to decipher his dispatch at Atlanta, turning it up all four ways, and finally asking him 'if it was poetry.'" Fortunately, Upton wrote most of his letters in pen and ink. Upton's failure to number many pages presents challenges to the modern scholar, especially since he often wrote long letters.[53]

Occasionally, Michie's published letters differ from the originals or from earlier transcriptions with no notice to the reader. Most changes are small and immaterial. Michie's editing gives greater weight to Upton's obsession with details, his devotion to God, and his extreme patriotism, particularly during his West Point days. Michie elevates many of Upton's sentiments, and he does not shy from putting words in Upton's mouth. As *Life and Letters* was published after Reconstruction, in 1885, the book tones down Upton's bitterness toward his southern classmates. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Reconstruction had slipped from the consciousness of the American public. Reunion and reconciliation became the bywords of the day. *Life and Letters* omits a February 1857 letter in which Upton tells his brother John of his hatred for secessionists.

Most of Upton's West Point letters to his sisters reveal a kinder, gentler nature. A small sample of Upton's voluminous correspondence with his wife Emily, located in the Princeton University Archives in the Throop and Martin Family Papers, is presented here. The two were separated more than they were together. Upton continually sought new climates to mitigate Emily's progressively debilitating condition, which was probably tuberculosis. Between August 3, 1868, and March 10, 1869, Upton wrote his wife sixty-seven letters, including two on January 19, 1869, showing his warmer, more emotional side. This correspondence gives credence to the argument that one of the causes for Upton's suicide was the loss of his wife just twenty-five months after they were married and a few months before he became West Point's commandant on July 1, 1870.

Stephen Ambrose erroneously declares that Michie painstakingly transcribed Upton's letters "without editing." Ambrose deems Michie's biography "full and balanced" and credits Michie for making his (Ambrose's) "task easier." According to Ambrose, "Michie sought to print as many of Upton's letters as possible, and he called on all of Upton's acquaintances for contributions." Ambrose claims to "have seen the manuscripts Michie used and checked them against printed versions." He further asserts, "Michie made some selections, but no changes in wording. The result was an *excellent* volume" (emphasis added). As a result, Ambrose accepts Michie and Wilson's descriptions of Upton and perpetuates them in his writings.[54]

Fitzpatrick finds Michie's portrayal lacking: "Unfortunately Michie's work, though reprinting valuable letters, is more hagiography than biography and provides little insight as to Upton's character and motivation." Fitzpatrick accurately calls Michie's work both "invaluable" and "incomplete." Until recently, Michie remained the only resource researchers and scholars could consult to understand Upton the man and soldier. As Fitzpatrick points out, Upton's five-year stint as commandant at West Point merits only three letters in Michie's book. That is factually true, but Michie's biography also includes excerpts from thirteen letters Upton wrote to Henry DuPont between 1870 and 1875. "Michie, in fact, did a great deal of editing of Upton's letters," Fitzpatrick acknowledges. He adds, "The

names of addressees often are omitted, names of people mentioned in the bodies of letters were deleted, and many letters were excerpted, thereby making it nearly impossible to gauge the context of much that was in them." Fitzpatrick concludes that, "given the 'missing' correspondence that does not appear in *Life and Letters*, Michie clearly made editorial decisions regarding which letters to reproduce."[55]

The letters and reports presented here have been edited to facilitate understanding but not manipulate meaning. In addition to transcribing Upton's occasionally illegible handwriting, it is necessary to "translate" the language and usage of nineteenth-century English and the exigencies of the battlefield for modern readers. For example, Upton rarely used paragraphs so as to avail himself of every inch of stationery. In this work, obvious break points in his conversation are set in paragraph form. He hyphenated words contrary to grammatical conventions. His hurried scrawls make it difficult to distinguish between periods and hyphens. A few letters in the Library of Congress and at the Hagley Museum and Library are relatively illegible, and they are so noted here. Upton used the old English double "ss" as "fs," as in "pafs." As did many soldiers from the front, Upton wrote up the sides of the paper and scribbled postscripts in a cramped space at the bottom, and occasionally ninety degrees across the original letter. Commas and periods have been inserted where he excluded them. Upton's fondness for semicolons has been remedied with commas. Common nineteenth-century practices such as writing "today" as "to day" have been modernized. Where Upton has underlined words for emphasis, these markings have been preserved. He occasionally used parentheses. Upton wrote three postwar letters in French to amuse himself and maintain fluency. An excerpt of one appears in *Life and Letters*, but Michie never reveals that the original was written in French.

The volumes of letters Upton wrote between 1856 and 1881 are scattered in repositories across the country. His correspondence with New York native and Janesville, Wisconsin, resident Thomas Howard Ruger are so dispersed. An 1854 graduate of West Point, Ruger had a distinguished Civil War career. After the war, he served as governor of Georgia, with the Freedmen's Bureau in Alabama, and as superintendent of West Point from 1871 to 1876. In June 2009, a large archive of Ruger's papers sold at auction for $6,462.50. Some of the letters Upton wrote to Ruger between 1870 and 1880 were reclaimed and passed on to the GCHD, but the remainder remains in private hands. Yale University's Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library has a collection of Ruger papers relating to his western service from 1879 to 1897.[56]

Upton's correspondence is also scattered throughout the National Archives. Most correspondence, on paper and microfilm and dated as early as 1864 and as late as 1881, is in the "Letters Received by the Office of the Adjutant General" series of Record Group 94. The letters' scattered locations are a monument to the War Department's continual reorganization and renaming of its various bureaus and departments. RG 94 also contains the regimental books of the 121st New

York Volunteers, and it is replete with general orders, special orders, promotions, demotions, logistical requests, and general correspondence—much of them over Upton's signature. Upton's ten official battle reports, which were published in *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, are part of RG 94 as well. An additional unpublished report is printed here.

The New York State Archives holds the Adjutant General's Office records from 1816 to 1896, covering 118 cubic feet and representing New York troops activity from 1861 to 1866. Until the 1980s, these records were stored in the New York State Adjutant General's Office and at West Point. According to the index for the adjutant general's correspondence and petitions, Upton generated thirty-one pieces of correspondence to the adjutant. Over the past 150 years, eighteen of these letters have disappeared, and many of the remaining thirteen are transcribed here for the first time with only the mundane omitted. Nearly all cover the period from October 1862 to mid-1864. Conspicuous by their absence are seven documents and letters from November 26, 1862—a critical time when Upton took command of the 121st, the Battle of Fredericksburg and Burnside's Mud March occurred, and the Army of the Potomac prepared for the spring campaign. The first extant Upton letter in the New York Archives is dated April 10, 1863, and the last is dated June 30, 1864.

Although every effort has been made to uncover as many Upton letters as possible, there are still letters to be found. When technology advances to the point that scholars can employ indices of the entire Upton corpus, a complete and definitive edition of Upton's letters will be available. Until then, Emory Upton's most important and formative letters and reports from 1857 to 1881 are included in these two volumes.[57]

Notes

1. Peter S. Michie, *The Life and Letters of Emory Upton, Colonel of the Fourth Regiment of Artillery, and Brevet Major-General, U.S. Army* (New York, 1885), 498. Hereafter Michie, *Life and Letters*.

2. David Fitzpatrick, "Emory Upton and the Army of a Democracy," *Journal of Military History* 77, no. 2 (April 2013): 468. Hereafter Fitzpatrick, "Upton and Democracy." Two of Upton's brothers who moved to Michigan became Republicans. The Whig Party concerned itself with the concentration of power in the executive branch, a comfortable balance of power among the three federal branches of government, and the defense of republican values (as opposed to democratic ones). In many of his postwar letters, Upton wrote of the excesses of democracy, which he equated with chaos and anarchy.

3. Merritt Starr, "General Emory Upton—His Brothers, His Career," *Oberlin Alumni Magazine*, May 1922, 12. Hereafter Starr, "Upton." Quote by James Wilson appeared in Richard Barry, "Emory Upton, Military Genius," *New York Times*, June 16, 1918. Hereafter,

Barry, "Upton, Military Genius." See also Anonymous, "General Emory Upton," review of *The Life and Letters of Emory Upton*, by Peter S. Michie. *New York Times*, July 20, 1885.

4. Stephen L. Bowman, "Ahead of its Time: Wilson's Cavalry Campaign of 1865," *Army History* PB-20–92–3, no. 23 (Summer 1992): 12, 18. Hereafter Bowman, "Wilson Campaign."

5. Stephen Ambrose, "Upton's Military Reforms," *Civil War Times Illustrated* 2, no. 5 (August 1963): 24–30. Hereafter Ambrose, "Upton's Reforms."

6. Walter S. Dillard, "The United States Military Academy, 1865–1900: The Uncertain Years" (PhD diss., University of Washington, 1972), 192–195 as cited in David Fitzpatrick, "*Emory Upton: The Misunderstood Reformer,*" (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 1996), 200–201. Hereafter "Upton." See also "West Point. The Case of the Colored Cadet—His Own Story—The Case Closed by the Judge Advocate-general—Sentence Decided But Not Published." *New York Times*, October 26, 1870 and "West Point. Close of the Trial of Cadet Smith—His Defense and the Reply of the Judge Advocate—the Probable Result Expulsion or Suspension." January 13, 1871. Thomas J. Fleming wrote in his *West Point: The Men and Times of the United States Military Academy* (New York: William Morrow, 1969) that Upton told Smith, "You shall not be persecuted into resigning. I am your friend. Come to me and you shall have justice" (219). This comment is unsubstantiated. Evidence indicates that Frederick Dent Grant, the president's son, was heavily involved in Smith's harassment. See William S. McFeely, *Grant: A Biography* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), 375–79. Hereafter McFeely, *Grant*. Neither Michie nor Ambrose discusses the incident, but it is covered in Fitzpatrick, "Upton" based on Dillard's narrative cited. See Henry O. Flipper, "Smith at West Point," chap. 16 in *A Colored Cadet at West Point* (New York, 1878). Hereafter Flipper, *Cadet*. Also Fitzpatrick, "Upton," 201–3.

7. Fitzpatrick, "Upton," 230, 232–34. Fitzpatrick speculates that the lack of Upton letters from Europe occurred because Upton either "tired of writing," or "because he was almost home," or "perhaps his correspondence from Europe was not subsequently published." The dearth of letters from Europe makes it difficult to follow his itinerary. Fitzpatrick cites "circumstantial evidence" for Upton's travel to France and Britain. Several of his letters give a forwarding address in Paris. A photograph taken in a Paris studio with a Champs Elysées address shows a corpulent Upton in full military dress uniform. This picture had to be taken in 1877, at the end of his journey. Upton quote from Emory Upton, *The Armies of Asia and Europe . . .* (New York, 1878), 372. Hereafter Upton, *Armies*. Sherman scholar John Marszalek states, "Upton's writings supported Sherman's belief that the army ought to be left in the hands of professionals like him—not politicians and not the militia." John Marszalek, *Sherman: A Soldier's Passion for Order* (New York: Free Press, 1993), 443. Hereafter Marszalek, *Sherman*.

8. Upton, *Armies*, iv; Walter Millis, *Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956), 139–40. Hereafter, Millis, *Arms and Men*.

9. Michie, an 1863 graduate, served as an engineer in operations against Charleston in 1863 and 1864. He rose to the rank of brevet general of volunteers. Returning to West Point in 1867, he served as professor of natural and experimental philosophy until his

death in 1901 at age sixty-two. Although Michie did not shy away from criticizing Upton, his biography is the filter through which we judge Upton.

10. Michie, *Life and Letters*, 4–7.

11. Wilson's reference to Upton's equals is in his introduction in Michie, *Life and Letters*, xxvii. Also James H. Wilson, *Under the Old Flag: Recollections of Military Operations in the War for the Union, the Spanish War, the Boxer Rebellion, etc.* (New York: D. Appleton, 1912), 2:166. Hereafter Wilson, *Under the Old Flag.* Not everyone thought highly of Upton. John Montgomery Wright called Upton "one of the grossest men in the corps." In West Point parlance, "gross" meant that a cadet did not fulfill his potential in military matters. The term did not imply any inferiority in academic matters. According to Wright, Upton must have learned his tactics elsewhere. He wrote bitingly, "If he [Upton]had tactical ability at that time he was reserving it for concentration in his book." Wright went on to contradict his definition of "gross," writing that while Upton certainly deserved his celebrity, he "was not a bright man in any direction while a cadet." Wright continued, "It is possible that the quickening of mind that brought him into notice and fame was the progress of the change that eventually overturned his mind and led him to self destruction [*sic*]." John Montgomery Wright, "West Point Before the War," *Southern Bivouac: A Monthly Literary and Historical Magazine* 1 (June 1885–May 1886): 13–21, 16.

12. Anonymous. "The Life of Emory Upton," review of *The Life and Letters of Emory Upton*, by Peter Smith Michie, *Science*, November 6, 1885; Anonymous. "Gen. Emory Upton," review of *The Life and Letters*, by Peter S. Michie, *New York Times*, July 20, 1885; Ralph Kirshner, *The Class of 1861: Custer, Ames, and Their Classmates after West Point* (Carbondale: SIU Press, 1999), 149. Hereafter Kirshner, *1861.*

13. Michie, *Life and Letters*; Fitzpatrick "Upton"; Stephen Ambrose, *Upton and the Army* (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1964). Hereafter Ambrose, *Upton.*

14. Donald E. Vandergriff, "Culture Wars," accessed January 14, 2014, originally published as a chapter in *Digital War: A View from the Frontline*, http://www.dnipogo.org/fcs/culture_wars.htm.

15. The Sherman quote is from his address to the graduating class of the US Military Academy, West Point, June 15th, 1869. "West Point. Close of the Graduating Exercises—Presentation of the Diplomas by General Sherman—His Address to the Graduates," *NY Times*, June 16, 1869, 8; Karl von Clausewitz, *War, Politics, and Power, Selections from "On War," and "I Believe and Profess,"* trans. and ed, with an introduction by Edward M. Collins (Washington, DC: Regnery, 1997), xiii. Hereafter Collins/Clausewitz, *On War.*

16. Collins/Clausewitz, *On War*, xii. For an alternative view of Clausewitz see John Keegan, "War in Human History," chap. 1 in *A History of Warfare* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 3–60. According to Keegan, Clausewitz described war as he thought it should be waged, not as it was—brutal, all-encompassing, and savage. Keegan states that "the real work of war in the age of Clausewitz was butchery" (9). He also argues that war was an extension of culture and not necessarily a complete extension of politics. Clausewitz's view of war was in an orderly world with rules, laws, ethics, and chivalry.

17. See Harry G. Summers, "Give War its Due," review of *A Country Made by War: From the Revolution to Vietnam—The Story of America's Rise to Power*, by Geoffrey Perrett. *New York Times*, May 28, 1989, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/05/28/books/give-war-its-due.html; and Harry G. Summers, "Clausewitz: Eastern and Western Approaches to War," *Air University Review* 37, no. 3 (March–April 1986): 62–71; John F. Marszalek, *Sherman: A Soldier's Passion for Order* (New York: Free Press, 1993), 301. See also T. Harry Williams, "The Return of Jomini: Some Thoughts on Recent Civil War Writing," *Military Affairs* 39 (December 1975): 204–6, Carol Reardon, *With a Sword in One Hand and Jomini in the Other: The Problem of Military Thought in the Civil War North* (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2012); and Edward Hagerman, *The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, Organization, and Field Command* (Bloomington: IU Press, 1988), 3–27.

18. See Ron Chernow, *Alexander Hamilton*, (New York: Penguin, 2004), 553; and John Ferling, *Jefferson and Hamilton: The Rivalry That Forged a Nation*, (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 229. Lester D. Langley, "The Democratic Tradition and Military Reform, 1878–1885," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly* 48 (September 1967): 200. The designation of the left- and right-wing camps of army reform appears in basically the same form noted here, changing only with the generation of reformers. This particular example is from John Slonaker, "The National Defense Act of 1920" (Carlisle, PA: US Military History Institute, Historical Services Division, 2006). During the war, Volunteer Maj. Gen. John Logan was passed over for promotion by Sherman for a West Pointer. After distinguishing himself at Atlanta, he nurtured his "wounds," as did Representative Benjamin Butler. After the war, Logan became a congressman from Illinois and the chair of the House Military Affairs Committee. In 1870, he introduced a bill reducing the army drastically, which "was particularly repugnant to Sherman." Logan wrote a ponderous tome in 1887 promoting the noble notion of the citizen soldier. Entitled *The Volunteer Soldier of America*, it perpetuates the myth that the nation depended on a committed citizenry that proved itself in the Revolution and certainly in the Civil War. Logan's scholarship is suspect, and the book is unorganized, confusing, and poorly written. In it, he attacks the professional soldier who was educated and trained at West Point, and who was "dedicated to the preservation of the military class and indifferent to the well-being of the nation." Richard Allen Andrews, "Years of Frustration: William T. Sherman, The Army, and Reform, 1869–1883" (PhD diss., Northwestern University, 1968), 53–54. See Russell F. Weigley, *Towards an American Army: Military thought from Washington to Marshall* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 128–29.

19. Munroe Smith, "Democratic Aspects of Universal Military Service, A Discussion Before the Academy of Political Science, May 1916," *Columbia War Papers* series 1, no. 13 (1917): 5–10; and Franklin H. Giddings, "The Democracy of Universal Military Service, A Discussion Before the American Academy of Political Science, July 1916," *Columbia War Papers* series 1, no. 13 (1917): 11–35. Wounded at Gettysburg, Huidekoper went on to lead the war effort as World War I impacted the United States. An Upton disciple, he

organized the Army League of the United States in 1912, and in 1914 he toured England, Holland, and Germany. Much like Upton, Huidekoper was appalled at the lack of war preparations in America compared to those in Europe leading up to the war. He told the *New York Times* that American military policy was "characterized by stupid shortsightedness and blundering, utterly inexplicable in a nation composed of intelligent men." He was convinced that if the Union had had a regular army of fifty thousand during the war, it "would have ended within a few months." Huidekoper wrote in the introduction of his 1915 book on military preparedness that he had liberally quoted Upton's *Military Policy* "either in whole or in part, nearly all of the most important paragraphs." Frederick L. Huidekoper, *The Military Unpreparedness of the United States: A History of American Land Forces from Colonial Times until June 1, 1915* (New York: MacMillan, 1915), introduction, xiii-xvi. Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood urged his audience to read Upton, Leonard Wood, *Our Military History: Its Facts and Fallacies*, (Chicago: Reilly & Britton, 1916), 19. Huidekoper urged Americans to understand the woeful state of unpreparedness for war. F. L. Huidekoper, "Army 'Utterly Inadequate.' United States Won Wars by Luck, Says F. L. Huidekoper." *New York Times*, December 7, 1914.

20. "Why Should We Have Universal Service?" introduction to *Columbia War Papers* series 1, no. 13 (1917): 3–4. Upton's "Testimony" is printed from page 25 through 35.

21. John H. Parker, *Trained Citizen Soldiery: A Solution of General Upton's Problem* (Menasha, WI: George Banta, 1916), 91, 184–207.

22. John W. Loveland, letter to the editor, *New York Times*, February 21, 1916; and R. M. Cheseldine, "Where Upton Made His Big Mistake," *Infantry Journal* 36 (March 1930): 279–88.

23. Briton Cooper Busch, *Bunker Hill to Bastogne: Elite Forces and American Society* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006), 110. Hereafter Busch, *Bunker Hill*.

24. Robert W. Coakley, "American Military History: The Early Period, 1607–1815," chap. 7, in *A Guide to the Use of Military History*, ed. John E. Jessup and Robert W. Coakley (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1979), 151–52. In the same publication, see also Ronald H. Spector, "Military History and the Academic World," chap. 7, 431–37.

25. Robert M. Cassidy, "Prophets or Praetorians? The Uptonian Paradox and the Powell Corollary," *Parameters* 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 130–43. 140–42. Hereafter Cassidy, "Uptonian Paradox."

26. Bruce L. Brager, *The Texas Militia: National and Local Implications. The Land Warfare Papers*, no. 61W (Arlington: Institute of Land Warfare, 2007); John Sayen, "The Overburden of America's Outdated Defenses," chap. 1 in *America's Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Reform for President Obama and the New Congress* (Washington, DC: World Security Institute's Center for Defense Information, 2008); Cassidy, "Uptonian Paradox," 130–43; Mackubin Thomas Owens, "The Hollow Promise of JCS Reform," *International Security* 10, no. 3 (Winter 1985–1986): 98–111; "Counterinsurgency Comeback," *The Wall Street Journal*, September 6, 2007, A 17; Book Review of "The Learning Curve: Rediscovering Counterinsurgency in Iraq," by Peter Mansoor, *Weekly Standard*, May 11, 2009.

27. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 257, 258–59. Hereafter Huntington, *Soldier and State.*

28. Edward M. Coffman, "The Long Shadow of *The Soldier and the State*," *The Journal of Military History,* 55 (January 1991): 73. Hereafter Coffman, "Long Shadow." For an excellent bibliographic essay on the entire controversy of civil-military relations, see Charles A. Byler's *Civil-Military Relations on the Frontier and Beyond: 1865–1917* (New York: Praeger, 2006). William Addleman Ganoe, *The History of the United States Army* (New York: D. Appleton, 1924): 298–354 . Hereafter Ganoe, *US Army.*

29. William B. Skelton, "Samuel P. Huntington and the Roots of the American Military Tradition," *Journal of Military History* 60, no. 2 (April 1996): 325. Hereafter Skelton, "Roots."

30. Fitzpatrick, "Upton," 246n. See Fitzpatrick, "Upton," 242–248 for a full discussion of the Indian army.

31. Russell Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 109, 110, 115, 125. Hereafter Weigley, *History.*

32. Weigley, *History,* 281. See also Weigley's "Problems of the Thinking Man in Uniform," review of *General John M. Palmer, Citizen Soldiers, and the Army of a Democracy*, by I. B. Holley Jr., *Air University Review* 35, no. 5 (July–August 1984): 93–96. Palmer (a fierce anti-Uptonian) "knew that one constant would remain: if the nation wished to stay free, it must contrive military institutions suited to the genius of a democratic people" Weigley, *History,* 721. Dr. Edward Philbin critiques Weigley's review in "On Palmer and the Pentagon: The Relevance of an Old Soldier's Ideas," *Air University Review,* March-April 1985, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1985/mar-apr/philbin.html.

33. Skelton, "Roots," 326, 327–38. Ambrose argues that ever since Upton's publication, "critics have maintained that" he was a "big army man" because his recommendation of a 140,000-man standing army was insufficient for a modern war, and because, "for purposes of internal security, the national volunteers were superfluous." Ambrose believes the national volunteers "were intended to be merely the entering wedge in getting the American public to accept the principle of" having a standing army for national defense. If a large army had resulted, Upton probably would not have objected, "but this was not his main objective." Ambrose, *Upton,* 107–8.

34. David Fitzpatrick, "Emory Upton and the Citizen Soldier," *Journal of Military History* 65, no. 2 (April 2001): 378. See also Salvatore Cilella, *Upton's Regulars: The 121st New York Volunteers in the Civil War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009). Hereafter Cilella, *Upton's Regulars.*

35. Thomas J. Goss, *The War Within the Union High Command: Politics and Generalship During the Civil War* (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2003), 194. See chapter 8, "War as an Instrument of Policy: Expanding the Study of Generalship," 92–211. As Goss describes it, the argument over who won the Civil War for the Union—the professional soldier or the volunteer—raged within the army's ranks and not in the general populace.