Atatürk's Diplomats & Their Brief Biographies

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Atatürk's Diplomats & Their Brief Biographies

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To the memory of
Willie & Martha
Who were loving presences
In my life

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GLOSSARY

Evkaf—Religious Foundations

Hulefa—Junior Clerk

Kaymakam—District Governor

Mukayyit—Recording Secretary

Mutasarrif—Governor of a Sanjak

Mümeyyiz—Verification Secretary, Chief Clerk

Salise—Third grade of officials

Saniye—Second grade of officials

Sanjak—Subdivision of a Province

Serhalife—Chief Clerk

Sır Kâtibi—Private Secretary

Tahakkuk official—Tax assessor

Ulâ—First grade of officials

INTRODUCTION

One man, however able and resourceful, cannot rule a country alone. Even Mustafa Kemal ATATÜRK had to have many assistants to make his political plans come to fruition. In particular, to establish a new nation against long odds and to staff the multitude of positions necessary to maintain standing in the world required a cadre of well-educated, devoted Foreign Service officers to serve with politicians and others who could be used for special missions. Their contribution to the success of the nation was at times crucial, but they have received little attention. Indeed, their role was generally neither celebrated at the time nor later. Rather, the major leaders in Ankara, especially ATATÜRK and İsmet İNÖNÜ, received primary attention. To fill in this gap and understand the full gamut of talent used by the Ankara leadership it is useful to make available biographical data on the hundreds of figures who were used in a foreign affairs capacity or recruited into that world during ATATÜRK's lifetime.

These brief biographies are introduced with an essay assessing the impact of ATATÜRK's revolution on the Foreign Ministry. This analysis is intended to provide a framework to which the biographies are attached to form an integral part. Although sections of this essay were originally written many years ago, they were published in an obscure journal that few libraries and even fewer individuals possess. Thus it seems useful to make this work available in considerably expanded form to a wider public and give context to the biographies that form a major portion of this book.

The biographical material that follows the essay is presented in order of first name as many of the subjects had not yet taken or never had a last name. Where a religious birth name exists but was either not the name used by the subject or was not retained after taking a last name, the more commonly used first name serves to determine place in the listing of biographies. The unused birth or other name is given in parenthesis. For later periods the last name becomes useful as well and accordingly a list by last names follows the biographical section in order to provide a quick reference to the first name. In the text of the biographic section, true last names adopted in the mid-1930s in consonance with the name law are always given in all capital letters.

The data in this work are drawn in the main from the archives of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but supplemented from numerous other sources. The design is intended to include even the lowest ranking personnel who had been recruited into Foreign Service during ATATÜRK's lifetime.

And the biographic material identifies the first women who served as officers in the Foreign Ministry. When the present author consulted this Ministry's repository it was organized by personnel folders in order of their register (*sicil*) number. Accordingly, in the present work the biographies list the register number just after the name of the personnel. But it is important to understand that this numbering system was put into operation around 1929 or just after the time when Latin characters were substituted for Arabic letters in the alphabet reform ATATÜRK engineered. Because that filing system represented the then current reality, it meant that the Foreign Minister of the time, Tevfik Rüştü ARAS, would be given register number 1.

For the most part, the other files in this registry are numbered roughly in order of joining the Ottoman and subsequently the Republican Foreign Ministry. But as only those serving from 1929 on had numbered files in the system as a consequence of starting from this point, all those who served during the Struggle for Independence and early Republic years who left the service and did not return or else died before 1929 are left out of this numbering system. I was able to find miscellaneous unnumbered files for some of these officials who would otherwise be omitted. But that means that some of those who met the criteria of dealing with foreign affairs in this fluid period may have escaped my net. Moreover, some of those who served briefly in the Struggle for Independence before being replaced by new officials may not have left records. And not all who performed foreign affairs tasks, especially in the early years, were actual employees of the Foreign Ministry. Some were figures of importance, such as the President's close collaborator, Secretary General Hasan Rıza SOYAK, who was not normally thought of as a diplomat; others were civil servants or were drawn for a time from the military, like General Âsım GÜNDÜZ, who took part in some of the most important negotiations conducted during ATATÜRK's lifetime, such as the Montreux Convention and the annexation of Hatay (Alexandretta). Thus, for the sake of completeness, the work that follows seeks to include as many of these ephemeral foreign servants as possible.

In addition to the archives of the Foreign Ministry, a major source has been the collection of biographies compiled by Hâmid ARAL, the *Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1967 Yıllığı*. This important work blazed the trail for this author, providing useful data on what assignments were actually carried out rather than just having data on appointments announced but not acted upon. Where no specific sources are shown in the biographical section, the material generally comes from these official sources. This data is supplemented by documents in the Prime Ministry State Archives (Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri). They provide information on the assignments of Turkish diplomats during all of the

Republic years. The difficulty in using this material stems from the absence of last names in the period up to the mid-1930s and beyond, so that there may be some confusion in identifying some of the lower ranking personnel mentioned in this material. And the dates derived from this material may not represent the exact time the personnel action described actually took place. Particularly, there may be a delay in returning to the Ministry after receiving the order to return or in leaving for post after being assigned. At the same time, this archive also contains dispatches from ambassadors regarding matters that the Foreign Ministry wished to call to the attention of the President. Thus, for example, the Prime Ministry State Archives contain a lengthy report from (Mehmet) Münir ERTEGÜN sent on by the Foreign Ministry to ATATÜRK proposing that the Turkish Embassy in Washington be closed in the summers and moved to Mexico City where the weather could be expected to be better! Some limited extracts from this sort of material are also incorporated in the biographies that follow.

Recruitment to foreign affairs positions during the first two decades of the Republic differed from the practice of later years in the degree to which personal and family relationships were allowed to play a greater determining part. And, of course, ATATÜRK himself as president took a close interest in the process and always decided ambassadorial or other major appointments. The Foreign Ministry by 1927 was required by law to institute a procedure for entrance in which senior Ministry officials administered written and oral examinations. That did not end preferential recruitment of sons of socially prominent families, for inevitably these top officials were also inclined to take social standing into consideration in judging examination results. To be sure, merit also counted. But becoming a protégé of a top official was considered by those whose memoirs often comment on this aspect to be key in determining personnel actions of all sorts. Hence, where there is clear evidence, these patron-client relationships are identified in this present work.

In this connection, a major effort has been made to identify the family networks of the Foreign Service personnel surveyed. Particularly valuable in providing insights into the culture of the Foreign Ministry have been Semih GÜNVER's *Fatin Rüştü Zorlu'num Öyküsü* and Feridun Cemal ERKIN's volumes entitled *Dışişleri'nde 34 Yıl*. Selahattin ÜLKÜMEN's *Bilinmeyen Yönleriyle Bir Dönem Dışişleri* also provides a useful account of the role of patron-client relationships. For coverage of those who started in the late Ottoman period, Galip Kemali SÖYLEMEZOĞLU's many-volume memoirs are useful as are Rıza Nur's several volume reminiscences. In addition, İbrahim Gövsa's *Türk Meşhurları Ansiklopedisi* provides some biographic data unavailable from other sources.

In addition to such sources, many decades of death notices in major Turkish newspapers have been consulted. These notices are an especially important resource as they customarily include references to relatives, particularly those relatives who enjoy high social status, such as positions in the Foreign Service. Thus this biographical data provides glimpses into the networks of family relationships that were particularly salient and ubiquitous in the Republican Foreign Ministry, as they had also been in the time of its Ottoman predecessor.

As will be clear from the footnotes, a particularly valuable aid has been the multi-volume *Türk Parlamento Tarihi* published by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. These volumes, based on records of the various parliaments of the Ataturk era, allow better coverage of individuals who either served both in the Foreign Ministry, often in senior positions, and in the Grand National Assembly, or who never served in the Foreign Ministry but who were used at times for diplomatic work. Of course, Mücellidoğlu Ali ÇANKAYA's *Yeni Mülkiye Târihi ve Mülkiyeliler* was also valuable in tracing the careers of some early adherents who otherwise left scanty traces. Many other collections of biographies, such as former ambassador Bilâl ŞİMŞİR's *Bizim Diplomatlar*, and internet resources have also been useful in supplementing archival data.

In reading these biographies one should keep in mind that by the end of the ATATÜRK era, the Turkish Foreign Service was structured along grades from 12 to one, with grade 12 being the lowest and one being the highest. Grade one was for ambassadorial rank. Grade 2 was for Minister First Class. Grade 3 was Minister Second Class. Grade 4 was Chargé or General Director. Grade 5 was Counselor of Embassy or Consul General First Class. Grade 6 was Counselor of Legation or Consul General. Grade 7 was First Secretary of Embassy or Consul First Class. Grade 8 was First Secretary of Legation or Consul Second Class or Branch Director. Grade 9 was Second Secretary or Vice Consul. Grade 10 was Third Secretary or Chancellor. Grade 11 was Documents Official or Secretary in the Ministry and Grade 12 was Attaché.

As time went on, time-in-grade requirements were instituted before one could be promoted. There were exceptions and credit was given for academic degrees acquired. Those with pull, such as Fatin Rüştü ZORLU, benefited from them to rise more rapidly than their fellows to the disgust of their contemporaries. And that gave the Turkish Foreign Ministry a competitive color that emerges with striking clarity from the memoirs.

This collection of biographical material should suggest many lines of analysis that could enrich understanding of this important formative period in the history of the Turkish Republic. And it is with this objective in mind that the biographies of those who came into the foreign affairs world during ATATÜRK's lifetime are presented.

I cannot end without expressing my deepest thanks to former Foreign Minister Haluk BAYÜLKEN. Without his invaluable assistance I would never have been able to consult the personnel files of retired Foreign Service officials and the coverage accordingly would have been quite incomplete.

And finally, I want to tender my undying thanks to my wife, who is by now inurred to the birth pangs of yet another published work. She is unfailing in her support.

George S. Harris
Bethesda, Maryland
May 2009

THE FOREIGN SERVICE UNDER ATATÜRK[1]

The history of Turkey during the 1920s and 1930s has often been approached from a focus on Turkey's great leader, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. That generally produces a recital of military and political accomplishments which were of undoubted value in the establishment of the Turkish Republic and its commitment to Western political behavior. But at the same time that approach risks giving the impression that modern Turkey was the reflection of one man. There was another side of Turkey's life during this period which is more often slighted. That is the activities of many talented people who in fact made the Turkish Republic work. Among them were the personnel of the Ankara Foreign Ministry. Indeed, this Ministry as well as the military profession were considered to be the two most sensitive and important administrative departments in the Turkish political structure. Thus to study the Turkish Foreign Service from the point of view of its personnel has much to add to an understanding of the sinews of the modern Turkish state.

Transitions are seminal times in the life of countries. The process of moving from monarchy to republic and from empire to national state unleashed forces that left lasting marks on Turkey. Creation of a bureaucracy formed an integral part of making the new Turkish state. But the development of this structure, at least to deal with foreign affairs, did not prove to be the linear process of moving from old to new that one might have imagined. The transition passed through distinct phases, but ended up closer to where it had begun than where it had been during the phase during the Struggle for Independence when the revolutionary movement led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Turkey was fighting for its life. Although the Foreign Ministry, as an elite institution, may have evolved in a somewhat different fashion from that of other government organs, nevertheless a look at the dynamics and personnel of the Foreign Ministry can shed light on the degree to which Atatürk presided over a social revolution as distinct from a political one.

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[1] A brief portion of this essay was originally published in *the Journal of the American Institute for the Study of Middle Eastern Civilization: Atatürk Centennial Issue*, vol. I, nos. 3 & 4, Autumn-Winter 1980-1981, pp. 39-51, under the title "Bureaucratic reform: Atatürk and the Turkish Foreign Office." Another segment was presented at the 2007 Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Conference in Ankara under the title "Ataturk's Management of Diplomacy during the National Struggle."

To position the modern Turkish Foreign Ministry in this continuum it is useful to start with its Ottoman forebears and take the story through the first two decades of Turkish Republican existence. By that time, patterns of life in the Turkish Republic had taken shape and it would be possible to determine more precisely how much change had taken place from the Young Turk period that preceded it.

The Ottoman Foreign Service

The Ottoman Foreign Service evolved in the 19th century to serve the needs of the Tanzimat reform movement. At the heart of this effort at regeneration carried out in the decades following the Gülhane Rescript of 1839 lay moves to strengthen and centralize the Ottoman governmental apparatus. Inevitably, this process demanded the articulation and differentiation of various government departments. In regard to the Foreign Ministry, this trend drew additional impetus from the growing need for linguistically proficient, secularly educated, cosmopolitan interpreters of the outside world, at a time when the Empire's survival was becoming increasingly dependent on its dexterity of maneuver on the world stage. These developments in turn fostered a deepening esprit de corps and sense of professionalism among the personnel of the Foreign Ministry.[1]

One of the important effects of the continuing reform movement in the period after the Crimean War was to bring a wave of non-Muslims, especially Ottoman citizens of Greek and Armenian origin, as well as a few Jews, into the Foreign Ministry.[2] They had the command of foreign languages that the Empire needed to deal with major European governments. And because they were able to pass between the two worlds, they often formed a bridge between Europeans and traditional Ottomans.

The influx of these representatives of the minority communities within the Empire did not disturb the informal networks of pull and favoritism that had operated among Muslims in the Foreign Ministry as in society at large. This system of informal arrangements played a major part in personnel recruitment, assignments, and promotions for members of all communities

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[1] See J.C. Hurewitz, "Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State System," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 15, no. 2, Spring 1961, pp. 141-42. Carter Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1789-1922* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), passim, presents detailed data on the Ottoman Foreign Ministry. See also Sinan Kuneralp, "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic," in Zara Steiner, ed., *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, London, 1982, pp. 493-512.

[2] Sinan Kuneralp, who has studied this period intensively, has pointed out that the few Jews never rose very far in the Ottoman Foreign Service, ending their careers at most as consul in minor Balkan cities.

serving in the Ottoman bureaucracy. Loyalty to relatives, schoolmates, and friends in the elite, generally in that order of precedence, formed the base of this system. In the Ottoman frame of reference nepotism had no prejudicial connotations. An honorable, trustworthy man looked after the interests of his extended family and observed traditional patterns of obligation. That commonly involved bringing relatives into the government apparatus, which was the most important source of wealth in the Ottoman Empire. And it dictated finding mentors among family or friends who could be relied on to help advance one's career. Moreover, those with whom one had such informal bonds of relationship were those whom a person could trust most. That was particularly important in view of the extensive informer system the Sultans used to uncover disloyalty to the regime.

At the same time, the privilege of coming from a well-placed, often well-off family provided informal education in political and social behavior that was of enormous advantage to aspiring bureaucrats. Furthermore, it facilitated finding patrons among the already established members of the ruling cadre. And in such a personal personnel system, to have mentors who could protect neophyte government officials as well as reward them, was of inestimable value to these new recruits.

Thus it should come as no surprise to find that most of those who held senior posts in the Foreign Ministry at the end of the Empire came from well-connected families, whose fathers or other close relatives had served in responsible positions in the past.[1] Indeed, striking webs of family connections permeated the Ottoman Foreign Service. They were an important predictor of bureaucratic success.

One important and long-lasting nexus bound over 30 individuals in relationship by birth or marriage to the Egyptian royal lineage. Indeed, almost all those with close links to Mohammed Ali's issue reached the upper ranks of the Ottoman service. For example, Said Halim Pasha (great grandson of Mohammed Ali), who became Ottoman Foreign Minister in 1911, secured the appointment of his niece's husband, Mahmud Muhtar pasha, as Ambassador to Berlin. Said Halim also saw to it that his brother-in-law, Nusret Sadullah Ayaşlı, was named Minister to Brussels in 1914. Nusret Sadullah would be able to continue his career under the Turkish Republic, but in the new regime soon left for an even higher ranking profession, that is, to become a deputy.

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[1] For identification of senior officers in the last decades of the Ottoman era, see Sinan Kuneralp *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkân ve Ricali (1839-1922)*, Istanbul, Isis, 1999, and the series of *Salname-i Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniye*, official almanacs of the Ottoman state. *Almanach de Gotha* as well is a useful source for personnel assignments for the years of the Ottoman Empire and the early Republic.

Other relatives of the Egyptian royal family too found that this relationship facilitated their rapid advancement. For example, Ottoman diplomat Mustafa Şekib bey rose rapidly after his marriage to the youngest daughter of Khedive Ismail. Although his career did not last into the Republican era, he became Minister to Washington in 1901. He was promoted to the grade of Ûlâ first class, the normal top rank of the diplomatic bureaucracy by 1904. He was then made envoy to Stockholm from 1909 to 1915. In Stockholm, he succeeded Şerif Pasha Kandan, the husband of another Egyptian princess.[1]

The prominence of those connected with Egyptian royalty continued well into the Turkish Republican era. For example, Hulusi Fuat Tugay, also the husband of an Egyptian princess, attained the rank of Minister within 16 years after joining the diplomatic service. He subsequently was made Ambassador in Chunking, Bucharest, and Cairo. He retired from this last post in 1954 after he was declared *persona non grata* for objecting to the nationalization of his wife's Egyptian property after Nasser overthrew the Mohammed Ali dynasty.

Descent from the Egyptian Khedival family (which, of course, originally sprang from an Ottoman Janissary), however, did not mean that Egypt in any way controlled or dictated Ottoman foreign policy. These Foreign Service families were Turkish-speaking and Ottoman in views, a cosmopolitan group, who rarely intermarried with Arabs. Even when members were born in Cairo, they usually also had residences in Istanbul. They often had European education and did not generally know much Arabic or identify with Arabs, who, though not formally discriminated against, in any event did not form an important stratum of the Ottoman or even Egyptian ruling class.

Among other important Ottoman Foreign Service families was that of Tanzimat architect, Reşid Pasha the Great. An early Ottoman ambassador who served in Paris and London, he had two sons who became Foreign Ministers. Thanks to Reşid's high position, one of the two even married into the Ottoman dynasty, at which point he immediately enjoyed rapid advancement.

The famous Menemencioğlu family, descended from the literary figure Namık Kemal, included a number of ambassadors and senior officials in the Foreign Ministry. This clan's reach also extended deep into the Republican era, where its members ranged from ambassadors to the longest-serving Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry.

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[1] See Emine Fuat Tugay, *Three Centuries: Family Chronicles of Turkey and Egypt* (London, 1963), for information on these relationships. An Egyptian princess, she was the wife of Ambassador Hulusi Fuat Tugay.

The descendants, in-laws, and collateral relations of Ambassador, Foreign Minister, and Prime Minister İbrahim Ethem Pasha (1818-1893) were almost as numerous in the Foreign Service as those connected with the Egyptian royal house. They included the Eldem family, and such relatives by marriage as Ambassador Cevat Ezine and Prime Minister Fethi Okyar. A few of their members, however, did not attain particularly high rank.

Among other celebrated lineages was the dynasty of Müverrih Hayrullah effendi, an Ottoman medical doctor, who died in 1866 as Ambassador in Tehran. His descendants included Ottoman ambassadors and chiefs of mission. One son was twice Ambassador in Tehran; another was literary figure Abdülhak Hamid Tarhan (1851-1937), Ottoman Minister in Brussels, who later served as an Istanbul deputy in the Republic.[1] A granddaughter's husband (Mehmet Emin Yeniçay) served also as Ambassador in Tehran in 1912, while a grandson, Abdul Hak Hüseyin served as Chargé in Washington during the early years of the First World War.[2]

These dynastic relationships were important even among the more successful non-Muslim officials, such as Ambassador Musurus pasha, a Greek who staffed his embassy in London with relatives. But he was not alone, Foreign Minister Yusuf Franko pasha, from a Syrian Christian family also benefited from having relatives in important posts in the Ottoman Foreign Service in the Young Turk period. And he in turn facilitated their rise or assignment to choice posts. Another high-achieving non-Muslim, Gabriel Noradounghian effendi, long-time Legal Counselor in the Foreign Ministry, after becoming Foreign Minister in 1912, saw fit to bring his son to serve as First Secretary in Paris.[3]

A measure of the significance of belonging to a prominent family is the number of senior Ottoman military and civilian officials of the rank of pasha who had relatives serving in the Foreign Ministry. It is possible to identify at least 285 such senior Ottoman officials whose relatives populated the Foreign Service community at the end of the Empire and the Republic that followed.[4] They form a veritable who's who of the late Ottoman state. Some of these top-ranking officials were related to serving Foreign Service officials

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[1] His first wife. Fatma, was descended from Piri Reis and Ottoman Reis ul Kuttab Hüseyin Hüsnü (1772-1828). Fatma was also a distant relative of Emine Esenbel, wife of Amb. Melih Esenbel. See İsmail Hami Danişmend, "Abdülhak Hâmidin Nesebi ve Ailesi," *Cumhuriyet*, April 13, 1948.

[2] *New York Times*, February 23, 1919, reported his death in Atlantic City.

[3] For Yusuf Franko pasha, see note 7 below.

[4] These pashas range from Marshal Abdi pasha, a Circassian, who was the grandfather of Emin Ergil (First Secretary in Berlin in 1906-1907 who then became a member of the Council of State) and great grandfather of the second wife of Nusret Sadullah Ayaşlı (last Minister to the Hague under the Ottomans and later Samsun deputy in the Republic) to Zühtü pasha, father of Hüseyin Kâzim Bey who served as Minister to Washington in 1909.

by marriage in ways that might seem distant in less family-conscious societies. But these relationships were cited in obituaries of those involved, indicating the salience of these connections.

In addition to family ties, school bonds played an important role in the careers of members of the Foreign Ministry. The case for ascribing significance to school ties cannot be established by statistics alone. Few schools existed at the end of the nineteenth century to supply recruits to the Foreign Service. Galatasaray Lyceum, whose curriculum was taught in French, appears to have provided well over twice as many officials as the *Mülkiye* (civil service school), which was a university-level institution teaching in Turkish. These two, together with the Istanbul Law Faculty and various military secondary schools in Istanbul, seem to have been the main educational establishments attended by those who entered the Foreign Service in the late Ottoman period. Foreign educational experience, typically at the Faculty of Political Science in Paris, was often, though not invariably, the passport to senior positions. Even if those who studied abroad at the university level did not generally have Ottoman university classmates, they often had important secondary school ties from education in Turkey. Yet the pattern of recruitment to the Foreign Service was so narrowly based that mere attendance at any particular school did not determine a successful career. On the other hand, the records indicate that attendance at some school was usually required for high office, although I can identify at least two senior officials in the last years of the Empire who had merely "private education."[1]

The importance of schoolmates in securing good assignments and rapid promotions is attested in memoirs of those who served in the late Ottoman period. Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu has described in detail the manipulations he attempted in order to advance through the pull of a classmate serving in the Minister's secretariat. His account of thirty years in the Foreign Service is replete with references to the saliency of Galatasaray relationships. As the evidence will show, it seems beyond question that a clique based on Galatasaray, with its high standards in French, dominated the Foreign Ministry at the end of the Ottoman Empire and in the early days of the Turkish Republic.[2]

Even before the advent of the Young Turks, this clique of Muslim Turks had begun gradually to reduce the influence of non-Muslims, who in the 1870s had monopolized many of the most important ambassadorships and

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[1] These were Yusuf Franko Pasha, son of a Christian mutasarrıf of Mt. Lebanon, who served as Ottoman Foreign Minister in 1922; and Samipaşazade Sezai, who was Minister (Orta Elçi) to Madrid, 1909-1921. It seems likely that there were some others who had only private schooling as well.

[2] Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu, *Hariciye Hizmetinde Otuz Sene* (İstanbul, 1949), passim.

other senior positions in major European capitals. This trend was particularly apparent in the diminution of officials of Hellenic ethnic origins reflecting the formation of Greece as a national state in the nineteenth century. When senior ambassadors of the earlier period drawn from those of this ethnic group died, they were not succeeded by others of Greek origin. On the other hand, Armenians and Syrian Catholics, from communities which remained inside the Ottoman state until after the First World War, maintained themselves well in the later decades of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century.

Remaking the Ministry—Young Turk Style

The Young Turks, who gradually ascended to power after the 1908 Revolution, did not at first have much impact on the personnel and structure of the Foreign Ministry. Nonetheless, particularly after a few years when they turned to more ultra-nationalist approaches, their appointments continued the trend to make the ministry somewhat less hospitable to non-Muslim officials. But Armenians and Arab Christians continued to occupy major posts. They were well represented at secondary levels and two of their number even reached the position of Foreign Minister: Gabriel Noradounghian in 1912-1913 and Yusuf Franko pasha briefly in 1922. In fact, Yusuf Franko pasha's brother-in-law served as Ambassador to Paris from 1908 to 1911, and his brother occupied the position of Undersecretary in the Foreign Ministry in this same period. The prominence of the last two was in part due to the fact that their father had been Governor of Lebanon in the mid-19th century, a position that was reserved for Christians by agreement with the international community. Moreover, Yusuf Franko pasha seems to have been made Foreign Minister through French pressure on the Sultan at about the time that his sister's French husband, Defrance, became French High Commissioner in Istanbul.[1]

Yet as far as the Foreign Ministry went, the Young Turk leaders did not establish a clear pattern of rewarding members of new families or of fostering the rise of new social groups. Indeed, recruitment appeared to narrow as fewer new personnel for the Foreign Service came from military secondary schools during this period, a route that was one of the main ways boys of lesser background could enter the elite. On the other hand, there is no evidence that old families were systematically penalized, except for a tiny minority intimately identified with the Sultan's excesses. One of the latter, Paris

[1] Robert F. Zeidner, *The Tricolor Over the Taurus, 1918-1922* (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 2005), p. 147.

Ambassador Sâlih Münir Pasha was immediately fired in 1908 for political reasons. The scion of an illustrious Ottoman ministerial family, he had actively hounded the Young Turks in exile in Europe. Yet his several in-laws in the Ottoman Foreign Ministry even received salary increases or promotions immediately after the 1908 Revolution. And, later his nephew, Melih Esenbel, would become Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry from 1958-1960 and then be given the choice appointment of Ambassador to Washington.[1]

A few well-connected envoys dropped out of sight because they fell out with the new regime. One of these, Şerif Pasha "Bo-sherif," ["handsome Sherif" in French, but it could also be pronounced "Boş Herif" by his detractors to mean in Turkish "Vapid Lout"] was the son of a former Ottoman Foreign Minister married to an Egyptian princess. He quit the service when he was not offered what he considered an adequately prestigious post.

It is notable, however, that no political appointees from outside the service were injected into the top ranks of the Foreign Service in the early years of the Young Turk period. No generals were rewarded with ambassadorships until 1912. The new envoys initially named by the Young Turks included such individuals as (Ahmet) Muhtar Mollaoğlu, whose father had been a legal adviser to the Ottoman court. Muhtar rose from the position of translator in the Prime Ministry in 1909 to become envoy in Athens in 1911 at five times his earlier salary. And he would achieve even higher-level assignments in the Republic as well.

Two of the fifteen heads of mission in 1908 were recalled to become Foreign Minister in quick succession. One of these, Mehmet Rifat pasha (1862-1925), was the son of Balkapani merchant Hasan effendi. He had graduated from the *Mülkiye* Civil Service School and may illustrate the ability to rise into elite social status through education.[2] He was brought back from serving at the Court of St. James's to assume the post of Foreign Minister in February 1909. He had married a Russian general's daughter whom he met in Tiflis in an early foreign assignment. Although she converted to Islam, some of his enemies in the Turkish Foreign Ministry had earlier tried to block his London ambassadorial assignment by advancing objections to his wife, but the British King interceded for him. After returning to two and a half years as Foreign Minister, he was sent as ambassador to Paris until the First World War broke out. He would end his career as ambassador in Berlin from August 1918 to March 1919.

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[1] Esenbel even served as caretaker Foreign Minister in the Sadi Irmak government of November 17, 1974-March 31, 1975, which never received a vote of confidence.

[2] See Ali Çankaya, *Yeni Mülkiye Târihi ve Mülkiyeliler*, vol 3 (Ankara: Mars Matbaası, 1968-1969), pp. 91-96.

Mehmet Rifat pasha was followed as Foreign Minister after a short interval by Mustafa Âsım bey (1870-1937), son of a member of the board of directors of the orphans' property foundation. Âsım and others who received favorable assignments at this time were almost all from families established in government service for at least one generation. He had attended the Galatasaray Lyceum and, after serving as a probationer in the Royal Court, rose steadily in the Ottoman Foreign Service, reaching the position of Minister in Brussels in 1908. After a brief stint there and in Stockholm, he became Minister in Sofia for two years before elevation to the post of Foreign Minister in October 1911. His last Foreign Service post would be Ottoman ambassador to Tehran from 1914 to 1915, when he was captured by the Russians while hunting in the outskirts of Teheran. He was then repatriated to Istanbul.

Available evidence is more fragmentary about rewards and retribution in the lower ranks of the service. A number of these individuals continued their careers without discernable change. Of the seven whose records available to me show salary cuts at this time, I have data on the social position of only two. The father of one had been an Undersecretary in the Grand Vezir's Office; the father of the other was a county governor (*kaymakam*). On the other hand, among nine whose records show promotions at this point, one was the son of a former chief secretary of Abdül Hamid. Another was Ragıb Raif Köseraif. His father, Raif pasha, had been a protégé of Grand Vezir Mithat Pasha. And although Raif Pasha rose to ministerial rank after Mithat's fall, his relations with Abdül Hamid were never close. Five of the others promoted in this period had fathers who occupied middle level government posts.[1]

The Young Turks did make some minor organizational changes in the Foreign Ministry to regularize the rank structure. But their main attention was focused elsewhere, particularly on the factional struggles of the period up to the emergence of the triumvirate of Enver, Talat, and Cemal pashas. As a result, the Young Turks did not undertake basic reforms of the Ministry and largely disregarded the various proposals made after 1908 for comprehensive reorganization of the Foreign Service.[2]

Starting in 1911, however, the Balkan wars began a process of disrupting the Ottoman Foreign Ministry. Record keeping disintegrated and there are gaps in the assignment files of a number of Foreign Service officers. Yet it is clear that some members of the Ministry left to join the armed forces, though apparently service in the Foreign Ministry exempted members

[1] Assignment and promotion data comes from the Foreign Ministry archives in Ankara, personnel files of retired Foreign Service officers in the Republic. See also the Short Biographies section below.

[2] See Söylemezoğlu, pp. 201-204, for schemes to reform the Foreign Ministry.

from obligatory military service. Others, particularly those near the end of their normal Foreign Service career, resigned to engage in other occupations. While a few political appointees and military officers were assigned to embassies during the final decade of the Ottoman regime, the records indicate a marked drop in recruits entering the Service at the lower ranks. Of course, the First World War was a time when diplomatic relations with many of the more than twenty-four states in which the Ottomans had come to be represented were broken, hence the requirement for personnel was correspondingly reduced.[1]

The War of Independence

The confusion at the end of the Empire blurred the transition to Kemalist service during the years of the national struggle. A number of Ottoman diplomats found that their connections with the Foreign Service had been interrupted by the World War. A small number of these made their way to Ankara to offer their services to the new regime or to respond to invitations from Atatürk's regime. Most of those who came were low-ranking figures. Only a handful of senior Ottoman diplomatic officials left the Sultan's service. Indeed, it should be emphasized that that there was no mass exodus of Foreign Service personnel to follow the nationalist banner. The Foreign Ministry as a whole displayed reserve toward the Ankara regime. And this fact may account for the warm welcome that those few officials who left Ottoman service received in Ankara.

Of the 184 Ottoman Foreign Service officers who can be positively identified as having eventually transferred to the Republican Ministry, only about 30 can be said with certainty to have joined Atatürk before the abolition of the Ottoman service on November 1, 1922. As the status of many others is not clearly established in their records, however, it seems reasonable to suppose that another 20 or so shifted allegiance to Ankara before the abolition of the Ottoman service. Even though several who remained at their Ottoman

[1] A full count of the countries and places where the Ottoman Empire was represented after the 1908 Young Turk revolution is difficult to compile. Hâmid Aral's otherwise useful *Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1967 Yıllığı* (Ankara: Ankara Basım ve Ciltevi, 1968) lists only chiefs of mission and foreign ministers in the Ottoman period. The Ottomans had consular relations with countries to which they did not send envoys. Hence, the listing, p. 908, of envoys to Brazil (Rio de Janeiro), begins in 1924, but in fact Münir Süreyya Bergman served as Consul-general there starting in 1910 before moving to Tiflis on the eve of the First World War as his personnel records show. Aral's record thus does not indicate, for example, that Ali Rauf Baykan, a *Mülkiye* graduate, served in Bombay in 1912-13 under Consul-general Mahrukizade Esref Cafer or that Majakiyan Ohannes effendi served as Consul-General Johannesburg in 1912. See also note 3 above.

posts were secretly working for the nationalists,[1] these calculations indicate that less than one-third of those who eventually came to serve Atatürk's regime joined during the years of the national struggle. Most who did so, in fact, joined at the very end of 1921 or in 1922. Considering that an aggregate of some 450 Ottoman officials (including those who had left for military service during the First World War) served in Foreign Service posts or in Istanbul between 1908 and 1922, it is clear that only a small fraction of the Ottoman Foreign Service deserted the Sultan during the Struggle for Independence.

Even when asked by Ankara to join, at least one former senior Ottoman envoy, who had shown himself to be well disposed toward the nationalists, turned down Atatürk's personal invitation. Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu had temporarily abandoned his 30-year career in the Ottoman Foreign Service toward the middle of 1919 to protest the Greek landing in İzmir. He then began unofficially to carry on propaganda for the nationalist cause in Rome. He published two short books (*Le Martyre d'un Peuple*, and *L'Assassinat d'un Peuple*), which defended Turkish national interests and opposed the terms of the Sèvres treaty.

After these tracts were called to the attention of Atatürk, the newly elected President on June 5, 1920, sought to persuade Söylemezoğlu to come to Ankara. Thanking Söylemezoğlu for his activities in Rome, Atatürk told him that "we need your assistance" in organizing the ministry and in rebuilding the personnel to represent "the people's government" of Turkey abroad.[2] But on July 17, 1920, Söylemezoğlu turned him down by telegram and then by a longer explanatory letter, arguing that "It is not the time to reorganize the Foreign Service extensively." And he pled that he would be more useful in Rome than in Ankara in helping procure war materiel. An additional, but unstated, reason behind his refusal to come to Ankara, however, was the precarious health of his wife. The result of his refusal was that after the Struggle for Independence was over, although he was only 50 years old when the Republic was declared, he was not offered a senior position in the Ankara Foreign Ministry, despite his close personal connections with the nationalist elite and his wealth of foreign expertise.[3]

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[1] For example, Enis Akaygen was a member of the Mim Mim Group in İstanbul. See Hüsnü Himmetoğlu, "M.M. Grubu ve Gerçek Yüzü," *Yakın Tarihimiz*, Oct. 4, 1962, p. 168. Emin Ali Türkgeldi in Paris was also secretly working for the Ankara regime, according to Bilâl Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1996), p. 139.

[2] Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu, *30 Senelik Siyasî Hatiralarımın Üçüncü Cildi: Kısım: I (1918-1922)*, p. 424. Söylemezoğlu was the father-in-law of Atatürk's military colleague and First Term Trabzon Deputy Hüsrev Gerede. Gerede would subsequently have his own successful diplomatic career.

[3] Ibid., pp. 424-429.

The slowness of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry to respond did not present serious difficulties for Ankara. Foreign affairs were pursued at first largely by force of arms. Regular diplomatic relations started slowly. Muhtar Mollaoğlu, who was Acting Foreign Minister from August 1920 to February 1921, was able to run the Ankara Foreign Ministry with only one secretary for five months before increasing his staff rapidly to 15.[1] This increase caused the Ministry to exceed its initial budget request for 1920-1921. As late as March 1921, after almost a year of operation, the Ankara Ministry's budget called for only 87 Foreign Service officials, from code clerks to ministers. This small corps was sufficient to represent the Ankara regime in Soviet Russia, Ukraine, Iran, Afghanistan, France, Italy, Britain, and the Caucasus republics.[2]

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

Though he was not officially a part of the foreign affairs establishment, Atatürk stood at the heart of Ankara's diplomatic structure. As Military Attaché in Sofia in 1913-1914, he had experienced diplomatic life with its broadening impact on his world view. He emerged convinced that he was the equal of the statesmen he had encountered there. Moreover, he obviously felt that he had better command of the imperatives of the Struggle for Independence and the future of Turkey than anyone else. Accordingly, as President, he himself personally participated in diplomatic negotiations whenever they could be held in Ankara. On other occasions, he sent critical correspondence by dispatch or telegraph that helped direct diplomatic activity. At times he did so apparently without coordinating with either the Foreign Minister or the Prime Minister. To the extent possible in those days before instant communications, he kept in close touch with and managed the course of diplomacy for the nationalist regime. Indeed, whatever the legal structure that the Ankara regime would erect, Atatürk would in fact all during his lifetime insist on a personal commanding role in devising Turkish foreign policy and in its execution. He even dabbled in the lowest levels of the recruitment process for the Foreign Ministry.[3] No assignment of personnel or significant action abroad could be taken without his approval. On occasion

[1] Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, *Zabıt Ceridesi*, Devre I, vol. 8, p. 252 (session of February 15, 1921). Muhtar revealed these numbers while explaining the need for more furniture than his ministry had budgeted.

[2] Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, *Zabıt Ceridesi*, Devre I, vol. 9, pp. 182-83.

[3] He recruited military colleagues, but even checked on civilian applicants. For example, Leyla Çambel was personally examined by Atatürk for entry into the diplomatic service. He rejected her.

even the marriage partners of diplomatic personnel had to be approved by the President.[1] This deep involvement was evident from the very beginning of his movement in Anatolia, although, as Mümtaz Soysal has cogently argued, during the Struggle for Independence many deputies insisted on exercising a right to share in foreign policy decision-making. That effort to rein in the President would be attenuated after the establishment of the Turkish Republic. But while this power-sharing lasted, Atatürk clearly found it frustrating.[2]

From the very first, Atatürk was concerned with the diplomatic tasks of securing assistance from Soviet Russia and carrying on propaganda in the Western world in favor of Turkish nationalist resistance against the European occupying powers and the invading Greeks. The reports of his meeting with a Soviet representative Major Budennyi in Amasya in June 1919 no longer seem likely to be true. But Atatürk himself reported to Parliament that he attempted to establish contact with the Bolsheviks in July 1919, just after his arrival in Erzurum for a Congress that would set forth demands for territory which the Turkish nationalists insisted should remain under Turkish sovereignty. At that time he sent an unofficial envoy, Dr. Fuat Sabit, to sound out the Soviets about sending aid to Turkey. When he did not receive word from this envoy, he dispatched Enver pasha's uncle, former Ottoman General Halil Kut, in September 1919 to explain to the Soviets what his movement was all about and to request cooperation against "imperialists." He specifically offered to join forces against the Armenians.[3] Again, this channel proved unsatisfactory. More successful contact with Moscow would take place only after the Ankara Grand National assembly opened in Ankara in April 1920.

The arrival of General Harbord in Anatolia to inspect the possibility of an American mandate over Anatolia showed Atatürk in command and operating with diplomatic skill even before the Ankara Assembly had elected him President. At the Sivas Congress which convened in September 1919 to give a national face to the Anatolian movement, Atatürk was faced with the insistence of some participants to explore an American mandate over Turkey. He met this agitation by issuing an invitation to the United States Senate to send a fact-finding mission of its members to Ankara before the victorious allies convened an international peace conference to dispose of Ottoman issues left by the results of the First World War. What he got instead of a delegation of senators was, as he no doubt expected, a visit from General Harbord, who

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[1] Semih Günver, *Fatin Rüştü Zorlu'nun Öyküsü* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1985), pp. 19-20.

[2] Mümtaz Soysal, *Dış Politika ve Parlâmento* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1964, pp. 77-78.

[3] George Harris, *The Communists and the* Kadro *Movement: Shaping Ideology in Atatürk's Turkey* (The Isis Press: İstanbul, 2002), pp. 18, 24.

was already on his way to Ankara as part of an independently conceived trip to inspect the possibility of an American mandate for Armenia. Atatürk made sure that Harbord was impressed with his determination to secure Turkey's independence and to continue the fight at all costs. Atatürk also used the opportunity to reassure the Americans that his movement would preserve minority rights and had nothing in common with Bolshevism.[1] And he repeated this message through Halide Edib Adıvar early the following year after Admiral Mark Bristol, who was by then in Istanbul as High Commissioner to handle American affairs, asked him to assure protection of United States citizens in Marash, where conflict with the French was going on.[2]

Another of his successful conduits to the American government was Annie T. Allen, a missionary who had served in the Ottoman Empire for over three decades. Unusual among missionaries, she was well-disposed toward the nationalist movement. At the same time, she served as a sort of "intelligence agent" for Admiral Bristol, a fact that Atatürk must have known, as each man used her to deliver messages to the other in the period between 1920 and 1922. The Turkish leader sought to impress her with his "democratic" leanings, invited her to dine with him, and saw to it that she was able to attend early sessions of the Grand National Assembly to gain a flavor of the strength of the nationalist regime.[3]

Atatürk could not only manage relations with other governments, he showed his talent for manipulating world public opinion by using foreign journalists to further his cause. One of these was G. Ward Price, correspondent of the *Daily Mail*. While still in Istanbul in 1919 Atatürk sought him out to analyze for him what a British administration would mean for Anatolia.[4] In preparation for the Mudanya Armistice talks in September he gave a key interview with Ward Price to set out the nationalist requirements for a cease-fire, forecasting with some precision Turkey's terms for peace as well.[5] Another of these journalists was Louis E. Browne, a correspondent of the Chicago *Daily News*. Browne reported on the Sivas Congress and was the agency through which Atatürk transmitted his request to the United States government for a delegation to come to Ankara to learn first-hand about his

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[1] Ibid., p. 19.

[2] Peter Buzanski, "Admiral Mark L. Bristol and Turkish-American Relations, 1919-1922," Ph.D thesis presented to the University of California at Berkeley, 1960, p. 152, from Bristol's Diary entry of Feb. 17, 1920.

[3] Ibid., pp. 147-149, from Bristol's Diary entry of June 13, 1920.

[4] Lord Kinross, *Ataturk, A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1965), pp. 166-167.

[5] Stephen F. Evans, *The Slow Rapprochement: Britain and Turkey in the Age of Kemal Atatürk* (Walkington: The Eothen Press, 1982), pp. 56-57.

movement. And, among others, he also met with a reporter for the *Chicago Tribune* in September 1922 to undergird preparations for the Lausanne peace process. Indeed, as peacemaking approached, he explained the new situation to the American journalist Richard Danin as well as to a reporter for the United Press International. And he made sure the French press was aware of Turkey's conditions for peace through an interview with the *Petit Parisien* as the Lausanne Conference was on the point of opening.[1]

Even after the official structure to manage foreign relations under a Foreign Minister was established by the Ankara Assembly, the Turkish President himself was not shy about taking the lead. He described in some detail his personal involvement in two weeks of difficult negotiations with an unofficial French envoy in June 1921.[2] Although the French were stubborn and tenacious in attempting to secure much of the substance accorded them by the Sèvres Treaty, Atatürk showed his skill and determination in forcing them to give ground. And on the heels of the Turkish military success in stopping the Greek advance at the Sakarya River, his personal spadework led to the signing of the Ankara Treaty in October 1921, effectively ending armed conflict with France.

Shortly thereafter, he personally negotiated with Ukrainian leader, Soviet General Mikhail Vasilievich Frunze, who arrived in Ankara in December 1921 at Atatürk's invitation as part of the President's grand design to extract aid from the Bolsheviks. The two concluded a Friendship Accord, signed with considerable fanfare on January 2, 1922. This political theater had little practical effect, however, as the Ukrainian regime was soon completely submerged in the Soviet Union.

Atatürk also played a direct role in orchestrating the effort to gain freedom for those Ottoman officials whom the British had rounded up in March 1920 and shipped off to Malta as detainees. While a number of these figures would prove not to be enthusiastic proponents of the Ankara regime, but rather were devoted to the Sultan's government, there were some who seemed likely to bolster the nationalist cause in significant degree. Moreover, Atatürk apparently felt that in general their release would show that the Ankara Assembly was capable of performing the function of protecting the interests of Turkish citizens. The British too were interested in a prisoner exchange for the smaller number of British nationals and especially military personnel held by the nationalist forces. Foreign Minister Lord Curzon even attempted to use the Turkish detainees as hostages for getting Ankara's

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[1] See Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri III (1918-1937)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1954), pp. 44-62.

[2] Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, *A Speech delivered*, pp. 523-527.

agreement to accept the Sèvres Treaty dismembering territory claimed by the nationalists.

The negotiations thus were long and difficult. Atatürk refused British offers of partial concessions and held out for the total release of the Malta detainees in exchange for the release of British personnel held by the Ankara regime. When attempts by other negotiators to resolve the issue proved unsuccessful, eventually Atatürk would use Hamid Hasancan, Vice President of the Ottoman Red Crescent, as his intermediary in Istanbul to deliver his own personal messages to the British. And through firmness and perseverance in this channel, he eventually achieved success in gaining release of all the Malta detainees.[1]

Atatürk was faced with a challenging problem when the Entente Foreign Ministers in March 1922 proposed a ceasefire on terms that represented a softening of the provisions of the Sevrès Treaty. Atatürk, who was at the front, telegraphed the Assembly not to reject these conditions out of hand, because he recognized the possibility of gaining a propaganda advantage. Thus he reversed the inclination of deputies to await the return of Foreign Minister Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk from a European exploratory trip before agreeing to the principle of an armistice. Then Atatürk convened the Cabinet outside of Ankara so that he personally could oversee the formulation of the Turkish response in greater detail to reflect his views instead of those of the deputies. And his insistence on the need for evacuation of Turkish territory to start immediately animated the Turkish position in Ankara's note of April 5, 1922. As Atatürk had foreseen, this Turkish counterproposal was rejected by the Entente ten days later. It was forthcoming enough, however, to allow the Turks to score something of the propaganda victory he had intended.[2]

Of even greater significance, Atatürk also provided intense direct supervision of the delicate and difficult negotiations at Mudanya in October 1922 that led to a successful conclusion of the Armistice ending the military phase of the Struggle for Independence. Through constant telegraphic contact that typified his deep involvement in Ankara's diplomacy, he stiffened İsmet İnönü's stance, giving him firm bounds beyond which he could not go in negotiations. At the same time, he orchestrated military pressure that provided the backdrop for successful conclusion of the armistice.[3]

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[1] Bilal N. Şimşir, *Malta Sürgünleri* (Ankara,: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2nd edition, 1985), pp. 333-334, 391.

[2] Ghazi Moustapha Kemal, *A Speech Delivered*, pp. 544-549. TBMM, *Gizli Celse Zabıtları*, Cilt 3 (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1980), pp.164-170 (session of March 30, 1922), gives Tengirşenk's explanation of the terms proposed by the Entente.

[3] TBMM, *Gizli Celse Zabıtları*, Cilt 3 (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1980), pp. 896 ff (sessions of October 7-10, 1922).

In addition to his own active participation in negotiations, throughout the wartime period Atatürk largely bypassed Ankara's informal diplomatic representation abroad and instead relied on special missions headed by political figures to carry out major diplomatic activities. He sent out both deputies and civil servants as well as private citizens on ad hoc missions to carry on propaganda and try to establish contact with European states and Russia during the Struggle for Independence. Theirs was not an easy task. Because the Sultan's government still held sway in Istanbul, these figures generally ran into difficulty in asserting their legitimacy. Thus even in Moscow, where they were invited by the Soviet regime in 1920, the first question the Turkish delegates encountered from their Communist interlocutors was "just who do you represent?" And right up to the moment that the Ankara Parliament declared Turkey a Republic represented by its President, Turkish missions continued to encounter such questions. Indeed, İsmet İnönü, on his return from the Lausanne Peace Conference, would tell the Peoples Party gathering considering the vote to declare a Republic that the lack of a Chief of State weakened Turkey in diplomatic eyes.[1]

Bekir Sami

As his chief diplomatic negotiator in the first years of the national struggle, Atatürk turned to Foreign Minister Bekir Sami. Bekir Sami was one of relatively few Ankara deputies at this time who had had lengthy experience in the Ottoman Foreign Ministry. His family came from the Caucasus and had moved to Turkey about the time he was born. He had graduated from the elite Galatasaray Lyceum and then from the Political Science Faculty in Paris before joining the Ottoman Foreign Service in 1883 to serve in Russia, Iran, and Italy. He rose to become Consul General at several posts before shifting to the Ottoman Interior Ministry in 1904. He then rapidly advanced to serve as a provincial Governor, ending up as Governor of Aleppo, Syria. Fired from this major post by Cemal pasha at the end of the First World War, Bekir Sami withdrew in exile to Tokat, where he was residing at the start of the Struggle for Independence. His opposition to the Young Turk regime evidently

[1] Bilal N. Şimşir, "Dış İlişkiler Bakımından Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin İlanı," in Zeynep Rona (ed.), *Bilanço 1923-1998: Siyaset, Kültür Uluslararası İlişkiler* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1999), pp. 367-380. Diplomatic nicety demanded that letters of credence be from one chief of state to another. Ankara's war-time letters were normally signed in the name of the government of the Ankara Assembly and never with the title of chief of state. After initial explanation, this point was overlooked by the revolutionary Soviet state, the Caucasus Republics, and Afghanistan. Elsewhere the problem did not arise in the same way because in other countries Ankara had only unofficial representatives during the Struggle for Independence.

impressed Atatürk, whose positive view of him was not affected by Bekir Sami's initial interest in an American mandate.

Bekir Sami's willingness to work for the nationalist cause gave him sufficient credentials that the Congress of Erzurum in 1919 elected him to membership in the Representative Committee that was erected to direct the Struggle for Independence, even though he was not physically present at this Congress. He then went on to participate in the Sivas Conference later that year. After this show of loyalty, he was elected Amasya Deputy in the December 1919 elections to the Ottoman Parliament. When the British closed the Istanbul Parliament in March 1920, he wasted no time in reporting to Ankara to take the oath of office at the opening of the Assembly there the following month. A few days later he was elected Foreign Minister in the first Ankara cabinet.[1]

After only eight days in office, Bekir Sami was sent to Russia at the head of a mission to conclude a treaty of alliance. This select delegation was comprised of two other members of Parliament besides Bekir Sami: Minister of Economics Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk and Deputy from Lazistan Osman Nuri Özgen, who was trained as an engineer. Evidently Özgen was selected because his service in combating the uprising in favor of the Sultan in the Bolu-Düzce region in May 1920 suggested a high level of loyalty to the Ankara regime, and perhaps also because Lazistan was adjacent to the Caucasus and a gateway to the Soviet realm. On final completion of the treaty with Moscow, Özgen would be sent to Tuapse to oversee delivery of military equipment from the Soviet regime, until he was recalled at the end of 1921 amid charges that he had misused his office. Though he was not further punished and continued to serve as a Deputy for the rest of the first term, Özgen was not subsequently reelected to Parliament.[2]

Among the non-parliamentary members of the delegation which Bekir Sami took to Moscow was the Counselor of the mission, military doctor İbrahim Tâli Öngören. İbrahim Tâli was charged with Communist Party affairs and would immediately leave Moscow to take part in the Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku on September 1, 1920. Öngören would then return to Moscow until the final treaty was signed in March 1921. He would become Consul General in Batumi at the end of November 1921 at the start of a short but successful Foreign Service career, which would lead him to become a Deputy. Finally, the mission included Staff Lt. Colonel Seyfi

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[1] Fahri Çoker, *Türk Parlamento Tarihi: Millî Mücadele ve T.B.M.M. I. Dönem: 1919-1923* (vol. 3: *I. Dönem Milletvekillerinin Özgeçmişleri*) (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1995), pp. 61-63; Metin Tamkoç, *The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of the National Security and Modernization of Turkey* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah press, 1976, pp. 339-340.

[2] Çoker, pp. 717-718.

Düzgören, a former member of the Ottoman Teşkilâti Mahsusa intelligence organization. Seyfi was a close friend of İnönü's since their service together in the Second Army in Edirne in 1907. He went to oversee military aspects of the negotiation with the Soviets and to arrange the flow of war materiel.

This delegation would set out with high hopes. But in Moscow, after difficult negotiations, made more arduous by the presence at times of former Committee of Union and Progress Prime Minister Enver pasha and other former Ottoman notables, they found that the Soviets refused to consider a Treaty of Alliance with the Turkish nationalists. Instead, the Bolshevik regime proposed merely a Treaty of Friendship. The Ankara negotiators reluctantly agreed to this alternative. They also accepted Soviet refusal to include in the Treaty a specific engagement to supply military aid inasmuch as such assistance was already being provided. The aspect of the Soviet position that caused particular discord when the draft Treaty was debated in the Ankara Parliament involved Moscow's demand for some territory in the provinces of Van and Bitlis, a demand that Bekir Sami felt constrained to consider. And the Soviets adamantly insisted on acquiring the port of Batumi which was supposed to be given back to the Ottomans according to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk which had been concluded between the Ottomans and the new Soviet regime in 1918.

These demands and Moscow's general hard bargaining caused the first draft of the Treaty of Friendship to be ignominiously rejected by the Ankara Assembly after a two-day closed session in October 1920. The deputy leader of the Turkish mission, Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk, who returned early to present the draft treaty to the Assembly, gave a negative view of Soviet good-will and tactics. And the Soviet demand for territory inside the borders set by the National Pact was the last straw. In the end, Tengirşenk's recital had the effect of turning the deputies sharply against the Treaty. Accordingly, Bekir Sami had to return empty-handed to Ankara toward the end of December 1920.[1] It would be left to other negotiators to conclude a successful treaty, though one largely based on the terms of the original version.

Despite this inauspicious performance, within a little over a month following his return, Bekir Sami was dispatched to take part in the Second London Conference in February 1921 to try to reverse the breakup of the Turkish heartland called for by the Treaty of Sèvres.

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[1] George Harris, *The Communists and the* Kadro *Movement*, pp. 27-35 covers in detail this important Parliamentary debate.

Selection of his negotiating team for this important European venture and the definition of its mandate occasioned considerable debate in the Ankara Parliament in both open and closed sessions.[1] Bekir Sami, however, did not take part in these lengthy deliberations as one might have expected. The original nomination request for delegates to go to London was presented by National Defense Minister Fevzi pasha Çakmak. The slate of negotiators that Çakmak presented contained some figures who would be rejected in the course of parliamentary consideration. When debate on this package began, Karesi Deputy Mehmet Vehbi Bolak, an early leader in the struggle against the Greeks, proposed sending as Advisers to the mission deputies who were fluent in languages and would be drawn from the Aydın, Bursa, Karesi and Anteb regions (where European powers were in occupation). As he was a representative from one of the regions most affected by the Greek advance, his name would be added to the list of negotiators. One of those who spoke most often in this debate, Kırşehir Deputy Yahya Galip Kargı, frankly announced "As to diplomats, we have no diplomacy." He proposed, to applause, that "the Representatives to be sent must absolutely be Deputies." There was much discussion in Parliament about whether the mission should be a political or diplomatic one. In view of the fact that many deputies believed that it would fail to change British opinion, they wanted to structure it so that at least it would have a propaganda value. In the end, however, Atatürk took the floor to state that "the right to select the representatives belongs to the Council of Ministers." And he defended this position on the basis that that procedure had worked for the second delegation to Moscow.

The other main question in regard to the London Conference revolved around the mandate for the Ankara negotiators, inasmuch as the invitation to talk with the British had come to the Sultan's government in Istanbul. The Ottoman Prime Minister had then invited Ankara to send some representatives to blend into the Istanbul delegation.[2] That procedure was entirely unacceptable to Atatürk, who insisted that the Istanbul government lacked legitimacy and that the Ankara delegation must be entirely self-standing. In the end, while the mission was on route Bekir Sami managed to get the Italian government to intervene with the British to secure a separate invitation for the nationalist delegates, providing them the parity with the Ottoman delegation that Atatürk desired.

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[1] TBMM, *Gizli Celse Zabıtları*, Devre I, vol. 1 (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1980), pp. 366-379, 382-421.

[2] Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, *Zabıt Ceridesi*, Devre I, vol. 8 (Ankara: T.B.M.M. Matbaası, 2nd edition, 1945), pp. 21-22, records Atatürk's own explanation of the problem.

In this way Bekir Sami was able to carry out Ankara's mandate to participate independently at the head of his delegation of seven other deputies: Adana Deputy and Foreign Affairs Committee member, Zekâi Apaydın; journalist and İzmir Deputy, Yunus Nadi Abalıoğlu; İzmir Deputy and expert on the Capitulations, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt; former military attaché and colleague of Ataturk, Trabzon Deputy Hüsrev Gerede, who had earlier served on the commission to define the border with Bulgaria; Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in Parliament, İzmit Deputy (Hüseyin) Sırrı Bellioğlu; Mehmet Vehbi Bolak; and Ankara's Rome Representative Cami Baykut.[1] Mehmet Vehbi Bolak, who had been a leader in partisan resistance against the Greek advance into Anatolia, resigned on the way to London; his place was taken by Erzurum Deputy Süleyman Necati Güneri, a lawyer and journalist.[2]

A number of advisers also were appointed to the mission, including former Ottoman Finance Minister Cavid, whom journalists reporting on the conference would later single out for his positive role. Others included Foreign Ministry Legal Adviser Münir Ertegün, Mehmet Niyazi Ramazanoğlu (a provincial administrator and teacher who was very close to Atatürk and was then made Mersin Deputy in 1923[3]), Ruşen Eşref Ünaydın (Galatasaray French teacher), former Saruhan deputy Tevfik, and Hamdi Arpağ (a senior official in the Ottoman Interior Ministry who had come over to Ankara as a domestic adviser). Former Ottoman Foreign Service officer Rauf Ahmet Hotinli, who had taken refuge in Romania after the British occupation of Istanbul, joined the Ankara delegation as an Adviser.[4] Two of the Deputies (Gerede and Apaydın) as well as Ünaydın and Arpağ would later be given embassies abroad, partly as a result of their diplomatic experience gained at this and later conferences. Arpağ would also be made a Deputy in 1923, the common reward for successful participation in these important negotiating delegations. And Cavid would be initially accorded a role at the Lausanne Peace talks in 1922-1923.

After receiving assurances from Ottoman Prime Minister Tevfik pasha that the Sultan's delegation would defer to Ankara, Atatürk softened his insistence that the Ankara delegation must act with complete independence from the Ottoman officials. Accordingly, once in London, the members of the

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[1] Sabahattin Selek, *Millî Mücadele II: Anadolu İhtilali: Yeni Türk Devletinin Kuruluşu* (İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1965), p.171, gives an incomplete list of attendees. He notes that Nihat Reşat Belger expounded in French the Turkish thesis. See also Kâzım Karabekir, *İstiklâl Harbimiz* (İstanbul: Türkiye Basımevi, 1960), pp. 918-919.

[2] *Damar Arıkoğlu, Hâtıralarım* (İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1961), p. 215.

[3] Atatürk and Lâtife even served as witnesses at his wedding in Tarsus on February 1, 1925.

[4] H. Adnan Önelçin, *Nutuk'un (Söylev'in) İçinden* (İstanbul: Yüce Yayınları, 1981), pp. 152-153.

Ankara mission did coordinate their activities with those of the Istanbul delegates. But they did so only after Tevfik pasha, who had come as leader of the Sultan's delegation, announced to the London Conference in his very first speech that he was ceding the floor to the Ankara representatives to speak for both representations in questions of policy. And the Ankara Assembly voiced its approval when Tevfik pasha's statement acknowledging primacy of Ankara in policy matters was reported at a session on foreign affairs.

Yet despite this favorable development, Bekir Sami's mission was again unsuccessful. He proved unable to carry out Atatürk's instructions to get European recognition of the borders of Turkey called for in the National Pact; and his agreement, made without consulting either Atatürk or other members of the delegation, to exchange all British prisoners of war for those Turks held by England (with the important exception of those London accused of mistreating either their troops or Armenians) was rejected by the Ankara Assembly. The Turkish deputies feared that the British would use this exception to hold back many Turkish prisoners. A similar fate met his accords concluded with the French and Italians on terms that Atatürk rejected as echoing the provisions of the Sèvres Treaty.

Thereupon, at the President's request, Bekir Sami resigned as Foreign Minister, although he continued to conduct propaganda for the nationalist cause in Europe. His almost continuous travels during his time in office, however, had meant that he had been able to devote little attention to giving structure to the Foreign Ministry for the Ankara regime. In the end, Atatürk lost all confidence in him and the President was highly critical in his historic five-day speech in 1927 outlining the history of the National Struggle. By this time Bekir Sami had already passed into the opposition.[1]

Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk

Also extremely active on the diplomatic front during the Turkish Struggle for Independence was Kastamonu deputy and first Minister of Economics, then Foreign Minister Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk, a lawyer who had received a doctorate in Political Science in Paris. Toward the end of the Young Turk period, he had served as Undersecretary in the Ministry of Justice. Tengirşenk's first diplomatic experience came when Atatürk designated him

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[1] See Ghazi Mustapha Kemal [Atatürk], *A Speech delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, President of the Turkish Republic* (Leipzig: K. F. Koehler, 1929), pp. 490, 497-502. Bekir Sami would be arrested in connection with the so-called "İzmir Plot" on Atatürk's life in 1926. He would be exonerated, however, and after his release would leave political life. He died in January 1933.

deputy chief of the special mission that set off for Moscow in the late spring of 1920. While Foreign Minister Bekir Sami remained in Moscow in the fall of 1920 in futile further negotiations, Tengirşenk returned to Ankara in October 1920 to report on the difficulties this mission encountered. His presentation changed the whole atmosphere in the Ankara Assembly regarding the Communist regime in Moscow, ending the unrealistic hopes that had animated deputies about trusting the Soviets to have abandoned Tsarist ambitions toward Turkey.[1]

When it came time to send another delegation to Moscow to perfect the treaty that Bekir Sami had begun, Atatürk picked Tengirşenk, to lead the mission because from his earlier experience in Moscow "he knows Russia." By using this expression, Atatürk must have meant that he expected that Tengirşenk, after his jaundiced presentation to the Assembly, would be tougher in negotiations than Bekir Sami had been. Perhaps Bekir Sami was not asked to return to Moscow because he was thought to have been willing to consider excessive concessions in order to cajole the Soviets into letting him keep family lands in the Caucasus.

To accompany Tengirşenk, Atatürk, after only a few minitues of cogitation, allegedly turned to Rıza Nur to ask: "Will you go?"[2] This somewhat off-hand selection process seems to have been typical of Atatürk's behavior in dealing with diplomatic appointments. It bypassed Acting Foreign Minister (Ahmet) Muhtar Mollaoğlu, who, like others nominally in charge of foreign affairs, immediately deferred to the Turkish President.

And finally Tengirşenk took Mehmet Ali Balin, a new recruit to the Foreign Ministry, as his Secretary and code clerk. The experience he would get from this mission undoubtedly predisposed the Ankara leadership to send Balin to be a secretary at the opening of the Lausanne peace talks at the end of the following year.

Tengirşenk and his party reached Moscow with their new instructions in February 1921. By now both sides were more eager to conclude an acceptable accord. Hence Tengirşenk, along with Rıza Nur and the newly arrived Turkish Ambassador to Russia, General Ali Fuat Cebesoy, was able in March 1921 finally to sign a treaty that the Ankara Parliament would ratify. Yet in the debate on the new text in the Grand National Assembly on July 21, 1921, there was discussion of the difficulties of translating accurately the binding French text. Other questions raised in Ankara included a consideration of the effects of the most favored nation clause, and whether the treaty bound

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[1] This Assembly debate was treated in detail in George Harris, *The Communists and the* Kadro *Movement*, pp. 27-35. For Tengirşenk's biography, see Fahri Çoker, vol. 3 (*I. Dönem*), pp. 627-630.

[2] Rıza Nur, *Hayat ve Hatıratım*, vol. 3 (İstanbul: Altındağ Yayınevi, 1967-1968), p. 695.

Turkey to oppose capitalism. Turkish parliamentarians also criticized the several months delay in bringing the treaty to a vote in the Assembly. And indeed, the Treaty was but slightly improved from that earlier rejected by the Parliament and in particular accepted the loss of Batumi to the Soviets. Yet in the end, the vote in the Assembly was 201 in favor as against the negative votes of only the 5 deputies representing Batumi. These deputies were explicitly given permission to vote against the treaty because it was recognized that they stood to lose their electoral districts as a result of the boundaries set by the treaty.[1] The overwhelming support for the treaty testified eloquently to the importance that deputies accorded relations with Soviet Russia.

While they were in Moscow, Tengirşenk and his colleagues took advantage of the presence of an Afghan "Extraordinary Ambassador" to conclude the Turkey-Afghanistan Accord of March 1, 1921. Turkey already had established diplomatic relations with the Afghan state and had sent a former Ottoman diplomat, Abdurrahman, as Ambassador a year earlier. Ankara considered Afghanistan, as a Sunni state to the east of Shia Iran, to hold the promise of being a Turkish satellite in what later would be described as "the Northern Tier." This Accord had the distinction of being the only treaty ever signed by what was to become the new Turkish Republic to began with the Islamic formula "In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful." Yet at the same time, it breathed a common revolutionary spirit, engaging the parties to combat "imperialists" who were said to be seeking to subjugate the East.[2]

Those important successes put Tengirşenk in line in May 1921 to succeed Bekir Sami as Foreign Minister, when the latter left office. In his new post, Tengirşenk then participated with Atatürk in negotiating the end of French military operations against the young Turkish nationalist regime in 1921. He also played a part in securing British agreement to release Turkish prisoners from Malta that same year. He and Atatürk also worked together to engineer the conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship with the Ukraine in January 1922.

On the heels of this string of accomplishments, he was sent to Europe in February 1922 to explain the aims and goals of the Turkish nationalists cause. In this connection, he, along with the Ottoman Foreign Minister, made

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[1] TBMM, *Zabıt Ceridesi*, vol 11 (Ankara: TBMM Matbaası, 1958), pp. 320-333 (session of July 21, 1921). Tengirşenk indicated that although he sympathized with the Batumi deputies, he believed that this treaty was demanded for the good of Turkey and Turkishness.

[2] See İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları, I. Cilt (1920-1945)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1983), pp.25-26, for the text of this treaty.

a joint presentation to the British government explaining the Turkish case.[1] This was an exploratory mission designed for "discovering and probing Allied and British intentions."[2] As such it accomplished its limited aims. But on returning to Ankara, Tengirşenk became ill and received a three month leave from his post as Foreign Minister. When he resumed his office just as Atatürk was choosing delegates to the all-important Lausanne Conference, the President decided to have him resign his Ministry position and remain a common Deputy in the Ankara Assembly. That did not prevent him eventually from returning to diplomatic service, however, for as a reward he would eventually be made Ambassador to London and even serve again as a Cabinet minister.

Rıza Nur

Rıza Nur emerged as another of the major political negotiators used by Atatürk during the Struggle for Independence. A military doctor turned politician, he had early on broken with the Committee of Union and Progress leaders. He then spent the First World War years in exile in Paris and Egypt, but returned to stand for election to the Ottoman Parliament in January 1920. On March 18, 1920, it was he who proposed that, because the British occupation was illegal, a public protest should be made and Parliament should cease activity until deputies could perform their duties without interference. Making his way to Ankara along with Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk, he became Minister of Education in the first Ankara Cabinet and then acting Foreign Minister for a short time while Bekir Sami was on leave to conduct his mission to Moscow in May 1920. A persuasive speaker who was not afraid to speak out, Rıza Nur had evidently convinced Atatürk of his understanding of foreign affairs. Moreover, as a staunch anti-Communist, he seemed unlikely to fall under the spell of the Moscow regime. Accordingly he was sent to Moscow with Tengirşenk when the latter returned to Moscow in December 1920 to finalize the Treaty of Friendship. His mission there was judged to have been successful.

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[1] H. Basri Danışman, *Artçi Diplomat: Son Osmanlı Hariciye Nazırlarından Mustafa Reşit Paşa* (İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1998), p. 130. This meeting was facilitated by Reşit pasha, who was then serving in London as unofficial Ottoman Representative with the title of "Special Delegate."

[2] See Osman Okyar, "Turco-British relations in the Inter-war Period: Fethi Okyar's Missions to London," in William Hale and Ali İhsan Bağış (eds.), *Four Centuries of Turco-British Relations* (North Humberside: The Eothen Press, 1984), p. 70.

Rıza Nur's performance in dealing with the Soviets, his role in negotiating the Treaty with Afghanistan concluded in Moscow in March 1921, and, no doubt, his leading part in proposing to Parliament to confer the title of Commander in Chief on Atatürk in August 1921, led to his selection to carry out other diplomatic ventures during the Struggle for Independence.

For example, Rıza Nur was nominated by the Cabinet, undoubtedly at Atatürk's instigation, to take part in the exchange of ratifications of the Treaty of Friendship with the Ukraine. This was the treaty which had been previously signed in Ankara on January 2, 1922, with Ukrainian delegate, General Mikhail Vasilievich Frunze. Riza Nur saw the prospect of going to Kharkov as a chance to observe further the course of events in Soviet lands. At a closed session of parliament on March 16, 1922, he was elected to head the mission. He was scheduled to take with him Saruhan Deputy İbrahim Süreyya Yiğit, who had been a volunteer under Atatürk in Bingazi in 1912 and then served as Spokesman for the Foreign Affairs Committee in Parliament.[1] However, for as yet unexplained reasons, Yiğit would resign from this duty on May 1, 1922, before the delegation had departed. As a third delegate, Parliament commissioned Trabzon Deputy and sometime naval officer Mehmet Recai, who had also served on the Foreign Affairs Committee in Parliament and who apparently knew how to flatter Rıza Nur.[2]

This party of deputies along with Major Yakup, who knew Russian, and a Secretary (who turned out to be extremely lazy and was sent home by Rıza Nur) seemed more than large enough to some in the Ankara Assembly to carry out this routine diplomatic mission.[3] Nonetheless, because the Ukraine had been Bolshevized, three deputies rose to propose sending Istanbul Deputy Numan "usta" (master craftsman), who was the sole member of the Turkish working class to have been elected to the Ankara Assembly. However, the reaction among deputies against wasteful spending led to Nurnan being rejected as a member of the delegation to Kharkov. Indeed, voices were raised in the Assembly asserting that only one person needed to go to complete this formality. After another Deputy implied further that the delegates were "bereft of knowledge," Rıza Nur stood to bitterly affirm that "I do not accept such slander," and somewhat petulantly announced his resignation from the

[1] TBMM, *Gizli Celse Zabıtları*, vol. 3 pp. 72-76, 303-304. Çoker, p 829.

[2] Çoker, *Türk Parlamento Tarihi, Millî Mücadele ve T.B.M.M. I. Dönem, 1919-1923*, vol. 3, p. 942.

[3] Rıza Nur, *Hayat ve Hatıratım*, vo. 3, pp. 907-908, 914-915. Yakup had come with his father while young from Russia to Turkey.

mission.[1] He then had to be talked into continuing by Foreign Minister Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk, who mollified his outraged sense of being defamed by giving him a commission to go on to Moscow to continue negotiations for Soviet aid.

After completing the treaty exchange ceremony in Kharkov on June 23, 1922, Rıza Nur proceeded to the Soviet capital for the more challenging part of his mission. By this time, Turkey's Moscow Embassy was in care of a Chargé in the aftermath of a raid on the Turkish military attaché's office by Moscow secret police on April 22, 1922, amid evidence that these Turkish officers were engaged in espionage against the Soviet regime. That led to the expulsion of four officers from the mission, and on May 10, 1922, Ali Fuad Cebesoy, the Turkish Ambassador, left Moscow to return to Ankara in hopes of focusing blame on the Soviets. That new development formed the background for the expansion of Rıza Nur's initial mandate to seek to expedite the flow of Russian military equipment. He would now use his presence in Moscow to try to repair this breech in relations with Turkey's most important foreign supporter.[2] In fact, he had even begun to try to mollify the Soviets, using the Ukrainian leadership as intermediaries. During his several-month stay in the Soviet capital he went into high gear to woo the Kremlin. He claims to have established especially close relations with Lev Mihailovich Karakhan, Foreign Minister Chicherin's principal Deputy and Adviser on Turkey and the Middle East.[3]

While in Moscow toward mid-July 1922, Rıza Nur received word that Ambassador Cebesoy had been asked by Foreign Minister Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk to return to the Moscow Embassy. Rıza Nur claims that he immediately warned Ankara that such a move would be refused by the Soviets.[4] Atatürk solved the problem by vacating the Presidency of the Defense of Rights Parliamentary Group on July 16, 1922. He offered that post to Cebesoy, who turned around from his route back to Moscow to assume this

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[1] TBMM, *Gizli Celse Zabıtları*, vol. 3 pp. 296-298, 301-303 (session of April 25, 1922). Rıza Nur told his colleagues that the Cabinet appointed him "to carry out some matters in Moscow" and ordered him to go immediately. At first he said he did not agree, but finally he was obliged to accept. Then the question of money arose and despite the urgency the mission to Ukraine was delayed. At this point, after asking the Cabinet to excuse him, only a weak majority in Parliament approved travel funds. "Now I myself do not want to leave under such commotion. I resign. Elect another comrade. I do not need the money. I do not go for the money," he said.

[2] Stefanos Yerasimos, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri: Ekim Devriminden "Millî Mücadele"ye* (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1979), pp. 466-470.

[3] Rıza Nur, *Hayat ve Hatıratım*, vol. 3, pp. 920-921.

[4] Document 177 in Yerasimos, p. 470, indicates that already on May 11, 1922, the Soviets in a letter to their ambassador in Ankara were accusing Cebesoy of responsibility for "sabotaging" relations and issuing ultimatums. While it would appear that the Soviets were guilty of gross violation of diplomatic norms in invading Turkish diplomatic space, the charges in this communication would have made clear from the start that Cebesoy would not be welcome back in Moscow.

politically important position as head of the ruling nationalist party in Ankara. At that point, Rıza Nur was in turn offered the Moscow ambassadorship, but, arguing that he needed to discuss in person various matters with Ankara before he could consider accepting, he gracefully refused. Thereupon under pressure from Parliament to fill the Moscow position without further delay, Atatürk saw to it that (Ahmet) Muhtar Mollaoğlu, who was then serving as Turkish Representative in Tiflis, was appointed Ambassador in Moscow.[1] After that development, Rıza Nur returned to Ankara in the latter part of September 1922.

Almost immediately, as Acting Foreign Minister during that month, Rıza Nur played a part in the abortive effort to establish a Turkish diplomatic presence in the Bukhara People's Republic which had been set up in the former Khanate of Bukhara. Atatürk had selected former Istanbul Police Commissioner and Konya Governor Gâlip (Pasinler) pasha as the nationalists' Envoy to Bukhara. In his presidential address on March 1, 1922, Atatürk had announced that the mission to represent Turkey would soon depart.[2] But Rıza Nur claims that he warned the President that Gâlip pasha's outspoken pan-Turkish nationalism would upset the Soviet Russian authorities, especially in the context of the Bashmachi revolt led by Enver pasha against the ruling Communist regime. In fact, the Soviet Russians prevented Gâlip pasha from proceeding beyond Trabzon and the rest of his party was unable to go beyond Batumi. After some six months of stalemate, Rıza Nur, then Acting Foreign Minister, persuaded Gâlip pasha to resign "for health reasons" in September 1922. Thus, although a Bukharan Embassy had been established in Ankara, a Turkish embassy in Bukhara was never able to be opened, for soon that Central Asian republic was fully incorporated in the Soviet Union.[3]

With this sort of experience in important diplomatic affairs, Rıza Nur was able to secure the post of second in command at the Lausanne treaty negotiations in November 1922. He was given chief responsibility for minority and capitulations matters, on which instructions from Ankara made clear that there could be no sacrifice of Turkish sovereignty.[4] Chief delegate İsmet İnönü made a point of telling the Grand National Assembly after the negotiations ended that Rıza Nur's work there was highly successful. In line with his specific responsibilities, Rıza Nur was active especially in opposing

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[1] TBMM, *Gizli Celse Zabıtları*, Cilt: 3 (Ankara, TBMM Basımevi, 1980), pp. 72-73, 303-308; Ali Fuat Cebesoy, *Moskova Hatıraları* (Istanbul,: "Vatan" Nesriyati, 1955), pp. 347-348; Rıza Nur, *Hayat ve Hatıratım*, vol. 3, pp. 921-922; TBMM *Zabıt Ceridesi*, Devre: I, vol. 24 (Ankara: T.B.M.M. Matbaası, 1960), pp. 496-499 (session of November 13, 1922).

[2] T.B.M.M. *Zabıt Ceridesi*, Devre 1, İçtima Senesi 3, vol. 18, (Ankara: T.B.M.M. Matbaası, 1959) p. 10 (session of March 1, 1922).

[3] TBMM, *Gizli Celse Zabıtları*, vol. 3, (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1980), pp. 839-840.

[4] See Türk İstiklâl Harbi, pp. 195-96.

provisions favorable to the Armenians. Indeed when he walked out of the January 6, 1923, session in the minority sub-commission in protest, the issue of providing a homeland for Armenians was henceforth dropped and no mention of that territorial issue made its way into the final treaty language. He also exerted special vigilance to see that international supervision of health issues did not give the Western powers anything approaching capitulatory rights. And he paid special attention to seeing that financial arrangements did not allow foreign interference in domestic affairs.

Despite these successes, his self-assurance did not make him fit well into Ankara politics. Soon he showed himself to be a "loose cannon" and quite egocentric. After the Ankara political scene was roiled by the arrests of other Turkish politicians accused of plotting against Atatürk in 1926, Rıza Nur felt it prudent to depart for Europe. His memoirs written in 1928 would be interlarded with criticisms of Atatürk and other officials of the Turkish Republican regime, many of whom he would accuse of being dissolute and unfit to serve. And the personal nature of his attacks on Atatürk led to his memoirs being banned for a time in Turkey.[1] He himself would return to Turkey in 1938, where he died in 1942 without attempting to return to political life.

(Ahmet) Muhtar Mollaoğlu

While Bekir Sami and others were off on their respective diplomatic missions, the Foreign Ministry was run after a brief interval by (Ahmet) Muhtar (whose family later took the name Mollaoğlu). A graduate of the Mülkiye Civil Service School, he had entered the Foreign Ministry and served eight years in Stockholm. He then rapidly worked his way up to become Minister in Athens in 1911. He served there until 1913, although with a brief interlude as Chargé in Vienna during the Tripolitanian War in October 1911. Then he was put on suspense pay until he became Acting Minister in The Hague for a short time in 1916. In March 1917 he assumed the position of Acting General Director of Political Affairs in the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, an honorary post, for two years. To add to his European experience, he had served in Kiev as Ottoman Minister for nearly a year in 1918-1919 before becoming a deputy. As a fifty-year-old experienced diplomat, he held the position first as Acting Foreign Minister for the Ankara regime for about six months while Bekir Sami was in Russia, and then he was named Acting Foreign Minister again for three months when Bekir Sami left for the London

[1] Rıza Nur, *Hayat ve Hatıratım*, vol. 3, passim