

Martha Augoustinos and Katherine J. Reynolds



UNDERSTANDING
PREJUDICE,
RACISM AND
SOCIAL CONFLICT

Understanding Prejudice, Racism, and Social Conflict

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Edited by
Martha Augoustinos and Katherine J. Reynolds



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Preface

As with most fields of social inquiry, the wider social and political climate over the last decade has been significant in shaping and influencing the research concerns and interests of this book: the psychology of prejudice and racism. Australia has witnessed an unprecedented period of public debate and controversy over matters of 'race', immigration, and national identity in the last decade. 'Race' has always been a central feature of the Australian political landscape since colonization. The treatment of Indigenous Australians throughout this period has been likened to genocide (Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 1997), and Australia maintained a race-based immigration programme known as the 'White Australia' policy until the early 1970s. Since the 1970s, however, 'multiculturalism' has been officially embraced by successive federal governments, and in line with this change Australia came to be recognized internationally as a 'successful' model of a multicultural society. More recently however, sustained attacks on 'multiculturalism' and racial politics emerged after the election of the conservative Howard government in 1996 and the rise of Pauline Hanson and the 'One Nation' party she founded. Since this time, Australia has witnessed a continual erosion of the 'liberal' social policies of the previous Keating Labor government. Indigenous people have borne the brunt of these attacks: their entitlements to land have been undermined by government policy, Prime Minister Howard has steadfastly refused to publicly apologize to Indigenous people for the forcible removal of Indigenous children from their families and communities (the Stolen Generations), and heated public debates have emerged over the nature of 'Reconciliation' that should be negotiated between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. It has been this political and social climate, a climate that transformed Australia from a liberal society that embraced, officially at least, cultural diversity and difference, to one in which racial politics took centre stage, that Australian social researchers have tried to make sense of. How could the political and social landscape change so quickly and dramatically? Were Australians deep down 'really' racist, but had repressed such tendencies because of the norms of 'political correctness'? The 'chattering classes' the 'educated elite', conservatives argued, had stifled open and free speech about politically sensitive issues for too long and now 'mainstream Australia' was reasserting itself. One political analyst refers to this political backlash as 'the revenge of the mainstream' (Johnson, 2000).

While this book is largely a product of trying to understand and make sense of these political and social events within Australia, during the same period several Western countries experienced and witnessed similar political debates over 'racial' concerns, for example, Le Pen and the National Front in France,

the proliferation of Neo-Nazi sentiment in a unified Germany, the electoral support of Joerg Haider and the Far-Right Freedom Party in Austria. Our book, therefore, should not be viewed as being concerned with parochial issues, to do with Australian political and social issues alone. Each and every chapter tries to grapple with prejudice and racism as not only a domestic concern, but also a pervasively international one.

Such shifts in the social and political landscape, where prejudice and racism become more or less culturally dominant, highlight the ephemeral nature of particular value systems and the interplay between the nature of the social system and individual attitudes and values. In our view, it is explaining this dynamic nature of prejudice that presents a significant and pressing challenge to the discipline of psychology. This point highlights our own theoretical biases. We believe that prejudice and racism as social phenomena, cannot be understood as the product of individual psychology. Of course prejudice is expressed discursively and behaviourally at the individual level, but an exclusive focus on the contents and processes of the individual mind ignores the structural context and the social identities within which people live out their everyday lives. In these terms, we believe that the interplay between the individual and the social system provides the most fertile ground for understanding the depth and complexity of social phenomena such as prejudice and racism. Judging from recent trends in social psychological research toward more asocial theories and research methods (e.g., information processing accounts, implicit prejudice measures, and personality approaches) ours is a minority view. However, this book reflects an attempt not only to represent current trends but also to emphasize their potential limitations and to highlight and advance more socially-based approaches to the study of prejudice and racism.

In terms of these aims, leading researchers were asked to provide an overview of theory and research related to their specific area of expertise and to identify strengths, weaknesses, and future directions. We also emphasized that the target audiences for the book were undergraduates, interested members of the general public, and academics looking for an introduction into prejudice and racism theory and research. We would like to thank all the authors for the enthusiasm with which they have embraced our vision and for their informative, thought-provoking, accessible, and up-to-date contributions.

We also would like to express our gratitude to Michelle Ryan and Lynette Webb for their assistance with organizing and compiling the references and the various indexes and for their careful attention to detail in formatting much of the manuscript. The editorial team at Sage: Michael Carmichael, Naomi Meredith, and Ziyad Marer provided constant guidance, encouragement, and enthusiasm for the book. Finally, we would like to thank our families, Dave, Dylan, Tony, and Georgina, who yet again have demonstrated their patience and encouragement with respect to our academic endeavours.

Martha Augoustinos and Kate Reynolds, 2001

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Part I

Prejudice and Racism: Defining the Problem, 'Knowing' the Experience

1 Prejudice, Racism, and Social Psychology

Martha Augoustinos and Katherine J. Reynolds

During the last years of the twentieth century, a range of international events has focused attention on issues of prejudice and racism: increasing ethno-nationalistic tensions in the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union; ethnic conflict in the Middle East and Africa; and a resurgence of debates and controversies concerning issues of 'race', racism, multiculturalism, nationalism, and immigration in western Europe, the US, and Australasia. In the 1990s alone we witnessed several sustained and systematic programs of genocide in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda. These sociopolitical events have led to a resurgence of research around issues of 'race', racism, and intergroup relations within the social sciences. With the publication of *The Authoritarian Personality* in 1950, by Adorno and his colleagues and Allport's *The Nature of Prejudice* in 1954, psychology, as a discipline, has contributed consistently and extensively to theories of prejudice and racism. While the common core of these theories has been to understand the psychology of prejudice, they have differed significantly in their theoretical approach and level of analysis. It is timely then, that as we enter the twenty first century we take stock and critically reflect upon what psychological theory has contributed to our knowledge of this pressing social issue, and offer some insights as to how the knowledge we generate may be put into practical service in understanding intergroup conflict and oppression. The present edited book has been written with this purpose in mind.

Most social researchers have argued that prejudice and racism manifest themselves at different levels, at the individual, interpersonal, intergroup, and institutional levels. As such, a variety of theoretical and conceptual approaches are therefore necessary to fully understand this social issue. Each of these perspectives is well represented by the contributors to this book, who outline significant and recent developments in relation to each approach. In presenting a variety of different analytic frameworks to understanding racism and prejudice, the present book also raises the difficult question as to whether it is possible to integrate these different approaches. This question has always been a bone of contention within psychology, as analytic frameworks differ significantly in their epistemological assumptions and orientations. As we will see, there are

very different views regarding whether such a theoretical integration is possible or even desirable in understanding prejudice and racism.

This introductory chapter is designed to orient the reader to the conceptual and theoretical content discussed throughout this book. Firstly, we will define the concepts 'prejudice' and 'racism', by reviewing the historical and contemporary definitions of these constructs. Secondly, we consider the role of scientific racism within the discipline of psychology itself, and what implications this has had on psychological theory and practice throughout the last century and into the present. Thirdly, we provide a brief overview of prejudice research within psychology, identifying four broad and distinct levels of explanation into which psychological theories can be classified: the individual, the cognitive, the intergroup, and the socio-cultural. Similarly, we have organized the parts of this book to correspond to these different explanatory levels. Lastly, we describe the contents of each chapter in this book, detailing the central arguments and theoretical orientation of each.

Prejudice

A plethora of terms within social psychology have been used to describe the concept of prejudice including: discrimination, ethnocentrism, ingroup favouritism, ingroup bias, outgroup derogation, social antagonism, stereotyping, and social distance. Many of the definitions of prejudice that have been popular at various times in social psychology are consistent with different theoretical approaches. Typically though, prejudice or related terms refer to negative attitudes or behaviours towards a person because of his or her membership of a particular group. However, use of such terms also conveys, more or less explicitly, a value dimension that such treatment is bad and unjustified (Ashmore and DelBoca, 1981; Duckitt, 1992). For example, prejudice was defined as being, 'without sufficient warrant' (Allport, 1954: 7), 'a failure of rationality' (Harding et al., 1969: 6), and 'irrational, unjust, or intolerant' (Milner, 1975: 9).

Consistent with this view, prejudice traditionally has been understood as: (a) a negative orientation towards members of particular groups, (b) bad and unjustified, (c) irrational and erroneous, and (d) rigid. Irrational, because prejudice is not seen to be tied to the social reality of the perceiver. Erroneous, because such views are the outcome of cognitive distortions due to, amongst other things: information processing limitations, the impact of mood effects, and dysfunctional personalities (e.g., authoritarianism). Bad, because of the negative consequences such attitudes can foster, and rigid because of the belief that prejudiced people are unlikely to change their view even in the face of contrary information. Clearly then, 'prejudice' and 'discrimination' have largely been constructed as pejorative terms (Harding et al., 1969).

More recent work, however, has avoided the inherent value connotations associated with the term. This has led to the use of a range of more 'evaluatively neutral' definitions of prejudice such as 'ingroup favouritism' or 'bias' (Duckitt,

1992). For example, Tajfel defined prejudice as 'a favourable or unfavourable predisposition toward any member of a category in question' (Tajfel, 1982b: 3). Similarly, Brewer and Kramer defined prejudice as 'shared feelings of acceptance-rejection, trust-distrust, and liking-disliking that

characterize attitudes towards specific groups in a social system' (1985: 230). In general, the move towards less pejorative definitions has been associated with the rise of cognitive models of prejudice that have come to view prejudice increasingly as a natural and inevitable consequence of inherent cognitive processes such as categorization and stereotyping. However, in many instances this more neutral terminology means that the affect and *values* that characterize prejudice have become more difficult to detect and recognize in theories of discrimination and social conflict. Moreover, as many social theorists have argued, this has had the net effect of obscuring the political and ideological dimensions of prejudice.

Racism

There has been a tendency within the literature to use the terms prejudice and racism interchangeably. Jones (1972) however, makes the case that racism is distinct from prejudice. While prejudice is usually regarded as an individual phenomenon, racism is a broader construct that links individual beliefs and practices to wider social and institutional norms and practices.

The belief in a racial hierarchy between groups is a central defining characteristic adopted by many theorists to define racism. For example, Jones defines racism as a 'belief in the superiority of one's own race over another, and the behavioral enactments that maintain those superior and inferior positions' (1972: 5). The belief that the differences between racial groups are biologically driven implies that such variability is fundamental and fixed. These essentialist beliefs lead to the categorization of people into groups based on assumptions that surface characteristics reflect deeper essential features (Allport, 1954; Medin, 1989; Rothbart and Taylor, 1992; Yzerbyt et al., 1997). Such characteristics it is believed, are inherent, unchangeable, and reflect the 'real' nature of the groups they are established to represent (Miles, 1989).

It has been argued however, that this definition of racism is quite restrictive because contemporary racism is less about beliefs in the biological superiority/inferiority of groups, and increasingly about beliefs in a *cultural* hierarchy (Essed, 1991). Contemporary racism justifies and legitimates inequities between groups, not on the basis of biology or 'skin colour', but on claims that certain groups transgress fundamental social values such as the work ethic, self-reliance, self-discipline, and individual achievement. Another contemporary variant of racism, referred to as the 'new racism', rejects the notion of a cultural hierarchy altogether, but instead, emphasizes the need and desirability of the separate development of cultural groups, claiming that it is not in 'human nature' for us to co-exist peacefully with culturally different 'others' (Barker, 1981). This distinction between the 'old' and the 'new'

racism(s) is a theme that runs throughout the book (see Chapter 2 in particular), but for now the important point is that racism has been defined and constructed variously, and often there are very fierce debates both within academe and in everyday life contesting what it is exactly that constitutes racism.

The second important difference between prejudice and racism relates to the role of power. At an individual level, a person can display race prejudice: 'a negative attitude toward a person or group based upon a social comparison process in which the individual's own ['racial'] group is taken as a positive point of reference' (Jones, 1972: 3), but this in itself does not necessarily constitute racism. In racism, the significance of ingroup preference (i.e., ethnocentrism) lies in the ingroup being able to exercise *power* over the outgroup (Operario and Fiske, 1998; Reicher, Chapter 16). If we define racism, without reference to power differentials between groups, it is clear that anyone can engage in ingroup preference and outgroup bias. 'Everybody is racist' is a counterclaim that is often used to counter accusations of racism (Hage, 1998). Indeed, this is often the implication of cognitive theories of prejudice: whether we like it or not, we are all prone to favouring our own group and discriminating against an outgroup. Importantly, the power one group has over another transforms race prejudice into racism and links individual prejudice with broader social practices (Jones, 1972, 1998).

Racism, practiced at a structural and cultural level, maintains and reproduces the *power* differentials between groups in the social system (Jones, 1998). Racism practiced at this broad societal level has been referred to as institutional and cultural racism. Institutional racism refers to the institutional policies and practices that are put in place to protect and legitimate the advantages and power one group has over another. Institutional racism can be overt or covert, intentional or unintentional, but the consequences are that racist outcomes are achieved and reproduced. For example, Jones (1972) highlights the entrance practices of university colleges in the US as an example of institutional racism. Universities relied on certain standardized tests to warrant entry despite the fact that African-American applicants had inferior training in the content that was assessed and in test taking. In this case, institutional practices are unequal and restrict the choices, rights, access, and opportunities of different groups.

Cultural racism occurs when those in positions of power define the norms, values, and standards in a particular culture. These mainstream ideals that permeate all aspects of the social system are often fundamentally antagonistic with those embraced by the powerless (e.g., African-Americans). In circumstances such as these the powerless, in order to participate in society, have to surrender their own cultural heritage and adopt new ones (e.g., those of the White majority).

Racism in Psychology

While psychology has contributed important insights to the study of prejudice and racism, at the same time it has not been immune from serious criticisms

that the discipline itself has promulgated concepts and theories that are highly racist and ethnocentric. Psychology's 'racist' history is difficult to deny: scientific racism was taken up enthusiastically by many of the discipline's respected and eminent founding figures, including Sir Francis Galton, who also founded and promoted the discipline of eugenics. Influenced by Darwinian evolutionary theory, Galton believed that different 'races' reflected a natural evolutionary hierarchy, at the top of which were European peoples. Such views were widely held between 1850 and 1910, not only by psychologists, but also anthropologists, ethnographers, and biologists. The cultural, social and economic developments during this period, in particular European imperialist expansion and colonial rule over indigenous peoples, created the ideal conditions for the proliferation of such Social Darwinist beliefs (Richards, 1997).

It was in the US however, where scientific racism and the empirical investigation of psychological 'race' differences were vigorously pursued. Between 1910 and 1940, 'race psychology' came to dominate the concerns of US psychologists. The 'Negro education' question and immigration together shaped and influenced the interest in race psychology during this period. With the abolition of slavery, US government policy became increasingly occupied with how to 'manage' the sizable African-American minority. The systematic empirical study of 'race' differences, to identify and map the 'innate' personality characteristics and mental abilities of African-Americans, was central to the race psychology project, its primary goal being to develop educational policies and interventions for this population group. The first wave of large-scale intelligence testing occurred during this time, the results of which (poorer performance of African-Americans compared to Whites) were used to justify and promote segregationist policies. Similarly, race psychology was put into service for identifying which 'undesirable races' or groups should be excluded from migrating to the US. Eminent American psychologists such as Yerkes and Terman were very supportive of this work, adding their intellectual weight to the 'race differences' school. British psychologists were less directly engaged in empirical 'race differences' research during this time (except for Pearson, who founded the *Annals of Eugenics* in 1925). Nevertheless, the central tenets of scientific racism were enthusiastically embraced by prominent British psychologists such as McDougall, Cattell, and Spearman. Meanwhile, in Australia, Stanley Porteus was applying the 'race differences' paradigm to his research on Australian Aborigines (Richards, 1997).

There is little doubt, therefore, that psychology during this period contributed substantially to the legitimacy that was given to scientific racism. As Richards (1997) makes clear, however, while scientific racism was espoused by very influential and eminent psychologists during this period, it was by no means embraced universally. By the 1930s, geneticists had discredited the concept of 'race' as a scientific category, and by 1940, devastating and influential critiques of scientific racism and race psychology by anti-racist critics such as Otto Klineberg, led to the eventual demise of race psychology.

The advent of Nazi eugenics and the experience of the Holocaust during the Second World War, ensured that race psychology did not re-emerge during the post-war period. The civil rights movement in the US and the growth of a Black psychology also contributed to a post-war social and political climate that suppressed explicitly racist theories (Richards, 1997). This was to remain the case until 1969, with the publication of Arthur Jensen's paper in the prestigious *Harvard Educational Review*, 'How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement?' The race and IQ debate, one that psychologists and other social scientists had effectively refuted back in the 1930s, was about to be played out once again.

While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to detail the comprehensive critiques that have been made to refute Jensen's claims regarding the existence of reliable 'racial' differences in intelligence, one can only concur with Richard's comment (1997: 273) that supporters of this position, 'betray an inability to let go of the concept' of 'race', even though it had been discredited as unscientific long ago.

There are quite simply, no stabilised, isolated, inbreeding gene-pools of any magnitude in the US [or elsewhere]. This point alone (totally separate from the heritability of IQ issue) surely comes close to being a clinching refutation of the race differences position. (Richards, 1997: 274)

Despite this, psychologists insist on resurrecting this debate, and recycling the same old arguments every so often. In the past decade alone, we have witnessed the furor and public controversy generated by Herrnstein and Murray (1994) and Rushton's (1994) claims regarding 'racial' differences in intelligence.

It is perhaps this debate on 'race' and IQ, more than any other issue, which has shaped the view that psychology as a discipline has contributed significantly to the justification and legitimation of racism. In his detailed history of racism and psychology, Richards (1997) contests this characterization of the discipline, arguing that throughout psychology's history, explicitly racist theorizing has always been a minority position, even during the 'hey days' of scientific racism in the early 1900s, and more recently, during the height of the race and IQ controversies. Indeed, Richards argues that it was the failure of scientific racism as a paradigm within psychology that 'enabled contemporary US psychologists to really begin to *see* racism (a term only dating from 1936) as a phenomenon ... to be recognized and articulated as a problem within and for Psychology' (1997: 112).

Other commentators, however, have not been so generous in their assessments, claiming that psychology has been and continues to be inherently racist (Bhavnani and Phoenix, 1994; Billig, 1979, 1985; Hopkins et al., 1997; Howitt and Owusu-Bempah, 1994). These critics are not only concerned with explicit and extreme forms of racist theorizing that attract considerable attention and criticism, but more subtle variants of racism that underlie mainstream concepts and theories that are widely accepted. Black psychologists such as Mama (1995) and Cross (1991), have argued that much of the anti-

racism theorizing that took place in the US post-war period simply replaced the old stereotype of African-Americans as biologically inferior, with a new stereotype that viewed them as 'damaged victims' of White racism. This construction of African-Americans as primarily socially dysfunctional and culturally deprived persists today and is implicit in much contemporary psychology. A recent review by Garcia Coll and colleagues (1996), for example, has argued that research on children from minority cultures focuses overwhelmingly on what are theorized to be developmental 'deficits'. Perhaps one of the most insidious and persistent forms of racism within psychology is the uncritical acceptance of White middle-class values, behavioural patterns, and performance as 'norms' against which all other groups are measured and compared (Sanson, Augoustinos, Gridley, Kyrios, Reser, and Turner, 1998).

Like the distinction that has been made between old and modern forms of racism (see Chapter 2), critics have also argued that dominant mainstream theorizing on race and prejudice contain elements of the 'new racism'. Specifically, Hopkins, et al. (1997) draw parallels between some of the central tenets of social cognition research and the new racism. Both social cognition and the new racism assume that 'race' is a natural category which people automatically use to categorize self and others. Far from being socially constructed and strategically deployed for social and ideological ends (see LeCouteur and Augoustinos, Chapter 13), race becomes a 'non-problematic 'given' which is ... somehow inherent in the empirical reality of observable or imagined biological difference' (Hopkins et al., 1997: 70). Within the social cognition tradition, 'racial' categorizations are theorized to be similar to other kinds of categorizations, driven by our cognitive and perceptual need to simplify complex sensory information from the social environment. In this way, racial categorization becomes a natural and inevitable human cognitive process, not an ideological and social practice (Augoustinos and Walker, 1998). Social categorizations such as 'race' are conceptualized as laying the cognitive and perceptual foundations for stereotyping and ultimately, discrimination towards dissimilar others. Hopkins and his colleagues argue that there are disturbing conceptual similarities between this social cognitive approach to prejudice and the 'new racism' discourse, both of which construct intergroup differentiation and discrimination as 'human', based on a psychological preference for similar others who share the same values and way of life, and a 'natural' tendency to prejudge dissimilar others, especially those who are 'racially' different (for an alternative analysis see Billig, 1985; Turner, 1999a).

Overview of Prejudice Research

As Duckitt makes clear in his chapter to this volume, a variety of explanations for prejudice and racism have been advanced by social psychologists throughout the 20th century. The prevalence of particular kinds of explanations have shifted during this time depending on wider historical and social factors and the

dominance of specific paradigmatic frameworks within social psychology itself. Researchers such as Allport (1954), Ashmore and DelBoca (1981), Simpson and Yinger (1985), and Duckitt (1992) have attempted, in different ways, to categorize the various types of theoretical explanations that have been advanced for prejudice. For example, Allport identifies six types of explanation (historical, sociological, situational, personality, phenomenological, and the stimulus-object level), Ashmore and DelBoca (1981) in their analysis of the stereotyping literature propose psychodynamic, cognitive and socio-cultural levels of analysis, and Simpson and Yinger (1985) identify three distinct levels of explanation for prejudice: the individual, group, and cultural levels. Consistent with these levels of analysis, the sections in this book are organized to reflect personality and socialization (Part II), cognitive (Part III), intergroup (Part IV), and socio-cultural (Part V) approaches.

Individual level theories dominated by the Freudian psychodynamic tradition were most prevalent between 1930 and 1960. From this perspective, prejudice, like other behaviour, was understood as being intrapsychically determined. Unconscious instincts primarily related to sexual and aggressive desires created psychological conflict within the person. In order to reduce tension, the person displaces their aggression onto certain groups and projects their own conflicts onto these targets in order to rationalize and justify their actions. For example, hostility towards members of a particular group is explained in terms of the outgroup's inferiority or violent nature.

Other individual level explanations of prejudice that locate prejudice within the personality are less psychodynamic in nature, placing less emphasis on unconscious and instinctual forces. Such personality-based theories link prejudice to child-rearing and socialization practices. Parent-child relationships with severe and punitive parental discipline can render offspring with an authoritarian personality that is characterized by, amongst other things, rigidity in thinking, intolerance of ambiguity, submissiveness to authority, and suggestibility and gullibility. Those with an authoritarian personality syndrome are also considered more prejudiced (see Heaven, Chapter 6).

Significant limitations have been identified with personality accounts of prejudice. Most notably is the issue of why certain groups rather than others become the target for prejudice by authoritarians or those with pent-up 'free-floating' frustration due to intrapsychic conflict. In addition, such theories neglect the potential interplay between individual psychology and social structural factors in the etiology of prejudice. While there is some recognition that economic and social factors may be elements that contribute to authoritarianism, these issues are never dealt with explicitly or integrated into the psychological analysis.

There is general agreement that cognitive theories of stereotyping have dominated the study of prejudice in the 1980s and 1990s. Ashmore and DelBoca (1981), among others, identify cognitive theories of prejudice as explanations that are primarily located at the individual level of analysis. These view prejudice and racism as inevitable consequences of 'normal' and functional cognitive processes such as categorization and stereotyping. Our

limited cognitive capacities, it is argued, make the simplification and generalization of social information necessarily adaptive, so that a group's tendency to view outgroup members as 'all alike' is not surprising. Cognitive mechanisms are thus viewed as the essential foundations to stereotyping and prejudice. Social cognitive approaches place greater emphasis on how social information is encoded, processed, and retrieved from memory than on the specific content associated with particular social groups (Ashmore and DelBoca, 1981). Like the personality approaches, cognitive approaches tend to ignore or downplay the wider social context of intergroup relations.

Intergroup perspectives, such as social identity theory and self-categorization theory, place greater emphasis on the psychology of the group: the social context within which groups interact and the nature of the power and status differentials that shape group life. From this perspective, categorizing and stereotyping are functional not because these processes simplify and reduce information, but because they enrich and elaborate our perception of the social environment and our place within it. These cognitive processes, it is argued, orient us to the 'actualities of social life' and the nature of group relations that exist at any one time.

It is perhaps an irony that among many social psychologists there is a deep-seated denial of the functional reality of the group and its psychological properties. Group-based attitudes and behaviour are considered to be flawed and to represent a less accurate account of social reality than individual-related processes (i.e., personality, cognitive processes). Furthermore, the functional positive outcomes of group life are overlooked and negative human social conflict is understood as the main consequence of group-based identification and interaction (see Oakes and Haslam, Chapter 11; Reynolds and Turner, Chapter 10).

Groups are largely associated with negative features of social interaction (e.g., conformity and the loss of individuality and autonomy), rather than a force that contributes to and enriches social life. It is often assumed that group-based perception – perceiving individuals as group members rather than as individuals – is inherently bad, distorts social reality, and ultimately leads to all sorts of perceptual biases like stereotyping. Stereotyping and prejudice are often constructed within these models as the ultimate consequence of failing to perceive people as individuals with unique characteristics and traits. Group-based approaches, such as social identity and self-categorization theories, fundamentally question these central assumptions of social-cognitive models, by emphasizing the psychological validity of group-based perception.

In contrast to individual and group-based perspectives on prejudice, social psychology has contributed less to structural and institutional theories of prejudice and racism. Cultural theories of prejudice view the internalization of group norms and values and conformity to such norms (as a function of social rewards and punishments), as fundamental in the widespread adoption of prejudiced values within a society (Ashmore and DelBoca, 1981). Furthermore, the acceptance of such norms reinforces particular cultural patterns and relations of dominance. For example, theories of 'symbolic racism' share the

common assumption that standards and values that are widely shared within a group can shape prejudice. The emphasis is on prejudice as a social or cultural norm. Even from this cultural perspective however, social psychologists have been more concerned with understanding how broader social and cultural norms are expressed and reflected in the psychology of individual perceivers.

One recent socio-cultural approach to racism that explicitly avoids making claims about the psychology of individual perceivers in its analysis of contemporary prejudice and racism is discursive psychology. Discursive psychology views racism as both interactive and communicative, and as located within the language practices and discourses of a society. It is through everyday language practices, both in formal and informal talk that relations of power, dominance and exploitation become reproduced and legitimated. The analytic site for discursive psychology is the way in which discursive resources and rhetorical arguments are put together to construct different social and 'racial' identities, and to provide accounts that legitimate these differences and identities as 'real' and 'natural'. Discursive psychology locates these language practices or 'ways of talking' at a societal level, as products of a racist society rather than as individual psychological and or cognitive products. The analytic site therefore is not the 'prejudiced' or 'racist' individual, but the discursive and linguistic resources that are available within an inequitable society. While this approach has been able to identify how linguistic resources are combined in flexible and contradictory ways to reproduce and justify racist outcomes, it says very little about the possible underlying psychological processes that are linked to the deployment of specific language practices in specific contexts. That is, it makes no claims regarding 'what is going on inside the person' when using racist discourse.

While Simpson and Yinger (1985) assume that these different levels of explaining prejudice and racism are unproblematic and complementary, others recognize the conceptual difficulties in reconciling the various assumptions that underlie the different approaches (Ashmore and DelBoca, 1981). For example, in what way can a personality approach to prejudice be reconciled with models with a group-based and institutional focus? If the norms of a culture change in a short time frame resulting in increased prejudice (i.e., at times of war) what implications does this have for the personality view? How does a group perspective account for stability in authoritarianism and therefore prejudice? How does the cognitive perspective deal with evidence that the use of stereotypes is not always associated with cognitively efficient outcomes? How does the discursive approach deal with individual subjectivity and accountability in everyday and formal talk around 'race' and difference?

More recently, Duckitt (1992) has attempted to provide a psychological framework for understanding prejudice and racism by integrating individual, group-based and structural approaches. For Duckitt, the psychological account of prejudice begins with the recognition that there are universal cognitive psychological processes that create a potential for prejudice. This potential is elaborated into socially shared patterns of prejudice through the reality of social

and intergroup dynamics. Mechanisms of transmission are identified which translate intergroup dynamics to individual group members. However, individual differences in susceptibility to such transmissions are believed to explain why there are variations in the expressions of prejudice despite similar social influences. Several chapters in this book will pick up on the potential that Duckitt identifies for such theoretical integration.

Overview of this Book

Perhaps the clearest message that emerges from the above review is that prejudice and racism are multi-level phenomena that include individual, cognitive, group, and societal/cultural levels of analysis. The parts in this book are structured to reflect the range of analytic approaches in the social-psychological study of prejudice and racism. We should acknowledge however, that we have devoted less space than usual to socio-cognitive theories of prejudice and stereotyping that now dominate social psychology. We believe that these approaches receive considerable attention already within the available literature, while other approaches, in particular intergroup and socio-cultural theories, are under-represented within our discipline. Some of the chapters in this book, while recognizing the contribution that social cognition has made to the study of prejudice, aim to extend this approach by adding a more social perspective. For example, Chapters 7 and 8 in Part III both demonstrate how an intergroup perspective, emphasizing social identity processes, can extend and improve upon mainstream theorizing on the role of affect and attitudes in prejudice and discrimination. In contrast, other chapters are highly critical of the central assumptions of social cognitive theories, leading to a radical reconceptualization of concepts such as categorization and stereotyping (e.g., Chapters 9, 10, and 12). We hope, therefore, that this edited collection will reignite interest in the social and cultural dimensions of prejudice and racism.

Part I: Prejudice and Racism: Defining the Problem, 'Knowing' the Experience

The chapters contained in Part I are primarily descriptive and address the nature and personal experience of contemporary prejudice and racism. In Chapter 2, Iain Walker discusses what has been referred to as the changing nature of racism over the last century. Many social analysts and theorists, including social psychologists, have argued that 'old-fashioned' or 'blatant' racism, which was based on notions of racial superiority and open opposition to racial equality, has now been replaced with a more socially acceptable variant, known generically as 'modern' racism (McConahay, 1982, 1986). There are several theoretical variants of the nature of 'modern' racism which include 'symbolic' (Kinder and Sears, 1981, 1985), 'ambivalent' (Katz and Hass, 1988), 'aversive' (Gaertner and Dovidio, 1986) and 'subtle' racism (Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995). Walker details each of these distinct yet similar theoretical approaches to modern racism and evaluates the overall conceptual adequacy of the modern racism construct.

He then applies this construct to understanding the nature of racism within the Australian social and historical context, reminding us that theories of modern racism have by and large emerged in the US to account for the nature of race relations within that country. How adequate then, are these theoretical approaches in explaining and accounting for race relations in other countries such as Australia? In reviewing the empirical research that has addressed majority group attitudes to Indigenous Australians since the 1940s, Walker concludes that there is no clear, identifiable transition from old to modern racism over this time, but rather, both forms of racism have co-existed. Indeed, he suggests that ambivalence and contradiction have been central features of racist attitudes, beliefs, and practices in Australia since British colonization. Similarly, there is evidence in the US that old and modern forms of racism are not historically distinct but have co-existed.

In Chapter 3, Darren Garvey presents a reflexive analysis of the everyday lived experience of racism from an Indigenous perspective and raises the moral dilemmas majority group members face as observers to such instances. The 'data' that Garvey presents is not the usual data of social psychology: numeric averages on rating scales that measure attitudes or significant interactions drawn from laboratory experiments. Rather, Garvey's chapter contains a number of rich narratives or personal accounts of the everyday lived experience of Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. Social researchers have increasingly turned to the analysis of narratives or story-telling accounts to understand how people make sense of their experiences, and construct and negotiate their various social identities (Riessman, 1993). As Garvey emphasizes, as psychologists, we have been trained to be highly suspicious of such personalized accounts, questioning their correspondence to 'what actually happened' or their representativeness. Language-based, interpretative methods such as the study of narratives, however, have been instrumental in 'giving voice' to those individuals and groups who have been traditionally silenced or have gone unheard. The recent *National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families* (1997), was instrumental in giving voice to hundreds of Indigenous people whose stories of being forcibly removed from their families and communities brought to the Australian public's attention, the institutionalized racist practices of past government policies. As we write this chapter, the Australian Federal Government has declared that despite the Inquiry's findings, there was no such thing as a 'generation' of stolen children, since only one in ten Indigenous children were removed under these laws! This sentiment is echoed in the letter to *The Cairns Post* (1999) in Chapter 3, whose writer refers to the 'Stolen children' as 'the greatest fraud and con on the planet'. Clearly, such sentiments reflect the difficulty that many Australians have in coming to terms with a racist history.

One of the most recurring themes in the narratives that Garvey presents in Chapter 3 is that of Aboriginal identity. These narratives demonstrate the way in which an Indigenous identity is variously constructed and contested both by majority group members and within Indigenous communities. The writer to *The*

Cairns Post for example, sets up two contrasting categories, 'pretend Aborigines' and 'real Aborigines', in order to challenge and contest the 'authenticity' of those whom identify themselves as Aboriginal (see also LeCouteur and Augoustinos, Chapter 13). Likewise, the rhetorical question in the narrative 'Are you 1/8th or what?' provides a rich and detailed account of the constant questioning and scrutiny Indigenous people encounter over their identity. The narrative, 'Going back to school', again highlights the experience of negotiating and constructing an Indigenous identity in Australia today, the constant shifting from being constructed as 'different' and 'other' to being denied an Aboriginal identity when one's physical appearance 'belies' this categorization. Currently in Australia, 'reconciliation' between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians has been at the forefront of political and social debate. In this spirit, Garvey concludes his chapter by offering us some possibilities for 'bridging the divide' between Aboriginal and White Australia.

Part II: Development, Socialization, and Personality

Part II includes chapters that primarily deal with personality and socialization approaches to the study of prejudice and racism. It also aims to present the extensive empirical work that has been conducted on the development of prejudice and racism in children. In Chapter 4, Drew Nesdale reviews the now voluminous literature on prejudice in children. The dramatic 'Black doll/White doll' research by the Clarks in the 1940s clearly indicated that by age four children demonstrated racial awareness, could differentiate between different racial groups and identify their own group membership. Moreover, these young children also demonstrated a strong preference for their own group. The Clarks' work inspired a long tradition of research that was to follow in the measurement of ethnic prejudice in children. Nesdale reviews the various techniques and methods that have been used to measure ethnic prejudice in children, including the ethnic preference technique, trait attribution, interviews, unobtrusive observation and implicit measures. Clearly, the task of developing an ecologically valid method and instrument to measure ethnic prejudice in children still remains elusive as all methods have proved to be problematic. Nonetheless, most of this research has confirmed that children show an increasing preference for their own group up until seven years of age, with many studies reporting a decline in ethnic bias thereafter. The critical issue that remains unresolved however, is whether a child's ingroup preference should be equated with outgroup prejudice. We will see throughout this book that this is a conceptual problem that plagues much of the intergroup relations literature.

Nesdale then reviews the theoretical approaches that have been applied to understand the development of ethnic prejudice in children, the most notable of which are Aboud's (1988) socio-cognitive theory and Tajfel and Turner's (1979) social identity theory. Nesdale considers the relative strengths and limitations of these theories in accounting for the development of ethnic

prejudice in children, concluding that while each offers critical insights that the other lacks, social identity theory is better placed to understand the development of a 'full-blown' prejudiced identity among older children.

In contrast to the development of prejudice and ethnic bias in children, Chapter 5, by Julie Robinson, Rivka Witenberg, and Ann Sanson, reviews the existing literature on the development of 'tolerance' in children. As Robinson, et al. make clear, this is no easy task, given the definitional ambiguities surrounding the notion of tolerance and the methodological problems associated with its measurement. While racial and cultural tolerance is often a value espoused in multicultural societies like Australia, there is a growing disaffection with this term and its implied meaning of 'putting up' with dissimilar others (Hage, 1998). Nevertheless, it still remains a widely used word that can shift from weak (putting up with) to strong (full acceptance) versions of the term.

The previous chapter documented the now long tradition of developmental research that has concluded that ethnic prejudice and bias is evident in very young children. In reviewing the same body of literature but focusing on the other side of the coin (the absence of prejudice), Robinson, et al., conclude that many of these studies 'have obscured evidence that an absence of ethnic and racial bias is also commonly observed among young children' (p. 78). By focusing one-sidedly on the presence of bias, many of these studies downplay the considerable individual differences that exist between children and how the presence or absence of bias varies contextually. As Nesdale indicated in Chapter 3, studies that focus on children's play interactions and friendship patterns, rather than trait attributions and preferences for abstracted stimuli such as dolls and pictures, show considerably less bias and evidence for ethnic tolerance and acceptance. This paints a much more optimistic and perhaps balanced picture of young children's capacity for ethnic acceptance. Robinson et al. next examine the cognitive factors and socialization experiences that appear to influence the development of tolerance in children. Finally, Robinson and her colleagues consider adolescence as a particularly important period for the development of political tolerance and tolerance for those with different beliefs, suggesting that this research may throw light on the development of ethnic tolerance and acceptance during adolescence. Their review suggests that education, cognitive skill, and moral development are factors that combine in complex ways to influence the acceptance of differences between groups.

As Patrick Heaven documents in Chapter 6, the publication of *The Authoritarian Personality* by Adorno and his colleagues in 1950 was an influential psychological contribution to understanding prejudice. Reflecting the intellectual influence of psychodynamic theory at that time, this groundbreaking book generated considerable interest in the idea that ethnocentrism, and more specifically prejudice, could be accounted for by intrapsychic processes and personality characteristics. While the early work demonstrated that authoritarianism, as measured by the F scale, was significantly related to ethnocentrism, anti-Semitism, and fascist tendencies, by the end of the 1950s, psychologists were beginning to question the extent to which personality could

account for these. Pettigrew (1958), among others, pointed to the greater importance of social and cultural norms that in some societies, such as apartheid South Africa, tolerated and reinforced prejudiced attitudes. As Heaven details, these conceptual concerns, together with the proliferation of criticisms associated with the psychometric properties of the F scale, led to the eventual decline of interest in authoritarianism during the late 1960s and 1970s.

However, interest in authoritarianism was rekindled in 1981 with the introduction of Altemeyer's work on right wing authoritarianism (RWA). While clearly related to the original concept of authoritarianism, RWA referred more specifically to a rigid adherence to social conventions, submission to established authorities, and a strong rejection of outgroups who are perceived to be culturally and ethnically different. Unlike Adorno et al., whose work was heavily influenced by Freudian psychodynamic theory, Altemeyer viewed RWA as an individual personality characteristic that was predominantly shaped by social learning experiences. Heaven's review concludes that the instrument Altemeyer developed to measure RWA has proven to be a better predictor of racial and ethnic prejudice in a variety of different settings than the early authoritarianism scales.

Finally, Heaven introduces the most recent personality approach in understanding prejudice: social dominance orientation (SDO) (Sidanius, 1993), an individual difference variable that refers to a person's need to maintain their ingroup's superiority and dominance in the social hierarchy. Individuals who are members of dominant groups (e.g., White men) differ in the extent to which they hold attitudes and beliefs that preserve, maintain, and justify their dominance over members of outgroups. Heaven concludes that thus far, SDO has proven to complement the work on RWA, and used together can account for much of the variance (50–60 per cent) in predicting prejudice.

Part III: Social Cognition, Mood, and Attitudes

Part III includes theoretical frameworks that are central to socio-cognitive models of prejudice and attitudes. Gaining momentum in the 1980s, and becoming firmly established in the 1990s, cognitive processing models of stereotyping have been very influential in shaping psychology's approach to the study of prejudice. In Chapter 7, Vance Locke and Lucy Johnston review this tradition of research, outlining the conceptual rationale that has led many psychologists to view categorization and stereotyping as the cognitive bases to prejudice. As Locke and Johnston argue, such cognitive approaches have usually implied that prejudice is an inevitable consequence of our perceptual and cognitive processes. It was not until Devine's (1989) pioneering work that this 'inevitability of prejudice' perspective, inherent in most social cognitive approaches, was challenged. Devine's disassociation model argued that while everyone has knowledge of the stereotypes associated with particular social groups and that these are automatically activated; at a conscious level, high-

and low-prejudice people differ significantly regarding the use and application of these stereotypes in their judgements and evaluations. Low-prejudice people were argued to consciously inhibit stereotypes, whereas high-prejudice people did not because they usually agreed with the content of these stereotypes.

Despite Devine's more optimistic position on the relationship between stereotyping and prejudice, the disassociation model nevertheless continued to argue that everyone, regardless of his or her values and beliefs, was prone to having stereotypes automatically activated. In their review of more recent empirical work however, Locke and Johnston conclude that it is only the highly prejudiced that are susceptible to automatic stereotyping; those low in prejudice are less prone to stereotyping at both the automatic and conscious levels of processing. While this is good news, there is a growing body of literature that suggests that all of us, regardless of our beliefs, can be influenced by stereotypes when they are activated beyond our awareness. 'Implicit stereotyping' (Greenwald and Banaji, 1995) can not only influence our judgements, but also our behaviour. Locke and Johnston consider the situations in which such implicit stereotyping is likely to occur and how contextual cues shape its expression.

Finally, given the proposed centrality of stereotyping to prejudiced judgments, Locke and Johnston consider what the literature suggests about the possibility of changing stereotypes and thereby minimizing their prejudicial consequences. While much of this research has suggested that people are likely to subtype disconfirming instances of a category, concluding that stereotypes are highly resistant to change, Lucy Johnston's own work has demonstrated that under certain conditions people can resist their use and even change their stereotypes. Overall, Locke and Johnston's chapter illustrates how central theoretical constructs in the stereotyping literature that were originally shaped by a model of the ordinary perceiver as a 'cognitive miser' (Fiske and Taylor, 1991), have more recently shifted to the view that we are all 'motivated tacticians' (Fiske, 1998) who strategically process information in ways that best suit our motivational needs, attentional resources, and personal beliefs and interests.

Negative feelings and affect towards minority outgroups have always been viewed as central to prejudice, but the cognitive accounts of prejudice that came to dominate social psychology since the 1970s, either ignored or downplayed affective determinants. As Baird and Duck emphasize in Chapter 8, there has been a recent resurgence of interest in how emotions and mood influence social judgements and intergroup behaviour more generally. 'The politics of gut feeling' is back on the research agenda, suggesting, not surprisingly, that negative affect can increase stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination (Esses and Zanna, 1995; Forgas and Fiedler, 1996; Mackie and Hamilton, 1993). In a series of four minimal group studies, Baird and Duck investigate the conditions under which a negative transient mood enhances discriminatory intergroup behaviour. Study 1 suggests that high-status groups in a negative mood are particularly prone to discriminating against low-status groups. Study 2 found that this tendency to discriminate against low-status groups was further

accentuated in the high-status, negative-mood condition, if participants were given explicit instructions to favour their own group, thereby mitigating any social norms against discrimination. Moreover, these participants enjoyed the task more and reported feeling better after discriminating than those who were instructed to be fair or to favour the outgroup. This finding suggests that in negative moods, discriminating against an outgroup functions in the service of mood repair. Put simply, it makes people feel better. Study 3 demonstrated that the tendency for intergroup discrimination in negative mood conditions can be attenuated by instructing participants to deliberate over their intergroup judgements and to reflect upon how their mood may affect these judgements. Thus, in transient negative moods, intergroup discrimination can be minimized by longer, deliberative processing. Lastly, Study 4 examined more directly the view that discrimination is motivated by a need to regulate affect, specifically, to repair a negative transient mood. Participants in a negative mood who were led to believe that their mood would be labile after the ingestion of a drug (placebo) showed more discrimination, and felt significantly better after discriminating than those who believed their mood was temporarily fixed. Baird and Duck conclude that for high-status groups in a negative mood, 'discrimination against outgroups is a successful strategy of affect control' (p. 142): that is, discriminating makes high-status individuals in a negative mood feel better! Together, these series of studies demonstrate that the need to feel better can accentuate discriminatory behaviour in particular intergroup contexts.

In Chapter 9, Deborah Terry, Michael Hogg, and Leda Blackwood examine the role that social norms play in the expression of prejudiced attitudes and discriminatory behaviour. At least since LaPiere's (1934) classic study on racial attitudes and discriminatory behaviour, social psychologists have recognized that there is no simple and straightforward link between people's expressed attitudes and their behaviour. The theories of reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) and planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1987, 1991) were formulated to understand this complex relationship more fully, recognizing that people's behavioural intentions were influenced not only by their attitudes but also by the subjective norms held by significant others towards the behaviour. Terry and her colleagues extend upon this formulation by applying the central theoretical constructs of social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987). Together, these theories suggest that people are more likely to express prejudicial attitudes behaviourally if such attitudes are consistent with the social norms for a group to which the person belongs (ingroup), and with which they strongly identify. Such group membership conditions provide strong motivations for a person to express xenophobic or ethnocentric attitudes behaviourally because by doing so the person not only validates their own self-concept but also their status as an ingroup member. The motivation to express behaviourally such attitudes towards minority groups is further enhanced under conditions of status uncertainty and insecurity. Typically, members of dominant groups are likely to express ethnocentric attitudes and behaviour when they feel their social position is under threat in some way. This then provides the legitimation and justification

for the expression of prejudicial attitudes and behaviour towards minority outgroups.

Terry et al. apply these ideas in a laboratory experiment and field survey, both of which provide support for the role of ingroup norms and salient group identity as determinants for the behavioural expression of ethnocentric attitudes. Importantly, Terry and her colleagues argue that these largely social and intergroup factors can account for the historical shifts and changes during the twentieth century in racial and ethnic 'tolerance'. Historical periods, such as the 1990s, that were characterized by increases in racism and ethnic intolerance in Australia and other Western countries, reflect shifts in the wider ideological or normative climate for the behavioural expression of such views. In such periods, members of dominant groups perceive ideological shifts in wider community norms regarding multiculturalism and ethnic tolerance that are then used to legitimate the behavioural expression of prejudice and intolerance.

Part IV: Prejudice and Group Life

The chapters in Part IV are all explicitly intergroup in their analyses of prejudice. One of the most influential analyses of intergroup discrimination stems from the minimal group studies (Tajfel et al., 1971). Several authors throughout this book refer to these studies in order to highlight that the division of people into two arbitrary groups is sufficient to stimulate discrimination that favours members of one's own group over members of the other group. Kate Reynolds and John Turner, in Chapter 10, provide a detailed description of these studies and their implications for understandings of intergroup discrimination. Both social identity theory and self-categorization theory have their origins in the minimal group research and these theories, their similarities and differences, are described in detail.

The theoretical and empirical focus of the chapter is the role of group-based processes and intergroup relations in understanding prejudice, discrimination, and social conflict. Groups are 'real' and have psychological significance for members. Consequently, individuals' collective psychology as group members, their social identity, in interplay with the realities of group relations within a social system are believed to be important in trying to understand both social antagonism and individual psychology.

It is argued that social antagonism is not an outcome of irrationality, cognitive deficiency, and personality-based pathology, as many theories suggest, but is rather a psychologically rational and valid outcome of the way members of certain groups perceive the social structure of intergroup relations. In these terms, prejudice can be viewed as an outcome of genuine political and social conflict. In line with this analysis, the authors question how theories that view conflict in the form of prejudice as an outcome of psychological deficiency can explain the important functional aspects of social disagreement and debate.

One of the central features of the self-categorization theory is its analysis of the categorization process. Penny Oakes and Alex Haslam use this analysis in

Chapter 11 to advance our understanding of a recurrent issue in prejudice and racism research, the relationship between categorization and prejudice. A widely accepted view is that because categorization enables people to be divided into ingroups and outgroups, 'us' and 'them', it is the primary source of intergroup hostility and prejudice. Such a position is reinforced by the belief that along with ingroup-outgroup categorization there is inevitably going to be evaluative bias – 'we are better than them'. Such discrimination is considered by many either to represent prejudice or to be the genesis of prejudice. For these reasons, the authors focus on the question of whether we are prejudiced because we categorize.

In trying to answer this question, Oakes and Haslam examine the nature of the categorization process. Theory and research that portrays categorization as a process that distorts and biases group-based social perception, is contrasted with work that argues that categorization is a sense-making, rational process that underlies all perception. This latter view is based on the self-categorization theory analysis that social life is an outcome of the actions of groups as well as individuals and that both must be able to be meaningfully represented psychologically. Four areas that are commonly used to support the contention that categorization compromises accuracy are discussed: accentuation effects, outgroup homogeneity, information construal, and ingroup favouritism or bias. In addition, for each, the opposite case, that such effects represent the functional and adaptive aspects of categorization, is also presented.

It is concluded that categorization has no special relationship to phenomena such as bigotry, intergroup hostility, and prejudice. Categorization is also demonstrated to be associated with individuated perception, prejudice reduction, and cooperation. Consequently, it is considered misleading to look to categorization itself as the culpable force in prejudice. Rather, the authors ask us to consider the reality of intergroup conflict and the extent to which political action has the potential to provide the real answer to racism and prejudice.

In line with a group-based analysis of prejudice, Michael Platow and Jackie Hunter in Chapter 12 ask 'doesn't real intergroup conflict over material and valued resources have anything to do with prejudice?' In order to reach the conclusion that 'it does' they review Sherif et al.'s famous boys' camp studies, known replications of this research, as well as work on social interdependence theory. The boys' camp studies demonstrated that negative attitudes and prejudice arise when groups (of similar power and status) are in competition for scarce resources and their interests are incompatible (e.g., negative interdependence – one group gains and the other group loses). However, tolerance and fairness prevail in situations in which group interests are compatible and complementary; where groups share superordinate goals (e.g., positive interdependence – one group gains only with the assistance of another group).

The conditions that drive competition or cooperation have been explored further within mixed-motive interdependence research. While such research indicates that groups are more likely to pursue competition than cooperation, findings also suggest that realistic conflict may not be a necessary condition for