Understanding the Modern Russian Police

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Contents

Preface **ix**
About the Authors **xvii**
List of Illustrations **xix**
List of Tables **xxi**

Section I

EVOLUTION OF THE RUSSIAN POLICE: FROM THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN POLICE TO A POST-SOVIET RUSSIAN MILITIA

1 Russian Police Prior to the October Revolution of 1917 **3**
1.1 Creation of the Ministry of Interior Affairs and Subsequent Emergence of a Police Bureaucracy during the Reign of Alexander I and Nicolas I: 1801–1855 3
  1.1.1 Early Development of the Ministry of Internal Affairs under the Reign of Alexander I 3
  1.1.2 Development of the MVD after the 1825 Decembrist Uprising: Establishment of the Third Department and Corps of Gendarmes 8
1.2 Police Administration during the Reform Era: 1856–1881 10
  1.2.1 Self-Governance Reform and Police Administration 10
  1.2.2 Judicial Reform of 1864 and Police Administration 13
  1.2.3 Reform of Censorship and Police Administration 15
  1.2.4 Further Police Development: 1860s–1870s 16
1.3 Imperial Police during the Counterreforms of Alexander III and Nicolas II: 1881–March 1917 19
1.4 Police Development between the Two Revolutions: March 1917–October 1917 23
1.5 Concluding Remarks 25
Endnotes 30

2 Creation and Early Development of the Soviet Police: 1917–1953 37

2.1 Creation of the Soviet Militia of Peasants and Workers—Its Role during the Civil War of 1917–1919 37
2.2 Policing during the New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1921–1928 42
2.3 Transformation of the Soviet Police under Stalin (1930s–1953) 46
2.4 Concluding Remarks 55
Endnotes 59

3 Further Soviet Police Developments: 1953–1985 67

3.1 Development of the Soviet Police after Stalin's Death: 1953–1964 67
3.2 Counterreform of the Soviet Police during the Late 1960s and Stagnation during the mid 1980s (1964–1985) 73
3.3 Concluding Remarks 80
Endnotes 83

4 Transformation of the Soviet and Post-Soviet Police from 1985 to 2008 89

4.1 Soviet Police under Gorbachev: 1985–1991 89
4.2 Early Development of the Post-Soviet Police under Yeltsin: 1991–1999 94
4.3 Development of the Modern Russian Police under Putin: 1999–2008 103
4.4 Concluding Remarks 107
Endnotes 109

Section II

CURRENT STATE OF POST-SOVIET POLICE: STRUCTURE, IDENTITY, AND MODERN POLICY ISSUES

5 Structure, Function, and the Workforce of the Modern Russian Police 119

5.1 Structure of MVD Agencies 119
    5.1.1 Overall Structure 119

5.1.2 Central Apparatus of the MVD 120
5.1.3 Main Department of the MVD in Federal Districts 126
5.1.4 Ministry of MVD within the Republic or the MVD Regional Department 128
5.1.5 The Circuit Departments of the MVD 130
5.1.6 State Inspection Security of the Traffic Movement Police (GIBDD) 133
5.1.7 Interior Troops of the MVD 135
5.2 MVD Agency Authorities 136
5.2.1 Operative-Search Authorities of Agencies of Internal Affairs 136
5.2.2 Investigative Authority of the Internal Affairs Agencies 138
5.2.3 Inquiry Authority of the Internal Affairs Agencies 140
5.2.4 Authorities of Internal Affairs Agencies Related to Administrative Violations 141
5.2.5 Internal Affairs Agency Authority to Protect Public Order 142
5.2.6 Internal Affairs Agency Authorities in the Area of Juvenile Delinquency 143
5.2.7 Internal Affairs Agencies with Traffic Control Authority 144
5.2.8 Internal Affairs Agency Authorities in the Area of Licensing 145
5.2.9 Activities of the Internal Affairs' Agencies (Agencies of Federal Migration Service) in the Areas of Passport Control and Registration of Citizen Movement 146
5.3 Workforce of MVD Agencies 147
5.3.1 Training and Educational Institutions of the MVD System 147
5.3.2 MVD Personnel Recruitment 148
5.3.3 Job Assessment and Motivation 149
5.3.4 Gender Issues within the MVD Workforce 150
5.4 Concluding Remarks 151
Endnotes 154

6 Public–Police Relations in Modern Russia 165

6.1 General Public Views of the Russian Police 165
6.2 Crime Rates, Victimization, Fear of Crime, and Contact with Police 173

6.3 Issues of Public–Police Cooperation in Russia 184
6.4 Perceptions of Police Officers in Public–Police Relations 188
6.5 Media and Public–Police Relations 189
6.6 Concluding Remarks 196
Endnotes 197

7 Police Corruption and Abuse of Power in Russia 201

7.1 General Problem of Police Corruption in Russia 201
7.2 Underlying Factors of Police Corruption in Russia 206
7.3 Common Forms of Police Corruption in Russia 211
  7.3.1 Physical Abuse and Torture 211
  7.3.2 Bribery and Other Illegal "Income Activities" by Police Officers 217
  7.3.3 Abuse of Power and Manipulation of Statistics 220
  7.3.4 High-Order Police Corruption and Corruption Networks in Russia 222
7.4 Police Corruption and Ethnic Minorities 224
7.5 Analysis of Modern Anticorruption Measures in Russia 225
7.6 Concluding Remarks 230
Endnotes 231

8 Conclusion: The Path to Reforms 243

Endnotes 251

References 257

Preface

Understanding the Modern Russian Police represents the culmination of 10 years of research focused on the Russian police. It is a product of an ongoing and fruitful partnership with the Volgograd Academy of Russian Internal Affairs Ministry (VA MVD) and the Volgograd branch of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (VAPA). The research would not have been possible without the support of leadership from the Volgograd Academy: Generals Dr. Boris Smagorinskyi and Dr. Vladimir Tretyakov as well as Dr. Oleg Tyumentsev of VAPA.

The book encompasses the efforts of many great researchers from Russia such as Nicolai Demidov and Anatoly Nickonov. The field research of this study was generously supported by grants from the Soros Foundation, the Fulbright Program, Marquette University, the University of Central Florida, and the U.S. Department of State. Also, the authors of this book are extremely grateful to Ann Roberston, Vladimir Sergevnin, and Mark Lanier for their valuable comments and reviews.

Introduction

The purpose of this book is to provide a timely and comprehensive analysis of the historical development, functions, and contemporary challenges faced by the modern Russian police, who are part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation (MVD). Although there is substantial historical information about the Russian police related to its history, sociological factors, and legal structure, there is no current single body of work that serves to integrate and compile the organization's historical and developmental origins, organizational dynamics, and current conditions.* The most recent comprehensive work in this area was published in 1996 and primarily focuses on the Soviet and early post-Soviet police development (Shelley,

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* See Beck and Robertson, 2009a, 2009b; Berman, 1950, 1966; Butler, 2003; Clarke, 1993; Conquest, 1968b; Curfman, 1997; Daly, 1998; Favarel-Garrigues, 2011; Gilinskiy, 2000, 2007; Handelman, 1995; Hingley, 1971; Knight, 1988; Kucherov, 1970; Lapenna, 1968; Lavroff, 1963; Matthews, 1993; Orlovsky, 1981; Robertson, 2004; Shelley, 1992, 1995, 2000; Solomon, 1987, 1992, 1996, 2005b; Squire, 1968; Terrill, 1989; Uidriks and Reenen, 2003, 2005; Volkov, 2002; Waller, 2004; Waxmonsky, 1982; Weiler, 2004; Weissman, 1985; Wolin and Slusser, 1957; Zuckerman, 1996.

1996). Perhaps as important, most of the materials about the modern Russian police are only available in the Russian language. One intention of this book is that, with the inclusion of a large body of literature in Russian, the English-speaking reader will have access to a richer and more timely understanding of the historical, political, and organizational dynamics that have impacted the police for the past two centuries.

In addition to providing substantial new information from original Russian language sources, it became clear, during the decade of our research related to the Russian police, that to fully understand the modern police, it was necessary to have a contextual understanding of the institution's origins. The current police organization has interesting linkages to early nineteenth-century Russian empire characteristics and, of course, was substantially impacted by the 1917 October Revolution and the subsequent USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) period. Until there is a basic understanding of this history and context, it is challenging to fully appreciate the contemporary challenges faced by the police. Also, because the police are a major component of the broader society, without a basic framework to understand the public reaction to the police, it is difficult to appreciate the influences and interactions that result.

Two main areas are examined in this book. First, the institutional development of the MVD is examined. Arguably, it is one of the most important executive agencies of Russia. The book traces major institutional changes that have occurred within the MVD during the past 200 years. The changes reflect responses to major social change in the context of both the socioeconomic and political conditions in Russia. The second area of concentration is the development of complex public–police relationships during the past 200 years. Because the MVD is one of the most powerful government institutions, the evolution of public–police relations during the periods of change is an important topic and one that exemplifies the general public attitude of Russian citizens about their government.

Understanding the Modern Russian Police is based on the well-documented notion of the state police nexus. In the classical theory of the Weberian State, the police are understood as one of the main government instruments that has a virtual monopoly of legitimate coercion (Loader and Walker, 2001; Weber, 1948). Theories of police studies consistently agree that the nature of police institutions inherently depends on the development of the prevailing government political system (Hinton and Newburn, 2009; Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006; Ryan, 2011).

Many police systems evolved from the personal guard of the country's ruler, the king or other politicians (Haberfeld and Cerrah, 2008). The primary goal of the early police was never to protect the public, but instead the safety and security of the ruler and to maintain the status quo of the extant political system (Haberfeld, 2002). This is especially true for the continental model of policing; Russia is a part of this system. The continental police model developed in the context of a centralized monarchical system of government within the traditions of "benevolent paternalism" (Mawby, 1990). The majority of continental police systems (e.g., France, Germany) slowly evolved into democratic institutions as the societies transformed into democracies. This process was facilitated by the maturation of civil society that demanded police accountability and transparency (Mawby, 1990).

The modern systems of democratic police are far from ideal. As the agency of social control, they continue to be inherently coercive and militaristic (Haberfeld, 2002). This creates a continuous tension between the values of a democratic society and effective crime control (Haberfeld and Cerrah, 2008). The relationships between modern police systems and the state became complex as new private agents entered the security market and the development of new service-oriented policing (Jones, Newburn, and Smith, 1996; Loader and Walker, 2001; Morgan and Newburn, 1997).

The case of the Russian police is unique since its development from an early continental system was interrupted by the emergence of a Soviet regime (Mawby, 1990). It is clear that understanding the modern Russian police can be done only through the careful analysis of its government's development from monarchy to the Soviet regime followed by the post-Soviet (emerging democracy) form.

That is why a major portion of this book is devoted to the historical development of the Russian police beginning in 1802. The overview is intended to provide the contextual framework that is necessary and helpful in order to fully understand the contemporary issues and challenges that face the modern Russian police. Most of the current issues stem from this historical development and subsequent evolution. Despite major differences in the historical political systems, Tsarist, Soviet, and the post-Soviet police share unprecedented similarities in structure, function, and major problems. Historic parallels also are apparent in the public policy responses to increasing crime rates and various institutional reforms aimed at improving police performance.

The first chapter examines the Tsarist police evolution that witnessed the creation of the MVD in the year 1802 and concludes with the 1917 October Revolution. The historical review demonstrates that the MVD was initially a bureaucratic centralized hierarchal institution that possessed omnipotent authority in the spheres of law enforcement and administrative regulation. As the societal demands for effective policing escalated, the Tsarist government often conducted MVD "reforms." However, the reforms primarily focused on increasing the number of personnel, the creation of new MVD agencies, and the expansion of administrative control authority. The public–police relationships in Tsarist Russia were complex. Whereas the overwhelming control by the police was often criticized, it also was accepted as a societal norm when the monarchical ideology was strong and socioeconomic conditions were stable.

In Chapter 2, the Soviet era is examined from the 1917 October Revolution until Stalin's death in 1953. This Soviet period was one the most violent periods in the country's history that involved the Russian police. Because the regular police were subservient to the political police, they frequently participated in violent government-led repressions against different population groups. In this chapter, it is clear that despite drastic changes in both the ideology and socioeconomic conditions, the Soviet police (abbreviated as the NKVD, MVD, or MGB at different time periods) maintained a surprising resemblance to the Tsarist police. During most of this period, the early Soviet police were organized in a hierarchical centralized form with various responsibilities and with a wide range of almost limitless power. Unlike the Tsarist police structure, Soviet police enforcement was proactive. The police were used not only to solve crime, but also to control the homeless, delinquents, drunkenness, and other antisocial behaviors. The police were feared by the peasants, and other groups, for their reputation and participation in the political repressions; however, the factory workers and other active members of the new Socialist society supported the organization.

Chapter 3 examines the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods. It is during this time that the Soviet police matured into a professionally educated and well-equipped law enforcement system. It continued the proactive tradition of fighting hooligans, delinquents, and "social parasites." However, nepotism emerged during this period along with corruption and the practice of altering the statistical performance reports to meet, or exceed, required levels. Most historians agree that, during this period, the Soviet police were effective in maintaining public order and solving routine crimes, but much less successful with white collar crimes, such as embezzlements, committed by state property managers. The high-ranking members of the Communist Party (*nomenklatura*) frequently interfered with investigations of corruption due to the fact that members of the *nomenklatura* and their families committed many of these crimes. Information related to serious offenses and white-collar crimes was concealed by the state-controlled media to maintain a positive image of the Soviet police. Consequently, during this period, the Soviet police enjoyed significant public support from all societal groups.

Chapter 4 examines the transformational period of police development that begins with Gorbachev's *perestroika* and concludes with the first term of President Putin in 2008. This period of transformation had mixed results for the police. On one hand, the police were freed from Communist indoctrination while being restructured to address the modern issues of an emerging post-Soviet society. On the other hand, during this period of transformation, organized crime became deeply intertwined with the police, causing unprecedented levels of corruption, police violence, and abuse of power. The crime rates continued to rise and the rate of solved crimes remained low. The hierarchal, militarized structure inherited from the Soviet period remained unchanged, and no effective control mechanism or public accountability was created to replace the Party's control. The cases of nepotism and police corruption that were concealed during Brezhnev's era became highly visible during *perestroika*. The media was no longer government controlled and depicted a new image of the post-Soviet police. Officers were often shown as dishonest, corrupt, violent, unable to solve crimes, and concerned primarily with personal gain. As a result, public support for the police declined drastically.

In Chapter 5, a detailed analysis is provided about the structure, authority, and workforce of the modern Russian police. During the Soviet Union era, detailed information about the police was considered a state secret. Even though this is no longer the case, it is still very difficult to obtain specific details on the structure and authority of the police. This is especially true in literature in English. The information is scattered among various laws and regulations and many of these are only available in specialized databases. To examine the detailed structure of the modern Russian police, more than 200 federal laws and decrees issued by the president were analyzed along with other bodies of government and the Minister of Internal Affairs. Seventy-five websites of specific police units were examined in order to explore the presence of regional differences. The findings of this analysis are presented in eight diagrams in this chapter. They include four major levels of the Russian police (central, district, regional, and circuit) and two special subunits of police (traffic and interior troops).

A significant part of Chapter 5 is devoted to the broad authorities of the contemporary police. Following the traditional division of authority, nine major areas of police responsibilities are examined:

1. Operative-search authorities (undercover police work)
2. Investigative authority (investigation of serious crimes)
3. Inquiry authority (investigation of minor crimes and first responses at the crime scene)
4. Authority related to administrative violations
5. Authorities to protect public order
6. Authorities in the area of juvenile delinquency
7. Agencies with traffic control authority
8. Authorities in the area of licensing (firearms and private detectives)
9. Activities of the interior affairs agencies (agencies of federal migration service) in the areas of passport control and registration of citizens' movement

As with the organizational structure, information concerning the considerable authority of the police is only available in a multitude of legal documents. Another serious obstacle that is addressed in this chapter is the inherent confusion of the relevant terminology. Many terms used in the legal documents (e.g., *operative search activities*) have unique meanings and are difficult to understand. Here, it is intended to define and clarify the meaning for the English-speaking reader and provide an explanation in lay terms. The scope of the authority of law enforcement also is discussed as related to the police structure that is presented in the diagrams earlier in the chapter.

In Chapter 5, problems associated with the contemporary police workforce are discussed including training, recruitment, job assessment, and gender issues. The information was obtained from the analysis of legal documentation, a review of existing Russian police university website curricula, and statistical information from the Ministry of Internal Affairs website.

The modern Russian police remain extremely centralized and are a hierarchically structured agency. The structure is highly formalized with a large management bureaucracy consisting of numerous personnel. The agency's authorities are vast and include functions that in many countries are performed by other government agencies or private businesses. The system of recruitment and job assessment is inadequate because the agency is unable to retain many of the qualified MVD staff. The police educational institutions are often used by applicants to obtain a free legal education without any intention of serving in the system. The reliance on quantitative job assessment indices does not promote effective performance and facilitates the altering of statistics and abuse of power at the officer level.

Chapter 6 examines the public–police relationships that exist today in Russia, including the areas of public trust, and satisfaction with police, and public–police cooperation. Until *perestroika*, public attitudes about the police were considered a state secret, but now this information is publicly available. This chapter's analysis is based on empirical data obtained by several leading Russian survey organizations, such as WCIOM (All-Russian Center for Research of Public Opinion), FOM (Fund of Public Opinion), Levada Center (named after the famous sociologist Yuri Levada), and ROMIR (Russian Public Opinion and Research of Market). Most of these organizations conduct national representative studies, but the results are only available in Russian and are located on their websites. In this chapter, the official statistical crime data that are provided by the Russian State Committee on Statistics, along with information extracted from the Ministry of Internal Affairs related to police performance, are discussed. Data that have been reported (published and unpublished) and collected by various Russian researchers from the Volgograd region during the period from 1997 to 2010 also is discussed here. The variety of data sources is intended to provide a comprehensive and timely analysis of public–police relations in Russia. The relationship between the media and police is discussed here as well. The discussion evolves from four major case studies and the examination of more than 100 articles published by the leading Russian newspapers.

Chapter 6 reinforces the findings most related to the strained public–police relationship that exists in Russia today. Since the Soviet Union's collapse, citizens have demonstrated high levels of public distrust and dissatisfaction with police. Despite the continuous reforms attempted by Yeltsin, Putin, and Medvedev, a majority of Russians do not see improvements in police work. The continued trend of pervasive public distrust and dissatisfaction with the police is consistent with statistics about the fear of crime, public concerns with safety, and levels of victimization in the past 20 years. The distrust and dissatisfaction are the main causes of poor public–police cooperation in Russia. Many Russians prefer to avoid the police even after becoming a crime victim. Law-abiding citizens fear the police. Officers themselves are often dissatisfied with their own performance, but assign blame to poor funding. Respondents identify the lack of accountability and corruption as the leading reasons for distrusting the police. The media remains one of the main sources of public information on police; however, the law enforcement bodies do not have an effective method of dealing with the media. Police often prefer to simply suppress the information instead of building a constructive dialog with the media. The results are that the media often uses unsupported and mostly unfavorable rumors related to the coverage of crime events and police performance. The process has intensified recently due to social media access.

Corruption and abuse of power are leading issues of the modern Russian police; therefore, Chapter 7 is focused primarily in these areas. The chapter is built from a combination of sources including various attitude surveys examining the experiences and views of corruption. Reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (among others) are discussed along with a legal analysis of practices by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Then an analysis of recently implemented Russian anticorruption legislation is presented. As in Chapter 6, the survey data are obtained from leading Russian organizations, such as FOM, WCIOM, ROMIR, and the Levada Center; the Russian literature; and unpublished original data collected in the Volgograd region of Russia. Information from several leading human rights advocacy groups, such as The Committee against Torture, the Public Verdict, Memorial, and the Moscow Helsinki Group also were utilized in our analysis. The chapter includes information from the Russian Supreme Court related to cases of bribery, physical abuse, and pretrial detention.

Most Russians consider the police extremely corrupt and prone to abuse of power. Yet these views are not necessarily based on personal experience with corruption. Chapter 7 addresses the major forms of police corruption that include physical abuse, torture, bribery, and other "illegal income activities," and abuse of discretionary powers. Torture and physical abuse are often combined with arbitrary detention and are used to solicit forced confessions or misappropriation of valuables. The ECHR has stated that Russian legal remedies for torture and abuse victims are mainly ineffective. A significant amount of money is circulated through the bribery markets. There are estimates that the total amount from bribes is equivalent to the entire annual budget of the MVD. The most dangerous form of police corruption involves high-order corruption where high-ranking police officials are entangled with organized crime groups. In Russia, this practice is known as "roofing" or providing a set of services by police to cover up criminal activities of certain crime groups.

The recent anticorruption police reforms are detailed here as well. These reforms include the disclosure of all income for high-ranked police officers, new detailed regulations for police service delivery, increased liability for bribery, and changes in crime reporting and performance statistics. It appears the reforms have been more or less ineffective and most citizens agree. To effectively address the systemic corruption, more transparency related to major police decisions is needed along with the uniform prosecution of all known abuse and bribery cases. An overall increase in public accountability is necessary.

The conclusion of this book is focused on the 2011 police system reforms known as the "2011 Police Reform of Medvedev." The potential for the new reforms to improve all the elements of the police system is discussed. Alternative policies are explored that could be beneficial and improve police performance and the public image. The book concludes with some predictions on the future of the Russian police and its potential reforms.

About the Authors

Olga B. Semukhina is an assistant professor of criminology and law studies at Marquette University. Dr. Semukhina holds a law degree from Tomsk State University and Master of Science degree in criminal justice from the University of Central Florida (UCF). She defended her SJD dissertation on international standards and comparative criminal procedure at Tomsk State University in 2002. In 2007, Dr. Semukhina defended her PhD dissertation on the rule of law and comparative court process at UCF. Dr. Semukhina is also a former defense attorney in Russia and a former assistant professor of criminal law and procedure at Tomsk State University. Dr. Semukhina received multiple grants from Ford and the Soros Foundation, the Open Society Institute, the Civil Education Project, the IREX and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (U.S. State Department) to conduct research and sustain the development of legal services in Russia. Together with Dr. Reynolds, Olga Semukhina participated in a number of projects examining police corruption and misconduct in Russia.

K. Michael Reynolds joined the faculty at the University of Central Florida in 1997. He was a law enforcement practitioner for twelve years prior to entering academia. For more than a decade, he has enjoyed productive partnerships with numerous Russian colleagues in Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad) and Moscow. He also participated in educational programs on several occasions in Tbilisi, Georgia, at the International Black Sea University. Dr. Reynolds received a long-term Fulbright award in 2007 and was hosted by the Volgograd Academy of the MVD of the Russian Federation where he was in-residence for six months. There he taught crime analysis courses utilizing GIS for crime analysis and conducted empirical research along with Dr. Semukhina. They focused on Russian police satisfaction and issues related to professional integrity. This decade-long partnership with numerous Russian collaborators provided a framework to secure a U.S. Department of State grant to promote civil society and address human rights issues in Southern Russia. Throughout their work in Russia, they received continual assistance from their dedicated foreign colleagues and also developed enduring friendships and sustainable research projects. Dr. Reynolds had the opportunity to invite numerous Russian scholars, practitioners and students to visit UCF in Orlando. Numerous research articles concerning the various challenges faced by the Russian police have been published in collaboration with Dr.

Semukhina, Dr. Reynolds was also a cofounder of a state-wide law enforcement information sharing system in Florida that has expanded to accommodate more than 4,000 users per day. The information sharing project has produced substantial results and removed barriers to the intelligence-led policing model.

List of Figures

Diagram 5.1 The structure of MVD “territorial” agencies. 120

Diagram 5.2 The structure of MVD interior troops. 121

Diagram 5.3 The structure of the MVD central apparatus and the departments that perform main its functions. 122

Diagram 5.4 The structure of the MVD central apparatus and the various departments performing supplementary functions. 123

Diagram 5.5 The typical structure of an MVD main department in the federal districts (okrug). 127

Diagram 5.6 The typical MVD structure in the republics or regions. 129

Diagram 5.7 The typical structure of the MVD circuit departments. 131

Diagram 5.8 The structure of State Inspection for Traffic Movement (“traffic police”). 134

List of Tables

Table 1.1 Timetable of major events: 1802–1917 29

Table 2.1 Timetable of major events: 1917–1953 57

Table 3.1 Timetable of major events: 1953–1984 82

Table 4.1 Leadership of the Ministry of Interior Affairs from 1992 to 2012 101

Table 4.2 Timetable of major events: 1985–2012 108

Table 6.1 Summary of empirical findings measuring public satisfaction with police from 1990 to 2011 166

Table 6.2 Summary of empirical findings measuring police trust from 1989 to 2011 167

Table 6.3 Summary of empirical findings measuring the dynamics of police work assessment: "Did the work of the police become better or worse from 1990 to 2010?" 168

Table 6.4 Public views of police from surveys conducted in the Volgograd region 169

Table 6.5 Public satisfaction of police units: 1998–2007 in the Volgograd region 170

Table 6.6 Trust and satisfaction of police: Demographic characteristics 1998–2007 in the Volgograd region 171

Table 6.7 Findings from the ICVS on police satisfaction: 1992–2002 173

Table 6.8 Registered crime rates reported by the Ministry of Internal Affairs: 1990–2010 174

Table 6.9 Official statistics on criminal investigation: 2003–2010 176

Table 6.10 Victimization percentages and reported crimes in Russia (ICVS) 177

Table 6.11 Victimizations and reported crimes in the Volgograd region 179

Table 6.12 Summary of empirical findings on fear of crime: 1989–2011 181

Table 6.13 Findings from the ICVS on fear of crime of selected countries: 1992–2002 181

Table 6.14 Ranking of public concerns in Russia: 1991–2009 182

Table 6.15 Summary of empirical findings on contact with the Russian police: 2000–2010 183

Table 6.16 Finding on source of information about police from surveys conducted in the Volgograd region[47] 190

Table 6.17 Case studies of media–police relations 193

Table 7.1 Summary of empirical findings related to the variable "do you believe that police officers are in general corrupt" from 1999 to 2010 203

Table 8.1 Summary of empirical findings related to the variable public attitudes toward adoption of a new federal law on "Police" from 2010 to 2011 246

I

Evolution of the Russian Police: From the Imperial Russian police to a post-Soviet Russian militia

> There is probably no country in the world
> where the police power occupies a wilder field,
> plays a more important part or touches the private personal life
> of the citizen at more points than it does in Russia
>
> *(*Kennan, 1889*)*

Russian Police Prior to the October Revolution of 1917

1

1.1 Creation of the Ministry of Interior Affairs and Subsequent Emergence of a Police Bureaucracy during the Reign of Alexander I and Nicolas I: 1801–1855

1.1.1 Early Development of the Ministry of Interior Affairs under the Reign of Alexander I

On September 8, 1802, the Russian Emperor Alexander I issued a Manifesto that established eight central ministries of executive power, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) (Kaiser and Marker, 1994). Numerous historians noted this document instituted the Russian police bureaucracy and concurrent development of the Russian *politseistaat* (police state) (Fastov, 2005; Rybnikov and Aleksushin, 2008; Yaney, 1973). The new government institutional ministers were personally appointed by the emperor and ordered to consult with each other prior to reporting to him (Yaney, 1973). The result was the creation of an unofficial, and later official, "committee of ministers" (later known as the "state council") that met regularly and was the only consultative agency to the emperor other than the Senate. Both played an important role in the political life of the Russian Empire throughout the entire nineteenth century.

Initially, the creation of the eight ministries in 1802 was aimed at simply streamlining the executive apparatus and providing auxiliary functional offices for government operations. The ministries were created to enforce personal responsibility and executive discipline in the Empire's government (Gordon et al., 1911). However, it became known as a newly created form of administration in Russia. The professional bureaucratic government was no longer organized by the regional principle, but instead used a division of labor based on functionality. This is especially true when talking about the function of the local Russian police.[1]

The MVD replaced the collegial structure of the police organization created by Peter the Great, which was developed in part by Catherine the Great and Paul I during the eighteenth century. During his reign, Peter the Great created nine colleges that were modeled after the Swedish administration of government (Fastov, 2005). These government institutions were planned as collegial offices of executive power organized by the main government areas.

Police function was not listed as a separate area of public administration, but instead was included in the Justice College. Despite their centralization and functional division, colleges did not have any local institutions and their main goal was to assist the tsar in administration of his power and policy development (Yaney, 1973). The only local police agency created by Peter the Great was the Police Chancery of St. Petersburg. It was established in 1715 to maintain public order in the Russian capital and consisted of soldiers and other military personnel (Mulukaev, Malygin, and Epifanov, 2005).[2]

The major functions of local police prior to 1775 were relegated to the governors and their local agents (*voevody*). Their responsibilities regarding policing were extremely diffused, plus there was a lack of clearly defined lines of subordination. This allowed both the governor and the *voevody* to abuse their power as long as they complied with the fiscal demands of the tsar and avoided massive civil disturbances (Le Donne, 1970). Policing functions were often performed by military personnel (garrison troop subdivisions) due to the lack of manpower. The lack of manpower was especially problematic in the remote borderline provinces of the Russian Empire (Gonyukhov and Gorobtsov, 2002).

Catherine the Great reformed the local administration and, for the first time, provided local police with some structure and articulated authority. In 1775, she created a two-tier system of local administration: the entire territory of the country was split into 26 provinces consisting of the districts (*uezd*) and towns. The organization of (*uezd)* police was very simple. It was comprised of one land captain (*kapitan-ispravnik*), two elected noble assessors, and two peasant assessors.[3] Together they constituted the lower land court (*nizhnii zemskii sud*). Despite its name, the lower land court was mainly a police institution at the district level that also performed some minor judicial functions (Yaney, 1973).

Local police administration in the towns and cities was more complex and varied by city size. The policies were outlined in the Decree (*Ustav*) of Public Order and Police adopted by Catherine the Great in 1782 in reaction to the Pugachev riot.[4] The smallest administrative unit within the city was a ward administered by the supervisor (*nadziratel*) and his assistant (*poruchik*) (Le Donne, 1970). Wards were grouped into the city districts led by the inspectors (*pristav*) and served by two assistants (*gradskie serzhanty*) who were required to reside within the district's territory (Rybnikov and Aleksushin, 2008).

The highest police officer (*gorodnichii)* was aided by the city police board (*uprava*) together with the inspectors from the city districts and other staff (Sichinskii, 2002). The police officers in both rural districts (*uezds)* and cities were mainly appointed with the consent or the advice of the governor (Yaney, 1973). Land captains were elected by the assembly of local gentry (landlords) with the consent of the governor.

The level of police organizational complexity between cities and rural areas initially appears surprising. However, there is a simple answer. While the cities in the Russian Empire were inhabited by a number of different social groups, many of whom were free and with the ability to own private property,[5] the countryside was primarily populated by privately owned serfs that were not free and were bonded to their assigned estate (Mulukaev, Malygin, and Epifanov, 2005). The serfs could not own property, participate in contractual relations, marry, or be a party in court. The landlord (*pomeschik)* (the noblemen or the appointed manager) had the full control and the legal authority to maintain public order within the boundaries of each estate and performed both judicial and policing functions for offenses against the landlord (Waldron, 2007). To maintain daily order, the community of peasants or serfs provided elected or appointed elders for each 100 (*sotskie*) and 1,000 (*tysyachnye*) serfs. They would supervise the daily life of the community that was governed by the customary law (Confino, 1985).

Because the peasant community had mutual responsibility for all members, the police officials would usually rely on the communities to police themselves. When the land captain had to investigate a serious crime, he would expect the community and the elders to search for and give up the person who committed the wrongdoing (Sichinskii, 2002). The self-policing and the landlord's absolute power kept the rural police mostly free of the daily public order maintenance. Police officials were used primarily to investigate serious crimes against the tsar and to protect the landlords in cases of peasant disturbances and riots (Yaney, 1973).

The creation of the MVD in 1802 changed the organization of police administration in Russia, but the change was rather gradual (Torke, 1971). From the moment of its creation in 1802, the MVD was charged with an enormous array of poorly defined tasks. Overall, the MVD was responsible for national well being, maintaining peace, and "the good order in the countryside." In order to perform these functions, the minister of the MVD had an administrative power over all fields of industry except mining. He was responsible for the maintenance of all public buildings, and for providing citizens resources that would be required to sustain them in case of famine or a similar public emergency.

The Manifesto by Alexander I of 1802 did not provide any departmental structures for the MVD to fulfill these various administrative functions. The only new structure that was originally identified by the Manifesto was the position of the deputy minister (*tovarishch ministra*) who should assist the minister in his functions (Mulukaev, Malygin, and Epifanov, 2005). Instead, the MVD of 1802 inherited a conflicting mix of departments and colleges created by the previous tsars, and was charged with an overwhelming array of ill-defined duties (Orlovsky, 1981). The Manifesto also did not provide clear instructions about the relationships between the Senate, the MVD, and the governors of the local provinces in Russia. To support the overwhelming functions and react to the developing complexity of social and economic conditions in Russia during the first 30 years of the nineteenth century, the MVD had to develop numerous structures and a vast administrative apparatus.

On January 19, 1803, the MVD's Central Department was established along with its four "expeditions" (subdivisions): first (1) expedition responsible for living supplies and the salt industry; second (2) expedition responsible for "good order"; third (3) expedition responsible for industries; and fourth (4) expedition responsible for public institutions, such as hospitals, prisons, orphan houses, and shelters (Fastov, 2005). The second expedition, which was performing the true policing functions, was traditionally divided between the rural and urban police departments.

The MVD also inherited responsibility for passport control and registration that was required for peasants, merchants, and even some gentry. Without a passport or registration (*vid na zhitel'stvo*), these groups of citizens could only reside at their main place of residence as predetermined by law. Even a temporary move to a different location required a registration or a passport. As a result, the MVD created "address expeditions" in both St. Petersburg (in 1807) and Moscow (in 1816) to register, control, and issue the passports for new residents (Rybnikov and Aleksushin, 2008). The passport system used to control citizen movement would become one of the major future activities of the Russian Imperial police (Matthews, 1993).

The "public medical expedition" was established within the MVD in 1804 to oversee the work of public healthcare institutions. This tradition continued through the decades thus allowing the MVD to oversee public medical institutions that included mental and juvenile agencies.

In 1806, the Main Postal department was transferred from the Senate to the MVD, thereby enabling the notorious censorship activities conducted by the MVD during the late nineteenth century. These functions became especially evident after 1865 when the Censorship Department was transferred from the Ministry of Education to the MVD apparatus.

In 1819, a new "economic" department joined the numerous structures of the MVD. It was charged with the organization of urban life, providing the population with needed supplies, improving the agricultural practices in the countryside, and organizing settlements in the newly acquired territories. In 1823, the department of foreign religious affairs was created to protect the existing Orthodox Christianity and to supervise the activities of other religions throughout the Russian Empire. One of the major functions of this department was to control the Jewish population and limit their intracountry movements. The police were involved in the deportation of Jews from the western provinces to the restricted areas in central Russia, where the government allowed Jewish settlements (Baron, 1976).

At the same time the MVD, slowly but consistently, eliminated local police independence and the ability for governors to exert any control, while also transforming local land courts and city councils (*uprava)* into their own agents. The result was that the local police became representatives of MVD. In 1837, a new Statute on County (*zemskaya*) Police and the Instructions to the Governors were issued,[6] which directed the governors and the land captains to follow the instructions of the MVD and its head (Orlovsky, 1981).[7] Prior to the creation of ministries, governors (and later governor-generals) were considered absolute monarchs ("viceroys") of the territories that they ruled and local police institutions functioned as their personal security agents for both protection and maintaining order.

During the early years of the MVD, provincial governors continued to enjoy independence and resented any direct MVD orders (Yaney, 1973). They considered themselves, and their police agencies, to be directly responsible only to the tsar (Waldron, 2007). However, by the mid-1830s, the official power of the MVD bureaucracy grew significantly (Kaiser and Marker, 1994). The MVD took over the local police institutions and the governors, and established a vertical hierarchy of the Russian police. Local police agencies were no longer security forces and personal agents of the governors. The local agencies became a part of the police bureaucracy; a nationwide, uniform, formal, and professionalized structure.

> The ministers exercised the direct control over their subordinate agents in each province, and every sector of public activity had to be integrated into the jurisdiction of a ministry. The governor's office became gradually integrated into the linear organization of the MVD (Le Donne, 1974, p. 103).

The Instructions to the Governors of 1837 eliminated some elected positions in the county police and created a new network of lower police officials called *stanovoi pristav*. This police officer was directly subordinate to the land captain of a rural district (*uezd)* and was responsible for the territory of *stan* (a subdivision of the *uezd*) (Yaney, 1973).

The land captain reported directly to the governor and the gentry's assembly, who were controlled by the MVD minister. Despite these changes, the rural police remained undeveloped and archaic compared to the city police departments and especially those in the capitals. This was due to the fact that a majority of the country's rural population remained serfs and, consequently, attached to private or public estates. The government's power stopped at an estate's threshold (Le Donne, 1974).

1.1.2 Development of the MVD after the 1825 Decembrist Uprising: Establishment of the Third Department and Corps of Gendarmes

The unsuccessful 1825 uprising of the Decembrist prompted Nicolas I to create the "supreme police" known as the Third Department. The Third Department was the first permanent political police established in the Russian Empire, and that was done by the Decree of Emperor issued on July 3, 1826. The purpose was to protect the monarchy and the political regime.[8] It replaced temporary agencies of the political police created during the reign of Alexander I (the committee of supreme police, and Special Chancellery) (Mulukaev, Malygin, and Epifanov, 2005). The Third Department was structurally separated from the MVD and belonged to the Majesty's Own Imperial Chancellery. Moreover, according to the Decree (*Ukaz*) of 1826, the Third Department had a duty to oversee the work of MVD agents, with the result of making the Third Department the most influential office in Russia (Squire, 1968). This subordination of the regular police to the political police endured throughout the entire history of the Russian Empire, which included the period when the two police agencies would be united in the MVD structure.

One of the most unique features of the Third Department was the Corps of Gendarmes created in 1827. They were "personal agents of the tsar, explicitly charged to act according to their conscience rather than formal law" (Yaney, 1973, p. 224). Ideally, the gendarmes were created to be moral agents for the Russian Empire and by their personal example should inspire confidence and loyalty to the throne, the emperor, and the monarchy (Lemke, 1909). To carry out these functions, gendarmes were placed in every province and district (*uezd)* (Yaney, 1973). The entire country was divided between five (later eight) gendarme circuits headed by the gendarme-general. The local gendarme surveillance network grew significantly by 1850.[9] It consisted of 126 gendarme commands located through the entire country, whose main duty was to report on the local political environment, views of the local nobility, and other groups of the free population (Rybnikov and Aleksushin, 2008).

Though the Third Department was always functioning under the original Decree of 1826, its authority and influence over the administration of regular police continued to expand, and some researchers deemed the entity a superior and "supralegal" institution of police power in the Russian Empire (Squire, 1968). Because gendarmes were frequently performing functions of the regular police, the public perceived the Third Department and MVD as the same (Lemke, 1909).

Notwithstanding the phenomenal development of the police administration in the first half of nineteenth century, local offices of both urban and rural Russian police were heavily criticized for being ineffective, corrupted, and slow. Paradoxically, despite the centralization and almost omnipotent jurisdiction, the central MVD office had few mechanisms to control the implementation of their decrees by the local offices. The hierarchical linear structure assumed full compliance and provided no feedback mechanism for public response or performance assessment for local police officials. This created the potential for an enormous abuse of power and corruption. The more remote the province was from the capital cities of St. Petersburg and Moscow, the less police presence could be found there (Starr, 1972).

The lack of control mechanisms was not the sole issue contributing to the police availability problem. Since its creation, the MVD's jurisdiction was ill defined. The central administrative apparatus and MVD local offices were created sporadically and often irrationally (Mulukaev, Malygin, and Epifanov, 2005). Sometimes these had overlapping jurisdictions and were given conflicting instructions. Concurrently, they were provided with almost omnipotent authority in executing these functions. This alone created the opportunity for unlimited power abuse and corruption. Corruption was often a mechanism for the local authorities to filter duties that needed to be performed and discretionary duties ignored. The establishment of the Corps of Gendarmes was an entity that was known to be above the law and frequently performed duties of the regular police, which exacerbated abuse and corruption. The gendarmes were notoriously known to be both abusive and violent. The Third Department did little to prevent the abuse (Monas, 1961).

The broad functions of the MVD and its local agents also were responsible for the numerous problems (Le Donne, 1974). The MVD was charged with controlling almost every aspect of daily life in the Russian Empire ranging from the maintenance of public order and crime prevention to control over the public buildings and living supplies for emergency situations (Waldron, 2007). However, the local offices did not possess adequate manpower to perform the overwhelming duties. With an expansion of the MVD's central administrative apparatus in the capital, the amount of decrees and other directive paperwork grew exponentially. However, the expansion of the local MVD manpower occurred mostly at the provincial level and not at the rural district level (*uezd*) and their subdivisions (*stans*) (Starr, 1972).

On a monthly basis, local police officers received a tremendous amount of instructions, some of which were conflicting and some simply unrealistic to implement (Yaney, 1973).[10] In order to survive, the local police officials had to choose which instructions and decrees to follow and which to ignore. These decisions were often made under the influence of local power stakeholders: the governor-general, the governor, and the local gentry participating in the government of the city or county. The influence was executed by political means as well as bribery.

The other serious obstacle to proper police administration in Russia was the quality of the lower police personnel. Local police officials were underpaid and provided with little benefits in comparison to the other public