Iraq After The Muslim Conquest

Perspectives on Society and Culture

3

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IRAQ
AFTER THE MUSLIM CONQUEST

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Preface to the Second Edition

It has now been over twenty years since *Iraq after the Muslim Conquest* was published and fifteen years since it went out of print. Since then requests to reprint it from friends and colleagues who had been unable to obtain copies have suggested that it might be a good idea to make the book available again. Gorgias Press has graciously agreed to reproduce the volume in its original form with the addition of the Author Index that previously had been distributed privately. Only one *erratum* has been corrected. Otherwise it seems best to leave the work as it stands in the hope that it can still provoke debate.

MGM

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List of Illustrations

Abbreviations

AB	*Analecta Bollandiana*
AION	*Annali del Istituto Orientale di Napoli*
AJSLL	*American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures*
AKGWG	*Abhandlungen der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Philologische-Historische Klasse*
AKM	*Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*
ANSMN	*American Numismatic Society Museum Notes*
ATR	*Anglican Theological Review*
BO	*Bibliotheca Orientalis Clementino-Vaticana*
BSOS	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies* (University of London), vols. 1 through 10 (1939–42)
BSOAS	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, beginning with vol. 11
BGA	*Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum*
CRAIBL	*Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres* (Paris)
CSCO	*Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium*
CSHB	*Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae*
DOP	*Dumbarton Oaks Papers*
EI	*Encyclopaedia of Islam* (1) first edition, (2) second edition
HTR	*Harvard Theological Review*
HUCA	*Hebrew Union College Annual*
IJMES	*International Journal of Middle East Studies*
IC	*Islamic Culture*
JA	*Journal Asiatique*
JAOS	*Journal of the American Oriental Society*
JCOI	*Journal of the K. R. Cama Oriental Institute* (Bombay)
JE	*Jewish Encyclopaedia*
JESHO	*Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*
JJS	*Journal of Jewish Studies*
JNES	*Journal of Near Eastern Studies*
JNSI	*Journal of the Numismatic Society of India*
JPHS	*Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*
JQR	*Jewish Quarterly Review*
JRAS	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*

JRCAS	*Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*
JSAA	*Journal of the Society of Archer Antiquarians*
JSS	*Journal of Semitic Studies*
MESAB	*Middle East Studies Association Bulletin*
MPG	Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus Series Graeca*
MW	*Muslim World*
OC	*Oriens Christianus*
OCP	*Orientalia Christiana Periodica*
PO	*Patrologia Orientalis*
P-OC	*Proche-Orient Chrétien*
REI	*Revue des Études Islamiques*
REJ	*Revue des Études Juives*
RHR	*Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*
ROC	*Revue de l'Orient Chrétien*
RSO	*Rivista degli Studi Orientali*
SBE	*Sacred Books of the East*
SHAW	*Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil. Hist. Klasse*
SI	*Studia Islamica*
WI	*Die Welt des Islams/The World of Islam/Le Monde de l'Islam*
WZKM	*Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kund des Morgenlandes*
ZA	*Zeitschrift für Assyriologie*
ZDMG	*Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*
ZII	*Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik*

Preface

THIS project began nearly fifteen years ago as a dissertation in history at the University of California, Los Angeles. It may never be finished. By now, however, most of the appropriate primary sources have been identified, although they have only begun to be exploited. Nevertheless, the following account is offered here as a kind of progress report in the interests of communication and in the hope of receiving constructive criticism.

Inspiration, training, and help have come from too many teachers and friends to mention all of them here. Muhammad Shaban first introduced me to the possibility of historical revision and of cultural assimilation. Speros Vryonis and Nikki Keddie made me an historian. I shall always be grateful for the early and continued support and encouragement of Ira Lapidus and for the assistance of Richard Frye. Thanks for helpful comments go to Richard Cooper, who read an intermediate form of the chapter on administrative theory and practice, and to Richard Bulliet and William Tucker, who took the trouble to read the completed manuscript. They will recognize where I have taken their advice; where I have not, I take the sole responsibility. Special thanks go to Mahmood Ibrahim, who was the best research assistant anyone could have; to Noël Diaz, who prepared the maps; to Patricia Wright, who helped with proofreading and indexing; and to Alice Calaprice and the editorial staff of Princeton University Press. Appreciation is also hereby expressed to all of those—family, colleagues, and friends—whose impatience made me realize that there were others, besides myself, with an interest in seeing this work completed. If this book had a dedication, it would be to the memory of Gustave E. von Grunebaum.

October 27, 1982

Acknowledgments

PART I, chapter 3 on Administrative Geography and part II, chapter 5 on Persians are based on articles published in *Iran* and are published here with the permission of the editors of that journal. The coins reproduced in figures 1 and 2 are courtesy of the American Numismatic Society, New York. The seal impression in figure 2d is published with the permission of the Trustees of the British Museum, that in figure 2e is authorized by the Yale University Library, and those in figures 2f and 2g were provided by Richard Frye. The audience hall of the *dār al-imāra* at Kufa is reproduced with the permission of the State Antiquities and Heritage Organization, Ministry of Culture and Information, Republic of Iraq (copyright reserved). The demon in figure 7f was provided by Giorgio Buccellati. The incantation bowl from Tell Abu Sarifa in figures 8a and 8b was provided by Robert Adams; the figures on incantation bowls from Nippur in figures 8c, 8d, and 8f are reproduced with the permission of the Oriental Institute, University of Chicago.

IRAQ
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Introduction

THE QUESTION OF CONTINUITY

CONTINUITY OR CHANGE?

In the fourth decade of the seventh century A.D., Iraq was conquered by Muslim Arabs. Since this conquest turned out to be permanent and was part of the conquest of most of western Asia and northern Africa by Muslims in the seventh and eighth centuries, it eventually came to be seen as an historical watershed between the ancient and medieval histories of these regions. There is a certain convenience to this view that is based on the assumption that the Islamic conquest itself had either immediate or eventual consequences, and it is justified to the extent that changes that were taking place at the end of Late Antiquity were caught up and institutionalized in Islamic civilization. But much of the civilization of Late Antiquity either survived fairly intact or found an Islamic form. The central question is: To what extent did the civilization of these regions in the early Islamic period represent a continuation of the past, and what was new about it? Military conquest, the emergence of a new religious tradition, and political domination by a different ethnic group would all seem to be reasonable criteria for periodization. In the case of Iraq, the Islamic conquest had the immediate effect of replacing Magian (or Zoroastrian) rulers who belonged to the Sasanian Persian dynasty with Muslim Arab rulers. Yet the designation of historical periods as late Sasanian or early Islamic refers to a time boundary that may not be very meaningful because such periodization tends to minimize continuities.

Exaggerations of the difference between Islamic civilization and the civilization of Classical Antiquity are the result of overlooking Late Antiquity, the period from about A.D. 300 until 600, during which the changes taking place in western Asia made the culture of this region look more and more "Islamic." By the sixth century, most of western Asia was divided between two imperial states: the Late Roman or Byzantine empire and the Sasanian empire. Both had experienced internal and external crises during the fifth century, and the reaction in both had led to more complete administrative centralization and absolutism in the sixth century when the rulers of both states attempted

to control their society and economy by means of a bureaucratic, hierarchic, provincial system. Both systems were paralleled by state-supported religious organizations: Christian in the Byzantine empire, Magian in the Sasanian empire. The developing connection between religious organizations and the state led to an increasing insistence on religious conformity, to a tendency to equate religious conformity with political loyalty and to equate nonconformity with treason, and to a tendency for warfare to assume a religious character. But the problems of dealing with religious diversity were handled differently. Justinian (527–57) outlawed it. The accommodation achieved by the Sasanian regime towards the members of non-Magian religious groups in Iraq foreshadowed the way Muslims dealt with their non-Muslim subjects. During this period, and especially in Iraq, these religious groups were transforming themselves into associative communal organizations with their own social institutions.

The relationship between Late Antiquity and Islamic civilization could thus be put in terms of continuity in the direction of change. This is, in fact, the first of five possible constructs for continuity posited by Gerschenkron, who identified them as (1) constancy of direction, (2) periodicity of events (i.e., continuity as cyclical repetition), (3) endogenous change (i.e., change brought about by internal factors), (4) causal regress (i.e., continuity as a chain of causally related events), and (5) stability in the rate of change.[1] Apart from the fact that (2) appears to mistake the similarity of circumstances in a cyclical or repeating pattern for real continuity, the usefulness of Gerschenkron's approach lies in the way he pointed out the problem of value judgment that is contained in viewing continuity as the gradualness of change. Continuity tends to be regarded as positive and to be identified with stability, or at least with gradual change brought about "naturally" by internal factors. Change tends to be regarded as negative and to be identified with the disruption, discontinuity, and readjustment brought about "unnaturally" by external factors. However, such value judgments represent the point of view of those who have an interest in the status quo and are the opposite for those who desire change.[2]

[1] A. Gerschenkron, *Continuity in History and Other Essays* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), pp. 21–29.

[2] J. Wansbrough remarks with regard to the establishment of a standard of Classical Arabic and of the concept of an eternal, immutable scripture that both involved "a distinctly static notion of authority, according to which change must signify corruption and conformity betoken nostalgic satisfaction," in *The Sectarian Milieu* (Oxford, 1978), p. 154.

Such value judgments are embedded in explanations of the early formation of Islamic civilization that have tended to take one of two forms. One explanation is put in terms of the external "influence" exerted by some other, older cultural tradition through conscious, intentional cultural "borrowing" by Muslims (heterogenetic). This approach often reflects the interests of those who use it. One of the earliest examples is the way in which culturally conscious Persians in the eighth and ninth centuries tended to ascribe everything to a pre-Islamic, Sasanian origin. More recently "Roman" and western "Christian" explanations have been used by European orientalists who defined civilization in Greco-Roman terms, or whose knowledge of western Asia stopped at the eastern border of the Roman empire, and who compared Islam to Catholic or Calvinist forms of Christianity. Some of them obfuscated the issue by using value-loaded east-west terminology and by putting the matter in terms of the fate of Hellenism in the face of creeping orientalization. Partly to offset the negative implications of such an approach, others presented the matter in terms of cultural inheritance, especially the inheritance by Muslims of Hellenistic philosophy and science and of Jewish or Christian religious values and doctrines. Since the argument was often philological in nature and rested on the cultural value of loan words from other languages in Arabic, it tended to suggest that Muslims possessed a "borrowed" culture. It is no accident that this approach coincided with the height of European imperialism in Islamic countries in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, since the use of Judaeo-Christian and Hellenistic explanations served to make Islamic civilization more "respectable" in European terms.

The second approach explains Islamic civilization as internally self-generated (orthogenetic). It traces all significant aspects of Islamic civilization to the religious requirements of Islam (which were probably more important for providing sanctions). This approach tends to be semiapologetic and nationalistic, and its popularity understandably coincides with the growing national independence of Muslims in the latter part of the twentieth century because it makes Islamic civilization more respectable in indigenous terms.

Heterogenetic explanations undermine Islamic originality, and orthogenetic explanations minimize historical continuity. Both approaches are often monist in nature; that is, they give one-dimensional explanations by preferring a "Roman," "Iranian," "Arab," "Christian," or "Jewish," origin for Islamic civilization in order to take

vicarious credit for its achievement. Lambton reconciled both approaches by identifying the changes that produced Islamic civilization as (1) the influence of Islamic legal theory on the development of social and economic institutions, and (2) the modification of Islamic theory by "the attitude of mind and custom prevailing in the conquered territories."[3]

Monist approaches have largely been abandoned in recent decades in favor of a pluralist approach that sees the formation of Islamic civilization as a cultural synthesis of many traditions of diverse origin. In this form, pluralist explanations probably go back to Mas'ūdī (d. 965), who saw Islamic civilization as the heir to the cultural contributions of Persians, Chaldaeans, Greeks, Egyptians, Turks, Indians, Chinese, and Arabs.[4] Hodgson balanced the ancient heritage against Islamic originality by proposing a cultural dialectic composed of three "moments." In the first moment a new cultural tradition begins in a creative action, in an inventive, revelatory, or charismatic encounter. The second moment is the creation of a group of people who are committed to its importance and who perpetuate and institutionalize it. The third, rather extended, moment is one of cumulative interaction in which the new tradition maintains its vitality through debate and dialogue, contrasting interests, secondary commitments and discoveries, and conflicting sets of presuppositions about what the tradition should involve. For Hodgson, Islamic civilization was unique in spite of its pre-Islamic heritage because of "the relative weighting of different elements in the culture."[5]

One of the main problems with the cultural synthesis approach to Islamic civilization is the tendency to treat it as a monolithic whole. Even in Islam's first century one finds many different and conflicting trends among Muslims. It is more productive to think in terms of what Muslims did than in terms of what Islam did, and even a dialectic treatment of issues is an oversimplification. Multidimensional explanations will be closer to reality, and creative adaptation (but then by whom?) is a better explanation than cultural "borrowing." Even very

[3] A.K.S. Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant in Persia* (London, 1953), p. 16.

[4] T. Khalidi, *Islamic Historiography: The Histories of Mas'ūdī* (Albany, 1975), pp. 81–142.

[5] M.G.S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam* (Chicago, 1974), I, 80–83, 104. In the same vein, M. A. Cook, in "The origins of *kalām*," *BSOAS* 43 (1980):43, declares his belief that "the raw materials of this culture are for the most part old and familiar, and that it is in the *reshaping* of these materials that the distinctiveness and interest of the phenomenon resides."

real external "influences" have different degrees of effectiveness on people who have different backgrounds and interests.

CULTURAL INTERACTION

Questions of continuity and change have thus become a matter of cultural interaction. This book is a study of the emergence of a local form of Islamic society in Iraq in the seventh and early eighth centuries and of the interaction of Muslim conquerors from Arabia with the native population they found there. It is hardly sufficient to explain their influences on each other in terms of "cultural osmosis." People do not necessarily imitate their neighbors, and when they do, the reasons can usually be found. One of the main purposes for evaluating the extent of continuity and change in early Islamic Iraq is to understand the nature and process of cultural continuity and transmission. It is to discover and to demonstrate the causes and means responsible for change or continuity and how and why either occurred. This, in turn, involves understanding the circumstances, identifying the channels of transmission, and appreciating the reasons why anyone would adopt aspects of the culture of someone else or why changes were effective.

Theories of cultural transmission have been used to explain diffusion. Since diffusion involves the social or geographical spread of an element of culture, it is a matter of change for the society that receives it. But when cultural transmission is put into a temporal context as the means whereby a local culture is preserved or adapted by successive populations in the same place, it becomes an aspect of continuity. The validity of the concept of continuity through transmission depends partly on whether or not the adoption of the external aspects of a culture necessarily means the adoption of the attitudes and values of the donor. Ashtor has denied that there was a donor-receiver relationship at all between the natives of the conquered territories and the Arab conquerors.[6] Glick identifies channels of communication as one of the elements necessary for cultural change through transmission by diffusion, although he seems to assume that otherwise culture is inherently conservative. He also uses the concept of selectivity by a recipient culture in adopting what is offered by a donor culture, and he identifies economic demands, fashion, the desire for knowledge,

[6] E. Ashtor, *A Social and Economic History of the Near East in the Middle Ages* (Berkeley, 1976), p. 21.

and the existence of conflict as factors that influence selectivity. He cites Julián Ribera's theory of imitation, which explains the exchange of cultural elements between two cultures that are in contact in terms of communication, the presence or absence of cultural barriers to communication, and the social and psychological receptivity of the recipient culture.[7] With certain modifications these explanations also serve for continuity through transmission in the case of Iraq where the conditions for successful transmission were the survival of the former culture, contact with the newcomers, communication, and reinforcement.

Reinforcement refers to the way an apparent similarity of customs or similar, common, or shared interests makes it easier for two populations that are in contact to increase their resemblance to each other. Where such reinforcement exists, there is a tendency for similarities to increase. When reinforcement is absent, there is resistance to such acculturation. Recurring evidence that something like this was happening in early Islamic Iraq made it necessary to consider reinforcement as a factor in cultural interaction. A similar idea, usually called receptivity, has been used in diffusion theory. Rosenthal suggests that the parallel between Platonic political ideas and the Islamic concept of Muḥammad as an ideal ruler enabled Platonic ideas to enter Islamic political theory.[8] Gibb used a form of it to explain the selectivity of Europeans in their borrowing from Islamic civilization. People on the receiving end of transmission by diffusion tend to disregard those things which conflict with their own values and accept or adopt only those things which are perceived as serving their own needs.[9] Hodgson repeated this idea in the form that receptivity is determined by particular needs and interests.[10] Glick gives a fairly complete statement of the importance of receptivity for transmission by diffusion:

> . . . even if the agents of diffusion are abundantly present . . . an idea may not diffuse unless it is congruent with the dominant modes of thought of the recipient culture. If incongruent (or apparently so) it must be stated in familiar terminology or placed within a rec-

[7] T. Glick, *Islamic and Christian Spain in the Early Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1979), pp. 7, 285.

[8] E.I.J. Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam* (London, 1958), pp. 57–58.

[9] H.A.R. Gibb, "The Influence of Islamic Culture on Western Europe," *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* 38 (1955–56), 85–87.

[10] Hodgson, *Venture*, I, 80.

ognized framework which makes it intelligible and renders its acceptance reasonable.[11]

But this is still in the context of diffusion, and Parker's suggestion that the impact of Arian German Christianity on the existing Roman tradition of the union of church and state in the Germanic states of the fifth and sixth centuries was to strengthen that tradition by "inoculation from a parallel tradition of the same kind"[12] comes closer to the way reinforcement will be used here. The same is true of the way Chaney explains the conversion of the Anglo-Saxons to Christianity in terms of an interpenetration of Germanic and Roman Christian religious traditions.[13]

However, in dealing with such issues at this level of abstraction, there is a tendency to hypostatize culture. Cultures do not make choices; people do. It is important to conduct this discussion in terms of the choices and behavior of individuals. At least in Iraq many competing alternatives existed at the same time within each of the ethnic and religious populations. Nor should it be assumed that cultural choices assisted by reinforcement are necessarily conscious, rational, or purposive. In fact, appealing to reinforcement to explain successful cultural transmission may raise more questions than it answers. It is much easier to say what was transmitted and how it was transmitted than it is to explain why reinforcement existed in the first place. The question of why the Muslim Arabs who arrived in Iraq in the seventh century had cultural and religious similarities to the people they found there is an important side issue that will not be treated here. That is the proper subject for a different book, and for the purpose of discussion it will be assumed here that the Qur'ān is what Muslims have always said it is.

WHY IRAQ?

The Islamic conquests are often interpreted in terms of their impact on the Mediterranean world and on western Europe. In its classic form, the debate surrounding the Pirenne thesis is Eurocentric because it puts the significance of Islam in terms of what it meant or did not

[11] Glick, *Islamic and Christian Spain*, p. 273.

[12] T. M. Parker, *Christianity and the State in the Light of History* (London, 1955), p. 89.

[13] W. Chaney, *The Cult of Kingship in Anglo-Saxon England* (Berkeley, 1970), p. 172.

mean for western Europe.[14] The importance of considering Iraq lies in understanding the significance of the Islamic conquest for western Asia rather than for Europe.

Any region in western Asia that came under Islamic rule in the seventh century could and ought to be examined for this purpose. But the nature, extent, and accessibility of information about Iraq in this period make the task relatively more easy compared to other regions. The availability of information reflects the importance of what was happening there. Why does Iraq seem ultimately to be more important than other conquered provinces such as Syria or Egypt in the shaping of early Islamic civilization? The answer lies partly in the ethnic and religious diversity of Iraq and partly in its location at a major economic crossroad and at the cultural crossroad where Semitic and Iranian cultural traditions came together. Iraq was a place of cultural creativity and a center for cultural diffusion. Changes that were taking place there make the region unique during late antiquity but characteristic of Islamic civilization.

As much as possible, the scope of this discussion will be confined to that part of the Tigris-Euphrates valley which was under late Sasanian rule. This region was nearly co-extensive with the western quarter of the Sasanian empire and roughly comparable to the modern state of Iraq. This book is a local case study of the development of a regional form of Islamic civilization. The problems created by treating Iraq in relative isolation from the rest of the Islamic empire are much less than the danger of generalizing too widely on the basis of local conditions in a single province. The reader is cautioned not to apply the conclusions that are reached here to other places without first verifying the similarity of their conditions.

METHOD

The approach and method of argument and presentation that will be used here have been conditioned by several problems in modern scholarship. One of them involves the temporal framework that has been used to assess the degree of continuity or change following the Islamic conquests. Historical continuity and change only exist in a temporal framework and whatever framework is used for comparison between point A and point B in time will be somewhat arbitrary.

[14] H. Pirenne, *Mohammad and Charlemagne* (New York, 1939). See also A. F. Havighurst, *The Pirenne Thesis: Analysis, Criticism, and Revision* (Boston, 1958).

However, the tendency has been to lump several hundred years together and to treat them as a monolithic, static unit. In particular, all of Late Antiquity from 300 until 600 and Islamic history until about 900 tend to be taken as single periods for the purpose of comparison and evaluation. But there are really no static "Sasanian" and "Islamic" models to compare. Proper account should be taken of continuing change during both periods. Immediate continuities or changes may only be evaluated by comparing conditions and institutions at the very end of Sasanian rule with those directly after the Islamic conquest. Such conditions and changes are described in the accounts of the conquest and occurred during the lifetime of a single generation. Long-term continuities or changes resulting from trends and developments that were taking place from the sixth until the eighth centuries serve to put the effects of the conquest into perspective.

For the sake of convenience, several shorter periods will be used as a framework for discussion. The late Sasanian period began with the political and economic recovery in the early sixth century during the second reign of Qubādh I (498/9–531) and lasted in Iraq until the Islamic conquest in the 630s. Within this period, the reign of Khusraw I Anūshirvān (531–79), who completed the reforms of Qubādh I, contrasts with that of Khusraw II Parvīz (591–628), which saw the most extreme expressions of late Sasanian political absolutism and imperial ambition. Many of the conditions in Iraq at the time of the Islamic conquest had only arisen during the reign of Khusraw II. Early Islamic history is most conveniently subdivided into a period immediately following the conquest in the 630s until the outbreak of the first civil war among Muslims in 657, a period between the first (657–61) and second (680–92) civil wars, and a period following the second civil war until the end of significant imperial expansion in the second and third decades of the eighth century. Since the period between the first and second civil wars virtually coincides with the reign of Muʿāwiya ibn Abī Sufyān (661–80), who was succeeded by his son Yazīd (680–83), it is convenient to call it the Sufyānī period. This will serve to distinguish it and them from the rule of their relatives, the descendents of Marwān ibn al-Ḥakam (684–85), which lasted until the Marwānī dynasty was replaced by the ʿAbbāsī dynasty in 750. The early Marwānī period, when the Islamic empire was at its height, occupies the decades following the second civil war and the reigns of ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Marwān (685–705) and his son al-Walīd I (705–15). In most

cases, the discussion here will begin with the late Sasanian period and go through the early Marwānī period.

A second problem, which is related to the first, is a tendency to make grand generalizations on a narrow base of evidence. In particular, there has been a tendency to generalize about Islamic history as a whole on the basis of conditions in Iraq, partly because the information about Iraq in early Arabic literature is so extensive. Standard interpretations that have been produced in this way have tended towards nationalism and have described early Islamic history as a period of "Arab domination." Treatments of specific subjects based on a more extensive examination of Arabic literature tend to be put within the framework of this standard interpretation whether the evidence fits it or not. At most, the conclusions of such studies only revise details without challenging the larger picture.

On the other side is a tendency to take the standard interpretation as a basis for arguing more general issues, to appeal to translations of the sources and the secondary works of modern scholars without verification, and to reach conclusions based on à priori arguments and unverified assumptions. Such an approach tends to build an intellectual house of cards and dissolves in meaningless generalizations. In this respect no theory is any better than the evidence that supports it.

The converse, of course, is that the answers one gets are no better than the questions one asks. In recent decades, social and economic issues have attracted increasing interest among historians in almost all fields. It has been tempting to apply modern social science theories and methods to such questions because of assumptions about their universality. But these theories and methods have largely been derived from the study of modern, western societies, and their applicability to premodern, nonwestern societies needs to be demonstrated before putting them to use. It seems more prudent and responsible to err on the side of caution, at least at first, and to use such theories and methods only when the evidence justifies it. This issue is, in fact, related to the general historiographical conflict between assertions of uniform, general "laws" of historical processes and assertions of the specificity of time and place. Generalizations are necessarily based on bodies of specific data, and their usefulness in understanding different bodies of data needs to be balanced against the limits of their applicability.[15]

For instance, models that have been developed for discussing modern

[15] Gerschenkron, *Continuity*, p. 7.

social change may be of some help. Gerth and Mills proposed treating social change under six categories: (1) what changed, (2) how it changed, (3) the direction of change, (4) the rate of change, (5) causes or conditions for change, and (6) the causal importance of individuals and ideas.[16] Ginsberg gave conquest as an example for two of the eight causative factors that have been used to explain social change: (4) external influences and (7) fortuitous events.[17] Change is also regarded as a result of social conflict. Conflict between societies creates larger social units, establishes or reinforces social stratification, and diffuses social and cultural innovations. Conflict between groups within a society is considered to be a major cause of innovation and change. Continuity is preserved by force or by social controls such as education. The difference in the rate of change between the rapid transformations caused by technological innovation and the slower changes in social and political institutions and in former ideologies has been called "cultural lag."[18] Although such contructs may not be entirely suitable for the seventh century, a modified form of lag theory seems to be one of the best explanations for continuity.

The same reservations apply to metropolitan theories of cultural diffusion that are widely used to explain cultural history. In their simplest form they are based on the assumption that all significant cultural change or innovation occurs at political capitals around the courts of rulers whence they are diffused to other places. Even though the Sasanian imperial capital was located in Iraq, it could be argued that this was because of the economic and strategic importance of this region to the Sasanians and not vice versa. The early Islamic imperial capital was located outside of Iraq at Madina in western Arabia and then at Damascus in Syria. The importance of the developments that were taking place in Iraq in the early Islamic period was unrelated to the location of the imperial capital which eventually returned to Iraq under the ʿAbbāsīs.

The object here is to strike a balance between those approaches that are all description with little or no interpretation and those that are all assertion with little evidence. The goal is to present enough evidence to justify the summaries and generalizations and to generalize without

[16] H. Gerth and C. Mills, *Character and Social Structure* (New York, 1953), pp. 377–79.

[17] M. Ginsberg, "Social Change," *British Journal of Sociology* 9 (1958), 214, 218.

[18] T. Bottomore, *Sociology: A Guide to Problems and Literature* (New York, 1971), pp. 297–300.

oversimplifying. Readers have a right to examine and evaluate the evidence on which arguments and conclusions are based so they can judge whether or not the generalizations and conclusions are justified. To this end, the method will be to present the evidence and to discuss what it means in terms of continuity or change. The arguments and conclusions derived from evidence will emerge in the course of the discussion and the reader will be allowed to share in the process of induction. However, many of the controversial issues in modern scholarship that are specific to particular subjects, often textual in nature, and only tangential to questions of continuity and change will be sidestepped unless they are directly important to the discussion. Although the argument is based on primary sources in several languages and on early Arabic literature, a rather large body of modern scholarship and some translations of sources into European languages will be cited for the convenience of the reader. Since some scholars occasionally misquote their sources, cite passages for nonexistent information, or argue on the basis of inaccurate translations, such secondary works and translations will be cited as far as possible, only if their statements have been verified in the original texts themselves. The reliability of modern works and the relative value of primary and secondary sources will be discussed in the section on Resources.

What, then, constitutes evidence? Interpretations of Sasanian and early Islamic history normally rely heavily on a rather extensive body of Arabic literature that was compiled from older materials during the ninth and tenth centuries. Whether or not the information contained in this literature is reliable for circumstances before the ninth century is the subject of a controversy that has been going on for thirty years. Although the material in these compilations has been colored by anachronism and partisanship, it would be just as arbitrary to assume that they are unusable for earlier history on the basis of their time of compilation alone, as it would to use them uncritically.

One way to deal with this material is internal: by subjecting it to extensive textual criticism to determine the probable origin and relative reliability of specific accounts. For instance, one of the major sources of information about the Sasanians is their Book of Kings, which was first compiled in the Middle Persian language during the reign of Khusraw Anūshirvān and then completed until the end of the reign of Khusraw Parvīz during the reign of Yazdagerd III (632–51). In 731 it was translated into Arabic by a Persian bureaucrat, Rūzbih/ʿAbdullāh ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, in the Islamic administration, but an

illustrated copy of the Middle Persian text still existed in the tenth century. Neither the Middle Persian text nor Ibn al-Muqaffa''s translation survive today, although the latter was used and quoted by several later Arabic-writing authors whose works have survived. A close comparison of late Sasanian and early Islamic conditions in Iraq as described in Arabic literature reveals significant differences between these two periods in spite of anachronisms; and this encourages the use of Arabic literature itself for comparative purposes. The works of earlier eighth-century Arabic-writing authors such as Abū Mikhnaf (689–775)[19] and al-Madā'inī (753-830), who were natives of Iraq, provide valuable information about conditions in early Islamic Iraq. Their works, too, survive mostly in the form of citations and quotations by later authors, so the information they provide may be identified as such. With the exception of a few crucial issues, the extensive textual criticism used to evaluate these materials will not be recorded here. The material that has been chosen for presentation reflects implicit judgments and a good deal of common sense in identifying the "most likely" accounts. If one accepts in general what is reported in Arabic literature, the emerging picture is sufficiently coherent.

The other way of dealing with this material is external. Although the information provided in Arabic literature should not be ignored, it should be weighed against the information contained in contemporary non-Arabic accounts. The best argument is one based on undeniably authentic, contemporary materials from the sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries. For Iraq such materials consist of coins, administrative seals and seal impressions, inscriptions, buildings, magical incantations written on bowls, letters, biographies, chronicles, and religious literature written in Persian, Aramaic, Greek, Hebrew, and Arabic. The use of all available materials makes possible a multivalent evaluation of each of them. Since Arabic literature tends to be concerned with the history of Muslims, these materials also provide information about the non-Muslim population. Above all, the information contained within the Arabic literary tradition is most convincing when it can be verified by earlier Middle Persian, Syriac, and Greek materials. For instance, the contemporary account of warfare along the Byzantine-Sasanian frontier during the sixth century, which was composed by Prokopios in Greek, contains material that was included

[19] For the rehabilitation of Abū Mikhnaf as a reliable source of information about Iraq, see U. Sezgin, *Abū Miḫnaf: Ein Beitrag zur Historiography der Umaiyadischen Zeit* (Leiden, 1971).

in the Sasanian Book of Kings. The reader should be alerted to the importance of confirming information from Arabic literature with information from sixth and seventh-century Syriac and Greek texts.

In order to deal with the history of an entire region and all of its people, not only the Muslim Arabs, it is necessary to construct an understanding of conditions based on primary sources of diverse natures, written in different languages, and pertaining to different disciplines. One purpose for doing this is to open up several new avenues of investigation by showing how such diverse materials may be used. Even those who are familiar with early Islamic history may find some of this material unfamiliar, but the only way to make unfamiliar materials familiar is to use them.

The use of all of these materials makes a more multidimensional comparative approach possible. The comparison of two adjacent periods should be more than a mere "before and after" catalogue of similarities and differences, and it ought to avoid a thrashing-about in a sea of details. No one should impose an interpretation on the material or look for particular features; one can usually find whatever one looks for, and a predisposition to emphasize similarities or differences will have a prejudicial effect on the outcome. Principles ought to be derived from specific circumstances for each society, culture, or period before one engages in comparisons. In this case, valid comparisons of conditions in Iraq before and after the Islamic conquest depend on a proper reconstruction and understanding of those conditions, so that criteria can be established to determine what may be used as evidence for continuity or change; this evidence should form the basis for the conclusions. Static comparisons should be avoided and a concern should prevail for the dynamics of continuity and change and for the process inherent in the formation of social institutions and in the transmission of culture. The tendency to emphasize law and language in discussions of society and culture should be complemented by a concern for values and behavior, interests and attitudes, and the perspective of the people themselves.

The major advantage in such a comparative method lies in the possibility of recognizing the importance of things that may at first seem unimportant or be overlooked. The best way to begin is to consider several topical themes separately before trying to interrelate them. Recurring patterns or themes will emerge as one moves from one topic to another. The method of presentation here will be to juxtapose and to discuss several subjects separately in terms of con-

tinuity and change. The reader will be asked to absorb discrete chunks of material on different subjects which, hopefully, will be tied together by the several common interpretive themes running through them. But the use of categories to present information and to organize discussion in a topical way has its own problems. The imposition of an Aristotelian topical structure on material tends to give it an architectonic appearance, and makes circumstances appear to be more stable, ordered, and coherent than they actually were. It is important to remember, therefore, that the issues were really more complex and dynamic than they are treated here.

Since this presentation will be topical rather than chronological, readers may wish to refer to some of the more chronological treatments. Among the more useful recent works are R. N. Frye, *The Golden Age of Persia: The Arabs in the East* (New York, 1975), and M.G.S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization*, vol. I, *The Classical Age of Islam* (Chicago, 1974), both of which treat pre-Islamic and early Islamic conditions in a broader geographical context. *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. IV, *From the Arab Invasion to the Saljuqs* (London, 1975), in particular pp. 1–56, "The Arab Conquest of Iran and its Aftermath," is as much about Iraq as it is about Iran. A chronological approach is also followed by M. A. Shaban, *Islamic History A.D. 600–750 (A.H. 133): A New Interpretation* (Cambridge, 1971), and by F. E. Peters, *Allah's Commonwealth* (New York, 1973), especially pp. 15–136; both of these deal with some of the issues under consideration here. Representative examples of the formerly standard interpretation of early Islamic history are provided in a simple, concise form by J. J. Saunders, *A History of Medieval Islam* (London, 1965), and by *The Cambridge History of Islam*, vol. I (London, 1970), especially pp. 3–103.

SUBJECTS

Because of the nature of the information available concerning Iraq from the sixth to the eighth centuries, the most immediately productive subjects for discussion are administrative traditions, patterns of ethnographic distribution, social and religious organization, and religious belief and practice. Whenever possible, attitudes and behavior will be taken into account. The first section will deal with administration. The remaining two sections will deal with the people of Iraq according

to the ethnolinguistic and religious categories they used to identify themselves and each other.

The section on administration will be divided into separate discussions of administrative theory and practice, taxation, and the geographical units of administration. This section will present a point-by-point comparison between the late Sasanian and early Islamic administrative systems in Iraq, including political theories and administrative ethics. The late Sasanian administrative system is not as familiar as it ought to be. It is an important example of the highly centralized absolutist traditions of Late Antiquity. Although it was similar to the contemporary Byzantine system in many ways, it was closer than the Byzantine system to the administrative traditions that developed among Muslims and were spread by them. It is generally assumed that early Islamic administration followed a Byzantine model merely because the political capital at Damascus in Syria lay in former Byzantine territory. A tendency also exists to associate the revival of Persian culture and administrative traditions with the advent of the ʿAbbāsī dynasty in the mid-eighth century simply because the ʿAbbāsī movement arose in the province of Khurasan in north-eastern Iran and established its imperial capital at Baghdad near the former Sasanian capital in Iraq. The section on administration is intended to demonstrate two things: that Sasanian administrative institutions, as they were adapted by Muslims during the seventh century, continued to be developed after the Islamic conquest, and that this happened in Iraq (as well as in the other eastern provinces) at least a century earlier than is usually assumed.

The fact that descriptions of the Sasanian administrative system and political theory were preserved in Arabic literature is important in itself. But because both the system and the theory continued to be developed and became increasingly rationalized and consistent under Islamic rule, the theoretical expressions assigned to the Sasanians in Arabic literature are very likely to be products of the ninth century or later. Quotations of statements by Sasanian rulers such as Ardashīr I (226–41) or Khusraw Anūshirvān, which occur in Arabic literature, need not be taken as authentic third-century or sixth-century expressions. Such statements are more important for the ideas they contain and indicate that the people who expressed them felt that they were appropriate to the Sasanian political tradition of authoritarian rule.

The second section is basically ethnographic and will deal with the people of Iraq according to ethnolinguistic categories. The major di-

visions are among those whose primary language was a form of Aramaic, Persian, or Arabic. Several other groups such as Kurds, Syrians, Indians, etc. are treated in the last chapter of this section. The first concern in dealing with all of these categories is to locate them geographically and socially in Iraq in the late Sasanian period and to discover whether or how their location changed as a result of the conquest. However it is equally important to consider the nature and significance of such ethnic identities because many people were polylingual and there was extensive cultural interpenetration and interaction. There is a general tendency to orient discussions of such matters towards the assumptions of cultural nationalism, to identify a land with a people, to place a positive value on cultural homogeneity, and to put the significance of language in terms of "national" identity. The intent here is to avoid such issues and to concentrate instead on the realities of ethnic diversity and on the cultural influences exerted by different ethnic groups on each other. The assumption that a geographical or ecological region coincides with a cultural region is essentially a projection of modern cultural nationalism. There seems to be a feeling that geography, language, and religion ought to coincide and that something is wrong if they do not. Cultural unity tends to be identified with stability, and diversity is regarded as not merely untidy but as somehow unstable, even though diversity may provide some of the conditions for cultural creativity. Iraq may be viewed either in terms of the survival of ancient, indigenous Mesopotamian traditions or as a crossroad of culture with no real geographical boundaries in cultural terms, but having different degrees of interaction and integration with the larger cultural region in western Asia of which it was a part.

The third section is based on religious categories and will discuss the people of Iraq as Magians, Jews, Christians, pagans, gnostics, and Muslims. The formation of social boundaries along religious lines in late Sasanian and early Islamic Iraq is an undeniable fact. The question is what it signifies. The realities of life for such religious communities are usually understood in terms of their legal status vis-à-vis their rulers and the degree of religious toleration they were granted. Although this is an important issue, there is a tendency to overlook their internal social organization and continuing change and development, especially among the non-Muslim population. The treatment of these religious communities also tends to be compartmentalized. There is a separate scholarly literature for each religious tradition, very little

comparative scholarship, and a tendency to forget that they were all part of the same society. As a result specialists in each religion tend to know less than they should about the others. One of the main objectives here will be to point out the common features and themes among all of them.

The use of ethnic and religious categories for the purpose of discussion has both advantages and problems. These are the categories provided by our sources and are important reflections of the contemporary outlook and of contemporary identities. Ethnographic changes were as significant for cultural change as religious conversion was for continuity (because converts preserved some of their former religious background). Glick's suggestion that the use of ethnic stereotypes is typical of societies in which different groups are competing for power[20] appears to be applicable to Iraq in this period, although it might be suggested that the same is true of religious stereotypes, especially under the last Sasanians. However, Glick's model of an ethnically stratified society[21] does not seem to apply to early Islamic Iraq at all, as we shall see. The main disadvantage of using ethnic and religious categories is that they emphasize ethnic and religious differences. Such a framework for discussion is not entirely satisfactory because it masks the features common to different ethnic and religious groups in the kind of mixed, pluralistic society that existed in Iraq.

TEXTUAL AIDS

The ethnic and religious diversity of Iraq in the late Sasanian and early Islamic periods is reflected in the linguistic diversity of the written materials. In the interest of precision, technical terms and proper names will normally be transliterated in the form in which they occur in the text being cited. The language to which such terms belong will be identified by abbreviations as follows:

A.	Aramaic	L.	Latin
Ak.	Akkadian	M.	Mandaic
Ar.	Arabic	M.P.	Middle Persian
Av.	Avestan	N.P.	New Persian
Gr.	Greek	Syr.	Syriac
Heb.	Hebrew		

[20] Glick, *Islamic and Christian Spain*, p. 183.
[21] Ibid., p. 178.

This will provide clues to the strengths and weaknesses of the argument and alert the reader to the linguistic significance of such terms without unduly cluttering the text. Terms will be defined the first time they are used and any term which is used more than once is included in the glossary. Among the Iranian languages, Avestan was used for the oldest of the Magian religious writings; Middle Persian was the official administrative and main literary language under the Sasanians, who used it in their inscriptions and documents; and New Persian was the spoken language in western Iran and Iraq by the late Sasanian period. Among the Semitic languages other than Arabic and Hebrew, Syriac and Mandaic exist as forms of Aramaic. Pahlavi and Kufic refer to scripts, not to languages. Middle Persian was written in the Pahlavi script, Arabic in the Kufic script. Both the Pahlavi and Kufic scripts were derived from scripts which were used to write the Aramaic language. In transliterating Syriac names and terms, when the consonant *b* stands for the Syriac soft *b* it will be transliterated as *bh* to reflect the orthography, but it should be pronounced as *v*.

The way in which loan words circulated among all of these languages is, in itself, a feature of the kind of multilingual, religiously diverse society that existed in Iraq. However, there is a tendency to rely on philology in cultural history, to look to the etymology of loanwords, and to see their significance as evidence of cultural transmission or inheritance. For instance, the fact that the term *akkar*, which is used for a sharecropper in early Arabic, is derived ultimately from the ancient Sumerian term *en gar* suggests an important aspect of continuity in indigenous Mesopotamian labor arrangements. But the main fallacy in such an approach lies in assuming that such terms have always meant the same thing and were used in the same way. This sort of approach seems to work best when such terms are accompanied by patterns of behavior, values, or institutions, which are more important than the terms themselves, after all.

Terms which circulated among several languages usually changed their form according to the rules of the language in which they were used. For instance, the Middle Persian term for a Magian priest was *magōpat*. This term occurs in Syriac texts as *mōhpaṭā*, but the New Persian form, *mōbadh*, is used in Arabic texts. Similarly, the Middle Persian word for a landlord or administrator of a rural subdistrict is *dēhkān*. Its Middle Persian plural is *dēhkānān*, but in Syriac texts it occurs as *dahqānē*, which is the Syriac plural form; in Arabic texts, it is given the form of an Arabic broken plural, as *dahāqīn*. Likewise,

the ancient Sumerian term for a bureaucratic scribe, *dupsar*, survived in Middle Persian as *dapīr*, which occurs in Syriac texts as *dawīr*. Its New Persian form is *dabīr*, but this is usually translated by the Arabic term *kātib* ("one who writes") in Arabic texts, and the New Persian term for chief scribe, *dabīrbadh*, is translated into Arabic as *ra'īs al-kuttāb* ("head of the scribes"). The New Persian term *shomordeh* is translated by the Arabic *dār al-ḥisāb* both of which mean "counting house." The significance of such accurate Arabic translations of Persian terms and phrases should not be overlooked. They provide some of the best evidence that the bilingual Arabs and Persians who were responsible for these translations really understood what these terms and phrases meant.

The presence of Arabic loanwords in Middle Persian texts is equally significant. For instance the term *aṣl* was used in early Arabic for the property equal to the principal that was mortgaged for a loan. This term occurs as *aslīk* in a Magian apocalyptic text that was written in Middle Persian shortly after the conquest, in reference to property mortgaged for tax debts. Since the language of debt was already used by Persians for taxes owed to the state in the late Sasanian period, the use of an Arabic term in such a context suggests not only that Arabs brought certain economic customs and their terminology with them but also that this had an impact on Magian Persians. The similarity between Persian and Arab economic practices provided sufficient reinforcement to enable a Magian Persian who was hostile to Muslim Arab rule to apply an Arabic term for principal to tax debts. However, this is a great deal to infer from a single term and the argument does not necessarily depend on this kind of analysis. Nevertheless, the presence and use of loanwords can be significant, and in order to enable the reader to recognize them, transliterated terms will be identified by the language to which they belong regardless of the language of the text in which they occur.

Proper names are also transformed from one language to another. John is Yōḥannan in Syriac and Yaḥyā in Arabic. The Arabic name of ʿAbdullāh ibn az-Zubayr, the rival caliph during the second civil war, is rendered on coins as *Apdula-i Zupiran* in Pahlavi script, following Middle Persian usage. Theophoric names also occur in different religious and linguistic traditions. Īshōʿyahbh (Isadore) means "Jesus gave" in Syriac, and Dadhīshōʿ means the same thing in New Persian. Both names were used by local Christians. The New Persian name,

Yazdāndādh (Theodore), means "God (Ohrmazd) gave" or "the Yazatas gave" and was used by Magians.

Because the forms of place names occurring in Arabic literature generally reflect the actual pronunciation during the seventh century, these forms will be used throughout the text without the Arabic definite article (*al-*) or diacritical marks, except for the consonants *'ayn* (ʿ) and *hamza* (ʾ). The reader may wish to refer to the map in part I, chapter 3, "Administrative Geography." The Arabic name, Mada'in (literally "the cities"), will be used for the Sasanian imperial capital instead of the name Ctesiphon because it is more descriptive of the metropolis. By the late Sasanian period, Ctesiphon was only one of several adjacent cities on both sides of the Tigris river. In discussing coins, the dates that are actually used on them will be given in the solar era of Yazdagerd III, which began in 632 and in the lunar era of the Hijra (A.H.), which began in 622.

This work is intended to be only a preliminary statement. It is not intended or expected to be definitive or to exhaust the subject. Its purpose is more to provoke discussion than to end it. Important aspects of economic, intellectual, and literary history will be mentioned only in passing or not at all. Intellectual history will be discussed only in terms of political theory and religious doctrine. There will be no treatment of science, technology, or art. This study of early Islamic Iraq is essentially an attempt at a descriptive analysis of some of the more significant aspects of continuity and change—a forest *and* trees approach—by establishing patterns and precedents prevalent during the century before the conquest. Against these patterns, then, the nature and extent of continuity or of the changes brought about by the conquest can be measured. Let us begin by considering administration.

Part I

ADMINISTRATION

Chapter 1

ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY AND PRACTICE

THE ORGANIZATION OF ADMINISTRATION

The Late Sasanian Monarchy

The debt that Islamic government owed to Sasanian administration tends to be exaggerated. Culturally conscious Persians such as the anonymous author of the *Kitāb at-tāj* claimed that the rules of administration used by Muslims had been borrowed from the Sasanians.[1] Arabic literature tends to heighten the impression that Islamic institutions were of Sasanian origin by anachronistically describing the Sasanians in contemporary ninth and tenth-century terms. In order to extract valid conclusions from such a mass of tendentious details, it is important to understand the nature of the Sasanian system and the theories that supported it on the eve of the Islamic conquest, as well as the process by which the principles and procedures of Sasanian statecraft were adapted by early Muslim administrators.

The Sasanian empire had achieved the greatest degree of centralization during the last century of its existence. The late Sasanian administrative bureaus at the capital at Mada'in, on the Tigris river in central Iraq, seem to have been organized in a fourfold system. Income was handled by a bureau of taxes and was used mainly to furnish the army with mounts, arms, provisions, and pay which were stored at military depots and distributed by means of a muster roll by military scribes. The scribes in the chancellery dealt with administrative and foreign correspondence and a fourth department was responsible for sealing and registering official documents.[2]

Imperial administration combined vertical hierarchic organization with a horizontal separation of powers at the provincial level. Under

[1] *Kitāb at-tāj fī akhlāq al-mulūk* (Cairo, 1914), p. 23.

[2] Balādhurī, *Kitāb futūḥ al-buldān* (Leiden, 1886), p. 246; Jahshiyārī, *Kitāb al-wuzarā' wa l-kuttāb* (Leipzig, 1926), pp. 3–4; Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh ar-rusul wa l-mulūk* (Leiden, 1879), I, 964, 1030; Tha'ālibī, *Ghurar akhbār mulūk al-furs wa siyaruhum*, ed. and tr. H. Zotenberg, *Histoire des rois des Perses* (Paris, 1900), p. 610; Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rīkh* (Leiden, 1883), I, 186–87.

Khusraw Anūshirvān (531–79), the entire empire was divided into four quarters that were oriented to the points of the compass; each quarter was divided into districts, and each district was divided into subdistricts.[3] Under the last Sasanians, each quarter had a military governor called a *spahbadh* (M.P. *spāhpat*) or *ispahbadh* (N.P.) who was served by a lieutenant called a *pādhghōspān* (M.P. *pātkōstpān*), although along the frontier the districts were under *marzbāns* (M.P. *marzpān*).[4] There were separate officials for the collection of taxes and for financial administration, and there was usually a separate hierarchy of Magian priests who had ritual and judicial responsibilities. This picture is complicated somewhat by the use of alternative means to separate responsibilities either by dividing military, financial, and religious-legal authority among different officials in the same jurisdiction or by establishing separate military and civilian financial districts, usually as border districts and crown provinces. In the latter case, local landed notables might be given both military and financial responsibility in their districts while crown property was assigned to members of the royal family.

This system was supported by a theory of government called the "circle of power," which amounted to a kind of paternal absolutism that operated through a strictly efficient hierarchy. An absolute monarch needs a monopoly of power and must be able to enforce his commands and defend his realm by means of an army; the army must *have a regular source of income, insured by economic prosperity*; prosperity depends on enlightened administrative practices, centralization, and absolute authority which must, after all, be enforced by the army. This concept of an interlocking circular balance of military force, economic prosperity, and justice, in which the failure of any one of these three components might destroy the entire system, is neatly summarized by the famous aphorism ascribed (among others) to the third century Sasanian ruler, Ardashīr I: there is "no ruler without men, no men without wealth, no wealth without prosperity, and no prosperity without justice and good administration."[5] One of the most

[3] Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, I, 892–94; Tha'ālibī, *Ghurar*, p. 609; Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rīkh*, I, 202.

[4] Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh* I, 1056.

[5] Tha'ālibī, *Ghurar*, p. 482. For the parallel Middle Persian passage in Book III, chapter 134 of the *Dēnkart*, see M. F. Kanga, "Kingship and Religion in Iran," *Acta Iranica* 3 (1974), 224–25. This division into ethical, military, and economic factors invites comparison with Indo-European trifunctionalism. See Georges Dumezil, *L'idéologie tripartie des Indo-Européens* (Brussels, 1958).

significant ways this attitude was symbolized was in the image of the state as a guarded garden.[6]

But late Sasanian theories went beyond mere centralization and hierarchic organization to a universalism expressed by a preference for organizing things by fours. The official fourfold Sasanian class system, administrative bureaus, and quarters of the empire were symbols of the four quarters of the universe, as were the four conjunctions of stars and crescents placed at ninety-degree angles around the circumference of late Sasanian coins. The image of the state as a throne with four legs associated with Hurmizd IV (579–90) conveys the same idea.[7] The Sasanian empire was universal, and its ruler was a universal emperor in the ancient style. More than that, Sasanian absolutism was founded on the concept of an impartial, blind, indeed merciless justice that was associated with astrology and the god of Time (Zurvān) and on the relationship between fatalism and authoritarian rule.[8]

In fact, the bond of the state was a concept of administrative ethics that amounted to equity. The reputation of the ruler for impartial authoritarian justice was intended to preserve the state by protecting the weak from the strong and by discouraging oppression by corrupt officials. Traditional versions of Sasanian royal policy again quote Ardashīr I: "We shall devote ourselves entirely to the maintenance of justice, to the spread of virtue and to the establishment of a lasting glory; fertility shall be restored to the earth, and our people shall be governed with benevolence. . . . My justice shall be the same for the powerful and for the weak, for the small and the great."[9]

Further, the state enforcement of religiously sanctioned law provided a theoretical basis for the interdependence between the official Magian priesthood and the Sasanian state. Once more, according to Ardashīr I: "Kingship preserves itself by religion and religion strengthens itself by kingship,"[10] or religion and monarchy are twin brothers—neither

[6] Dīnawarī, *Kitāb al-akhbār aṭ-ṭiwāl* (Leiden, 1912), pp. 114–15; Thaʿālibī, *Ghurar*, pp. 722–32.

[7] A. Scher, "Histoire nestorienne (Chronique de Séert)," II(1), *PO* 7(1950), 195; Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, I, 991. For the corresponding fourfold division of the heavens, see R. C. Zaehner, *Zurvan, a Zoroastrian Dilemma* (Oxford, 1955), pp. 147–48, 163, 351. For the universal significance of Sasanian astral symbolism and its ancient Babylonian background, see H. P. l'Orange, *Studies on the Iconography of Cosmic Kingship in the Ancient World* (Oslo, 1953), pp. 22–23, 25, 41–42.

[8] Zaehner, *Zurvan*, p. 58.

[9] Masʿūdī, *Murūj adh-dhahab wa-maʾādin al-jawhar* (Beirut, 1966), I, 285.

[10] Thaʿālibī, *Ghurar*, p. 483. For the parallel passage in Book III, chapter 58 of the *Dēnkart*, see Kanga, "Kingship," pp. 222–23.

can do without the other. "Religion is the foundation of kingship and kingship is the protector [of religion]. For whatever lacks a foundation must perish, and whatever lacks a protector disappears."[11]

The ruler himself was hedged about with a special sanctity. The divine glory or fortune (M.P. *x^{v}arnah*), which was limited to members of the dynasty, was the supernatural source and symbol of their legitimacy. It took the form of a ram or of a radiant light around the head of the monarch, as reflected in the luster of the pearls and the symbolism of the stars in his crown or on his coins. The imagery of fire, as well as solar, lunar, and astral symbols, served both to identify the Sasanian ruler as the choice and representative of Ohrmazd, the god of light, and to announce his claim to cosmic rule. As mythic sacrificer, dragon slayer, and rainmaker, his person was sacred and his office required ritual physical perfection and ritual seclusion behind a curtain or a veil. It was a sacrilege to kill him, but blinding was enough to disqualify him as king, as was done to Hurmizd IV when he was deposed.[12]

The prerogatives of kingship included a monopoly on the symbols of power and wealth: the crown, throne, mace, and the limitation of the right to issue coins to the reigning monarch, who guaranteed their weight and purity and who kept large cash reserves in the royal treasury as the necessary insurance to support the system. Although the usurper Bahrām Chūbīn (590–91) never took the royal title himself and only called himself the guardian of the empire, he issued his own coins and is said to have ascended a golden throne, placed the crown on his head, held audience, received taxes, paid salaries, and administered the entire kingdom according to the laws.[13] This is a rather idealized

[11] Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, I, 289. The imagery of twins ties this concept to Zurvanism, and the myth which gives Ohrmazd the priesthood and Ahriman the kingship reflects the ambivalence of this relationship. See Mary Boyce, "Some Reflections on Zurvanism," *BSOAS* 19 (1957): 309; and idem, *The Letter of Tansar* (Rome, 1968), pp. 16, 33–34.

[12] Contemporary, sixth-century evidence is in Prokopios, *History of the Wars*, I.v. 2–3, 7; vi. 17; xi. 3–4, and in Theophylactus Simocatta, who describes the jewel-encrusted golden crown and royal vestments of Hurmizd IV in his *Historiae* iv. 3, 7–8 (Stuttgart, 1972), p. 153. For accounts in later Arabic literature, see A. Scher, "Histoire nestorienne (Chronique de Séert)," II(2), *PO* 13 (1919), 444; Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, I, 1046; Thaʿālibī, *Ghurar*, p. 661; Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, I, 190. For these aspects of Iranian kingship, see Geo Widengren, "The Sacral Kingship of Iran," in *The Sacral Kingship*, Studies in the History of Religions, supp. to *Numen* 4, (Leiden, 1959).

[13] H. Zotenberg, *Chronique de Abou-Djafar-Mo'hammed-ben-Djarîr-ben-Yezid Tabari, traduite sur la version persane d'Abou-ʿAli Mo'hammed Belʿami* (Paris, 1938), II, 285–86.

picture of what a reigning monarch was supposed to do. Similarly, in traditional descriptions of Būrāndokht (630–31) as a reigning queen, she is said to have struck coins, built stone and wooden bridges, and remitted the arrears of taxes.[14]

Most of these themes are summed up in the reign of Khusraw Parvīz (590–628). In a letter to the Byzantine emperor Maurice he is said to have called himself "Chosroes, King of Kings, master of those who have power, lord of peoples, prince of peace, savior of men, good and eternal man among the gods, most powerful god among men, most honored, victorious, ascended with the sun and companion of the stars."[15] He is also represented as being addressed as a god (Syr. *ālahā*) by his queen, Shīrīn.[16] A delegation of Nestorian Christians told him in 612 that "just as the sun which gladdens the entire earth by its light and warmth, your goodness spreads abundantly over all men."[17] Both his authoritarian use of fatalism and his pretensions to universal rule are symbolized by the gold stars and signs of the zodiac set in a sky of lapis lazuli along with the seven climes on the canopy over his throne, and by his depiction enthroned in heaven on the dome of the building at Ganzaca in 624.[18] Universalist claims combined with opportunism and the inner economics of his absolutist policy were responsible for the predatory warfare he carried out against the Byzantines in the early seventh century. The huge size of his royal treasure (which is said to have been accumulated from the time of Fīrūz in the late fifth century) was legendary, and he increased it by foreign conquests and by exactions from his own subjects.[19] Later Arabic tradition

[14] Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, I, 1064.

[15] Theophylactus Simocatta, *Historiae*, iv. 8, p. 164.

[16] I. Guidi, *Chronica Minora I*, *CSCO, Scriptores Syri*, 1 (Louvain, 1955), 28; *Scr. Syri.*, 2 (Louvain, 1955), 24; T. Nöldeke, "Die von Guidi herausgegebene syrische Chronik," *Sitzungsberichte der Philosophisch-Historischen Klasse der kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 127 (1893), 28. Since Shīrīn was an Aramaean from lower Iraq, she may actually have used such a term.

[17] J. B. Chabot, *Synodicon Orientale* (Paris, 1902), pp. 563, 580–81.

[18] L'Orange, *Cosmic Kingship*, pp. 18–21; Thaʿālibī, *Ghurar*, p. 699.

[19] Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, I, 1041–42; Thaʿālibī, *Ghurar*, p. 687; Yaʿqūbī, *Ta'rīkh*, I, 195. Beginning with forty-eight million mithqāls (one *mithqāl* = 4.25 grams) of coins struck by Fīrūz and Qubādh I, the treasure had grown to 468 million *mithqāls* by 607 and then 1.6 billion *mithqāls* in 620 (A. Christensen, *L'Iran sous les Sassanides* (Copenhagen, 1944), pp. 453–54; Ṭabarī, I, 1042, 1057). The inventory taken in 624 counted four hundred million purses of *dirhams*, one hundred thousand purses of *dīnārs*, and jewels, gold and silverplate, furs, precious cloth, thousands of concubines, horses and mules, and almost one thousand elephants (E. G. Browne, "Some account of the Arabic work entitled 'Niháyatu' 1-irab fi akhbari'l-Furs wa'l-'Arab,' particularly of that part which

honored his reputation for hierarchic centralization and authoritarian control by quoting from him the principle that "he who does not obey his superior is not obeyed by his subordinates."[20]

The Early Islamic Amīrate

The earliest application of Sasanian theories and practices to Islamic government are not to be found primarily among the Commanders of the Faithful at Madina or Damascus but among the Muslim governors of Iraq and the east during the seventh century. Perhaps this was natural since only one seventh-century Commander of the Faithful (ʿAlī, 656–61) ever resided in Iraq, but it was supported by the nature of the governor's office in which the combination of military, fiscal, and religious responsibilities was remarkably and conveniently close to the Sasanian concept of monarchy. This helps to explain the introduction of royal customs by Muslim governors, the employment of hierarchic concepts, and the separation of powers at the provincial level below that of governor in his appointment of subordinate financial and judicial officials.

The Islamic governor (Ar. *amīr*), at least in the seventh century, was more than simply a military official. The nature of the early amīrate was the result of Muhammad's own practice as leader of the Muslim community in all of its activities, especially at Madina between 622 and 632. Immediately after the conquest of Iraq, when the local Muslim community was practically identical with the armies of occupation that settled at Basra, Kufa, Mada'in, and Mawsil, leadership of the army also meant leadership of the local community. This was expressed formally by leading public worship as the *imām* (Ar.), delivering the sermon (Ar. *khuṭba*), and rendering or receiving allegiance (Ar. *bayʿa*) on behalf of the community. Likewise, the combination of financial with military responsibilities under early Muslim governors in Iraq was an extension of the authority exercised by Muhammad at Madina where he had collected the tithe and distributed it to the needy. It was also a direct result of the nature of the conquest of Iraq where the income from the Sasanian taxation system was made the permanent booty (Ar. *fayʾ*) of the Muslim community, an arrangement which

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treats of the Persian Empire," *JRAS* (1900), p. 250. Khusraw Parvīz refused to spend any of it during the crisis at the end of his Byzantine war, so it fell fairly intact into the hands of the Muslim conquerors when Mada'in fell in 637 and was divided among them (Ṭabarī, *Taʾrikh*, I, 2434).

[20] Thaʿālibī, *Ghurar*, p. 690.

incidentally preserved the Sasanian relationship between taxes and the support of the army.

The removal of the frontier further and further to the east during the seventh century transformed the military functions of the governors in Iraq from those of a general in the field at the time of the conquest to those of a military administrator who appointed subordinates, established an urban police force (Ar. *shurṭa*), and sent contingents of troops to the eastern frontier and against rebels. In addition, the *amīr* acted as paymaster for the garrisons in the cities of Iraq. Because of his appointment of officials to collect taxes and to distribute them fairly among those who were entitled to them, the Sasanian division between military and financial responsibilities survived at the level below the *amīr*. Responsibility for justice was also eventually separated from the combined responsibilites of the *amīr*, and from about 660 onwards *amīrs* appointed their own judges (Ar. sg. *qāḍī*). Thus, the outlook and expectations which allowed the mutual reinforcement of Sasanian and Islamic concepts of government are revealed in the report which ʿAmr ibn Maʿdikarib is said to have made to the caliph ʿUmar I (634–44) about the administrative record of Saʿd ibn Abī Waqqāṣ at Kufa: "He divides the shares equitably, judges cases justly, and leads the bands successfully."[21]

By the time of Muʿāwiya (660–80), a more developed, authoritarian political theory had emerged. The main statements of these concepts of government are associated with Ziyād ibn Abīhi, who was governor of all of Iraq and the east for Muʿāwiya from about 669 until 673. They are contained in Ziyād's inaugural speech (Ar. *khuṭba*) at Basra in 665, in the fourfold inscription in the corners of the public audience hall he built at Kufa in about 670, and in the panegyric in his praise, which was composed by Ḥāritha ibn Badr al-Ghudānī. There is also a body of aphorisms and anecdotes that may be apocryphal but conform to the general image tradition had of him.

These statements base political power on divine legitimation. Terminology ascribed to Ziyād corresponds to the usages of the Sufyānī period, and in fact, provides a good deal of the evidence for Sufyānī usage, in which the regime was called the government of God (A./Ar. *sulṭān Allāh*), the military forces were called the army of God (A./Ar.

[21] Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 279. The background of this report lies in the complaints made by the Kufans that Saʿd did not perform the *ṣalāt* (Ar. for the Muslim act of worship) well and was unjust to members of the tribe of Asad in dividing the booty (Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, I, 2594; Zotenberg, *Chronique*, III, 472, 474).

jund Allāh), and the treasury was no longer called the property of the Muslims (Ar. *māl al-Muslimīn*) but the property of God (Ar. *māl Allāh*). It was Ḥāritha who, in praising Ziyād, called Muʿāwiya the Deputy of God (Ar. *khalīfat Allāh*) and Ziyād his wonderful assistant (Ar. *wazīr*).[22] The clearest statement is in Ziyād's *khuṭba*, where he told the Basrans, "We govern you with the authority (A. *sulṭān*) of God which He bestowed on us and we protect you with the *fay'* of God which He granted us."[23]

The use of divine legitimation to justify Sufyānī absolutism meant that, ultimately, the most effective sanctions on a ruler's behavior were reward or punishment by God. This is reflected in a part of Ziyād's inscription stating, in effect, that good and evil will be rewarded in kind; this seems to paraphrase *Qur'ān* 10:26–27.[24] Both in the *khuṭba* and in his inscription, Ziyād is given the appearance of favoring a balance in the ruler's behavior between leniency or flexibility without weakness and forcefulness without compulsion (Ar. *jabariyya*) or harshness.[25] We are also told that he expected both honesty and firmness from his administrative appointees.[26]

The relationship between ruler and subject was put in terms of the reciprocal exchange of justice and protection for obedience. In 665 Ziyād told the Basrans: "You owe us obedience and we owe you justice."[27] He was famous for his impartial and inflexible justice, which was essentially the same kind of equity applied by the Sasanians to protect the weak from the strong and violent by insisting on a mo-

[22] Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 78. There is also a reference to *māl Allāh* in a letter from Muʿāwiya to Ziyād in 661 (Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 12) and in an administrative decision (Ar. *tawqīʿa*) ascribed to Ziyād; see Ibn ʿAbd Rabbihi, *Kitāb al-ʿiqd al-farīd* (Cairo, 1363/1944), IV, 217.

[23] Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 75. Since the rest of the *khuṭba* is in the first person singular, Ziyād's lapse into the plural in this passage may be significant; but it is uncertain whether it should be taken as the royal plural, as a reference to the regime in general, or as a reference to himself and Muʿāwiya, although in the latter case one might have expected the dual. However, pronoun agreement is not at all consistent in early Arabic.

[24] Ibn Abī l-Ḥadīd, *Sharḥ nahj al-balāgha* (Cairo, 1378/1959), XVI, 198; Ibn Qutayba, *ʿUyūn al-akhbār* (Cairo, 1964), II, 211. Likewise, when Abū Bakra recognized Muʿāwiya's position as deputy of God over His creation (*Ar. khilāfatu-llāh fī khalqihi*), the only sanction he could employ to encourage Muʿāwiya to behave virtuously and to watch over himself and his flock was the fear of God's future judgment (Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 14).

[25] Ibn Qutayba, *ʿUyūn*, II, 211; Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 211. A similar ideal is also ascribed to the Commander of the Faithful ʿUmar I; see Ibn Saʿd, *Kitāb aṭ-ṭabaqāt al-kabīr* (Leiden, 1909), III (1), 250.

[26] Ibn Qutayba, *ʿUyūn*, I, 55.

[27] Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 75.

nopoly of force and by treating everyone alike. His rigorous insistence on the letter of the law is illustrated best by the celebrated story of the bedouin who violated the curfew at Basra in 665. In an effort to curb crime, Ziyād had made violation of the curfew a capital offense; but the bedouin, ignorant of the rule, had brought his milch camel into the city for sale the following morning. When the *shurṭa* caught him out on the street at night, he was taken to Ziyād, who believed his story but said that his execution would serve as an example to the people and had him beheaded.[28] Ḥāritha called Ziyād a just leader (Ar. *imām*) who was determined in the face of distractions, and praised the bounty that streamed from his hands like milk, sharing it equally with rich and poor alike so that no one complained of inequity.[29] Failure by either the ruler or his subjects to perform their duties dissolved the bond, and Ziyād is said to have told the Basrans that if he should fail to keep his word they could disobey him.[30]

Ḥāritha also emphasized Ziyād's responsibility to protect and defend his subjects. He described how, at a time of evil and fear, Ziyād arose as the sword of God among them—bright and radiant, strong, experienced, unworried, and energetic—and was victorious by God's command.[31] Although, on the whole, Ḥāritha's themes of generosity and protection appeal to virtues from his native Arab background, it is worth noticing that the local Nestorian Christians normally addressed the late Sasanian monarchs as "victorious."

In fact, the way the concept of reciprocal obligations was symbolized by the image of the *imām* and his flock (Ar. *raʿiyya*) is very close to indigenous pre-Islamic traditions in Iraq. The imagery of shepherd and sheep used for political and religious authority and responsibility, which comes from ancient Mesopotamia, was employed both by the local Christian ecclesiastical leaders[32] and by the Sasanian rulers who called themselves royal shepherds.[33] In praising Ziyād, Ḥāritha says

[28] Ibn ʿAbd Rabbihi, *ʿIqd*, III, 471–72; Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, II, 76–77.

[29] Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, II, 78. The Sasanian background of the emphasis on administrative equity is assumed by the way tradition has a native *dihqān* advise the governor, whom al-Ḥajjāj appointed to be in charge of upper Falluja at the end of the seventh century, to give the same judgment to a notable (Ar. *sharīf*) as to a commoner so that people would trust him; see Jāḥiẓ, *Rasāʾil* (Cairo, 1964), II, 32.

[30] Ibn Abī l-Ḥadīd, *Nahj*, XVI, 202.

[31] Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, II, 78.

[32] F. Nau, "Histoires d'Aḥoudemmeh et de Marouta, métropolitains jacobites de Tagrit et de l'Orient," *PO* 3 (1909), 92. The use of such imagery in Syriac Christian literature is very consciously Biblical.

[33] Dīnawarī, *Akhbār aṭ-ṭiwāl*, pp. 30, 44, 108; R. Frye, "The Charisma of Kingship

that when the flock (Ar. *raʿiyya*) went astray he was not oppressive. Although Ḥāritha's use of *raʿiyya* to mean Muslim subjects and to express the paternalistic responsibility of the ruler coincides closely with Ziyād's general reputation, this is one of the first times that this term appears in an Islamic political context.[34] Likewise, the advice which Ziyād gave to his tax collectors to treat the peasants well because "as long as they are prosperous, you will be prosperous" was essentially Sasanian.[35] We thus find a combination of Sasanian, Arab, and genuinely Islamic ideas contributing to the absolutist ideology of the Sufyānī period, at least as it was gathered around the person of Ziyād.

One result of the resemblance between Sasanian and Islamic concepts of government was that early Islamic administration in Iraq tended to preserve late Sasanian distinctions between military jurisdictions and civilian financial districts. In the first temporary settlement that was made by Khālid ibn al-Walīd along the middle Euphrates during the conquest, the agents whom he appointed to be in charge of the various agricultural subdistricts were called tax collectors while those who were left as Khālid's lieutenants at such places as Hira, ʿAyn Tamr, and Anbar were essentially military officers who were in charge of the frontier garrisons (Ar. *masālih*) where the Persians had had garrisons before the conquest.[36] Under ʿUmar I both the Euphrates subdistricts and the ex-Sasanian crown province of Kaskar remained as civilian financial jurisdictions under the authority of the governor at Kufa.[37]

The division of military, financial, and religious responsibilities at the highest levels of Islamic provincial administration neither occurred suddenly nor was entirely complete during the seventh century. The degree of semiautonomy or central control was determined by whether subordinate or collegiate appointments were made by the Commander of the Faithful or by the local governor. The emergence of financial

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in Ancient Iran," *Iranica Antiqua* 4 (1964): 41, 47–48. This imagery is also used in the Arabic description of how Būrāndokht behaved well towards her *raʿiyya* (Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, I, 1064). This term is used in an Islamic context in the *qiṣṣa* (Ar. "narration") of the Khārijī Sālih ibn Musarriḥ in the 690s, where God is said to have put ʿUmar I in charge of the Muslim flock (*raʿiyya*) (Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, II, 883).

[34] See also Ibn ʿAbd Rabbihi, *ʿIqd*, I, 8. *Raʿiyya* had already been used for Muʿāwiya's Muslim subjects by Abū Bakra (Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, II, 14); and *sulṭān* and *raʿiyya* are contrasted in a letter Ziyād supposedly wrote to al-Ḥasan ibn Fāṭima (Ibn Abī l-Ḥadīd, *Nahj*, XVI, 194).

[35] Ibn Qutayba, *ʿUyūn*, I, 10.

[36] Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, I, 2050–52.

[37] Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, VI, 11; Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, I, 2455–56, 2596, 2637, 3058.

officials at the provincial level was also connected to the separate administration of crown lands. An early administrative profile is provided by the appointments that ʿUmar I is said to have made for the government of Kufa in 642, when ʿAmmār ibn Yāsir was made *amīr* and put in charge of worship and the army; ʿAbdullāh ibn Masʿūd was appointed to give the call to worship (Ar. *muʿadhdhin*) as teacher (Ar. *muʿallim*) or judge (Ar. *qāḍī*) and put in charge of the treasury (Ar. *bayt al-māl*) as administrative assistant (Ar. *wazīr*); and ʿUthmān ibn Ḥunayf was put in charge of the measurement of the land for establishing the tax.[38] In 661 under Muʿāwiya, responsibilities were divided at Kufa between al-Mughīra ibn Shuʿba (second term, 661–69), who was governor general, and ʿAbdullāh ibn Darrāj, a client (Ar. *mawlā*) of Muʿāwiya, whom he appointed to be in charge of the taxes (Ar. *kharāj*) and crown property (Ar. pl. *ṣawāfī*) of Kufa.[39] Financial and other responsibilities were combined under Ziyād; but in 683 the rival Commander of the Faithful, ʿAbdullāh ibn az-Zubayr at Madina, appointed ʿAbdullāh ibn Yazīd al-Ansārī as *amīr* over the worship, war, and border posts of Kufa and Ibrāhīm ibn Ṭalha ibn ʿUbaydullāh al-Aʿraj as *amīr* over the tax (Ar. *kharāj*) of Kufa.[40] With the establishment of Marwānī authority in Iraq under ʿAbd al-Malik (685–705), however, financial and military authority were again combined in the person of al-Ḥajjāj (695–714).[41]

There was thus a continuing dichotomy between the late Sasanian separation of powers on the provincial level as a function of absolutist centralization and the distinctively Islamic concept of the amīrate as a combination of military, financial, and religious responsibilities. Henceforth, the Sasanian tradition would be associated with the imperial centralization of the early ʿAbbāsīs and with the imperial tradition in subsequent Islamic government, while the combination of powers would be associated with greater provincial autonomy and eventually with administrative decentralization and political fragmen-

[38] Abū Yūsuf, *Livre de l-impôt foncier (Kitab al-Kharadj)* (Paris, 1921), p. 56; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf* (Cairo, 1959), I, 163–64; idem, *Futūḥ*, p. 269; Ibn al-Faqīh, *Mukhtaṣar kitāb al-buldān* (Leiden, 1885), pp. 165, 171: Ibn Qutayba, *Kitāb al-maʿārif* (Cairo, 1969), p. 249; Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, VI, 3; Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, I, 2637, 2645, 2647.

[39] Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 290, 295; Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, II, 10–11; Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, II, 258.

[40] Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, II, 467, 509.

[41] Responsibilities continued to be divided among the subordinates of al-Ḥajjāj and, although worship (Ar. *ṣalāt*) and war (Ar. *ḥarb*) were normally combined in early Islamic government, he assigned them to two separate officials at Kufa in 705 (Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, II, 1182).

tation. Consequently, there seems to be sufficient evidence to warrant the suggestion that in Islamic Iraq during the seventh century the division of financial and military responsibilities was viewed as a frame of reference; administrative arrangements often were described in these terms in the Arabic literary tradition, while occasionally financial and military responsibilities were actually divided between two officials at the same time in the same place.

Early Islamic administration also duplicated the relationship between the *ispahbadh* and his *pādhghōspān* in the office of lieutenant or vice governor (Ar. *khalīfa*) to the *amīr*. Although *khalīfa* was used for a subordinate official before Islam and outside of Iraq, this term appears in references to early Islamic Iraq with the meaning of a lieutenant appointed by either his immediate superior or by the Commander of the Faithful for the same jurisdiction as his superior during the latter's absence (usually at the capital). The best example of this practice from the end of the Sasanian period is the case of Farrūkh-Hurmizd, the *ispahbadh* of Khurasan during the reign of Azermīdukht (ca. 632). He remained at court as an unsuccessful suitor of the queen while his son Rustam, who is said to be the same man as the famous general of Yazdagerd III, served as his father's *khalīfa* in Khurasan.[42] The recall of the lieutenants of Sa'd ibn Abī Waqqāṣ from their frontier posts in 638 and their settlement in the newly founded city of Kufa provides a striking parallel to Sasanian practice. Each of them took up his residence in the provincial capital, leaving his own lieutenant (Ar. *khalīfa*) in charge of his post.[43] Since the beginning of Islamic rule, a *khalīfa* was also appointed for the governors of Basra and Kufa during their absence.[44]

The Mint

The financial responsibilities of early Islamic governors included minting coins. Governors shared this responsibility with the Com-

[42] Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, I, 1065; Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rīkh*, I, 197. The use of this term in this context appears to be an Arabic translation of *pādhghōspān* and serves to increase the impression of a connection between these two offices. Elsewhere the term *khalīfa* is used for a viceroy in a south Arabian inscription of 543; see W. Montgomery Watt, "God's Caliph: Qur'ānic Interpretations and Umayyad Claims," in *Iran and Islam*, ed. C. E. Bosworth (Edinburgh, 1971), p. 567. *Khalīfa* is also used for the representative of a rural official (Gk. *pagarch*) in an Egyptian papyrus of 643; see A. Grohmann, *From the World of Arabic Papyri* (Cairo, 1952), p. 114.

[43] Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, I, 2497. The lieutenant whom Qa'qā' ibn 'Amr left at Hulwan was a Persian from Khurasan called Qubādh.

[44] Ibid., I, 2607, 3414; Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 166.

mander of the Faithful and inherited it from the Sasanians along with the mints and coins themselves. The imitation of late Sasanian coins by the early Muslim rulers in the east is one of the clearest aspects of direct continuity both in finance administration and in royal symbolism. Although the Sasanians used both gold and silver coins, taxes were computed in the silver coins called *zūzē* in Syriac or *dirhams* in Arabic; these were derived from the Attic *drachma*, which had been introduced into the east by Alexander the Great and had been perpetuated by the Seleucids and Parthians. The Sasanian *dirham* had an average weight of 3.9 grams and was supposed to be equal in value to one twenty-fifth of a gold coin, while four *zūzē* equaled a *stater* (Syr. *estīrā*, Gk. *tetradrachma*) or Hebrew *shekel*.[45]

Sasanian coins were a convenient means of publishing royal claims to authority along with certain aspects of Sasanian imperial ideology, and they provide contemporary evidence for the theoretical foundations of Sasanian rule. Normally Sasanian silver coins presented a portrait of the reigning monarch in profile on the obverse, each with his distinctive crown and headdress. From the beginning of the dynasty, the Magian fire altar flanked by two priests was represented on the reverse as an indication of the official status enjoyed by Magianism under the Sasanians. Of equal importance was the introduction of astral symbols on the coins of fifth-century rulers and the organization of these symbols into meaningful patterns on the coins of the last Sasanian monarchs. Yazdagerd I (399–420) was the first monarch represented with a crescent moon on the front of his crown, and the coins of both Bahrām V (420–38) and Yazdagerd II (438–57) show an upturned crescent beneath a circle representing the sun above their crowns. The coins of Fīrūz (459–84) marked the definite establishment of these symbols on Sasanian coins; the obverse contains a crescent in front of the crown and the crown itself is surmounted by an upturned crescent beneath a circle. Some of his coins show two outspread wings

[45] E. Ebeling, "Das Aramäisch-Mittel-Persische Glossar Frahang-i-Pahlavik im Lichte der assyriologischen Forschung," *Mitteilungen der Altorientalischen Gesellschaft* 14 (1941), 36–37; R. Göbl, "Aufbau der Münzprägung," in F. Altheim, *Ein Asiatischer Staat*, p. 97; F. Paruck, *Sāsānian Coins* (Bombay, 1924), pp. 37, 39, 47; N. Pigulevskaya, *Les villes de l'état iranien aux époques parthe et sassanide* (Paris, 1963), p. 183; M. L. Rodkinson, *The Babylonian Talmud* (Boston, 1918), X, "Baba Kama," 147; idem, XI, "Baba Metzia," 112; idem, XIV, "Baba Bathra," 366–67; C. E. Sachau, *Syrische Rechtsbücher* (Berlin, 1907), II, 198; A. Vööbus, *History of the School of Nisibis*, *CSCO* (Louvain, 1965), p. 273; J. Walker, *A Catalogue of the Arab-Sassanian Coins* (London, 1941), pp. cxlvi–vii.

flanking the crown. The crescent and a five-pointed star made their first appearance on the reverse of his coins: the crescent to the right, the star to the left of the fire altar. These were also the first Sasanian coins to bear dates in the form of the regnal year of the monarch written out in Pahlavi script on the lower left side of the reverse (see fig. 1a). Subsequent Sasanian silver coins maintained the placement of these elements, and there may be a connection between the use of astral symbols and the introduction of dates. This possibility is increased by the presence, apparently for the first time, of a court astrologer in 496 and 497 in the reign of Jāmāsp (496–98/9).[46]

The coins of Qubādh I (488–96, 498/9–531) were essentially the same as those of Fīrūz, but an upturned crescent was placed on each shoulder of the monarch on the obverse.[47] The star and crescent were combined for the first time on the coins of Khusraw Anūshirvān (531–79), where a six-pointed star was placed between the horns of a crescent on each shoulder of the portrait on the obverse (see fig. 1b). In addition, the coins minted in the thirty-fourth year of his reign, which had a frontal portrait of the monarch on the obverse, had a six-pointed star on either side of his crown and a star inside a crescent on each side of the standing figure of the king on the reverse. His profile coins also had three crescents around the margin of the obverse at ninety-degree intervals with the crescent above his crown, which extends into the margin making the fourth. The coins from the fifth year of his reign onwards contained the name of the king with the slogan "may he prosper" (M.P. *afzūn*), and the coins from his thirty-fourth year had the legend "the protector and master of the world."[48] With all of this, it might be suggested that at least the placing of the crescents around the margin symbolized Khusraw's claim to universal rule over the four quarters of the world and was connected to the division of his empire into four quarters and to the preference for organizing

[46] Göbl, "Münzprägung," pp. 67, 74–75; Paruck, *Sāsānian Coins*, pp. 27, 63, 83, 103; Scher, "Histoire nestorienne," II(2), 128–29. Paruck explained the symbolism of the crescent and star as the conjunction of Venus with the moon, which was a sign of good luck and prosperity. More recently S. Shaked has suggested that the "stars" found together with the moon on Sasanian seals are really representations of the sun and its rays; see "Jewish and Christian Seals of the Sasanian Period," in *Studies in Memory of Gaston Wiet*, ed. M. Rosen-Ayalon (Jerusalem, 1977), pp. 17–31.

[47] Göbl, "Münzprägung," pp. 67, 73; Paruck, *Sāsānian Coins*, pp. 64–65.

[48] Göbl, "Münzprägung," pp. 57, 63; Paruck, *Sāsānian Coins*, pp. 65, 103–4, 106, 267–71. Compare the greeting "may the visitor prosper" given by Ziyād to al-Mughīra ibn Shu'ba when he received the latter in the audience hall of the citadel at Istakhr in 662 (Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II,24).

things by fours in Zurvanism. The only important innovations on the coins of Hurmizd IV (579–90) were the placing of a five-pointed star inside a crescent in front of his crown or a six-pointed star on each side of his crown on the obverse, as well as the addition of five- or six-pointed stars to the crescents around the margin of the obverse (see fig. 1c).[49]

The coins of Khusraw Parvīz were based on these fifth- and sixth-century precedents and set the pattern for most of the seventh century. Above the profile of the monarch on the obverse was an upturned crescent surmounting the crown and extending into the margin, where it held a star. On either side of the crown and its superstructure was an outstretched wing and there were three more six-pointed stars inside crescents at ninety-degree intervals around the margin and four stars inside crescents around the margin on the reverse. The reverse still had a star to the left and a crescent to the right of the fire altar, but a double pearl border was added around the margin of the obverse and a triple pearl border around the margin of the reverse (see. fig. 1d). According to tradition, at the end of the thirteenth (spring, 603) or the thirtieth (spring, 620) year of his reign, Khusraw Parvīz ordered that new coin dies be engraved and had some two or four billion *dirhams* struck from the surplus in the treasuries over and above what was set aside for provisioning the army. These coins were heavier than usual; according to Miles, the highest frequency group of the *dirhams* of Khusraw Parvīz average between 4.11 and 4.15 grams. The coins of his successors down to the end of the dynasty bore the most distinctive characteristics of his type of coin, with legends in which the name of the ruler is followed by *afzūn* or the slogan "may the royal fortune increase" (M.P. *afzūt GDH*).[50]

After the conquest, the Islamic government in Iraq accepted the existing Sasanian coins for the payment of taxes without regard for differences in weight. Coins were minted for Yazdagerd III (probably in eastern Iran) down to the twentieth year of his reign in 651, when he died. Although the royal mints are said to have been confiscated by the Muslims at the time of the conquest, the first coins minted by the Islamic authorities in Iraq and the East were copies of the coins of Yazdagerd III and Khusraw Parvīz. These Arab-Sasanian coins,

[49] Paruck, *Sāsānian Coins*, p. 66.

[50] G. C. Miles, "Dirham," *EI*(2), II, 319; Paruck, *Sāsānian Coins*, pp. 67–68; Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, I, 1056–57. The account in Ṭabarī is anachronous in calling these coins *waraq* (Ar. "paper-thin") *dirhams* and in giving their weight as two-fifths of a *mithqāl*.

Fig. 1. Sasanian and Arab-Sasanian Coins.

a. Fīrūz (Peroz) (459–84)

b. Khusraw I, year 14
obv. HUSRUI; AFZUN
rev. BIŠ; JHRDH (?)

c. Hurmizd IV, year 12
obv. AUHRMZI; AFZUI
rev. DDPV (?); DVJDH

d. Khusraw II, year 35
obv. HUSRUI; AFZUTU GDH
rev. BBA; PNJSIH

e. Arab-Sasanian, year 25
obv. HUSRUI; AFZUTU GDH;
bismillāh
rev. BIŠ; PNJVIST

f. Mu'āwiya, year 41
obv. MAAVIA AMIR VIRUIŠNIKAN;
AFZUTU GDH; bismillāh
rev. DA; YAJHR

g. ʿAbdullāh ibn az-Zubayr,
year 53 (=65 H.)
obv. APDULA AMIR VIRUIŠNIKAN;
AFZUTU GDH; bismillāh
rev. DA; SIPNJAH

h. Abdullāh ibn az-Zubayr, year 63
obv. APDULA I-ZUPIRAN;
AFZUTU GDH; bismillāh; BPR; GDH
rev. KRMNRMAN (?); SIŠST (?)

which made their first appearance in the twentieth year of Yazdagerd III, were lighter than those minted by Khusraw Parvīz. They were called "full weight" (Ar. *baghlī*) *dirhams* because they were supposed to be equal to a *mithqāl* (Ar. 4.25 grams) in weight, but in fact their average weight of 3.98 grams brings them closer to the general Sasanian standard before the increase in weight under Khusraw Parvīz. Some individual coins were heavier, and, at 4.16 grams, two of them even outweigh those of Khusraw.[51]

At first the Muslims simply reproduced the style of the Sasanian coins. The Arab-Sasanian coins had the usual profile of Yazdagerd III or Khusraw Parvīz with their distinctive crowns and headdresses on the obverse, with the *afzūt* legend behind the head of the king and his name in front. On the reverse was the Magian fire altar flanked by two standing figures and the date beginning with twenty (M.P. *vist*) written in Pahlavi script on the Yazdagerd-style coin. The usual patterns of stars and crescents were in the margins on both sides. After a year the imitations of the coins of Yazdagerd III were replaced by those of Khusraw Parvīz, but they were dated in the era of Yazdagerd III beginning with the year twenty-one (see Fig. 1e).[52]

Several conclusions may be drawn from the striking of such coins by the Islamic government. In the first place, it is apparent that the reputation of the Sasanian monarchy survived the fall of the dynasty as a useful guarantee of the weight and purity of coins. Secondly, it is reasonable to suppose that the perpetuation of the types of coins issued by these two monarchs was due to the continued employment of the minters who knew how to make these coins. Perhaps the eventual preference for copies of the coins of Khusraw Parvīz may have been due to the rather large number of his coins that were already in circulation and to his reputation. Thirdly, the coins themselves provide the best evidence for the early use of the era of Yazdagerd as a system of dating, apparently without any break after his death, and whoever was responsible for the sequence of dates in that era, which appear on these coins as late as the year sixty-two (A.H. 74/A.D. 693), probably knew their significance. Fourth, the use of dates in the era of Yazdagerd implies an unwillingness, on the part of those who minted the coins for their new rulers, to accept the formal legitimacy of Muslim

[51] Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām as-sulṭāniyya wa l-wilāyāt ad-dīniyya* (Cairo, n.d.), pp. 76–77; Miles, "Dirham," p. 319; Tabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, I, 2371, Walker, *Arab-Sassanian Coins*, pp. xxvi, xxxv, cxlvii, 1–2.

[52] Paruck, *Sāsānian Coins*, p. 128; Walker, *Arab-Sassanian Coins*, pp. xv, xxvi-vii, xxxvii. The coins of Hurmizd IV were also imitated.

rule according to Sasanian traditions of statecraft, as well as a lack of appreciation or concern on the part of the Muslims themselves at first concerning the meaning of the portrait and the date on these coins. Fifth, the very employment of the royal portrait and the Magian and astral symbols on these coins are an indication that the need to maintain their acceptability by the use of existing and easily recognizable forms outweighed any religious objections to the use of such non-Islamic symbols. Indeed, there do not seem to have been any such objections at first.

On the other hand, although the style of the previous Sasanian coins was maintained in all its details, since the beginning a legend in Kufic script, usually "in the name of God" (Ar. *bismillāh*), was added to the margin of the obverse on the Arab-Sasanian coins. The presence of the *bismillāh* is the only part of these coins that could have identified them as Islamic to a Muslim Arab, and it may have been thought that this was all that was necessary to offset the Sasanian and Magian symbolism. It is worth noticing, however, that no change was made in the internal arrangement of the design on these coins but that the *bismillāh* was put in the margin. The presence of the star and crescent on these coins is also noteworthy because it marks the first official use of this motif by the Islamic state. The Sasanian origin of this motif and its astral significance are equally indisputable, but the later use of the star and crescent as an Islamic emblem does not seem to have been derived from these coins. This fact in itself would indicate that the Muslims were unconcerned at first about the imagery on Sasanian coins.[53]

Beginning in the reign of Muʿāwiya, several changes made in the Arab-Sasanian coins indicate a growing concern for the internal symbolism and purpose of the coins. Although coins of the earlier type continued to be minted, coins now began to appear with the date in the era of the Hijra. Also, the portrait of Khusraw Parvīz continued to be used on the obverse, but his name, on occasion, was replaced by that of the Muslim Commander of the Faithful or a governor. As early as A.H. 41/A.D. 661, coins were struck for Muʿāwiya at Darabjird in Fars bearing that date in the era of the Hijra with the *afzūt* legend behind the head of Khusraw's portrait, but in place of his name

[53] Walker, *Arab-Sassanian Coins*, pp. clvi, 9, 10, 13. For a discussion of the meaning of these symbols and of the representation of Sasanian crowns in the mosaics on the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem and the paintings at Qusayr ʿAmra as signifying the fall and subjection of the Sasanians to triumphant Islam, see O. Grabar, "The Umayyad Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem," *Ars Orientalis* 3 (1959), 48–52, pl. 3, fig. 5.

the legend "Muʿāwiya, Commander of the Faithful" (Ar./M.P. *amir-i viruishnikan*) was written in Pahlavi script in front (see Fig. 1f).[54] During the second civil war, coins which were struck in the East for the rival Commander of the Faithful, ʿAbdullāh ibn az-Zubayr, bore either his name with the title *amir-i virrōyishnikan* and dates in the era of Yazdagerd from fifty-four to sixty-three (A.D. 685-94) or his name and patronymic (*Apdula-i Zupiran*) with the dates from A.H. 62–69/A.D. 681–88 (see fig. 1g and h).[55] The leader of the Azraqī Khārijī group of Muslim rebels, ʿAbdullāh ibn al-Fujāʿa al-Qaṭarī also announced his claim to the caliphate by striking coins with his name and patronymic or the title "Commander of the Faithful" on them from 688 until 694.[56] The last Commander of the Faithful to be represented on the Arab-Sasanian coins was ʿAbd al-Malik (685–705), whose Khusraw–style coins bore either the legend "ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Marwān" or "ʿAbd al-Malik, Commander of the Faithful."[57]

Coins in the Sasanian style were also struck by governors in Iraq and the East beginning with ʿAbdullāh ibn ʿĀmir, who was governor of Basra for Muʿāwiya from A.H 41/A.D. 661 until A.H 45/A.D. 665 and whose Khusraw-type coins bear the name-legend *Apdula-i Amiran* and are dated from forty-one through forty-four, presumably in the era of the Hijra.[58] Ziyād also struck coins of this type bearing his own name in the form of "Ziyād ibn Abī Sufyān," which documented his formal adoption as the brother of Muʿāwiya (see fig. 2a). Ziyad is also supposed to have demanded that taxes be paid in the heavier Khusrawī coins rather than in the lighter coins struck by the Islamic government, probably in order to profit from the difference in weight by restriking them as lighter *dirhams*.[59] Both Samura ibn Jundab and ʿUbaydullāh ibn Ziyād struck coins in their own names as governors of Iraq, and ʿUbaydullāh is said to have struck the first debased *dirhams* (Ar. *zuyūf*).[60]

Further innovations were introduced in the Arab-Sasanian coins

[54] R. Curiel, "Monnaies Arabo-Sasanides," *Revue numismatique*, Ser. 6, no. 7 (1965), 325–27; Miles, "Dirham," p. 319; Walker, *Arab-Sassanian Coins*, p. xxvi.

[55] Walker, *Arab-Sassanian Coins*, pp. xxv, xlii, 33–36.

[56] Ibid., pp. lxi, 112–13.

[57] Ibid., pp. 26–27, 33.

[58] Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 15, 71; Yaʿqūbī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 258; Walker, *Arab-Sassanian Coins*, pp. xlvi, 47.

[59] Māwardī, *Aḥkām as-sulṭāniyya*, p. 77; Walker, *Arab-Sassanian Coins*, pp. xlii–iv, 40, 42.

[60] Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 468; Walker, *Arab-Sassanian Coins*, pp. xlv, xlvii–ix, 55, 57-60, 66–67, 69–70.

during the second civil war when ʿUmar ibn ʿUbaydullāh, who was governor of Basra for Ibn az-Zubayr in 683 and of Fars in 687, replaced the *bismillāh* on the margin with the phrase "Praise be to God!" (Ar. *li-llāh al-ḥamd*) on some of his coins.[61] According to Balādhurī, Muṣʿab ibn az-Zubayr, who ruled Basra and the East for his brother, the rival Commander of the Faithful, struck *dirhams* with the words *Allāh* and "blessing" (Ar. *baraka*) at his order in 689 on the Sasanian mint. The coins of both Muṣʿab and his brother did have the *bismillāh* on the margin as usual. One of Muṣʿab's coins has a Kufic legend in the margin reading "Muṣʿab, God is his sufficiency" (Ar. *ḥasbuhu-llāh*).[62]

These experiments continued after the Marwānī restoration in Iraq. The dates for A.H. 72–75/A.D. 691–94 began to be written in Kufic instead of Pahlavi characters on coins of the anonymous Khusraw type.[63] The coins of Khālid ibn ʿAbdullāh ibn Asīd, who was governor of Basra and its dependencies for ʿAbd al-Malik from 691 until 693, bore the usual *bismillah* on the margin along with the legend "Muḥammad (is) the messenger of God."[64] According to Balādhurī, when al-Ḥajjāj became governor of Iraq in 694, he inquired about the Persian coinage, made use of the Sasanian mint, collected the minters there and sealed their hands, and had his first *dirhams* struck that year from bullion and from the good silver extracted from the *zuyūf* and counterfeit coins that he called in. He had the marginal legend "*bismillāh* al-Ḥajjāj" put on these coins, and in the following year he ordered similar coins struck everywhere in the territories under his authority with the legend "God is one, God is eternal" (Ar. *Allāh aḥad Allāh aṣ-ṣamad*). The religious leaders are said to have objected to this and nicknamed the new coins "the detested."[65] Extant examples of the Arab-Sasanian coins of al-Ḥajjāj in the style of Khusraw Parvīz actually do have his name and the *bismillāh* on the margin, followed by the "testimony" (Ar. *shahāda*) that there is only one God and Muḥammad is His messenger, or by the legend "al-Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf *amīr*." His are the last of the Arab-Sasanian coins from Iraq and were minted as late as 702 (see fig. 2b).[66]

[61] Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 463–64, 580, 582.

[62] Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 468; Walker, *Arab-Sassanian Coins*, p. 102.

[63] G. Miles, "The Iconography of Umayyad Coinage," *Ars Orientalis* 3 (1959), 208–9.

[64] Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 818, 834, 835; Walker, *Arab-Sassanian coins*, p. 109.

[65] Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 468–69.

[66] Walker, *Arab-Sassanian Coins*, pp. xxv, 120.

Fig. 2. Arab-Sasanian and Post-Reform Coins and Sasanian Administrative Seals.

a. Ziyād ibn Abī Sufyān, year 55
obv. ZIYAT I-ABU SUFAN;
AFZUTU GDH; bismillāh; rabī
rev. BJRA; PNJPNJA

b. al-Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf, year 80
obv. HAJAJ [YU]SF[AN];
AFZUTU GDH; bismillāh; rabī
rev. BIŠ; HŠTAT

c. Post-reform *dirham*, Kufa, year 79 (A.D. 698–99)

obv.
Field: *Allāh aḥad Allāh aṣ-ṣamad lam yalid wa lam yūlad wa lam yakun lahu kufuwan aḥadun.* (God is One, God is Eternal. He does not beget nor is he begotten and there is none equal to Him.) Qur'ān, 112.
Margin: *Muḥammad rasūl Allāh arsalahu bi-l-hudā wa dīn il-ḥaqq liyuẓhirahu ʿalā-d-dīn kullihi wa law kariha-l-mushrikūn.* (Muḥammad is the messenger of God whom He sent with guidance and the religion of truth in order to make it victorious over all religion even though the polytheists detest [it].) The first four words paraphrase Qur'ān 9:33; the rest quote it.

rev.
Field: *lā llāh illā llāh waḥdahu lā sharīkun lahu.* (There is only one single God. He has no partner.) This is not a Qur'ānic quotation, but these terms occur together in Qur'ān 9:31.
Margin: *bismillāh ḍaraba hadhā dirham bi-l-Kūfati fī sanati tisʿa wa sabʿīn.* (In the name of God, this *dirham* was struck in Kufa in year seventy-nine.

d. *glmykn W nwt'rtḥštrkn ḥm'lky* (amārkar of Garmēkan and Nōdh-Ardashīr-akan). British Museum, 119970.

e. *g'lwl 'pldl mgwḥ ZY ḥwsr(w) š't kw'ty* (mōbadh of Upper Jalula' in Khusraw Shadh Qubadh). Yale University, James B. Nies Collection of Babylonian Antiquities, 4498(a).

f. *b'pyl mgwḥ wyḥ kw'ty* (mōbadh of Bābil in Veh-Kavat). In R. Frye, "Sassanian Clay Sealings in the Baghdad Museum," *Sumer* 26 (1970), 238–39, fig. 3.

g. *tyspwn štrdst'an mgw ZY ḥwsrwd š't kw'ty* (mōbadh of Ctesiphon, shatristān of Khusraw Shadh Qubadh). In the possession of R. Frye.

The replacement of the Arab-Sasanian coinage with a new Arab-Islamic coinage was part of the Marwānī restoration in Iraq following the second civil war (Ar. *fitna*). New *dirhams* bearing only Arabic legends, generally without images and at first anonymous, began to be struck in 695 or 696 (see fig. 2).[67] This change signified an increasing awareness of the importance of numismatic iconography by the Islamic regime and may have been a reaction to the way the opposition had made the marginal legends on the Arab-Sasanian coins more and more Islamic in content during the second *fitna*. At least the linguistic aspect of the coinage reform was related to the change in the tax records from the Persian language to the Arabic under al-Ḥajjāj at about the same time. All that Balādhurī says, however, is that the Sasanian *dirhams* differed in weight, and because Muslims needed a standard weight in order to pay the alms tax (Ar. *zakāt*), a new Arab *dirham* was created with the weight set at seven-tenths of a *mithqāl*.[68] At a standard mint weight of 2.97 grams, these coins weighed only three-quarters of a *baghlī* or Arab-Sasanian *dirham*, and it took twenty of them to equal a *dīnār* in value.[69] Like Ziyād before him, al-Ḥajjāj also required that taxes be paid in the older, heavier Khusrawī *dirhams*, and Walker suggested that this was in order to melt them down for the new coins.[70]

The Islamic coinage reform provides a remarkable example of continuity as a result of change. Apart from the *bismillāh* that was put on the Arab-Sasanian coins from the beginning, the earliest Islamizing changes coincided with the introduction of Sasanian administrative institutions under Ziyād, as we shall see, and mark the first real awareness of the significance of numismatic iconography on the part of the Islamic regime. These changes in the introduction of Hijrī dates and the names of Commanders of the Faithful or governors imply at the same time the transmission of the reason for putting the name of the ruler and the use of a meaningful date on coins to Muslim Arabs. As

[67] F. Baethgen, "Fragmente syrischer und arabischer Historiker," *AKM* 8 (1884), 35; *Chronicon ad Annum Domini 846 Pertinens*, *Chronica Minora II*, *CSCO*, *Scr. Syri*, 3 (Louvain, 1955), 232; *Scr. Syri*, 4 (Louvain, 1955), 176; Dīnawarī, *Akhbār aṭ-ṭiwāl*, p. 322; Elias of Nasibin, *Opus Chronologicum*, I, *CSCO*, *Scr. Syri*, 21 (Louvain, 1954), 152–53; *Scr. Syri*, 23 (Louvain, 1954), 73; Miles, "Dirham," p. 319; idem, "The Iconography of Umayyad Coinage," *Ars Orientalis* 3 (1959), 212; Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 939; Walker, *Arab-Sassanian Coins*, p. xxv. Walker, followed by Miles, fixes the date for the reform of the *dirham* at A.H. 79/A.D. 698–99.

[68] Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 465–66; Māwardī, *Aḥkām as-sulṭāniyya*, p. 77.

[69] Miles, "Dirham," p. 319; Walker, *Arab-Sassanian Coins*, pp. cxlvii–ix.

[70] Māwardī, *Aḥkām as-sulṭāniyya*, p. 77; Walker *Arab-Sassanian Coins*, p. cxlix.

the awareness of the importance of such usages and their propaganda value increased towards the end of the seventh century, the Marwānī reaction to the Islamizing tendencies on the coins of their opponents culminated in the appearance of an entirely new Arab-Islamic coinage and a more complete appreciation of symbolism (or the lack of it) on coins. Late Sasanian epigraphic administrative seals may have provided a precedent for these epigraphic coins. Epigraphic seals have two or three lines in a field surrounded by a circular marginal inscription and bear a remarkable organizational resemblance to Islamic epigraphic reform coins (see fig. 2d–g).

The Administrative Bureaucracy

The Tax Department. It is easier to compare Sasanian and Islamic administrative theories than it is to determine how many of the details of Sasanian administrative practice were actually employed by Muslims in Iraq. Administrative continuity was encouraged by the tendency for the same families to remain in state service over several generations, by the fact that an Arabic epistolary style for official purposes had already been worked out in the Sasanian chancellory, by the survival and employment of Sasanian scribes, and of local Arabs, by the existence of handbooks for administration in the Islamic period that described the procedures that had been followed under the Sasanians, and by the way native Arabs and Persian *mawālī* (Ar.) and landlords who were involved in Islamic administration expected continuity. Even so, there is very little direct evidence that administrative procedures under the Muslims were essentially what they had been under the Sasanians. More often the evidence is circumstantial. What seems to have happened was that Sasanian procedures were followed at lower levels of the administration by those officials who survived from the previous regime while they began to be followed only gradually at the highest levels. This was due to the influence of these officials and to the handbooks themselves. The process was inaugurated by a circle of bilingual Persian and Arab administrators at Basra, where the main institutional forms of Sasanian civil and military administration were adapted by the newly formed Islamic state.

Under the Sasanians, the records for income derived from taxes and for expenditures for the army and other kinds of expenses were kept separately. As Jahshiyārī described the system, there were two financial bureaus: the tax bureau (Ar. *dīwān al-kharāj*) and a department that handled gifts and the payment of troops (Ar. *dīwān an-nafaqāt*). The

latter contained registers of names, ornaments, and riding animals. Jahshiyārī states explicitly that the taxes were used to pay the army.[71] ʿUtba ibn Ghazwān, al-Mughīra ibn Shuʿba, Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī, the Persian Payroazh, and the other founders and organizers of Basra were responsible for the establishment of a Sasanian-type tax bureau and a military register for the Muslim army.[72]

In the system which is ascribed to Khusraw Anūshirvān, the record of income due from each district was based on the measurement of taxable land and was kept in a central register (M.P.? *durūzan*). District finance officials (Ar. *ʿummāl*) were billed for the amounts due and returned them accompanied by a written invoice to the local "counting house" (N.P. *shamarrah* or *shomordeh*, Ar. *dār al-ḥisāb*), where taxes were collected before being forwarded to provincial governors and then to the capital. The official in charge of the finance bureau (Ar. *ṣāḥib al-kharāj*) sent the Sasanian monarch an annual record of the amount of tax levied, the amount of expenditures, and the balance remaining in the treasury; the king then sealed and returned the report.[73] This operation was run by a body of financial secretaries who kept the central records and accompanied the tax collectors in their districts to keep the local accounts.[74]

There is little, if any, indication of the operation of such a system in Iraq immediately after the Islamic conquest, partly because of the ways in which taxes were collected. It is natural to assume that the survey of the Sawad of Kufa by the Muslims in 642 resulted in a register listing the taxes that were due from the districts for which local notables were responsible, districts such as Hira that owed tribute, and from ownerless estates. Even so, there is no evidence for a system of bills and invoices administered by secretaries. Even the early existence of a register of taxable land is uncertain at Basra, where the responsibility for finances is described simply as "in charge of taxes" (Ar. *ʿalā kharāj*) or "in charge of the treasury" (Ar. *ʿalā bayt al-māl*).

The formation of a real fiscal bureaucracy at Basra is associated

[71] Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarāʾ*, p. 3.

[72] See M. Sprengling, "From Persian to Arabic," *AJSLL* 56–57 (1939–40), 175–224, 325–36.

[73] Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 464; Dīnawarī, *Akhbār aṭ-ṭiwāl*, p. 73; F. Løkkegaard, *Islamic Taxation in the Classic Period* (Copenhagen, 1950), p. 180; Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, I, 247; Zotenberg, *Chronique*, II, 224, 341.

[74] Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarāʾ*, p. 4. A reference is made to the secretary of the finance director or tax collector of lower Iraq (Beth Aramaye) in the early sixth century; see O. Braun, *Ausgewählte Akten persischer Märtyrer* (Munich, 1915), p. 191.

with Ziyād, who had already spent two decades in the finance administration at Basra when he became its governor in 665 and who ruled both Basra and Kufa and their dependencies for Muʿāwiya from 669 until 673. Already in 658–59, when Ziyād was in charge of the *kharāj* and the *bayt al-māl* of Basra for the governor Ibn ʿAbbās (656–59), there is a description of the tax collectors (Ar. *ʿummāl*) bringing the taxes of the districts of Basra to Ibn ʿAbbās, who in turn forwarded them to ʿAlī (656–61).[75] As governor, Ziyād favored the employment of leading Persians knowledgeable in tax matters as financial secretaries (Ar. *kuttāb al-kharāj*), was the first to pay his *ʿummāl* salaries of one thousand *dirhams*, and sent annual accounts to Damascus.[76] Ziyād and his son ʿUbaydullāh were served by men like Zādhānfarrūkh, the son of Payrōazh, whose family was closely involved in the transition from Sasanian to Islamic finance administration.[77] Whether or not such people had belonged to the fiscal bureaucracy before the conquest or were only notables who knew the system, it was due to their employment in the Islamic finance bureau that the expertise and interests of the Sasanian scribes survived. At least by the time of Ziyād there was a register for income from taxes with the numbers and placenames written in Persian, and probably in the Pahlavi script,[78] by a body of Persian bureaucrats at Basra. About the same time the register listing Sasanian crown property in Iraq was also recovered.

The bilingual abilities of these Persians made them especially important to the administration and gave them an ethnic reputation as bureaucrats.[79] It was a Persian *mawlā* of the Arab tribe of the Banu Tamīm whose parents had been taken captive in eastern Iran, Ṣāliḥ ibn ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān, who was responsible for putting the financial accounts into Arabic for al-Ḥajjāj in 697 over the objections of Zādhānfarrūkh. When the latter died in 701, Ṣāliḥ succeeded him as head of the finance bureau (Ar. *dīwān al-kharāj*), and the system of Arabic

[75] Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, I, 3230, 3440, 3448.

[76] Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, II, 279; Ibn Ṭabāṭabā, *Kitāb al-fakhrī* (Beirut, 1960), p. 107.

[77] Sprengling, "Persian to Arabic," p. 187.

[78] Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 300; Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarāʾ*, p. 33. Yaʿqūbī's claim that Ziyād had cursive (Ar. *naskh*) script used in the books may signify a simplifying innovation in keeping administrative records. According to El-Hawary, *naskh* was used for ordinary handwriting in the first/seventh century and may be even older than Kufic script. See H. M. El-Hawary, "The Most Ancient Islamic Monument Known Dated A.H. 31 (A.D. 652) from the time of the third Calif ʿUthman," *JRAS* (1930), p. 329. It is also worth noting that the terms that are quoted in Arabic literature as having to be translated into Arabic are all in New Persian.

[79] Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarāʾ*, p. 30.

accounts that he had introduced served as the basis for subsequent practice in Iraq.[80] The family of Zādhānfarrūkh survived for at least three generations more in government service in Iraq and Khuzistan down to the end of Marwānī rule.[81]

The earliest direct evidence for the use of invoices with tax returns in Islamic Iraq is given in the well-known story of how in the early eighth century, after the language change, the Persian administrator, Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, delivered the tax invoices from his district to Ṣāliḥ on scented parchment. Whether or not the story itself is apocryphal, it is significant because of its suggestion of how Sasanian procedures came to be used in the Islamic finance bureau and because the story assumes that both Ṣāliḥ and Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ had some knowledge of what Sasanian practice had been. On this occasion, at least, Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ's conscious and artificial revival of the preferences of Khusraw Parvīz for scented parchment was an intentional archaism.[82]

The Department of the Army. The income from regular taxes was earmarked for the support of the army in the Sasanian system and was administered by a staff of military scribes. Such officials were appointed as military advisors to generals and military governors in the late Sasanian period to see that the monarch's orders were obeyed. Military scribes were in charge of the army accounts, the inspection and payment of troops, and the division of the spoils, with the responsibility for seeing that the royal treasury got its share of the booty. They were also employed as liaison officers and envoys.[83] The best example of such a military scribe in the early seventh century was Babai, the secretary of the *marzbān* of Hira, Rūzbī, the son of Marzūq. Babai is described as accompanying the *marzbān* in the chase, and it is said that it was through his assistance and counsel that the *marzbān* was able to contend successfully against the desert Arabs and thus "escaped the trap into which Khusraw wanted him to fall" by sending him to such a dangerous frontier.[84]

[80] Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 300–301; Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarāʾ*, pp. 33-34.

[81] Sprengling, "Persian to Arabic," pp. 190–91.

[82] Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 464–65.

[83] Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarāʾ*, pp. 4–5; A. N. Stratos, *Byzantium in the Seventh Century* (Amsterdam, 1968), I,381–82. Dīnawarī, in *Akhbār aṭ-ṭiwāl* (pp. 57, 86, 90), assumes the existence of such an official (Ar. *kātib al-jund*) in the fifth and sixth centuries. There were similar officials on the Byzantine side of the border where the emperor Anastasius appointed the Egyptian Apion as manager of finances for the army he sent against the Persians at Amid in 503, and Prokopios describes himself as such an adviser to Belisarios (*Wars*, I.i. 3; viii.5).

[84] J. B. Chabot, "Le Livre de la chasteté composé par Jesusdenah, évêque de Baṣra,"

A position with similar responsibilities appears very early in Islamic military administration. The assignment of persons who could write and count to divide the booty among the members of the conquering Muslim armies seems to reflect Sasanian practice, although it must be admitted that the situation demanded that someone perform the division in some way. We are told that even in the time of Muḥammad, his own share of the booty was recorded by Muʿayqīb ibn Abī Fāṭima.[85] Ziyād himself began his career this way. He had been born to a pair of Persian and Byzantine slaves at Ta'if in western Arabia, where he was raised as an Arabized *mawlā* of the tribe of Thaqīf and learned how to write and to count. As a young man in 635 he went along on the expedition of ʿUtba ibn Ghazwān to lower Iraq, where he was put in charge of dividing the booty which was taken at Furat. ʿUtba paid him two *dirhams* per day and Balādhurī describes him as a servant boy (Ar.*ghulām*) wearing a slave lock.[86] In 637, after the fall of the Sasanian capital of Mada'in, Saʿd ibn Abī Waqqāṣ appointed ʿAmr ibn ʿAmr ibn Muqarrin to collect the treasures in the White Palace, the royal residences, and the rest of the houses in the city.[87] Another *mawlā* of Thaqīf, as-Sā'ib ibn al-Aqraʿ, who was with the Basran army that conquered Khuzistan, collected the booty from the fortress (Ar. *qaṣr*) of the Persian nobleman Hurmuzān. Later as-Sā'ib provided liaison for ʿUmar I (634–44), who, because he knew how to write and to count, sent him with the Iraqi Muslim army that defeated the Persians at Nihawand in western Iran in 642. Afterwards, he divided the booty among those who had participated in the battle and remitted one-fifth to the Commander of the Faithful.[88]

But booty is an irregular and uncertain source of income at best and hardly suitable for the sole support of a standing army. The heart of Sasanian military administration, the means by which income from taxes was redistributed to the professional bodies of mercenary soldiers, was the muster roll listing the men capable of military service. It entitled them to be provided with horses, weapons, provisions, and pay by the state. Yaʿqūbī describes the system under Khusraw Anū-

Melanges d'archeologie et d'histoire 16 (1896), 42, 260; Scher, "Histoire nestorienne," II(1), 154.

[85] Ibn ʿAbd Rabbihi, *'Iqd*, IV, 161; Thaʿālibī, *The Laṭā'if al-maʿārif of Thaʿālibī*, tr. C. E. Bosworth (Edinburgh, 1968), p. 57.

[86] Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, I, 489; idem, *Futūḥ*, p. 343; Dīnawarī, *Akhbār aṭ-ṭiwāl*, p. 232; H. Lammens, "Ziād ibn Abīhi, vice-roi de l'Irāq," *RSO* IV (1911–12), 23.

[87] Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh*, I, 2444.

[88] Dīnawarī, *Akhbār aṭ-ṭiwāl*, pp. 140, 143, 146.

shirvān as composed of three registers: one for listing those who were able to fight but needed weapons (Ar. *dīwān al-muqātila*), one for stipends (Ar. *dīwān al-ʿaṭā'*) listing names and riding animals presumably for the amount of pay, and the muster roll itself (Ar. *dīwān al-ʿarḍ*).[89] The official who was responsible for these registers was probably called "the one in charge of men" (N.P. *mardomānbādh*). A cavalryman is said to have received up to four thousand *dirhams* annually.[90]

The foundation of the first Islamic military *dīwān* at Basra by al-Mughīra ibn Shuʿba in 637–38 with the help of the Persian nobleman Payrōazh was certainly inspired by Sasanian practice, although it was not so elaborate at first and later developed modifications to suit the realities of Arab military society. The basic principle was the same. Income from the conquered territories was distributed to the veterans of the conquest who settled in Basra by registering them in the *dīwān* and paying them according to the roll.[91] Traditional versions of the establishment of the military *dīwān* in Iraq by ʿUmar I probably reflect the extension of the system to Kufa by 641–42. Veterans of the conquest received two thousand *dirhams* apiece per year while local notables who joined the Islamic administration and were registered in the *dīwān* received one or two thousand *dirhams* apiece.[92]

The register was kept at the government compound (Ar. *dār al-imāra*) at Basra and from the beginning it was written in Arabic and staffed by Arabs or by Arabized *mawālī*. Judging from references made to the records from Ziyād's administration, which were preserved at

[89] Thaʿālibī, *Ghurar*, p. 610; Yaʿqūbī, *Ta'rīkh*, I, 186–87. The *dīwān al-ʿaṭā'* seems to be the same as the *dīwān an-nafaqāt*.

[90] Yaʿqūbī, *Ta'rīkh*, I, 203; Zotenberg, *Chronique*, II, 229. Local notables are supposed to have been in charge of lists of young men from which they procured recruits for the infantry (Løkkegaard, *Islamic Taxation*, p. 169). Infantrymen performed garrison duty and menial tasks on campaigns, and if they were paid at all they were supposed to receive not less than one hundred *dirhams*.

[91] Sprengling, "Persian to Arabic," p. 186. G. R. Puin, *Der Dīwān von ʿUmar b. al-Ḫaṭṭāb* (Bonn, 1970) denies Sasanian influences and argues that the Muslim *dīwān* grew out of circumstances at Madina. But it is important to distinguish between the *dīwān* established by ʿUmar at Madina, which distributed pensions and provisions to a non-military population that included women according to how early one had converted to Islam, and the stipends paid by the military *dīwāns* at Basra and Kufa in return for military service.

[92] Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, I, 2540. Balādhurī (*Futūḥ*, pp. 457–58) says that the Persian notables were paid one thousand *dirhams*, while Yaḥya ibn Ādam, in *Kitab al-Kharāj: Taxation in Islam* (Leiden, 1958), I, 51 and Yaʿqūbī in *Ta'rīkh*, II, 176 say that they were paid two thousand *dirhams*.

least into the eighth century, they cannot have involved much more than the writing of proper names, numbers, and a few technical terms.[93] In theory, a Muslim military scribe was supposed to be able to calculate the proper amount of salary payments and to recognize the distinguishing marks of the animals and the emblems of the soldiers.[94] Under ʿUmar I and ʿUthmān (644–56), ʿAbdullāh ibn Khalaf al-Khuzāʿī is regarded as the first director of the military register at Basra while Abū Jabīra ibn aḍ-Ḍaḥḥāk al-Ansāri was in charge of the *dīwān* at Kufa.[95] But the career of Ziyād is a perfect example of how a divider of booty graduated to military administrator. When ʿUtba left Basra in 636, Ziyād became the military scribe of al-Mughīra ibn Shuʿba, who was governor from 636 to 638; this probably involved him directly in the foundation of the military *dīwān* there.[96] Al-Mughīra's successor, Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī (638–42, 643–50) "discovered" him, and the description of how during his second term Abū Mūsā entrusted his two seal rings to Ziyād, who was in charge of the affairs of the people, might suggest that Ziyād was responsible for both the treasury and the military *dīwān*.[97] This was certainly the case under Abū Mūsā's successor, ʿAbdullāh ibn Āmir ibn Kurayz (650–56), who put Ziyād in charge of the *dīwān* and treasury—that is, over the entire financial administration, both income and expenditure.[98] Ziyād kept this position during the reign of ʿAlī (656–61) when he served Ibn ʿAbbās (656–59) as secretary in charge of the tax bureau and the *dīwān* at Basra.[99]

For two decades, in spite of the rotation of governors, Ziyād and ʿAbdullāh ibn Khalaf, who was probably his subordinate, provided the same kind of continuity in the administration of the revenues and the army at Basra that Abū Jabīra did at Kufa. But after twenty years the population capable of bearing arms at Kufa had increased through settlement and the coming of age of their own and captive children.

[93] Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 346–47; Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā'*, p. 33.

[94] Ibn ʿAbd Rabbihi, *ʿIqd*, IV, 177.

[95] Ibn ʿAbd Rabbihi, *ʿIqd*, IV, 163–64, 168, 169; Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā'*, pp. 14, 19; Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 831, 837; Thaʿālibī, *Laṭā'if*, p. 59. ʿAbdullāh ibn Khalaf was killed at the Battle of the Camel in 656, but Abū Jabīra is supposed to have kept his position until he was dismissed by ʿUbaydullāh ibn Ziyād in the late 670s.

[96] Ibn Qutayba, *Maʿārif*, p. 346; Zotenberg, *Chronique*, III, 445–46.

[97] Dīnawarī, *Akhbār aṭ-ṭiwāl* p. 125; Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, VII(1), 70; Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, I, 1711.

[98] Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 357.

[99] Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā'*, pp. 20–21; Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, I, 3230. When Ibn ʿAbbās was dismissed in 659, Ziyād was left in charge of the *kharāj* (Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, I, 3448).

In 657 ʿAlī found it necessary to have the tribal leaders at Kufa (Ar. *ashrāf*) register the fighting men, their sons of fighting age, the *mawālī*, and the slaves of their clans.[100]

About a decade later, when he was governor, Ziyād made significant changes in the military organization, reduced the power of the *ashrāf*, centralized the military administration, and neutralized the tribal units by combining mutually hostile groups into new divisions of roughly equal size (five at Basra and four at Kufa) to replace the original seven divisions. The *ashrāf* were replaced by officials (Ar. sg. *ʿarīf* or *naqīb*) who were appointed or confirmed by the governor. They were put in charge of the new divisions and were responsible for making up the lists of fighting men, distributing pensions and salaries, collecting taxes (Ar. *ṣadaqa*) from them, administering the property of orphans, and identifying suspects. They were also responsible for the good behavior of their units.[101]

Thus, there appear to have been at least two important differences between the Sasanian military register and the Islamic military *dīwān*. First, there is no indication that the Sasanian register was organized along tribal lines or used to maintain order and discipline in a tribally organized military population as at Basra and Kufa. Ziyād's use of the *dīwān* and its officers as an instrument of social control seems to have been an original adaptation of the possibilities contained in the Sasanian system.

Secondly, the amounts of the stipends and the ratio between cavalry and infantry distributed by the Islamic *dīwān* seem to be quite different from those quoted for the Sasanian system in Arabic literature. Theoretically, a Sasanian cavalryman could receive up to forty times as much as an infantryman, although in the divisions of booty a Muslim cavalryman was supposed to receive only twice the share of an infantryman.[102] But the discrepancy between the stipends given by the Iraqi *dīwāns* to the veterans of the early campaigns and the tribal leaders and the stipends given to later settlers and average tribesmen could be as much as eight or twelve to one and gave an economic dimension to the social distances among them. Still, the range of difference seems

[100] Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, I, 3371–72.

[101] Ibn ʿAbd Rabbihi, *'Iqd*, V, 8: Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, VI, 63; H. Lammens, *Études sur le siècle des Omayyades* (Beirut, 1930), pp. 91–92, 128–29; idem, "Ziād," pp. 220, 659, 660; Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, II, 79, 242.

[102] M. Khadduri, *The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybānī's Siyar* (Baltimore, 1966), pp. 84, 106–107. According to Abū Yūsuf (*Kharāj*, pp. 27, 29) a cavalryman's share of booty should be three times that of an infantryman.

to have been less in the Islamic system. Persian notables received at most only half the theoretical Sasanian maximum, which was still in the upper range of Islamic stipends, while the Daylamī unit (probably infantry) at Kufa received a group stipend that breaks down to two hundred and fifty *dirhams* apiece, the same as an average Arab tribesman but still higher than the theoretical Sasanian minimum.[103]

Of more significance is the impression of an overall equalization and depression of military stipends in the Islamic system compared to the Sasanians. The standing army of the late Sasanian period seems to have been composed of fairly small elite cavalry units and urban garrisons. Although the Muslims raised the tax rates and improved the collection of provisions in kind, income had to be spread over a larger total permanent military population or sent off to Madina. This resulted in generally lower stipends, which were only partly offset by monthly rations and further undermined by inflation in the garrison towns, and led to a continued interest in booty both as an additional and more equitably divided income. However, Arab tribesmen continued to be impatient with the remaining discrepancies in the stipends, which continued to be greater than in prior divisions of booty. It might also be suggested that because of the larger number of soldiers that had to be supported, the Islamic system depended more heavily and in different ways on the sources of revenue and supply than the Sasanian system had done. In spite of the Sasanian origin of the principle and operation of the military register, its application to Islamic military society in Iraq introduced subtle but significant changes, both for the native population and for the Arab Muslim settlers.

The main ceremonial occasion, during which soldiers presented themselves for the distribution of their stipends and provisions, was the military review, which symbolized and emphasized their dependence on the state's economic support systems. The Sasanian army normally passed in review before the monarch, who was seated on a throne or dais together with the general or military scribe at the beginning of a campaign. The famous story preserved in Arabic literature about the inspection of the army of Khusraw Anūshirvān by his scribe Pāpak, son of Nahravān, is certainly tendentious but the details it

[103] Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 280, 455; M. A. Shaban, *Islamic History. A.D. 600–750 (A.H. 132)* (Cambridge, 1971), p. 55. See also D. Ayalon, "Preliminary Remarks on the *Mamlūk* Military Institution in Islam," in *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, ed. Parry and Yapp (London, 1975), p. 45. Concerning these Daylamī Iranians who were also called *Hamrā'*, see part II, chapter 5: Persians.