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EUROPEAN VALUES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by
Vilho Harle

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Preface

In 1987 the Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI) launched international TAPRI Workshops on 'European Futures: Bases & Choices'. The workshops are concerned with European values in international relations; human rights in an East–West perspective; technology, co-operation and political order in Europe; the Soviet Union and Europe; superpower stereotypes; alternative security in the Arctic region; and the political consequences of nuclear disarmament in Europe. The workshops have had two or three meetings, with some sixty scholars taking part.

The TAPRI Workshops have been financed mainly by a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, to which I wish to extend my warmest thanks. Needless to say, the Foundation bears no responsibility for the workshops' publications or other activities.

The present volume is based on the work of the TAPRI Workshop on European Values in International Relations, which so far has met twice: in Tampere on 29–31 May 1987, and in Helsinki on 22–4 September 1988. The book represents a selection of papers presented at these two meetings; in addition I have solicited contributions from other scholars to fill some gaps and to give a wider perspective.

The present workshop seeks to contribute to the ongoing debate on the identity of Europe by applying various approaches, from political philosophy to more current analyses of contemporary European issues.

Originally the task was to investigate alternative organizing concepts which would form the basis of a European identity. The purpose was to trace European lines of political thought in the fields of diplomacy and international relations, along the lines suggested by Martin Wight in his famous paper on 'Western Values in International Relations'. What we wanted to find out was whether there exist uniquely European conceptions of peace, security, co-operation, neutrality, and so on in theories of international relations.

However, it soon became clear that the suggested European values do not necessarily contribute to a more peaceful world. On the contrary, a more 'negative', a 'darker' side of European international (political) thought emerged from the initial perusal of European values: it was found that the European political thought and cultural heritage, i.e. the European way of thinking, contained a strong element of dualism, a tendency to make a distinction between good and evil, between 'us' and 'them', between 'our' friends and enemies. This aspect has been given no space in the debate on European identity – though the 'enemy' lurks behind many statements in that debate. Therefore the workshop decided to make explicit this hidden, darker dimension of Europeanism. Consequently, the present volume tends to be somewhat critical of 'Europeanism' as far as the total unity of interests and values is concerned.

The contributions can be divided into four parts. The first three papers deal with *theoretical dimensions and applications of dualism and the 'enemy' in European political thought.* Harle's first contribution is an introduction to the present collection; the chapter was distributed as a background paper to the second workshop meeting – therefore, it emphasizes the role of dualism in European thought and gives dualism a uniquely European connotation. Aho and Vähämäki discuss more general aspects of the 'enemy' and its consequences in politics and international relations. It will perhaps remain an open question whether the three contributions deal with strictly and uniquely 'European' phenomena, but it can be suggested that dualistic ideas and the 'enemy' have a central role in European thinking and that European thinking has had, and still has, a similarly central role in a more general 'Western' or 'occidental' world and its values.

Second, three contributions are devoted to the *history of political ideas* – a dimension which was a focal concern of the current workshop. Of course, Burke (discussed by Harle), Schmitt (by Demandt) and Hegel (by Dossa) are only examples, but certainly central figures in the political traditions of dualism and the 'enemy'.

Third, as well as discussing theoretical backgrounds and the history of ideas, the book takes some examples from reality in order to identify the *role of dualism and the 'enemy' in contemporary European issues and debates.* Salih's chapter tries to see what Europeanism looks like from outside Europe; Jokisalo looks at conservative contributions to the debate on German reunification and security – a problem which is certainly central to any idea of a United Europe or 'Common European House'; and Weiler and Dossa deal with the Israel/Palestine issue, which is far too often ignored as a 'European' problem. These contributions should not be evaluated from the point of 'truth'; we cannot determine who is right and who is wrong, but the reader may perceive that all these four papers imply that dualistic ideas and the 'enemy' hardly contribute to the solution of real issues and conflicts. Instead, it is more likely that 'European' thinking contributes to the aggravation of those conflicts.

Fourth, the two final contributions deal with *alternatives to dualism and the 'enemy'*. Finger and Galtung emphasize new social movements, soft or green values, and on the demilitarization of European thinking and politics. Unfortunately, we were unable to give more attention to alternative values and ideas, ways of overcoming dualistic distinctions and the dangers of giving the 'enemy' a central role in political thought. In most chapters this dimension is discussed only in passing, just modestly encouraging new research efforts and thinking towards this more constructive goal. Indeed, it seems obvious that new, alternative values should be given serious attention in future investigations of the identity of Europe and Europeanism.

Geographical, economic and cultural diversity, if rid of the dark side of dualism and the 'enemy', is an integral part of Europe and Europeanism. So it is more easy than usual to say that the contributors to the present volume were encouraged to apply different approaches and emphasize opposing arguments: there was no pressure to reach artificial uniformity – the project members tried to give food for thought to each other and to all participants in the debate on Europeanism.

Tampere, Finland
19 July 1989

1 European Roots of Dualism and its Alternatives in International Relations

Vilho Harle

A quest is in progress for the identity of Europe, a search for common, all-European interests in terms of security and co-operation. However, the idea of Europeanism, or the identity of Europe, remains somewhat diffuse. One may well ask whether European unification is possible? Are there factors that could integrate Europe politically from the Urals to the Atlantic and from the north to the Mediterranean? Experience shows that the answer is likely to be negative. The divisions, differences, unique experiences and conflicting interests of the various states in Europe are formidable obstacles to unification.

Yet it may be possible for the divisions to be overcome. The emerging Europeanists seem to believe in a common cultural basis. Furthermore, it is pointed out that Europe lives in a world of increasing military, and particularly economic, power struggles. Therefore, they say, the intra-European contradictions and conflicts can and must be solved or managed in order to guarantee Europe's future and its welfare and security, as well as a reasonable say in world affairs. Scholars might contribute to this process by investigating alternative organizing concepts which would form the basis of a European identity. The purpose would be to trace European lines of political thought in the fields of diplomacy and international relations. For example, one might enquire whether there are uniquely European conceptions or connotations of peace, security and co-operation, or balance of power, neutrality etc. in theories of international relations. And if such are found, it might be worthwhile to explore how they might contribute to the growth of Europeanism at present or in the future.

The suggested supporting role for scholars takes the idea of Europeanism for granted, as given, as a non-problematic ideal. If however one wishes to follow the lines of critical social research – as peace researchers are expected to do – one must not forget the consequences. Then one should ask whether 'European' conceptions would increase or decrease potentialities for co-operation (*or* conflicts) between the European states—as well as between the European states and their environment (i.e. nations representing other values and conceptions). Do European values contribute to a more peaceful world —or do they rather aggravate violence and the danger of war?

The answer to this question requires application of a historical perspective to the genesis and development of European ideas of international security. Here I can suggest four questions: (1) What have been the basic dimensions of international thought, the dominating and shared modes of structuring the abstract reality called international relations?[1] (2) Through which cultural processes are these modes of thinking transmitted from the past to the contemporary world? (3) What are the implications of the old patterns of thinking for the contemporary world and the future of humankind? And (4) What alternatives are there to the dominating modes of thinking, and how might these alternatives become accepted?

Dualistic modes of thinking

We might envisage several answers to the first question, but I shall deal exclusively with only one of them. It seems clear that an integral part of the European cultural heritage, the European way of thinking, is related to dualism. Dualism appears in other cultures too, but in the European cultural heritage and in the European mind it seems to have a surprisingly central role. As Peter Gay (1978, p. 231) has suggested, the need to experience through polarities seems to have profoundly dominated the mental style of Western man. Polarities appear indispensable, however imprecise, unscientific, evasive and distorting they are. It seems natural to confront radical with reactionary, past with present, private with public, true with false, us with them, friends with enemies, good with bad. In the European mind, the idea of 'one state, two systems' sounds strange and exotic.[2]

Johan Chydenius (1985) distinguishes between an essential dualism (in which the principle of good and the principle of evil are eternally opposed to each other) and an existential dualism (in which actually existing good is distinguished from actually existing evil). He also distinguishes between simultaneous and successive dualism. Essential dualism is always simultaneous: good and evil exist at the same time and eternally. Existential dualism may be either simultaneous or successive. The simultaneous variant of existential dualism implies that at a certain point of time, when part of it lapsed into a lower state, good was given its counterpart in evil. Henceforth good and evil existed side by side. The successive variant of existential dualism implies that a good state is transformed once and for all into an evil state. Good and evil are opposed to each other, but they are separated by a span of time.

It is important to discuss the roots of dualistic thinking in at least three—perhaps overlapping—areas: religion, politics and enemy images, if we wish to understand why contradictions hold such a strong position in current modes of thinking. This is not a comprehensive list; I shall be referring to them as examples. In addition, my discussion will aim at giving some food for thought, at suggesting a larger research programme, instead of conclusive discussion.

The religious idea of contradictions was born in ancient Persia, and was later adopted by Judaism and Christianity. During the earliest documented history, in Persia, Zarathustra singled out *Ahura Mazda* (the Lord of Light, the Wise Lord) as the one true God. However, there also exists his opponent: the Evil Spirit (*Angra Mainyu*). There is a cosmic conflict between the Holy Spirit and the Evil Spirit; the conflict becomes one between the powers of Light and Darkness, good and evil, and human beings align themselves on either side. There will be an ultimate eschatological conflict between the powers of Light and the powers of Darkness. In the end a Saviour (*Saoshyant*) will appear in due season and join the good forces and, in consequence, the powers of Darkness will be overthrown and the earth renewed in unending youth and incorruption. Judaism derived this story and similar religious myths from Persian and other neighbouring cultures. And Christianity (as well as Islam later on) has for centuries carried with it these fundamental elements of Zarathustra's and the Jewish religions.

In addition to these religious roots we find the idea of political contradiction, related not to religion but rather to the struggle for power between and within nations during the ancient Greek era. This contradiction made its appearance in a permanent power struggle between Athens and Sparta and in opposition to Macedonia due to the rise of its power over the other Greeks. A fundamental theoretical and ideological expression of this was related to the differences between tyranny and democracy, and between tyranny and freedom.

Since Homeric times the most important divisive line has been between Athens and Sparta, starting with competition and rivalry for political superiority and culminating in a long and practically never-ending war. Even towards the final end of this violent competition, Demosthenes in his early speeches was still referring to this distinction. According to him Athens was obliged 'not to allow Sparta to rise to a formidable power before the decline of Thebes, not to allow the desired balance of power to alter unperceived so that a Spartan rise exceeds the Theban decline'. He therefore suggested that the Athenians 'should not take the other line of wanting Sparta rather than Thebes as opponents, which is not what we require, but that neither shall have the power to injure ourselves'. Indeed, the Athenians had to take care of their own interests and not become actual members of the states they support instead of Athenians (*Greek Political Oratory*, 1985, p. 173).

An important suggestion made by Athens in several connections, and by Demosthenes in one of his early speeches, was that Athens was defending *democracy* against *dictatorships*. Athens waged war for *freedom*, it was defending *the weak and the poor* against *the rich and the strong*. Indeed, there could be no peace between democracies and oligarchies; Demosthenes said that it was better that 'all the Greeks should be our enemies under democracy than our friends under oligarchy', for:

> In dealing with free states, in my view, there is no difficulty about regaining peace, while with oligarchy even friendship is precarious. There can be no good feeling between oligarchy and democracy, between the desire for power and the aim at a life of equality. [*Greek Political Oratory*, 1985, p. 183]

The violent unification of Greece was the final solution to the power struggle. This approach was tacitly supported for example by Aristotle, the famous Macedonian (who for decades was looked upon with suspicion in Athens) and tutor to Alexander the Great. But Demosthenes actually acquired his unique fame with the speeches directed against Philip of Macedonia. Demosthenes emphasized, for example, that there is no safety for free states in over-familiarity with dictators, and that Philip's 'very titles are diametrically opposed to' freedom. Indeed, 'every king and every tyrant is an enemy of freedom and an opponent of law'. Therefore, 'take good care that in your eagerness to avoid war you do not acquire a despot'. Demosthenes suggested that if Philip's 'proceedings are peaceable' and 'without any doubts, seriously', then 'we should maintain peace'. But if—as Demosthenes thought—there were any doubts about Philip's intentions, then Athens was obliged to resist aggression. There was therefore no sense in talking about the distinction between war and peace: 'we have no choice' but 'we are left with the one most just and unavoidable course, which speakers like this deliberately overlook. What is that? Resistance to aggression' (*Greek Political Oratory*, 1985, pp. 235–6).

Speaking of the basis of European identity, it is mainly related to the enemy against which Europe is allegedly forced and felt obliged to fight. There have been several such enemies, but I shall concentrate on one of them: the Orient. In many senses, its role has been the most central.

Shiraz Dossa (1987) has suggested that while the East had always been perceived to be different from the West because of evident disparities in language and customs, no Greek in the archaic period attached moral or political significance to the differences perceived. The demarcation was made clear by Herodotus, whose subject was the struggle between Greece and the Persian Empire. However, the original situation was perhaps not so idyllic as Dossa suggests: fear of enemies (barbarians or non-Greeks) and hatred of them had their origins before Herodotus. The heroic defensive wars against the strong Persian power was perhaps the second wave in the crystallization of this opposition: the Trojan war was the first. But it is true that the Persian Empire as the enemy was functional to Greek unity, while the Trojan war was not. The expansion of Persia actually brought the Greeks together for defence, albeit temporarily, while the original unity with Agamemnon as the suzerain over all the other Greeks disappeared, according to Homer, during the Trojan war.

One can agree with Dossa on the point that the classical Greek political philosophy played an important role in the process. Political philosophy came to life as the staunch opponent of things Oriental: its articulation of the genius of the Occident presupposed the Orient as negation, signally lacking in salient respects. Plato and Aristotle created an ideal of politics where the notion of political space was almost sacred: it entailed a distinction between the inside and the outside. According to this picture, inside lay the promise and the possibilities of human accomplishment; on the outside, there were none. Indeed, the outside was not part of the human equation; outsiders were beneath even the underdogs on the inside; outsiders lacked the peculiar sensibility, the natural attributes and the rational talents of those within the circle.

There was a social need for this theory in the quest for Panhellenism. Indeed, the historian Xenophon (1984) and the great political orators Isocrates and Demosthenes argued for the idea of Panhellenism along similar lines. On every page of his *Anabasis*, Xenophon clearly brings out the contrast between Greek and barbarian. According to Xenophon the barbarian world was vast and diverse, feudal and ancient or tribal and savage, while the Greek world was compact, united by the sea, and essentially one in its approach to life. It was thought that the barbarians were, by nature, slavish and the ways of the barbarians were completely unacceptable to the civilized Greeks. More importantly, it was