

# Divine Providence

*The Molinist Account*

THOMAS P. FLINT

CORNELL STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

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## Divine Providence

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Thomas P. Flint

D I V I N E  
P R O V I D E N C E

*The Molinist Account*

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*To JoAnn*

Sì come eterna vita è veder Dio  
né più si brama né brama più lice,  
così me, Donna, il voi veder felice  
fa in questo breve et fraile viver mio.

—Petrarch, *Rime sparse* 191.1–4



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T. P. F.



# Introduction

## 1. The Senators and the Philosophers

In February 1964, Bobby Rowan, a member of the Georgia Senate, proposed that the following amendment be incorporated into the Georgia election code:

No person may vote either in the Democratic primary or in the general election in the State of Georgia who has been deceased more than three years.

Needless to say, such a proposal immediately engenders questions (as well as smiles). At least two of these questions are especially pertinent. First, why let dead people vote at all? And second, why suspend their post mortem franchise after three years?

Supporters of the proposal apparently had answers to such questions. In general, they argued, the friends and relatives of the deceased would know full well how their dearly departed would have freely decided to vote in any proximate election. Why should the accident of death prevent a vote from being cast in the way everyone knows it would have been cast had said accident not occurred? Of course, since candidates and issues change as time moves on, our knowledge concerning how the deceased would have voted decreases the longer they have been dead. At some point, our confidence would be low enough that we would no longer have any idea just how to count the vote of the inanimate. The proposed amendment thus suggested three years as a reasonable statutory limit.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For a discussion of this fascinating incident, see Jimmy Carter, *Turning Point* (New York: Times Books, 1992), pp. 183–184.

Fortunately, the debate over this curious proposal was apparently not without humor. Equally fortunately, the debaters did not include contemporary philosophers of religion. For had such philosophers been present, the discussion might well have evolved into a debate over an issue that most politicians would find, as Alice (of Wonderland fame) might put it, even curiouiser than the proposed amendment. On the surface, the advocates of the amendment seemed to be assuming that there are truths stating how a dead person would have freely voted had he or she lived until election day.<sup>2</sup> But, a philosophical Senator might have asked, *are* there any such truths? Can we, can even God, know how a person would freely act in a certain situation if they are in fact never placed in that situation? Is there any fact of the matter to be known in such cases?

Discussion of this question would no doubt have set many senators' heads spinning. But during the past twenty years or so, this issue has become one of the most hotly debated topics in the field of philosophical theology. Many philosophers have argued that there are truths of the sort described above, and that God would be both cognizant of such truths and able to utilize his knowledge of them in his creation and providential governance of the world. On the other hand, many have denied such claims; some have insisted that there are no such facts to be known, while others have argued that, even if there are such truths, they would be of no practical use to God.

The current debate on this issue, though, is hardly unique in the history of philosophy. The claim that God both knows and can use propositions of the requisite type was proposed and defended at length by Luis de Molina, a sixteenth-century Spanish Jesuit theologian whose views on divine providence and related issues were set forth in his *Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis, Divina Praescientia, Providentia, Praedestinatione et Reprobatione Concordia*, known commonly by a less audacious but more mnemonic moniker—the *Concordia*. Molina's *Concordia* was attacked with great vehemence by a number of his contemporaries. The controversy his work engendered, perhaps the most fiery in the annals of late medieval philosophy, has simmered on the back burner of philosophical attention ever since, with intermittent trips to the front of the range. Among English-speaking philosophers, the heat was turned up again roughly two decades ago when Alvin Plantinga unknowingly presupposed the Molinist view in his response to the problem of evil.<sup>3</sup> Since that time, the dispute has reached the boiling point, and currently shows no sign of cooling. Alfred Freddoso's 1988 translation of Part IV of the *Concordia* has

<sup>2</sup> William Hasker would no doubt remind me that many of the bill's supporters may have believed only in truths about the *likely* voting behavior of the deceased!

<sup>3</sup> See Alvin Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), chap. 9; see also his *God, Freedom and Evil* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), pp. 34–45.

only added to the contest by making the relevant section of Molina's work (augmented by Freddoso's excellent introduction and notes) more widely accessible.<sup>4</sup>

## 2. The Plan of This Book

In this book, I endeavor to contribute to this discussion in three ways: by explicating the picture of divine providence offered by Molinists, by defending that picture against what I see as its most powerful critics, and by applying the general Molinist picture to specific providential domains.<sup>5</sup> Not surprisingly, I have divided the work into three parts.

Part I offers the attempt at explication. The first chapter presents what I see as the two foundations of the Molinist edifice: the traditional theological claim that God is the all-knowing, sovereign, providential lord of the universe, and the metaphysical claim that, as those known as libertarians have insisted, freedom requires indeterminism. My aim in this chapter is both to elucidate these two claims and to suggest that the orthodox Christian would naturally be inclined to embrace both of them. Chapter 2 then gives a detailed account of the picture of providence fashioned by Molina, a picture designed to accord with the theological traditionalism and metaphysical libertarianism described in the first chapter.

In Part II, this Molinist account is defended against numerous attacks. Having (in Chapter 3) canvassed the major alternatives to Molinism and argued that the traditional Christian has solid *prima facie* reason to prefer the Molinist picture, I proceed in the next four chapters to consider whether this surface plausibility of Molinism can be undermined. Various objections to Molinism, from traditional Thomist objections to the contemporary criticisms of such philosophers as Robert Merrihew Adams and William Hasker, are examined in these chapters. Central to this part of the book is a discussion of the "grounding" objection, an objection which, in one form or another, crops up in most criticisms of Molinism. My conclusion is that none of the objectors offers a persuasive case against the Molinist. Since the burden of proof is, it

<sup>4</sup> See Luis de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia*, tr. Alfred J. Freddoso (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). References to Molina in later notes are to this translation, and provide both the disputation and section numbers and the page number in the Freddoso translation; e.g., Molina, Disputation 51, section 14 (p. 153). References to Freddoso's introduction are given as, e.g., Freddoso, "Introduction," p. 49.

<sup>5</sup> Though references to Molina are frequent in the course of this book, the reader should note that my main concern is with the account of providence that Molina sketched—i.e., with the *object* pictured, not primarily with either the artist or his picture. For better or worse, this is a book in philosophical theology, not in the history of philosophy.



seems to me, on the critics here, the failure of their arguments suggests that the Molinist picture of providence is by far the most attractive one for the orthodox theist to endorse.

To suggest, though, is not to entail. For it could be that the general Molinist picture, though graced with the veneer of verisimilitude and resilient in the face of attack, would prove unenlightening or even distorting when we try to apply it to particular topics encompassed by the general Christian notion of providence. Part III looks at several attempts at applied Molinism. Questions connected with papal infallibility, prophecy, and petitionary prayer are addressed from an expressly Molinist point of view to see whether or not such a stance is of value to the Christian concerned with such issues. In each case, I will suggest, Molinism can indeed be applied fruitfully (though not nearly so easily as one might initially have conjectured). This result probably ought not astonish the reader; after all, as a confessed Molinist, I would hardly be expected to pick topics that are *not* susceptible to profitable Molinist analyses. Even so, since the issues addressed (even papal infallibility, if understood as evoking the larger issue of divine governance of the Church) are of central concern to most Christians, I think that both the value of the Molinist perspective and the plausibility of expecting that perspective to prove fertile relative to issues not investigated here (issues such as predestination, revelation, the Incarnation, and others) will have been firmly established if my efforts in Part III are successful.

Before embarking on this tripartite expedition, let me first identify my starting points.

### 3. Orthodox Christianity

In describing the plan of this book, I have made several references to traditional or orthodox Christianity, and the reader might well wonder what exactly this is. I have no simple (or even complex) definition to offer. As a Roman Catholic, I think I have a pretty clear grasp of what orthodox Catholicism amounts to.<sup>6</sup> But among Christians as a whole, nothing comparable to definitive papal or conciliar pronouncements, or to the consistent teaching of the magisterium, can be appealed to as a clear and unquestioned arbiter of disputed questions concerning Christian practice or belief.<sup>7</sup> And, of course,

<sup>6</sup> It might be argued that, were I better acquainted with the work of contemporary Catholic theologians, my sense of having a firm grasp would have dissolved by now. I doubt it. Still, it could be. And, of course, it could be that I have cause here to be grateful to a providential God.

<sup>7</sup> Needless to say, virtually all Christians look upon Scripture as authoritative. But I take it as an obvious truth that Scripture does not offer clear answers—answers that just anyone can see—to disputed questions; if it did, the questions would not be disputed.

the list of questions which have not been disputed over the last century or so, even among those who consider themselves Christians, is not all that long.

Still, I think that the notion of traditional or orthodox Christianity is not so vague as to be useless. And though propositional belief is only part (and arguably not the most important part) of Christian commitment, I think we can identify a number of theses which, if not definitive of what is usually meant by orthodox Christianity, are at least typical of such Christians.

Traditional Christians believe that God exists. And the God they believe in is not just a symbol of overarching truths, or an impersonal ground of being, or the life-force oozing throughout the universe, or anything of that sort. Orthodox Christians believe in a personal God, one who freely chose to create the universe we see around us and who sustains that universe in being. Unlike us, this God is perfect in all respects. He is infinite in knowledge, power, and goodness, and unencumbered by spatial or temporal limitations. Moreover, he doesn't just *happen* to be perfect; it couldn't have been the case that God failed to possess any of the perfections he actually exhibits. God has a plan for his universe, and his perfections guarantee that his plan shall succeed. Part of this plan involved God's saving fallen mankind by sending his only son among us. That son, Jesus, true God and true man, reconciled us to his father through his death and resurrection; through references to the Holy Spirit, he also led us toward a recognition of the Trinity—of three persons in one God. As Christians, we are united together with Christ and each other on earth, and look forward to the perfection of these relationships when Christ raises our bodies from the dead and leads us with him to paradise.

Perhaps enough has been said to give one a feel for what I mean by orthodox Christianity. If not, this might help: Think of those who are widely considered the towering figures in the history of Christian thought—figures such as Jerome, Boethius, Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, and Edwards. If a proposition is universally embraced (or nearly so) among such figures, then the proposition is part of orthodox Christianity. (My guess is that each of the claims listed in the previous paragraph would pass this test.)

I am painfully aware of just how inexact all this is. Still, my guess is that only the obstinate would deny that there is a genuine tradition of the sort I am alluding to within Christianity. More important, I feel confident that many of my readers will recognize this tradition as one that they themselves embrace. Since it is these readers whom I see as my principal interlocutors, perhaps enough has been said about what I mean by traditional or orthodox Christianity.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> I refer in Chapter 1 to what I call the traditional view of providence. Hence, to avoid possible confusion, I shall henceforth generally use *orthodox* (rather than *traditional*) to designate the position I have outlined in this section.

#### 4. A Passel of Philosophical Presuppositions

In addition to this theological presupposition, a number of philosophical assumptions will be made throughout this text.<sup>9</sup>

First, I will assume that there are *properties* (e.g., *being purple*), *propositions* (e.g., *No iguana is purple*), and *states of affairs* (e.g., *my iguana's being green*). I will assume that properties can exist even if nothing has that property; that propositions can exist even if they are false; and that states of affairs can exist even if they are not *actual*, or do not *obtain*. One proposition will be said to *entail* another just in case it is not possible that both the first be true and the second be false. (Entailment will be symbolized by a double-line arrow; hence, where *A* and *B* stand for propositions, "*A*  $\Rightarrow$  *B*" will stand for "*A* entails *B*." ) One state of affairs will be said to *include* another if and only if it is not possible that both the first obtain and the second not obtain; if it is not possible that both the first obtain and the second obtain, then the first will be said to *preclude* the second.

I will assume that there are individual substances, and that some of the properties exhibited by these substances are *essential* to them (i.e., such that it is not possible that the individual exist but not have that property) while others are *accidental*.

As several of the assumptions already mentioned imply, I will assume that there are modal facts—that some propositions are *necessary* (i.e., necessarily true), some *impossible* (necessarily false), and some *contingent* (neither necessary nor impossible). Analogous distinctions can be made among states of affairs.

I will also assume that there are *possible worlds*—states of affairs that both possibly obtain and are *maximal*, where a maximal state of affairs is one such that every other state of affairs is either included or precluded by it. Propositions will be said to be possible just in case they are true in some possible world, where to say that a proposition is true *in* a world is to say that it would have been true if that world had been actual. Necessary propositions will be those that are true in every possible world; impossible propositions, those that are true in no possible world. A proposition is true if and only if it is true in the *actual* world—the possible world which is in fact actual.

Finally, I will assume that there are some true *counterfactuals* (sometimes called subjunctive conditionals), and that a conditional of this "If it were the case that *C*, it would be the case that *A*" sort (symbolized by a single-line

<sup>9</sup> My reliance on Plantinga here should be evident. See *The Nature of Necessity*, especially the first six chapters. For a concise presentation of the core of this metaphysical picture, see Edward Wierenga, *The Nature of God* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 6–11.

arrow: " $C \rightarrow A$ ") is true just in case there is some possible world in which  $C$  and  $A$  are both true which is closer (i.e., more similar) to the actual world than is any world in which  $C$  is true and  $A$  is false.<sup>10</sup>

None of these assumptions will be defended in this book, for three reasons. First, there is more than enough to say on the topic at hand without doubling the size of the book by discussing foundational matters. Second, I doubt that I would be up to completing a work thus doubled. And finally, I have little original to say in defense of these claims. Readers interested in debating them will find ample discussion in what we philosophers so charitably refer to as "the literature." I take it that most readers would at least recognize that the assumptions I have made are far from idiosyncratic. Furthermore, my guess is that many of the arguments given in the following chapters are not essentially dependent on the metaphysical assumptions listed here. Those assumptions may be, not the crucial foundation without which those arguments collapse, but rather like the ship, sails, and maps one relies on in sailing around an island: other ships, employing different rigging and charts, might afford one much the same view.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> See David Lewis, *Counterfactuals* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), chap. 1.

<sup>11</sup> I hope that no one will try to make relativistic nonsense out of this. My point is *not* that it makes no difference what assumptions one makes, or that all assumptions are equally valid (any more than a sailor would claim that it makes no difference what ship one takes, or that all maps are equally accurate). The point is only that, having used one set of assumptions to reach a certain conclusion, I have no right to presume that others, using what I see as inferior assumptions, would not end up in the same place, just as, having used one ship and map to reach a certain destination, I have no right to presume that others, using what I see as inferior ships or less accurate maps, would not reach the same place.



PART I

AN EXPLICATION OF THE  
MOLINIST ACCOUNT



## The Twin Bases of Molinism: Providence and Freedom

You who are living consider every cause  
as originating in the heavens  
as if they determined all, of necessity.

If this were so, free will would be destroyed,  
and there would be no justice,  
no joy for good nor sorrow for evil.

The heavens initiate your impulses—  
I do not say all, but granting I did say so,  
a light is given to you to distinguish good from evil,

and free will which, if it is severely tested  
in its first battles with the heavens,  
afterward, rightly nurtured, conquers all.

—Dante, *The Divine Comedy (Purgatory)*, tr. H. R. Huse, 16.67–78

The Molinist picture of providence constitutes an attempt to blend together two distinct notions which are independently attractive to the orthodox Christian. The first of these is the strong notion of divine providence typically affirmed by Christians through the centuries; the second is the libertarian picture of freedom. Before looking at the Molinist picture which develops from their combination, let us in this chapter examine each of the two notions independently. My goal here is to provide a clear (albeit brief) sketch of the two ideas and explain why the orthodox Christian would naturally find them extremely appealing.

### 1. The Traditional Notion of Providence

As we saw in the Introduction, one central element of orthodox Christian belief is the claim that God, our creator, is perfect in every respect. The notion



of divine providence that orthodox Christians have typically come to endorse—a notion I shall refer to as the *traditional notion* (or *traditional picture*) of providence—is essentially a picture of how a God who is perfect in knowledge, love, and power exhibits those perfections through the detailed control he exercises over his creation.<sup>1</sup> Being omniscient, God has complete and detailed knowledge of his world—its history, its current state, and its future. Being omnipotent, God has complete and specific control over that world, a world which has developed and will continue to evolve in accord with his sovereign and never-failing will. Being omnibenevolent, God has used his knowledge and power to fashion and execute a plan for his world that manifests his own moral perfection and the inexhaustible love he bears for his creation. According to this traditional picture, then, to see God as provident is to see him as knowingly and lovingly directing each and every event involving each and every creature toward the ends he has ordained for them.

Though God's providential control of individuals' lives is clearly central in the traditional picture, that control is just as clearly seen as extending to various groups. For example, God can have providential plans for families or nations as well as for individuals. Similarly, Christians have traditionally seen the Church as the beneficiary of specific divine care and guidance. The tradition has also insisted on the special place of humans (as opposed to other species) in creation, and has sometimes even suggested that individuals of other species are divinely provided for merely as a means to some end, not for their own sake.<sup>2</sup>

Two elements of the traditional picture of providence are worth emphasizing, since they will play significant roles in ensuing discussions. First, the tradition maintains that God has complete and certain *foreknowledge*.<sup>3</sup> That is, there is no event still to occur of which God is ignorant or uncertain. God never has to “wait and see” how things develop; he never has to fashion a horde of contingency plans and prepare to execute them depending upon how things turn out; he never has to make do with only probabilities, or

<sup>1</sup> It is perhaps worth noting that at least many of these orthodox Christians would also insist that the danger of distortion is very real if we assume that terms such as *knowledge*, *love*, *power*, and *control* can be used in a strictly univocal sense when speaking of the human and divine realms.

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, Aquinas, *De Veritate*, question 5, article 7. It should be noted that, in recent years, many traditionalists, while not denying that providence may well single out certain groups, have attempted to downplay what might be seen as exaggerations of this truth, and have instead emphasized the universality of God's providential care.

<sup>3</sup> In speaking of foreknowledge here, I mean only that God has knowledge of what is in *our* future, whether or not such events are future to him. No assumption is being made concerning the (interminably) disputed questions concerning God's relation to time.

likelihoods, or best guesses concerning the future. Second, God exercises *sovereignty* over his world in a very strong and specific sense. God doesn't simply give his first creatures their initial powers and arrangement and then, like the deity of the deists, sit back and let things develop on their own. Nor does his control extend only to certain general features of the world, the specifics being out of his hands. (For example, advocates of the traditional notion would frown on those who might suggest that God sees to it that animals come into existence, but does not determine which species in particular come to be. Similarly, it would reject the claim that God ensures only that some people or other are saved, but not that any particular person is among those saved.) Rather, traditionalists insist that God is sovereign in the sense that every event, no matter how large or small, is under God's control and is incorporated into his overall plan for the world.

It is easy to see why such a picture would naturally appeal to orthodox Christians.<sup>4</sup> Clearly, a God who exercised *no* control over or knowledge of his creation would be a far cry from the loving Father in whom orthodox Christians believe. If God is perfect in knowledge, power, and goodness, then he surely must be lovingly involved with and cognizant of the lives of his creatures. But why, the orthodox Christian would naturally wonder, diminish this involvement and knowledge unnecessarily? Isn't it natural (for the orthodox) to think that God knows, not just *some* things about his world, but *everything* about it? Isn't it natural to think that he has arranged it so that, not just *some* things, but *everything* fits together in such a way that his love is made manifest? Isn't it natural to think that *nothing* is left to chance, that nothing haphazard or unexpected from the divine perspective occurs—that "Oops!" is an interjection God need never employ? In the absence of strong arguments to settle for something weaker, the appeal of the picture of providence described above seems evident.

In fact, it is fairly easy to portray a God who lacks this type of strong providential control as a rather comical figure. Consider, for example, the following dialogue from Avery Corman's novel *Oh, God!*, where the first speaker is the title character.

"It's better that I shouldn't meddle. What am I going to do—get into favorites? So I come up with the concepts, the big ideas—the details can take care of themselves."

<sup>4</sup> Of course, aspects of this picture might simultaneously frighten, or at least unsettle, some Christians. God's control, for example, might seem so extensive as to threaten human initiative and dignity. Much philosophical reflection on what is largely an appealing picture of providence might well be the fruit of fears such as these.

"Then the way things happen on earth . . ."

"They happen. Don't look at me."

"And there's no plan, no scheme that controls our destinies?"

"A lot of it is luck. Luck and who you know."

I was staggered. He just went zipping along.

"Looking back, of course I made a few mistakes. Giraffes. It was a good thought, but it really didn't work out. Avocados—on that I made the pit too big. Then there are things that worked pretty good. Photosynthesis is a big favorite of mine. Spring is nice. Tomatoes are cute. Also raccoons."

"But what about *Man*?" I was trying to rise to the responsibility. "What about his future? The future of the planet?"

"It's a good question."

"And?"

"I couldn't tell you."

"Don't you know?"

"Well, like I say, I don't get into that. Of course I hope you make it. I mean, I'm a real fan. But it's like in a ball game. If you're in the stands, you can root, but that's about all."

"You're God. You can protect our future, alleviate suffering, work miracles!"

"I don't do miracles. They're too flashy and they upset the natural balance. Oh, maybe I'll do a miracle now and then, just for fun—if it's not too important. The last miracle I did was the 1969 Mets and before that the 1914 Boston Braves and before that I think you have to go back to the Red Sea."<sup>5</sup>

Needless to say, humorous constructions of this sort cut little philosophical ice. Still, from the orthodox Christian's perspective at least, the very fact that there is humor here is due in large part to the incongruity between the deity Corman depicts and the God of the tradition. The *prima facie* case for an orthodox Christian's embracing the traditional notion of providence thus seems strong.

Not surprisingly, those we have called orthodox Christians have (with rare exceptions) in fact historically embraced this traditional notion of providence. Virtually all of the major Christian voices through the centuries, from such early figures as Justin Martyr, Origen, and Augustine, through such great medieval thinkers as Anselm, Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham, to Reformers such as Luther and Calvin, would firmly embrace this traditional picture.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Avery Corman, *Oh, God!* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1971), pp. 20–21.

<sup>6</sup> I have resisted the urge to offer voluminous references at this point. After all, even critics of this picture have not denied its traditional status, and some of them have gone to great lengths to explain why they think so many giants in the history of Christianity have been led astray in this regard. See, for example, William Hasker, "Response to Thomas Flint," *Philosophical Studies* 60 (1990), 123. See also Richard Rice, "Biblical Support for a New Perspective," and John Sanders, "Historical Considerations," both in *The Openness of God: A Biblical*

Councils and catechisms are equally explicit in their endorsements. Take, for example, the following passage from the Westminster Confession of 1647:

God, the great Creator of all things, doth uphold, direct, dispose, and govern all creatures, actions and things, from the greatest even to the least, by his most wise and holy providence, according to his infallible foreknowledge, and the free and immutable counsel of his own will, to the praise of the glory of his wisdom, power, justice, goodness, and mercy.<sup>7</sup>

Or consider the equally explicit statement from the First Vatican Council:

By his providence God protects and governs all things which he has made, "reaching mightily from one end of the earth to the other, and ordering all things well" [Wisdom 8:1]. For "all are open and laid bare to his eyes" [Hebrews 4:13], even those things which are yet to come into existence through the free action of creatures.<sup>8</sup>

That there is a solid Christian tradition here, then, seems evident.

Equally clear is the support within that tradition for the two elements of providence—foreknowledge and sovereignty—highlighted above. Explicit affirmations of God's foreknowledge even of free human actions can be found in such early Christian writers as Justin Martyr, Origen, Tertullian, Damascene, Chrysostom, Jerome, Augustine, and Cyril.<sup>9</sup> Medieval and Reformed thinkers were equally explicit. Aquinas, for example, in various places considers the question whether God knows future contingents (i.e., truths about future events which are not physically determined by present events), and gives various reasons for concluding that he does know them.<sup>10</sup> Specific sovereignty is likewise repeatedly affirmed. Calvin is typically enthusiastic and eloquent in this regard:

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*Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God*, ed. Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker, and David Basinger (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1994).

<sup>7</sup> Quoted in Paul Helm, *The Providence of God* (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1994), p. 42. Note as well this earlier passage from the Confession: "God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established" (ibid., p. 87).

<sup>8</sup> Vatican Council I, *Dei Filius*; tr. in *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1994), p. 80.

<sup>9</sup> For Tertullian, see *Adversus Marcionem*, ed. and tr. Ernest Evans (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), II, 5. For the rest, see Molina, Disputation 52, sections 21–27 (pp. 181–183).

<sup>10</sup> See, for example, *De Veritate*, question 2, article 12, and *Summa Theologiae*, Ia, question 14, article 13.