Friedrich Nietzsche and Weimar Classicism
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Friedrich Nietzsche and Weimar Classicism

Paul Bishop and R. H. Stephenson
# Contents

Acknowledgments vii

A Note on Editions, Abbreviations, and Translations ix

Introduction 1

1: *Die Geburt der Tragödie* and Weimar Classicism 24

2: The Formative Influence of Weimar Classicism in the Genesis of *Zarathustra* 63

3: The Aesthetic Gospel of Nietzsche’s *Zarathustra* 97

4: From Leucippus to Cassirer: Toward a Genealogy of “Sincere Semblance” 151

Appendix: The Composition of *Zarathustra* 197

Bibliography 243

Index 265
Es war nur Schein, allein der Schein war groß.

[It was only semblance, but the semblance was great.]
— Goethe, Faust Part Two

Wirklich den Pessimismus überwinden —; ein Goethischer Blick voll Liebe und gutem Willen als Resultat.

[Truly to overcome pessimism —; a Goethean glance full of love and good will as the result.]
— Nietzsche, Nachlass, Autumn 1887


[Goethe penetrated the play of becoming as “true illusion,” as an illusion that does not conceal but rather reveals being.]
— Ernst Cassirer, Freiheit und Form
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P. B.; R. S.
A Note on Editions, Abbreviations, and Translations

The following editions of Nietzsche’s works and correspondence have been used:


To refer to individual works by Nietzsche, the following abbreviations are used:

- **PTZ** = *Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen* (Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks)
- **GT** = *Die Geburt der Tragödie* (The Birth of Tragedy)
- **UB** = *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen* (Untimely Meditations)
- **MA** = *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches* (Human, All Too Human)
- **M** = *Morgenröthe* (Daybreak)
- **FW** = *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* (The Gay Science)
- **Z** = *Also sprach Zarathustra* (Thus Spoke Zarathustra)
- **JGB** = *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* (Beyond Good and Evil)
- **GM** = *Zur Genealogie der Moral* (On the Genealogy of Morals)
- **GD** = *Götzen-Dämmerung* (Twilight of the Idols)
- **EH** = *Ecce Homo* (Ecce Homo)
- **AC** = *Der Anti-Christ* (The Antichrist)
- **WM** = *Der Wille zur Macht* (The Will to Power)
The following translations of Nietzsche’s works have been consulted as a basis for our own translations (listed in chronological order of first publication):


To refer to works by Goethe, Schiller, and Schelling, the following editions and abbreviations have been used:


References to Goethe’s *Faust* are given by line number; the following translations have been consulted:


The following work has been used as a basis for the translations of Schiller’s *Ueber die ästhetische Erziehung*:

Introduction

Meine allgemeine Aufgabe: zu zeigen, wie Leben Philosophie und Kunst ein tieferes und verwandtschaftliches Verhältniss zu einander haben können, ohne dass die Philosophie flach ist und das Leben des Philosophen lügenhaft wird.

[My general task is to show how life, philosophy, and art can have a deeper and familial relationship to each other, without philosophy being shallow and the life of the philosopher becoming untruthful.]

Nietzsche, 6[17]; KSA 8:104

According to Friedrich Nietzsche, the meaning of an object may be revealed by tracing its origin, which is uncovered by genealogy. Certainly, there has been no lack of studies placing him, genealogically, in relation to Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Arthur Schopenhauer, Richard Wagner, and so forth, and this with good reason. In this book, we shall argue that the missing perspective, to use one of Nietzsche’s favorite terms, is that of Weimar Classicism. When this perspective, the Kulturkampf or “cultural struggle” waged by Goethe and Schiller, is overlooked, the framework, and hence the structure, of Nietzsche’s thinking is distorted to the point of unintelligibility. Once restored, however, this perspective opens up afresh the coherence and purposiveness in Nietzsche’s philosophical aesthetics.

Friedrich Nietzsche’s education at Schulpforta, where he studied from 1858 to 1864, gave him access to the world of the ancient classics, as well as to the Weimar classicists of the previous generation, Johann Wolfgang Goethe and Friedrich Schiller. In his biography of Nietzsche, Curt Paul Janz reminds us that “die Jugend, die hier aufwuchs [. . .], ging auf in der Welt von Hellas und Rom und in der Welt Goethes und Schillers” (“the young men who grew up here . . . did so in the world of ancient Greece and Rome, and in the world of Goethe and Schiller.”) In Die Geburt der Tragödie (The Birth of Tragedy, 1872), Nietzsche makes constant allusion to Schiller in general and to his concept of “aesthetic semblance” in particular, as well as to Goethe. So when Nietzsche, who had devoured Schiller’s aesthetic writings when he was still at school, speaks of the world as being justified “only as an aesthetic phenomenon” (nur als aesthetisches Phänomen), he
is thinking of Schiller’s concept of the aesthetic as a fusion of physical and intellectual experience (GT Versuch §5; KSA 1:17; cf. GT §5 and §24; KSA 1:47 and 152). Similarly, Nietzsche’s immensely influential “polaristic thinking” (that is, thinking in terms of polar opposites), in which each term (such as the Apollonian and the Dionysian) is affirmative and exists in its own right, rather than as a negation of the other, is inherited via Goethe. More specifically, Nietzsche draws from Weimar Classicism the distinction between Schein des Scheins (falscher/logischer Schein) and Schein des Seins (wahrer/aufrichtiger Schein); a mode of argumentation usefully called “binary synthesis”; and the notion of transformation (Verwandlung, Veredlung, Verklärung) through the aesthetic. Later, Nietzsche regretted using Kantian and Schopenhauerian terminology in Die Geburt der Tragödie; but he let stand the alignment of his concept of the Apollonian with Schiller’s idea of the naïve. And in all his later works, the aesthetic — in the precise Schillerian sense — remains a central, positive concept.

In particular, the British Germanists Elizabeth M. Wilkinson (1909–2001) and L. A. Willoughby (1885–1977) argued, in a series of books, articles, and commentaries, that it was possible to discern and elucidate a common set of ideas and concepts in such writers as Goethe and Schiller, whom they understood as participating in what they called a “perennial aesthetic.”

Because Nietzsche not only read Goethe and Schiller but, as becomes clear from Die Geburt der Tragödie and Also sprach Zarathustra, deployed aspects of their texts to support his own aesthetic arguments, it is not only possible but fruitful to regard Nietzsche, too, as participating in this perennial aesthetic. In answer, then, to their question, “whatever happened to Weimar Classicism?” one answer is that it reemerged in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche.

The conception of aesthetic experience as a conciliation of the sensuous Dionysian and the formal Apollonian, borrowed from Weimar Classicism and placed at the heart of Die Geburt der Tragödie and Zarathustra, leads Nietzsche to set up the artist — not the philosopher, not the scholar, nor the soldier or warrior — as the model of human being. Artists, as opposed to philosophers, love their senses (compare FW §372; KSA 3:624), employ “die Falschheit mit gutem Gewissen” (“falseness with a good conscience”; FW §361; KSA 3:608), and have “den guten Willen zum Scheine” (“the good will to semblance”; FW §107; KSA 3:464). Nietzsche wrote that for him “Schein ist [. . .] das Wirkende und Lebende selber” (FW §54; KSA 3:417; “semblance is the very thing that is effective and is alive”). In Menschliches, Allzumenschliches (Human, All Too Human) Nietzsche talks of “die unschuldigen Listen der Seelenverführung” (“the innocent subterfuges for seducing the soul”) that artists must needs understand, “denn in ihrer Welt, in der es auf Schein abgesehen ist, brauchen auch die Mittel des Scheins nicht nothwendig ächt zu sein” (MA II §154; KSA 2:442; “for in their
world, in which what is aimed at is semblance, even the methods by which semblance is produced do not necessarily have to be genuine”). Of course, Nietzsche is not to be read as recommending untruth: he is simply recasting Schiller’s concept of “frank illusion” as definitive of art and the aesthetic.

In this book, we take as our starting point the view, contested in some circles or, rather, simply denied, that Nietzsche’s work, *Also sprach Zarathustra*, has a single, coherent message. This study identifies that message with what Goethe, referring to the aesthetic doctrines of Oeser, called “das Evangelium des Schönen” (“the gospel of beauty”). In addition, it seeks to relate the central theme of *Zarathustra* with Nietzsche’s major pre-occupation in his earlier writings, namely, aesthetics. Moreover, Nietzsche’s use of themes, ideas, and even formulations borrowed from Schiller’s aesthetic writings in general and Goethe’s *Faust* in particular are shown to provide a link between *Die Geburt der Tragödie* and *Also sprach Zarathustra* (composed in four parts between 1882 and 1884). A hitherto unappreciated unity of plot, style, and argument is thereby revealed in Nietzsche’s *Zarathustra* and, indeed, his philosophical oeuvre as a whole. A rare example of a recognition of the tradition to which Nietzsche was so indebted can be found in the work of Peter Sloterdijk, who notes in his study of *Die Geburt der Tragödie: Der Denker auf der Bühne* (Thinker on Stage, 1986):

The whole man must move at once — diesen Satz Addisons, den Lichtenberg einmal zustimmend in seine Notizbücher eintrug, hätte auch Nietzsche als seine Devise wählen können; der Mensch muß sich als ganzer in seine Äußerungen legen.

[“The whole man must move at once”: Nietzsche could have chosen this adage from Addison, which Lichtenberg had once recorded approvingly in his notebook, as his own motto. Man must express himself as a whole self.”]

Ten years after Sloterdijk, a British Germanist examined at length the relationship between Schiller and Nietzsche, only to be taken to task by one reviewer for his reliance on the scholarship of Wilkinson and Willoughby. Nevertheless, the same reviewer drew explicit attention to “the theory of ‘Schein,’ to which Nietzsche emphatically alludes in the opening chapter of *Die Geburt der Tragödie* and which is central to his concept of the Apollinine [sic]; a theory which the work of Wilkinson and Willoughby, and their students, has done much to elucidate.

In autumn 1883, whilst he was writing *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche quoted a passage from his earlier work and saw in it the key theme of his subsequent philosophy: “sie [the theory of ‘Schein’] rettet die Kunst — und durch die Kunst rettet sie sich das Leben.’ *Grundgedanke. Mein weiteres Leben ist die Consequenz*” (KSA 10,16[11]: 501; cf. GT §7; KSA 1:57; “it rescues art — and through art it saves life.’ *Fundamental thought. The rest of my life is the
consequence”). Furthermore, Zarathustra faces up to “die höchste und wahrhaftig ernst zu nennende Aufgabe der Kunst” (“the highest and, indeed, the truly serious, task of art”), precisely as that is set out in Die Geburt der Tragödie: “das Auge vom Blick in’s Grauen der Nacht zu erlösen und das Subject durch den heilenden Balsam des Scheins aus dem Krampfe der Willensregungen zu retten” (GT§19; KSA 1:126; “to save the eye from gazing into the horrors of night and to deliver the subject by the healing balm of semblance from the spasms of the agitations of the will”): Nietzsche turns to art to find what Faust looks to nature for, when he asks Mephistopheles: “Hat die Natur und hat ein edler Geist / Nicht irgendeinen Balsam aufgefunden?” (Faust Part One, lines 2345–46; “Has nature and a noble mind / Not found some soothing balm?”) Zarathustra certainly stares long and hard into the dark night of nihilism; what has often been ignored, however, is the vitalizing balsam of the aesthetic doctrine it offers. For in Zarathustra, the solution to the problem, posed in Die Geburt der Tragödie, of the aesthetic justification of the world is worked out at length.

Wachet und horcht, ihr Einsamen! Von der Zukunft her kommen Winde mit heimlichem Flügelschlagen; und an feine Ohren ergeht gute Botschaft.

Ihr Einsamen von heute, ihr Ausscheidenden, ihr sollt einst ein Volk sein: aus euch, die ihr euch selber auswähltet, soll ein auserwähltes Volk erwachsen; — und aus ihm der Übermensch.

Wahrlich, eine Stätte der Genesung soll noch die Erde werden! Und schon liegt ein neuer Geruch um sie, ein Heil bringender, — und eine neue Hoffnung! (Z1 22 §2; KSA 4:100–101)

[Wake and listen, you solitary ones! From the future there come winds with secret wing-beats; and good tidings go out to delicate ears.

You solitary ones of today, you who have withdrawn, you shall one day be a people: from you, who have chosen yourselves, shall a chosen people spring; — and from them, the Superman.

Truly, the earth shall yet become a site of healing! And already a new fragrance surrounds it, one which brings salvation, — and a new hope!]

What is Weimar Classicism?

Already we have used the (much disputed) expression “Weimar Classicism”: what do we mean by it? What do we mean by “classicism,” and to what extent are we justified in applying the term to the collaborative Kulturkampf undertaken by Goethe and Schiller in the years from 1794 to Schiller’s death in 1805, and continued thereafter by Goethe until his own death in 1832?

The recent revival of interest in classicism is by no means restricted to the “new classicism” in architecture that Charles Jencks and Paolo Por-
I NTRODUCTION

Classicism, in the traditional sense of a canon of qualities and ideals turned to account over and over again in all the plastic arts for well over two thousand years, although thought to be dead only some thirty or forty years ago, is apparently “alive and well but, as always, living in interesting times.” And in other areas, too, there has been a considerable quickening of interest, emboldening a growing self-confidence amongst enthusiasts, characterized in the comment that classicism is “as inevitable as a phenomenon of nature.” However that may be, this recent return to classicism does seem to have some affinity with Jean Baudrillard’s injunction that we should “pass over to the side of the object.” For, as Adrian Stokes put it, over fifty years ago, in his study of Cézanne:

[Classicism] springs from a precise love and a passionate identification with what is other, insisting on an order there, strong, enduring and final as being an other being, untainted by the overt gesture, without the summary treatment, without the arrière pensée of “thinking makes it so.”

At least this is certainly what Goethe had in mind when, late in life, he recommended Greek poetry as the kind that one may come to terms with “as if it were a reality.” Seeing it as “our duty” to turn as far as possible ideas into reality, and to resist the destructive action of a corrosive kind of imagination that would seek to undo “the reality we thereby achieve,” Goethe notes that his younger contemporaries are “shy of the real,” “upon which everything imaginary is based and everything ideational must come to rest.” If objectivity and objectification may be taken as the hallmarks of the notoriously evasive term “classicism,” then Goethe seems to be unambiguously endorsing core classical values.

And yet, in recent debates amongst Germanisten in Germany itself the very identity of Weimar Classicism has been called into question. By contrast, in A Reassessment of Weimar Classicism, published in 1996 for an English-speaking audience, the editor could state that “so much has been written about this canonical period in German literature that surely nothing can be added to change the accepted view of this era.” And a distinguished English Germanist has felt able to sum up the aim of Goethe and Schiller’s classical program aphoristically as the reconciliation of “particular and general, sense and reason, experience and necessary truth, man’s particularities and his generic character.” Perhaps suspecting that this widely accepted view comes perilously close to identifying the Weimar program with the traditional topos of the poet’s office in general — “he diffuses a tone and spirit of unity, that blends and (as it were) fuses each to each,” as Coleridge has it — the German debate since the late sixties has been marked by deep-seated suspicion of the ideological investment, initially on the part of nationalis-
cally-minded nineteenth-century literary historians, that the Klassik-Legende represents.23 One of the fruits of this debate has been the careful historical work it has stimulated, in particular in setting German culture of the late eighteenth, early nineteenth centuries in a somewhat wider context than the traditionally narrow, national one, both historically and geographically (especially with reference to the European Enlightenment).24 This (sometimes quite explicitly) historicist approach25 has thrown into doubt the accepted periodization of so-called “German Classicism” (1750–1832?); and of the narrower notion of “Weimar Classicism” (1794–1805? or 1780–1810? or 1789–1815?).26 It has also led, because of the identification of overlapping issues and shared concerns on each side, to a fashionable tendency to blur, or even ignore, the traditional demarcations of Klassik and Romantik.27

Undoubtedly, the intellectual and artistic achievement of Goethe and Schiller is illuminated in the perspective of the movements of events and ideas amidst which they lived and worked. But it is surely an exaggeration to claim that the function of the Weimar classical aesthetic “is intelligible only if one takes into account the contemporary historical context in which it arose.”28 Other contexts — not least, the logical — can be equally, if not more, enlightening, as can a lengthening of the historical perspective, to take in developments in poetics and aesthetics before and since the period in question. Concentration on the immediate social and historical context can unduly restrict understanding to the localized and parochial, and may, as can be the case with, for instance, Rezeptionsästhetik, privilege, even canonize, a quite untypical, ill-informed, first reaction on the part of a writer’s contemporaries, or on the part of succeeding generations of readers.29

The wider significance of Weimar Classicism has been accurately identified by Paul de Man (1919–83) in The Rhetoric of Romanticism, when he writes that “the Schillerian aesthetic categories, whether we know it or not, are still the taken-for-granted premises of our own pedagogical, historical, and political ideologies.”30 For, while it is true that the ideas of the German Romantics have enjoyed a renewed currency in international intellectual circles in the last thirty years or so,31 a version of Goethe’s and Schiller’s cultural theory has, for much longer, been deeply influential in German, British, and American secondary and tertiary education, in particular through the reforming zeal of Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835).32 And there seems to be something insistently important at stake in the tension that de Man, along with many others (including Friedrich Schlegel, Schiller, and Goethe), detects between the classical and the Romantic tendencies in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Germany. Goethe and Schiller’s critique of dillettantism, for example, is obviously aimed at the Romantic school.33 The remarkable conceptual consistency, after Schiller’s death in 1805, of Goethe’s own outwardly unsystematic writings on art and culture (which traced, in respect of a rich variety of cultural phenomena, the ramifications of the the-
ory he and Schiller had worked on together) clearly owes a great deal of its precision to the way in which he keeps his Romantic contemporaries firmly in his critical sights. The Winckelmann essay of 1805, for instance, represents a defiant stand against the rising tide of Romanticism; and there is no mistaking the bitterness of Goethe’s words about the “irresponsible regressiveness,” as he put it, of the Romantics in his announcement of the last of the annual art exhibitions that he and a small circle of supporters had set up in order to promote classical values — an initiative that failed. Indeed, his journal Kunst und Altertum (Art and Antiquity), begun in 1816, which some of his younger contemporaries expected to undergo a late conversion to Romantic art, had, in fact, as one of its central aims, the continuation of the critique of Romanticism. As Goethe wrote to Schiller on 18 March 1801: “Wir stehen gegen die neuere Kunst wie Julian gegen das Christenthum” (“We stand in the same relation to the recent developments in art as [the Emperor] Julian stood in relation to Christianity”). In order to avoid regressing to the undifferentiated identification of, say, the Schlegels with Schiller and Goethe, such as characterized the colportage of German ideas by Madame de Staël (1766–1817) and by Henry Crabb Robinson (1775–1867), we clearly need to be in a position to distinguish one intellectual tendency from the other.

Exactly what divides them, however, has proved not at all easy to pinpoint. After all, what is sometimes regarded as the quintessential quality of Romantic sensibility, “the Romantic keynote, the longing (Sehnsucht) for the lost object,” is the very constituent of that “sentimental” outlook that Schiller set up in opposition to the “naïve,” and with the merits of which he so clearly identified. For that matter, Goethe, too, is as aware as Jacques Lacan (1901–81) that the structure of human feeling is essentially “Romantic,” in this sense: that desire (das Wollen) — “der Gott der neueren Zeit” (“the god of modern times”), as he calls it in a late essay on Shakespeare — is never fulfilled, but is always seeking an unattainable satisfaction. Far from excluding his own sensibility from what he regards as an ineluctable fact of human experience, Goethe insists that “sehnsuchtsvolle Phantasie” (“everyearning imagination”) is an essential ingredient of all art. And, evoking the “serious play” that he and Schiller, as well as Nietzsche, see at the heart of aesthetic experience, he notes resignedly in a sympathetic review of Ludwig Tieck in 1826:

Da der Mensch doch einmal die Sehnsucht nicht los werden soll, so ist es heilsam, wenn sie sich einem bestimmten Objekte hin richtet, wenn sie sich bestrebt, ein abgeschiedenes großes Vergangene ernst und harmlos in der Gegenwart wieder darzustellen.
[Since a human being cannot ever get rid of longing, it is salutary if it is directed toward a particular object, if it strives to re-present seriously and harmlessly in the present something great that happened in the past.]

Nor does it seem possible to differentiate “Weimar Romanticism,” as it has been called recently, from Weimar Classicism by simply invoking irony, whether “Romantic” or not. Such blatantly open-ended works as *Wilhelm Meister, West-östlicher Divan*, and *Faust* abound in playful, disruptive ironies; moreover Goethe, like Schiller in his review of Bürger’s poetry, is insistent that ironic distance is essential to aesthetic effect, citing Laurence Sterne (1713–68) and Oliver Goldsmith (1728–74), as well as some Spanish romances, as exemplary instances of “diese hohe Lebensansicht” (this exalted outlook on life). Indeed, the pervasive tone of Goethe’s essays, letters, and conversations after 1800 is one of ironic skepticism. And it is certainly not plausible to argue for a distinctively anti-theoretical stance on the part of either Goethe or Schiller. Schiller, who took his reader on a bracing, abstract, indeed transcendental, route through Letters 11 and 12 of his *Aesthetic Letters*, was quick to discern, as one of the points of affinity between them, Goethe’s “philosophischer Instinkt” (“inborn intellectual tendency”), as if to forestall the ever-repeated attempts to drive a wedge between the two of them. Indeed, for someone who, in the middle of battle, takes the trouble to think up “allerlei Hypothesen” (“all kinds of hypotheses”) to explain a rogue cannonball; who insists that, when theorizing, one go to the very limit of one’s powers of abstraction; who argues “daß wir schon bei jedem aufmerksamen Blick in die Welt theoretisieren” (“that with every attentive glance into the world, we already theorize”); and who emphasizes that literary criticism, like artistic practice itself, needs the context of a coherent (Schillerian) aesthetic theory to be fully developed — is it not remarkable that such a writer can be so routinely presented and caricatured as an arch-empiricist, and therefore dismissed?

The thoroughgoing difference between the outlook of Weimar Classicism and that of the German Romantics may, to some extent at least, be clarified with reference to Goethe’s relation with Schelling. Looking back on his interest in Schelling, Goethe notes in the unsent draft of a letter to Boisserée on 2 March 1828 that, while he appreciated Schelling’s respect for nature, he could neither grasp nor share “die Art und Weise wie er zu Werke ging” (“the way he went about his task”). In his *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie* (*Presentation of my System of Philosophy*) of 1801, Schelling had claimed to be collaborating with Goethe in opposing the “confused night” of Newtonian physics. But for all his (to Goethe, no doubt flattering) talk of aesthetic unity, or “Poesie,” representing Nature, the term that Schel-
ling used, *intellektuelle Anschauung* (“intellectual perception” or “intuition”), turned out to be a contradiction in terms, at least when considered retrospectively from his lectures on the philosophy of art of 1802/3.\textsuperscript{52}

In his *Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie* (*First Outline of a System of Philosophy of Nature*, 1799) Schelling assigns to art, indeed to aesthetic productivity in general, the unique capacity to manifest “der letzte Grund der Harmonie zwischen Subjektivem und Objektivem” (SW 3:610; “the ultimate foundation, that of harmony between subject and object”), thus linking the conscious with the unconscious (SW 3:616), the realm of Freedom with that of Nature (SW 3:612–13). And since “die ästhetische Anschauung eben ist die objektiv gewordene intellektuelle” (“aesthetic perception is intellectual perception become objective”), art recreates the absolutely identical state of being that can be thought of as obtaining before the emergence of the separated, and alienated, ego (SW 3:625). Goethe could be forgiven for seeing in all this a humble recognition of the superiority of art to philosophy, of the aesthetic to the abstractly intellectual (SW 3:627–28); but it cannot have been long before it dawned on him that, notwithstanding beguiling verbal similarities, there was in fact a thorough-going difference between his own and Schelling’s view of nature. For while in the *Erster Entwurf* of 1799 art is, ostensibly at least, accorded the status of revealing the absolute identity, in the *Kunstphilosophie* (*Philosophy of Art*) of 1802/3 it is now philosophy that really comprehends it. Although Schelling still speaks of art and philosophy as being on a par (SW 5:369), it is quite clear that philosophy has the higher calling in that it is “die unmittelbare Darstellung des Göttlichen” (“the immediate representation of the Divine”), whereas art is relegated to being “nur Darstellung der Indifferenz [des Idealen und Realen]” (SW 5:381; “only the representation of the lack of difference between the Ideal and the Real”). Where Jürgen Habermas, referring to the conflict between absolutist and historicist-genetic modes of thought in Schelling’s philosophy, speaks of a “disunity” (*Zwiespaltigkeit*), Goethe talks quite bluntly (in conversation with Kanzler Friedrich von Müller on 21 September 1820) of Schelling’s “forked tongue” (*Zweizüngigkeit*), clearly indicating his rejection of Schelling’s attempts at uniting opposites into conciliatory synthesis by means of mere verbal identities. Goethe is insistent that aesthetic consciousness, although it embraces intellect, is not essentially intellectual: “Abstraktion” (“abstraction”), he holds, entails a “Reduktion auf Begriffe” (“reduction to concepts”);\textsuperscript{53} nor is it simply a matter of imagination, unless it be imagination in its aesthetic, productive modality;\textsuperscript{54} and nor, most important of all, is aesthetic perception in any way transcendent or religious. It is rather, Goethe claimed, what Spinoza had in mind when he spoke of that “third kind of knowledge,” that coordinates “confused” empirical knowledge with “distinct” intellectual knowledge to yield “intuitive” knowledge of individual objects.\textsuperscript{55} In Goethe’s own terms,
aesthetic knowledge arises when, however fleetingly, our sense-impressions are coordinated with our conceptual thought, rather than subordinated to purposive thinking, as is the common case. It is this that marks Weimar Classicism’s divergence from its Romantic contemporaries’ identification of intellectual play with aesthetic play, of *Poesie* with (allegorical) rhetoric, of the sublime with the beautiful — a distinction on which Goethe emphatically insists. Paul de Man is, therefore, quite right to point out that “what gives the [Weimar] aesthetic its power [. . .] is its intimate link with knowledge”; but Goethe and Schiller would not accept his characterization of their aesthetic thinking as an “ideology.” For them, as for its founder Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714–62), aesthetics was the science of such knowledge as can be gained by the mind in collaboration with our physiology. For them, as for our cultural tradition, classicism is, therefore, a way of perceiving this world in its rich and varied particularity; nothing could be more alien to their aesthetic outlook than, say, Jean-François Lyotard’s Romantic nostalgia for a sublime transcendent. For the Weimar Classicists, aesthetic and mystical experience are quite distinct.

That is not to say that the knowledge gained from aesthetic mindfulness of the individual object — of the *Urphänomen* that so fascinated Walter Benjamin (1892–1940) — could, in their view, be expressed in discursive language any more easily than the mystic’s vision. As Goethe told Hegel, the whole difficulty arises from trying to express in discursive language the quality inhering in the self-regulating relations between things, in which the combination of two rhythms will instantaneously create a third, subsuming one of the operative polarities. Indeed, while it may be an exaggeration to claim that Goethe’s classical solidarity “was a direct result of his early studies in alchemy,” this assertion contains a kernel of truth. For one of Goethe’s fundamental contributions to his collaboration with Schiller consisted in the subtle modes of thought and of rhetorical presentation that he had developed over many years since he first became fascinated with hermeticism and “mystisch-kabbalistische Chemie” (“mystical cabalistic chemistry”), and which he went on to apply in his scientific work. Of particular relevance here is the adoption and adaptation by Goethe, and later by Schiller, of that variation of the principle of *coniunctio oppositorum* known as “binary synthesis,” William James offered an illuminating analysis of just this kind of synthesis in a discussion of mystical modes of experience:

The keynote [. . .] is invariably a reconciliation. It is as if the opposites of the world [. . .] were melted into unity. Not only do they, as contrasted species, belong to one and the same genus, but one of the species, the nobler and better one, *is itself the genus and so soaks up and absorbs its opposite into itself*. 
The most significant element for Goethe in this hermetic-mystical tradition seems to have been that the feminine principle was restored to a position of equality with the masculine principle — or Nature with Spirit — and that woman was again coequal with man. For what he had in mind by “developing more consistently” (konsequenter ausbilden) his hermetic heritage (HA 9:414) becomes manifest in the poem “Zueignung” of 1794, first intended as a prologue to “Die Geheimnisse,” itself an articulation of mystical doctrine. Working in a tradition stretching back at least as far as Apuleius’s invocation of the Goddess Isis, and with intertextual reference to Dante’s encounter with Beatrice in Purgatory (Canto 30, line 32) — “una donna m’apparve” — Goethe’s speaker encounters his mother-image as mountain-goddess. She offers him a veil, an age-old symbol associated with Ishtar’s descent into the underworld, “der Dichtung Schleier aus der Hand der Wahrheit” (“the veil of poetry from the hand of truth”; HA 1:152). Goethe’s use of this ancient theological symbol in the context of aesthetics has led to its being called “the symbol of symbols.” And rightly so, for what Goethe meant by “the veil of poetry” is the network of sensuous, “sound-look,” relations, drawn as it were across the discursive surface of the text, some meaningless and obscuring, others meaningful and heightening what is revealed. In other words, what Goethe could not accept literally as revelation of mystical intuition, he understands symbolically, in the sense of an aesthetic conjunction of the artist’s medium — here, language — with the felt life of the psyche. The upshot of this particular “chymical marriage” is Gestalt, the living form of art, which gives tongue to what is otherwise left inarticulate — the voice of the Goddess, “the god-like woman,” evoked by Schiller in his Aesthetic Letters as the epitome of aesthetic experience (Letter 15, §9).

Goethe and Schiller’s identification of the Feminine with the imagination in its aesthetic modality is made quite explicit throughout their work. Of particular significance in the present context is the fact that Goethe, when he reflected on how Mother Nature was to be described in language, drew on these same aesthetic principles. In Nature, he states in the preface to his Morphologie of 1817, we find “nirgend ein Bestehendes, nirgend ein Ruhendes, ein Abgeschlossenes” (“nowhere anything stable, at rest, or detached”); rather, we find “daß alles in einer steten Bewegung schwanke” (HA 13:55; “that everything is in constant flux.”) And later, in an essay of 1823 entitled Probleme, he noted that the simultaneity of oppositional forces at work in Nature cannot be expressed in discursive language (HA 13:35–36). He suggests that an “artificial-cum-artistic mode of discourse” (einen künstlichen Vortrag) be introduced, matching the ebb and flow and subtle interconnectedness of Nature’s workings. In the language of contemporary modern French feminist theory, we may speak of this recommended aesthetic style as l’écriture féminine or parler femme, marked as it is by fluidity
and dislocation, elasticity and spontaneity, and going beyond syntactical correctness. The liquid, primordial feminine matrix in which the Goddess traditionally has her being is precisely what is reflected in Luce Irigaray’s call for a specifically feminine style, for “its privileging of the tactile, the simultaneous, the fluid, the proximate — a disruptive excess.” Clearly, when Goethe ended his *Faust* with the famous lines, “Das Ewig-Weibliche / Zieht uns hinan” (“The Eternal Feminine / Draws us on”), he had far more in mind than any glorification-as-humiliation, as Theodor W. Adorno has it, of the Woman-as-(subordinate)-Muse. Rather, he was evoking here the long classical tradition stretching from paganism to Christianity of a gentle, tender, nurturing, aesthetic Goddess.

Above all, what Weimar Classicism has in common with *parler femme* is what Goethe’s Werther famously denounced as the inadequacy of the “Either-Or,” and what Irigaray has deplored as phallocentric “either . . . or” stabilities. Just as Schiller argues that the “naïve” and the “sentimental” are aspects of a fundamental unity (“das Naïve ist das Sentimentalische,” in Peter Szondi’s memorable formulation), so what appear to the discursive mind to be opposites are re-presented by Goethe as stages in a process of successive reciprocal subordination. Whatever else this is, it is not the dialectic associated with Hegel culminating in a Third Thing; nor is it the identity-philosophy of Schelling, for what the mind distinguishes remains, conceptually at least, distinct; and nor again is it the deconstructive irony of Friedrich Schlegel, inducing an ever more frenzied vertigo. Although, as Goethe freely admits, employment of this figure of thought lends a paradoxical tone to his discourse (and Schiller’s), such linguistic play is necessary since “keine Worte zart und subtil genug sind” (“no words are delicate or subtle enough”) to convey the workings of the inner life, particularly of that mode of (aesthetic) thinking that, for Goethe, defines the artist. So in contrast to that “romantic confusion” championed by Friedrich Schlegel, and extolled as genial “mixing and melting” (*bald mischen, bald verschmelzen*) in his 116th Fragment, Goethe seeks to hold together quite diverse elements in a unity that yet keeps intact their distinct identities. Examples of these “paradoxical” yokings of opposites into a unit that is composed of distinct entities in varying proportions abound in his and Schiller’s work. When Goethe says “die Erfahrung [ist] nur die Hälfte der Erfahrung,” for instance, understanding this maxim requires the reader to give the second occurrence of “experience” a heightened meaning, in which the antithesis (“idea,” “theory”) is incorporated, whereas in the case of the first occurrence, it is absent. This same “double-coding” is quite explicitly at work in his exposition of what he argues is Shakespeare’s thought-process in his dramas:
Because obligation and desire in the human being cannot be absolutely separated, both aspects must coexist at the same time everywhere, even if one may be predominant and the other subordinated.

In Shakespeare, he claims, this simultaneity is presented, at moments of crisis, as “an unrealizable desire raised to the level of a compelling obligation” (daß ein unzulängliches Wollen [. . .] zum unerläßlichen Sollen erhöht wird). Here conceptual distinctness is preserved, while the undivided reality it clarifies is kept steadily in focus. Such ironic skepticism with regard to the gulf between linguistic and natural reality could hardly be more unlike “ideology.”

The totality that Schiller quite uncompromisingly aimed at in his Aesthetic Letters — “so muß es bei uns stehen, diese Totalität in unserer Natur, welche die Kunst zerstört hat, durch eine höhere Kunst wieder herzustellen” (Letter 6, §15; “it must be open to us to restore by means of a higher art the totality of our nature that civilization itself has destroyed”) — is not, then, the totality on which Lyotard has urged us to wage war, and which some contemporary cultural theory routinely attacks. Wholeness for Weimar Classicism is not the abstract universality promoted by the Romantics, and systematically codified by Hegel. Whatever term may be used, “totality” for Goethe and Schiller, and so it was understood by Nietzsche, means the imperfect but unique integrity of some particular: an individual action, or poem, or natural object, or event, or social practice, or person. It is, in a word, realism, as Georg Lukács rightly senses: respect for actual (aesthetic) entities, for res. The kind of work of art they promoted, says Goethe, need not be complete down to the last detail:

Eine solche Arbeit braucht nicht im höchsten Grade ausgeführt und vollendet zu sein; wenn sie gut gesehen, gedacht und fertig ist, so ist sie für den Liebhaber oft reizender als ein größeres ausgeführtes Werk.

[Such a work does not need to be executed to the highest degree and be perfected; if it is well-observed, thought-through and ready, then it is often more attractive for the amateur than a larger, fully executed work.]

In an early piece of art criticism, Goethe writes that “wer allgemein sein will, wird nichts” (“he who wants to be general, ends up being nothing”). The movement of Weimar Classical thought is away from the general and toward the particular, away from what Erich Heller called the characteristic “scene of Romantic art [. . .] the play with abstractions [. . .] and with disembodied
forms and patterns.” The human mind, Goethe argues, while enjoying the elevation of high abstraction, longs for the particular, without losing a universal perspective. According to classical theory, then, it is the office of the artist to provide this stereoscopic perspective by “epitomizing” human significance in a particular form. Significant entities that engage our aesthetic interest are, then, like the people we fall in love with, not exemplifications of a general proposition, but symbols on to which we project, by isomorphy, our felt-thought. It is, of course, the business of reflection to subject aesthetic perceptions to intellec­tion; but not to displace them with the resultant conceptual entities — a reifying tendency which, in Goethe’s view, Romanticism and Newtonian science had in common.

The overriding concern in the cultural theorizing of Goethe and Schiller is to make conceptual room for a reasoned account of our aesthetic experience of human life and the universe we live in — “die Welt als ästhetisches Phänomen” (“the world as an aesthetic phenomenon”), in Nietzsche’s famous phrase — alongside, though not in competition with, the empirical-scientific and the romantic-religious worldviews. Conflict with these other, in our Western culture more prevalent, modes of consciousness arose, not from any inherent antagonism towards them on the part of the Weimar Classicists and Nietzsche, but rather from the tendency of both outlooks to encroach illegitimately on the proper province of aesthetic consciousness. The concerted challenge of Weimar Classicism to the hegemony of either the scientific or the religious culture that has alternately dominated Western civilization goes some way, perhaps, to explaining Metternich’s spreading the word in the Russian and Prussian courts that Weimar was a hot-bed of revolutionary sentiment. Thus Adorno’s appeal in his Minima Moralia for respect for individual existence may be seen as a continuation of this inherently ethical tradition, of the call to resist what Adorno characterizes as “die erledigende Gebärde, mit welcher Hegel [. . .] stets wieder das Individuelle traktiert” (“the dismissive gesture which Hegel constantly accords the individual entity”), the same Hegel whom he accuses of opting “mit überlegener Kälte [. . .] für die Liquidation des Besonderen” (“with serene indifference for liquidation of the particular”). Indeed Adorno avers that “nur dort vermag Erkenntnis zu erweitern, wo sie beim Einzelnen so verharrt, daß über der Insistenz seine Isoliertheit zerfällt” (“knowledge can only widen horizons by abiding so insistently with the particular that its isolation is dispelled”), and he refers explicitly to Nietzsche (FW§228; KSA 3:511) when presenting his case for what he calls “the morality of thought”:

Die Moral des Denkens besteht darin, weder stur noch souverän, weder blind noch leer, weder atomistisch noch konsequent zu verfahren. Die Doppelschlächtigkeit der Methode, welche der Hegelschen Phänomenologie unter vernünftigen Leuten den Ruf abgründiger
Schwierigkeit eingetragen hat, nämlich die Forderung, gleichzeitig die Phänomene als solche sprechen zu lassen — das “reine Zusehen” — und doch in jedem Augenblick ihre Beziehung auf das Bewußtsein als Subjekt, die Reflexion präsent zu halten, drückt diese Moral am genauesten und in aller Tiefe des Widerspruchs aus.  

[The morality of thought lies in a procedure that is neither entrenched nor detached, neither blind nor empty, neither atomistic nor consequential. The double-edged method that has earned Hegel’s *Phenomenology* the reputation among reasonable people of unfathomable difficulty, that is, its simultaneous demands that phenomena be allowed to speak as such — in a pure “looking-on” — and yet that their relation to consciousness as the subject, reflection, be at every moment maintained, expresses this morality most directly and in all its depths of contradiction.]

What Adorno says here of Hegel at his best applies a fortiori to Weimar Classicism. When Goethe, for whom was what was ultimately at stake was the issue of barbarism or culture, famously defined classicism as healthy, he meant by this, succinctly restating Schiller’s central thesis, wholesome sensitivity to the particulars of (sensuous) beauty. In a sense, we are dealing here with a secularized version of the distinction made by St. Augustine (354–430) between use (*uti*) and enjoyment (*frui*). In his treatise *On Christian Doctrine*, Augustine defined enjoyment of a thing in terms of “resting with satisfaction in it for its own sake,” whereas its use consisted in its employment “to obtain what one desires.” For Augustine, however, God alone was to be enjoyed; following His death, however, as proclaimed by Nietzsche, it becomes not only legitimate, it becomes the new commandment, to enjoy the objects of the world for their own sake. Augustine wrote:

> The beauty of the country through which we must pass, and the very pleasure of the motion, charm our hearts, and turning these things which we ought to use into objects of enjoyment, we become unwilling to hasten the end of our journey; and becoming engrossed in a factitious delight, our thoughts are diverted from that home whose delights would make us truly happy.

For the outlook of Weimar Classicism, however, as for Nietzsche, we have already reached the goal of our journey, and our home is the earth — “bleibt der Erde treu!” (“remain true to the earth!”), as Zarathustra urges us (Z Vorrede §3; KSA 4:15). Christianity, morality, the argument for the existence of God from design, the belief in Providence — “das ist nunmehr vorbei” (“that’s all over now”), says Nietzsche, and we are free to enjoy the objects of the world for their own sake, to see the world as an aesthetic phe-
nomenon. By the same token, the same respect of, and love for, the particular is nowhere more powerfully expressed than by Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, who counsels his disciples, his “friends,” who are like children, to be yet more like them:

[Die Kinder] spielten am Meere, — da kam die Welle und riss ihnen ihr Spielwerk in die Tiefe: nun weinen sie.
Aber die selbe Welle soll ihnen neue Spielwerke bringen und neue bunte Muscheln vor sie hin ausschütten!
So werden sie getröstet sein; und gleich ihnen sollt auch ihr, meine Freunde, eure Tröstungen haben — und neue bunte Muscheln! —
(Z II 5; KSA 4:123)

[The children were playing by the sea, — then the wave came and swept their playthings into the deep: now they are crying,
But the same wave shall bring them new playthings and shower new, colorful sea-shells before them!
Thus they will be consoled; and, like them, you too, my friends, shall have your consolations — and new, colorful sea-shells!”]

Notes

3 For a thorough analysis of the modern phase of this tradition, see Carsten Zelle, Die doppelte Ästhetik der Moderne: Revisionen des Schönen von Boileau bis Nietzsche (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1995). Despite a tendency to conflate the beautiful with the sublime, Zelle offers a stimulating reconstruction of Schiller’s aesthetic theory.


