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

THE Aesthetics OF Ugliness

A Critical Translation

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Aesthetics of Ugliness

A Critical Edition

Karl Rosenkranz

Edited and translated by Andrei Pop and
Mechtild Widrich

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Guide to Frequently Translated Words

abscheulich – abominable (*as in 'snowman'*)
albern – silly
Anschauung – experience, *rarely* intuition
aufheben – cancel (out)
Auflösung – dissolution (*of harmony or disharmony*), resolution (*of a contradiction*)
Bedingung – condition (unbedingt – unconditional)
Bestimmung – determination, definition
Beziehung – relation, connection
bloß – mere, sheer, plain, brute
Dasein – existence, being, entity
Einheit – unity, unit (*pl.* units)
ekelhaft – disgusting
Empörung – outrage
entsetzlich – terrifying
Entzweiung – rupture, break
Erscheinung – appearance, *rarely* phenomenon
Existenz – existent (being)
Fratze – grimace
furchtbar – frightful, *rarely* terrible
Gebilde – entity
Gegensatz – opposite, opposition
Geist, geistig – spirit(ual), *in some contexts* intellect(ual), *rarely* mind/mental
gemein – mean, *rarely* common
Gesetzmäßigkeit – law-likeness
Gestalt – shape, *rarely* form, figure
Gestaltung – design, formation (*respectively if context is art or reality*)
gleich – same, *rarely* equal
gräßlich – gruesome, atrocious
Grauen – horror
grell – glaring, lurid
hinausgehen – supersede or go beyond
Kraft – force
Komik – the comical, *more fluently* humour
komisch – comical, *more fluently* funny
Macht – power
Mannigfaltigkeit – multiplicity
Maaßlos(igkeit) – immoderate(ness)
nichtig; Nichtigkeit – null and void; nullity

niedlich – cute
niedrig; Niedrigkeit – low, the low *but sometimes noun* baseness
Pietät – (filial) piety, family feeling
Regelmässigkeit, Regularität – regularity
Reiz, reizend – charm, charming
roh – crude
scheußlich – hideous
sinnlich – sensible, sensuous (*depending on English usage*)
Sitte – custom
sittlich, Sittlichkeit – moral, morality
Tendenz – tendency (*in the political sense, as in 'tendentious'*)
übergehen – turn (into), pass (over) to
Übergang – transition
ungeheuer – tremendous, *as noun* monster
Unterschied – difference, *rarely* distinction
Verbildung – disfiguration (*not strictly facial, broadly as flawed figuration*)
Verhältnis(se) – circumstance(s) connection(s), relation (*singular only*)
Verkehrung – reversal, *rarely* perversion
Vernunft – reason
Verschiedenheit – differentness
Verständigkeit – reasonableness
Verstand – common sense, *rarely* understanding
verzerrt – distorted
Vorstellung – (mental) image, notion, imagination (*when the faculty is being discussed*)
wahrhaft – genuine
Wechselbeziehung – interrelation
Wechselwirkung – reciprocity, interaction
Wechselspiel – interplay
widrig – repulsive
Zerrbild – distorting mirror, distorted picture
Zerrissen(heit) – torn(ness)
zierlich – delicate

Approaching Ugliness

Karl Rosenkranz's Contribution to Philosophy

Introduction

God doesn't have a sense of humour? If not, how could the world persist?
Karl Rosenkranz, notebook entry, 1836[1]

Less than a century ago, a prominent mathematician could assert that, 'Like the word "beautiful" in aesthetics and the word "good" in ethics, "true" gives logic its direction.'[2] In the present day, these subject matters are no longer taken for granted in these fields. In particular, aesthetics, that eighteenth-century coinage that awkwardly combines art, pleasure, and the senses in one single word, may have gained by turning from the clouds of beauty to the soil of art and its functions. And there is no doubt that artists themselves have played a key role in debunking simple identifications of aesthetics with the beautiful. Whether one takes as a paradigm Edouard Manet's *Olympia*, Alfred Jarry's *Père Ubu*, Marcel Duchamps' *Fountain*, Andy Warhol's *Brillo Box* or the Sex Pistols' *Never Mind the Bollocks*, it is an article of faith in modern art that rejecting old recipes for aesthetic success is tantamount to securing the same.[3] When a twentieth-century philosopher of art like Nelson Goodman declares, 'the symptoms of the aesthetic are not marks of merit', this sounds less like a fact and more like confident avant-garde self-avowal. Goodman continues:

> Folklore has it that the good picture is pretty. At the next higher level, 'pretty' is replaced by 'beautiful', since the best pictures are often obviously not pretty. But again, many of them are in the most obvious sense ugly. If the beautiful excludes the ugly, beauty is no measure of aesthetic merit; but if the beautiful may be ugly, then 'beauty' becomes only an alternative and misleading word for aesthetic merit.[4]

The points, taken individually, are fair. Not all good artworks are good-looking. And not by accident: in a Jenny Saville portrait, it may be that an artwork's very intent, and

[1] Karl Rosenkranz, *Aus einem Tagebuch: Königsberg Herbst 1833 bis Frühjahr 1846* (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1854), 5. All translations, unless otherwise noted, are by the editors.
[2] Gottlob Frege, 'Der Gedanke', *Beiträge zur Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus*, 1:2 (1918), 56.
[3] Mechtild Widrich, 'The "Ugliness" of the Avant-Garde', in *Ugliness: The Non-Beautiful in Art and Theory*, ed. A. Pop and M. Widrich (London: Tauris, 2014), 69–81, discusses this tradition and its relation to the view of beauty and ugliness as optional in art.
[4] Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 255.

its achievement, are to be aesthetically unsettling. Goodman, who in his youth ran an art gallery and collected art all his life, knew this. On this basis he posed a dilemma for aesthetic theory. If beauty excludes ugliness, it is useless as a mark of merit, since some ugly pictures are good. If, on the other hand, a beautiful picture can be ugly, beauty is not an informative concept, for presumably to be one thing, it should exclude its opposite. This 'presumably' shows the circularity of the argument. Perhaps ugliness is outweighed by beauty, somehow exploited or subverted by it, in good art. On the other hand, if the second horn of the dilemma is right and beauty is just a synonym for merit, then it is strange that 'ugliness' for Goodman should not be just be a synonym for aesthetic failure. But if it is, the first horn of the dilemma could not arise, for no good art could be ugly. The passage, far from posing a challenge for classical aesthetics, shows Goodman fumbling with two formulations of the same contradictory notion: namely, that beauty is only a word for aesthetic merit, while ugliness is a real phenomenon.

The result is not the isolated failing of a consistent thinker, but rather a distinctly modern experience: only try to meet Saville's gaze on the cover of this book, or recall T.S. Eliot's 'patient etherized upon a table'.[5] To call either beautiful seems wilful, to admit ugliness in art or in the world, a platitude. But how can ugliness be real if beauty is not? Should not the two terms, fundamental or derived, enjoy the same status? Such questions moved Karl Rosenkranz, in the *Aesthetics of Ugliness* (1853), to disagree with his master Hegel, who, following Goethe, had called the devil a 'highly prosaic person', useless for art. This Rosenkranz met with Goodmanian disbelief: 'Is then the drawing of evil so easy that every bungler can succeed at it?'[6] Granting Hegel and the Neo-Platonists that evil may be a mere privation of good, Rosenkranz argued not only that ugliness is an indispensable feature of its salient representation, but that such salience can make an ugly work, *as* ugly, aesthetically valid, even beautiful. To deny this is to demand from art only 'moral exhibitions', not insight into our imperfect world.

The quarrel between Rosenkranz and Hegel about the possibility of representing negativity in aesthetic terms is still of interest today for the light it casts not only on aesthetic notions, but on their relation to one another and to the more alarming real world. More recent students of Hegel, driven by Modernist ideas about the autonomy of art and its values, have seen in relational accounts like Rosenkranz's a theological impulse linking ugliness with evil, in contrast to Hegel's putatively value-free science of aesthetics.[7]

[5] The notorious third line of 'The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock', following the lyrical couplet: 'Let us go then, you and I / When the evening is spread out against the sky / Like a patient etherized upon a table'. T.S. Eliot, *Prufrock and Other Observations* (London: The Egoist Ltd., 1917), 9.

[6] Karl Rosenkranz, *Ästhetik des Häßlichen* (Königsberg: Gebrüder Bornträger, 1853), R 357. We quote from our translation, but provide the original German pagination as (R #).

[7] This has been the case following Hans-Robert Jauss's influential edited volume on 'the no longer fine (beautiful) arts', *Die nicht mehr schönen Künste. Grenzphänomene des Ästhetischen* (München: Wilhelm Fink, 1968). Jauss's point that, in modernity, ugliness becomes autonomous from beauty and its cognates has been applied retroactively by Hegelian scholars like Otto Pöggeler, Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, and more recently Bernadette Collenberg-Plotnikov and Francesca Iannelli, who distinguish rather starkly between the genuine, fragmentary aesthetics of Hegel (as found in student notes) and the more systematic aesthetics of the Hegelians. For a Jaussian approach to Rosenkranz in art history, see Jeffrey Hamburger, ' "To Make Women Weep": Ugly Art as "Feminine" and the Origins of Modern Aesthetics', *RES: Anthropology and Aesthetics* 31 (Spring 1997), 19.

But for what other reason should ugliness have no relation to beauty, if not the denial that the two may be correlated with extra-aesthetic values that make art morally, politically, or otherwise practically interesting? As Goodman and Rosenkranz suggest, such assertions should be tested not only against our experience of art, but in light of the commitments they impose on us. For Rosenkranz, at least, the correlation of beauty and ugliness, though it mirrors that of good and evil, is not a matter of morality, but of art's orientation to other things that we value and reject. This commits him in turn to a view of ugliness as dependent on beauty that many readers find incompatible with its real existence. It might help to compare Goodman's allergic reaction to beauty with a neatly parallel reaction to ugliness by Rosenkranz's illustrious contemporary, the Swiss novelist Gottfried Keller. On receiving a copy of the *Aesthetics of Ugliness*, Keller complained:

> The title is already absurd and romantic. Beautiful is beautiful, and ugly is ugly, in all eternity. There is nothing else to do, but what the physicists do with heat: they know no positive coldness and do not use this concept, but only less heat. So it must be with beauty. The manner of presenting much of art history as intentionally applied, beautifully executed ugliness is a creeping irrationality; for to be precise, this never happens in true art (degeneracy is not to be taken into account), and what one wants to point out in fact is nothing but pure beauty. Here too we must hold on to the ever more normative procedure of the natural sciences and not assume, against general and absolutely singular beauty, an opposite of positive ugliness, like a devil, but only a lower degree of beauty.[8]

Keller's appeal to scientific method might have been applauded by the nominalist Goodman. And his point that beauty and ugliness are one subject matter is sound; but one cannot on this basis dismiss ugliness by calling it 'lesser beauty'.[9] Quantitative talk of heat obscures the fact that 500 ugly pictures do not add up to a beautiful one – beauty and ugliness play different roles in aesthetics, despite their relationship to one another, just as differing states of a physical system may do. Keller is left desperately denouncing ugly art as degenerate (*Ausartung*, a cousin of *Entartung*), which does not tell us how to distinguish it from 'purely beautiful' depiction of ugly objects. Goodman, at any rate, is clearer about the ugliness of some great art.

Why should philosophers, art historians, artists, and readers in general care about beauty and ugliness as substantive aesthetic terms? Well, the general reader comes first, since these terms are ensconced in social life, where they are unlikely to go away any time soon. Think only of the large, if increasingly covert, role they play in sexuality and

[8] Jacob Baechtold, *Gottfried Kellers Leben: 1850–1861* (Hertz, 1894), 224, discussed in Werner Jung, *Schöner Schein der Häßlichkeit oder Häßlichkeit des schönen Scheins* (Frankfurt: Athenäum, 1987), 201.

[9] In 'The coexistence of beauty and ugliness', in *Ugliness: The Non-Beautiful in Art and Theory*, 165–79, I tried to do justice to both insights (that beauty and ugliness have one subject matter, but are irreducible) by presenting them as converse two-place relations holding between all objects, so that for every 'A is lovelier than B', there is a 'B is uglier than A'.

its social exploitation.[10] But the artist and writer have an equal stake in the matter, as the production of beauty and ugliness in the service of very specific moral, political, economic and other interests has been an explicit task or motivation in many cultures over millennia.[11] Even if advocates of the avant-garde are right to say that the connection has become contingent or optional, it can only be ignored at the cost of ignoring art of the past, and indeed some signal achievements of the avant-garde itself.

Deeper than this 'inclusiveness argument' is the link between aesthetic qualities, art's content, and the role it plays in human society. Beauty and ugliness are after all intra-aesthetic categories that, informed by the anthropological and sociological study of their historical formations, can account for the role that art and artefacts play in economic, moral, religious, and political life – why a ruler would expend considerable resources for certain monuments, say, or imprison a caricaturist. Without aesthetic force of a positive and a negative nature, all of these functions are relegated to art's content, to be extracted from written documents and the iconographic decoding of symbols. Such a didactic view of how art functions is rejected by practically everyone today – but so is a formalism according to which the content of art is irrelevant to its function.[12] The middle ground, which is not a compromise but only honesty about the data to be explained, is that there are both sensual and intellectual aspects of works of art; it is denial of one or the other that fuels indifference to the aesthetic categories which can coordinate them.[13] If this is right, substantial accounts of beauty and ugliness are fair game, and a legitimate goal, for the philosophy, criticism, history, and practice of art.

To give Modernist scepticism its due, Goodman is surely right that a theory of beauty ignoring the phenomenon of ugliness will not be convincing. It is regrettable if not surprising that the recent enthusiasm for beauty makes little provision for ugliness. Thus, beauty theorist Elaine Scarry reluctantly concedes the beauty of 'Japanese noise guitar', which an interviewer was worried would be missed by opera lovers.[14] The noise guitarist might respond as Arnold Schönberg did to film producer Louis B. Mayer: 'My music isn't lovely!'[15] It is a hard-won Modernist achievement to insist that ugliness

[10] As Henri Zerner once replied to Ernst Gombrich's insistence on the possibility of pure decoration: 'Is the present use of lipstick ever "pure design"? That it has aesthetic value (for better or worse) is beyond question. If a woman were asked by an anthropologist, she might indeed reply that she uses it just for aesthetic and decorative reasons. But let a man wear lipstick, and the cultural implications come quickly to the foreground.' In '*The Sense of Order*: An Exchange', *New York Review of Books* (28 June 1979), 62.

[11] Whether or not the concepts are universal, their salience to many cultures is shown in research by Claude-François Baudez, 'Beauty and Ugliness in Olmec Monumental Sculpture', *Journal de la Société des Americanistes* 98(2) (2012): 7–31; see also the essays in our anthology *Ugliness*, and its annotated bibliography (275–99).

[12] For example, Alois Riegl in his study of ornament, according to which a historical development of form itself dictates what was made when. Late in his *Spätrömische Kunstindustrie* (1902), Riegl conceded that culture and form are connected by aesthetic categories.

[13] These may be explained in biological, sociological, or idealist terms – or left as basic.

[14] David Bowman, 'Does Beauty Really Equal Truth?', interview with Elaine Scarry, *Salon*, 9 Nov. 1999, available at: http://www.salon.com/1999/11/09/scarry/ (accessed 18 August 2014). The work of Alexander Nehamas is an exception in taking account of ugliness.

[15] Friedrich Torberg, *Die Tante Jolesch; oder, Der Untergang des Abendlandes in Anekdoten* (München: Langen-Müller, 1975), 286.

should not be aesthetically transmuted. On the other hand, whether the truth of Schönberg's self-assessment is compatible with the success, force, and other (further or synonymous) aesthetic features of his art is a matter of theory and observation. Consider the analogy with logic: from the fact that some logical properties apply when sentences are true, others when false, still others in any case, one may hold that logic is the science of truth (with falsity explained as non-truth), or of something more general (inference), but it would be silly to conclude that truth and falsity have no bearing on it.[16]

Truth and falsity do matter in logic, and most people can see that. But the subjective tone of aesthetics makes the existence of both its positive and negative terms seem exotic. Rosenkranz, in introducing and defending the very publication, not the specific content, of his *Aesthetics of Ugliness*, makes recourse to a kind of *scientia oppositorum:* 'No one is amazed if biology also concerns itself with the concept of sickness, ethics with that of evil, legal science with injustice, or theology with the concept of sin.'[17] His point is not merely that ugliness deserves study, but that it is central to *aesthetics*: 'To say "theory of ugliness" would fail to bring out so clearly the scientific genealogy of the word.' To work out this aesthetics, in art and everyday life, and in a systematic rather than in a historical way, is the task that Rosenkranz pursued in this book. Its stand-alone publication provoked much head scratching, and not just from Keller.[18] Even Rosenkranz's best friend among the older Hegelians, the statesman and soldier Karl August Varnhagen von Ense, asked gently why ugliness should be separated from its better half.[19] Rosenkranz replied that he provided what was missing, but a deeper answer might flow from the Hegelian insight developed at length in the book's middle section, on incorrectness in art: modern art achieves its greatest triumphs through the conquest of resistant material, which involves either the breaking of rules in the service of genius or the confrontation of disorder in the world. 'Simple beauty' of the Keller kind, Rosenkranz declares in his most iconoclastic mood, is dull and in the end ugly. Genuine modern beauty, by contrast, has always an admixture of ugliness, whether tragic and pessimistic in nature or comical and optimistic. This is because, while beauty is conceptually self-contained, ugliness as its negation always points to beauty. In notes that predate the writing of the book, Rosenkranz is still bolder, claiming that humour, the distorting principle of caricature, is the *metaphysical* basis of all beauty, because it 'plays with the serious', being able to cross all the registers of the aesthetic from the

[16] For example, Michael Dummett, *Frege: Philosophy of Language* (London: Duckworth, 1981), 433, insists logic is not really about truth, but about 'the relation of logical consequence'. Note the circularity: consequence is logical in that new sentences preserve truth or falsity.

[17] Rosenkranz, *Aesthetics*, R iv. Cf. R 4: 'It is appropriate that finally the dark side of the luminous form of beauty should become of central moment to the science of aesthetics, as illness is to pathology, and as evil is to ethics.'

[18] Notable is the anonymous review by Julian Schmidt, in *Die Grenzboten* 28 (July 1853), 1–9. A former student of Rosenkranz but pronounced foe of Hegel, Schmidt is not always fair, but often pertinent, in his criticisms. We return to them below.

[19] Arthur Warda (ed.), *Briefwechsel zwischen Karl Rosenkranz und Varnhagen von Ense* (1926), 199. Alexander von Humboldt endorsed Rosenkranz's project in correspondence that has unfortunately been lost. See Holger Funk, *Ästhetik des Hässlichen: Beiträge zum Verständnis negativer Ausdrucksformen im 19. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: Agora, 1983), 245.

ridiculous to the sublime.[20] The *Aesthetics of Ugliness*, then, *is* Rosenkranz's positive aesthetics, and the additional texts we have translated bear witness to the fact that he never wrote about beauty and the sublime more probingly than in this volume devoted to their opposites.

To see why the book took on the form it has, and advanced the theses it does with the examples it contains (Rosenkranz boasted having amassed twice as much evidence as he printed), it will be necessary to look briefly at the author's life and philosophy. We then return to the most distinctive and challenging theses of the book, without neglecting its problems. Some of these, regarding the ethical implications of his doctrine, must have become obvious to Rosenkranz himself just a few years after publication, as artists such as Courbet and Baudelaire expanded the range of what might be seen as good in art by leaps and bounds, assimilating much that, in Rosenkranz's eyes, schooled by Romantic painting, poetry and caricature, had at best the negative virtue of bringing vice and evil to light. From a contemporary perspective, other aspects of Rosenkranz's presentation may cause offence – passages that now read as racist or misogynist, and which, even given a charitable historical context, reveal the limits of Rosenkranz's attempt to apply aesthetics not just to art and the realm of the aesthetic (which he pointedly and explicitly identifies with a realm of appearance), but to whatever this shares with reality in general.[21] That his apparent retrogression from Hegel's limitation of aesthetics to art makes Rosenkranz's ideas timely will be emphasized in the final section of this introduction, on thinking about ugliness today. A brief note on the language of the original, and its translation, concludes this prefatory material.

Rosenkranz's life and work

As with Karl Marx, there is a recurrent myth that Karl Rosenkranz (1805–1879) studied with Hegel. In one case, the myth is silly, as Hegel died when Marx was aged 13; in the other, the confusion is such that it would be equally wrong to say, as some scholars do, that Rosenkranz did *not* study with Hegel. He did in fact attend some of Hegel's classes in the late 1820s in Berlin. But he found the master's laboured speech, regularly interrupted by coughing and the taking of snuff, incomprehensible.[22] Two Hegelian teachers, Carl Daub and Hermann Hinrichs, impressed Rosenkranz more with their

[20] Rosenkranz, *System der Wissenschaft: ein philosophisches Encheiridion* (Königsberg: Bornträger, 1850, excerpt translated in this book; pp 296–306), 615. In 1850, Rosenkranz had not yet begun writing the *Aesthetics*. Cf. R 170–1 on caricature and the ideal.

[21] Schmidt complains that Kant and even Hegel had rightly emphasized this distinction, which Rosenkranz, Theodor Vischer, and other mid-century aestheticians had forgotten, and which he sums up as: 'beauty is only for humans' (*Die Grenzboten*, p. 4). Rosenkranz would agree, if this is rightly understood. He would not agree that Hegel had banished natural beauty, whatever Hegelians might have done: see his *Studien* (Berlin: Jonas, 1839), ix–x.

[22] Karl Rosenkranz, *Von Magdeburg bis Königberg* (Berlin: Heimann, 1873), 187. Most of his early biography is based on this amusing autobiography, which ends with the move to Königsberg (and the embrace of philosophy). As a student, Rosenkranz was a devotee of the more eloquent Friedrich Schleiermacher; on turning Hegelian, he published friendly criticism of Schleiermacher (1831, printed in book form in 1836).

earnestness than their theories, convincing him to study and finally to meet Hegel.[23] Meanwhile, as a junior faculty member in Halle, he attended Hegel's final lectures and birthday party, before his death of cholera in November 1831. By this time Rosenkranz had behind him a dissertation on German literary history and a habilitation thesis on Spinoza, and had struggled his way free of Romanticism and to an appreciation of the Middle Ages and their art, a learning experience he was to remember as being most difficult.[24] Being the youngest and most historical of the Hegelians, he was taken on to work on the massive editions of Kant and Hegel, providing the concluding biographical volumes of both, focussing on the dissemination of Kant's philosophy in the former, and on Hegel's life and its relation to his philosophy in the latter – an apt arrangement for the prophet and the Messiah of idealism.[25]

With his appointment in 1833 to Kant's chair in philosophy in Königsberg, occupied in the intervening years, first, by Traugott Krug (who left it to fight against Napoleon!) and then Johann Friedrich Herbart, Rosenkranz took up perhaps the most famous teaching post in German academia, but he also left Berlin for a backwater. His colleague Karl Ludwig Michelet joked about Rosenkranz disappearing into the mists of the Baltic, and in fact the alienation from the Hegel circle grew gradually over the following two decades to a breaking point in the mid-1850s, despite Rosenkranz's brief return to Berlin in July 1848 to serve in the liberal government of Rudolf von Auerswald, and as a Congressman in the first chamber of the Prussian Landtag. This political experience left him disappointed but not embittered, and while there is some justice in editor Dieter Kliche's picture of the aesthetics of ugliness as a work of political resignation, Rosenkranz's motto from Fourier (calling the aesthetics, like picking up rubbish and similar tasks, *works of devotion*) suggests rather a renewed commitment to the political dimension of everyday life.[26]

However political experience may have coloured the work, Rosenkranz, as Kliche notes, had worked on ugliness for at least 15 years. A letter of 1837 mentions patient preparations, including the building up of a collection of caricatures, which was to

[23] Hinrichs published a Hegelian reading of tragedy, *Das Wesen der antiken Tragödie* (Halle: Ruff, 1827), which was censured by Goethe for its turgidity, but may have inspired Nietzsche. Daub, with whom Rosenkranz studied only a semester in Heidelberg, proved more central to Rosenkranz's development: his *Judas Ischariot*, 2 vols. (Heidelberg: Mohr und Winter, 1816–18), in arguing that evil is the cause of natural ugliness, provoked Rosenkranz's resistance in an 1836 essay (collected in *Studien*, 155–205), to which he returns in his twelfth endnote of the *Aesthetics* (cf. R 24, R 439).

[24] *Magdeburg*, 361–63, gives an account of his turn to Spinoza, motivated by Hegel's critique of the latter's concept of substance, which Hegel identified with the Absolute, and thus the Subject, and thus, for Rosenkranz, a theistic God. Puzzled, he read Spinoza.

[25] Bernhard Bolzano 'learned to love and respect the man, whom I cannot warm to as a philosopher' on reading Rosenkranz's biography of Hegel. Wolfgang Künne, 'Goethe und Bolzano', in *Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, vol. 18 (Berlin and Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2012), 84. Rosenkranz, in turn, was one of the few Hegelians to have read Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre. Aus einem Tagebuch*, 44–5.

[26] Dieter Kliche, 'Pathologie des Schönen', in Karl Rosenkranz, *Ästhetik des Hässlichen*, ed. D. Kliche (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2007), 477–81. Margaret A. Rose, 'Karl Rosenkranz and the "Aesthetics of the Ugly"', in *Politics, Religion, and Art: Hegelian Debates*, ed. Douglas Moggach (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2011), 231–52, rightly insists that Rosenkranz's politics were more liberal (and leftist) than most historians suggest, and that his emphasis on the comic belies Kliche's account of his pessimism.

shape the finished volume, written in seven months in 1853.[27] That Rosenkranz, married and father of three children, engaged in such collecting, whose cost in remote Königsberg must have been considerable, suggests the importance of the project for him. The first decade of his activity in the Baltic city was a flurry of literary activity, with many polemical pamphlets defending Hegelian philosophy, important articles on political science, comparative religion, and German literary history, and a textbook of psychology that went through several editions and whose concept of fear fascinated Kierkegaard. Besides this, there were important reviews (including one of Hegel's *Aesthetics*, which we reprint in part), poems and a play, literary sketches of Königsberg and its denizens, a critique of duelling, and so on. Little wonder that intellectual exhaustion, coupled with impatience, set in. In a reply to the distinguished historian of philosophy, Eduard Zeller, Rosenkranz declines some writing opportunity, saying that he has put journalism and polemics behind him for the time being in order to devote himself to systematic work.[28] Informed readers might expect him to have meant his own *System der Wissenschaft*, which appeared just before the *Aesthetics*, in 1850, but that book is modestly subtitled *A philosophical enchiridion* (manual), and is no more than an update of Hegel, revising the psychology, logic, and above all the natural history and aesthetics in ways Rosenkranz had done in his apologetics, and above all in light of the science of the first half of the nineteenth century.[29] This book contains the author's considered thoughts on *everything*, including aesthetics (reprinted in this volume), but it is hardly the new systematic work for which he gave up controversy.[30] A reply to his critic Friedrich Dorguth is telling:

> I am heartily fed up with all dispute over principles. I would be satisfied if I were to succeed in constructing for a few disciplines a finer profile, a more solid foundation and a more natural context. One may argue over whether I have done this by thinking with 'abstract Spirit' or if it was only a mindless 'cerebral movement' – in God's name, let it only be true. On page 3 you ridicule my opting for a 'wholly new thinking'. What a weakling I must be, if I aimed at 'newness' in thinking, and indeed *ex arbitrio*!'[31]

[27] *Briefwechsel*, 59. In 1850, as the notes to the *System* translated by us make clear, he thought of the project as an *Aesthetics of Caricature*. He also intended it to be extensively illustrated. But a constitutional aversion to finishing things made the project seem far off: 'Must one not hold everything in oneself in continuous flux, can one then conclude or settle any element of spirit, of study, once and for all?' *Studien* (Berlin: Jonas, 1839), viii.

[28] Karl Rosenkranz, *Briefe 1827 bis 1850*, ed. Joachim Butzlaff (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1994), 353 (no. 293). It is regrettable that Butzlaff was not able to publish a second volume of Rosenkranz's letters; these can be pieced together in part from the Varnhagen volume, Paul Herre, ed., *Karl Rosenkranz. Politische Briefe und Aufsätze 1848–1856* (Leipzig: Dieterich, 1919), and the appendix to Lotte Esau, *Karl Rosenkranz als Politiker* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1935).

[29] Rosenkranz, nephew of the mathematician Grüson, was more aware of these failings than other Hegelians, having debated the respective merits of Hegel and Newton with his uncle.

[30] Perhaps most interesting of Rosenkranz's 'systematic' efforts is his political geography in *Die Topographie des heutigen Berlin und Paris* (Königsberg: Bornträger, 1850).

[31] Letter to F.L.A. Dorguth, 30 July 1845, in Butzlaff, *Briefe*, 247 (no. 287).

There is a bracing modesty to this even today, as debates continue to rage about the reduction of *Geist* to brain states. But how on earth could this come out of the mouth of a mid-nineteenth-century Hegelian?[32] Even in his orthodoxy, Rosenkranz took on a more worldly attitude than was usual among Hegelians: in the first volume of his *Logic*, he styles himself 'a declared enemy of all abstraction that cannot legitimate itself in the concrete', insisting that the few traditional examples philosophers have 'chewed on' since Aristotle and Bacon should be richly supplemented.[33] This 'realistic tic', as he called it, may explain his agnosticism about ontology, especially those shadowy reaches that cannot be based on example. It also issued in a theoretically interesting revision of the key Hegelian concept of the idea (*Idee*).[34] For Hegel, this 'unity of the concept and reality' was one with the Absolute, and comprised everything, all substance: there is no 'idea of *some thing*', as he dismissively puts it, but concepts and material things are just limited, finite shavings of the whole of truth and reality, which is ideal.[35] Rosenkranz holds on to the formulation in terms of the identity of concept and reality, but dispenses with any hint that there is *one* idea: an idea is simply the 'objective and absolute form of the subjective concept', of which of course there are many.[36] Indeed, a subtle change in the inherited definition points to this: the idea is 'the existence of itself as the unmediated unity of the concept and its reality'.[37] Its reality: the idea is whatever is independent of thinkers that comes into play when they succeed in thinking (of things). As such, it is self-determined and prior to whatever objects it embraces. Rosenkranz's own examples are suggestive: life is not the same as its organic causes, freedom is not the same as its social causes. Simpler examples would work too: to borrow one from Socrates, if I use the word 'horse' to think of a horse, and you use it to think of a man, then the ideas involved in my and your thinking are the ideas of horse and man respectively. The objects could be destroyed, and the subjective concepts die with us, but the ideas of man and horse would remain. The resulting view of the rationality of all reality (because it can all come under concepts), which Rosenkranz calls both *Realidealismus* and *Idealrealismus*, is meant to do justice to both realism and idealism. It is also supposed to generate the whole majestic Hegelian panorama of

[32] Throughout his life, Rosenkranz held Hegel's improvement on Kant to consist of stating the ontological presuppositions of formal logic. *Magdeburg*, 361–2.

[33] Rosenkranz, *Wissenschaft der logischen Idee: Metaphysik* (Königsberg: Bornträger, 1858), vii–viii. At R 177, Rosenkranz defends his rich use of examples against Schiller.

[34] The advertisement for the *System* in the back of the *Aesthetics*, probably by the author, notes that in it, 'the teaching on the idea has been substantially changed and raised to a new doctrine', which, as we will see, is accurate despite the retention of Hegel's definition.

[35] G.W.F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik* (Nürnberg: Schrag, 1812), I: p. 55, where the definition is only mentioned casually; in the *Enzyklopädie* (1817, §161, pp. 111–12; 1845 §213, pp. 182–3), we learn that 'the idea is the true *in and for itself, the absolute union of the concept and objectivity*' (all italics are original). Hegel goes on to equate the idea with the absolute, with truth, and, warning that 'the idea itself is not to be taken as the idea *of some thing*' (*irgend Etwas,* literally *some something*, important because 'something' was taken to be the widest concept available, applicable to all objects), ends by suggesting that there is just *one* idea, and that is the 'one, general substance'.

[36] In *Magdeburg*, p. 361, Rosenkranz complains of Hinrichs' logic that it mixed up the subjective (conceptual) and objective (ontological) halves of Hegel's.

[37] *System*, 117 (§236) and 119 (§238). At *System*, 466 (§711), Rosenkranz uses the plural, *Ideen*, without giving an impression of carelessly relapsing into an everyday usage.

natural and human science, a *system* whose schematic inadequacy Rosenkranz was in no position to reject.[38] But it is typical of him that he explains the ideality of reality in down-to-earth terms as the joy of recognition, the grasp of the idea in the awareness that an object falls under a concept. This process, as he puts it, is also an ethical and an aesthetic one. 'The unity of the idea with itself as *reunion* gains a yet greater intensity and sensitivity, like the rejuvenation of a convalescent; like the comicality that results from ugliness, and so on. There is more joy in heaven over a sinner that repents than over ninety-nine just men.'[39]

No wonder that Rosenkranz's old colleagues turned against him as Neo-Kantian resistance to the Hegel School intensified. In 1860, articles by the conservative Michelet and the revolutionary Lassalle tore into Rosenkranz: the official complaint was a theological one, since Rosenkranz insisted that Hegel had been a theist, not a pantheist, but the critics, after praising Rosenkranz's literary style, pulled out all the stops, accusing him of the cardinal sin: a regression to Kant. In response, Rosenkranz defended his theology and embraced the Kantian label, which he identified above all with an open attitude in philosophy and courtesy in debate.[40] The polemics that followed unfortunately overshadowed the *Aesthetics*, which in its way signalled a more decisive break with Hegel, at least as he was then worshipped in Berlin.[41] Rosenkranz did in the end retreat somewhat from philosophy, following up his volume on Goethe (1847) with a two-volume study of Denis Diderot, his autobiography (whose 487 pages end with his move to Königsberg), and a second Hegel biography, *Hegel als deutscher Nationalphilosoph*.[42] The predicate of that title had by this time come to have a bitter ring for Rosenkranz: the son of a French mother and himself a Francophile (he spent two months in Paris in the summer of 1846), and a patriotic German (see the rant in this book about the neglect of German novels), he could not accept the nationalist vitriol of the Franco-Prussian War, particularly the blanket rejection of French art and thought. Retiring from teaching in 1873 on account of blindness, he lived his final years in obscurity, his aesthetics carried on by a few of his students, notably the poet-critic

[38] Two decades after the *Aesthetics*, Rosenkranz in fact re-edited Hegel's *Enzyklopädie* in Kirchmann's *Philosophische Bibliothek* series of great works of philosophy (Berlin: Heimann, 1870), sharply deploring the 'randomness' of the reasoning in all the books that carry 'inductive method' proudly on their title pages. He hopes against this that Hegel, for all his empirical obsoleteness, will prove a discipline of thought, quoting loosely from Hegel's review of Jacobi: 'one has to know what one has said; but this is not as easy as one thinks' (p. xxii) The part after the semicolon is in any case Rosenkranz's.

[39] *System*, 137 (§258).

[40] In *Der Gedanke*, vols 1 and 2 (1860 and 1861). Joachim Butzlaff, in the *Neue Deutsche Bibliographie* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2005), vol. 22, 71 (also available online), mistakes Rosenkranz's complaint that he had been 'solemnly de-Hegelized' as a confession that he had been refuted: he was only complaining of his social exclusion from the Berlin cabal. His philosophical reply is in *Epilegomena zu meiner Wissenschaft der logischen Idee. Als Replik gegen die Kritik der Herren Michelet und Lasalle* (Königsberg: Bornträger, 1862), which led to further replies in *Der Gedanke* for 1862.

[41] His loving parody in 1836 of the 'vulgar opinion' of Hegel has more than a whiff of iconoclasm, especially the image of the end of art as 'the world spirit ascending the peak of the cultural pyramid in his philosophy'. See Rosenkranz's review of Hegel's *Ästhetik, Jahrbuch für wissenschaftliche Kritik*, January 1836, 8 (excerpts translated in this book, see pp. 287–96).

[42] He did not wholly give up controversy: his discussion of Moriz Carrière's aesthetics is in the final volume of his *Neue Studien*, printed in 1878, two years before his death.

Rudolf Gottschall and the aesthetician Maximillian Schasler.[43] His own papers, and what he had of Hegel's were dispersed or burned, some in San Francisco after the 1906 earthquake, some in Königsberg in 1945.[44]

Realism in aesthetics

The brief account of his life is not given for its own sake, but for the light it throws on the aesthetics of Rosenkranz. His interest in caricature, the metropolis, medieval and non-Western cultures (not placed, as in Hegel, on lower rungs of intellectual development) will be obvious to the reader: more subterranean, but no less decisive, is his break with the idealist aesthetic tradition of Kant, Hegel, and contemporaries like Arnold Ruge. This break, which issues in a realism about the existence of aesthetic properties, and which Rosenkranz, as we have seen, was to declare in his *Logic*, published five years after the *Aesthetics*, remains in this book to some extent implicit. Rosenkranz aims to correct, not supplant, writers he rightly thought greater than himself: but his realist tendency becomes explicit just where he starts rebelling against Kant, around the middle of the book. As it informs his diverse views of ugliness, it is worth sketching before diving into the detail.

But, first, just what can realism in aesthetics mean? That beauty, ugliness, and whatever other aesthetic properties exist are to be found *in the objects themselves* and only trivially in the perceiving subject who takes account of them.[45] This position might sound alarming to the art historian or institutional art theorist, but of course sociological and cultural theories of aesthetic judgement also have to appeal to empirical realities and not just subjective conditions of the possibility of aesthetic experience. The fact of spectators, even of consciousness, does not render an aesthetics idealist or conventionalist: it is the claim that consciousness *constitutes* the aesthetic object that does so.[46]

[43] Schasler's monumental two-volume *Kritische Geschichte der Ästhetik* (Berlin: Nicolai, 1882), dedicated to Rosenkranz, adapted many of his distinctions to an intellectual history of aesthetic systems, rather in the style of Hegel's lectures on the history of philosophy. Also like Hegel and Kant, Schasler denied that ugliness aesthetically applied remains ugly. More interesting from an art historical standpoint is Rudolf Gottschall's article, 'Glossen zur Aesthetik des Hässlichen', *Deutsche Revue über das gesamte nationale Leben der Gegenwart*, 3 (July–September 1895): 38–54, which adapted Rosenkranz's categories to art of the late nineteenth century. The one substantial discussion of Rosenkranz in English, siding rather with Schasler, is Bernard Bosanquet, *A History of Aesthetic* (London: Swan Sonnenschein/New York: Macmillan, 1892), 400–9.

[44] Butzlaff, *Briefe*, 11, notes that Russian libraries did not appear to have saved any of this, but remained optimistic because of then-recent discoveries of Kant material.

[45] R 178 lists Schiller among the subjectivists, as he was in the *Letters on Aesthetic Education*; but in unpublished notes on the 'aesthetic estimation of quantities' (*Von der ästhetischen Größenschätzung*), Schiller conceded that objects cause the 'phenomenon' of the sublime in subjects, and that we predicate it of the objects. *Schillers Sämmtliche Schriften. Historisch-kritische Ausgabe*, ed. Karl Goedeke (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1871), vol. 10, 201. This position might be called an 'internal realism' like Hilary Putnam's.

[46] Such a position, traditional to German aesthetics, is revived by Juliane Rebentisch. Intermediate positions are possible, though perhaps less interesting than full-blooded realism and idealism. Realism too, to be clear, has to account for conscious experience.

Such a focus on the subject had been Kant's great innovation, and much has been claimed for it: not only the inward turn of German idealism, but the whole critical tenor of modern theory of knowledge with its focus on mental acts. It might seem strange for a Hegelian to attack *this* aspect of Kant, on which Hegel built in limiting aesthetics to art. And Rosenkranz does not attack the actual arguments of the *Critique of the Power of Judgement* that purport to show taste to be both subjective and universal. Rather, he bluntly rejects the doctrine where it is most implausible: where it refers to the sublime, which Kant had made out to be *more* subjective than judgements of beauty, tracking not form in nature but our inability to conceive it, and reflecting feelings of pleasurable fear, respect, and inadequacy in our response to it. That post-Kantians had done away with even this tenuous link to nature frustrates Rosenkranz:

> We know very well, where the sublime in it exists; we seek it out, in order to enjoy it; we make it the goal of troublesome journeys. When we stand on the snow-covered peak of smoking Aetna and see Sicily before us between the coasts of Calabria and Africa, washed by the sea's waves, the sublimity of this view is not our subjective act, much rather the objective work of nature, which we already expected before we reached the peak. Or when the Niagara Falls, its spray rising into the heavens, thunders over the shaking walls of stone for miles round, it is in itself sublime, whether a human witnesses this theatre or not.[47]

Rosenkranz characteristically combines crisp examples (of what we would now call tourist sites), psychology (our expectation of the sublime effect of the view), and realist argumentation concerning the persistence of objects of perception. If this reads like an anticipation of G.E. Moore's arguments against the idealist doctrine that to be is to be perceived, it provoked similar charges of naïveté. Rosenkranz's former pupil Julian Schmidt, for instance, in his organ of 'programmatic realism', *Die Grenzboten* [The border messengers], called this passage 'school-boyish', pointing out that a change in size makes mincemeat of Rosenkranz's argument: 'a Gulliver from Giant-Land would find the Niagara Falls, on wading them, no more sublime than a sluice.'[48]

It is easy to ridicule realism in this manner by singling out the contribution of the spectator to aesthetic experience. An aesthetic realism that dispenses with people is indeed silly. But Rosenkranz, who was talking only about our anticipation of a sublime view, never denies this. And a moment's thought suggests that Schmidt's counterexample plays into Rosenkranz's hands: he has not shown the sublime to be the product of 'the power of one's own soul', in which case we would be ill-placed to understand the giant's view, but only that the relation of one's bodily size to that of the object (a plainly physical one) plays a role in the sublime. One cannot disprove realism about aesthetics thus. But the challenge remains pertinent to the extent that it prompts the realist to specify what the perceiving subject contributes to aesthetic experience. This is in fact what Rosenkranz does in the body of the book, turning from putative cases of ugliness in form (in physical nature, inanimate and animal) to intentional ugliness in aesthetic

[47] R 178–9.
[48] Schmidt, *Die Grenzboten,* p. 5.

and moral rule-breaking.[49] Neither the interest in natural ugliness, nor the ascent from the physical to the moral world, is unusual among the post-Hegelian aestheticians, as Schmidt notes. What makes this development unique in Rosenkranz, and will be discussed more closely in the next two sections, is an identification that concedes to idealist aesthetics their main insight: that what makes *objects themselves* ugly is the recognition of the subject that they fail to conform to some ideal. Thus the kind of naïve-Hegelian criticism of, say, amphibians as neither land- nor sea-dwellers becomes an attribution of ugliness in light of a teleology assumed by observers of animals (Rosenkranz, not seeing the point of a long neck, finds giraffes ugly). This step, far from abandoning realism about aesthetic qualities, extends it to observers: it only makes sense to find some pieces of nature, some living things, some humans and artworks and writings, beautiful, ugly, or indifferent if a relation between these objects and the judging subject is the real object of the aesthetic judgement. This leads to the refutation of a lot of accusatory aesthetics which equate ugliness with matter, primitive states of *Geist*, evil (notably, by Rosenkranz's teacher Daub), and a variety of other imperfections: as Rosenkranz ironically points out in the Preface to the section on deformation, which is probably the most philosophically rewarding ten pages of the book, the devil can make himself pretty if need be, so that any theory that just happens to make ugliness the same as some moral or other non-aesthetic failing cannot be the whole truth. The truth in such speculation, Rosenkranz suggests, depends on intention, both that of the artist who renders the world in beautiful or repulsive ways, and that of the observer of art or nature who interprets what is encountered in aesthetic terms.

What it means to interpret the world aesthetically is precisely the formal aspect of cognition, its phenomenal character emphasized by Kant:

> Aesthetics may rest content with illusion. When the jet of a fountain squirts through the air, the resulting appearance is a purely mechanical product of the height from which the water must first fall, but the violence with which it shoots out lends the water an illusion of free movement. A flower waves its petals back and forth. The flower does not really turn itself this way and that, back and forth; the wind pushes it. But illusion makes the flower appear to be moving on its own.[50]

Aesthetics as the province of appearance is formal through and through, but the account remains realist precisely because the appearance, as illusion, may be true or false. It is here that Rosenkranz offers his substantial account of what beauty and ugliness track, which is freedom, understood very broadly:

[49] As Schmidt notes, the backtracking from Hegel's 'culture only' position is obvious already in the long introduction, which treats in sequence the 'naturally ugly', the 'intellectually ugly', and the 'artistically ugly'. Of course, a Hegelian might go through this trichotomy to conclude that the artistically ugly alone is fundamental. That is not what Rosenkranz does in the body of the book, which shuffles the order of the elements: while the first section, on formlessness, deals in great part with natural phenomena, art examples crop up too, and they predominate in the second section, on incorrectness, only to take their place among natural, moral, and religious examples in the third and longest section, on 'disfiguration or distortion', which ends with an enthusiastic account of caricature as the reunion of intentional ugliness with the ideal.

[50] R 166–7. For stylistic reasons we have removed the definite article before 'illusion' in the first line.

> In fact, the ultimate ground of beauty is nothing but *freedom*; this word is meant here not in the brute ethical sense, but in the general sense of spontaneity, which is indeed perfectly consummated in moral self-determination, but which also becomes an aesthetic object in the game of life, in dynamic and organic processes. Oneness, regularity, symmetry, order, natural truth, psychological and historical accuracy cannot yet by themselves satisfy the concept of the beautiful.[51]

Freedom, as Rosenkranz understands it, is no purely subjective state found only in a thinking subject, though its (possibly illusory) recognition by a subject explains aesthetic judgements. Freedom in the sense of dynamic process can be found throughout nature, and some of its most interesting applications are indeed in the natural substrate of human subjects. A revealing passage finds flatulence objectionable because it is a bodily process that escapes our conscious control: this obviously and elegantly explains why it is found particularly offensive in company, say, in a meeting. But this lack of control also makes flatulence funny, because it is felt to represent a freedom of the body asserting itself against our conscious regulation. As such, it reminds us that we are, despite social and other hierarchies, alike at least 'in this non-arbitrary humbleness of our nature'.[52]

What Rosenkranz here appreciates about low bodily humour has not just been overlooked but often actively suppressed. Take Rembrandt's *Rape of Ganymede* in Dresden, painted in 1635 for a Protestant client. As Rosenkranz pungently puts it, in this down-to-earth interpretation of the myth, the eagle's claws 'pull up [the boy's] shirt to reveal his round behind', while 'he pees in fright in the manner of children'.[53] This, Rosenkranz allows, is really funny, and his account of freedom – of which Ganymede is deprived, while his bladder seems to exercise it – can help us see why without assuming a desire to parody the myth. But all this is to assume that what Rembrandt painted Ganymede *doing* matters: an assumption not shared by the English etcher Anthony Cardon (or more likely by his employer Colnaghi) who in 1795 published an impeccable reproductive etching that left out the urine (Figure 1). Such cleaning up of Rembrandt's bodily fluids was not undertaken in all reproductions of the period.[54] But the censored print, for all its silliness, conveys an important insight: not only is content as central to aesthetic value as formal properties, but the refusal to think on it is liable to lead to all kinds of distortion and 'counterfeiting' of art, as Rosenkranz pointedly put it in his Preface.

[51] R 166. *System*, 562, defines beauty as 'harmonious-appearing freedom of spirit in sensuous form'. He seems to have formulated this principle first in his criticism of C.H. Weiße's book on Goethe's *Faust*: 'Without seeing freedom as the principle of the Faust poem, much in it must seem arbitrary, as it does to Mr. Weiße.' *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik*, 80 (October 1837), 606.

[52] R 234.

[53] R 232. Margarita Russell, 'The Iconography of Rembrandt's *Rape of Ganymede*', *Simiolus* 9(1) (1977), 5–18, discusses the critical puzzlement over this work.

[54] The 1770 engraving in the *Recueil d'estampes d'après les plus célèbres tableaux de la Galerie Royale de Dresde* has the urine, above the coat of arms of the Elector of Saxony!

Figure 1 Anthony Cardon after Rembrandt van Rijn, *Rape of Ganymede* [1635], etching and engraving, 1795, The British Museum, London.

Source: © The Trustees of the British Museum.

Problems of ugliness

Rembrandt's peeing Ganymede bears witness to a key aspect of Rosenkranz's thinking: its tendency to slide casually, without warning, from artwork to its subject matter, or from representation to reality. This tendency, we contend, is one of the book's strengths when it comes to drawing attention to cultural and psychological aspects of art.[55] Its unsettling nature is most obvious in those passages where Rosenkranz's judgement diverges sharply from our own. Not long after he warns us that aesthetics deals in illusion, we come across this passage: 'Dwarf size is the normal dimension of the Laplander. A bushman, on the other hand, whose head is big, whose thigh is thin, whose legs are almost fleshless, wanders already into the apelike mode and thus becomes a caricature of the human form.'[56] A reader today is likely to either ignore this or put down the book in disgust. But can we learn anything from it? After all, Rosenkranz has just told us that aesthetics' real basis in freedom may be illusory. Do proportions, thought of as purely phenomenal and thus formal, avoid this? Note that Rosenkranz, like Hegel, distrusts physiognomy and nowhere relies on it to cement transitions from ugliness to inferiority.[57] But, according to Kant, aesthetics delivers judgements concerning the purposiveness of natural objects that rely on nothing but perceived form. That this led even the great cosmopolitan to dodgy remarks about the inhabitants of New Holland and Tierra del Fuego should warn us about the pitfalls of moving from phenomenal to real qualities.[58] The passage then may make a good cautionary tale about such ventures.

For starters, we may note that the views are racist, but not unusual of his era: the Sami people of Northern Europe, then called Lapps or Laplanders, were themselves subject to much tendentious ethnography, and exhibited in Hagenbeck's human zoo in Hamburg. Nor does Rosenkranz attack Africans in general: early in the *Aesthetics* he praises the 'blacks of Dahomey and Benin', especially the 'bodyguard of several thousand amazons' of the Dahomey king.[59] This is in line with German taste of the

[55] Werner Röcke, 'Karl Rosenkranz (1805–1879)', in *Wissenschaftsgeschichte der Germanistik in Porträts*, ed. Christoph König, Hans-Harald Müller and Werner Röcke (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2000), 33–40, argues that despite its rejection by philologists like Karl Lachmann and Jakob Grimm, Rosenkranz's work on medieval German literature presaged a later turn to cultural and social history in the discipline.

[56] R 173–4. Cf. R 32, where it is said that the bushman, 'like the cretin, is ugly by nature'.

[57] On Hegel's critique of physiognomy in the *Phenomenology*, see Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Hegel on Faces and Skulls', in *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Alasdair MacIntyre (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), 219–36; Steven De Caroli, in 'The Greek Profile: Hegel's Aesthetics and the Implications of a Pseudo-Science', *Philosophical Forum* 37:2 (2006), 113–51, points out that Hegel nevertheless relied on physiognomic ideas in his aesthetics. Hinrich Lichtenstein, *Reisen im südlichen Afrika*, vol. 2 (Berlin: Salfeld, 1812), 86, ridicules phrenological attempts to locate 'the organ of murderousness' in a Bushman skull, relying instead on environmental factors.

[58] Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, 3rd edn. (Berlin: Lagarde, 1799), 300 (§67).

[59] R 28. Rosenkranz thinks all 'races and social classes' obey the rule that 'with growing freedom, the beauty of the appearance grows as well'. On German enthusiasm for the female bodyguard of the King of Dahomey, see Suzanne Preston Blier, 'Meeting the Amazons', in *Human Zoos: Science and Spectacle in the Age of Colonial Empires*, ed. Pascal Blanchard, Nicolas Bancel, Eric Deroo, and Sandrine Lemaire (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009), Chapter 13; for more on the Amazons, see Blier, 'Mort et créativité dans la tradition des amazones du Dahomey', *Ethnocentrisme et création*, ed. Annie Dupuis (Paris: Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, 2013), 67–80.

time, as is the skewed account of the San peoples (called Bushmen), persecuted by Dutch settlers and routinely said to occupy a state between the human and the animal.[60] If Rosenkranz relied on this kind of travel literature, his description of San proportions as 'a caricature of the human form' is not a purely formal judgement. Indeed, one of the lessons of Rosenkranz's third section is that our perception of ugliness is never simply formal, but relies on our standard of beauty. The imputation of an inferior state to the Bushmen cannot be justified on such a basis, unless we have established a biological standard of beauty as the superior state: it is interesting that, even in repeating the racist remark about being like an ape, Rosenkranz draws no biological conclusion on its basis. And we can see why, on a realist construal of aesthetics: whether a formal negation corresponds to a real characteristic is a matter of fact about the world, which an aesthetic representation, as an intentional human act, either captures or fails to capture. That the Bushman 'becomes a caricature', says, as we would expect, more about Rosenkranz than about his subject.

The processual nature of such judgements (stating that persons or things *become* ugly or beautiful), and its problematic relation to real qualities of their subjects, are deeply connected with Rosenkranz's view of caricature, which distorts its subject in representing it justly. Although he speaks of caricatures *in the world*, there is no doubt that caricature, as in the case of a suite depicting the French colonization of the Marquesas (see Figure 16 on p. 253), is a vehicle of social criticism and reporting. Could Rosenkranz express this duality without making reality contain walking caricatures? Not, it seems, without losing some of the force of his exposition of caricature as both a creative process and (in the truthful case of a fit target) the amplification of real problems in the world. This merit is often connected with the naïve tendency of sliding from a discussion of pictures and narratives to one of the persons or events they represent.[61] The most striking such ambiguity is probably Rosenkranz's long quote from George Catlin's *Indians of North America*, which retells the tragic end of Wi-jun-jon, an Assinneboine who journeyed to Washington, returned to his tribe with Americanized dress and habits (above all, drinking), and was murdered, ostensibly on suspicion of having become too powerful a witch doctor.[62] Catlin himself tells the story in an ironical dialogue with a Frenchman, full of stereotypical interjections in French. He also obligingly provides before-and-after images of Wi-jun-jon, whom he had painted on other occasions, in 'the full regalia

[60] See the discussions in *Archiv für Geographie, Historie, Kriegs- und Staatskunst*, 7 (1816): 54; *Der Sammler* 99 (18 August 1831), 395; *Das Panorama des Universums*, vol. 10 (Prague, 1843), 300. Even sympathetic accounts like Lichtenstein and Robert Moffat, *Missionary Labours and Scenes in Southern Africa* (London: John Snow, 1842), stress the bushmen's abjectness. Moffat, for one, quotes Gibbon to the effect that South Africans were 'the connecting link between the rational and irrational creation' (p. 6). The phrase is not in Gibbon, but inspired by Chapter 25 of the *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, where Gibbon, despite hating slavery, attributes its success to Africans' weak intellects. Such contradictory attitudes were the rule in European writing about Africa.

[61] Rosenkranz admits 'a distinction between caricatures that belong to the world of real phenomena, and those belonging to the world of art' (R 393). Among the former are knights of industry, precocious children, pedants: a whole cast of Biedermeier types.

[62] R 418–19.

of his magnificent national costume' and then as 'the horrible, ridiculous grimace' he had become (see Figure 15 on p. 251).[63] Rosenkranz seems blissfully unaware of the role Catlin plays in *making* this caricature, but then, as literary scholars have pointed out, Catlin himself resorted to indirect discourse, irony, and hyperbole in recounting the story because of his own anxiety about not being believed by his public.[64] But just as he may have exaggerated or even distorted Wi-jun-jon's final appearance and behaviour to suit his needs, it is possible for such distortion not to be only a parody or travesty, which would invert some positive attribute for the purpose of ridicule, but a kind of disciplined distortion meant to draw attention to the corrosiveness of what is being criticized. In Rosenkranz's concluding words on the case, 'If art should handle such contradictions, it must have the irony to ridicule the shortcomings of culture itself.'[65]

This aphorism launches into the discussion of colonial caricature in the French Marquesas. The impression that caricature can face up to modern political problems in a way that neither tragedy nor didactic propaganda can certainly links Rosenkranz to contemporaries like Charles Baudelaire (in his writings on caricaturists) and even recent advocates of the graphic arts like Art Spiegelman. Unlike these writers, Rosenkranz prefers to give a quasi-logical account of caricature as the negation of ugliness itself, a 'contradiction of the contradiction' (R 42), able to rise to the same ideal that the most ambitious kind of art pursues. True, Rosenkranz distinguishes three kinds of caricature, viz., portrayal, symbolization, and idealization, with the last being the highest. The Catlin kind (portrayal), being most akin to the world's own caricature, is the lowest. But in all cases, whether an aesthetic or a moral or a political ideal is being made conspicuous by its absence, for Rosenkranz, 'caricature points restlessly beyond itself, because with itself it represents at the same time something else' (R 414). The realist point of the untruth of caricature is to bring us closer to reality. In doing so, it is also aesthetically delightful, as Rosenkranz noted in comparing the laughter ugliness can unleash with the feeling of recovering from illness. It is this kind of thoughtful hedonism that Rosenkranz finds in a Viennese farce, wherein a misanthrope trades roles with the mountain king, only to complain bitterly that the latter exaggerates his misanthropy. 'How true, how deep, how philosophical, we want to say, is this humour! If we all could see ourselves once so truly objectively, would we not also be of the opinion that we indeed appear to ourselves, but not quite how we really are, rather a trifle exaggerated?' (R 428).

[63] Catlin's oil painting is in the Smithsonian Museum of American Art, Washington, DC. It and the English book show 'before and after' scenes, posing Wi-jun-jon in Assinneboine attire before the cupolas of Washington, and then as a Yank back home. The German edition Rosenkranz knew only has the latter image, an interesting decision in itself.

[64] Brian W. Dippie, *Catlin and his Contemporaries: The Politics of Patronage* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), 322, and Laura L. Mielke, *Moving Encounters: Sympathy and the Indian Question in Antebellum Literature* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2008), 13–16.

[65] R 419.

Ugliness today

We hope that some of the interesting features of Rosenkranz's text, and its limitations, have emerged in our quotations and discussion, and entrust the further exploration of both to the reader: in concluding, we only mention several avenues of research that Rosenkranz does not pursue but which might benefit from acquaintance with his work. The first may be seen by a quick art-historical examination of the modern editions of Rosenkranz. The 1968 German facsimile edition (contemporaneous with Jauss's volume on the '*no longer fine arts*') and the 1984 Italian edition have plain covers, as befits sober Hegeliana; the 1984 Romanian edition, translated by an art historian interested in computer art and systems aesthetics, features Bosch's late, livid *Carrying of the Cross*; the 1992 Spanish edition has a detail from Brueghel's *Fall of the Rebel Angels*, while both the German reprint of 1996 and the French edition of 2004 feature Jeff Koons' polychrome sculpture of angels driving a pig.[66] In brief, whether the emphasis is on Renaissance monsters or contemporary kitsch, new editions of Rosenkranz address themselves to the art world's fascination with the disgusting and the abject, which dominated painting and sculpture in the 1980s before undergoing feminist and identity-cultural transformations in riot girl, grunge, Young British Art, and other 1990s tendencies. That Rosenkranz, with his own parade of aesthetic deformities and diagnoses, should interest theorists of the abject and the grotesque as a historical precursor is not surprising; they could, however, probably learn also from his coordination of positive and negative aesthetic features that the attempted separation of the latter into autonomous, utopian markers of avant-garde identity is problematic. And, in another spirit altogether, nominalist debunkers of aesthetics as social capital in the tradition of Pierre Bourdieu, as much as Kantian transcendentalists trying to reconstruct the aesthetic judgements of ugliness, might gain from Rosenkranz's explorations of aesthetic rule-following and rule-breaking.[67]

Less straightforward, but perhaps deeper, is the book's value to those trying to apply aesthetic methods to ethics. We are no longer, like Jauss and Goodman and their peers, so confident that aesthetic features can exist independently of one another, and of substantial worldly commitments. Despite this, recent efforts to explore the subjective and moral dimension of habitat destruction through environmental aesthetics are plagued by a certain arbitrariness, as if the authors are merely convinced ad hoc of the applicability of aesthetic attributes (the sublime, the beautiful) to landscapes and living things, coupled to the notion that our societies value aesthetic objects more highly than certain natural ones. There is a flourishing conservationist literature that argues that endangered species (or individual animals) have the same kind of aesthetic value as

[66] The 1996 Reclam edition (reprinted with a new cover in 2007) reprints the 1990 text, one of the last books published by Reclam Leipzig, the East German branch of the venerable publishing house. Though the 1996/2007 version of Kliche's afterword adds page references left missing in 1990, there was no error-checking of Rosenkranz's text: the error at R 4, for instance, is still to be found in the 2007 reprint.

[67] In particular, his view of the pleasant and the sublime as species of the beautiful, with corresponding opposites within the ugly, simplifies the logic of aesthetic judgement.

works of art.[68] Here the difficulties Rosenkranz had in moving from formal qualities of representations to the content represented, and the ways he tried to justify such moves, are pertinent. Furthermore, more general aesthetic and affective reasoning in moral discourse, like appeals to the 'yuck factor' in bioethics, could gain from Rosenkranz's articulation of the kinds of negative reactions evinced and their justification.

In thus commending Rosenkranz to contemporary ethicists and social activists, we do not want to give the false impression that he had ready answers to all questions. Indeed, attempts to understand nature or society in aesthetic-moral terms are hardly new. But when Theodor Adorno, in the 1960s, saw in the revulsion caused by polluted landscapes nothing but bourgeois bad conscience about domination, or Alois Riegl, writing at the turn of the twentieth century, conjectured that the same sentimentality informs animal rights, the preservation of historic buildings and of rock faces, it is the idealist, subject-oriented face of aesthetics that asserts itself.[69] An industrial landscape is more than a prod to conscience; it is a bad place to live, even if often a visually striking one, and our discomfort, as well as the split between our visual appreciation of things like photographs of factories and our aversion to living in their vicinity, must reflect this to some extent. But to what extent? Already the significance of something *looking* ugly is less clear: as Rosenkranz put it, so much of our aesthetic attitude to landscape depends on how it is lit.[70] Formal qualities matter after all, *even in reality*. The passage on Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* (R 349–51), though ambivalent, is exemplary: Rosenkranz notes the curious fact that though the professor feels no compunction about destroying the monster's companion (an act which would doom his own), he nevertheless feels a thrill of murder in doing so. Aesthetics is more than an epiphenomenon of moral or material processes: it is one of the active domains in which life, humanity, right and wrong, are decided. Its pursuit may prove more than its own reward: it may let us 'look through the struggle of phenomena', like the book's closing image of the maenad, feet planted on the ground, eyes turned to the stars.

A note on the text

In translating a book on ugliness steeped in Hegelian terminology but dealing mainly with works of art and literature, two reader constituencies matter: the philosopher and the general reader. Unfortunately, the history of philosophy has calcified a number of bad translations of key words, some as old as the seventeenth century. Perhaps the slipperiest, *Vorstellung*, the standard German word for a subjective conception, sensory

[68] For criticisms of these views, and an improved analogy of species with *genres* of art, see Alan Carter, 'Biodiversity and All that Jazz', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 80(1) (January 2010): 58–75.

[69] Theodor W. Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970), 76; On Alois Riegl, 'Das Denkmalschutzgesetz', *Die Neue Freie Presse*, 27 February 1905, 6, see Mechtild Widrich, 'The Willed and the Unwilled Monument', *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 72(3) (September 2013): 382–98, on the analogy with the protection of animals, p. 389.

[70] R 18, 26.

or internal, visual or aural or linguistic, is usually rendered 'idea' after Locke's eccentric usage.[71] The result is that *Idee*, a common word, is capitalized as 'Idea', giving it a Platonic ring. Rosenkranz indeed uses *Idee* to stand for an objective concept, but that only makes it all the worse to use English 'idea' for subjective *Vorstellung*. We therefore, according to context, alternate 'image', 'thought', 'imagination' and other clear markers of subjective conceiving. On the other hand, the philosophical classic *Anschauung* since Kant has been translated as 'intuition', leading to much confusion with mathematical intuitionism, biological instinct, and supposed sources of pure insight in philosophy. We have used 'view', whenever the derivation from 'look' (*anschauen*) seems to demand it, but for general purposes, as Max Black and Peter Geach once suggested, it is best translated as 'experience', which does not impose a visual interpretation. We have done this where we could, and it not only makes lovely sense of what Rosenkranz is saying, but it rightly highlights the Kantian heritage. The distinction between *das Schöne* and *Schönheit* (the beautiful and beauty), and the corresponding words for ugliness, though it usefully distinguishes object from concept, we have not followed strictly, because the style would have suffered, and Rosenkranz does not draw this distinction. Because Germans capitalize *all* nouns, we have not: even if the book had talked a lot about *das Absolute*, we would still have translated it as: 'the absolute'.

This brings us to Hegelian terminology, on which Rosenkranz particularly relies to find terms for strife and fragmentation. Thus, for *Entzweiung*, we prefer the physical 'rupture' over received jargon like 'diremption', which, like the pretentious Latin of the Standard Edition of Freud, gives a false sense of what it is like to read the author in German. Among Hegelian terms of art, only *Aufhebung* is frequent in Rosenkranz, but *never* in the famous equivocal sense of at once conserving, destroying, and elevating: in Rosenkranz, to be *aufgehoben* is to be univocally destroyed or invalidated, and though the use may be neutral about a superseded thing's continued existence, this is clear enough in each context. We therefore use plain English 'cancel' throughout, which is similarly neutral about a cancelled thing's continued existence. An interesting case, because it deviates from Hegel more subtly, is Rosenkranz's use of *Verstand*. Though he too, like Hegel, unfavourably contrasts this with *Vernunft* (reason), in Rosenkranz, it is not mathematical or purely discursive 'understanding' that is denigrated, but common sense. Rosenkranz's own terminology, that of ugliness, tends to come from everyday discourse, so we stick with etymologically transparent words (mean for *gemein*, which matches both current and ancient usage; but 'common' is the better reading in some contexts, and there we have used it). Most terms are self-explanatory, others are explained in our foot-of-page notes. Rosenkranz's own, at times self-indulgent and often fascinating endnotes are printed, as in the original, at the back.

One oddity of nineteenth-century typography deserves mention: long dashes are not always parenthetical, but often function as subparagraph breaks, a sign that a new point is being addressed within the larger topic. This is useful, so we have left it untouched. Most translations, to maintain consistency, are ours: we give the original where Rosenkranz does and it is not too long. Original page numbers are bold and

[71] Rosenkranz himself, *System*, 228 (§118), notes that in the Romance languages the word 'idea' is used both in the subjective sense of *Vorstellung* and in that of abstract thought.

bracketed, e.g. **(5)**. In all doubtful cases, we followed the conviction that this is not, as some German historians say, the definitive text on ugliness, but a good starting point: to paraphrase Austin, not the last word, but one of the first.[72]

The book is illustrated with prints that Rosenkranz explicitly discusses. A few paintings are likewise illustrated in the form of reproductive prints, as was usual in publishing at mid-nineteenth-century. This should enhance reading and appreciation of the book's engagement with visual material. And though in his Preface Rosenkranz inveighs against lavishly illustrated but prudish texts, his own 1850 notes call for an atlas of illustrations to 'really put paid to tender sensibilities'. Instead of doing this, he quickly wrote and published the present book. We cannot provide the atlas – Umberto Eco has done this to some extent in his anthologies – so we focus on some of the less familiar pictures, and some famous ones about which Rosenkranz makes specific points.

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September 2014

[72] J.L. Austin, 'A Plea for Excuses', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 57 (1956–57), 11. Schmidt calls Rosenkranz a preamble to any future aesthetics of ugliness (p. 7).

Aesthetics of Ugliness

Karl Rosenkranz

Translated by Andrei Pop and Mechtild Widrich

Foreword

An aesthetics of ugliness? And why not? Aesthetics has become the collective name for a large group of concepts, which is in turn divisible into three particular classes. The first has to do with the idea of beauty, the second with the notion of its production, that is to say, art, the third with the system of the arts, with the representation of the idea of beauty through art in a specific medium. We tend to gather concepts of the first class under the rubric of the metaphysics of beauty. But if the idea of beauty is to be considered, an investigation of ugliness is inseparable from it. The concept of ugliness, of negative beauty, thus is a part of aesthetics. There is no other science **[iv]** to which it could be assigned, and so it is right to speak of the aesthetics of ugliness. No one is amazed if biology also concerns itself with the concept of illness, ethics with that of evil, legal science with injustice, or theology with the concept of sin. To say the 'theory of ugliness' would fail to bring out so clearly the scientific genealogy of the word. As for the name, the handling of the subject itself will have to justify it.

I have taken pains to develop the concept of the ugly as the midpoint between that of the beautiful and that of the comical, from its first beginnings to the fullness it gives itself in the form of the satanic. In a way, I reveal the cosmos of ugliness from its first chaotic patches of fog, from shapelessness and asymmetry, to its most intensive formations in the endless multiplicity of disorganizations of beauty that is called caricature. Formlessness, incorrectness, and the deformity of disfiguration[1] are the distinct levels of this self-consistent series of **[v]** metamorphoses. The attempt has been made to show how ugliness has its positive presupposition in beauty, which it distorts to create the mean[2] instead of the sublime, the repulsive instead of the pleasant, and instead of the ideal, the caricature. All the arts and all the epochs of art among the most diverse peoples are hereby invoked to clarify the development of the concepts using apposite examples, which should also provide raw material and reference points for future students of this difficult province of aesthetics. Through this work, whose imperfections I believe I know best, I hope to fill a gap that has until now been all too tangible, for the concept of ugliness has until now been handled only in a fragmentary and incidental fashion, or else with great generality, which risks affixing the subject within very one-sided definitions.

The well-meaning reader who really seeks self-instruction may grant all this, and still ask: Should such an unpleasant, disgusting object be so thoroughly

[1] *Verbildung* meant broadly as negative figuration, not narrowly as destruction of faces.

[2] Rosenkranz's *gemein* is an everyday word with connotations of social status (gross, common, vulgar, coarse, base, vile) and ill will (petty, vicious, the modern use of 'mean'). But it is also a technical term indicating a distortion of the sublime. *Widrig* likewise spans a range of phenomena of resistance, from the abstract (adverse or unfavourable: *widrige Umstände*, unfavourable conditions) to the visceral (repugnant, repellent).

investigated? Undoubtedly, for science has in recent times touched on this problem again and again, and it requires **[vi]** resolution. Naturally I do not wish to advance a claim to having accomplished this. I am satisfied if here, as in other areas, it is granted that I have at least made a step forward. The individual may well think of this subject[3]:

> —down there it's terrible
> And man should not challenge the gods
> And desire never, but never, to behold
> What they kindly conceal in night and horror![4]

The individual may think thus and set aside the science of ugliness unread. Science itself, however, follows only its own necessity. It must go forward. Charles Fourier, under the rubric of the division of labour, defined one type that he called the *travaux de dévouement* [works of devotion], to which no one is predisposed by nature, but which men do out of resignation, because they recognize their necessity for the common good.[5] The attempt to satisfy such a duty is made here as well.

But is this business really so terrifying in practice? Does it not also contain points of light? Does not a positive content also lie in hiding for the philosopher, for the artist? I certainly think so, for ugliness **[vii]** can only be grasped as the midpoint between beauty and the comical. The comical is impossible without an ingredient of ugliness, which it dissolves and re-forms in the freedom of beauty. This cheering and universal consequence of our investigation will excuse the undoubted pain of some sections.

In the course of the treatise, I excuse myself at one point, in a way, for thinking so much through examples. But it is obvious to me that I did not need to do so; for all aestheticians, among them Winckelmann, Lessing, Kant, Jean Paul, Hegel, Vischer, and even Schiller himself, who recommends the sparing use of examples, proceed in the same manner. Of the material that I have accumulated for this purpose over a span of years, incidentally, I have made use of only a little over a half, and may thus consider myself to have been quite parsimonious in this respect. Through my choice of examples I have only aimed to be many-sided, so as not to impose through examples a limitation on general validity which has plagued the history of every science.

[viii] The way I handle the material might seem old-fashioned and perhaps too precise. Modern writers have invented for themselves a striking method of citation, namely to sprinkle their texts liberally with inverted commas. Where they find the citation remains mysterious. It is a lot for them to add a name. But it seems to them pedantic to then add to the name of an author the name of a book. Doubtless it would

[3] The 1853 edition has *Gestande*, which is not a word. We follow the Reclam edition's reading.

[4] From the ballad, 'Der Taucher' [The Diver, 1797], by Friedrich Schiller, *Gedichte* (Stuttgart and Tübingen: Cotta, 1852), 304, with the full stop turned into an exclamation mark.

[5] See Charles Fourier, *Théorie de l'unité universelle*, vol.4 (Paris: Société pour la propagation et la réalisation de la théorie de Fourier, 1841), 150, 161. Fourier thinks this a domain for child labour, especially those involving 'répugnances industrielles' (p. 138).