

Handbook of Party Politics



Edited by
RICHARD S KATZ AND WILLIAM CROTTY

HANDBOOK
of
PARTY POLITICS

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INTRODUCTION

Richard S. Katz
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Political parties have repeatedly been acknowledged as the critical link to democratic governance. An open, participant-oriented, viable, and representative system of parties operating within free and fair electoral procedures performs duties that make democratic government possible; without such parties, a democracy can hardly be said to exist.

Political commentators, both within and outside of the academy, have for a long time sought to describe and explain how parties are structured and mobilized, as well as the nature of their programmatic appeals to meet the demands of effective governance. A number of early studies deserve special mention. Among these are Lipset and Rokkan (1967); Epstein (1967); LaPalombara and Weiner (1966); Duverger (1954); and Neumann (1956). In more recent decades, there have been Powell (1982); Harmel and Janda (1982); Lawson and Merkl (1988); Klingemann *et al.* (1994); Dalton *et al.* (1984); and Lijphart (1999). The field is rich in its explorations, and these represent but a sample of the major studies undertaken.

As these works, and innumerable others, show, parties differ in regard to their operations in parliament, in electoral campaigns, in organizing and mobilizing a democratic citizenry in support of policy positions, and in developing and expressing in real-world political terms systematic ideologies of governance. Whatever their differences, however, democratic political parties have much in common in how they approach their functional roles in a society and in their broad impact in shaping the character of the democratic experience.

PARTIES AND CHANGE

Parties have always been in a process of change. In part, this is because they have had to adapt to developments in their societies, and in the context in which they operate more broadly. Particularly in recent decades, these changes – including the globalization of trade, finance, and markets; the collective and multinational creation of regional political alignments such as the European Union and NATO; the communications revolution brought on by the electronic media, the Internet, cell phones, and the resulting high-speed access to news; transportation, technological, and democratizing developments that threaten the traditional and familiar – have cumulated, and their impacts have compounded. While they may not be different in kind from changes to which parties have had to adapt in the past, and their depth and breadth may prove to be no greater, as with much in the contemporary world the pace with which they confront the parties and the speed with which parties must react if they are to be successful are without precedent.

At the same time, however, one must recognize that many of these changes in the environment in which parties operate are not exogenous to the parties, but rather are the consequences of the policies that the parties have chosen to put into place, or have chosen to allow to come about unopposed. Thus, parties are changing partly because they have created the circumstances that facilitate those changes. Even if parties did not create religious beliefs or class or regional differences, they (or their leaders or founders) chose to politicize

some and not to politicize others. While parties did not invent radio or television or the Internet (misrepresentations of Al Gore's claims to have facilitated the development of the latter notwithstanding), as governors they largely set the rules that determine their relevance. Even from this perspective, however, the pace of change has increased.

A different kind of change has come about as a result of the dramatic spread of democratic government that Huntington (1991) has identified as the 'third wave' of democratization. Not only has the number of democratic parties and party systems increased, but also this increase has occurred under significantly different circumstances than was the case with earlier 'waves'. Aside from the circumstances already suggested as affecting the established parties, these 'third wave' cases have benefited (or suffered) from unprecedented levels of international scrutiny and involvement, in particular through a variety of democracy promotion agencies such as International IDEA, IFES, and the United Nations.

MODELS OF PARTY

A great variety of models of party are either implicit or explicit in the chapters of this *Handbook*. Abstractions from two of them have, however, been particularly influential in shaping both theories and research agendas, and can serve to suggest some of the most important parameters of change. These are derived particularly from Epstein's (1967) analysis of European and American parties, one of the foundational studies for an appreciation of comparative parties in an earlier era.

Epstein compares the loosely federated American party coalitions, or what he refers to as a 'pluralist' party system, with a 'programmatic' party approach more generally associated with Europe. There is a divide of consequence here, and Epstein's claim is that the pluralist system, compared with the programmatic, mass-based dominant European parties, may better serve national policy and democratic ends, and is more cohesive, policy-oriented, and better mobilized than its cousin on the Continent. Other scholars have come to quite different evaluative judgments. There is agreement, however, that operations of the parties in such areas as campaigning, policy formulation and implementation, staffing and organization, resource base, and sources of funding are characteristically different.

As time has evolved, the American parties have increasingly come to fit conceptions of a free market competitive, candidate-centered, electorally focused party system. There are signs that the European parties – at different rates of change in various countries and among individual parties – have begun to move in this direction. Such a transition represents an enormous functional and organizational shift in emphasis and conception for the Continental parties, more so than for the loosely structured, campaign-oriented parties in the United States. The changes under way are clearly significant for both types of party systems. They raise fundamental questions as to the continuing role of parties and the extent of their social relevance and interaction within the society. In particular, campaign-only organizations of the American type, given their dependence on extensive non-party funding, their failure to engage in activities not directly related to campaigning for public office, the fragmentation of political coalitions and the increasing independence of electorates that follow, and the fragmentation and subservience (to candidates) of the party organization, tend to ignore many of the functions regarded as central to parties in the European mold.

Epstein (1967: 357) argues that the non-programmatic nature of the looser American associational model allows

a leadership capable of responding to diverse electoral considerations, and a transactional or brokerage view of political activity. A party may still be associated with particular policies and interests, presumably in accord with habitual voting patterns of large portions of the electorate, but it preserves, in theory as in practice, a loose and accommodating character. Such a party, while having had patronage seeking memberships in the past, does not usually have large numbers of program-committed members. The brokerage party ... is unattractive to members of this kind ... it does not have the need of a majoritarian party to legitimize, through mass-membership participation, any program or policies. For electoral purposes which are of prime importance, a cadre organization suffices.

This approach contrasts with the 'class consciousness' that he presumes to define the most significant electoral cleavages in the European model, and the mass-mobilized, highly organizationally articulated, and (at least in some cases) highly patronage-oriented parties of European nations.

These dimensions highlight the fundamental distinctions in form and operations of categories of comparative party systems and serve as a starting point in tracing the broad changes

that have taken place in recent decades. A side issue of related importance, and of greater significance than the actual forms the parties take, is which type of party best serves broader ends of social integration, political mobilization, policy representation, and democratic governance, the ultimate criteria by which all party systems are judged.

It is Epstein's (1967: 357) contention

that the looser American-style parties better serve the democratic purpose as it is conceived in pluralist terms. The pluralist democrat rejects the validity or legitimacy, and even the regularized existence, of a majority electorate united over the wide range of complex issues in a modern nation. Separate majorities on separate issues, or perhaps on sets of issues, there may be, but that is very different from believing in a single majority for almost all issues ... the pluralist cannot recognize the claims of a programmatic party, with or without a membership organization, to represent a coherent majority for all of its policies. Behind this denial of majoritarian-party claims lies the pluralist's disbelief in a majority-class interest, the simplest theoretical support for the strong-party school.

These assertions can be debated, and have been extensively. There is wide agreement, however, that the basic objective of serving societal needs and the related questions as to the extent to which parties in different societies can be engineered to serve public interests in what is perceived to be a more efficient and productive manner are centrally important. As a result, understanding the degree to which the political environment predicts the parties' character and role, and defines the boundaries for consciously designed change, becomes significant. To the extent that those boundaries are highly restrictive, arguments over preferred party roles and models may well have little ultimate effect on the quality of their political representation.

These types of questions have engaged party analysts for generations. However, while the basic concern with democratic performance remains, more recent research, as indicated by the chapters in this volume, is evidencing the impact of forces on party behavior that have tended to separate parties of both original types from their societal roots. The American parties have moved towards the pure electoral campaign- and candidate-oriented model. The European mass parties, while significantly more cohesive and more programmatic in general, are beginning to evidence similar trends. The legislative parties in both types of systems have developed a degree of distance from the electoral parties. Should such trends continue,

which is likely, what then can be said about the quality and comprehensiveness of the parties' contribution to the operations of democratic government? These are among the fundamental issues forcing contemporary party research and, as indicated, are addressed in varying contexts in the analysis in this volume.

A HANDBOOK OF PARTY POLITICS

The widely acknowledged centrality of parties, coupled with the obvious scope and pace of party change, makes political parties both an important and an exciting field for research. As with any rapidly developing and substantively broad field, the parties literature is itself both broad and rapidly developing – and, moreover, in many respects quite fragmented. In this context, we had two objectives in inviting many of the world's leading scholars in the field of political parties to contribute to this *Handbook*.

The first objective is to provide a reliable and thorough summary of the major theories and approaches that have been, and continue to be, prominent in the development of the field. The chapters that follow aim to provide a concise 'road map' to the core literatures in the various subfields of party-related research. While no single volume can hope to summarize – or, indeed, even to cite – all of the authors who have made significant contributions to our current understanding of parties, each chapter aims to summarize where we are and how we have arrived at that point for its own topic area.

The other, and complementary, objective is to identify the theories, approaches, and research efforts that define the current 'cutting edge' of the field. What do these scholars understand to be the most important questions that need to be addressed and what do they see as the most promising avenues for addressing them?

In general, the chapters are broadly comparative, defined by a substantive question rather than by geography. As in many other areas of political research, however, the literature on political parties has had to confront the question of 'American exceptionalism', and that is reflected in the organization of this *Handbook*. In some subfields, it is reasonable to include the United States as simply one more case, or perhaps even as the precursor of developments that may be expected to spread more broadly. In others, however, the United States – whether for reasons of history, or culture, or political institutions – is too different to be comfortably included with the rest of the

world. For these subfields, we have included separate chapters on the United States. Other areas also have their own peculiarities, addressed in separate chapters as well.

Given the complexity of the subject, there is no unproblematic way to organize the literature on parties, and hence no straightforward way to organize and order the chapters that follow. Rather, we have simply grouped them under a few broad headings. The first is concerned with a range of questions of definition: What is a party, where did parties come from, and how were they integrated into theoretical understandings of politics? How do political parties fit into theories of democracy? How can we classify differing party types and differing types of party systems? The second broad heading concerns the functions of parties. What do parties do, and how do they do it? Third, how do parties organize, and how are party organizations changing? Fourth, how do political parties relate to society more broadly? Fifth, how do parties relate to the state, and how does the state relate to and regulate the parties? Finally, what can we say about trends that are of relatively recent origin (parties in the media and cyber age, parties in the European Union) and about their future?

The subjects of these broad sections obviously overlap. In many cases, rather than addressing different subjects, they address the same subject from different perspectives. In doing so, they reflect the richness and complexity of the field of party research.

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PART I

DEFINITION OF PARTY

1

WHAT IS A POLITICAL PARTY?

John Kenneth White

‘But who do you say that I am?’ – Jesus Christ to his disciples, Matthew 16: 15

Defining political parties is a task that at first glance appears to be relatively simple. In 1984, political scientist Robert Huckshorn provided ‘a pragmatic definition’ of parties in his textbook *Political Parties in America*: ‘[A] political party is an autonomous group of citizens having the purpose of making nominations and contesting elections in hope of gaining control over governmental power through the capture of public offices and the organization of the government’.¹ For Huckshorn, the *raison d’état* for having political parties was simple: they were the means necessary to win elections and provide direction to government.

But is that really so? As students of political parties are well aware, many legitimate political parties exist for reasons that have little to do with winning elections. How else would one explain the proliferation of third parties in recent years? For example, while the Beer-Lovers’ Party in Poland began as a prank, over time it developed a serious platform for which the humorously stated goals of the party – lively political discussion in pubs serving excellent beer – became associated with the values of freedom of association and expression, intellectual tolerance, and a higher standard of living. In 1991, it captured 16 seats in the Sejm, the lower house of the Polish parliament. Thus, while the Beer-Lovers’ Party had

satirical origins, it became a force in Polish politics due to its ideas – not because it was formed with the stated purpose of winning elections. Much the same could be said of the Green Party in the United States. As the party’s website states, Greens are ‘committed to environmentalism, non-violence, social justice, and grassroots organizing’. The Greens are especially supportive of a campaign finance reform law that would renew democracy ‘without the support of corporate donors’.² Like the Beer-Lovers’ Party, the Greens have almost no hope of winning most US elections – including the most important one of all, the presidency. The 2000 Green Party presidential nominee, Ralph Nader, though he cost Democrat Al Gore the presidency in 2000, won a mere 2.7 percent of the popular vote cast.³

Yet political scientists would unanimously classify most third parties (including the Beer-Lovers’ party and the Greens, along with many others) as legitimate parties. But concomitant with such legitimacy come numerous assumptions made by academics as to what political parties *are* and *are not* – and, even more frequently, what they *should be*. If parties are to act as ‘mediating institutions’ between the governors and the governed, then what tasks should they be performing? Should they be election facilitators who provide candidates with ballot access? Or do they exist to promote ideas no matter how controversial? Just as political scientists make assumptions about party behavior,

they also make many presuppositions about *partisan* behavior. For example, do voters behave in an entirely rational manner, thus making parties objects of political utility? Or do voters eschew parties altogether and bring other considerations – if any – into the making of their ballot selections?

Thus, defining what a political party is and what functions it should assume is hardly an objective task. Rather, it is a normative one, and the answers given by political scientists have varied over time. Below are several oft-cited responses to the question ‘What is a political party?’:

- Edmund Burke (1770): ‘[A] party is a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed.’⁴
- Anthony Downs (1957): ‘In the broadest sense, a political party is a coalition of men seeking to control the governing apparatus by legal means. By *coalition*, we mean a group of individuals who have certain ends in common and cooperate with each other to achieve them. By *governing apparatus*, we mean the physical, legal, and institutional equipment which the government uses to carry out its specialized role in the division of labor. By *legal means*, we mean either duly constituted or legitimate influence.’⁵
- V.O. Key, Jr (1964): ‘A political party, at least on the American scene, tends to be a “group” of a peculiar sort. ... Within the body of voters as a whole, groups are formed of persons who regard themselves as party members. ... In another sense the term “party” may refer to the group of more or less professional workers. ... At times party denotes groups within the government. ... Often it refers to an entity which rolls into one the party-in-the-electorate, the professional political group, the party-in-the-legislature, and the party-in-the-government ... In truth, this all-encompassing usage has its legitimate application, for all the types of groups called party interact more or less closely and at times may be as one. Yet both analytically and operationally the term ‘party’ most of the time must refer to several types of group; and it is useful to keep relatively clear the meaning in which the term is used.’⁶
- William Nisbet Chambers (1967): ‘[A] political party in the modern sense may be thought of as a relatively durable social formation which seeks offices or power in government, exhibits a structure or organization which links leaders at the centers of government to a significant popular following in the political arena and its local enclaves, and generates in-group perspectives or at least symbols of identification or loyalty.’⁷
- Leon D. Epstein (1980): ‘[What] is meant by a political party [is] any group, however loosely organized, seeking to elect government officeholders under a given label.’⁸
- Ronald Reagan (1984): ‘A political party isn’t a fraternity. It isn’t something like the old school tie you wear. You band together in a political party because of certain beliefs of what government should be.’⁹
- Joseph Schlesinger (1991): ‘A political party is a group organized to gain control of government in the name of the group by winning election to public office.’¹⁰
- John Aldrich (1995): ‘Political parties can be seen as coalitions of elites to capture and use political office. [But] a political party is more than a coalition. A political party is an institutionalized coalition, one that has adopted rules, norms, and procedures.’¹¹

While these definitions vary and many have persisted throughout the ages, they remain controversial. Should parties emphasize their ideological roots, as Burke and Reagan prefer? Or are parties merely tools for gaining access to governmental office, as Epstein, Schlesinger, and Aldrich indicate? Or are they important mediating instruments designed to organize and simplify voter choices in order to influence the actions of government, as Downs, Key, and Chambers imply? Even Downs thought his original definition was misguided, since the governing party did not conform to his idea of ‘a single, rational, decision-making entity controlling government policy’. Thus, Downs redefined parties as follows: ‘A political party is a team of men seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election. By *team*, we mean a coalition whose members agree on all their goals instead of on just part of them.’¹²

Such hedging – along with the widespread lack of consensus within the political science community as to what political parties exactly are or should be – calls to mind the various responses Jesus Christ received when he queried his disciples, asking them ‘Who do people say that the Son of Man is?’. They replied: ‘Some say John the Baptist, others Elijah, still others Jeremiah or one of the prophets.’ Jesus persisted, asking his disciples ‘But who do you say that I am?’ One of them, Simon Peter, responded: ‘You are the Messiah, the Son of the Living God.’¹³ If only, in a more

secular fashion, there could be such a definitive definition as to what parties are and what they ought to do.

Because neither citizens nor scholars have ever satisfactorily answered these normative questions, the attempt to define what a political party is – and what tasks should be entrusted to it – has often produced more confusion than explanation. In the United States, the confusion dates back to the inception of the modern American polity. In *The Federalist*, James Madison likened parties to interest groups which he derisively labeled as ‘factions’. Yet Madison’s discussion of ‘faction’ is rather vague, with a primary emphasis on controlling the ‘mischiefs’ of the propertied interests.¹⁴ One reason for the framers’ lack of intellectual coherence was their distrust of those repositories of political power. To the Federalists, the word ‘power’ had such negative connotations that Alexander Hamilton substituted the word ‘energy’ for it.¹⁵ One Democratic-Republican party opponent spoke out against the Federalist energizers in 1802, saying, ‘I would as soon give my vote to a wolf to be a shepherd, as to a man, who is always contending for the *energy of government*’.¹⁶

Not surprisingly, the framers were reluctant to sharpen their thinking about political parties. Instead, they often made a virtue out of political stalemate, which essentially guaranteed querulous parties arguing over limited objectives. Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in *Democracy in America* that ‘parties are an evil inherent in free governments’.¹⁷ The beneficent effect of parties, said Tocqueville, was that the governmental competition ensured by the US Constitution made them small-minded: ‘They glow with a fractious zeal; their language is violent, but their progress is timid and uncertain. The means they employ are as disreputable as the aim sought.’¹⁸ The result, Tocqueville claimed, was that ‘public opinion is broken up ad infinitum about questions of detail’.¹⁹

With the passage of time, scholars have sought to redefine political parties and distinguish them from ‘factions’ – i.e., interest groups – often assigning more noble tasks to the former than the latter. In 1942, V. O. Key, Jr. suggested that interest groups ‘promote their interests by attempting to influence the government rather than by nominating candidates and seeking the responsibility for the management of government [as political parties do]’.²⁰ Other scholars disagree, noting that in an age of weakened political parties, interest groups frequently influence nominations, are instrumental in electing favorite candidates, and help manage the government by influencing

both the appointment of officials and the actual decision-making process itself.

THE PARTY CONSENSUS

Even though there exists a rather profound disagreement among political scientists as to *how* political parties ought to operate, there has emerged a passionate consensus behind many of the normative arguments made on their behalf. Beginning with the publication of *The American Commonwealth* in 1888, James Bryce began a tradition that consisted of scholarly investigation and laudatory treatment: ‘Parties are inevitable. No free country has been without them. No-one has shown how representative government could be worked without them. They bring order out of chaos to a multitude of voters’.²¹ Nearly six decades later, E.E. Schattschneider echoed Bryce, writing in his masterful book, *Party Government*, that ‘modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties’.²² Schattschneider’s passion for parties remained undimmed. Shortly before his death, he said: ‘I suppose the most important thing I have done in my field is that I have talked longer and harder and more persistently and enthusiastically about political parties than anyone else alive’.²³ His enthusiasm has been echoed by political scientists in the generations since. For example, Giovanni Sartori claimed parties were ‘the central intermediate structures between society and government’.²⁴ Clinton Rossiter applied the following tautology to the American context: ‘No America without democracy, no democracy without politics, and no politics without parties’.²⁵

Rossiter’s axiom has been applied by other political scientists to their home governments around the globe. For example, in the once communist-controlled ‘Captive Nations’ of eastern Europe, the emergence of party competition (including Poland’s Beer-Lovers’ Party) is used to measure the varying progress of these countries toward democracy. Likewise, in the former Soviet Union, signs of a fledgling party system win accolades from the vast majority of scholars. In the western hemisphere, the march toward democracy in South America is celebrated, as one country after another has discarded dictatorship in favor of democratic party rule. Thus, political scientists measure the march toward democracy in such diverse nations as Iraq, Haiti, Bosnia, and the former Soviet Union in terms of those countries’ capacities to develop strong party organizations that are the foundations for free,

democratic elections. The US-based Committee for Party Renewal summarized the prevailing consensus about the role parties should play – and the discipline's passion for them – in a 1996 *amicus curiae* brief filed with the US Supreme Court:

Political parties play a unique and crucial role in our democratic system of government. Parties enable citizens to participate coherently in a system of government allowing for a substantial number of popularly elected offices. They bring fractured and diverse groups together as a unified force, provide a necessary link between the distinct branches and levels of government, and provide continuity that lasts beyond terms of office. Parties also play an important role in encouraging active participation in politics, holding politicians accountable for their actions, and encouraging debate and discussion of important issues.²⁶

The equating of successful parties to efficiently productive government structures is largely a twentieth-century phenomenon. In 1949, political scientist Hugh McDowall Clokie observed: 'Party government is without doubt the distinctive feature of modern politics. ... [Parties are] fully accepted today as essential organizations for government in the modern state, recognized under varying conditions as entitled to give direction to the course of politics, and endowed either by law or usage with a special status and function in the constitutional system in which they operate.'²⁷ One underlying reason for Clokie's contention that party and government are as one is the increased attention given to defining what a political party is as a matter of state law. For example, Missouri state law defines an 'established political party' as 'a political party which, at either of the last two general elections, polled for its candidate for any statewide office, more than two percent of the entire vote cast for the office'.²⁸ New York's statute is similar: an 'officially recognized party' is one that polled 50,000 or more votes for governor in the previous statewide election.²⁹ In 1986, Leon D. Epstein usefully compared political parties to quasi-governmental agencies that were akin to regulated public utilities, noting that state governments frequently defined political parties and regulated their functions.³⁰

THE VIEW FROM THE TRIPOD

In ancient Greece, when the priestess of Apollo at Delphi made ready to deliver a prophesy,

she positioned herself on a special seat supported by three legs, the tripod. The tripod gave the priestess a clear view of the past, present, and future.³¹ By linking parties so closely with government, political scientists – most prominently, V.O. Key, Jr. – devised the tripod of party-in-the-electorate (PIE), party organizations (PO), and party-in-government (PIG), as a means of teaching what parties were and what they were meant to accomplish.³² The tripod became a convenient teaching tool, as well as a means of assessing party performance. Frank J. Sorauf, whose 1968 textbook has been used to educate three generations of students in American political parties courses, described parties as 'tripartite systems of interactions'.³³ Everett Carl Ladd, Jr. maintained that the PIE-PO-PIG tripod could be used as a means of measuring social change and the institutional party response to it:

1. *Party as Organization*. There is the formal machinery of party ranging from local committees (precinct, ward, or town) up to state central committees, and the people who man and direct there. The party is 'the organization' or 'the machine.'
2. *Party as the Mass of Supporters*. For some, this identification is strong, and they consistently back candidates running under the party label. For others, the attachment is relatively weak and casual. Here, party exists in the eyes of its beholder; it is a bundle of electoral loyalties.
3. *Party as a Body of Notables*. Most political leaders in government and outside it are identified by a party label. *Party* is sometimes used to refer to that collectivity of notables who accept the party label, and party policy then becomes the *prevailing policy tendencies* among this collectivity.³⁴

But while parties have been inextricably linked to government's performance, many reject the PIE-PO-PIG model. Rather than being passionate about parties, ambivalence is often a more common emotion on both the part of the public and elected officials. As George Washington once observed, 'In a Government of a Monarchical cast, Patriotism may look with indulgence, if not with favor, upon the spirit of the party. But in those of popular character, in Governments purely elective, it is a spirit not to be encouraged.'³⁵ Washington's distrust of parties was shared by his peers. Prior to the end of the Revolutionary War, John Adams bemoaned the drift of the country's elites toward party politics: 'There is nothing I dread so much as a division of the Republic

into two great parties, each arranged under its leader and converting measures in opposition to each other.³⁶ His spouse, Abigail Adams, agreed: 'Party spirit is blind, malevolent, uncandid, ungenerous, unjust, and unforgiving.'³⁷ Thomas Jefferson declared in 1789 that if he 'could not go to heaven but with a party', he 'would not go there at all'.³⁸ Alexander Hamilton associated parties with 'ambition, avarice, personal animosity'.³⁹ And James Madison famously wrote that it was necessary to devise a republic that would 'break and control the violence of faction'.⁴⁰

The public disdain for parties continues to persist – especially in the United States. In 1940, Pendleton Herring wrote that American political parties could not adhere to an ideology: 'At best,' Herring wrote, 'all a party can hope to maintain is an attitude, an approach.'⁴¹ But with the passing decades public hostility toward parties has grown, as Americans prefer to eschew them as unreliable advocates and unfaithful governors. In 1982, 40 percent of Massachusetts residents told one pollster: 'Instead of being the servants of the people, elected officials in Massachusetts are really *the enemy of the people*'.⁴² A decade later, when ten registered voters from across the nation were asked what political parties meant to them, two shouted 'Corruption!'. Others used words like 'rich', 'self-serving', 'good-old-boy networks', 'special interests', 'bunch of lost causes', 'lost sheep', 'immorality', 'going whatever way is on top', and 'liars'.⁴³ Campaigning for the presidency in 2000, George W. Bush mentioned the Republican Party just twice in accepting the nomination—once in order to scold his fellow partisans to 'end the politics of fear and save Social Security', and once to tout his bipartisan success: 'I've worked with Republicans and Democrats to get things done.'⁴⁴ Democratic candidate Al Gore never mentioned his party in his acceptance speech.⁴⁵ A poll taken in December 2001 found public skepticism toward the two major parties continued to be high: 56 percent believed the Democrats were 'taking advantage of the current mood to push the interests of their special interests supporters'; 60% thought the Republicans were guilty of doing the same thing.⁴⁶

As they have on so many other occasions, Californians have become trend-setters by taking their scorn for political parties to new heights. In 1998, they were allowed to vote for candidates from different parties in what is called a blanket primary. Party affiliation did not matter, as Democrats, Republicans, and

even independents could support the candidates of their choice whatever their party listing. According to one exit poll, 58% liked this new method of choosing party candidates; only 9% found it confusing.⁴⁷ But the result has been to make party membership so casual that it has virtually no relevance. In 2003, Californians voted to recall an unpopular Democratic governor, Gray Davis. While the recall portion of the ballot required a simple 'yes' or 'no' vote, the second ballot contained a list of 135 possible replacements. Such is the state of California politics when political parties are insufficiently vested with the power to organize voter choices, as the vast majority of academicians would prefer.

PARTY PARADIGMS

One reason why academics believe that political parties are essential to governing is the rather 'perverse and unorthodox' belief, as political scientist V.O. Key, Jr. expressed it in 1966, that 'voters are not fools'.⁴⁸ This rather novel idea has guided two especially important party paradigms that emerged in the twentieth century: *the rational-efficient model* and *the responsible parties model*.

The rational-efficient model

First advocated by Anthony Downs, the rational-efficient model emphasizes the parties' electoral activities at the expense of virtually all other party functions. As Downs stated in his 1957 book, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*:

Our model is based on the assumption that every government seeks to maximize political support. We further assume that the government exists in a democratic society where periodic elections are held, that its primary goal is reelection, and that election is the goal of those parties out of power. At each election, the party which receives the most votes (though not necessarily a majority) controls the entire government until the next election, with no intermediate votes either by the people as a whole or by a parliament. The governing party thus has unlimited freedom of action, within the bounds of the constitution.⁴⁹

Thus, the rational-choice model envisions the winning of elections not as a welcome outcome but as the only outcome worth having. As a victorious Richard Nixon told cheering supporters upon finally winning the presidency in 1968: 'Winning's a lot more fun.'⁵⁰ From the

rational-efficient perspective, parties exist to win elections and all party-related projects are designed to make that happen. Incentives to participate in the process come from the patronage jobs that are to be had once victory is ensured.

From the voters' perspective, the party-in-the-electorate behaves rationally – i.e., using the information provided by the party candidates to make rational selections that will benefit them personally. This view of the electorate's voting considerations is far from universal. Some believe that parties are the emotional ties that bind – thus, while voters may rationalize their selections to pollsters there is an emotive quality to their vote. As with sports, it is hard to know with certainty why fans root for particular teams. Others see the electorate as lacking any rationality whatsoever. Walter Lippmann, for one, wrote in 1925 that there was hardly any intelligence behind the balloting:

We call an election an expression of the popular will. But is it? We go into a polling booth and mark a cross on a piece of paper for one of two, or perhaps three or four names. Have we expressed our thoughts on the public policy of the United States? Presumably we have a number of thoughts on this and that with many buts and ifs and ors. Surely the cross on a piece of paper does not express them.⁵¹

The organizational structure of rational-efficient parties consists of a cadre of political entrepreneurs. There is a large degree of centralization and no formal party membership. The organizational style is professional where workers, leaders, and candidates are often recruited from outside the organization or are self-recruited. Efficiency is stressed above all else. There is little, if any, organizational continuity after the election.

In the rational-efficient model, elected officials are allowed to do as they wish once elected, as long as their activities help to win the next election. As political parties wane in influence, Downs's rational-choice model has become the one most often used by political scientists to explain voter behavior. According to the Social Sciences Citation Index, since the 1980s citations from Downs's *Economic Theory of Democracy* have steadily risen.⁵² In a 1965 foreword to the paperback edition of *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Stanley Kelley wrote that years from now he would 'be surprised if Downs's work is not recognized as the starting point of a highly important development in the study of politics'.⁵³

The responsible parties model

While the framers of the US Constitution viewed political parties with a jaundiced eye, by the 1830s those in government came to see the utility of having effective parties. Martin Van Buren, for one, believed parties rendered an important public service when they were organized around issues of principle:

Doubtless excesses frequently attend [parties] and produce many evils, but not so many as are prevented by the maintenance of their organization and vigilance. The disposition to abuse power, so deeply planted in the human heart, can by no other means be more effectually checked; and it has always therefore struck me as more honorable and manly and more in harmony with the character of our people and of our institutions to deal with the subject of political parties in a sincerer and wiser spirit – to recognize their necessity, to prove and to elevate the principles and objects to our own [party] and to support it faithfully.⁵⁴

Van Buren's notion of a principle-based party system formed the genesis for the 'responsible party' school that became popular in the mid-twentieth century. The idea for the responsible parties model formed the basis for a report issued by the American Political Science Association's Committee on Political Parties in 1950: 'An effective party system requires, first, that the parties are able to bring forth programs to which they commit themselves and, second, that the parties possess sufficient internal cohesion to carry out these programs.'⁵⁵ Achieving party unity around a coherent set of ideas matters because (1) it gives voters a clear choice in election campaigns; (2) it gives the winning political party a mandate for governing; and (3) it ensures the party as the likely instrument whereby voters can make a legal revolution.

While the responsible parties model gives priority to the enunciation of the majority party's platform, it also envisions a vibrant role for the opposition: 'The fundamental requirement of accountability is a two-party system in which the opposition party acts as the critic of the party in power, developing, defining and presenting the policy alternatives which are necessary for a true choice in reaching public decisions.'⁵⁶ No wonder that the Committee on Political Parties began its work on the following premise: 'Throughout this report political parties are treated as indispensable instruments of government.'⁵⁷

The committee's passion for parties became endemic throughout the academy. Fifty years

after its publication, *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System* remains required reading. Evron Kirkpatrick praised the report as 'a landmark in the history of political science as policy science'.⁵⁸ Theodore J. Lowi ranked the report as 'second only to the 1937 President's Committee on Administrative Management as a contribution by academics to public discourse on the fundamentals of American democracy'.⁵⁹ William Crotty claimed that publication of *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System* 'may have been the most significant influence on the debate over the operation of political parties that occurred between the Progressive period and the party reform movement of the 1970s'.⁶⁰

Yet the responsible party argument is not without its critics. The most prominent of these, ironically, was Evron M. Kirkpatrick, a member of the Committee on Political Parties.⁶¹ In 1970, Kirkpatrick renounced the report as 'irrelevant and disturbing', explaining it was 'disturbing to any political scientist who believes that the discipline can provide knowledge applicable to the solution of human problems and the achievement of human goals'.⁶² Others saw a tension in the report between those who advocated intra-party debate and those who preferred inter-party conflict. Austin Ranney wondered if it is 'possible for twenty-seven million Democrats to "participate" in the close supervision of their government any more than it is for one-hundred-fifty-million Americans to do so'.⁶³ Clearly, the Committee envisioned an enlightened issue activism, with the rank-and-file guiding the party's direction and emboldening it with purpose. But the Committee also envisioned a party council – an elitist, national body that suggested party responsibility was something that flowed from the top down. Murray S. Stedman, Jr. and Herbert Sonthoff thought the party council was another illustration of the 'increasingly administrative or even quasi-military approach to the study of political problems'.⁶⁴ Julius Turner worried that such placement of power in the hands of party elites would result in control by unrepresentative factions.⁶⁵

The responsible party advocates' contention that political parties are vital to successful governing appears to be so self-evident that it is often forgotten that it was a contentious subject in the early years of political science. At the turn of the twentieth century, some scholars wondered whether any polity could (or should) be characterized by a commitment to *collective* (meaning party) responsibility or to *individual* responsibility. M.I. Ostrogorski criticized

the discipline's infatuation with collective responsibility: 'This theory appeared alluring enough to be adopted by some writers of prominence, and expanded in certain cases, with brilliancy of literary style. It has, however, one defect: it is not borne out by the facts.'⁶⁶ William Graham Sumner agreed. A believer in individual responsibility, Sumner wrote in 1914: 'I cannot trust a party; I can trust a man. I cannot hold a party responsible; I can hold a man responsible. I cannot get an expression of opinion which is single and simple from a party; I can get that only from a man.'⁶⁷ Herbert Croly maintained that party government was undesirable because it 'interfered with genuine popular government both by a mischievous, artificial and irresponsible [i.e. parochial and localistic] method of representation, and by an enfeeblement of the administration in the interest of partisan subsistence'.⁶⁸

Others disagreed. In 1900, Frank A. Goodnow made the case for collective party responsibility: 'The individual candidate must be sunk to a large extent in the party. Individual responsibility must give place to party responsibility.'⁶⁹ Perhaps no scholar better demonstrates the movement of the political science community toward party responsibility (and the inherent conflicts contained therein) than Woodrow Wilson. At first, Wilson maintained that party responsibility was more fiction than fact. Addressing the Virginia Bar Association in 1897, he declared:

I, for my part, when I vote at a critical election, should like to be able to vote for a definite line of policy with regard to the great questions of the day – not for platforms, which Heaven knows, mean little enough – but for *men* known and tried in public service; with records open to be scrutinized with reference to these very matters; and pledged to do this or that particular thing; to take a definite course of action. As it is, I vote for nobody I can depend upon to do anything – no, not if I were to vote for myself.⁷⁰

Later, Wilson saw collective responsibility as not only desirable but also necessary. In a 1908 book, *Constitutional Government in the United States*, Wilson wrote: 'There is a sense in which our parties may be said to have been our real body politic. Not the authority of Congress, not the leadership of the President, but the discipline and zest of parties has held us together, has made it possible for us to form and to carry out national programs.' He added: 'We must think less of checks and balances and more of coordinated power, less of separation of functions and more of the synthesis of action.'⁷¹

There is a creative tension in Wilson's scholarship. He believes that collective responsibility is essential, but couples it with a plea for individual responsibility by emphasizing the president's role as party leader. In an article about Grover Cleveland's cabinet, Wilson observes: 'What we need is harmonious, consistent, responsible party government, instead of a wide dispersion of function and responsibility; and we can get it only by connecting the President as closely as may be with his party in Congress.'⁷² In subsequent editions of *Congressional Government*, Wilson goes further in placing the president at the apex of responsible party government:

If there be one principle clearer than another, it is this: that in any business, whether of government or of mere merchandising, *somebody must be trusted*, in order that when things go wrong it may be quite plain who should be punished ... *Power and strict accountability for its use* are the essential constituents of good government. A sense of highest responsibility, a dignifying and elevating sense of being trusted, together with a consciousness of being in an official station so conspicuous that no faithful discharge of duty can go unacknowledged and unrewarded, and no breach of trust undiscovered and unpunished – these are the influences, the only influences, which foster practical, energetic, and trustworthy statesmanship.⁷³

Wilson's predilection for individual (read presidential) responsibility was not universally accepted by subsequent generations of political scientists. As the Committee on Political Parties warned in its 1950 report: 'When the president's program actually is the sole program, either his party becomes a flock of sheep or the party falls apart.'⁷⁴ In 1955, former Committee on Political Parties member V.O. Key, Jr. introduced the concept of 'critical elections', with political parties acting as catalysts in electoral realignments.⁷⁵

By 1950, collective party responsibility had become political science's First Commandment and digressions from it were often considered heretical. One reason for the espousal of collective party responsibility was the desire of many political scientists to limit conflict. In *The Semi-Sovereign People*, E.E. Schattschneider wrote: 'The best point at which to manage conflict is before it starts.'⁷⁶ His argument reflected one made by social scientist Lewis Coser. In Coser's *The Functions of Social Conflict*, Schattschneider heavily underlined this passage: 'One unites in order to fight, and one fights under the mutually recognized control of

norms and rules.'⁷⁷ Parties, therefore, became a sort of 'thought police' in the establishment and maintenance of order.

THE DECLINE OF MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS

In the Information Age, many scholars argue that political parties 'aren't what they used to be'. Voters may not pay as much attention to party labels as before, though some believe that increased ideological polarization and greater organizational skills are helping to bring parties back to life.⁷⁸ There exists a lively academic debate between those who say parties are in an irreversible decline and those who see a party revival.⁷⁹ Many of the arguments center around the ideas presented in this chapter – i.e., what are the normative functions that should properly be ascribed to political parties? The differing answers only add more intensity to the passions on both sides.

But the twenty-first-century phenomenon that will cause political parties to either adapt or wither away is the decline of mediating institutions. Robert Putnam believes we are in an era where citizens are more likely than ever before to be 'bowling alone'.⁸⁰ In Putnam's view, social capital is slowly eroding as more citizens than ever before refuse to join either bowling leagues or other civic-minded institutions – including political parties. The Internet is contributing to this development, as citizens sit alone at a computer without the social and community interactions so favored by the political parties of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Thus, the 'quality' of political participation is quite different and less interactive. Citizens may be able, for example, to select a party's nominees by voting on their computer without any guidance from the party organizations. At once, the Internet has leveled the playing field, as information becomes available to party producers and consumers alike. In short, political parties no longer provide a filter for information. Instead, they are just one provider – among many – of several different types of information that are available on the World Wide Web. As political parties adapt to these new conditions, new definitions of parties – replete with new normative assumptions about their functions – are likely to shape the ongoing debate about political parties in the twenty-first century.

NOTES

1. Robert Huckshorn, *Political Parties in America* (Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1984), p. 10.
2. See Green Party of the United States website, <http://www.gp.org> (accessed October 13, 2003).
3. In Florida, Nader received more than 97,000 votes, the vast majority of which would have either supported Al Gore or stayed home. If Gore had won Florida, he would have received at least 292 electoral votes, 22 more than the 270 majority required to win in the Electoral College.
4. *Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents* (1770), in Paul Langford, ed., *The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 317.
5. Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1957), pp. 24–5.
6. V.O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (New York: Crowell, 1964), pp. 163–5. First edition published in 1942.
7. William Nisbet Chambers, 'Party Development and the American Mainstream', in Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (eds), *The American Party Systems* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 5.
8. Leon D. Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1980), p. 9.
9. Hugh Sidey, 'A Conversation with Reagan', *Time*, September 3, 1984.
10. Joseph A. Schlesinger, *Political Parties and the Winning of Office* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).
11. John H. Aldrich, *Why Parties?* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 19.
12. Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, p. 25.
13. Matthew 16: 13–16.
14. James Madison, *Federalist #10*, Clinton Rossiter ed., (New York: New American Library, 1961)
15. In *The Federalist*, Hamilton wrote: 'Energy in the executive is the leading character in the definition of good government.' See Alexander Hamilton, 'Federalist #70', in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, *The Federalist Papers*, ed. Clinton Rossiter, (New York: New American Library, 1961), p. 423.
16. Quoted in Ronald P. Formisano, *The Transformation of Political Culture: Massachusetts Parties, 1790s–1840s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 8.
17. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, ed. J. P. Mayer (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969), p. 174.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 175.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 176. Tocqueville added that the demise of great parties in the United States had resulted in a 'great gain in happiness, but not in morality' (p. 176).
20. Key, *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, p. 18.
21. Quoted in Leon D. Epstein, *Political Parties in the American Mold* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), p. 18.
22. E.E. Schattschneider, *Party Government in the United States* (New York: Rinehart, 1942), p. 1.
23. Quoted in Epstein, *Political Parties in the American Mold*, p. 32.
24. Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party System: A Framework for Analysis* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. ix.
25. Clinton Rossiter, *Parties and Politics in America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 1.
26. Amicus curiae brief filed by the Committee for Party Renewal in *Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission* (February 1996), p. 3.
27. Hugh McDowall Clokie, 'The modern party state', in Norman L. Zucker (ed.), *The American Party Process: Readings and Comments* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1968), pp. 5, 7.
28. Cited in Frank J. Sorauf and Paul Allen Beck, *Party Politics in America* (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1988), p. 9.
29. See Howard A. Scarrow, *Parties, Elections, and Representation in the State of New York* (New York: New York University Press, 1983), p. 2.
30. Leon D. Epstein, *Political Parties in the American Mold*, pp. 155–199. During the 1980s, the Committee for Party Renewal, a multi-partisan group of US political scientists sought to 'deregulate' political parties by challenging the state laws in the courts. Most notably, the committee succeeded in the landmark US Supreme Court decision *Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Central Committee*, 489 US 214 (1989).
31. See Everett Carl Ladd with Charles D. Hadley, *Transformations of the American Party System* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), p. 1.
32. See Key, *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, p. 164. The person who invented the PIE–PO–PIG analogy was Ralph M. Goldman. See Ralph M. Goldman, 'Party chairmen and party factions, 1789–1900'. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1951, ch. 17. Paul S. Herrnson subsequently introduced a fourth component, the party-in-the-campaign. See Paul S. Herrnson, *Party Campaigning in the 1980s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988).
33. See Frank J. Sorauf, *Party Politics in America* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1972 edition), p. 9.

34. Everett Carl Ladd, Jr., *American Political Parties: Social Change and Political Response* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1970), p. 8.
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42. Emphasis added: See John Kenneth White, *The Fractured Electorate* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1983), p. 103.
43. See Richard Morin and E.J. Dionne, Jr., 'Majority of voters say parties have lost touch', *Washington Post* (July 8, 1992), p. A-1.
44. George W. Bush, Acceptance Speech, Republican National Convention, Philadelphia (August 3, 2000).
45. See Al Gore, Acceptance Speech, Democratic National Convention, Los Angeles (August 17, 2000).
46. Greenberg, Quinlan, Rosner survey (December 2-4, 2001).
47. CNN exit poll (June 2, 1998).
48. V.O. Key, Jr., *The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936-1960* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 7.
49. Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, pp. 11-12.
50. See Stephen C. Shadegg, *Winning's a Lot More Fun* (New York: Macmillan, 1969).
51. Walter Lippmann, *The Phantom Public* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1925), pp. 56-7.
52. See Martin P. Wattenberg, *The Rise of Candidate-Centered Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 18.
53. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.
54. *Ibid.*, 100.
55. Committee on Political Parties, *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System* (New York: Rinehart, 1950), p. 1.
56. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
58. Evron M. Kirkpatrick, 'Toward a more responsible party system: political science, policy science, or pseudo science?' Paper presented at the Sixty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, September 8-12, 1970. This paper was subsequently published in *American Political Science Review*, 65 (December 1971), 965-990.
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66. Moisei Iakovlevitch Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Party System in the United States* (New York: Macmillan 1910), p. 380. Quoted in Ranney, *The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government*, p. 116.
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68. Quoted in David E. Price, *Bringing Back the Parties* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984), p. 102.
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2

THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY ORIGINS OF MODERN POLITICAL PARTIES: THE UNWANTED EMERGENCE OF PARTY-BASED POLITICS

Susan E. Scarrow

Party-based politics was one of the transforming inventions of the 19th century. Of course, parties were not unknown before this time, but it was not until the 19th century that they emerged as central organizing features in many countries' politics. Before this, parties were loose groupings at best, linked by support for a particular leader or political idea. Often they were equated with 'factions', unwanted divisions that endangered the national order. Yet despite these widespread and deep-rooted anti-party biases, during the 19th century parties took on a well-defined shape both inside and outside of the legislatures in many countries.

These changes in political parties coincided with, and stimulated, a much wider transformation of politics. Across Europe and North America the 19th century witnessed a broad movement towards mass electoral politics. As the electorate grew, so too did the seeming inevitability of party-organized electoral competition. Because of this, the presence of multiple, competing, political parties gradually came to be considered one of the hallmarks of a democratic regime: as E. E. Schattschneider (1942: 1) would put it in the middle of the 20th century, 'political parties created democracy, and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties'. Along with this shift came new definitions that highlighted electoral aspirations as the most important feature which distinguished political parties from other groups seeking to influence public policy. In the succinct words of Anthony Downs (1957: 25), a party is 'a team seeking to control the

governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election'. Though electoral competition came to be seen as a core activity for parties, in more elaborate functionalist descriptions parties did much more than this. They performed multiple tasks, including, according to one list, selecting official personnel, formulating public policies, conducting and criticizing government, providing political education, and intermediating between individuals and government (Merriam, 1923: 391). All this was a far cry from Edmund Burke's late 18th century definition, in which a party was 'a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed' (Burke, 1889: 530).

The best way to understand how this transformation occurred, and how party-based politics came to be a central feature of modern democratic practice, is to look to political developments in the 19th century.

THE CONCEPTUAL HERITAGE: ARE ALL PARTIES FACTIONS?

As suggested above, political parties as we know them today have their roots in distinctly inhospitable intellectual soil. Versions of the word 'party', derived from the Latin *partir* (to divide), were in use in all the major European languages by the 18th century. At this stage the term was most usually applied in a negative

sense, interchangeably with the term 'faction', to describe divisions around ideas or personal interests which threatened peaceful government. The label 'party' was not confined to the realm of secular politics: it also was applied to rival religious factions, whether within the Catholic Church or as a designation for protestant sects (Sartori, 1976: 5–12; Beyme, 1978: 677–701). This broad usage of the party label lingered, particularly in continental Europe.

The slow emergence of a secular and non-pejorative definition of parties is evident in political practice as well as theory. Through the 18th century and well into the 19th century, most of those involved in what we would now describe as political parties themselves rejected the label: in fact, many claimed the moral high ground of pursuing the best path for the nation, while deriding their opponents for being 'partisan'. Such a reaction was seen perhaps most strongly in the French Revolution. Influenced by Rousseau's ideal of the General Will, and his attack on associations that rallied only a part of the nation, rival groups staked claims to speak for all the people. Ironically, though the Revolutionary groupings claimed to be above party, later French commentators who rejected the Revolution viewed these groups as prime exemplars of partisan excesses, so that in France one of the enduring legacies of the Revolution was an anti-party bias across the political spectrum (Ignazi, 1996: 282–6).

Though this strand of French thought was perhaps extreme in its anti-partisanship, much of the 19th century's intellectual anti-party heritage was rooted in the long-standing equation of parties with factions, that is, with groups pursuing private ends at the cost of the broader public welfare. Factions were by definition immoderate and self-serving, and factional rivalry threatened public order. Thus, Lord Bolingbroke, an English politician and writer, warned in 1738 against the dangers of parties, arguing that they were qualitatively little different from factions, because all pursued particular ends instead of the good of the whole state: 'party is a political evil, and faction is the worst of all parties' (Bolingbroke, 1881: 219). A few years later, in 1742, David Hume gave a somewhat more sympathetic account of political parties, but he nonetheless compared them with dangerous weeds that are difficult to extirpate (see Hume, 1953: 77–84). Fifty years later, in 1796, Burke went further than Hume's cautious defense of parties, but his willingness to see some types of parties as compatible with public welfare was by no means the norm for this period. More typical of the lingering suspicion

of parties were the sentiments expressed in the new American republic, where luminaries such as President Washington warned in 1796 against the 'baneful effects of the spirit of party' (see Washington, 1896: 218).

Such prejudices notwithstanding, political parties developed rapidly in the new American republic (Aldrich, 1995: 68–96). And here as elsewhere, anti-party attitudes gradually changed as experience with political parties grew. By the middle of the 19th century political life in many countries had begun to be defined in terms of partisan struggles. Reflecting this shift, 19th-century writing about political parties shows a similar move away from questions about whether countries were better off without parties at all, towards a discussion of party types and party features. As this sequence suggests, views of parties tended to be reactive, shaped by experiences with parties rather than pointing the way towards changes in political practice. Thus, to understand the development of party scholarship, we need some understanding of when and why parties themselves began to assume the characteristics of modern parties.

WHY PARTIES?

The newfound prominence of political parties in much of 19th-century Europe seems clearly linked to two distinct but interrelated developments: the transfer of political power to legislatures, and the expansion of the electorate. Many authors have emphasized the temporal and causal priority of parliamentarization in this process: 'First there is the creation of parliamentary groups, then the appearance of electoral committees, and finally the establishment of a permanent connection between these two elements' (Duverger, 1954: xxiv). Sartori described a similar sequence: legislatures became more responsible, then parties became more important, then party competition led parties to try to gain an electoral edge by enfranchising new, and presumably grateful, voters. Finally, the need to mobilize a larger electorate stimulated the parties to develop more formal organizations (Sartori, 1976: 23). The sequential models proposed by Duverger and Sartori apply well to Britain, but they seem less useful for understanding countries such as Denmark, where large expansions of the franchise preceded the emergence of legislative parties. Their model also ignores the extent to which parties in some countries were

Table 2.1 *Steps toward institutional democratization in western Europe*

	Parliamentarization ^a	Suffrage for lower house exceeds 10% of population over 19 years old ^b	Universal manhood suffrage ^a
Austria	1919	1873	1907
Belgium	1831	1894	1894/1919
Denmark	1901	1849	1849
Finland	1917	1907	1907
France	1875	1848	1919
Germany	1919	1871	1871
Italy	1861	1882	1913/1919
Netherlands	1868	1888	1918
Sweden	1917	1875	1911
Switzerland	1848	1848	1848
United Kingdom	1832–35	1869	1918

Sources: ^aKohl, 1983: 396; ^bBartolini, 2000: 582–5

important in winning more responsibility for the legislature – in some instances, parliamentarization was as much a product as a cause of party growth (Svåsand, 1980). These gaps may be the reason others have emphasized the causal priority of the expanding franchise in stimulating the emergence of parties in the modern, that is, electoral, sense of the word. As Epstein (1980: 23) put it most concisely, ‘the enlargement of the suffrage accounts for the development of modern parties’.

In any case, it is unlikely that a single model can explain why parties emerged when they did, because, as Table 2.1 illustrates for some countries in western Europe, the sequence of changes in the legislative and electoral realms varied broadly. Countries can be roughly divided into three categories: those where the shift of decision-making to legislatures (‘parliamentarization’) preceded the creation of a large electorate, those where legislative sovereignty increased only after the creation of a large electorate, and those where the two changes occurred more or less simultaneously. These patterns are clearly key to any model that hopes to explain why recognizably modern, electorally-oriented, political parties emerged where and when they did. Unfortunately, it is much more difficult to pinpoint the year when modern parties began to play a role in each country’s political life. Though Duverger (1954: xxxix) writes figuratively about ‘the birth certificate of a party’, in many cases these birthdates are hard to establish, particularly for the earliest parties. The lack of such firm dates is one reason why it is difficult definitively to link these two institutional changes with the timing of party emergence. Still, it seems evident that differences in institutional change

affected both the timing and the particulars of party development. They also affected perceptions about the need for parties.

For instance, in the United States, both representative government and a broad franchise were present at the country’s independence, and national political parties developed in the wake of both. In contrast, in Britain the superiority of the elected chamber of Parliament was established by 1832, and soon thereafter parties began organizing daily activity within the House of Commons (Cox, 1987). However, it was not until the election of 1885 that more than half of British adult males had the right to vote (Williams and Ramsden, 1990: 285). Thus, in Britain parties emerged as established parliamentary groupings before they became organized forces to contest elections (McKenzie, 1955). But *contra* Duverger and Sartori, a sequence like that in Britain did not inevitably lead to electorally-oriented parties with extra-parliamentary organization. This was amply illustrated by experiences in Italy. In this newly created country the parliament had constitutionally-guaranteed dominance from the time of the country’s independence in 1860 (indeed, this supremacy stretched back to 1848 in Piedmont, the constitutional monarchy which became the nucleus of the new Italian state). Yet the franchise remained limited in Italy, and parties had little incentive to build up extra-parliamentary electoral organizations. Politicians also felt little incentive to form binding ties within the legislature, and they valued independence from party as an honorable course (Carstairs, 1980: 149–50). In the three countries named above, ‘parliamentarization’ occurred comparatively early, but the development of parties differed greatly.

Outside Switzerland, most continental European powers retained strong monarchies and weak legislatures well into the middle of the 19th century. These systems were shaken by the revolutions of 1848, but, with the exception of Piedmont, the democratic constitutions of 1848–49 were quickly replaced by more autocratic ones which discouraged popular political activity. Because of this, for much of the 19th century political observers in these countries might describe national political disputes in partisan terms, but there was no need for these ‘partisans’ to form strong associational links: legislators seldom voted, and governments did not get their mandate from legislative coalitions. As a result, late parliamentarization may have affected not only the nature of the parties which developed (legislative links were more loosely organized), but also their number (in countries where parties did not form governments, there were fewer incentives to work together).

In many places, democratization of the suffrage outpaced the transfer of responsibility to the legislature, so that countries like Germany and France had manhood suffrage long before their elected bodies received a full mandate to govern. In Germany and Austria this sequence led to the development of active extra-parliamentary organizing even before the representative assemblies gained complete authority. However, the same did not happen in Second Empire France, where broad suffrage elections preceded parliamentarization, but where partisan organizing was almost entirely prohibited. This brings up a third, and often overlooked, set of institutional constraints that were important determinants of the timing of political party emergence: laws governing the right to free assembly, free association, and free speech.

WHY NOT PARTIES?

When trying to explain why parties emerged when and where they did, it is as important to consider the institutional obstacles to party building as to look at the institutional incentives for organized competition. These obstacles can easily be overlooked by those who study party emergence in the Anglo-American realms, because they played such a minor role in these countries. Yet one of the things which made the United States and Great Britain unusual in the first half of the 19th century was the extent to which their citizens enjoyed the right to form political organizations and to

express opposition to government policies. Press freedom and the right to free assembly were enshrined in the US Constitution, though even here press freedom (freedom from prior censorship) initially was viewed as being compatible with public action against those deemed to be disseminating views which threatened public order (Levy, 1985). This interpretation reflected the prevailing view in British Common Law. British censorship laws were abolished at the end of the 17th century, but well into the mid-19th century strict libel laws hampered the publication of remarks which might be construed as attacks on the government or on those who governed (Harling, 2001). But British laws did allow groups to organize to petition Parliament to present their grievances. Thus, for instance, while the violence associated with the Chartist protests of the 1830s was illegal, the petition itself was legitimate and was voted on by the Parliament (though soundly rejected). At a time when the electorate was very small, the Chartist protests did not lead to the foundation of a political party, but this episode demonstrates the comparatively wide scope of freedom of political association that Britons enjoyed by the first part of the 19th century.

The case was sharply different on much of the European continent. Here, many countries maintained laws throughout the 19th century that were designed to inhibit the development of organized political groupings and to stifle views hostile to those of the government. In central Europe, the brief period of relative freedom after Napoleon’s defeat was ended by the 1819 promulgation of the Karlsbad Decrees, which committed all states in the German Federation to establish political censorship and other restrictions on political activities. In 1831 these common measures were extended to forbid all political gatherings, and in 1832 it became illegal to form a political organization (Beyme, 1978: 707). These laws severely limited political opposition, but they did not entirely prevent the articulation of liberal and nationalist positions. Such ideas found their place in books (very long documents were exempt from censorship), in private associations, and, to a lesser extent, in the legislatures of some of the German states (Blackbourn, 1997: 125). In much of Germany direct press censorship was ended by 1850, but even after this governments continued using other legal tools to harass publishers of unsympathetic newspapers (Ruud, 1979: 525). The combined result of these restrictions was that schools of ‘partisan’ thought emerged within these

countries well in advance of the appearance of organized parties.

Across continental Europe, prohibitions against political organizing were briefly lifted after the revolutions of 1848–49, but they were quickly reimposed once these revolutions failed. Such strictures gradually relaxed, but in many countries their remnants lingered well into the 20th century. For instance, until 1899 German laws prevented all cross-regional links between party associations, and until 1908 local political associations in most German states had to notify local authorities whenever they held public meetings: women and minors were legally excluded from all such gatherings. Germany also had another type of legal obstacle to party development: laws intended to thwart the development of specific parties. Most notably, from 1878 to 1890, Germany's anti-socialist laws banned socialist or communist publications, and prohibited public meetings to promote socialist and communist aims, though they did allow Social Democratic candidates to compete in Reichstag elections and to take their seats if they won (Fairbairn, 1996; Turk, 1990; Ruud, 1979: 525).

Legal measures in France also inhibited party formation for most of the 19th century. Laws that limited the right to freedom of assembly and freedom of association were legacies of the reaction to the first French Revolution. These laws were carried forward into the 19th century, becoming progressively more restrictive. For instance, at the beginning of the 19th century political gatherings of fewer than 20 people were allowed to assemble without a permit, and some political organizers tried to create networks based on small cells. But even this type of organizational effort was thwarted after 1834, when laws against political gatherings were extended to cover groups of all sizes (Huard, 1996: 77). Many restrictions against political organization continued for some years after the regime democratized in 1871, although they were no longer so strictly enforced. They were not entirely abolished until 1901, when a new law of association gave parties the same standing as other organizations (Huard, 1996: Ch. 11). In addition, through the end of the Second Empire governments continued to use post-publication legal procedures to harass or shut down newspapers expressing views hostile to the government. Restrictions on press freedom were not lifted until 1881 (Ruud, 1979: 524). The combination of these restrictions did not entirely stifle partisan organization in the Second Empire and the early Third Republic, but they certainly discouraged efforts to build

permanent structures for mobilizing political support.

This brief review makes clear that the emergence of modern parties was not just a function of changing organizational incentives. It also was influenced by the strength of organizational *disincentives*: in many places party development was retarded by laws deliberately designed to stifle political opinions and political organizations, particularly those that might threaten the status quo.

WHY THESE PARTICULAR PARTIES?

In addition to trying to explain the overall emergence of modern parties, party scholars also have been interested in explaining why certain *types* of parties developed when and where they did. Klaus von Beyme gives one of the best brief overviews of the development of different 'party families', and he offers considerations about the interaction between the development of various party types, noting for example that 'Radical parties emerged mainly in those countries in which the Socialist movement developed into a powerful factor rather late' (1985: 43), and that Conservative parties have usually been 'the second party to develop, the organizational response to the challenge of Liberalism and Radicalism' (1985: 46). But as intriguing as his observations are, they beg the question of why the earliest parties emerged. One type of answer looks to sociological factors to explain why and when certain party types appeared. From this perspective, parties are entrepreneurs which try to exploit existing social divisions, transforming social identities into political ones. Thus, in Seymour Lipset's and Stein Rokkan's (1967) oft-cited account of cleavage-based party formation, different types of parties were the products of successive social revolutions that brought new conflicts to the fore.

More recent investigations of the development of particular party families have been less concerned with general explanations and more concerned with the reasons why similar social conditions did not always produce similar party formations. For instance, in separate studies Stathis Kalyvas (1996) and Carolyn Warner (2000) have sought to explain why Christian Democrats flourished in countries such as Belgium and Italy but not in France. Stefano Bartolini (2000) has examined the factors in addition to the industrialization of the labor force which explain the varying

timing and success of left parties. These accounts do not reject the importance of societal preconditions, but they have tended to stress the importance of decisions by individual politicians, and of institutional settings which made it more or less easy for new parties to compete. They reject (as did Lipset and Rokkan) a simple mechanical model whereby cleavages are automatically translated into parties, and focus instead on the process by which political entrepreneurs more or less successfully mobilized these cleavages and created new political identities.

POLITICAL PARTIES AS OBJECTS OF ANALYSIS

The study of political parties developed much more slowly than the emergence of parties themselves. Reviews of the American and European party literature of the 19th century clearly show how little is written about political parties until after the first third of the century (see Scarrow, 2003). This doubtless reflects the limited experiences with political parties up to that time, but it also reflects the very slow recognition of parties as a legitimate part of the governing process. Thus, in the United States, where recognizably modern parties developed comparatively early, prior to the 1840s few analysts paid much attention to parties as institutions (though particular parties figured more prominently in political polemics). Alexis de Tocqueville, the perceptive French observer of Jacksonian America, was one of the earliest commentators to devote an extended reflection to the role of the parties in American political life. He saw American parties through the lens of French anti-party prejudices, and hence argued that the American parties founded on selfish and even petty interests were more conducive to public welfare than parties based on high principles, because the latter are less willing to compromise (Tocqueville, 1839: Ch. 10).

Tocqueville's comments on the desirability of different types of parties were typical of one of the most prominent strands of writing about parties prior to the 1840s. Around this time, however, the emphasis in the literature started to shift, particularly in countries which were beginning to acquire more experience with party politics.

In Britain, for instance, changes in political practice in the wake of the Reform Act of 1832 prompted some sharp debates about the newfound prominence of parties in parliamentary

life. Some observers were profoundly disturbed by the growing expectation of party loyalty within governing cabinets, and of party-line voting within Parliament, viewing these changes as an unwise retreat from the Burkean ideal of parties as uncoerced coalitions united by shared principles. One such critic was Lord Brougham, a politician who served as a Whig minister during the 1830s, but who split with his colleagues because he prized his political independence. Brougham (1839: 300) denounced the increasingly partisan politics of the 1830s as 'this most anomalous state of things, – this arrangement of political affairs which systematically excludes at least one-half of the great men of each age from their country's service, and devotes both classes infinitely more to maintaining a conflict with one another than to furthering the general good'. Although other British analysts shared Brougham's regret over the disappearing role for the independent legislator, by mid-century most Anglo-Saxon commentators tended to accept party discipline as a necessary cost of parliamentary government. One of the most prominent advocates of this view was Henry George, Earl Grey, the son of a prime minister and himself a member of several cabinets. In a treatise that was quickly translated into several languages he argued that 'Parliamentary Government is essentially a government by party', and that cohesive parties led to better government even if some of this cohesion was 'purchased' by the favors which ministers could offer to their supporters (Grey, 1858). A few years later, Walter Bagehot (1867) amplified on this theme of the centrality of cohesive parties in parliamentary government.

Even in continental Europe, where parties and legislatures were much less developed than their Anglo-American counterparts, there is also evidence of an increased awareness of party politics by the second third of the 19th century. Some of their earliest concerns were taxonomical efforts to categorize parties conceived of as schools of political thought. One of the earliest and most elaborate of these taxonomies was developed by Friedrich Roehmer (1844), whose observation of Swiss politics led him to develop a very elaborate classification based on the four ages of man. Roehmer's categories were not widely adopted – they were in fact painstakingly dismissed in articles like that published a few years later in the *Staatslexicon* (Abt, 1848) – but many agreed with Roehmer's central premise that there were cross-national similarities in the varieties of available political alternatives.

Britain's comparatively early experience with party-based parliamentary government was on the minds of many across the continent who sought to establish more constitutional forms of government. Some saw Britain as a model worth emulating, such as the Austrian translator of Earl Grey's treatise on parliamentary government (Grey, 1863) and the German legal scholar Robert von Mohl (1872). Yet defenders of more autocratic systems tended to disparage party-based government and the party discipline this seemed to demand. For instance, in 1871, a few months after the formation of the new German empire, the influential German historian Heinrich von Treitschke pointedly rejected the British example, arguing that Germany benefited from having a constitutional monarch who was 'above the parties' (Treitschke, 1903). Four decades later, on the eve of World War I, German authors continued to debate the desirability of party participation in public life. While the liberal theorist Friedrich Naumann still found it necessary to defend parties as being a necessary form of contemporary political life, with educational and creative value (see Naumann, 1964: 214), others voiced concern about the partiality of parties, and repeated Treitschke's argument that constitutional monarchy was a good form of government precisely because monarchy transcended partisan divisions (Hasbach, 1912: 586).

American observers also responded to British accounts of party-based parliamentary life. Perhaps most famously, the young Woodrow Wilson (1885) was inspired by his studies of British politics to argue that American government could be improved by the advent of 'real party government', under which there would be a more secure link between Congress and the Executive. Others emphasized the special role of parties in the ethnically diverse and politically divided American federation, stressing parties' beneficial role as a 'nationalizing influence' (Ford, 1898). These responses to the British experience were the origins of what would become a long-running debate among US academics about the feasibility, and desirability, of responsible party government in the United States (see Ranney, 1954).

The 1890s saw the emergence of another concern that would form the basis for much subsequent party scholarship: writings on parties as extra-legislative organizations. A great deal of this commentary was fuelled by the perception that party organizations were becoming too powerful and well organized, with the prime example of this being the

'machines' that dominated politics in many American cities at the time. One of the most enduring of these works was Moisei Ostrogorski's (1902) comparison of party organizations in Britain and the United States. Ostrogorski was a French-educated Russian whose suspicion of the benefits of organized political parties was shared by other French scholars of the period (Quagliariello, 1996). Others also shared his interest in parties' organizational activities. For instance in Germany, where Social Democratic organization had inspired other parties to strengthen their own extra-parliamentary associations, Robert Michels and Max Weber were soon to write their now classic comments on the relations between parties' professional organizers and their rank-and-file supporters (Michels, 1959; Weber, 1982). But it was observers of US politics who wrote the most on this subject, undoubtedly because at the beginning of the 20th century the US parties had the strongest organizations.

The roots of the strong American party organizations extended back to the Jacksonian era, when the Democratic Party dominated national politics for much of the 1830s. This party shocked many contemporary observers by its unabashed use of public resources for party ends, but patronage politics quickly emerged as the new norm. From the Jacksonian era through the end of the 19th century and beyond, American parties often treated electoral victory as a license to distribute government jobs and other public assets to their supporters. Reactions against such intermingling of public and private interest became an increasingly prominent strain in 19th-century American political debates.

These attacks came to the fore in the final decade of the century, when 'good government' reformers and Populists became ever more strident in denouncing the evils of existing political parties and in promoting institutional innovations like referendums that would enable 'the people' to bypass the parties. Academic observers also were troubled by party corruption, but they were less willing to attack the existence of parties. By this time many saw parties as essential to the functioning of the US political system (Beard, 1910; Macy, 1904). Though very few defended the party machines, some did argue that the spoils of office might be a necessary price to pay for having parties which were strong enough to coordinate politics within the institutionally and geographically fragmented United States (Goodnow, 1900; see also Ford, 1898).

CONCLUSION

This chapter has tried to show how the roots of modern parties, and of modern party scholarship, are to be found in the 19th century. The emergence of party-organized politics was an unanticipated, and even unwanted, side-effect of the liberalization and democratization of politics in that century. Although countries took varied routes to the modern party era, by the beginning of the 20th century recognizably modern parties had begun to play an important role in many places, structuring electoral choices, coordinating legislative and executive action, mobilizing the electorate, and recruiting candidates. The study of political parties developed largely in the wake of these changes. The attitude towards parties changed as well. For much of the 19th century, many who wrote about political parties approvingly quoted Burke's late-18th-century definition, according to which parties were groups united in pursuit of the *national* interest. By the end of the 19th century, however, some analysts had begun to question Burke's emphasis on parties' pursuit of the national interest, arguing that competing parties served the national welfare precisely because they pursued *particular* (as opposed to national) interests: as the American Anson Morse (1896: 80) put it, 'the true end of party ... is, in ordinary times, to promote not the general interest, but the interest of a class, a section or some one of the many groups of citizens which are to be found in every state' This kind of emerging acceptance of the inevitability and necessity of party competition laid the groundwork for a view of parties that was to become dominant in much of the 20th century, a pluralist view that saw parties as beneficial mediators of individual and group demands. It is only by appreciating the views of parties that preceded this pluralist conception that we can understand how big a shift this new vision of politics represented.

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3

PARTY ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES

William Crotty

INTRODUCTION

Political parties evolved in America quite simply because the new nation could not function without them. Democratic representation depended on a new and unique system linking voters to political office-holders and holding those in power accountable to the mass electorate.

The relationship between theory and practice, with the theory usually preceding, and making the case for, the institutional development to follow, was not the case with political parties. A need to align forces to develop coalitions of interest to elect representatives, including the president, resulted in the uncertain evolution of the party system.

In the United States the parties were not welcome, and to a large degree and despite their utility they remain objects of suspicion and distrust. They are extra-constitutional structures not envisioned by the framers of the Constitution. From the earliest beginnings, they have been objects of criticism. In *The Federalist*, which was meant to rally support for the new Constitution of 1787, James Madison (1961) warned against 'factions' that would divide the new nation and emphasize the economic, regional, and state divisions. The new Constitution had been agreed to in an effort to provide the foundation for a nation and a new system of governance, one that united the colonies and provided a basis for a national accommodation and unity. The parties threatened to undo what had been accomplished.

The parties initially grew out of need. The theoretical justification of the parties followed later. The argument that evolved in time was that political parties are indispensable to a democracy. They fulfill functions that no other organization, then or now, could. These include: representing the interests of the mass of voters; mobilizing them to support candidates and parties; presenting issue alternatives relevant to the problems facing the nation and enacting them once in office; recruiting candidates to run for public office and supporting them in campaigns; and providing the unity and cohesion to make a fragmented governing system perform adequately.

These are not easily achievable objectives. Yet they are crucial to democratic governance. Political parties provided the critical linkage in any society whose ultimate power rests on elections.

A final general point is that the parties are agents of democratization in another regard. In the competitive battle for additional sources of support for winning elections and exercising power, the parties pushed the bounds of the electorate to greater inclusiveness (Keyssar, 2000). The parties extended the reach of the franchise, from a select few in the colonial period, to a mass-based male electorate, to the inclusion of women (denied the vote until 1920), minorities (effectively disfranchised until the Civil Rights and Voting Right Acts of the 1960s), and younger members of the society (the 18-year-old vote in the 26th Amendment to the Constitution).

PARTIES AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE

The lineage of parties in America and elsewhere is directly tied to democratizing forces within society. Political parties are agents of democracy, critical to any system intending to represent and institutionalize the rule of the mass.

There are a number of ways of making this point. Henry Jones Ford wrote in 1898:

The bane of the Whig ideal of government was party spirit. It introduced principles of association inconsistent with the constitutional scheme. Because of party spirit gentlemen betrayed the interests of their order and menaced the peace of society by demagogic appeals to the common people. Instead of the concert of action which should exist between the departments of government as the result of a patriotic purpose common to all, devotion to party was substituted, and the constitutional depositories of power were converted into the fortifications of party interest. (Ford, 1967: 90)

Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. (1970: 16–17) puts the matter somewhat differently:

Political parties are children of egalitarianism. They have no place in pre-egalitarian societies, and their presence in some form which denotes the basic commonality of function cannot be avoided in any egalitarian system. ... We can ... understand the egalitarian revolution and the manner in which it produced the social base for new political institutions like parties by noting its enemy – what it was directed against. It was an attack on *ascriptive class societies*, societies in which social position was determined by birth. These are commonly called *aristocratic* since *aristocracy* is a generic name for the hereditary ruling class of an ascriptive class society. The aristocracy, a small fraction of the population, typically possessed a monopoly of all or nearly all the components of high social position, such as wealth, prestige, and power, and occupied a position of legally defined privilege. Most people in aristocratic societies were blanks, having no say in the social, economic, and political decisions of the system, and were permanently fixed in a distinctly subordinate position.

Changes of such a radical nature towards egalitarianism and an emphasis on the individual's self-definition of interests in society were revolutionary, undermining the old order and replacing it with a new and uncertain social and political structure. For those who held power by reason of birth or wealth, it was a development fraught with fears as to the

dissolution of the state and the destruction of society, its norms and value commitments as they then existed. Such fears proved to be well founded.

A second point in this regard: Political parties evolved (they were not planned and, as indicated, were believed to be disruptive and corruptive of a sound order). They were created out of need, instituted as a practical and effective mechanism (whatever their faults) for mobilizing and representing the mass of people. The party systems gave meaning to the Constitution; they incorporated millions of newcomers into the politics of the society; and they made the promise of democratic participation in self-government a universal reality.

THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

The Constitution of the United States does not mention political parties. How the society should mobilize a mass electorate was unknown; the implicit expectation was that individual voters would inform and motivate themselves and decide the public interest. The government would be based on a unified nation and rule in its best interest. It was to be a poor reading of human nature, although one familiar in early theorizing on democracy. It also evidenced a large degree of naiveté concerning the functioning of the new system:

In the process of party building, American founders confronted and effectively solved a long series of political problems. Some were foreseen and some unforeseen, some were at hand from the outset and some emerged only in the course of the work. It was throughout an endeavor of pragmatic adaptation and inventiveness under necessity, guided at the beginning by immediate purposes or a general desire to prove the republican experiment, informed only later by a conception of party as a goal. The problem of establishing the republic and of establishing party overlapped, and in a sense they all involved the practical fulfillment of the nation and democratic promise of the Declaration of Independence. (Chambers, 1963: 10–11).

Parties provided a link between ruled and ruler, and a vehicle to channel representative need upwards. Democratic politics is grounded in conflict. It pits groups, regions, ethnic affiliations, religious denominations, races and even such things as lifestyle commitments against each other. The role of the parties is to allow peaceful resolution of differences and to

compromise and accommodate the conflicting interests. The parties help provide a sense of national identification and participation in policy-making necessary to the functioning and adaptability of a democratic system.

The initial impetus for the American party system developed out of just such struggles. The competition was over nothing less than the nature and operation of the constitutional Republic. In many respects it is a curious story, one that combines institutional and systemic needs with values that forcefully disparage the form of an agency that could fill those needs.

There was no model of a party system that the founders could adapt to the American situation. It had to be created in response to the pressures for representation and governance. It was to be experimental. Those involved in its creation intended it as temporary.

The Federalist, in promoting the new national Constitution, warned of the necessity of curbing the evils of faction. It was a position shared by James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, principal authors of the appeal for a unified nation in *The Federalist*, and, in short order, among the primary architects of the evolving party system.

George Washington, in his 'Farewell Address', warned against 'the baneful effects of the Spirit of Party; a conflict that would divide and potentially destroy the new nation' (Washington, 1896: 218). John Adams, who followed Washington in the presidency, wrote that 'a division of the republic into two great parties ... is to be dreaded as the greatest political evil under our Constitution' (quoted in White and Shea (2000: 15); on the same subject see McCulloch (2001)). Such warnings came at the precise time the new party system was in its formative stages. Thomas Jefferson was to be the founding force (along with Madison) of the earliest of the mass-based political parties (the Democratic-Republicans or Jeffersonian Republicans, or, more simply, the Jeffersonians, which became the base for the later Democratic party). This party was to compete with the elitist Federalists (then dominant under George Washington and his successor John Adams) and was intended to oppose Adams, Hamilton and their policies by organizing an opposition force of interests and, in 1800, electing Jefferson to the presidency.

The elitist Federalists had little motivation, or belief for that matter, in extending the scope of decision-making and no desire to create any type of permanent party system (as neither did Jefferson nor Madison). The new parties were

considered temporary expedients to meet an immediate national emergency. Parties were looked upon as 'sores on the body politic' (Chambers, 1963: 68; Hofstadter, 1969).

The divisions that led to the efforts to expand the conflict to a public beyond the bounds of political office-holders and to solidify support for policies enacted, or to be enacted, began at the very birth of the nation. Hamilton, for example, initiated support at the Constitutional Convention for his conception of a strong federal government with financial, budgetary, and economic powers sufficient to stabilize the trade and international dealings of the new country.

There was, of course, opposition. Many believed the farm-oriented, rural nature of the country should predominate in federal policy-making. They also favored a system recognizing the preeminent role of the states in the Union (rather than a centralized federal government). In their minds, and largely consistent with the history of constitutional development in the new nation, a state-centered political system expressed the reality of the American experience. It was the basis upon which the Revolution had been fought. For such advocates, a strong presidency with extensive powers over the states and the nation's economic and monetary policy sowed the seeds for a return to the monarchy from which they had just freed themselves. Jefferson was to emerge as the champion of this political faction and in 1800 he and his new party (built on a coalition of southern states allied in the North with Governor George Clinton of New York) contested Adams and the Federalists for the presidency and won.

The precipitating issues, in addition to economic favoritism for mercantile trade and financial institutions, were the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. Both these acts (especially the latter) severely compromised the rights of citizens, including the right to criticize in speech or through the press the government, its leaders, or its policies.

The opposing sides, Federalists and Jeffersonian Democrats, did not consider themselves to be parties in the contemporary sense of offering electors alternative voting choices and as representing group coalitions intended to dominate governance, although of course this is what they did. The divide was far more serious and involved nothing less than what the United States should become as a nation: what the text of the Constitution actually meant in practice; the distribution of powers within the federal system; the rights to be

guaranteed to individuals; the manner in which political power was to be exercised; and the economic and political sectors that should, by right, be favored by the government.

There was little give on either side, limited room for compromise, and a belief in the total acceptance of one set of values over the other:

The Federalists and Republicans [Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans] did not think of each other as alternating parties in a two-party system. Each hoped instead to eliminate party conflict by persuading and absorbing the more acceptable and 'innocent' members of the other; each side hoped to attack the stigma of foreign allegiance [England for the Federalists; France for the Jeffersonians] and disloyalty to the intractable leaders of the other, and to put them out of business as a party. (Hofstadter, 1969: 8)

The Federalists were a party without a broad mass base. After their defeat in the presidential election of 1800, they soon disappeared, leaving a period of one-party dominance by the Jeffersonians. As an indicator of the totality of the divide between parties, the Jeffersonians believed they had established the nature, limits, and purpose of the new nation: 'The one-party power that came with the withering away of Federalism was seen by the Republicans [Jeffersonians] not as anomalous or temporary, much less as an undesirable eventuality, but as evidence of the correctness of their view and of the success of the American system' (Chambers, 1963).

It would take decades, if not generations, before the full conception of competing ideological and policy-making agendas, both representing legitimately contrasting strains of representation, intended to be resolved by the parties' election outcomes, was to be accepted. Pragmatic tolerance of an opposition, operating within the bounds of constitutionally-validated institutional structure, evolved over time, but its roots were embryonic in the organizations mobilized in the 1790s.

One other point is significant: the party system itself actively and rapidly evolved (more quickly than its popular acceptance). Essentially created (in an uncertain manner) at the birth of the nation and following a period of one-partyism that ended with the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828, it took forms that have come down to us in the contemporary period. Its initial development and permanence in American politics provide testimony to its crucial contributions to a functioning democratic system.

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES

The American party system has a number of distinguishing characteristics, which have influenced its evolution and served to define its special character, its structures, and its operations.

Federalism

The American parties had to adapt to a federal structure of government. This ensured a loose structure, a party system sensitive to state and local concerns while attempting to put together coalitions for national office. The parties thus were weakly structured organizations appealing to a variety of interests and attempting to unite political forces within a national entity sufficiently to compete effectively for the presidency. The result was not only that they managed to do this, but their coalitional nature has come to be recognized as a superior mobilizing device, as opposed to single-issue or one-group (religious, ethnic, religious class, regional) parties (however large their membership). The coalitional party helps to promote a more tolerant, compromising, and inclusive democratic electorate.

Another somewhat surprising development, given the basic nature, loose structure, weak incentive and reward systems, and inability to discipline party activists or office-holders (conditions that are the direct opposite of the mass parties of Europe), has been the major parties' ability, consistently over time, to represent broadly antagonistic and competing coalitions for power. The Democrats, evolving from the days of Jefferson, have generally been more sensitive to the needs of the less well-off in society, the Republicans more representative of wealth, corporate, and financial power.

The United States does not have a true class-based political structure, although the New Deal coalition came close. Still, while emphasizing cross-cutting cleavages, there has been a broad economic and class dimension to the two parties' coalitions that has been consistent throughout America's electoral history.

The electoral system

The United States employs a single member district electoral system with a first-past-the-post decision rule in elections. This is not the

most accurate gauge of a populace's views or its vote (proportional representation systems do this far better). It has been argued that it does contribute to a more decisive electoral outcome and therefore greater stability in governance. It is also a force in pushing for combining into two broad party coalitions.

The Electoral College was meant to break the impasse at the Constitutional Convention among big and small states, national and state-oriented forces and those favoring popular democratic election. The compromise solution was that a form of filter on the public will and indirect decision-making by a group of elders or more politically astute electors was included in the Constitution. With the possible exception of George Washington, preordained as the first president, it has never worked well and has been a constant object of proposals for reform, amendment, or replacement by direct election. It does serve to reemphasize the winner-takes-all nature of single member districts in electing presidents, and therefore pressures voting blocs into one party or the other. It serves to reemphasize the coalitional nature of party politics and that an election in the United States can be won only by one of the two major voting blocs. In the process, third, minor, and splinter parties have little or no chance of success.

Third parties

In any given election of consequence, there will be a number of third or minor party candidates on the ballot. More recently, minor candidacies have made a practice of competing in presidential and state party primaries as a means of promoting their views and gaining support for their positions (abortion, limits on taxation, animal rights, environmental concerns, anti-vivisectionism, fundamentalist religion, and family values being some of the causes promoted). These are basically ideological and policy-driven, single-issue groups who use the elections to further public awareness of their positions. V.O. Key, Jr. (1964) has labeled them 'ideological interest groups'. They are not serious threats to unseat or replace the dominant parties. In addition, the major parties' electoral superiority has been reemphasized by state and local regulation as to registration requirements and ballot access provisions. These work to minimize or eliminate minor party candidacies and, not by accident, decisively favor the principal parties.

There has, of course, been limited evidence of third party success. Abraham Lincoln and the new Republican Party managed to win

the presidency within 6 years of the party's founding. It is a feat that proves an exception to one of the most enduring rules in the political landscape. It is constantly cited by any serious alternative party that challenges the major parties. A three-way split in 1912, brought on by Theodore Roosevelt's Bull Moose party, led to the election of Democrat Woodrow Wilson in an era of Republican dominance. The breakaway of liberals (the Progressive party of Henry Wallace) and of states-rights, anti-civil-rights Dixiecrats (under Governor Strom Thurmond of South Carolina) from the Democratic party in 1948 was predicted to derail the reelection of Harry S. Truman. Truman won a close race. Alabama Governor George Wallace ran a similar (to Thurmond) race-based law-and-order campaign focused primarily in one region (the South) in 1968 and 1972 that developed some national support. Ross Perot in 1992 and 1996 financed his own Reform Party that attracted (for a third party) an impressive share of the vote (18.9 percent in 1992; 8.4 percent in 1996).

Others have run as small party candidates with little success: Ralph Nader's candidacy in 2000 did affect the election's outcome by drawing enough support to give the pivotal Florida popular vote, and with it the Electoral College, to George W. Bush. Lyndon LaRouche, a perennial candidate with an authoritarian streak, has contested a number of elections and party primaries. John Anderson was a liberal Republican who contested the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. A number of other minor candidates, such as Gary Bauer, Alan Keyes, and the Reverend Al Sharpton, have run in the primaries of one party or the other.

Primary nominations

The most radical democratic initiative was opening the parties' nominating process to mass-based influence through the primaries. The primary largely replaced caucuses (the first system used) and conventions. The national convention remains as the official party vehicle for deciding presidential nominees, but its function in the contemporary period is to legitimize decisions already made in the primaries. Caucuses and conventions are still used in the states on a limited basis. The primaries include all party activists (and in some states, any elector who chooses to vote in the prenomination phase) and the decision of these party activists is binding on delegates to the national conventions.

One consequence is to include more voters in the most important of party decisions, the selection of its nominees for public office. It replaces a mixed nominating system composed of conventions, caucuses, and largely advisory ('beauty contest') primaries. The final decision in the older system was mostly influenced by party regulars, their leaders, and the major interest group representatives important to the party in its campaign for office. Opening the nomination system has significantly reinforced the broad and flexible nature of party coalitions while further lessening the structural and institutional coherence of the party itself. Curiously, perhaps, it has not diluted the partisan differences in policies or ideology that separate the core identifiers of the two parties (Miller, 1988; Miller and Jennings, 1986). In addition, it has indirectly weakened the need or capacity of third parties to contest elections. A variety of choices on a range of issues, one left-leaning in the American political mainstream, the other right-leaning, are offered to primary participants.

Regionalism

This was once the primary force in shaping party agendas and coalitions and the issues and groups to which the parties directed their appeals. Regionalism faded in the 1920s, although it has still had some relevance (the South in its Republican vote being the most prominent example) in recent generations. The New Deal led to more nationalized and class-based politics and the issue-driven campaigns of recent generations, and regionalism has fallen to a decidedly second-level influence.

Party loyalty

There is no clear indicator of an individual's party allegiance. In the American context, aggregate party loyalty is a fuzzy concept based on registration figures (often inadequate and outdated), the division of the vote in any given election, or people's statements as to which party they support. There is no such thing as a mass-based, dues-paying loyal party membership. Party 'members' are free to affiliate with and support the candidates of their choice (in or between parties). The system allows a significant degree of cross-party votes in elections, often one predictor of the likely winner.

The most accepted and analytically useful indicator of party support has been the concept of party identifications developed in *The*

American Voter (Campbell *et al.*, 1960). As explained in *The New American Voter* (Miller and Shanks, 1996: 120), an update of the original study:

Party identification is a concept derived from reference and small group theory positing that one's sense of self may include a feeling of personal identity with a secondary group such as a political party. In the United States, the feeling is usually expressed as 'I am a Democrat' or 'I am a Republican.' This sense of individual attachment to party need not reflect a formal membership in or active connection with a party organization. Moreover, one's sense of party identification does not necessarily connote a particular voting record, although the influence of party allegiance on electoral behavior is strong, and there is evidence of a reciprocal relationship in which voting behavior helps establish, and solidify or strengthen, one's sense of party allegiance. The tie between individual and party is psychological – an extension of one's ego to include feeling a part of a group. Party identification can persist without legal recognition or formal evidence of its existence; it can even persist without resting on or producing a consistent record of party support either in one's attitudes or one's actions.

It is a measure of an individual's psychological identification with one party or the other. It has proven remarkably consistent in identifying the intensity and voting loyalties of various categories of identifiers and, if not the major force in voter decision-making, it rivals issue positions and candidate perceptions in importance. Its role is central as an explanatory variable in explaining both voting outcomes and party ties: 'personal identifications with the Republican or Democratic party are more stable than any other variable and play a major role in shaping most other political attitudes as well as vote choice' (Miller and Shanks, 1996: 18).

STAGES OF PARTY DEVELOPMENT

Five broad stages of party development can be identified. Each phase served historically different needs for the nation and evidenced different patterns of party support.

The *first stage* involved the creation of the political parties. It extended from the 1790s to what could be called the reinvention, or revitalization, of the party system after the collapse of the Federalists and the one-party era of Jefferson and Madison's Republican-Democrats (the early Democratic party) up to 1828. In this

era, the 'parties and the party system appear to have served particularly significant integrative functions in the period of nation-building' (Chambers and Burnham, 1975: 7).

The *second stage*, begun with the Jacksonian presidency and continued to the Civil War, witnessed the development of the party structures, from state and national nominating conventions to party institutions and campaign operations and approaches. These initial institutional forms have come down to the contemporary period (with the addition of the direct primary in the early years of the twentieth century and the opening of party operations in the late 1960s and early 1970s) in forms recognizable since their adoption. It is during this period that parties set their competitive patterns as well as the institutional forms that have endured.

The Democratic party fragmented in the 1840s and 1850s over questions of slavery, the role of the states in the Union, interpretations as to the divisions of constitutional powers, and expansionist issues the political system had been attempting to deal with since the nation's founding. The era also witnessed the failure of the Whigs, a party with a policy agenda and roots broadly similar to the early Federalists. This left the initiative to the new Republican party, and its 1860 presidential candidate Abraham Lincoln, to unify and mobilize sentiment in the North to resolve the cleavages over the states' place in the national system and, during the Civil War, to end slavery, an issue that had divided the nation since its birth, and one the Constitution did little to resolve permanently.

The most significant development, from a party and representative standpoint, of the second period may well have been the establishment of an enduring mass base to the party system, the national government, and policy-making (Chambers and Burnham, 1975: 11). The ends of an inclusive, representative democracy came to fruition during the years 1828–60. To these could be added 'those of egalitarianism', symbolized by the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828, in contrast to the elitist oligarchies of Massachusetts and Virginia that had held power to this point.

The *third stage* of party development encompassed the years 1865–1932 and is referred to as 'a derivative stage', that is, a period of 'adjustment rather than creativity' (Chambers and Burnham, 1975: 14). It was also a period that saw the nationalization of American problems and the incorporation of vast numbers of immigrants into the nation's politics, parties,

and democratic value structures. In these regards, it was a dynamic period of expansion and economic development for the country, one the party system both adapted itself to and encouraged.

The institutional developments did see the advent of the urban boss and the political machines. They also saw a level of corruption in all phases and all forms of government activities not experienced before or since.

The period was characterized by a one-party Republican dominance outside the South, and by competitive two-party elections nationwide with the Republicans normally victorious. The presidential election of 1876 (Hayes–Tilden), decided by the Congress, ended efforts (until the 1950s and 1960s) to integrate the races in the South and established the primacy of Democrats in the region. It would turn out to be a mixed blessing in that, while critical to the Democratic Party's success in national elections, this rise of Southern Democrats added a conservative and often racist component to what was the nation's more liberal party.

The election of 1896 (McKinley–Bryan) pitted a populist (Bryan) against a conservative, expansionist, and pro-corporate interest Republican. The Republican Party won overwhelmingly and cemented its position as the nation's dominant party up to the New Deal and the candidacy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The Republican control of the presidency after 1896 was broken by Woodrow Wilson's two terms (1912–20), brought on by a split among Republicans (between Teddy's Roosevelt's Bull Moose party and the Republican Party 'regulars' as represented by incumbent William Howard Taft).

The *fourth stage* of party development was the New Deal era symbolized by Franklin D. Roosevelt's victory in 1932 and to a large extent a product of the Great Depression. The New Deal party system was built on a class division, the less well-off voting Democrat, the better-off economically voting Republican. This division had been present throughout American political history, but the New Deal gave it a voice and meaning previously not apparent.

Among the consequences were the creation of the social welfare state, the regulation in the public interest of financial and corporate activities, and an expansion of the federal government and its powers. The New Deal permanently established Washington as the centerpiece of American politics.

The *fifth stage* of political development is basically the post-New Deal era with the full

incorporation of African-Americans into politics and American society, and an end to the expansion of the welfare state. It led to a Republican ascendancy from 1968 on (broken by the presidencies of two southern centrist Democrats, Jimmy Carter (1977–1981) and Bill Clinton (1993–2001)).

Dominant in this stage of development, beginning with the Nixon presidency and developed most determinedly in the Ronald Reagan administration and pursued by the presidency of George W. Bush (2001–09), has been an effort to curtail social programs and spending, revise the tax code to redistribute wealth upwards (a contrast with the policies of the New Deal era), run budgetary deficits of historic proportions, a greater militarization, and, in the second Bush's term in office, the necessity of dealing with global terrorism.

The new era has seen a weakening of party bonds, a seismic increase in the cost of politics, a polarization of the electorate, the growth of an independent vote, a rise in the importance of issue voting, and candidate-centered (as against party-centered) campaigns. The political party in this era remains a symbolic attachment for most Americans but its actual influence over voters and office-holders has declined:

the modern mass party retained a virtual monopoly over one key component – access to office for ambitious politicians – and with that political careers remained party centered. It was this virtual monopoly that disappeared in the critical era of the 1960s, and with its disappearance, the modern mass party also disappeared as an institutional form. It was a casualty of social, political, and technological changes and its own weakening institutions; but it was above all the loss of its virtual monopoly control over campaigns as candidates were able to develop an alternative to the party-centered campaign – the candidate-centered campaign organization – that made the modern mass party collapse ... With that the century and a half of party-centered elections ended and the contemporary era of candidate-centered elections began. (Aldrich, 1995: 269)

The contemporary era has seen a refocusing of party efforts and a decrease in the party's powers to influence elections, manage and finance campaigns, and choose through nomination processes its preferred candidates. The trade-off has been an increased role in party decision-making by the party's base and a freedom to organize campaigns and seek elective office by respective candidates. Such changes

in the political environment have not been universally acclaimed. They may be inevitable and unquestionably establish more demanding barriers for the parties to surmount.

CONCLUSION

The party system was created out of necessity. Its development mirrors the expansion and increasing democratization of the nation. It has never been a welcome addition to American politics, although the services it provides a democratic society are invaluable. The system began in the efforts of the 1790s to mobilize support for the competing conceptions of government and to answer the policy demands of opposing constituencies. The two parties' coalitions and policy agendas when in office continue to respond to the same dynamics.

The parties of the contemporary era reflect their births and the pressure for representation and national development within a society in constant change. The weakening of party ties and institutional structure in the modern period introduces a new period of adaptive and political stress to institutions that have served the nation well.

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4

PARTY IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY

Richard S. Katz

Notwithstanding that the democracy of Athens clearly predated the invention of political parties in the modern sense of formal organizations that promote candidates for office under a common identifying label, and notwithstanding the persistence of a few small democracies in which parties have not taken root (Anckar and Anckar, 2000) and the somewhat more common phenomenon of non-partisan local governments within systems that have parties at the national level, it is widely accepted 'that the political parties created democracy and that modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties' (Schattschneider, 1942: 1). Behind this apparent consensus, however, there is a wide range of views about what democracy means, and correspondingly about the proper nature and functions of political parties and party systems in a democracy.

Despite the great divergence of views, however, they can be organized around a relatively short list of interrelated questions. Three clusters of these questions bear directly on the definition of democracy:

1. Is democracy primarily about the discovery and implementation of the 'popular will', or is it primarily about popular imposition and enforcement of limits on government power? If democracy is about the implementation of the 'popular will', how is that defined and identified? And if democracy is about the limitation of government, can this be reconciled with majority rule, or does it require that minority groups that might be victimized by an arbitrary majority be able to impose a veto?
2. Is democracy primarily about outcomes or is it primarily about process, and if democracy is primarily about outcomes, is the meaning of 'outcomes' restricted to choices of policy or personnel, or does it extend to consequences for the moral or psychological development of citizens?
3. Is democracy to be understood as a macro or a micro phenomenon – as Sartori (1965: 124) might ask, is 'democracy on a large scale ... the sum of many little democracies'? Sartori's answer was no.).
Others bear more directly on the nature of parties or party systems:
4. Are parties properly considered as autonomous actors in the political process among which voters are called upon to choose or are they channels through which citizens themselves act politically?
5. Ought parties to be distinctive and exclusive with regard to their policies and support bases, or ought they to be convergent and overlapping?

PARTIES IN POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY

The simplest, and – at least through the 1970s – the dominant normative and (except with regard to the United States) empirical answers to these questions in Anglo-American political science begin with the 'responsible two-party government' model (Ranney, 1962; American Political Science Association Committee on Political Parties, 1950; with regard to party

government more generally, see Rose, 1974; Castles and Wildenmann, 1986; Katz, 1987). In its essence similar to Lijphart's (1999) model of majoritarian democracy, which focuses heavily on political parties, but also to Riker's (1982) model of populism in which parties are at most implicit, this model identifies democracy with the majority choice between two distinctive alternatives. These alternatives are embodied in political parties of which one, because there are exactly two, must win a majority at any election. That party then assumes control over the government until the next election, and because that control is undivided, the governing party can be held unequivocally responsible for its stewardship at the next election. Clearly this collective responsibility is contingent upon the cohesion of the party in power – and by extension to prospective voting, upon the cohesion of the opposition party as well.

Beyond this, however, the cohesion of the responsible two-party government model itself breaks down along a number of dimensions. The first concerns the basis of party cohesion. Is it cohesive support for a particular leader or team of leaders as in Beer's model of Tory democracy (1982: 91–8), or for a particular line of policy, as in his model of Socialist democracy (1982: 79–86)? Alternatively, is electoral politics about finding the popular will by allowing the people to put 'predominant political control in the possession of those who are by descent, by character, by education, and by experience best fitted to exercise it' (Hearnshaw, 1933: 293–4) in a society where social classes are hierarchically ordered but not divided by fundamental interest (Tory democracy), or is electoral politics a peaceful alternative to warfare between classes whose interests are fundamentally opposed (Socialist democracy)?

Beer describes these models as 'collectivist', but particularly the Socialist (policy-oriented) model has individualist equivalents in what I have described as binary and Downsian models of popular sovereignty (Katz, 1997). In the first, issues are assumed to form two clusters – the generalization of Duverger's (1959: 215) claim 'that political choice usually takes the form of a choice between two alternatives' – so that the two parties, each representing one of these clusters, take distinctly different policy stands. In the second, issue positions are assumed to be the equivalent of points on a policy line, with the parties remaining cohesive with respect to policy but tending to converge on the first preference of the median voter. The Downsian model of democracy also

differs from binary democracy (and indeed from all of the other popular sovereignty models) in its assumptions (in the case of Downsian democracy explicit; in the cases of the other models implicit) concerning the relationship between the goals of policy-seeking and office-seeking (Strøm, 1990). In the Downsian model, parties formulate policy proposals in order to win elections; in the other models, parties try to win elections (seek office) in order to be able to formulate public policy.

The second dimension concerns the social basis of parties, in particular whether party is understood to be the political arm of a coherent social group or class in a fundamentally segmented society (e.g., the party of the working class or of farmers or of the religious) or alternatively as an alliance or representative of citizens who share common, but potentially mutable, views on issues. The former, which corresponds to the 'i' (ideological oppositions) end of the functional dimension developed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 10) from Parsons' (1959) scheme of functional subsystems in society, is associated with the mass party of integration, and a political strategy of mobilization and encapsulation; the latter corresponds to the 'a' (interest-specific oppositions) end of the dimension, and to the catch-all (Kirchheimer, 1966), or electoral-professional (Panebianco, 1988: 262–7) models of party, and to a strategy of compromise and conversion.

The third, and related, dimension concerns what Ranney (1962: 156) described as 'the little civil war about "internal democracy"'. On one side, early 20th-century scholars like Frank Goodnow (1900), the mid-20th century Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association, advocates of the 'Socialist democracy' model of party government, and the parties of the 'new left' (although, as small parties, not advocates of the two-party model) see internal democracy as necessary for various combinations of three reasons. Particularly from the perspective of 'Socialist democracy,' internal party democracy is essential in order for the party to be able to speak as the authentic voice of the social segment it represents, and this in turn both legitimizes the dominance of the party on the ground over the party in public office (Katz and Mair, 1993) and privileges the party manifesto over the individual judgement or consciences of elected officials. Particularly from the perspective of the new left, internal democracy allows ordinary party members to become actively involved as participants in policy-making for

the party, and thus in true self-governance as citizens (see below). Finally, all advocates of internal party democracy see it as essential as a way to hold party leaders accountable, or, in the terms of principal-agent models, internal democracy is seen as a way of enforcing the control of party members as the principals over both party officials and public officials elected under the party's banner as their agents.

On the other side, the principal argument is that internal democracy is incompatible with external cohesion (Ford, 1900, 1909; Downs, 1957: 25), or simply that democracy is about what happens between parties, not within them (Schattschneider, 1942). Moreover, if one assumes that the Downsian assumptions that lead to the expectation of party convergence on the first preference of the median voter would be translated to intraparty politics as well, then even if the parties could each present a coherent face to the electorate the result of intraparty democracy would be to fix each of the parties at the median of its own supporters, obviating the virtues of two-party competition. In principal-agent terms, the complaint is that public officials should be the agents of the electorate as a whole, and that the conflict of interest entailed in expecting them also to be the agents of their party membership organizations will allow, or even force, them to shirk this primary responsibility. Often in the American case this is supplemented by the claim that the entire enterprise – which in the absence of true membership organizations generally equates the party's membership with its electoral supporters or at least its registrants or primary election voters (e.g., V.O. Key's (1964: 163–5) category of 'the party in the electorate') – is fundamentally misguided: parties, in this view, are alliances of leaders between which voters choose, and not organizations of the citizens themselves (Schattschneider, 1942: 59).

The assumptions that there is a common interest that is identifiable by an elite who will be recognized by ordinary voters (Tory democracy), or that there are only two cohesive social groups competing for political power (Socialist democracy¹), or that even if there are two sides to every issue, they are the same two sides across all issues (binary democracy), or that an entire program of policy proposals can be reduced to a single point on a single dimension (Downsian democracy), each in its own way justifies a two-party system as both adequate and, given the presumed importance of having a stable majority outcome, desirable. Each is, however, also highly questionable.

Given its privileging of 'strong and stable government first' (Amery, 1947: 19), there

really is no Tory-like alternative to two-party government, and hence no way of dealing with the implausibility of its underlying assumptions about the nature of society and of the common interest or popular will. Each of the other models, however, can be adapted to a multi-party version that does not depend on such highly restrictive premises.

The easiest to adapt institutionally is Socialist democracy; if one replaces the Marxian assumption that there is an all-subsuming division between the proletarian and bourgeois classes with a more general cleavage-based view of society, then the Socialist prescription of two cohesive parties can be generalized to a prescription of a one-to-one correspondence between fundamental social segments and integrative parties. The problem is to get from this multi-party system of group representation to a decision process that can be assumed to result in the popular will, particularly in light of the well-known 'paradox of voting' (Brams, 1976; Condorcet, 1775 [1785]; Arrow, 1963).

The same problem arises with individualist theories of popular sovereignty as soon as the binary or unidimensional assumptions are violated. One of the classic statements of the problem in the first case comes from Moisei Ostrogorski's (1902: II, 618–19) study of late 19th-century politics in the United States:

what was pompously called the national verdict was, as a rule, tainted with ambiguity and uncertainty ... after 'the voice of the country had spoken', people did not know exactly what it had said; ... for, however paramount a particular question may have been in the public mind, considerations foreign to it constantly entered into the 'popular verdict'.

The problem in the second case has been extensively explored in the rational choice literature; simply, if preferences are not single-peaked (i.e., if there is not a single underlying dimension), then there is no stable equilibrium or Condorcet choice except under unbelievably restrictive conditions (Plott, 1967; for a full discussion of this literature in empirical as well as theoretical terms, see the chapter by Budge in this volume).

Ostrogorski's solution was to replace permanent and all-encompassing parties with what would amount to a series of two-party systems (what he called 'single issue parties' (1902: II, 658–63), each of which would address one issue, resolve it, and then be replaced by a new pair of parties taking the two sides of a new issue.² If issues are understood as continua rather than dichotomies, then one might imagine the same idea applied one dimension at a time instead of

Table 4.1 *Summary of popular sovereignty theories of democracy and competitive party systems*

Theory of democracy	Ideal number of parties	Should the parties be durable over time and comprehensive with respect to issues?	Should parties be primarily office-seeking or policy-seeking?	Should party coalitions cut across social divisions?
Binary	2	yes	policy	yes
Downsian	2	yes	office	yes
Ostrogorskian	2 (at any one time)	no	policy	yes
Legislative	As many as there are distinct combinations of policy preferences	yes	policy	yes
Tory	2	yes	policy	yes
Socialist	2	yes	policy	no

one issue at a time. Aside from the question of whether problems can be solved one-at-a-time and once-and-for-all, the obvious danger here is that if a succession of transient amateur administrations does not lead to chaos, it will lead to the dominance of the administrative officials as the sole possessors of the networks and expertise required for the government of a complex state (Ranney, 1962: 129).

The alternative is a multi-party system in which the parties are identified with unique combinations of policy positions rather than with social categories, and the problem of arriving at particular decisions on particular questions is transferred from the electoral arena to the legislature, leading to a model of democracy that might be called 'legislative popular sovereignty'. This opens the possibility of coalition formation through the trading of votes, and if not the likelihood of a Condorcet outcome, then at least the plausible argument that parties, as the representatives of groups of people who are in fundamental agreement across issues, and provided that their representation in the legislature is proportional to the size of those groups among the citizens, will reach the same outcome that the citizens would have reached themselves had direct democracy been possible.³

The implications of each of these six models of popular sovereignty democracy for the proper nature of political parties are summarized in Table 4.1.

PARTIES IN LIBERAL THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY

The six models of democracy suggested in the previous section all identify democracy with

the discovery and implementation of the popular will. The major alternative family of democratic theories is concerned primarily with the liberal value of popular self-protection. This shift in value priorities implies a shift in attitude toward the relationship between government and citizens as well: for the popular sovereignty theories, government is a tool of the people, and therefore in a sense a part of them, whereas for the liberal theories the government is a potential danger to the people, and therefore necessarily separate. In principal-agent terms, while many, but by no means all, popular sovereignty theories recognize agency slack (with the individual parties or office-holders as the agents) as a potential problem, for liberal theories agency slack (with the government as the agent) is one of the two principal problems that must be addressed in institutionalizing democratic government.

All democratic theories must be concerned with the problem of the unchecked rule of a minority over the majority. That is, of course, the reason for the concern with majority formation in popular sovereignty theories. Liberal theories also rely on popular elections to control this danger. But where the converse problem of the unchecked rule of a minority *by* the majority is at most of secondary concern for popular sovereignty theories (which define democracy as the implementation of the will of the majority), it is the other principal problem for liberal democratic theories.⁴

That said, liberal theories of democracy can be classified into four types, defined by the intersection of their assumptions about the nature of conflicting interests in society and therefore about the way in which what might be called majority tyranny can be avoided, on the one hand, and their assumptions about the relative commitments to liberal values of elites

and of ordinary citizens, and therefore about the centrality of agency slack, on the other.⁵ As with the popular sovereignty theories, each set of assumptions has implications concerning the proper nature and role of political parties and party systems.

The first pair of liberal theories may be identified as 'pluralist'. The defining assumption is that the cleavages among interests are fluid and cross-cutting, rather than fixed and mutually reinforcing. As a result, institutions – including political parties – can be structured so as to make it difficult for any enduring majority to form while at the same time moderating the temptation of any majority of the moment to abuse its position.

Like the responsible two-party government models, these theories generally call for a two-party system, albeit primarily because this will allow the majority to evict a government – what Pinto-Duschinsky (1997, 1999) has called 'removal van democracy' – rather than to ensure either stable government or popular endorsement of the policies to be pursued by government. They differ most centrally from the responsible two-parties models, and indeed in the American debate over responsible two-party government these pluralist liberal models represent the other side of the debate, in that they call for parties that are not cohesive with regard to policy, and especially not cohesive with regard to their social basis. Rather, the claim is that if each party depends at least in part on the support of groups that also support the other party, then neither party will be able to participate in the unreasonable exploitation of any group without itself suffering significant loss of support from that group.

This emphasis on weak and incoherent parties, coupled with confidence in the ability of ordinary voters armed simply with the right of frequent elections to prevent leaders from intruding on their rights, is particularly evident in pre-20th-century versions of majoritarian or pluralist liberal theory. Prominent examples include Jeremy Bentham's call for annual elections to allow voters to '[divest] of their power all unfit representatives, before they had time to produce any lasting mischief' (1962: III, 561) coupled with his hostility to political organizations, as exemplified by the weak cohesion of his own Radical Party, or the antipathy for political parties expressed in *The Federalist* coupled with the call for biennial elections of the House of Representatives.

Particularly after the collapse of democratic governments in Europe in the inter-war years, and in response to survey research that showed

elites to be more committed to liberal values than were ordinary citizens, the focus shifted to place greater emphasis on the self-restraint of leaders, on the sociological preconditions of cross-cutting cleavages and dispersed and variegated access to politically relevant resources, and on regular competition among elites. Prominent examples of theorists of this genre include Schumpeter (1962), Sartori (1965), and Dahl (1956, 1966, 1971) – for a critique, see Bachrach (1967). As in the Downsian model of popular sovereignty, parties are understood to be teams of leaders rather than organizations of citizens, but unlike the Downsian assumption of prospective policy-oriented competition, the pluralist liberal ideal is retrospective result-oriented judgement by voters whose vocabulary is necessarily limited to 'yes' or 'no' (Schattschneider, 1942: 52). Moreover, because ordinary citizens are not only illiberal but also incompetent – 'the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field' (Schumpeter, 1962: 262) – leaders ought not to be restrained (e.g., by intraparty democracy) from presenting the people with 'results they never thought of and would not have approved of in advance' (Schumpeter, 1962: 278).

If cross-cutting cleavages are a prerequisite for stable liberal democracy, as the pluralists argue, then such a regime ought not to exist in countries where cleavages are deep and mutually reinforcing. Yet, as Lijphart (1968) observed, the Netherlands (divided by religion), Belgium (divided by language), and Switzerland (divided by both religion and language) appeared to defy this rule. In response, he advanced the model of consociational democracy, based on his observation of democracy in the Netherlands. In many respects, this was a modern version of Calhoun's (1943) model of 'concurrent majorities', taking account of the fact that the fundamental social segments might not be coterminous with the geographic subdivisions of a federal state, and, as with the more recent versions of pluralist liberal theory, assuming that greater elite autonomy is both necessary and desirable. Together, they exemplify theories that can be identified as 'veto-group liberalism'.

As the name implies, these theories solve the problem of majority exploitation by abandoning the majority principle altogether, and replacing it with a system of mutual vetoes. In Calhoun's version of this model, the central government would be relatively limited in scope, and the vetoes would be exercised by

Table 4.2 *Summary of liberal theories of democracy and competitive party systems*

Theory of democracy	Ideal number of parties	Cohesiveness of parties	Should party coalitions cut across social divisions?	What level of constraints should the party impose on its leaders?
Benthamite or Madisonian	2	low	yes	strong
Schumpeterian or polyarchal	2	low	yes	weak
Concurrent majorities	At least one for each social segment	high	no	strong
Consociational	One for each social segment	high	no	weak

the subnational governments. There is nothing directly said about the nature of the political parties operating within each subnational system, although given the tenor of his argument, it would appear that subnational governments are meant to operate under some version of responsible party government. One may infer, however, from Calhoun's (1943: 34) disdain for separation of powers as an adequate guarantor against the majority faction, that coherent national parties are incompatible with his vision of democracy.

The basic claim of the consociational model is that 'overarching cooperation at the elite level can be a substitute for crosscutting affiliations at the mass level' (Lijphart, 1968: 200). It is a government by elite cartel⁶ characterized by four conditions: 'government by a grand coalition of the political leaders of all significant segments of a plural society'; operation of a system of mutual vetoes by the leaders of all significant segments of society; proportionality as the standard for allocation of all or most political 'goods'; and a high degree of internal autonomy for each group (Lijphart, 1968: 25). This system is supported by an electoral system of closed-list proportional representation with a single national district, all of which implies cohesive national political parties dominated by their leaders. Further, while the implication of Calhoun's argument is that there would be a separate party system within each of the significant social segments (subnational units), in the ideal consociational system, there would be a one-to-one correspondence between parties and social groupings.⁷ Finally, in contrast to the pluralist vision of continuous, if moderated, interparty conflict between elections, the veto group liberal model assumes that electoral conflict will be replaced by inter-elite cooperation that is made

necessary precisely by the mutual hostility of the social groupings' members. This means that the parties' leaders, whether initially chosen 'democratically' or not, must have the autonomy to override the unwillingness of their followers to compromise.

Table 4.2 summarizes the prescriptions for political parties of these liberal models of democracy.

CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY

As indicated above, the responsible two-party government model corresponds quite closely to Lijphart's model of majoritarian democracy. While the alternative, consensus democracy, has much in common with consociational democracy, from which it might be understood to be derived, it is also different in three important respects that bear on the role of political parties in democracy.

Consociational democracy explicitly rests on a system of mutual vetoes. In consensus democracy, the emphasis is instead on negotiation, and indeed Lijphart (1999: 2) indicates that Kaiser's (1997: 434) term 'negotiation democracy' might be adopted as a synonym. With regard to the majority principle, which veto group liberalism overtly rejects as inadequate, consensus democracy takes a more ambiguous position. While oversized majorities clearly are preferred to minimum winning coalitions, this is still less than demanding a grand coalition. On the other side, minority governments are also preferred to minimum winning coalitions, because this implies constantly shifting majorities supporting particular issues in place of one stable majority. Nonetheless, the ultimate decision *rule* remains

the majority principle. At the same time, however, the simple distinction between 'the majority', which can be held accountable for all of the government's decisions, and 'the minority', which might replace it if enough voters change their preferences, is obscured.

The second respect in which consensus democracy differs from consociational democracy concerns the basis of the divisions among parties. In the consociational model, parties clearly are reflections of deep social cleavages. While the consensus model recognizes sociological dimensions of party competition, the very use of the dimensional metaphor, not to mention consideration of both a socioeconomic and a post-materialist dimension, implies a continuous multi-dimensional policy space in which parties choose positions, rather than a categoric 'menu' of parties directly corresponding to social structure.

The third difference concerns what I have called the 'partyiness of government' (Katz, 1986: 40–6). While one might argue about which 'aspect' of a segment's identity (party, church, press, union) is dominant in any particular arena, the fundamental point for the consociational model is that the leadership cadre of each segment forms a kind of 'interlocking directorate' (Lijphart, 1968: 59–70), so that party is intimately connected to the full range of governmental activity, and indeed the full range of political activity more widely understood. Among the defining characteristics of consensus democracy, on the other hand, is the explicit exclusion of party from the judiciary and central bank coupled with limitation of party influence through strong corporatist institutions (which are understood to be competitors for party dominance), territorial division of power, and presidentialism.

The conjunction of these three differences implies a model that is different both from popular sovereignty, which is about finding the popular will, and from liberalism, which is about the containment of conflict. Instead, consensus democracy appears to be about equitable management in the pursuit of objectives that have been defined *a priori* to be good. One of these 'goods' is demographic representativeness. Having cut party free from social cleavage, and in any event including gender – which has never been taken to define a social cleavage analogous to race or language group, or economic sector – among the traits that ought to be mirrored in a representative body, one must presume that parties individually are to be demographically representative, either of the population as a whole or of their individual

but heterogeneous electorates. Another 'good' is economic prudence; presumably parties should both advocate economically prudent policies and advance leaders who will be competent in their pursuit. In other words, consensus democracy appears to limit not only the role of parties in societal governance, but also the scope for politics within the parties. Indeed, in its tendency to judge outcomes by technocratic standards, one might ask whether it also limits the scope for citizens to engage in politics, and in this sense ask whether it is an alternative form of democracy, or rather a lesser democracy.⁸

DEMOCRACY AS A WAY OF LIFE

Both popular sovereignty and liberal theories define democracy in terms of what the government does (or does not do). While they often make prescriptions concerning process, these are justified by their impact on, or necessity for, the valued policy outputs. Other theories, however, identify democracy with its impact on those who participate in it, which they attribute to the process itself. In contrast to Schumpeter's (1962: 242) definition of democracy as a 'type of institutional arrangement for arriving at political – legislative and administrative – decisions', these theories in their fullest form see democracy as a way of life. As John Dewey (1927: 143) put it, 'The idea of democracy is a wider and fuller idea than can be exemplified in the state even at its best. To be realized it must affect all modes of human association, the family, the school, industry, religion.'

Even if attention is limited to the narrowly political sphere, in which political parties may be expected to be relevant, these theories are concerned with the development of citizens in the sense of being efficacious people who have fully developed their individual capacities and have achieved self-mastery (Bachrach, 1967: 4; Mill, 1962: 49–52; Lane, 1962: 161 (quoting Margaret Mead)) and of understanding themselves to be members of a community who can and do make civil judgements and evaluate goods in public terms (Mill, 1962: 71–3; Barber, 1984: 158), rather than merely being citizens in the juridical sense. Clearly simply going into a voting booth every few years and making a private choice (both in the sense of being motivated by private passions and in the sense of neither being revealed nor justified in public) among parties or candidates will be

inadequate to further these objectives.⁹ But what is the role of parties in this process of democratic development?

One answer has already been indicated with regard to the attitudes of new left parties to intra-party democracy (Kitschelt, 1982). Particularly in their local branches, parties can provide a venue in which citizens can be actively engaged in the actual doing of politics: debating issues (rather than merely listening to debates) and making decisions (rather than merely voting for others who will make decisions for them). This is a more extensive and continuous democracy than the representative model of the mass party with its congress and national executive committee, or the popular choice of candidates through a direct primary. Organizationally, it calls for frequent meetings, decision by members rather than delegates, and rotation of office-holders both within the party and among the party's elected officials. The contrast between this understanding of intraparty democracy, and thus of the proper nature of parties themselves, and the understanding in the responsible party government models is illustrated by the debate within the German Green party between the 'Realos' and the 'Fundis'. For the Realos, the possibility of policy influence in the Bundestag or even coalition membership required abandonment of rotation of office-holders, and granting party leaders the authority to reach accommodations with other parties; for the Fundis, the principles of democratic life within the party were more important than influencing government decisions more directly.¹⁰

While all this may be possible in a small party and with regard to local questions, a large or geographically dispersed party will require more formal organization and representative institutions. This raises the problem of the 'iron law of oligarchy', posited by Michels (1962) on the basis of his study of the German Social Democratic Party – a party ideologically committed to democracy, but in Michels' view profoundly undemocratic in its actual functioning. In Michels' (1962: 365) view, the problem that he observed were the result of organization: '[I]t is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization says oligarchy'. The precise implication for the relationship between parties and democracy is open to debate. Most commonly, the iron law is taken to imply that large-scale democracy is impossible, and that if political parties are essential

institutions of large-scale democracy, then they are part of the problem. If democracy is a state to be achieved, then this reading clearly is correct. If, however, democracy is a state to be approached to a greater or lesser degree, then Michels himself suggests an alternative interpretation. Within only a few pages of the iron law itself, Michels (1962: 366, 369) observes that only the 'blind and fanatical' could fail 'to see that the democratic current daily makes undeniable advance'. Moreover, '[s]ometimes ... the democratic principle carries with it, if not a cure, at least a palliative, for the disease of oligarchy'. A democratic movement (or society), 'in virtue of the theoretical postulates it proclaims, is apt to bring into existence (in opposition to the will of the leaders) a certain number of free spirits who ... desire to revise the base upon which authority is established'. If all this is true, then although party as organization may contribute to the problem, party as the carrier of the democratic ideology may be a palliative.

In the American context, Herbert Croly (1909, 1914) also argued that political parties, whatever their virtues in the original transition from colonial rule, were an impediment to democracy. The reason was twofold. On one hand, parties imply 'a separation of actual political power from official political responsibility ... The leader or leaders of the [electoral] machine are the rulers of the community, even though they occupy no offices and cannot be held in any way publicly responsible' (Croly, 1909: 125). On the other hand, parties demand of citizens 'that they think and act in politics not under the influence of their natural class or personal convictions, but according to the necessities of an artificial partisan classification' (Croly, 1914: 341). Democracy, however, requires direct rather than mediated public decision: initiative, referendum, and recall, rather than periodic partisan election (Croly, 1914: 324). It also requires citizens to think and act as members of a community, habits which party, precisely because it is 'part', destroys. His conclusion was that democracy was, at least when he was writing, impossible at the national level in the United States, where representative government, which could never be truly democratic in part because it requires parties, would have to do. At the state level, however, institutions could be devised that would allow what he identified as direct democracy.¹¹ Democracy could thus be advanced by shifting the locus of power to smaller units, which would make parties unnecessary.

This prescription, that power be shifted to more local units, is a recurring theme among democratic theorists who are more concerned with the impact of democracy on the human development of citizens than with the policy outputs of government (Pateman, 1970; Barber, 1984; Mansbridge, 1980). A second recurring theme is the importance of applying the democratic virtues of equality and collective self-rule beyond the narrowly governmental, in particular to include workplace democracy. What is conspicuous by its marginality, and often by its complete absence, is any mention of political parties.

PARTIES AND REPRESENTATION

No discussion of contemporary democracy can ignore the fact that modern democracy necessarily is representative democracy. And since parties are intimately involved in the process of representation, this means that consideration of the place of parties in democratic theory must address the place of parties in the theory of representation.

Analysis of representation involves three questions: Who are the represented? Who is the representative? What is it that the representative does in representing the represented?

Beginning with the last of these questions, the literature suggests five basic answers. The first mode of representation is the descriptive mirroring of demographic characteristics. With the second mode of representation, it is the distribution of opinions rather than of personal characteristics that is to be mirrored. With these two modes, representation means *standing for* the represented. The other three modes understand representation as *acting for* the represented. The third and fourth modes relate to the classic distinction between the representative as delegate and the representative as trustee (see, for example, Wahlke *et al.*, 1962). The delegate serves as the direct agent of his or her constituents, doing what the represented want him or her to do, serving as a conduit for their opinions, following their direct instructions. The trustee, on the other hand, acts for the represented by using his or her own judgment to advance their interests, but not necessarily in accordance with their currently expressed opinions. The fifth mode of representation is to act for the represented in the role of ombudsman, or more generally of provider of constituency service.

While party is implicated as the representative in all five of these modes of representation, whether it is the individual but partisan

official, the constituency party, the national party, or the parliament as a whole (with the individual parties contributing to its composition) that should be understood as the primary representative varies from one mode of representation to another, and among alternative conceptions of democracy. Similarly, whether the represented should be understood primarily as the citizenry as a whole, the citizens of particular areas or groups, the citizens who are voters of the party (again either as a whole or in particular areas or groups), the individual citizens, or indeed the party membership organization itself also varies depending on the particular sense of representation and the general conception of democracy being considered.

In its original implications, the distinction between trustee and delegate roles refers not just to the decision process underlying the representative's vote (do what one's constituents want or do what they would want if they were as wise as the representative), but to the nature of the democratic process as well. The delegate orientation only makes sense if one regards democracy primarily to be about the aggregation of interests or opinions; since the citizens cannot all be present to express their views or defend their interests, they 'hire' a representative to speak for them. If, however, democracy is about deliberation, then one naturally asks, as Edmund Burke asked in his 1774 address to the electors of Bristol, 'what sort of reason is that, in which the determination precedes the discussion; in which one set of men deliberate, and another decide; and where those who form the conclusion are perhaps three hundred miles distant from those who hear the arguments?' and thus arrives at a trusteeship model of representation. Parties contribute to this kind of representation as the members of parliament, but it is a form of representation in which the real representative is the parliament as a whole representing the people as a whole. This is very much an 18th-century view of representation based on an assumption of nascent and weak parties, but it is also reflected in the model of consensus democracy, with its emphasis on parliamentary (as opposed to cabinet) power, and Tory democracy, with its emphasis on independent leadership pursuing a singular national interest.

The conjunction of the idea of parliament as the representative and the idea that deliberation is essential to democracy also underlies many of the claims for representation in the sense of mirroring. The claim that the demographic characteristics of the citizens should be mirrored by the representatives has three primary justifications: that inclusion of minority