Golddiggers, Farmers, and Traders in the "Chinese Districts" of West Kalimantan, Indonesia

Mary Somers Heidhues



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visit to London, the author also consulted material in The British Library, India Office Library and Records (IOLR).

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A special word of thanks goes to my children for their implicit and explicit support. Once delightful distractions, they are now valued companions.

INTRODUCTION

This study is a history of a single province of Indonesia, West Kalimantan, and within the history of that huge territory, concentrates on what was once called the "Chinese Districts" and the town of Pontianak. The high proportion of the inhabitants who were ethnic Chinese imprinted a special cultural stamp upon these districts, giving them their name. By concentrating on the Chinese minority in that area during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this study aims to remedy a lack of information—and some misinformation—about an important minority concentration in Indonesia, retrieving where possible a record that is fast disappearing.

The story of the Chinese gold-mining kongsis of West Borneo (as West Kalimantan was called during the colonial era) and of the Dutch colonial attempts to suppress them is, at least superficially, widely known. What happened after the protracted struggles of the nineteenth century is, however, less known, and often difficult to reconstruct.

The Chinese of West Kalimantan are a unique group among Indonesia's Chinese minority, contrasting with the prevalent image of Chinese as economically successful businessmen. Most of them are, unlike the subjects of many recent studies, neither *towkays* nor tycoons, drawing attention because of their economic "success" as entrepreneurs and big businessmen. A few people in West Kalimantan may fit this description, but they are not typical of the community, which is made up for the most part of small traders, shop owners, farmers, and fishermen. Many Chinese in the province are poor, some even living at the subsistence level.

Nor are West Kalimantan's Chinese "sojourners," to use a term popularized by Wang Gungwu. They are long-term settlers, some of them with roots that go back to the eighteenth century, yet over the years, outsiders have branded them aliens because they held to a culture perceived as foreign. Superficially, they appear to have remained very "Chinese," above all retaining the use of the Chinese language over generations, in contrast to the long-resident ethnic Chinese of Java, who adopted Malay and other local languages, losing the ability to speak a Chinese language.

Nor is their presence, unlike Chinese settlement in some parts of the Indonesian Archipelago, a result of Dutch colonialism. The Dutch East India Company did, indeed, encourage Chinese to come and populate its newly-established headquarters in Batavia after 1619, while Dutch and other Western enterprises brought Chinese coolies in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to work mines and plantations, especially in the islands outside of Java. Chinese migrants arriving in West Kalimantan usually organized their own migration, using their own networks. In the early days, local Malay rulers encouraged them to come, but neither colonial authorities, who occasionally tried to cut off immigration, nor Western enterprises, promoted their coming.

Above all, the Chinese in West Kalimantan are a significant minority, numbering perhaps four hundred thousand persons, well over 10 percent of the population of the province. This region has been, historically, together with eastern Sumatra, Bangka-Belitung, and the Riau archipelago, one of four major concentrations of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia outside Java.

The first migration of Chinese to West Kalimantan remains difficult to document, but their history soon involves the attempts of the various indigenous and colonial polities in the region to suppress and control them, often through violence. Such attempts begin with the relations between Chinese-dominated mining communities and the Malay rulers of Sambas and Mempawah, who encouraged them to come to the island but then found the miners too powerful to control. Dutch colonial efforts followed, their exertions lasting for much of the nineteenth century. Batavia was determined to eliminate the special organizations of the Chinese—which it saw as establishing independent Chinese-dominated states within the colonial realm—at first by force, then, in the twentieth century, by administrative measures. At the same time, the Dutch recognized the "usefulness" of the Chinese settlers who had acquired a key position in the economy of West Borneo. During World War II, the Japanese occupied the territory and asserted supremacy over its peoples, trying brutally but unsuccessfully to break the Chinese economic grip on the territory and to subject the community to Japanese rule. Most recently, the Indonesian state extended its activities to West Kalimantan, seeking not only to control the political and economic activities of the ethnic Chinese, but attacking their cultural autonomy as well. In attempting to subordinate the minority, it too resorted to violence, putting an end to the history of the Chinese Districts by driving ethnic Chinese from rural areas of the province in 1967.

A second theme of this history is how strong community organization helped the Chinese to face, and sometimes to surmount, external threats. Like other Chinese communities abroad, those of West Kalimantan maintained a variety of bodies for internal control and the achievement of common purposes. At first, these were the famous kongsis, shareholding partnerships that ran the mines and—this is another unique attribute of West Kalimantan—governed extensive territories with all the trappings of independent states, including a kind of democratic governance that gave much of the community its say in political decisions. After the last of the kongsis was abolished in 1884, there followed a plethora of voluntary organizations with political (parties and "reading rooms"), social (language and hometown organizations, surname associations) economic (chambers of commerce, traders' and producers' associations), and cultural (schools, temple boards) purposes, not to mention the "secret societies," sworn brotherhoods whose activities strongly colored outsiders' perceptions of the community. Although most of these organizations were dissolved under the Suharto government after 1965, some have survived. Others are currently being reconstituted. This organizational proliferation helped to maintain cultural autonomy in a non-Chinese environment.

Some years ago, referring to the period before 1942, I called Chinese society in West Kalimantan "Little China in the Tropics,"[1] emphasizing their attempts, so

[1] Mary Somers Heidhues, "Little China in the Tropics: The Chinese in West Kalimantan to 1942," in *South China: State, Culture and Social Change during the 20th Century*, ed. L. M. Douw and P. Post (Amsterdam: North-Holland for Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1996), pp. 131-138. For rural Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, Mary Somers Heidhues,

typical for diaspora communities, to re-create the homeland abroad. Living in relatively compact and homogeneously Chinese settlements helped the Chinese of West Kalimantan to build something like a "little China." Yet they were "in the tropics" and the physical and social environment extracted its price. Houses were built of local materials and sometimes, as in local custom, on elevated foundations. Farming methods and, as will be shown in chapter three, fighting methods had to change. So did the rhythm of life, customary activities, even food and dress. They lived among, and often with, other non-Chinese peoples. In the end, the expansion of state power decisively limited the freedom to recreate any kind of "China" within Indonesia's borders. These people were "in the *Indonesian* tropics," with strongly limited freedom to develop a "little China."

Even if the minority in West Kalimantan deviates from the image of "rich and economically powerful," its economic activities form the third theme of this history. Chinese traders and farmers held a central place in the region's economy and contributed to the introduction of new crops and their adoption by native producers. West Borneo's economy in precolonial and colonial times had a strong export orientation and a propensity for smuggling. It still does. The economy of the province is highly centrifugal, not bound to Java (the administrative center of colonial and independent Indonesia), but linked to places beyond its borders like Singapore, Sarawak, and other destinations abroad. The centrifugal nature of West Kalimantan's economy is one of the reasons for recurrent conflict with the center.

Writing the history of this community is no simple task. There are no existing internal histories of the community as such, only of one of the kongsis. Most Chinese-language sources that might illuminate the community's past have been lost, probably irretrievably, because of lack of interest, an aggressive climate, and, above all, because of repression and violence. A few Chinese-language references survive, but they stem mostly from outsiders. Consequently, the following chapters rely on written sources, above all colonial documents and other materials in Dutch and Indonesian, to extract the history of the region and its people. In addition, the author visited Pontianak and the former Chinese Districts a number of times between 1963 and 2000. Until the end of that period, relying primarily on written sources offered the only possibility for reconstructing local history; neither the Indonesian government nor the author's personal situation would have permitted the kind of long-term field study that might provide deeper information on more recent developments in West Kalimantan. That will be a task for others, in a more open political environment, to complete. They will perhaps use this study for historical background.

A significant part of this work deals with Hakka Chinese, allowing a comparison with Bangka, with its miners and farmers, and with Hakkas in China and places abroad, especially their relations with indigenous peoples. Hakkas dominated the Chinese Districts and later moved as traders into the interior. As S. T. Leong, Sharon Carstens, and other scholars of "Hakkaology" have shown, this group of Han Chinese has shown a strong ability to preserve Chinese culture and Hakka identity in hostile surroundings, especially through their language. At the same time, Hakkas have, even in China, displayed a readiness to work together

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"Chinese Settlements in Rural Southeast Asia: Unwritten Histories," in *Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese in Honour of Jennifer Cushman*, ed. Anthony Reid (St Leonards: Allen and Unwin for Asian Studies Association of Australia, 1996), pp. 164-182.

with non-Chinese peoples.[2] The Chinese of West Kalimantan, especially the Hakkas (Teochiu dominate the urban community of Pontianak), often formed alliances with the Dayaks or indigenous peoples of the island, both through economic activities and through family relations. Thus, although Hakkas retained their language and identity, they often lived near to or at the level of indigenous peoples.

The author does not speak more than a little Mandarin Chinese, and no Hakka or Teochiu whatsoever. This was not the handicap it might have been for a more field-centered project. Especially during the more recent visits to Kalimantan, it was easy to converse with people in Indonesian, not least because Chinese-language schools had been closed down in 1965-1966 and replaced by education in Indonesian, although most Chinese still use Chinese languages in familiar settings.

Finally, although emphasizing the ethnic Chinese element in its population, this text should be a contribution to the social and economic history of West Kalimantan. The different ethnic groups of West Kalimantan, admittedly, have different histories, but this history tries to place the ethnic Chinese in the context of the past of the entire province and its people.

SPELLING, NAMES, MEASURES

Finding a reasonably consistent—or at least comprehensible—orthography for this text was no mean challenge.

Chinese Terms

First of all, the word "Chinese." Naturally, there are significant differences between residents of China and persons of Chinese descent living in Indonesia. Any term that would make this clear, even "ethnic Chinese," would simply be too clumsy to repeat each time I refer to the subject of this study. Therefore, the people of West Kalimantan who are of Chinese origin will be termed "Chinese," and it should be clear to the reader who is meant, and that most of these people are, today, Chinese Indonesians.

Chinese terms and proper names are presented in the following chapters as closely as possible to the way they are presented in the documents. The decision to follow the usage of the time and place is certainly open to challenge. The Dutch wrote down what they thought they heard, with no thought of a consistent orthography. The differences in pronunciation between Hakkas, Teochius, and some regional differences add to the confusion. Nevertheless, Mandarin Chinese was not understood by most Chinese in West Kalimantan before the twentieth century and to Mandarinize their names from an earlier era is to insert them into a national Chinese sphere to which they did not belong. Using local spellings puts these people in local history.

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[2] See Leong Sow-theng, *Migration and Ethnicity in Chinese History: Hakkas, Pengmin, and their Neighbors*, ed. Tim Wright, introduction by G. William Skinner (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997); Sharon A. Carstens, "Pulai: Memories of a Gold Mining Settlement in Ulu Kelantan," *Journal of the Malaysi an Branch, Royal Asiatic Society* 53,1 (1980): 50-67 and Sharon A. Carstens, "Form and Content in Hakka Malaysian Culture," in *Guest People: Hakka Identity in China and Abroad*, ed. Nicole Constable (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1996), pp. 124-148.

This does not solve all problems. Not only are many terms hard to decode in handwritten and sometimes even in printed sources; in a single document a person's name may be spelled in three different ways. How incomprehensible the results may be is shown by the military historian Hooyer,[3] who writes of the activities of "To Spoen," apparently unaware that this is the same as "Fosjoen (M. *heshun*)" and deciphers "Kioe Liong (*jiu long*, nine dragons)" as "Kioe Siong." I have opted for the most likely spelling, following the documents. The reader should beware that "oe" is pronounced "u" and, in words like "kapthai" and "laothai," "th" is pronounced like "t." However, for better understanding and consistency, a transcription in Mandarin Chinese follows (in *pinyin*) wherever possible, and there is a glossary of foreign words and their transcriptions, as far as they are known, at the end of the text.

Translations are mine, except as noted.

Malay/Indonesian Names and Place Names

Malay/Indonesian orthography has changed over the years. Indonesian personal and place names will, wherever possible, be given in modern spellings (*ejaan yang disempurnakan*). Some places in West Kalimantan that formerly had Chinese names now have Indonesian names, but in discussing the period of Chinese settlements, the older names will be used; I have tried to modernize the spelling. Otherwise, Indonesian prevails. Dutch names and terms are as found in the documents. For the colonial period, the name "West Borneo" is used. Today, Borneo usually applies to the entire island, Kalimantan to the Indonesian part of it. After independence, Indonesians called the province West Kalimantan, Kalimantan Barat, or Kalbar, and I follow that usage.

Currencies, Weights, and Measures

"Dollars" and "$" refer before the twentieth century to Spanish/Mexican silver dollars, the most widely accepted currency in the area during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

"Rp" are Indonesian Rupiah. Their value in US dollars has fluctuated since independence, from 15 Rp to the US dollar in the 1950s to over 10,000 in recent times.

Dutch guilders, "*f*" (florin), were worth about US$.40 in the pre-World War II years. During the nineteenth century, there was a discrepancy between copper guilders, worth 100 *duit* or cents, and silver guilders, which were worth 120 *duit*. The Chinese quickly recognized the difference and acted accordingly.

Weights and measures were often not standardized. They are explained, as far as possible, in the text and glossary. In mining times, gold was often simply weighed in silver dollars.

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[3] G. B. Hooyer, *De krijgsgeschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indië van 1811-1894*, Vol. 2 (The Hague: van Cleef and Batavia: Kolff, 1896), p. 16.



Map One. West Kalimantan, showing the Chinese Districts.

CHAPTER ONE

THE SETTING: THE PEOPLES AND THEIR HISTORIES

Today, boundaries clearly define where West Kalimantan begins and ends. The borders of Kalimantan Barat, Indonesia's fourth largest province, enclose an area of 146,807 square kilometers (roughly four times the size of the Netherlands) and a population in 1999 of about 3,850,000.[1] One of the world's largest islands, Borneo, which took its name from the Sultanate of Brunei, is bounded on the north and west by the South China Sea, on the south by the Java Sea, and on the east by the Straits of Makassar and the Sulawesi or Celebes Sea; the equator bisects it. When Indonesians call the Indonesian part of the island "Kalimantan," to most of them the name signifies "river of precious stones," although the term probably meant "land of raw sago" (*lamanta*), a product that grows abundantly in its swampy areas.[2]

Historically, the island of Borneo has been relatively impervious to outside influences. Dense tropical forest inhibited communication and colonization, and its immense land mass is hard to access from the coastal areas. Few bays or sheltered inlets offer ships a safe anchorage; sand bars obstruct the mouths of the great rivers that provide a path into the interior, making it difficult or impossible for larger ships to enter. The rivers themselves, because of low water levels in the dry season, rapids, or excessive rain in wet seasons, may not be navigable for much of the year.

Kalimantan, with well over two-thirds of the total area of the island of Borneo, was in colonial times a part of the Netherlands Indies. Sarawak and Sabah in the north form East Malaysia, part of the Federation of Malaysia; they were formerly under British rule. The Sultanate of Brunei, Brunei Darussalam, is a smaller, independent state (once a British protectorate) in the north, sharing no common border with Indonesia.

With that, the boundaries appear to be very clear. In the era of the Netherlands Indies, the Dutch divided their Borneo territory into two residencies, South and East Borneo and West Borneo or Borneo's Western Division

[1] West Borneo's geographic features are described, for example, in J. C. F. van Sandick and V. J. van Marle, *Verslag eener spoorwegverkenning in Noordwest-Borneo* (Batavia: Albrecht, 1919). More information is in G. L. Uljee, *Handboek voor de Residentie Westerafdeeling van Borneo* (Weltevreden: Visser & Co., 1925), and, in a nutshell, in Denys Lombard, "Guide Archipel IV: Pontianak et son arrière-pays," *Archipel* 28 (1984): 77-97.

[2] Victor T. King, *The Peoples of Borneo* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 18. For an introduction to Borneo, see King, *Peoples*, pp. 1-28; Jan B. Avé and Victor T. King, *Borneo: The People of the Weeping Forest: Tradition and Change in Borneo* (Leiden: National Museum of Ethnology, 1986), pp. 7-8.

(*Westerafdeeling*). A final correction to the latter's borders was made in 1894,[3] while the border of the northern territories—now part of Malaysia—was delineated in 1884, 1891, and 1912.[4] After Indonesian independence, Kalimantan became a single province, but this changed in 1957, when what had been the Western Division in colonial times became the province (or first-level region) of West Kalimantan or Kalimantan Barat.[5] The former colonial territory of South- and East Borneo now forms three provinces: South, East, and Central Kalimantan. Yet, however well-defined the borders, even the international borders, people continue to cross them easily and events have often spilled across them. (See map one.)

The geographical subject of this study is not the entire province of Kalimantan Barat. It concentrates on the capital city of Pontianak, together with what was once called the "Chinese Districts," because the population of Chinese origin exercised such a strong influence on the area and its development. These districts reached north from Pontianak along the coast toward Sambas and the Sarawak border, following the more fertile river valleys for tens of kilometers inland. They formed part of the old native principalities of Sambas, Mempawah, and Pontianak. Technically, the Chinese Districts were, in the late nineteenth century, the two administrative districts of Sambas and Monterado (the capital of the Monterado district later moved to Singkawang), but in practice the areas of strong Chinese influence included Pontianak itself and the entire area west of the principality of Landak and north of the Kapuas River, including the former gold-mining regions dominated by Chinese mining organizations. In contemporary administrative terminology, this includes the municipality (*kotamadya*) of Pontianak and parts of the districts (*kabupaten; kabupaten* and *kotamadya* are second-level regions) of Pontianak and Sambas. (The capital of *kabupaten* Sambas—Singkawang—was due to separate from Sambas to become a *kotamadya* at the time of writing. The new capital of this *kabupaten* would be the town of Sambas.)

The Chinese began to settle in this area in considerable numbers about the middle of the eighteenth century. In the 1920s, Pontianak and the Chinese Districts, a fraction of the area of West Borneo, were home to two-thirds of the population of the residency and an estimated 90 percent of its ethnic Chinese.[6] A similar concentration prevails today.

PAST BOUNDARIES

Just as no clear territorial boundaries separated precolonial Southeast Asian polities, the peoples who inhabited the western part of Borneo in precolonial times

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[3] Jacob Ozinga, *De economische ontwikkeling der Westerafdeeling van Borneo en de bevolkingsrubbercultuur* (Wageningen: Gebr. Zomer en Keuning, 1940), p. 84.

[4] Graham Irwin, *Nineteenth-Century Borneo: A Study in Diplomatic Rivalry* (Singapore: Donald Moore Books, 1967), pp. 206-207; see also *Koloniaal Verslag* (1891): 2 (Bijlage, Verslag der Handelingen van de Staaten-Generaal [Appendix, Minutes of the Estates-General] [title varies], 1866-1923).

[5] Harlem Siahaan, *Golongan Tionghoa di Kalimantan Barat: Tinjauan ekomonis historis* (Jakarta: Leknas-LIPI, mimeo, 1974), pp. 37-38.

[6] H. Zondervan, "De economische ontwikkeling van Nederlandsch-Borneo," *Indische Gids* 50,1 (1928): 611-612. Although 90 percent may be an exaggeration, the concentration remains.

did not define their space according to the artificial borders of modern times. O. W. Wolters's description of traditional Southeast Asian realms certainly applied to West Borneo:

> There were no "borders" in the modern sense but only porous peripheries . . . . ecological factors kept ethnic groups in habitation zones where they could live comfortably. There were, of course, vital economic interdependencies such as upstream and downstream, forest and agricultural peoples, forest collectors, and port polities.[7]

More important than borders were the coastal and riverine centers of power; among those on the island of Borneo, the northern seaport of Brunei was one early focus of trade. This Islamic sultanate claimed hegemony over other port centers, so that in time the whole island came to be called by its name. In the seventeenth and especially the eighteenth centuries, other harbor polities came onto the scene, and some of them challenged Brunei's dominance. Banjarmasin was the trading center for the south. There, and in the southern part of the West Coast, influences from Java were more important than those of Brunei or of neighboring Malay areas.

In the seventeenth century, Sukadana was the most important port in the West, apparently because it controlled an entrance to the great Kapuas River system that dominates the western part of the island. Landak, inland on the River Landak, the major tributary of the Kapuas, monopolized the source of diamonds in the region. These two principalities had been linked to the Javanese realm of Majapahit, and, in the seventeenth century, the Sultanate of Banten in West Java claimed authority over them. Sukadana was hardly a metropolis; the port may have had no more than five thousand inhabitants at its peak.[8]

Larger Malay port cities in Sumatra or along the Malay Peninsula (like Palembang in the early period of Srivijaya or Melaka in the fifteenth century) were primarily entrepôts, where traders exchanged products brought from far away, as well as collecting and exchanging local goods. Bornean ports tended, because of their less central location on international sea lanes, to be dependent only on the exchange of local goods for imported products. China was a prominent customer. Visitors and traders from China reached the island well before the thirteenth century, although the number who settled certainly was very small in early times. Borneo's exports, jungle and marine products, were exchanged for salt, rice, textiles, and other consumer goods. Early on, Borneo's minerals—gold and diamonds—must also have entered international commerce.[9]

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[7] O. W. Wolters, "Southeast Asia as a Southeast Asian Field of Study," *Indonesia* 59 (October 1994): 10. As van Goor points out, even the Dutch government was not willing, "until far into the nineteenth century... to indicate exactly where its territorial claims ended." See J. van Goor, "Seapower, Trade and State Formation: Pontianak and the Dutch 1780-1840," in *Trading Companies in Asia, 1600-1830*, ed. J. van Goor (Utrecht: HES Uitgevers, 1986), p. 85.

[8] Ozinga, *Economische ontwikkeling*, pp. 27-28; Valentijn, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, estimated that the town had six hundred houses, cited in Dr. [John] Leyden, "Sketch of Borneo," *Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen* (1814), pp. 1-64, repr. in *Notices of the Indian Archipelago and Adjacent Countries* (1837), p. 99.

[9] Compare the distinction between the two kinds of ports in Anthony Reid, *The Lands below the Winds*, vol. I of *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 57, 60.

Lesser coastal kingdoms to the north of Sukadana competed for trade. Archaeological discoveries in the area around Sambas indicate that this region participated in international trade as early as the eighth to tenth centuries. Its location in the northwest of the island and a relatively good anchorage favored the area (the capital was not situated in its present location), which also benefited from the export of gold.[10] Farther south were other principalities—some coastal, like Mempawah, some farther inland—each with a relatively well-defined center but only a vague boundary. Marriage and family bonds reinforced political relationships within kingdoms, as well as relationships to outside kingdoms like Banten or Riau; nonetheless these alliances were fluid and often short-lived.

Essential to these small principalities was their geographical situation at or near the mouths of rivers. Borneo's great rivers, which arose in the low mountains toward the center of the island, acted as its highways. In the early nineteenth century, only footpaths crossed the island's jungles where the rivers failed to penetrate; in the 1830s, the territory had "no carriage road in the whole country, nor a single horse or beast of burthen."[11] River basins also form Borneo's major regions: in the east, the Mahakam and its tributaries are the route to the interior, while the Barito river system defines southern Borneo and the Kapuas River and its tributaries the western part. Rulers established control of major or subsidiary river sheds, of their trade and traffic, and of the people who lived along the banks by setting up headquarters near the river mouth. Like most other Malay principalities, those of western Borneo were really "only an aggregation of river settlements."[12]

Rulers of coastal harbors placed themselves just far enough upstream to defend themselves against pirate attacks from the sea and to gain a sheltered anchorage. In fact, the immediate coastal area was hardly inhabited. Swampy and subject to frequent flooding, and exposed to attack from marauders, the coasts were largely ill-suited for dwelling or cultivation.

A pattern of *hilir* (downstream) and *hulu* (upstream) relations enabled rulers to support their realms to a significant extent through trade. Smaller potentates would settle farther upriver, each with control of the trade passing their vantage point at the mouth of a tributary, but with only partial control of their territory. They paid tribute to, and traded with, rulers situated downriver. Most of the downstream rulers and their immediate subjects were, by the eighteenth century, Muslims and speakers of Malay. The upriver people might not be Malay or Muslim at all; these groups were commonly called Dayaks. This water-aligned system of tributaries, both hydraulic and political, was common among Malay sultanates in Borneo, parts of Sumatra, and the Malay Peninsula.

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[10] On archeological finds in Sambas, see for example, E. Edwards McKinnon, "The Sambas Hoard: Bronze Drums and Gold Ornaments Found in Kalimantan in 1991," *Journal of the Malaysian Branch, Royal Asiatic Society* 67,1 (1994): 9-28. Earlier studies include Tan Yeok Seong, *Notes and Views on Sambas Treasures* (Singapore: Nanyang Book Company, 1948); Roland Braddell, "A Note on Sambas and Borneo," *Journal of the Malayan Branch, Royal Asiatic Society* 22,4 (1949): 1-15; and Tom Harrisson, "Gold and Indian Influences in West Borneo," *Journal of the Malayan Branch, Royal Asiatic Society* 22,4 (1949): 33-110.

[11] George Windsor Earl, *The Eastern Seas, or Voyages and Adventures in the Indian Archipelago* (London: W. H. Allen 1837, repr. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 222.

[12] J. R. Logan, "Traces of the Origin of the Malay Kingdom of Borneo Proper," *Journal of the Indian Archipelago* 2 (1848): 513.

River sheds did not necessarily confine the inhabitants to a defined territory, however. Footpaths in the *hulu* connected one river area with another and offered upstream people a means of circumventing the authority of a downstream ruler if he became too demanding. Sometimes, port rulers extended their influence to other ports, moving upriver or by sea along the coast, thereby gaining influence over neighboring river sheds.[13]

Trade and power relations brought the Malay coastal principalities of western Borneo into a wider zone of principalities. The seas linked them to Malay kingdoms elsewhere, like Johor-Riau, Kedah, and Siak, or to the islands of Bangka and Belitung. They also brought first Indian and then Islamic influences to the island; Chinese and Arab traders visited, as did traders from nearer locations. For the coastal dwellers, their Malay identity and Islamic religion connected them to a world encompassing much of the Malay-Indonesian archipelago.

Malay royal chronicles (*hikayat*) and genealogies (*silsilah*) represent the Bornean polities as part of a wider space that reaches from Sulawesi to Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula. The region is united by a common culture, although it is divided by rivalries in trade and warfare. The elite confirmed the unifying aspects of language, religion, and customs through intermarriage. Their chronicles refer to the same heroes and events; even their language is remarkably uniform, however much spoken Malay may have varied from place to place.[14] After the introduction of Islam, this space expanded ideally to include the entire Islamic world, with Mecca as its center, but in the images of Bornean Malay chronicles, Mecca remained a distant and symbolic center,[15] and the Malay World itself was the focus of power and interaction.

THE PEOPLES

Three major ethnic groups—today people speak of "three pillars"—have dominated the history of West Kalimantan: Dayak, Malay, and Chinese. Writing on ethnic and national identities in Southeast Asia often stresses that ethnicity is not necessarily the result of physical appearance or genetic inheritance; ethnicity is also the result of social and environmental processes and, to some extent, it is an

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[13] This model of upstream-downstream relations is based on Bennet Bronson, "Exchange at the Upstream and Downstream Ends: Notes toward a Functional Model of the Coastal State in Southeast Asia," in *Economic Exchange and Social Interaction in Southeast Asia*, ed. Karl L. Hutterer (Ann Arbor: Michigan Papers on Southeast Asia, 1977), pp. 39-52. Muhammed Gade Ismail, "Politik perdagangan Melayu di kesultanan Sambas, Kalimantan Barat: masa akhir kesultanan 1808-1818" (M.A. thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 1985) applies the model of Bronson to power relations in Sambas in the early nineteenth century; see also Muhammed Gade Ismail, "Trade and State Power: Sambas (West Borneo) in the Early Nineteenth Century," in *State and Trade in the Indonesian Archipelago*, ed. G. J. Schütte (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994), pp. 143-44 and, for a general view of *hulu-hilir* relations in Sumatra, J. Kathirithamby-Wells, "*Hulu-hilir* Unity and Conflict: Malay Statecraft in East Sumatra before the Mid-Nineteenth Century," *Archipel* 45 (1993): 77-95.

[14] A. C. Milner, *Kerajaan: Malay Political Culture on the Eve of Colonial Rule* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1982), pp. 3-4, passim.

[15] See Denys Lombard, "Vers la conception d'un espace géographique et d'un temps linéaire," in *Le carrefour javanais: Essai d'histoire globale*, Vol. II, *Les réseaux asiatiques* (Paris: Éditions de l'École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1990), pp. 196-200, where he discusses the vision of space in the *Hikayat Hang Tuah*.

artificial construct.[16] Especially in precolonial times, people might change or, as Wolters says,[17] manipulate their ethnic identities. Even as late as the mid-nineteenth century, colonial reports occasionally complain that individuals are "more Chinese than Malay" or "more Malay than Chinese," suggesting that people often failed to stay put in the ethnic boxes the administrators assigned them.[18]

Certainly, the colonial powers endeavored to classify and solidify ethnic identities. For most people, however, and at most times, being Chinese, Malay, or Dayak meant that a person differed from members of other designated groups in multiple ways: by appearance, clothing, language, religion, housing, and occupation. To most people, the boundaries defining these three identities were tangible, even if boundary crossing took place. A Dayak might, by adopting Malay language, dress, and religion, become Malay, *masuk Melayu* (literally, "enter Malayhood"). He might then be considered a Malay and no longer Dayak—although converts frequently retained identifiable Dayak cultural traits.

In addition, Borneo's society is characterized, even in recent times, by a high degree of ethnically linked economic specialization, which reinforces identities and makes the lines separating groups more impermeable. Only in most recent times has such specialization become less distinct, but it has in no way disappeared. Ethnicity may sometimes be a matter of choice, but certain long-lasting and established "primordial" qualities also define ethnicity, and even sub-ethnic identities, as they are experienced and understood in western Borneo.[19]

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[16] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983) sees nations as at least partly constructed, influenced by popular literature and the press, among other factors. Those who see ethnicity as flexible and not determined include Fredrik Barth, "Introduction," in *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, ed. Fredrik Barth (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969), pp. 9-38, and the "situational" approach of contributions to Charles F. Keyes, ed., *Ethnic Change* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982), and Judith Nagata, "What is a Malay? Situational Selection of Ethnic Identity in a Plural Society," *American Ethnologist* 1,2 (1974): 331-350. On the other hand, Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) believes ethnic identities are persistent and long-lived. On the ethnic identity of the Chinese in Indonesia, see, among others, Mary Somers Heidhues, "Identity and the Minority: Ethnic Chinese on the Indonesian Periphery," *Indonesia Circle* 70 (1996): 181-192, and Mary Somers Heidhues, "Chinese Identity in the Diaspora: Religion and Language in West Kalimantan, Indonesia," in *Nationalism and Cultural Revival in Southeast Asia: Perspectives from the Centre and the Region*, ed. Sri Kuhnt-Saptodewo et al. (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1997), pp. 201-210. For ethnicity in Borneo, see Victor T. King, *Ethnic Classification and Ethnic Relations: A Borneo Case Study* (Hull: Centre for South-East Asian Studies, University of Hull, 1979).

[17] "In some areas, there was a considerable degree of bilingualism and opportunities for manipulating one's identity. Bilingualism signifies that people with different origins had learnt to live together." Wolters, "Southeast Asia," p. 10.

[18] Monthly reports from West Borneo, Short Report, Assistant Resident of Sambas, August 1853, located in Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI), Jakarta, colonial archives, Borneo's Westerafdeeling (BW) 6/1 (90). There are scattered references to persons of double ethnic identity, for example a Chinese official mentioned in Political Report, West Borneo, 1866, ANRI BW 2/4 (224).

[19] Smith, *Ethnic Origins of Nations*. On ethnic specialization in Borneo, see King, *Ethnic Classification*, p. 19 and King, *Peoples*, pp. 38-39. Sub-groups of the major ethnic groups also differed from one another, having their own "ethnic boundaries," as will be seen in the case of the ethnic Chinese.

DAYAKS

While Dayaks are generally considered to be the "indigenous" people of the island, the name "Dayak" nevertheless covers a multiplicity of groups who constitute about 40 percent of the current population of the province.[20] The name, which may mean something like "uplander" or possibly even "slave," applies to non-Muslim peoples with differing cultures. Although some persons regard "Dayak" as a pejorative term, or see "Daya" as more polite, the name is widely used both by non-Dayaks and by people indigenous to the island, and, among the latter, it is currently favored by young intellectuals and political leaders as the term that best describes their own ethnicity.

Traits that distinguish certain Dayak groups from others[21]—for example, differences in their language or social systems, or differences in the extent to which they cultivate wet rice or dry rice or subsist as nomadic collectors, or whether they live in long houses, and so on—can be very significant to the people themselves, and they are certainly important to anthropologists. However, it is very difficult to identify Dayak sub-groups in the sources (many of them Dutch reports) that will be used for this discussion, since these documents often ignore such distinctions. Furthermore, among the Dayak groups living nearer the coast and those who maintain frequent contact with Malays and Chinese, group identity may became blurred.[22] If, in the following discussion, the Dayaks seem to be stereotypically portrayed and sketched as bit players, this is a result, in part, of a vagueness that characterizes both the available sources and the changeable identities of the sub-groups themselves.

In the coastal kingdoms, members of the Malay courts and other associates of the rulers held authority over Dayaks, including the right to their labor and taxes, through appanages. The *Hikayat Upu Daeng Menambun*, a Malay history of Mempawah, describes how this was done. In this case, an inheritance is being divided, and people ask about

> the Dayak of Mempawah, Pebahar and Malingsam, in order to apportion them correctly. For from of old it had been the custom that the Pangeran Mangku [one of the princes of the Mempawah court] ruled over the Sekayuk Pebahar Dayak, and the man who became Panembahan [Mempawah's ruler] over the Sekayuk Mempawah.[23]

When, in the late nineteenth century, the Dutch extended their authority to places where few Malay courts existed, they began to rule some Dayak groups of the

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[20] John McBeth and Margot Cohen, "Murder and Mayhem: Ethnic Animosity Explodes in Bloodshed," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 20, 1997, p. 27.

[21] Often named for the river area where they lived, Dayaks who moved might or might not take their name with them. Report of Major Andresen, 1852, cited in E. B. Kielstra, "Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van Borneo's Westerafdeeling," Part IV, *Indische Gids* 11,1 (1889): 951.

[22] Ozinga, *Economische ontwikkeling*, p. 32.

[23] Fritz Schulze, *Die Chroniken von Sambas und Mempawah: Einheimische Quellen zur Geschichte West-Kalimantans* (Heidelberg: Julius Groos, 1991), p. 63 (Malay transliteration); p. 115 (German translation). The *Tuhfat al-Nafis* also refers to this; see Raja Ali Haji bin Ahmad, *The Precious Gift (Tuhfat al-Nafis): An Annotated Translation by Virginia Matheson and Barbara Watson Andaya* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 77-78, 81.

interior directly. Otherwise, they relied on Malay appanage holders to control them.[24]

The Dayaks who lived near the coast or along major rivers are sometimes called "Malayic Dayaks," because of cultural and language affinity to Malays. The boundary between them could be especially porous in this environment, with many Dayaks crossing over to become more "Malay" without completely deserting their Dayak past. Some "Malay" rulers also acquired legitimacy or extended their power by marrying into Dayak ruling families, as did Daeng Menambun of Mempawah.[25]

Usually, Malay nobles or retainers who were holders of appanages mobilized the Dayaks to provide the Malay rulers with labor and supplies, including fighting men for the court in wartime, and useful goods like rice or, for foreign trade, jungle products. After the eighteenth century, the rulers often used—or tried to use—Dayak fighters to subdue the Chinese.[26]

Ideally, under the *hulu-hilir* system, which governed much of Malay-Dayak relations, trade and tribute were mutually beneficial: Malays could not live and forage in the forest; Dayaks, as a rule, avoided seafaring and lacked the external relations necessary for trade abroad. Over time, however, the Dayak appear to have become the weaker of the two partners in this relationship,[27] and many colonial officials and other observers felt the Malay-Dayak relationship was purely exploitative.

Examples of this unequal relationship between Malay rulers and Dayaks under colonial rule abound. In 1851, for example, Dayaks paid the ruler of Sambas or his appanage holders a *hasil* (yield, crop) of at least five to ten guilders annually, in cash, produce, or gold dust, as well as rice at the harvest. The ruler profited from trade with the interior and from time to time expected extra "gifts."[28]

In 1873, the Gado Dayak of Mempawah complained that the Malay authorities were assessing onerous fines not sanctioned by custom. If they laid out *ladang* (dry fields) too close to paths, or set fire carelessly to surrounding plots, the fine was fifteen guilders. Although traditional Dayak punishments for adultery existed, the ruler instead demanded a month of forced labor from those brought to justice for this violation; even offenses like stealing fruit attracted his attention.

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[24] The Dutch took control over the Dayaks of Lara-Bengkayang from a member of the Sambas court in 1823, but they returned it to the court later. T. A. C. van Kervel, D. W. J. C. van Lijnden, "Bijdrage tot de kennis van Borneo: De hervorming van den maatschappelijken toestand ter westkust van Borneo," *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië* 15,1 (1853): 186. Pontianak seems to have had few or no appanages; members of court were given a salary by the sultan. J. J. K. Enthoven, *Bijdragen tot de Geographie van Borneo's Wester-Afdeeling* (Supplement, *Tijdschrift van het Koninklijk Aardrijkskundig Genootschap, 1901-1903*) (Leiden: Brill, 1903), p. 851.

[25] This discussion of ethnic groups in West Kalimantan draws especially from King, *Ethnic Classification* (he adopts the term "Malayic Dayaks" from A. Hudson) and King, *Peoples*. On Mempawah, see Schulze, *Chroniken von Sambas und Mempawah*, pp. 19-20, and below.

[26] P. M. van Meteren Brouwer, "De geschiedenis der Chineesche Districten der Wester-Afdeeling van Borneo van 1740-1926," *Indische Gids* 49,2 (1927): 1063.

[27] C. Kater, "Aanteekeningen op Prof. Veth's 'Westerafdeeling van Borneo', 5de boek van het tweede deel," *Indische Gids* 5,1 (1883): 12. Although he felt the colonial system had tipped the balance in favor of the Malays, Kater wrote, "In general [Veth's] description of the Malay is too dark, that of the Dayak too rose-colored."

[28] R. C. van Prehn Wiese, "Aantekeningen betreffende Borneo's Westkust," *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 10,1 (1861): 140-141.

He assessed every family two guilders for a new ironwood fence being built around his palace, and demanded a contribution for his wife's funeral.[29]

A later example cites a tax or *hasil-Dayak* of *f*7.50 per family, assessed in cash. Adult males had to provide twenty days of corvée labor. Ten percent of the value of natural products exported (this was called *sepuluh-satu*, out of ten, one) went to the ruler, and he, or the appanage holders, also demanded additional "voluntary" contributions.[30]

Without political organization beyond the level of *kampung* or settlement, dependent on imported goods like salt,[31] the Dayaks had little chance for successful confrontation with outsiders. Apart from "weapons of the weak" like adulteration, short-weighing, foot-dragging, pleading insolvency, and other strategies,[32] the Dayak had few effective methods for defending themselves against exploitation. When pressed too hard, they might resort to violence against neighboring Malay settlements or simply flee. In the case of the Gado Dayaks, violence had brought the matter to the attention of colonial authorities.

The Dutch regarded the Chinese, too, as exploiters of the Dayaks. The Chinese began, in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, to displace the Malay aristocracy as the trading partners and patrons of the Dayaks. Whether the Chinese immigrants "drove out" the Dayaks from their territory as they came to settle in West Borneo is a more complicated question. In 1859, an official came upon a group of Dayaks who had fled from attacks by Chinese gold miners in the 1840s, who were then living far in the interior on the border with Sarawak, in a miserable settlement plagued by disease and meager harvests. Their flight had only brought them more suffering.[33] But this seems to have been an exception; more often the Dayaks stayed near Chinese settlements.

Protecting the Dayaks from rapacious rulers, appanage holders, and Chinese exploiters provided a reason for expansion of Dutch colonial rule. Governor-General Rochussen, in his 1851 farewell address, made the "uplift and protection" of the

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[29] Report of Resident, Pontianak, February 10, 1873, in Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague (ARA), Archief Ministerie van Koloniën, 1850-1900 (1932), 2.10.02 V. 13.5.1873 (76).

[30] This example is from Ngabang, Landak, in 1883. J. ten Haaft, Memorie van Overgave (memorandum of transfer), Landak, 1934, ARA 2.10.39, MvO KIT 984, p. 73. Inventaris van de Memories van Overgave, 1849-1962, Westerafdeeling Borneo, MMK (Ministerie van Koloniën) 260-265 and KIT-Collectie, KIT 980-992. See the similar listing for Sambas Dayaks in Muhammed Gade Ismail, "Politik perdagangan," pp. 99-101. It could be argued that the oppression of the Dayaks became worse under colonial rule, because Dutch support of the rulers changed the balance of power, but that is a matter for another study.

[31] Salt normally had to be imported to Borneo. Humidity and rainfall were too high to permit salt production by evaporation, even in the coastal areas. Some salt springs do exist in the interior. See J. H. Crockewit, "De zoutbron aan de Spauk-rivier, landschap Sintang, residentie Westerafdeeling van Borneo," *Natuurkundig Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-Indië* 12,2 (1856): 85-90.

[32] To borrow the title of James C. Scott's study of resistance by the powerless, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

[33] Report of Assistant Resident van Gaffron, ARA 2.10.02 V. 22.5.62 (38). This description fits the Dayaks of Lara who were driven from Bengkayang (Lara) by the Chinese. The troubles lasted from the beginning of 1842 to October 1843 (see also chapter two).

Dayak a major goal of policy for the West Coast.[34] Another Dutchman, Baron von Hoëvell, publisher of an influential colonial journal and man of the church who never even saw the island, thought the Dayak were "benevolent, tractable, hospitable, not averse to work, and simple," adding, "This good and strong people is entirely entangled in the serpents' coils of the Malays."[35]

The Dutch resolution to "protect" the Dayaks led in subsequent decades to the imposition of measures against the Malay rulers, and for the Chinese, to the enactment of restrictions on settlement outside the towns:

> Certainly the Dayaks are left open to all kinds of abuses on the part of these [Chinese] people, and for this reason the settlement of Chinese outside of the residential quarters set aside for their nation should be prevented as far as possible, although their visiting various parts of this region for the purpose of trade may take place freely and without hindrance.[36]

Did the writer see the contradiction in what he was proposing?

In spite of their reputation as exploiters, the Chinese also forged close and mutually beneficial links with the Dayaks. A mid-nineteenth century report says of some Dayaks, "they would rather attach themselves to the Chinese than to the Malays."[37] Conflicts with the Chinese were not typical: the Chinese in Monterado frequently invited the neighboring Dayaks to their feasts and into their houses.[38]

These Dayaks were distancing themselves, it seems, from the political and cultural influences of the Malay power holders, using the presence of the Chinese to gain more freedom for themselves. There are repeated references to intermarriage, and a report adds "sometimes the Dayaks adopt many of the Chinese customs"; some even spoke Chinese. Chinese men would marry Dayak women (Chinese and part-Chinese women usually married only Chinese men).[39] Especially after the dissolution of the Chinese mining organizations, Dayaks worked in Chinese-operated gold mines.[40] As late as the 1940s, Dayaks were still adopting some

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[34] J. J. Rochussen, "Redevoering, gehouden bij de overgave van het bestuur aan den heer Duymaer van Twist, in den Raad van Indië, op den 12den Mei 1851," *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië* 18,1 (1856): 56.

[35] W. R. Baron von Hoëvell, "Onze roeping op Borneo," *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië* 14,2 (1852): 188-89. Compare the invective of W. L. de Sturler, *Voorlezing over den innerlijken Rijkdom onzer Oost-Indische bezittingen in verband met den oorsprong en den aard der zedelijke en maatschappelijke gesteldheid der bevolking van die gewesten* (Groningen: J. Oomkens, 1849), pp. 13-16, against the Chinese who with their usury "have laid an iron yoke" on the Dayak and should be forced to desist.

[36] Political Report for 1872, Resident (Van der Schalk) of Pontianak, March 13, 1873, ANRI BW 2/10 (230). For more on residence restrictions in the twentieth century, see chapter five.

[37] E. A. Francis, *Herinneringen uit den levensloop van een "Indisch" ambtenaar van 1815 tot 1851* (Batavia: van Dorp: 1856-1860), 1: 238. Many other sources confirm the affinity between Dayaks and Chinese.

[38] E. de Waal, *West Borneo*, vol. 8 of *Onze Indische Financien*, ed. E. A. G. J. van Delden (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1907), p. 25, referring to a letter of van de Graaft.

[39] The report, from ca. 1858, is cited in Kielstra, "Bijdrage," Part XIX, *Indische Gids* 14,1 (1892): 1265. On language, see for example G. L. Uljée, *Handboek*, p. 48.

[40] H. E. D. Engelhard, "Bijdragen tot de kennis van het grondbezit in de Chineesche Districten," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 51,7 (1900): 256. Usually Dayak laborers were less expensive than Chinese coolies.

Chinese customs: many spoke some Chinese; some maintained house altars in the Chinese style; and some women wore Chinese slacks instead of short skirts or sarongs. In addition, Dayaks imitated the immigrants' rice-growing methods, laying out rain-fed *sawahs* (wet rice fields) and sometimes even beginning to irrigate them.[41]

Over the period of Chinese settlement in West Borneo, from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, Chinese immigrants had formed links with many of these "original" inhabitants of the island. These links were sometimes profitable, giving the Dayaks more liberty from Malay overlords and introducing new economic possibilities, but at other times the two sides and their interests clashed. The Malays, and later the Dutch, used certain groups of Dayaks to put down the Chinese; other Dayak groups sided with them. Just as ethnic boundary crossing existed, so did ethnic alliances shift, and no group presented a monolithic front with, or against, another.

This insight cannot, however, be gained from Dayak sources. In the past, Dayak cultures were non-literate. Their histories were transmitted orally. However important these memories were, and are, to Dayak societies, they are not helpful in constructing a history of the Chinese in West Kalimantan.

MALAYS

Malays represent perhaps 40 percent of the current population of West Kalimantan, being roughly equal in numbers to the Dayaks. Like other ethnic groups, Malays were not a homogenous community. Historically, differences in status created social divisions. Members of the courts, most of them relatives of the ruler or of his important retainers, formed one distinct social group. Others groups included, for instance, freemen, craftsmen, soldiers, peasants, fishermen. Malays, as Muslims, were usually free of taxes and corvée. *Masuk Melayu*, "becoming a Malay," was possible in theory for anyone who chose to follow Islam and Malay customs, but recently converted Dayaks or people of mixed Malay-Dayak origin were not always accepted as full Malays in the nineteenth century; such people were often distinguished as *anak bumi*, children of the land, or *orang sungai*, people of the river.[42]

An 1832 account outlines a more extensive social differentiation among Malays, with *raja* (princes, rulers), *priyayi* (their children, the upper nobility), *mantri* (nobles and officials), *panggawa* (servants of the state), *anak sungai* or *anak desa* (children of the river or village, free farmers), *anak dagang* (traders, usually non-Malay outsiders), *orang berutang* or *kawan* (debtors or retainers), and *budak* (slaves). Important administrative officials were close relatives of the ruler. The principality of Sambas, for example had a sultan, six *mantri raja* (court officials), who were the Pangerans (*pangeran*, prince) Bandahara, Pakunegara, Temenggung, Sumadilaga, Sumadisastra, and Laxamana. Then followed four *kiai* (Islamic

[41] General Memorandum, Sub-district Bengkayang, District Singkawang, by M. Waisvisz, July 12, 1938-May 20, 1941, ANRI BB 287, 38-39.

[42] Ismail, "Politik perdagangan," p. 90. Some Western sources use *anak sungai*, cf. Kielstra, "Bijdrage," Part IV, *Indische Gids* 11,1 (1889): 951. Conversion of Dayaks was not a primary goal of Malay rulers, since it would deprive them of taxable subjects. See General Report for 1880, ANRI BW 5/11 (26).

teachers), four *orang kaya* (nobles), and an *imam* (an Islamic official). The crown prince, if there was one, might be called Pangeran Ratu.[43]

Trade was the basis of the rulers' wealth; they also assumed title to the lands and their people.[44] Princes and relatives of the sultans depended on favors and appanages from these rulers for their income. If they were not satisfied, members of the royal family might challenge the ruler's position, resort to piracy, or squeeze their Dayak subordinates. Even non-noble Malays seldom worked the land; many were fishermen or craftsmen. Only a few were subsistence farmers.[45] The courts obtained rice from Dayaks or through external trade.

Among, or culturally related to, the "Malays" were other groups that are sometimes subsumed under that name. In the early eighteenth century, Bugis adventurers from Sulawesi entered the area, allying with the royal houses like Mempawah and Sambas. Like Malays, they were Muslims, fitting well into Malay society, but they had their own language, customs, and economic roles. During the following century, other Bugis followed the first adventurers and became, not just nobles or retainers, but settlers and traders. Most members of this ethnic group now live in the neighborhood of Pontianak.

In time, other immigrants from the surrounding islands joined them, including Javanese (recalling the historic connections of Sukadana and Landak to Majapahit and later to Banten), Madurese, Minangkabaus, and others. Common to these groups was their adherence to Islam. In the twentieth century, small numbers of non-Islamic peoples from the Indonesian archipelago also migrated to West Kalimantan, and the name *pribumi*, indigenous, came to include all autochthonous Indonesians—the Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants, the Malays, and the Dayaks—but not, at least until the late twentieth century, the Chinese.

The Arabs made up a special group. They were of foreign origin, but since they were Muslims, the men intermarried easily with Malays. After the founding of the Sultanate of Pontianak by an Arab house, Arabs, as rulers and subjects of the rulers, acquired a kind of "honorary Malay" status. Like Malays, they were free of certain taxes or, in colonial times, of restrictions on landholding. This "honorary Malay" status contradicted their legal status in colonial times. In the rest of the colony, persons of Arab descent were "Foreign Asiatics,"[46] but in West Borneo, Arabs were seen as natives.

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[43] E. A. Francis, "Westkust van Borneo in 1832," *Tijdschrift voor Neêrland's Indië* 4,2 (1842): 14-17; Ismail, "Politik perdagangan," pp. 77-82. Compare Andresen's list of four princes: Ratu, Tommonggeng, Paku Negara, and Bendahara, cited in Kielstra, "Bijdrage," Part IV, *Indische Gids* 11,1 (1889): 951. Van Prehn Wiese, "Aantekeningen," pp. 138-139, also has a list, slightly different from this, for Sambas. Given the length of Francis's list, one wonders if all posts were filled, or if the informant might have described an ideal situation.

[44] That the land belonged to the ruler, as God's representative on earth, seems to have been less a traditional arrangement than one enforced by colonial policy.

[45] Kielstra, "Bijdrage," Part IV, *Indische Gids* 11,1 (1889): 953; Ozinga, *Economische ontwikkeling*, p. 34.

[46] Foreign Asiatics, in colonial times, included Chinese, Arabs, and Indians, even if born in the Indies. They enjoyed some privileges that natives did not, but were subject to other legal restrictions; see below.

Malay Histories of West Borneo

Authors of Borneo's Malay histories attempted to locate their realms in a Malay-Islamic world and to underline their legitimacy. Illustrious ancestry and political prowess reflected glory on the rulers, while the presence of Chinese immigrants was of no significance to these writers, and therefore goes unrecorded.

According to one royal genealogy, *Silsilah Raja-Raja Sambas*, the early rulers of Sambas descended from a brother of the Sultan of Brunei who migrated first to Sukadana, where he married the sister of its reigning sultan, and then to Sambas itself. This chronicle, which reports that Sambas was also a tributary of Johor, thus places this principality in a triangle of influence between Brunei, Johor, and Sukadana.[47]

Mempawah, too, seems to have been a "breakaway" polity from Brunei. Its court history, *Hikayat Upu Daeng Menambun*, claims another point of origin: the Bugis adventurers who spread through the Archipelago after the Dutch occupied Makassar in 1667.[48] This *hikayat* recounts the tale of five Bugis brothers who traveled through the Malay world; one became *yang dipertuan muda*[49] of Riau-Johor, while the others dispersed. The second brother, Upu Daeng Menambun, visited Sukadana, where he married a daughter of the sultan whose mother came from the ruling family of Mempawah.[50] Later, this Daeng Menambun moved to Mempawah and became its ruler or *panembahan*. Both this *hikayat* and the *Tuhfat al-Nafis* (The Precious Gift), which was composed in Johor, relate the story of the five adventurers, thereby placing Mempawah in a web of relationships like that of the Sambas court. Yet Mempawah's connections reach more widely, to Makassar, Sumatra, Java, Riau and the Malay Peninsula.[51] The influence of the five Bugis, according to the chronicles, extended to Sambas as well, where the youngest brother, Upu Daeng Pamase, married a sister of its sultan.[52]

However richly these chronicles may relate Malay histories, they relegate the Dayak to an unimportant role, and the Chinese to invisibility. Only one longer Malay text deals with the role of the Chinese, and that is a nineteenth-century work called *Syair Perang Cina di Monterado*. Written in the environs of the court of Mempawah, it describes the war between 1850 and 1854 against the Chinese gold miners of Monterado from a pro-Malay—and pro-Dutch—perspective. Its account of the war contributes to chapter three.

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[47] Schulze, *Chroniken von Sambas und Mempawah*, pp. 141-161.

[48] Ibid., p. 14.

[49] Literally, "younger ruler," a kind of second king.

[50] Some sources indicate that this woman was not a "Malay," but a Dayak. This account would thus illustrate the Islamization of Mempawah through the influence of Sukadana and the arrival of the Bugis.

[51] Schulze, *Chroniken von Sambas und Mempawah*, pp. 35-86; see also Raja Ali Haji bin Ahmad, *The Precious Gift*.

[52] Schulze, *Chroniken von Sambas und Mempawah*, p. 160.



Map Two. Southeastern China, indicating approximate home areas of Chinese of West Kalimantan.

CHINESE

The most populous group of immigrants not native to the Archipelago was made up of the Chinese. They, too, were a variegated group. Although nearly all Chinese in West Kalimantan came from the southern Chinese province of Guangdong (with a few Hokkiens from Fujian), their languages—Hakka, Teochiu, Cantonese, Hainanese, and others—were mutually unintelligible. To most outside observers, the Chinese appeared as a homogeneous group, but the divisions among them were great enough to enable the Dutch to apply "divide and rule" tactics to subdue them, as will be seen in later chapters.

The two largest groups in West Borneo were the Teochiu (M. Chaozhou), who came from the northeastern coastal area of Guangdong, around the port city of Swatow (Shantou), and the Hakkas, who migrated primarily from inland Guangdong's hilly areas or from poorer lowland parts of the province, where they often lived mixed with other language groups. Hakkas also lived in inland Fujian province (Tingzhou), but few if any Fujian Hakkas migrated to West Borneo.

Differences between Hakkas and Teochius should not be exaggerated; both are Han Chinese, both speak a southern Chinese language. Hakkas opened new land in China, sometimes with the help of local minority people, farmed less fertile areas, and migrated readily to new sites—hence the name Hakka (M. *kejia*), which means "guest people." In Borneo, too, they were pioneers. Teochiu tended to concentrate in urban areas and in trade, while Hakkas worked in mines and agriculture, and later became small traders in the interior. Even today Teochius (who in colonial documents are often called "Hoklo" [M. *fulao*]) are the most numerous group among the Chinese population in the city of Pontianak and the regions to the south of it, while Hakkas are the major group in the north, especially in the former Chinese Districts. (See map two: Chinese homelands of Hakka, Teochiu, etc.) The most numerous group among the Chinese in Java, the Hokkiens, were relatively few on the island, although a few prominent Hokkien families lived in Pontianak, as well as representatives of other speech groups, in particular the Hainanese.

Table 1.1
Sub-ethnic or Speech Groups among Chinese in West Borneo
1930 Census

Hakka	38,313	
Teochiu	21,699	
Cantonese	2,961	
Hokkien	2,570	
Other	1,257	
Total	66,700	(of these, 16,669 were born abroad)

Source: Based on 1930 Census.[53]

[53] W. L. Cator, *The Economic Position of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1936), p. 96.