
Society and Politics in Africa
Political History of Guinea since World War Two
Mohamed Saliou Camara

Political History of Guinea since World War Two provides an in-depth study of the political evolution of Guinea from World War Two to the present. Based on primary-source information, it examines with rare depth and breadth the eventful history of this nation-state, whose trajectory has impacted in no small ways Francophone Africa and the rest of the continent. Interviews with some of the most knowledgeable and most credible actors and/or witnesses of Guinea's political history and archival research, including the papers of key individuals never opened to the public before, constitute the foundation of this work. The author's personal and professional experience further strengthens the work. As a native Guinean, a historian, and a journalist imbued with the political ideology of the PDG regime, the author was also a close and alert witness of the political transformation of this country. Hence, the book offers an incisive analysis of domestic politics and policy making under the five successive regimes that have governed Guinea since independence in 1958. It also offers an equally incisive analysis of the country's foreign relations within international frameworks such as the Organization of African Unity, the United Nations, the Nonalignment Movement, the Economic Community of West African States, the Mano River Union, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and so on. This ground-breaking work is perfectly suited for courses in areas such as history, political science, African studies, decolonization studies, Third World studies, and nationalism studies.

"Mohamed Saliou Camara makes recent history accessible to readers by presenting riveting accounts of the true stories of people taking part in key nation-building moments. He analyzes and explains the reasons behind some horrific events but also details deeply personal accounts of those striving for positive change. Perhaps the best compliment that can be paid to Dr. Camara is his insistence on first-hand documentation, and his published work is the culmination of years of interviews conducted internationally plus his own knowledge of African politics and history. He is a trusted historian and an author who guides readers to a deeper understanding of historic turning points that have a bearing on us all. I cannot recommend Dr. Camara's work highly enough."

Lynnette Porter, Professor, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

Mohamed Saliou Camara is Professor of History and International Relations at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Florida. A former journalist for the National Radio Television of Guinea, a former speechwriter for the Guinean Presidential Press Bureau, and a Fulbright alumnus, he holds a Ph.D. in history from Northwestern University. Dr. Camara is the author of *His Master's Voice: Mass Communication and Single-Party Politics in Guinea under Sékou Touré*; *Le pouvoir politique en Guinée sous Sékou Touré*; *The Development of a Trans-National Region in West Africa: Transcending the Politics of Sovereign Nation States*; and the fifth edition of *Historical Dictionary of Guinea* (with Thomas O'Toole and Janice Baker).

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Political History of Guinea since World War Two

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To the CAMARAS and the FROEHLICHS
for helping me understand that every person
is his or her own key to the vestibule of success.

In memory of PROFESSOR YOLANDE JOSEPH-NOËL BÉHANZIN
who sacrificed her rights and privileges
as a French citizen to help Guinea solidify its national
sovereignty through education and African civism.

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Preface

In 2008, the Republic of Guinea lit its fiftieth candle as an independent and sovereign nation-state. The holding of a "truth and reconciliation" forum was supposed to be the highlight of the celebration; a "National Reconciliation and Solidarity Committee" had been formed and a budget adopted for that purpose. Unfortunately, the project never materialized, due to the seemingly inexorable political, economic and social crises into which the country had been sinking over the decades.

During the presidential campaign and elections of May and August 2010, national reconciliation became yet again the leitmotiv in the midst of the transition from the tumultuous rule of Captain Moussa Dadis Camara to a hopefully democratic regime. In radio talk shows, on the Internet, in the print press, in private conversations and elsewhere, Guineans wondered endlessly how to achieve true national reconciliation in the face of a thickening fog of ethnocentricity, to which popular culture refers in that country as "ethnocracy."

At this crucial juncture, I was interviewed on the political situation in Guinea and West Africa by several international media outlets, including *BBC History Magazine,* Newstalk93fm (Kingston, Jamaica), *CNN World, Sanlian Life Weekly Magazine* (Beijing, China), and BBC Africa. During the same period, a number of Guinean and African web radio stations invited me on their call-in talk shows to discuss my previous books on Guinea, in light of the ongoing transition. From the discussions that took place over the months, I came to the conclusion that the likelihood of achieving genuine national reconciliation in the foreseeable future is extremely slim, unless the emotional and self-serving, or rather self-defeating, manipulation of history is earnestly addressed.

Among those responsible for that manipulation two groups stand out, the first consisting of self-proclaimed ideological heirs to the late President Sékou Touré, whose memory and thoughts they are bent on rehabilitating. The second group mainly comprises former political prisoners and former exiles/self-exiles and the families of victims of the political purges of the 1960s and 1970s led by the *Association des victimes du camp Boiro* (that is, an association of family members of victims of the Boiro political detention camp in which an unknown number of real and perceived PDG opponents perished). Although some members of these groups appear open-minded and in search of a feasible way forward, many are outright fanatics.

It is incumbent upon historians, therefore, to deconstruct the trends that these groups exhibit by thoroughly researching, reconstructing, and analyzing

the historical facts. In that process, historians ought to be keenly aware of the existence of dogmatic conceptions of "truth" when it comes to reconstructing and analyzing the recent past of the country, especially with regard to the question of "perennial plot" and state violation of human rights under Sékou Touré. Pro-Sékou Touré hardliners tend to fustigate anyone, historian or not, who attempts to deconstruct their version of "truth," according to which, if any entity can be considered a victim of the recent past, Touré and his family should be that entity. Also, members of the self-righteous anti-Sékou Touré wing are quick to label any such historian a nostalgic propagandist of a dead past.

Paradoxically, elements of the first group insist that national reconciliation cannot be achieved, unless Guineans stop digging into the past and start looking only forward. The reasoning of one such individual, with whom I have had long conversations on the matter, is that Guinean historians have the responsibility to help bring about closure and healing among the Guinean people by conveying a message of reconciliation and not continuing to dig into the past (!). She basically rejected the idea that, unless the facts are reconstructed and brought to light for all to ponder, rumors and counter-truths will continue to poison people's minds, especially among the youth, and deepen the hatred that she denounced.

According to this and other likeminded individuals, the whole truth would have been known, had the CMRN military regime of General Lansana Conté allowed former PDG dignitaries to confront their accusers in a trial instead of summarily executing them in 1984 and 1985. At the same time, she insists that expecting the PDG regime to put the thousands of "plotters" on trial with lawyers to defend them in court would be asking too much of that regime at that time. My interlocutor insisted that the country simply could not afford it and challenged anyone to name one case in which such a trial took place on the entire African continent at that time.

At the same time, elements of the second group want nothing short of digging deeper and deeper into the past. Their purpose, though, is not finding *the* truth, however unpleasant it may be; rather, they are interested in exonerating, at all costs, their loved ones who perished in political detention camps during the regimes of Presidents Sékou Touré and Lansana Conté.

It goes without saying that neither approach is conducive to an objective, balanced, and productive study of Guinea's political history. Thankfully, the large majority of Guineans, especially the younger generations, are genuinely interested in learning the past for the purpose of preparing a better future in accordance with the idea that the transcendental value of the past resides in its potential to inform the present toward a better future. To such persons and to the entire readership, including those not genuinely interested in "digging into

the past," historians owe objectivity in their reconstruction, documentation, and analytical presentation of the facts. Yet they can best fulfill that responsibility by being constantly mindful of the fact that their primary loyalty is to history and not to any particular sociopolitical entity.

The present book stems from a careful reflection on the foregoing considerations in the context of the moral and intellectual responsibility of historians. It evolved through a long period of research, beginning in my journalism years at Guinea's *Voix de la Révolution* radio and television network (1980s). The research has produced two books, *His Master's Voice: Mass Communication and Single-Party Politics in Guinea under Sékou Touré* (Africa World Press, 2005) and *Le pouvoir politique en Guinée sous Sékou Touré* (L'Harmattan, 2007), and a number of articles on different aspects of the political, military, media, religious and socio-cultural history of the country. To some extent, therefore, *Political History of Guinea since World War Two* can be posited as a culmination of my research and writings on Guinea to date.

I first planned to write the book in French with the desire to help refocus the confused and confusing debate that surrounds the country's long-standing sociopolitical and economic crisis by placing it in the proper historical perspective. However, my wife, Cynthia, tenaciously argued that a complete political history of Guinea would be more useful in the Anglophone world, where, in many regards, knowledge of that country is in its infancy. Then, the outpouring of pointed questions regarding the historical background to the senseless violence against peaceful civilians, the beating and public raping of women by security forces on the fifty-first anniversary of the country's democratic rejection of French colonialism confirmed her argument.

Furthermore, when United States President Barack Obama mentioned Guinea in his 2010 State of the Union address, it was to underscore the gross malgovernance of that country and its potential negative effects on international security. After mentioning a new initiative that will give the U.S. the capacity to counter threats at home and strengthen public health abroad, Obama indicated, "That's why we stand with the girl who yearns to go to school in Afghanistan; why we support the human rights of the women marching through the streets of Iran; why we advocate for the young man denied a job by corruption in Guinea."

The confluence of these high-profile reasons and more insidious ones further compelled me to develop this study in English. The book is not tailored to fit the preoccupations of any particular group at any particular instance in history, however. Rather, just like any other history book of its kind, it is purported to be a valuable intellectual tool for scholars, students, and the general public alike.

The originality of the study owes much to the substantial amount of primary-source information from which it stems. Those sources include interviews with a large array of Guinean nationals of various backgrounds and positions, as well as African and foreign experts. The sources also include personal papers of current and former leaders in the fields of politics, administration, security, education, mass media, finance, and so on, and those of former political prisoners. Adequate access to and usage of primary-source information further strengthens the scientific balance of the book, especially in view of the precarious state of much of Guinea's colonial archives and those covering the first decades of independence.

In an effort to fill that gap, my intensive interviewing went beyond the national elite and included leaders and members of local political entities and civil society organizations, whose experiences and perspectives more accurately reflect those of the grassroots Guinean citizenry. This extensive usage of primary sources (Guinean, African, and foreign) will give the reader a varied body of authentic accounts as well as original and pertinent analyses of the relatively short and yet rich, complex, and stimulating historical period that is the subject of my inquiry.

Acknowledgments

My utmost gratitude goes to my wife, Cynthia, for being patient, understanding and supportive throughout the years it took me to research and write this book. The richness and originality of the work was made possible in many regards by the cooperation of numerous actors, witnesses, and analysts of the historical facts, events, and processes studied therein. For sharing with me their memories and analytical input and the contents of their jealously preserved personal papers I am deeply indebted and sincerely grateful to them. Although the sheer number makes it unpractical to name them here, the reader will encounter their names and input throughout the text. The contribution of those persons is all the more valuable because some of them had to defy or ignore risks of harassment and intimidation in order to grant me recorded interviews or even informal conversations on particularly sensitive matters, with the understanding that their accounts may appear on the pages of this book.

Indeed, harassment and intimidation have long become powerful weapons in the hands of both supporters and detractors of each of the successive regimes having ruled Guinea since 1958. Each side seems determined to impose its "historical truth" and, in the process, drag in the mud anyone who dares to offer an account that contradicts that "truth." The methods to that end are today all the more perverse with the use and misuse of the Internet and its multimedia capabilities. I am certainly aware of this trend for having experienced it first hand in a variety of ways.

I am particularly grateful to Professor Lynnette Porter of the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University for the utmost professionalism with which she read and helped shape the manuscript through her pertinent remarks and insightful suggestions. I am also sincerely thankful to Christopher Hayden, a respected independent scholar of Guinean affairs, and Ambassador Alpha Ibrahima Sow, a renowned Guinean scholar and former Permanent Representative to the United Nations, for their eminently enriching feedback.

While researching the colonial archives in Senegal and France I benefited tremendously from the assistance of numerous individuals. I am thankful to them all. I am equally thankful to a number of Guinean media outlets for allowing me to use their forums and cross-reference some of my primary-source information with knowledgeable guests.

As well, my gratitude goes to Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University for the support I received toward the publication of this work. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the Press Bureau of the Presidency of the Republic of Guinea (identified in the photo credits as PBPRG); the Communication Division of the Guinean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (identified in the photo credits as DCMAEG for Direction de la communication du Ministère des affaires étrangères de Guinée); the Communication Bureau of the Presidency of Burkina Faso (identified in the photo credits as CBPBF); the United Nations Multimedia Resources Unit; the United States Department of State; Tierno S. Bah, the publisher of WebGuinée; Chantal Colle Communications; Guineeweb; the French Press Agency (AFP); RFI.fr; Aminata.com; Generation Positive; the Press Bureau of the Republic of Guinea (identified in the photo credits as PBRRG); and Cynthia Froehlich for granting me the permission to reprint the map and photos published in this book.

Abbreviations

AAPSO	Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization
AASC	Afro-Asiatic Solidarity Council
ACDP	Alliance Cellou Dalein President
ACHPR	African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
ACMS	African Center for Monetary Studies
ACT	*Association des couturières de Tangama*/Association of Female Tailors of Tangama
ADB	African Development Bank
ADJDM	*Association durable des jeunes pour le développement de Mali*/Long-Term Association of Youth for the Development of Mali
ADPG	*Avenir démocratique et prospérité de Guinée*/Democratic Future and Prosperity of Guinea
AEF	*Afrique Equatoriale Française*/French Equatorial Africa
AFCAC	African Civil Aviation Commission
AFDAM	*Association féminine pour le développement agricole de Mamou*/Women's Association for the Agricultural Development of Mamou
AFDVDD	*Action des femmes volontaires pour le développement durable*/Organization of Women Volunteers for Sustainable Development
AFP	*Agence France Presse*/French Press Agency
AGDH	*Association guinéenne des droits de l'Homme*/Guinean Association for Human Rights
AJG	*Association des journalistes de Guinée*/Association of Guinean Journalists
ALIMAG	*(Société d') Alimentation Générale de Guinée*/General Alimentation Company of Guinea
ANC	African National Congress (South Africa)
AOF	*Afrique Occidentale Française*/French West Africa
APC	All-People's Congress (Sierra Leone)
APFE	*Association pour la promotion des femmes et des enfants*/Association for the Promotion of Women and Children
APIF	*Association pour la promotion des initiatives féminines*/Association for the Promotion of Women's Initiatives
APROFET	*Association pour la promotion de l'entreprenariat féminine à Tougué*/ Association for the Promotion of Female Entrepreneurship in Tougué
ASF	African Standby Force
ASFEGMASSI	*Association des femmes de Guinée pour la lutte contre les IST/SIDA*/Association of Guinean Women against HIV/AIDS
AU	African Union
AVFA	*Association des veuves et femmes victimes d'abandon*/Association of Widows and Abandoned Women
BAG	*Bloc africain de Guinée*/African Bloc of Guinea
BAP	*Brigade attelée de production*/Plow Farm
BATA	*Bataillon autonome des troupes aéroportées*/Paratroopers Autonomous Battalion
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation

BCEAO	*Banque centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest*/Central Bank of West African States
BCRG	*Banque centrale de la République de Guinée*/Central Bank of the Republic of Guinea
BDS	*Bloc démocratique sénégalais*/Senegalese Democratic Bloc
BGCE	*Banque guinéenne du commerce extérieur*/Guinean Bank for Foreign Trade
BIAG	*Banque Internationale pour l'Afrique en Guinée*/International Bank for Africa in Guinea
BIAO	*Banque internationale pour l'Afrique de l'Ouest*/International Bank of West Africa
BICIGUI	*Banque internationale pour le commerce et l'industrie*/International Bank for Commerce and Industry
BMP	*Brigade mécanisée de production*/Mechanized Farm
BNCR	*Bureau national de coordination des réfugiés*/National Bureau for Refugee Coordination
BS/US	*Bloc soudanais*/*Union Soudanaise*/Sudanese Bloc/Sudanese Union (Mali)
C.Af.	*Convention africaine*/African Convention
CA	*Conseil d'administration*/Administrative Council (Student Government)
CBG	*Compagnie des bauxites de Guinée*/Bauxite Company of Guinea
CBO	Community-Based Organizations
CCP	[State Department] Committee on Colonial Policy (USA)
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CDP	*Convention démocratique panafricaine*/Pan-African Democratic Convention
CEAO	*Communauté économique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest*/Economic Community of West Africa
CEFA	*Comité d'études franco-africain*/Franco-African Studies Committee
CEG	*Comité d'entente guinéenne*/Guinean Entente Committee
CENI	*Commission électorale nationale indépendante*/Independent National Electoral Commission
CENTO	Central European Treaty Organization
CER	*Centre d'éducation révolutionnaire*/Revolutionary Education Center
CFA (Franc)	*(Franc des) Colonies françaises d'Afrique*/ (Franc of the) French Colonies of Africa, changed to *Communauté française d'Afrique*/French Community of Africa, changed to *Communauté financière d'Afrique*/Financial Community of Africa
CFLN	*Comité français de libération nationale*/French National Liberation Committee
CFTC	*Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens*/French Confederation of Christian Workers
CGT	*Confédération générale du travail*/General Confederation of Labor (France)
CGTA	*Confédération générale des travailleurs d'Afrique*/General Confederation of African Workers
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (USA)
CMP	*Comité mixte de pilotage*/Joint Steering Committee
CMRN	*Comite militaire de redressement national*/Military Committee for National Recovery
CNC	*Conseil national de la communication*/National Communication Council
CNDD	*Conseil national pour la démocratie et le développement*/National Council for Democracy and Development

CNISR	*Commission nationale pour l'intégration et le suivi des réfugiés*/National Commission for the Integration and Monitoring of Refugees
CNKN	*Centre national Kwame Nkrumah*/Kwame Nkrumah National Center
CNLS	*Comité national de lutte contre le SIDA*/National AIDS Committee
CNN	Cable News Network
CNOSCG	*Conseil national des organisations de la société civile de Guinée*/National Council of Civil Society Organizations of Guinea
CNR	*Conseil national de la révolution*/National Council of the Revolution
CNSTG	*Union syndicale des travailleurs de Guinée*/Syndicate Alliance of Guinean Workers
CNT	*Conseil national de transition*/National Transition Council
CNTG	*Confédération nationale des travailleurs de Guinée*/National Confederation of Guinean Workers
CODEM	*Coalition de l'opposition démocratique*/Coalition of the Democratic Opposition
COFEG	*Coordination des ONG féminines de Guinée*/Coordination of Women's NGOs of Guinea
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Soviet Bloc)
COMMUNA	*Comité militaire d'unité nationale*/Military Committee for National Unity
COSALAC	*Comité de soutien à l'action de Lansana Conté*/Action Committee for the Election of Lansana Conté
CPF	*Centre de promotion féminine*/Women's Empowerment Center
CPP	Convention People's Party (Ghana)
CRPF	*Centre régional de promotion féminine*/Regional Women's Empowerment Center
CRTO	*Centre régional de télédétection de Ouagadougou*/Regional Remote Sensing Center of Ouagadougou
CSE	*Conseil suprême d'Etat*/Supreme State Council
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CTRN	*Conseil transitoire de redressement national*/Transitional Council for National Recovery
DEG	*(Entreprise nationale de) Distribution des eaux de Guinée*/National Water Distribution Company of Guinea
DES	*Diplôme de fin d'études supérieures*/Bachelor's Degree
DGS	*Direcção-Geral de Segurança*/General Security Directorate (Portugal)
DGSE	*Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure*/General Directorate for External Security (France)
DNPF	*Direction nationale de la promotion féminine*/National Directorate for the Promotion of Women
DOM TOM	*Département d'Outre-Mer, Territoire d'Outre-Mer*/Overseas Department, Overseas Territory
DSG	*Démocratie socialiste de Guinée*/Socialist Democracy of Guinea
ECOSOC	(United Nations) Economic and Social Council
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Military Observer Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EISA	Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa
EMPA	*Ecole militaire préparatoire africaine*/African Military Cadet School
ENAM	*Ecole nationale des arts et métiers*/National School for the Arts and Occupational Training
ENELGUI	*Entreprise nationale d'électricité*/National Power Company of Guinea

ENI	*Ecole normale des instituteurs*/Secondary and High School Teachers Training School
ENP	*Ecole normale primaire*/Elementary Teachers Training School
ENPTT	*Ecole nationale des PTT*/National Post, Telegraph and Telephone School
ENSUP	*Ecole normale supérieure (de Manéah)*/Manéah National College of Education
ENTAG	*Entreprise nationale de tabac et allumettes*/National Tobacco and Match Company
ERC	*Entreprise régionale de commerce*/Regional Trading Post
FAAF	*Fonds d'appui à l'autopromotion féminine*/Support Fund for Women's Self-Promotion
FAC	*Ferme agro-communale*/Communal Farms
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FAPA	*Ferme agro-pastorale d'arrondissement*/District Farm
FAPRG	*Forces armées populaires et révolutionnaires de Guinée*/People's Revolutionary Armed Forces of Guinea
FEANF	*Fédération des étudiants d'Afrique Noire en France*/Federation of Black African Students in France
FGM	Female genital mutilation
FIDH	*Fédération international des droits de l'Homme*/International Federation for Human Rights
FLN	*Front de libération nationale*/National Liberation Front (Algeria)
FNLA	*Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola*/National Front for the Liberation of Angola
FNLG	*Front national de libération de la Guinée*/National Front for the Liberation of Guinea
FRAD	*Front républicain pour l'alternance démocratique*/Republican Front for Democratic Alternation
FRELIMO	*Frente de Liberatção de Moçambique*/Mozambique Liberation Front
FSPE	*Fédération syndicale professionnelle de l'éducation*/Union of Education Professionals
FUDEC	*Front uni pour la démocratie et le changement*/United Front for Democracy and Change
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GEC	*Groupe d'études communistes*/Communist Studies Group
GECI	*Génération citoyenne*/Citizen Generation
GNF	*Franc guinéen*/Guinean Franc
GPT	*Guinée pour tous*/Guinea for All
HALCO	Harvey Aluminum Company
HCF	Human Capital Flight
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IAFA	International African Friends of Abyssinia
IASB	International African Service Bureau
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICG-G	International Contact Group-Guinea
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IDI	Industrial Development International
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFIs	International Financial Institutions

IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
ILO	International Labor Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMPORTEX	Import and Export
IOM	*Indépendants d'Outre Mer*/Overseas Independent (Parliamentary Caucus)
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPC/IPGANC	*Institut polytechnique Gamal Abdel Nasser de Conakry*/Gamal Abdel Nasser Polytechnic Institut of Conakry
IPK/IPJNK	*Institut polytechnique Julius Nyerere de Kankan*/Julius Nyerere Polytechnic Institut of Kankan
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks
JRDA	*Jeunesse de la révolution démocratique africaine*/Youth of the African Democratic Revolution
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
LMS	Labor Migration Service
LURD	Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MARG	*Mission d'aménagement régional de Guinée*/Mission for the Regional Development of Guinea
MASPFE	*Ministère des affaires sociales, de la promotion féminine et de l'enfance*/Ministry of Social Affairs, Promotion of Women and Childhood
MATAP	*Ministère de l'administration du territoire et des affaires politiques*/Ministry of Territorial Administration and Political Affairs
MDA	*Mouvement démocratique africain*/African Democratic Movement
MDDP	*Mouvement Dadis doit partir*/Dadis Must Go Movement
MDDR	*Mouvement Dadis doit rester*/Dadis Must Stay Movement
MDV	*Mouvement démocratique voltaïque*/Democratic Movement of Upper Volta
MNC	*Mouvement national congolais*/Congolese National Movement
MNC	Multinational Corporation
MNPG	*Mouvement national des pionniers de Guinée*/National Organization of Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts
MOSALAC	*Mouvement de soutient à l'action de Lansana Conté*/Action Movement for the Election of Lansana Conté
MPLA	*Movimento Popular da Liberatção de Angola*/Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MPR	*Mouvement populaire de la révolution*/Popular Movement for the Revolution (Zaire)
MPS	*Mouvement populaire sénégalais*/Senegalese People's Movement
MRU	Mano River Union
MRWPN	Mano River Women's Peace Network
MSA	*Mouvement socialiste africain*/African Socialist Movement
MSUS	*Mouvement socialiste d'union sénégalaise*/Socialist Movement for Senegalese Union
NAM	Nonalignment Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBA	Niger Basin Authority
NCBWA	National Congress of British West Africa
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NGR	*Nouvelle génération pour la république*/New Generation for the Republic

NICT	New Information and Communication Technology
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NLC	National Liberation Council (Ghana)
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NRC	Niger River Commission
NSC	National Security Council (USA)
OAMCE	*Organisation africaine et malgache de coopération économique*/African and Malagasy Organization for Economic Cooperation
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OBK	*Office des bauxites de Kindia*/Kindia Bauxite Company
OCA	*Office de commercialisation agricole*/Agricultural Trading Agency
OCAM	*Organisation commune africaine et malgache*/African and Malagasy Common Organization
OERS	*Organisation des Etats riverains du fleuve Sénégal*/Organization of Senegal River States
OGDDH	*Organisation guinéenne de défense des droits de l'Homme*/Guinean Organization for the Defense of Human Rights
OGUIDEM	*Observatoire guinéen de la déontologie et l'éthique des médias*/Media Ethics Observatory of Guinea
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
OIF	*Organisation international de la francophonie*/International Organization of Francophony
OMVG	*Organisation pour la mise en valeur du fleuve Gambie*/Organization for the Development of the Gambia River
ONACIG	*Office national du cinéma de Guinée*/National Cinema Agency of Guinea
ONAH	*Office national des hydrocarbures*/National Petroleum Agency
ONSLG	*Organisation nationale des syndicats libres de Guinée*/National Organization of Free Unions of Guinea
ONUC	*Opération des Nations unies au Congo*/United Nations Operation in the Congo
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSSERA	Organization of Social Science Research in East Africa
OUSA	*Organisation de l'unité syndicale africaine*/Organization of African Labor Unity
PAI	*Parti africain de l'indépendance*/African Independence Party
PAIGC	*Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde*/African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde
PCF	*Parti Communiste Français*/French Communist Party
PCGeD	*Programme cadre genre et développement*/Gender and Development Blueprint Program
PDCI	*Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire*/Democratic Party of Ivory Coast
PDG	*Parti démocratique de Guinée*/Democratic Party of Guinea
PDU	*Parti pour le développement et l'unité*/Development and Unity Party (Upper Volta)
PEDN	*Parti de l'espoir pour le développement national*/Party of Hope for National Development
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (USA)
PEV/SSP/ME	*Programme élargi de vaccination, soins de santé primaire et médicaments essentiels*/Vaccination, Basic Health Care and Essential Medication Program
PIDE	*Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado*/International and State Defense Police

PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PLUS	*Parti libéral pour l'unité et la solidarité*/Liberal Party for Unity and Solidarity
PNR	*Parti national pour le renouveau*/National Party for Renewal
POLISARIO	*Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro*/People's Liberation Front of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro
PPAG	*Parti progressiste africain de Guinée*/African Progressist Party of Guinea
PPG	*Parti du peuple de Guinée*/People's Party of Guinea
PPG	*Parti progressiste de Guinée*/Progressive Party of Guinea
PPN	*Parti progressiste nigérien*/Progressive Party of Niger
PR	*Parti républicain*/Republican Party
PRA	*Parti de regroupement africain*/African Rally Party
PRA	*Pouvoir révolutionnaire d'arrondissement*/District Revolutionary Authority
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRD	*Parti républicain du Dahomey*/Democratic Party of Dahomey
PREF	*Programme de réformes économiques et financières*/Economic and Financial Reform Program
PRG	*Présidence de la République de Guinée*/Presidency of the Republic of Guinea
PRGF	Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
PRL	*Pouvoir révolutionnaire local*/Local Revolutionary Authority
PRP	*Parti du renouveau et du progrès*/Renewal and Progress Party
PRR	*Pouvoir révolutionnaire régional*/Regional Revolutionary Authority
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PSC	Peace and Security Council (African Union)
PSEMA	*Parti social d'éducation des masses africaines*/Social Party for the Education of the African Masses
PSG	*Parti socialiste de Guinée*/Socialist Party of Guinea
PTS	*Parti du travail et de la solidarité*/Labor and Solidarity Party
PUDIG	*Parti de l'union pour le développement intégré de la Guinée*/Union Party for the Integrated Development of Guinea
PUNG	*Parti de l'unité nationale de Guinée*/National Unity Party of Guinea
PUP	*Parti de l'unité et du progrès*/Unity and Progress Party
RADDHO	*Rencontre africaine pour la défense des droits de l'homme*/African Rally for the Defense of Human Rights
RCC	Revolutionary Command Council (Egypt)
RCS	*Révolution culturelle socialiste*/Socialist Cultural Revolution
RDA	*Rassemblement démocratique africain*/African Democratic Rally
RDA	*Révolution démocratique africaine*/African Democratic Revolution (Guinea)
RDD	*Regroupement démocratique dahoméenne*/Democratic Rally of Dahomey
RDIG	*Rassemblement pour le développement intégré de la Guinée*/Rally for the Integrated Development of Guinea
RDR	*Rassemblement des démocrates pour la deuxième république*/Democrats Rally for the Second Republic
RFI	*Radio France internationale*/Radio France International
RGP	*Rassemblement pour une Guinée prospère*/Rally for a Prosperous Guinea
RGUD	*Rassemblement Guinéen pour l'unité et le développement*/Guinean Rally for Unity and Development
ROSIGUI	*Réseau des ONG de lutte contre le SIDA*/Network of NGOs for the Fight against AIDS

RPA	*Rassemblement populaire africain*/African People's Rally
RPG	*Rassemblement du peuple de Guinée*/Rally of the People of Guinea
RTG	*Radio télévision guinéenne*/Radio Television of Guinea
RUF	Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)
SADR	Saharoui Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara)
SAKOBA	*Société d'aquaculture de Koba*/Koba Fish Farming Company
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SBK	*Société des bauxites de Kindia*/Kindia Bauxite Company
SBZ	*Sowjetische Besatzungzone*/Soviet Zone of Occupation (Germany)
SDECE	*Service de documentation extérieure et de contre-espionnage*/External Documentation and Counterespionage Service
SEATO	South East Asian Treaty Organization
SEEG	*Société d'exploitation des eaux de Guinée*/Water Treatment Company of Guinea
SFIO	*Section française de l'Internationale ouvrière*/French Section of Workers International
SGBG	*Société générale de banques en Guinée*/Guinean Branch of the General Banking Corporation
SGC	*Société guinéenne de commerce*/Guinean Commerce Company
SGP	*Société générale de pétrole*/General Petroleum Company
SIFIDA	*Société internationale financière pour l'investissement et le développement en Afrique*/International Financial Corporation for Investment and Development in Africa
SLECG	*Syndicat libre des enseignants et chercheurs de Guinée*/Free Union of Teachers and Researchers of Guinea
SMD	*Société minière de Dinguiraye*/Dinguiraye Mining Company
SNA	*Service national d'alphabétisation*/National Adult Literacy Service
SOE	State-Owned Enterprise
SOGEL	*Société guinéenne d'électricité*/Guinean Electrical Company
SOGEPAM	*Société guinéenne d'exportation des produits agricoles et miniers*/Guinean Agricultural and Mining Export Company
SOGETRAG	*Société générale des transports de Guinée*/General Transportation Company of Guinea
SOGUIFAB	*Société guinéenne de fabrication*/Guinean Manifacturing Company
SOGUIRUSSE	*Société guinéo-russe de production minière*/Guineo-Russian Mining Company
SOLOPRIMO	*Société de construction de logements à prix modérés*/Affordable Housing Construction Company
SOMCAG	*Société mixte de carburants aéronautiques de Guinée*/Joint Aviation Fuel Company of Guinea
SONEG	*Société nationale des eaux de Guinée*/National Water Company of Guinea
SOPROCHIM	*(Société) Provençale de chimie*/Chemical Company of Provence
STI	Sexually Transmitted Infection
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organization (Namibia)
TNGO	Transnational Nongovernmental Organization
UAS	Union of African States
UDD	*Union démocratique du Dahomey*/Democratic Union of Dahomey
UDG	*Union démocratique de Guinée*/Democratic Union of Guinea
UDTG	*Union Démocratique des Travailleurs de Guinée*/Democratic Union of Guinean Workers

UEMOA	*Union économique et monétaire de l'Afrique de l'Ouest*/West African Economic and Monetary Union
UFD	*Union des forces démocratiques*/Union of Democratic Forces
UFDG	*Union des forces démocratiques de Guinée*/Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea
UFGN	*Union des forces pour une Guinée nouvelle*/Union of Forces for a New Guinea
UFR	*Union des forces républicaines*/Union of Republican Forces
UGTAN	*Union générale des travailleurs d'Afrique Noire*/General Union of Black African Workers
UIBG	*Union internationale de banque en Guinée*/International Banking Union in Guinea
ULIMO	United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Program
UNEP	*Union nationale des étudiants patriotes*/National Union of Patriotic Students
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNI	Union Network International
UNIA	Universal Negro Improvement Association
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNITA	*União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola*/National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNPG	*Union nationale pour la prospérité en Guinée*/National Union for Prosperity in Guinea
UNR	*Union pour la nouvelle république*/Union for the New Republic
UPE	United Party in Exile (Ghana)
UPG	*Union populaire guinéenne*/Guinean People's Union
UPG	*Union pour le Progrès de la Guinée*/Union for the Progress of Guinea
UPI	United Press International
UPN	*Union pour le progrès national*/Union for National Progress
UPR	*Union pour le progrès et le renouveau*/Union for Progress and Renewal
URFG	*Union révolutionnaire des femmes de Guinée*/Revolutionary Union of Guinean Women
URR	*Union républicaine et résistante*/Republican and Resister Union
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USCG	*Union des syndicats confédérés de Guinée*/Association of Confederated Trade Unions of Guinea
USCRI	United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants
UDS	*Union démocratique sénégalaise*/Senegalese Democratic Union
USPG	*Union socialiste et progressiste de Guinée*/Socialist and Progressive Union of Guinea
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USTG	*Union syndicale des travailleurs de Guinée*/Syndicate Alliance of Guinean Workers
UTMG	*Union des teinturières de la moyenne Guinée*/Association of Women Cloth Dyers of Middle Guinea
WABA	West African Bankers Association
WACH	West African Clearing House
WACSOF	West Africa Civil Society Forum
WAIFEM	West Africa Institute for Financial and Economic Management

WAJA	West African Journalists Association
WAMA	West Africa Monetary Agency
WAMZ	West African Monetary Zone
WARDA	West Africa Rice Development Association
WASU	West African Student Union
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

Introduction

Conventional wisdom has it "when empires fall, nations rise." The fall of Europe's colonial empires and the rise in their stead of new nation-states in Asia and Africa, the world's largest and most populous continents, has been one of the most far-reaching legacies of the twentieth century. It stemmed from the preoccupation for lasting peace after the Second World War (WWII) and revolutionized international relations by significantly altering the longstanding pattern of world affairs consisting of "the West and the rest." World affairs had long meant basically European affairs and the ramification of the affairs of Europe's powers to the distant areas of the earth, as Frederick Hartmann has observed. Hartmann comments that now "the peoples of Asia and Africa speak their hopes and fears for themselves. As a result, there are many more sovereign states able to decide for themselves what they wish to do,"[1] and international relations have lost much of their former European-centered character.

Behind this generic characterization of post-WWII world affairs there is a complex history of decolonization, statecraft, and nation-building to be scrutinized in conjunction with the Cold War dynamics of East-West and North-South interrelations. Within that context, the present book is purported to be a scrutiny of the political evolution of the West African nation-state of Guinea-Conakry from World War II to the present.

A relatively large number of studies have been published over the past decades on different facets of Guinea's eventful history, some balanced and insightful, some mostly fragmented and biased. However, when the security forces of the junta of Captain Moussa Dadis Camara brutally attacked a crowd of peaceful protesters in September 2009, the reactions coming from the Western Anglophone world denoted widespread lack of knowledge of the country's history and political culture. In fact, most insightful studies available to date are in French, which, in itself, reflects the colonial past of this and other Francophone African nation-states. To the best of my knowledge, a comprehensive study of Guinea's political history has yet to be produced in English, and this book is intended to fill that gap.

In a broader context, the fall of colonial empires and rise of post-colonial nation-states has been amply studied, yet much of the available literature tends to present decolonization exclusively from the inside out, in terms of nationalism, or exclusively from the outside in, in terms of transfer of power. What is needed is a more balanced approach wherein both perspectives are

carefully examined and methodically presented if the symbiotic nature of the global, regional, sub-regional and local roots and dynamics of decolonization, statecraft and nation-building are to be fully understood.

Also, the intersecting agendas of nation-building, statecraft, and socioeconomic development in post-colonial Africa have most often been viewed through Western (capitalist) or Eastern (socialist/Communist) lens. That has prompted dependency theorists to explain African foreign relations in terms of patron-client relationships. According to this school of thought, the granting or acquisition of legal independence did little to alter the constraining web of economic, political, military, and cultural ties that continued to bind African countries to the former colonial powers, as Samir Amin explains.[2] The scenario is most commonly referred to in African ideological parlance as neocolonialism.

In Peter Schraeder's view, it "is especially prominent in writings about the relationship between France and its former colonies, primarily due to the policies designed to maintain what French policymakers refer to as their *chasse gardée* (literally, an exclusive hunting ground)."[3] This conception supports Jean-François Bayart's theory of African extroversion, by which the author means "the creation and capture of a rent generated by dependency and which functions as a historical matrix of inequality, political centralization and social struggle."[4] From this perspective, the foreign policy orientations of African leaders like Sékou Touré of Guinea are considered with puzzlement as an anomaly in that, although the result of Touré's external relations might appear to be dependency, the intention was consistently to assert independence, as Mairi Stewart MacDonald avers.[5]

Such interpretations make the balanced approach advocated herein all the more pertinent. For the approach to materialize and yield the desired results, however, careful attention ought to be paid to the conceptions of sovereignty, national development and, more broadly, historical progress that leaders of the anti-colonialist movement espoused as politicians and statesmen. The conceptions in question were largely informed by those leaders' historical and cultural worldviews as black Africans whose societies were subjected to centuries of slavery and slave trade followed by decades of European colonial occupation under the pretext of bringing them civilization and modernity.

Insightful analyses of those worldviews and their historical sources are found in Frantz Fanon's study of the collective psychology of the colonized, in Léopold Senghor's and Aimé Césaire's works on Négritude, as well as in the political writings of Jomo Kenyatta, Kwame Nkrumah, and Sékou Touré, to just name a few. In the context of former French Africa, such approach is ever more desirable as the 15 nation-states that emerged from the former French

West Africa and Togo (AOF-Togo) and French Equatorial Africa (AEF) and Madagascar enter their second half century of independence, along with former British colonies.

In 2010, 17 African nation-states celebrated 50 years of independence with tremendously mixed feelings across Africa and around the world. On this solemn occasion, Barack Obama, the first US president of African descent, hosted a Young African Leaders Forum at the White House while French President Nicolas Sarkozy was parading with some of Francophone Africa's most controversial heads of state. President Obama's Young African Leaders Forum has been interpreted as a powerful message to Africa's current and future leaderships that, for the continent's independence to be fruitful and fulfill the needs and wants of the African people, good governance, respect for human rights, and democracy must permeate Africa's political cultures.

Also, on the fifty-second anniversary of the French referendum (September 28, 1958) aimed at fulfilling de Gaulle's dream of a Franco-African Community in the stead of the French Union, crowds of African immigrants held sit-ins in front of French embassies in the United States, Canada, Europe and elsewhere to protest against *Françafrique*, a dubious phenomenon which most observers equate with French neocolonialism in disguise. Africans have interpreted the sit-ins as a powerful message to the continent's current and future leaderships that neocolonialism is ever more unacceptable. They also see them as a vindication of those African leaders who understood early on that there would be no true African independence and sovereignty without a decisive rupture of any and all forms of domination-subordination relationships between Africans and their former colonial occupiers. Such was the path that former French Guinea took in September 1958 by being the only colony to democratically reject the Gaullist constitutional project and choose total and unconditional independence.

As it unfolded in the 1950s and 1960s, the decolonization of Africa was dealt with from two different vantage points at the global level. On the one hand, it was treated as an integral component of the quest for global hegemony by the two Cold War superpowers: the United States, leading the Capitalist world or Western Bloc mobilized under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Soviet Union, leading the Socialist/Communist world or Eastern Bloc regrouped under the Warsaw Pact. Throughout the Cold War the two hegemons portrayed themselves as "the empire of liberty" and "the empire of justice," respectively. On the other hand, having made self-determination a core component of its quest for lasting peace in the wake of WWII, the United Nations viewed the end of colonialism in Africa as a major leap forward toward the eradication of deep-seated causes of warfare. Within those global parameters the decolonization of Africa was also influenced by earlier

developments in Asia, notably the independence of major nations such as India (1947) and Indonesia (1949), as well as the launching of the Chinese Revolution (1949) and the military victory of Indochina over the French colonial forces (1954).

Guinea's approach to national sovereignty can best be understood when analyzed in this multilayered context. The present work examines the process with a view to providing a comprehensive and balanced study of the interplay of global, regional, sub-regional and local factors that influenced the decolonization process, nation-building, statecraft, and governance throughout the past 70 years. French West Africa's switch of loyalty from the Vichy side to that of Free France and entry into WWII in November 1942, following the Allied Operation Torch in North Africa, serves as the earliest frame of reference for the analysis of the decolonization process. Others include the Brazzaville Conference (1944), which General de Gaulle convened to discuss the post-war reforms in the French colonies, followed by the creation of the African Democratic Rally (RDA) in 1946 and the struggle for emancipation in French West Africa. Complementing these are the adoption (1956) and implementation (1957) of the Defferre Blueprint Law granting semi-autonomy to France's African colonies, and General de Gaulle's referendum (1958) aimed at launching France's Fifth Republic and replacing the French Union with a Franco-African Community.

To the extent that the end of colonialism in Africa opened a new era in international relations Guinea's independence entered African history, along with Ghana's before it, as a trail blazer in that it opened a breach into the French colonial fortress and triggered the downfall of the second major colonial empire on the continent. Regrettably, the prestige that came with this historical exploit was short lived; and the encroachment of Cold War forces and Guinea's forced request for Soviet aid put the West African nation-state on a collision course with Western Cold War fanatics and their African client states.

That state of matters, in turn, put the Guinean state on the defensive and led to massive repression against real and perceived political opponents under Sékou Touré's regime. The harsh maltreatment of such opponents coupled with the lack of economic development further overshadowed the single-party regime's achievements in crucial areas like free universal education, women's liberation and youth empowerment, the promotion of African cultural values, and the cultivation of collective self-reliance. The unbalanced representation of those facets of the legacy of the Touré regime ought to be corrected if the first decades of Guinea's post-colonial history are to be accurately understood. The present inquiry purports to bring to light pertinent facts, the incisive analysis of which will help correct the unbalance.

In this book, the evolution of the Guinean state and society since independence in 1958 and the development of a distinct national culture are explored in ways which transcend the outside-in piecemeal studies found in much of the available literature. In so doing the book offers a holistic picture of the country's history from the inside out. While researching and writing that complex history, one of the biggest challenges that the author faced, with regards to personal communications, was how to extract solid information from the emotionally charged narratives of interlocutors of all walks of life. Cracking that shell without altering the originality of the substance contained therein proved to be particularly delicate, especially when the narration of personal experiences is enmeshed with subjective interpretations of particular facts and events. Elucidating the intricacies of such enmeshments requires what oral history expert Jan Vansina conceptualized as a study of form and structure, an analysis of literal and intended meaning, and a determination of the aim of the message.[6]

To an extent, the same has been true for a major portion of the body of written materials consulted. That includes prison memoirs of former political detainees and the writings of Guinean exiles whose political agenda had been to defeat the regime of the PDG. The materials also included the writings of foreign "Cold War warriors," from whose ideological perspective Third World nationalists of Sékou Touré's caliber were nothing more or less than Communist activists. Another category encompasses the writings of PDG leaders, members, and sympathizers. Decanting such oral and written narratives would have been nearly impossible to accomplish without this author's native familiarity with the country and its culture and his ability to combine the flexibility of journalistic inquiry and the rigorous treatment of information required in historical methodology. Additionally, the author's keen familiarity with the modes of conceptual reasoning and analytical methodologies central to the study of political philosophy proved exceptionally useful in decorticating the rhetoric of key players in the political history scrutinized in this volume.

That having been said, it also bears emphasizing that sustained access to and adequate usage of a large range of primary-source information further strengthens the scientific balance and originality of a study such as this. If anything else, it enables the researcher to transcend the polemical clichés populating the discourse inside Guinea and abroad. The discourse has been this polemical because of the ways in which the country's independence has been managed. The political behaviors of Ahmed Sékou Touré, General Lansana Conté, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, General Sékouba Konaté, and Alpha Condé and their respective administrations have immensely fueled the polemic,

and so have the intrigues of outside forces, the impact of which has been grossly underestimated in some quarters and grossly overestimated in others.

In the final analysis, neither those behaviors and intrigues nor the fruitless polemic erected thereupon do justice to the positive nationalism which underpinned the democratic vote by which the Guinean people overwhelmingly chose independence over foreign occupation in 1958. Nevertheless, they seem to prove, albeit unintentionally, the resilience of that nationalism. Indeed, it has been consistently argued that the fact that political and ethnic violence has not thus far escalated into civil war, whereas neighboring countries with seemingly more stable regimes (e.g., Liberia, Senegal, and Côte d'Ivoire) have experienced devastating wars, attests to that resilience.

In order to ensure a thorough examination of these and the other central dimensions of Guinea's political history, the book is organized into 13 chapters grouped in three parts. Part I, The Multi-Stratum Context of Decolonization, analyzes the influence of the East-West rivalries of the Cold War era on the conceptualization and implementation of the rights of all peoples, great and small, to self-determination. Chapter 1 examines the philosophies underlying the political attitudes of the United States and the Soviet Union toward the decolonization of Africa and Asia, as well as the role of the United Nations in the decolonization process. Chapter 2 discusses the historical impetus that Pan-Africanism provided to Africans in general and those under French colonialism in particular in their struggle for emancipation and, ultimately, self-determination. In Chapter 3, the discussion is focused on French Guinea in an effort to underscore the political mobilization that had been achieved in that colony at the time Metropolitan France was forced to revise its colonial policy under General Charles de Gaulle. The chapter addresses that aspect from the standpoint of the development of the political and unionist struggle for African emancipation and just labor laws in French West Africa, in the context of the constitutional and institutional changes that befell France and her colonial empire in the immediate post-WWII period. The chapter documents and analyzes the process through which that struggle prepared French Guinea to successfully reject de Gaulle's constitutional project aimed at reforming colonialism and substituting a Franco-African Community for the erstwhile French Union.

Part II is devoted to Guinea's turbulent first half century of national sovereignty under the regime of President Sékou Touré. Thus, Chapter 4 presents an in-depth study of the making of single-party rule under the PDG through the triple process of statecraft, nation-building and the consolidation of national sovereignty in the face of enormous hostilities from the former colonial power and its African client states and European allies. Among the key

aspects analyzed are the establishment of the institutional supremacy of the party over the state, which evolved into a system of party-state; the radicalization of the regime in response to the frequent attempts by domestic opponents and foreign enemies at destabilizing the state and overthrowing the leadership; and the systematic transformation of major segments of the population into social-political branches of the single party and their empowerment within that specific context. Such segments included women, workers, youth, religious communities (notably the Muslim majority), and the armed forces.

Against this backdrop, Chapter 5 discusses the core doctrinal paradigms and domestic policies of the PDG regime. Those include the regime's socialist political economy, which was an amalgam of Marxist-Leninist conceptions of history, Maoist collectivism, and interpretations of African communalism often dubbed African socialism or Afro-socialism; education reform and Chinese-inspired Socialist Cultural Revolution; women's liberation; and youth empowerment. Another paradigm analyzed in the chapter is that of "people's class versus anti-people's class." An expression of the PDG power politics, this paradigm epitomized the regime's philosophy of class struggle, from which sprang the profoundly problematic notion of "perennial plot." The latter is posited as a byproduct of the intense power struggle between the PDG and its opponents, and the cause of the darkest episode of Guinea's recent history.

Chapter 6 explores the PDG foreign policies in Africa and globally by focusing on the following aspects: Guinea as a theater of the Cold War East-West swirl in Africa; the regime's contribution to the advancement of the national liberation struggles on the continent; the state's contribution to the prevention and resolution of conflicts in Africa and the Middle East; and its participation in the promotion of regional cooperation and integration in West Africa. Also examined on the global level is the framing of Guinea's foreign policy in the contexts of the Nonalignment Movement (NAM) and the global Muslim community mobilized inside the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

Chapter 7 recapitulates the legacy of the PDG regime and highlights the state of Guinean society as of early 1984, the last months of that regime, as President Ahmed Sékou Touré died suddenly on March 26. The chapter also brings to light the unfolding of the power struggle for succession among the political and biological clans that had formed around the late leader and arguably made him a hostage of his own single-party system. It furthermore explains that the bloodless coup through which a military junta replaced the PDG regime under a Military Committee for National Recovery or *Comité*

militaire de libération nationale (CMRN) was facilitated by the long-standing politicization of Guinea's armed forces.

Part III deals with the historical evolution and devolution of the country's politics under the regime of General Lansana Conté and during its immediate aftermath. Chapter 8 examines the peripeteia that marked the actual militarization of the state under Conté and the outbreak of power struggle among top officials of the CMRN, the outcome of which was the establishment of yet another system of personal rule and state patronage along ethnic lines.

Chapter 9 focuses upon the socioeconomic policies of the Conté regime by discussing economic liberalization in conjunction with the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of the World Bank and IMF, including the privatization or liquidation of all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) inherited from the PDG socialist era. It also analyzes the rise of a private sector and the explosion of unemployment and human capacity flight (HCF), also known as brain drain. Additionally, the chapter analyzes the Conté regime's education and employment reform in relation to these latter phenomena and their effects on the culture of youth and women's empowerment inherited from the Touré era.

Chapter 10 brings to light the emergence of a pro-democracy movement among students, labor unions, and religious and women's organizations. Also, it examines the influence of the concerted and sustained actions of the movement upon the state's decision to introduce multipartyism, in spite of which the system never resulted in free and fair elections nor did it foster true rule of law.

Chapter 11 explores the foreign policy of the Conté regime with special attention to the various ways in which it was influenced by the civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Côte d'Ivoire. Also explored is Guinea's participation in the peacekeeping operations of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Additionally, the chapter scrutinizes the massive influx into Guinea of Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees, along with the bilateral relations among the governments concerned as a result of the Conté regime's alleged backing of government forces or rebel groups.

Chapter 12 focuses the study on the crisis of authority that marked the last years of the Conté regime, which manifested itself in several major ways: failure of governance, oligarchic rule, and social unrest. The paralyzing power struggle among the cronies of the Conté family is examined in relations with the accelerated deterioration of the president's health and the ensuing crisis of state authority. Last, the chapter analyzes the state of the Guinean state and society by the downfall of the Conté regime and the overall legacy of that regime.

Finally, Chapter 13 analyzes the end of the Conté era and the rule of the short-lived National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD) under

Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, as well as the turbulent transition to democratic civilian rule in which the international community intervened in various manners out of concern for security in the West African region. The chapter closes with an examination of the first three years of that civilian rule under the presidency of Alpha Condé.

Even though the men and regimes that ruled Guinea may take center stage in this work at times, the study is principally concerned with the broader historical context in which they evolved and operated, along with the normative societal values and forces that underpinned their political choices and behaviors. In other words, *Political History of Guinea since World War Two* is primarily the study of the dialectic interplay of historical events and processes and their correlation with the values of the society that is the paramount agent of that history.

I

The Multi-Stratum Context of Decolonization

At the end of World War II, Africa, the world's second largest continent, counted only four sovereign nation-states: Ethiopia, Liberia, South Africa and Egypt. Though invaded and occupied from 1936 to 1941 by Mussolini's forces chiefly bent on securing Italy's colonial presence in Eritrea, the federal empire of Ethiopia was never the colonial possession of any foreign power. Likewise, the present-day Republic of Liberia was never formally occupied by a foreign power, although in 1847 a group numbering about 3,000 freed slaves, free-born blacks and mulattoes from North America proclaimed an independent nation-state named Liberia, incorporating the much larger native communities of that West African coastal area.

Regardless of the attachment of the territory's "Americano-Liberian" elite to the United States of America and the latter's occasional self-serving patrimonial mentorship to that elite, Liberia is not, like the Philippines, a former American colony, nor has it ever been, like Puerto Rico, Guam or the U.S. Virgin Island, a territory of the United States of America. On the contrary, the initiative to create this outpost in 1822 was chiefly based on the urge to solve the "Negro problem" in America, as many saw it in the United States. Therefore, what became Liberia has never been to America what Algeria was to France or the Rhodesias to Britain, that is, settlement colonies for metropolitan citizens.

As for South Africa, the independence proclaimed in 1934 from Great Britain applied only to the White settler community that had formed the original Union of South Africa in 1910, later (1961) recognized as the Republic of South Africa. It entered history as the infamous entity widely known since 1948 for the utter racism of its regime of Apartheid or separate development of races.

Egypt had only enjoyed a partial independence since 1922 from Great Britain under the latter's "Empire by treaty" scheme. In the view of many experts, Egypt became truly independent and sovereign only with the overthrow in 1952 of King Farouk (1920–1965, ruled 1936–1952), in the Free Officers' military coup led by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–1970). In this legendary birthplace of one of Africa's oldest civilizations, the ousting of Farouk also meant that a group of Arab officers ended the rule of the Albanian dynasty founded in 1805 by Muhammad Ali Pasha (1769–1849), who was an Ottoman army commander sent by the Sultan Mahmut II to expel Napoleon Bonaparte's forces in 1801. Nasser's Arab junta, which had been renamed the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), also brought British rule to an effective end in 1956 as part of the fallouts of President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal and the subsequent invasion of Egypt by Israel, Britain and France. Many historians of decolonization have argued that the Suez Crisis, as the episode came to be known ("Operation Musketeer" to the three invaders), marked the definite end of Britain's global imperial might by not only humiliating her politically and diplomatically, but also by stripping her of the highly lucrative control over the strategic Suez Canal.

In any case, up until the end of World War II, the underlying assumption among European colonialists was that European authority over African territories would continue for an indefinite period, as Thomas Hodgkin points out in his classic study of African nationalism.[1] In the post-war period a major historical shift unfolded, which Hodgkin captures in these statements:

> This is an assumption which we are no longer entitled to make. In our generation "the colonial problem" means, principally, the problem of the relationship between Europe and its outpost communities in Africa, on the one hand, and the indigenous African societies on the other. Put crudely, it means: what adjustments, compromises, surrenders, must European colonial Powers—and their settlers—make in face of the claims of "African nationalism"?[2]

The ultimate outcome of this shift came in the form of what commentators have conceptualized as waves of independence. The dynamics of the decolonization of former French Guinea ought to be explored in this context. In the views of John D. Hargreaves,[3] Bill Freund,[4] Frederick Cooper,[5] Paul Nugent[6] and Guy Arnold,[7] independence materialized throughout the African continent in five successive waves, the first of which corresponded to the pre-World War II period and encompassed the four countries mentioned earlier. The second wave occurred during the 1950s: Libya (1951), Tunisia, Morocco and Sudan (1956), Ghana (1957) and Guinea (1958).

The third wave, the largest by most standards, in the 1960s encompassed the following countries: Cameroon, Chad, the Central African Republic, Congo

Brazzaville, Congo Kinshasa, Côte d'Ivoire, Dahomey (present-day Benin), Gabon, Upper Volta (present-day Burkina Faso), Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia (fusion of former Italian Somalia and British Somalia), and Togo (1960); Sierra Leone, Tanganyika (1961); Algeria, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda (1962); Zanzibar (joined Tanganyika in 1964 to form the current Federal Republic of Tanzania) and Kenya (1963); Zambia (former Northern Rhodesia) and Malawi (former Nyasaland) (1964); Gambia (1965); Botswana and Lesotho (1966); Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius and Swaziland (1968).

The fourth wave took place in the following decade with the decolonization of Guinea-Bissau (1974); Angola, Cape Verde, the Comoros, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe (1975); Seychelles (1976) and Djibouti (1977). The fifth wave witnessed the liberation of Zimbabwe (former Southern Rhodesia) in 1980. Finally, the sixth wave, during the 1990s, witnessed the liberation of Namibia (1990), Eritrea (1993) and the birth of post-Apartheid South Africa with the election of Nelson Mandela (1918-) to the presidency of the Republic of South Africa in 1994 (r.1994 to 1999).

Historically, the second and third waves represented turning points in the political evolution of Africa for two reasons. First, they were directly linked to the changing balance of power in the global arena which originated in the intricacies of World War II and were amplified by the ensuing political and ideological tension known as the Cold War between the capitalist West and the socialist/communist East. Second, the unfolding of these waves enabled Africa, for the first time in centuries, to meaningfully participate in world affairs as a free player, thanks, in large measure, to the rule of numbers which characterizes the workings of the United Nations General Assembly.

One can best appreciate the meaning of Africa's entry into the newly instituted world body by recalling that as the UN celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of its Charter on June 26, 1970, 43 of its 126 members were African nation-states. At the same time, Asia, the world's largest continent, had 29 nation-states in the General Assembly, compared to 26 for the Americas (North, Central, South and the Caribbean combined), 25 for Europe (including the Soviet Union) and three for Oceania. With the overwhelming majority of those African nation-states having been admitted to the UN between 1960 and 1968 upon achieving independence, one can understand why the world organization referred to the 1960s as the "African decade."

In contrast, only three African nation-states participated in the signing of the Charter in San Francisco twenty-five years earlier, and only two of those (Ethiopia and Liberia) were truly representative of African sovereignty, for the third was none other than the Union of South Africa. Compared with the

Americas with 11 nation-states, Europe with 10, Asia and Oceania with two each, Africa clearly made a considerable leap forward between 1945 and 1970. Correspondingly, having taken place inside this dynamic, to which some analysts have referred as the "political awakening of Africa," Guinea's emergence to national and international sovereignty in 1958 will be most intelligible when explored in the triple context of the realignment of global balance of power, the self-empowerment of the pan-African movement, and the evolution of French Guinea within French West Africa or *Afrique Occidentale Française* (AOF). Such is the methodological approach utilized in the next three chapters.

A leading expert in decolonization studies, Tony Chafer seems to support this approach when he argues that any study of decolonization needs to take account of the fact that "developments in the colonies took place against a background of world events that were in large measure determined by the actions and interactions of the world's major industrial powers."[8] In so doing, Chafer further argues, historians must attach "due weight to the impact of the Second World War, the Cold War, the relations of the colonial powers with the U.S. and the profound formative influence of the colonial powers economically, culturally, and politically, on the colonies they administered."[9]

Having underscored the influence of both the United States and, to a lesser extent, the United Nations, as well as the effects of the constraints of the colonial powers' own recent history and current domestic economic and political constraints, Chafer poses the following premise, which deserves special attention: "Thus, decolonization was not the product of free choices, but an often chaotic process in which the variables of international, national, regional and local politics, as well as accidents of luck and timing, all played a role."[10]

The scientific accuracy of this assertion is hard to fully establish because, even though the history of decolonization is riddled with unexpected occurrences, there is almost always an overarching vision, albeit not entirely clearly articulated in some cases, in accordance with which a given anti-colonial movement develops. Chafer's notion of "chaotic process" should then fall more in the realm of tactical actions and reactions by the opposing forces and less in that of the overall strategic decisions of such forces. That accidents of luck and timing played a role in the liberation wars fiercely fought in French Algeria and the Portuguese colonies of Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique, for example, is indubitable. Nevertheless, these wars were nothing short of deliberate undertakings aimed at achieving one ultimate objective: ending the domination and exploitation of the native populations and the plunder of their natural resources by the colonial powers.

Chapter 1

The Global Context

As it unfolded in the 1950s and 1960s, the decolonization process in Africa came to be dealt with from two different vantage points at the global level. On the one hand, it was treated as an integral component of the quest for global hegemony by the two Cold War superpowers: the United States, leading the Capitalist world or Western Bloc mobilized under NATO, and the Soviet Union, leading the Socialist/Communist world or Eastern Bloc regrouped under the Warsaw Pact. Throughout the Cold War the two hegemons portrayed themselves as "the empire of liberty" and "the empire of justice," respectively. On the other hand, having made self-determination a core component of its quest for lasting peace in the wake of the Second World War, the United Nations viewed the end of colonialism in Africa as a major leap forward toward the eradication of deep-seated causes of warfare. The decolonization of Africa was also influenced by earlier developments in Asia, notably the independence of major nations such as India (1947) and Indonesia (1949), as well as the launching of the Chinese Revolution (1949) and the military victory of Indochina over the French colonial forces (1954). The present chapter examines the impact of these various historical events on the reemergence of the anti-colonial movements in Africa which resulted in the waves of decolonization discussed previously.

The United States, the NATO Factor and the Colonial Question

During the formative years of the decolonization movement in Africa (late 1950s and early 1960s), some conventional wisdom evolved among commentators describing the United States' policy on the colonial question in the post-World War II period. They presented this policy as unequivocally consistent with the spirit of the Atlantic Charter, the joint declaration which U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt (1882–1945, r. 1933–1945) and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill (1874–1965, r. 1940–45 and 1951–55) issued on August 14, 1941. In that declaration the two leaders addressed the colonial question by reiterating the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live, and they wished to see "sovereign rights

and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them."[1] The conventional wisdom was nurtured with the argument that the only plausible explanation to Churchill's consent is that America must have pressured Britain, the world's most entrenched colonial power of the time, to renounce traditional colonialism and go along with America's ideal of freedom and cultivation of global capitalism.

These arguments contain an imbroglio of historical truths and inaccuracies. On the one hand, in light of the provisions of the Atlantic Charter, the Roosevelt administration established, in 1943, a State Department Committee on Colonial Policy (CCP) tasked with formulating a broad policy with regard to the colonial question. In Fitzroy Andre Baptiste's words, "The Committee produced a three-point policy as follows: (1) dependent peoples desiring independence should have the opportunity to attain that status; (2) nations responsible for the future of colonial areas should fix, as soon as possible, dates upon which independence would be granted; and (3) the establishment of an international trusteeship system."[2]

In the grand scheme of things, however, the United States was far more interested in the abolition of classical colonialism, in which it was in great disadvantage compared with European nations such as Britain and France, and the opening of colonial empires to "free" global trade. Most specifically, from this vantage point, America wanted the liquidation of the Imperial Preferences concluded in 1933, as Gilbert A. Sekgoma put it.[3]

Evidently, such an approach put the United States and its closest Western allies on different sides of the fence for a number of reasons, not least the latter's increased dependence on vital resources from their colonies for the rebuilding of their economies devastated by the war. In fact, the impact of the Great Depression of the 1930s had exacerbated the imperial protectionist attitude of Britain and France, the beginning of which goes back to World War I. In the case of Britain, Charles P. Kindleberger cites the 33 1/3 percent of duties which the McKenna budget imposed in 1915 in an effort to reduce imports of luxuries and, supposedly, to save shipping space. The tariffs thus erected "made it possible for the United Kingdom to discriminate in trade in favour of the British Empire, something it could not do under the regime of free trade which had prevailed since the 1850s,"[4] Kindleberger points out. In France, by 1918, minimum tariff rates had been raised from five to 20 percent, and maximum rates from 10 to 40 percent. Kindleberger is keen to point out, though, that the use of import quotas in France dates from 1919 rather than the Depression in 1930, although export and import prohibitions were a widespread feature of Colbert's mercantilism two and a half centuries earlier. The historical reality is that a number of countries, including Japan, Australia,

New Zealand, Canada and the United States, increased tariff coverage and raised rates to gain revenue. This awkward tariff race among otherwise strategic allies generated a vicious cycle of making and unmaking trade regimes, many of which only lasted a few months at a time.

In the particular case of the United States, World War I proved to be a major game changer in terms of the country's foreign economic policy. According to Kindleberger, up to 1914, dominant economic issues were argued among American economists and politicians in terms of domestic interests in a world taken as given, which U.S. action did little to affect, rather than in terms of economic theory or foreign relations. During most of the nineteenth century and the first decade of twentieth, the British-dominated international economic system served American interests well. America thus could afford to be loyal to that system. Kindleberger summarizes the turning point in U.S. foreign economic policy as follows:

> World War I changed the entire position of the United States in the world economy. According to economic analysis, a country progresses through a series of stages: young debtor, mature debtor, young creditor and mature creditor. The United States went from the first to the fourth in three years, from 1914 to 1917. Assembly-line methods devised by Henry Ford just before the war were expanded to produce equipment and munitions for the Allied powers of Europe and for the United States itself. Based on the Federal Reserve System, the financial apparatus of the country grew in parallel. J.P. Morgan & Co. financed British and French private borrowing in the United States, and served as fiscal agent in supporting the pound and franc in foreign-exchange markets. In the end, the US government itself undertook to finance Allied borrowing in dollars, especially those for consumption and reconstruction in 1918 and 1919.[5]

With this newfound power came heightened awareness and protection of American national interests. The succession of the Great Depression, World War II and the Cold War further consolidated America's self-awareness and further legitimized the nation's overarching international economic politics and policies. Toward the end of World War II the Roosevelt administration intimately tied this worldview to its efforts at ending Europe's colonial imperialism wherein Roosevelt argued that the continued existence of colonial/neo-colonial empires would, in all likelihood, cause future wars. Once again, there is no historical evidence to support an objective challenge to President Roosevelt's sincerity regarding his expressed concern for the advancement of world peace and development. Nonetheless, experts have convincingly demonstrated the primacy of his interest in opening empires to American capital.

Sekgoma puts this consideration forward to explain what he views as an underlying paradox in the ways in which American and British authorities interpreted the clause of the Atlantic Charter quoted earlier. On the one hand,

argues Sekgoma, the Americans hoped to use the clause to pressure Britain into decolonizing its empire and opening it to free trade; hence they entertained the view that the principle "they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live" should apply to all humanity. On the other hand, the official perspective in Britain was that the principle applied only to European nations disorganized by the war and not to the colonial peoples outside Europe.

Sekgoma supports his analysis by quoting Churchill, who, on two occasions at least, addressed the matter in no uncertain terms. He first stated in October 1941 before the British House of Commons: "The Joint Declaration does not qualify in any way the various statements of policy which have been made from time to time about the development of constitutional governments in Burma, India or other parts of the British Empire."[6] Then, in November 1942, he reiterated the policy in these terms: "Let me, however, make this clear in case there should be any mistake in any quarter. We mean to hold what we own. We have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire."[7]

Baptiste corroborates Sekgoma's conclusion that the "need for areas of capital expansion, consumer markets and sources of raw materials was the prime motto behind [America's] anti-colonial policy."[8] Baptiste argues, though, that the United States operated a shift in its approach to the colonial question from a policy genuinely favoring decolonization on democratic principles to one based on the doctrine of "enlightened self-interest." He further argues that the factor which above all else brought about the shift was the advent of the Cold War and, with it, Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Baptiste recalls that the onset of the Cold War between the North Atlantic and Soviet blocs was marked, between 1947 and 1953, by dramatic indices which provide a valid explanation of things to come.

The indices included the Communist threat to France, Italy and Greece; the coup d'état in Czechoslovakia in February 1948; the Berlin blockade in June 1948; and the offensive in China, Indochina, Korea, Malaya and Indonesia. The United States responded by championing the formation of a broad and deep Western politico-military alliance known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), under which the so-called Truman Doctrine called for a "crusade" against the evil of Communism. The United States also pushed for the creation of the Central European Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) as shields against the USSR and China; the launching of the Marshall Plan for economic aid to Western Europe, and its Asian equivalent, the plan for the economic recovery of Japan; and the formation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).[9]

Under the new bipolarization of global forces to which commentators referred as "balance of terror," a fundamental characteristic of the Cold War, the United States was more interested in building stronger strategic alliances with the colonial powers of Europe. The causes and fates of the colonized peoples of Africa, Asia and the Caribbean took the backseat as this strategy increasingly overshadowed the colonial question. This mode of thinking can be easily detected in a speech titled "'The World's Colonies and Ex-Colonies: A Challenge to America," which Henry A. Byroads, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near East, South Asian and African Affairs, delivered in October 1953 before the World Affairs Council of North California. Byroads stated that the American government must approach colonial questions in terms of the enlightened self-interest of the United States. He went on to say that the U.S. recognized that the disintegration of old colonialism is inevitable, but premature independence for these peoples, who are unable to cope with disease, famine, and other forces of nature, would not serve American interests nor would it serve the interests of the free world as a whole. Least of all, he added, would it serve the interests of the dependent peoples themselves.

He further commented: "Let us be frank in recognizing our stake in the strength and stability of certain European nations which exercise influence in the dependent areas. These European nations are our allies. They share many common interests with us. They will probably represent, for many years to come, the main source of the free-world defensive power outside our own."[10] Secretary Byroads concluded, "We cannot blindly disregard their side of the colonial question without injury to our own security. In particular, we cannot ignore the legitimate interests which European nations possess in certain dependent territories. Nor can we forget the importance of these interests to the European economy which we have contributed so much to support."[11]

Such was the ambivalence with which the United States designed and exerted multifaceted pressure upon the colonial powers of Europe, most specifically Britain, for an orderly decolonization of their empires. A crafty use of the lend-lease policy with Britain during World War II, the Marshal Plan, the NATO alliance and the self-determination clause in the United Nations Charter enabled the United States government to influence its British counterpart's colonial stance to the point that in 1947 Britain had no choice but to withdraw from India. Ten years later the Gold Coast became Britain's first Tropical African colony to gain independence under the name Ghana.

Indubitably the struggles of the people of India, Ghana and other colonies contributed to the acceleration of the decolonization of the British Empire. Nonetheless, America's influence played a major role in it as well, and so did post-war developments inside the British political establishment. One such

development was the electoral victory of the Labor Party, whose leader, Clement Attlee (1883–1967), a former wartime deputy to Churchill in the Government of National Unity, had contradicted Churchill's pro-colonial statements. Attlee had pledged before the West African Students' Union in London that his party, if victorious in the first post-war election, would honor the decolonization principle contained in the Charter.

Attlee's stand was, in fact, rooted in Britain's broader approach to a colonial dilemma at the end of World War II. Indeed, the development of military air technology and the invention of the atomic bomb made Britain's centuries-old sea power inadequate for the defense of an empire scattered over five continents. With the emergence and intensification of anti-colonial movements in Asia, Turkey and Greece and, to paraphrase Sekgoma, the eventuality of their spilling over into Africa, Britain's imperial supremacy became increasingly unsustainable. Attlee was pragmatic enough to recognize that with "the advent of air warfare, the conditions which made it possible to defend a string of possessions scattered over five continents by means of a fleet based on island fortresses [had] gone."[12]

For Britain's newfound pro-decolonization policy and America's ambivalent position to merge and pave the way for the end of colonialism in Africa, beginning with Ghana's independence under the leadership of arch pan-Africanist Kwame Nkrumah (1909–1972), two interests had to be reconciled. First, America placed the entire decolonization question in the context of NATO versus the Soviet Bloc and, accordingly, determined that independence under pan-African leaders was the most realistic option. This called for a measured approach, for, as Baptiste points out, British authorities feared that a hastened granting of independence might expose these volatile and unsophisticated peoples to the insidious dangers of Communist penetration. On the other hand, intransigence might cause the pan-Africanists to turn more readily towards the Soviet Union. Second, Britain needed time to ensure protection for British and Western investments in African countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya. To that end, decolonization was to be negotiated with African political leaders "acceptable" to both Britain and the United States, with a view on NATO interests.

The same Cold-War considerations underpinned America's relations with France over the colonial question. In this case, though, Washington went along with French ultra-colonial stand in both the Maghreb and Indochina. In both regions France's colonial intransigence ignited lengthy wars of independence: Indochina from 1945 to 1954 and Algeria from 1954 to 1962. Here, too, a turning point, the Suez crisis of 1956, prompted a shift in American foreign policy.

The culmination of an abrupt chain of events, this crisis was triggered by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's sudden decision to nationalize the Suez Canal, which was a vital shipping route for the industrialized West and a lucrative asset controlled by the Suez Canal Company, in which Britain and France were the main shareholders. The nationalization came as a reaction to Britain's and the United States' equally sudden withdrawal of their offer to finance the building of the Aswan High Dam, a project for which the Egyptian leader had put his political reputation on the line. On their part, Britain and the U.S. withdrew their promise due to Nasser's hostility toward Israel and, most of all, his perceived pro-Soviet leanings. The military attack which Israel, Britain and France launched on Egypt under various pretexts turned the crisis into a full-blown war code-named "Operation Musketeer" by the assailants.

In the words of Baptiste, the escalation of the crisis raised the spectre of a wider conflict in the oil-rich Middle East between NATO and the USSR, supported by Muslim states and the nationalists fighting the French in North Africa. As a strategic analysis by the Eisenhower National Security Council (NSC) spelled out in a document produced on August 22, 1956, this prospect posed a serious dilemma for the United States. In that document the NSC gave an ominous prospect unless the U.S. government made the best move possible to defuse the crisis. Egypt could close the Suez Canal, in which case the movement of raw materials for Western use would have to be rerouted, causing serious delays and increasing shipping costs, as well as the demand for ocean freighters and tankers which would exceed their availability. That could lead to one of two plausible worse-case scenarios.

Under the first worse-case scenario, assuming that crude oil from the Persian Gulf continues to be available, the closing of the Suez Canal, the Trans-Arabian pipelines and Iraq Petroleum Company pipelines would have the following implications to the Western Powers: (a) controls on petroleum consumption would have to be introduced both on national and international levels of energy management; (b) in order to maintain Western Europe's demand at the time of the beginning of the Suez Crisis, the production of crude oil would have to be increased in the U.S. and Canada by 1.3 million barrels per day, in the Caribbean by 200,000 barrels per day, and in the Persian Gulf by 500,000 barrels per day; and (c) the U.S. and the Caribbean could meet the increased crude oil production for the first 90 days. Whether the increased production could be maintained for an extended period was doubtful, and, at any rate, the Western Hemisphere would run the risk of seeing its oil reserves depleted.[13]

Under the second worse-case scenario, in which no crude oil would be available from the Persian Gulf as a result of the closing of the Suez Canal,

Trans-Arabian pipeline and Iraq Petroleum pipelines, the NSC predicted that there would be an immediate shortage of approximately 3.1 million barrels per day to the Western World, particularly Western Europe. This shortage could be met only partially by rationing and additional production from other sources. Consequently, as the NSC document inferred, military action by either the UK, France or the U.S. "will probably require a withdrawal of forces from NATO commitment and thus temporarily weaken the military posture in Western Europe."[14] As dreadful as this scenario appeared, the NSC viewed it to be of small consequence when compared to the long-term economic effect on NATO and the loss of Western prestige and influence in the Middle East with the possible emergence of Nasser as the apparent victor in his contest with the West.

The anticipated consequences of such outcome would hurt the Western World in the following ways: (1) the inevitable decrease in Western prestige could result in the loss of U.S. bases in the Middle East and North Africa and ultimately in other regions in the world; (2) Middle Eastern governments amenable to U.S. policies and interests would be discredited and Algerian freedom fighters would gain momentum against French colonialism; (3) other Muslim governments would be pressured to expropriate Western investments in oil fields and pipelines and make concessions to the Soviet Union, thereby accelerating Soviet expansion and consolidating Soviet power throughout the Middle East; and (4) Iraq could withdraw its participation in the Baghdad Pact, leading to its failure, and the Israeli-Arab conflict could escalate considerably.[15]

Baptiste's assessment is that the United States solved the dilemma by backing Nasser against Britain, France and Israel and threw its weight behind the nationalists in Algeria. Although both moves angered Britain, France and Israel, observes Baptiste, history shows that the West and NATO were the beneficiaries in the sense that Egypt and the nationalists in Algeria were brought under the influence of the United States and, indirectly, NATO, and the fall-out from giving Nasser his victory over the West in the Suez Crisis was avoided. Baptiste concludes his analysis of this pivotal course of events by arguing that, in a balancing act, "the United States decided to let France have her way in settling the 'Colonial Question' in her colonies in sub-Saharan Africa and in the French Caribbean."[16]

The Soviet Union, the Asia Factor and the Colonial Question

Just as the United States framed its policy on the colonial question in terms of American national interests and NATO global security, which entailed the containment and ultimately the defeat of Communism, the Soviet Union developed its approach to the question from the standpoint of the global

struggle against Western imperialism and the eradication of all forms of exploitation of man by man. Similarly to its Western counterpart, the Soviet approach had very little bearing on the core interests of the peoples of Tropical Africa.

Until the 1960s and 1970s, Soviet interests in Africa were mostly limited to South Africa, which, by virtue of being the most industrialized and most urbanized country on the continent, was viewed by both Lenin (1870–1924) and the Communist International or Comintern as the future vanguard of the African Revolution. According to Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin,[17] African affairs received little attention among the Soviet intelligentsia and intelligence circles under Stalin, except within the Communist University of the Toilers of the East. Andrew and Mitrokhin insist that Khrushchev (1894–1971) was far more interested in Africa than Stalin (1878–1953) had been: "Though he knew little about the Dark Continent, he was favourably impressed by the fiery anti-imperialist rhetoric of the first generation of African post-colonial leaders."[18] To illustrate this statement, the authors invoke an enthusiastic declaration by Khrushchev a few days before Ghana became the first Sub-Saharan African colony to win independence: "The awakening of the peoples of Africa has begun."[19]

Although he argues that Communist support for national liberation movements is older than the Soviet state, in that Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) sympathized with most of the revolutionary and national emancipation movements of their day, William G. Thom concurs with Andrew and Mitrokhin's assessment of Soviet interest in Africa. He indicates that Soviet support for foreign liberation struggles may have been made an important element of Kremlin foreign policy early in the history of the USSR, but "Black Africa did not become a serious concern of Soviet foreign policy until the late 1950s."[20] Insisting that Africa tended to be viewed in Moscow in terms of European colonialism or not at all, Thom also argues that for most of the first forty years of Soviet history Africa stood on the outermost edge of Soviet consciousness.

Only in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the "wind of change" of which British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan (1894–1986, r. 1957–1963) spoke in February 1960 began sweeping the continent, did the Soviet policy of noninvolvement change. According to Thom, the change in policy came about when Russian observers came to the realization that the decolonization process that was taking place in Africa could be damaging to the capitalist West and, by the same token, beneficial to World Communism, provided Moscow and its allies could properly exploit it.