ULRICH TRUMPENER

# Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918

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# ERRATA

## *Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918*

BY ULRICH TRUMPENER

1) Because of last-minute changes in pagination, several index entries and cross-references in the footnotes refer erroneously to a page either behind or in front of the correct page.

2) In many footnotes the word "and" was erroneously printed in front of "*passim*."

3) In some parts of the book the umlaut sign in "Jäckh" was omitted.

| | |
|---|---|
| p. 19, note 33, line 2 | insert period after "Feb" |
| p. 76, line 17 | "Glotz" should be "Goltz" |
| p. 79, note 33, line 1 | "Bd. 33" should be "Bd. 34" |
| p. 101, note 88, line 1 | "Külhmann" should be "Kühlmann" |
| p. 159, lines 21-22 | "nonannexionist" should be "nonannexationist" |
| p. 179, line 3 | insert comma after "Hertling" |
| p. 217, note 43, line 8 | delete "*Deutschland*," |
| p. 223, note 56, line 1 | delete "*Deutschland*," |
| p. 251, lines 20 and 22 | "SPD" should be "USPD" |
| p. 294, lines 17-22 | should be "Although on June 19 Bethmann Hollweg . . . payments without collateral, Helfferich . . . to follow through." |
| p. 311, line 21 | delete hyphen between "Reich" and "Ottoman" |
| p. 355, line 7 | insert "the" after "from" |
| p. 414 | transpose lines 5 and 6 under "Egypt" |

Princeton University Press, 1968

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By Ulrich Trumpener



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*To my parents*

# PREFACE

FOR ALMOST exactly four years, the Ottoman empire participated in the First World War as an ally of the Central Powers. The Turks'[1] intervention on the side that lost the war destroyed their empire and opened the door to drastic political changes throughout the Near and Middle East. However, before they suffered defeat and the dismemberment of their empire the Turks played a remarkably active role in the European war and contributed, at least indirectly, to both its prolongation and intensification. By their military efforts and promotion of a potentially dangerous program of subversion in the Asian and African possessions of the Entente, the Turks tied down sizable British, Russian, French, and Italian forces which might otherwise have been used against the Central Powers in Europe. More important, the Ottoman army and navy successfully prevented the use of the Black Sea Straits for communications between Russia and her Western allies and thereby contributed substantially to the weakening and eventual collapse of the Russian war effort. Though they came to depend increasingly on financial and other assistance from Germany and, to a lesser extent, the Dual Monarchy, the Turks' cobelligerency was of great advantage to the Central Powers and perhaps even a decisive factor in enabling them to hold out as long as they did.

While the military developments on the Turkish fronts and the wartime policies of the Entente regarding the Ottoman empire have been treated in numerous well-documented studies, the Central Powers' general relationship with their Ottoman ally has so far received little scholarly attention. This study

[1] Although "Osmanlis" would be a more appropriate designation for the heterogeneous population of the Ottoman empire (and especially for its ruling elite), the term "Turks" will be used instead throughout this book in conformity with prevailing Western practice. As for the terms "Ottoman empire" and "Ottoman," I have taken the liberty of using them interchangeably with "Turkey" and "Turkish."

seeks to narrow the existing historiographic gap. It is concerned *primarily* with the nature and results of Germany's wartime policies in and with regard to the Ottoman empire. It also attempts to offer some insights into the character and achievements of the *Ittihad ve Terakki* (Union and Progress) Party which ruled the Ottoman empire from 1913 to 1918. Austria-Hungary's and Bulgaria's Turkish policies are dealt with only in passing, though an effort has been made to record those instances when they impinged directly on the German–Ottoman relationship.

The central question to which this book addresses itself is whether the Germans were really as influential or dominant in the Ottoman empire as most traditional works have suggested. Did Berlin, on the eve of and during World War I, have a decisive voice in the formulation of the Porte's policies? To what extent did the Germans control the Ottoman armed forces? What economic power did they hold in the Turkish lands and what gains did they make during the war? What long-range plans did the Reich government and German economic interests develop with regard to the Ottoman empire? Was the ruthless persecution of the Ottoman Armenians during the war inspired or condoned by Germany? These and related issues are the major concern of this study. No attempt has been made to describe the military events in the various Turkish theaters of war in detail. Historiographically, that is well-covered ground, and I have therefore purposely kept my references to front-line developments, naval engagements, etc., to a minimum.

My interest in the subject was first aroused when I looked through the newly opened wartime records of the German foreign office. The bulk of the documentation is taken from these and various other German government files, some of which are presently held in East German archives. In addition, I have consulted the wartime records of the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry and the private papers of several contemporary figures. Permission to use the Turkish government archives

was not granted; it was therefore necessary to rely on translated, Turkish scholarly monographs and other secondary sources for information on the highly involved policy-making processes at the Porte. Wherever the available evidence was of dubious quality, the tentative nature of my conclusions has been indicated.

Several topics have been omitted from the discussion. German subversive activities in Persia and Afghanistan and various frictions between Germans and Turks in connection with these enterprises have been exhaustively treated in a recently published study by Ulrich Gehrke; thus I have excluded that subject altogether. Similarly, no attempt has been made to deal with the Zionist Question. For a review of this issue the reader may refer, among others, to Saadia Weltman's article, "Germany, Turkey, and the Zionist Movement, 1914-1918," in the *Review of Politics* (1961). I have also ignored Germany's wartime propaganda and cultural programs in the Ottoman empire; let it be noted that the Germans themselves concluded at the end of the war that these programs had been of minimal political value.

In the initial stages of my research, my thesis adviser at the University of California, Professor Raymond J. Sontag, gave me much valuable guidance and assistance. I also profited from the advice of Werner T. Angress, Charles Jelavich, and Paul Seabury while I was a student at Berkeley and, more recently, from conversations or correspondence with Fritz T. Epstein, Hans Herzfeld, Gotthard Jäschke, Henry Cord Meyer, Dankwart A. Rustow, and Gerhard Weinberg. I am, of course, solely responsible for all errors of fact and judgment in this book.

My debts to librarians and archivists are heavy. I was given efficient assistance at the University of California Library at Berkeley, the Hoover War Memorial Library at Stanford, the National Archives, the Library of Congress, the New York Public Library, and the Yale University Library. At the Uni-

versity of Iowa Library, Mr. Dale M. Bentz, Mr. Frank Hanlin, and others satisfied my various requests with extraordinary understanding and kindness. My research in Europe was made both more profitable and enjoyable by the courteous assistance I received at the *Bundesarchiv* in Koblenz, the *Oesterreichisches Staatsarchiv* in Vienna, the Friedrich Meinecke Institute at the *Freie Universität*, Berlin, and, most particularly, at the *Deutsches Zentralarchiv*, Potsdam.

A travel grant from the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, an Old Gold Faculty Research Fellowship from the University of Iowa, and other financial assistance from that institution and from the University of Alberta facilitated the completion of this book. I also want to record my gratitude to Dr. Sedat Sami, who expertly translated a variety of Turkish publications for me, and to Mr. Joseph W. Baker for his help in copying documents from barely legible microfilms. The final copy was typed by Mrs. Mary R. Lyon.

My wife, Mary, helped me at every stage of my work and gave me much needed encouragement. I owe my greatest debt of gratitude to her and to Katherine, John, and Elizabeth, who patiently put up with the prolonged absences of their father.

Edmonton, Alberta, Canada U.T.
February 1967

# CONTENTS

# ABBREVIATIONS

## Archival Material

Identification of depositories in footnotes.

| | |
|---|---|
| FO | German Foreign Office Archives, 1867-1920, Auswärtiges Amt, Bonn (American and British microfilm holdings) |
| AHFM | Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry Archives, Oesterreichisches Staatsarchiv, Vienna |
| DZA | Deutsches Zentralarchiv, Potsdam |
| Jackh Papers | The Papers of Ernst Jackh, Yale University Library |
| Kanner Papers | The Papers of Dr. Heinrich Kanner of Vienna, Hoover War Library, Stanford |

Other abbreviations in footnotes

| | |
|---|---|
| FO | Berlin Foreign Office |
| AHFM | Vienna Foreign Ministry |
| OHL | German Supreme Army Command |
| *Dt* | *Deutschland* (file citation) |
| Bd., Bde. | *Band, Bände* (volume[s] of German files) |

## Abbreviated Titles Used

As a rule, book titles have been omitted in all but the first footnote citation of each item. The following abbreviated titles are used where it is necessary to distinguish between several works of one author:

| | |
|---|---|
| Fischer, *Weltmacht* | Fritz Fischer, *Griff nach der Weltmacht* |
| Lepsius, *Deutschland* | Johannes Lepsius, *Deutschland und Armenien 1914-1918* |
| ———, *Bericht* | *Bericht über die Lage des Armenischen Volkes in der Türkei* |

## *Abbreviations*

| | |
|---|---|
| Mühlmann, *Deutschland* | Carl Mühlmann, *Deutschland und die Türkei, 1913–1914* |
| ———, *deutsch-türkische Waffenbündnis* | *Das deutsch-türkische Waffenbündnis im Weltkriege* |
| ———, *Oberste Heeresleitung* | *Oberste Heeresleitung und Balkan im Weltkrieg 1914–1918* |
| Rathmann, *Stossrichtung* | Lothar Rathmann, *Stossrichtung Nahost 1914-1918* |
| Steglich, *Bündnissicherung* | Wolfgang Steglich, *Bündnissicherung oder Verständigungsfrieden* |
| ———, *Friedenspolitik* | *Die Friedenspolitik der Mittelmächte 1917/18*, Bd. 1 |

Unless otherwise noted, all footnote references to Howard, Smith, and Wheeler-Bennett pertain to their works, *The Partition of Turkey*, *The Russian Struggle for Power: 1914–1917*, and *Brest-Litovsk*, respectively.

# NOTE ON SPELLING AND PLACE NAMES

Except in direct quotations from Western-language sources and similar special cases, all Ottoman personal names are spelled in consonance with modern Turkish usage. Thus Talaat Pasha appears as Talât Paşa, Djavid (or Javid) Bey as Cavid Bey, Mustapha Kemal as Mustafa Kemal, and so forth. The following notes on pronunciation may be helpful to the reader:

c "j" as in "job"
ç "ch" as in "child"
ş "sh" as in "shut"
ö French "eu" as in "peu"
ü French "u" as in "tu"

A circumflex over a vowel indicates a broadened sound.

The place names cited are generally those of the Ottoman period and rendered in the most customary English mode of spelling, for example, Constantinople instead of Istanbul, Smyrna instead of Izmir, Erzinjan instead of Erzincan. I apologize, particularly to Turkish readers, for taking these liberties.

# Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914-1918

# CHAPTER I

## The Eve of World War I

THE DECLINE of the vast and polyglot Ottoman empire after the 16th century and the concomitant appearance of numerous politically malleable spots in the Balkan peninsula, North Africa, and parts of western Asia may be termed one of the most important developments in the diplomatic history of modern Europe. As the once powerful state of the Ottoman sultans weakened and shrank because of administrative ineptitude, economic, intellectual, and technological stagnation, and the rebelliousness of some of its subject peoples, the Russian and Habsburg empires, as well as Britain and France, were drawn increasingly into Ottoman affairs—and into mutual competition for political and economic influence in the Near and Middle East. After the Napoleonic Wars these four great powers occasionally worked together, especially when it came to assisting some disaffected ethnic or religious group in the Sultan's realm, but usually their relationship in and along the edges of the Ottoman empire was marked by friction or outright animosity. Determined to prevent each other from gaining undue advantages from the weakness and possible collapse of the Ottoman state and intent on securing certain political or economic objectives in the Near and Middle East, the four great powers were repeatedly drawn, in various alignments, into conflict with each other. The clash of great power interests after 1815 was characterized by periodic Austro-Russian friction in the Balkans, several Anglo-Russian confrontations in the Straits region, intermittent Anglo-French quarrels over Egypt, and, most spectacularly of all, by the Crimean War in the 1850s.[1]

[1] For general introductions to the "Eastern Question" see Jacques Ancel, *Manuel historique de la question d'Orient* (4th edn., Paris, 1931); J.A.R. Marriot, *The Eastern Question* (4th edn., Oxford, 1940);

## *The Eve of World War I*

During the last two decades of the 19th century the rivalry of the great powers in the Near and Middle East assumed a new dimension with the appearance of imperial Germany on the scene. Initially, the newly founded Reich had proved most reluctant to become actively involved in the "Eastern Question," but during the 1880s, and more particularly after Bismarck's dismissal, Berlin gradually abandoned its policy of restraint. Prussian military reformers and agents of Germany's armaments industry made their appearance in Constantinople, the latter soon outbidding some of the traditional foreign suppliers of the Sultan's army and navy. In addition, German banks, industrial firms, and railroad interests moved into the underdeveloped lands of Sultan Abdülhamid II and secured concessions, markets, and spheres of influence for themselves. Although German governmental support of many of these ventures was initially rather fitful, it became more and more pronounced as time went by. Kaiser Wilhelm II himself twice journeyed to the Ottoman empire before the turn of the century and during the second visit (in 1898) delivered pointedly pro-Ottoman and pro-Islamic speeches. Simultaneously, some

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L. S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453* (New York, 1958); and the excellent new study by M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923* (London, 1966).

The entrenchment of foreign capital in the Ottoman empire, especially after the 18th century, is well covered in D. C. Blaisdell, *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire* (New York, 1929); and Nasim Sousa, *The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey* (Baltimore, 1933).

On Russia's aspirations at the Straits and the counter-moves of the other European powers—especially Britain—useful summaries may be found in James T. Shotwell and Francis Deák, *Turkey at the Straits* (New York, 1940); Ettore Anchieri, *Constantinopoli e gli Stretti nella politica russa ed Europea* (Milan, 1948); B. A. Dranov, *Chernomorskiye prolivy* [The Black Sea Straits] (Moscow, 1948); and Egmont Zechlin, *Die türkischen Meerengen-Brennpunkt der Weltgeschichte* (Hamburg, 1964).

nationalistic groups in Germany, particularly the Pan-German League, began to talk openly of the need for expanding German influence in the Ottoman empire.[2]

Germany's *pénétration pacifique* of the Sultan's lands, crowned by the initiation of the "Bagdad Railroad" project, naturally provoked misgivings in Russia, Britain, and France, each of them having "traditional" interests in the Ottoman empire or adjacent regions. There is no need here to enumerate the various strategic, political, and economic interests of these countries which were hurt, or at least threatened, by Wilhelmian Germany's ventures into the Near and Middle East, or to discuss the diplomatic frictions which resulted from this clash of interests. Suffice it to note that from the 1890s on Germany's efforts to extend its economic, political, and military influence in the Ottoman empire put a serious strain on its general relations with Russia and Britain, and, to a lesser extent, with France. On some issues, notably the Bagdad railroad, tensions were ultimately reduced by a series of compromise settlements (the last one, with Britain, being concluded in the summer of 1914), but it is generally agreed today that the frictions between Germany and the Entente powers in and

[2] Cf. Hajo Holborn, "Deutschland und die Türkei 1878-90," *Archiv für Politik und Geschichte,* v (1925), 111-59; Mary E. Townsend, *The Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire 1884-1918* (New York, 1930), pp. 208-19; W. O. Henderson, *Studies in German Colonial History* (London, 1962), pp. 74-79; George W. F. Hallgarten, *Imperialismus vor 1914,* 2 vols. (rev. edn., Munich, 1963), I, 223-49, 266-70, 306-308, 474-83, 595-610, and *passim*; and the recent Marxist interpretations in A. S. Jerussalimski, *Die Aussenpolitik und die Diplomatie des deutschen Imperialismus Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts* (2d edn., Berlin, 1954), *passim*, especially pp. 265ff.; and Lothar Rathmann, *Berlin-Bagdad* (Berlin, 1962), pp. 5-63.

On Pan-German agitation for the eventual acquisition of living space in the Ottoman lands during the 1890s, see Alfred Kruck, *Geschichte des Alldeutschen Verbandes 1890-1939* (Wiesbaden, 1954), pp. 38-40.

along the edges of the Ottoman empire contributed substantially to the general atmosphere of distrust which made the First World War possible.[3]

The troubled relations between Germany and the Entente powers in the Near and Middle East prior to the outbreak of World War I have been analyzed and elucidated in numerous excellent studies. The prewar relationship between Germany and the Ottoman empire itself, on the other hand, has remained relatively obscure, and historical opinion on that subject is still very much divided. While some scholars have suggested that Germany's general influence in the Ottoman empire on the eve of World War I was not extraordinary, perhaps even on the decline,[4] others have concluded that by 1914 the Ottoman empire was little more than a satellite of the Reich.[5]

[3] Most of the standard histories on the origins of World War I (S. B. Fay, B. E. Schmitt, Luigi Albertini, A.J.P. Taylor, etc.) offer excellent coverage of these subjects. See also Christopher Andrew, "German World Policy and the Reshaping of the Dual Alliance," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1:3 (1966), 137-51.

On the international repercussions of the Bagdad railroad project the pioneering study by Edward Mead Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway* (New York, 1923) has been supplemented and partly superseded by several more recent works, among them John B. Wolf, *The Diplomatic History of the Bagdad Railroad* (Columbia, Mo., 1936); Louis Ragey, *La question du chemin de fer de Bagdad* (Paris, 1936); Maybelle K. Chapman, *Great Britain and the Bagdad Railway, 1888-1914* (Northampton, Mass., 1948); E. R. J. Brünner, *De Bagdadspoorweg . . . 1888-1908* (Groningen, 1957); and Hallgarten, *Imperialismus vor 1914*.

[4] See, for example, Henry Cord Meyer, *Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 1815-1945* (The Hague, 1955), p. 72; Fritz Fischer, "Weltpolitik, Weltmachtstreben und deutsche Kriegsziele," *Historische Zeitschrift*, 199 (1964), pp. 265-346, and *passim*, especially 308-22.

[5] For emphatic support of this thesis in recent monographic works, see W. W. Gottlieb, *Studies in Secret Diplomacy During the First World War* (London, 1957), p. 33; Lothar Rathmann, "Zur Legende vom 'anti-kolonialen' Charakter der Bagdadbahnpolitik in der wil-

In order to clarify this issue and thus put the evolution of German-Ottoman relations during the war years into proper perspective, it will be necessary to review briefly the economic, political, and military ties that linked the two countries in the summer of 1914.

In many ways Germany's involvement in the internal affairs of the Ottoman empire during the prewar decades was most noticeable in the economic sphere. In fact, the search for markets, raw materials, and lucrative investment opportunities was practically the only constant in Germany's prewar activities in the Sultan's realm. What had the Germans accomplished by 1914?

As far as their most ambitious venture, the construction of a railroad from the Bosporus to Bagdad, is concerned, it is essential to remember that this project was only partially completed by the summer of 1914.[6] While the main line from Haydar Pasha, on the Bosporus, theoretically extended to a point just beyond the Euphrates River, there were still two unfinished sections in the Taurus and Amanus ranges which dras-

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helminischen Aera des deutschen Monopolkapitalismus," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, Sonderheft IX. Jahrgang* (1961), p. 253; and A. F. Miller, *Pyatidesyatiletye mladoturetskoi revolutsii* [The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Young Turkish Revolution] (Moscow, 1958), pp. 44-45. Miller's assertion that "German imperialism" had gained "full domination over Turkey" by 1914 has been incorporated verbatim into the most recent Soviet world history. See E. M. Shukov, editor-in-chief, *Vsemirnaya istoriya* [Universal History] 10 vols. (Moscow, 1955-65), VII, 360.

[6] The technical and financial aspects of the construction project up to the outbreak of World War I are covered in Hermann Schmidt, *Das Eisenbahnwesen in der asiatischen Türkei* (Berlin, 1914); Carl Mühlmann, "Die deutschen Bahnunternehmungen in der asiatischen Türkei, 1888-1914," *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, 24 (Oct. 1926), pp. 121-37, 365-99; Orhan Conker, *Les chemins de fer en Turquie et la politique ferroviaire turque* (Paris, 1935); and Herbert Pönicke, "Heinrich August Meissner-Pascha und der Bau der Hedschas- und Bagdadbahn," *Die Welt als Geschichte*, 16 (1956), pp. 196-210.

tically limited the usefulness of the railroad. The track laid from the eastern terminal, Bagdad, on the other hand, had not quite reached Samara by the beginning of World War I, and even this stretch was of limited use because of its remoteness from the major sections of the line.[7] As will be shown later, the truncated state of the Bagdad line not only occasioned serious military problems during the war years, but also gave rise to a multitude of squabbles between Germans and Turks. For the moment, it should be noted that contrary to widespread contemporary charges, the Bagdad railroad enterprise was as yet neither capable of dominating the economic life of the Ottoman empire nor a suitable instrument for exerting political pressure on the Porte. On the contrary, by 1914 the railroad faced grave financial problems, and after 1914 it fell increasingly under the control of the Ottoman military authorities and provincial government agencies.[8]

Aside from the promotion of the Bagdad railroad project, German economic activity in the Ottoman empire in the prewar decades was characterized by heavy investment in the areas of municipal transportation, electric utilities, agriculture, and mining, and by a steadily mounting volume of trade between the two countries. Among the German companies doing business in or with the Ottoman empire, particularly important were: the *Deutsche Bank* of Berlin, the *Deutsche Orientbank*, the *Deutsche Palästina Bank*, the Krupp and Mauser com-

[7] Contrary to the data given in most modern literature on the Bagdad railroad, a large part of the track from Tell el Abyad to Ras el Ain (a stretch of 103 kilometers along the present Turkish-Syrian border) had not been laid by the outbreak of World War I. The total length of missing trackage between Haydar Pasha and Bagdad as of August 1, 1914 was therefore about 825 km (roughly 500 American miles). Cf. Richard Hennig, *Die deutschen Bahnbauten in der Türkei, ihr politischer, militärischer und wirtschaftlicher Wert* (Leipzig, 1915), p. 9; and FO, *Türkei 152*, Bd. 79, Rössler to Bethmann Hollweg, 20 Oct 1914; Rosenberg to Zimmermann, 27 Nov 1914.

[8] See Chapter IX.

panies, the *Siemens Bau A.G.*, the *Hamburg-Amerika* steamship company, the *Deutsch-Levantinische Baumwollbau-Gesellschaft*, and the *Anatolische Handels- und Industriegesellschaft*. But there were numerous other firms which also profited from the progressive opening up of the Ottoman market.[9] However, despite the steady increase of German investments in and trade with the Ottoman empire from the 1880s to 1914, the Reich did not secure a controlling position in the Ottoman economy. On the eve of World War I several other European countries, notably France and Britain, were still firmly entrenched economically and even ahead of Germany in several areas.[10]

As the following table indicates, Germany was still lagging behind Britain, France, and Austria-Hungary in terms of imports from the Ottoman empire and almost equally far behind

[9] For detailed information on the various German enterprises in the Ottoman empire prior to the war, see Gottlieb, pp. 21-24; Henderson, pp. 77-82; Hallgarten, I and II, *passim*; Kurt Hassert, *Das Türkische Reich* (Tübingen, 1918), pp. 201-202; and Rathmann, *Berlin-Bagdad, passim.*

[10] On the influx of European capital and the expanding control of foreign interests over broad sectors of the Ottoman economy in the prewar decades, cf. Blaisdell, pp. 1-184; Gottlieb, pp. 19-27; Hallgarten, I and II, *passim*; Herbert Feis, *Europe, the World's Banker, 1870-1914* (New Haven, 1930), pp. 313-60; Orhan Conker and Emile Witmeur, *Redressement économique et Industrialisation de la Nouvelle Turquie* (Paris, 1937), pp. 41-53; Osman Nebioglu, *Die Auswirkungen der Kapitulationen auf die türkische Wirtschaft* [Probleme der Weltwirtschaft, Universität Kiel, v. 68] (Jena, 1941), part 2, *passim*; and Edwin Borchard and William H. Wynne, *State Insolvency and Foreign Bondholders*, 2 vols. (New Haven, 1951), II, 393-481.

The extent of foreign control over the Ottoman economy by 1914 can be gauged by the fact that out of a total of 244 industrial enterprises in the Ottoman empire only 54 were Turkish. Similarly, of the total Ottoman railroad trackage of 5,443 km, 3,910 km were operated by foreign concessionaires. See Nebioglu, p. 60; and Reinhard Hüber, *Die Bagdadbahn* (Berlin, 1943), p. 49.

both Britain and Austria-Hungary in the volume of exports to the Ottoman empire.[11]

Value of Ottoman Exports in 1913
(in Turkish pounds gold [T£])

| TO | |
|---|---|
| Britain | 4,661,000 |
| France | 4,294,000 |
| Austria-Hungary | 2,238,000 |
| Germany | 1,234,000 |

Value of Ottoman Imports in 1913
(in Turkish pounds gold [T£])

| FROM | |
|---|---|
| Britain | 8,128,000 |
| Austria-Hungary | 6,146,000 |
| Germany | 4,688,000 |
| France | 3,591,000 |

Similarly, Germany's total capital investments in the Ottoman empire were still considerably smaller than those of France. While French investments by 1914 amounted to at least 800 million gold francs (and possibly exceeded 900 million), the total of German investments lay somewhere between 500 and 600 million.[12] A major portion of the German capital, roughly 340 million francs, was invested in the Ottoman rail-

[11] Nebioglu, p. 64. These data, which are based on official Turkish statistics, may be misleading in that some of the German trade was handled by Austro-Hungarian middlemen and hence listed as Austrian, but there can be no doubt whatever that Britain's share in the foreign trade of the Ottoman empire was still much larger than that of Germany. Cf. Hassert, pp. 194-95; and Gottlieb, p. 21. Meyer's conclusion, p. 72, that Germany had only eight percent of Turkey's trade in 1914 is, on the other hand, not entirely convincing.

[12] Cf. Nebioglu, p. 69; Conker and Witmeur, p. 53; Feis, pp. 319-20; and Pierre Renouvin, *Le XIXe Siècle: II. De 1871 à 1914* [Histoire des relations internationales, v. 6] (Paris, 1955), 274.

road system, particularly in the Bagdad line, compared with about 320 million francs the French had put into this sector of the Ottoman economy.[13]

The French share in the "Ottoman Public Debt," which was administered by an international agency on behalf of the Porte's creditors, by 1914 amounted to approximately 59 percent, while Germany and Britain were holding about equal shares of most of the remainder.[14] The financial influence of France and Britain in the prewar Ottoman empire can also be gauged by the position of the *Banque Impériale Ottomane* (BIO), the leading Franco-British bank in Constantinople. Aside from controlling the Tobacco Monopoly and a large number of business enterprises in the Ottoman empire, the BIO still enjoyed the prerogatives of a state bank; that is, it had a legal monopoly on the issue of bank notes in the empire. Although bank notes and other types of paper money were used on only a modest scale in the Ottoman empire prior to the war, the privileged status of the BIO in the monetary sphere was by no means unimportant, as events after July 1914 were to show.[15]

[13] Hüber, p. 49. Cf., however, Nebioglu, p. 69, and Feis, p. 320, who list the French railroad investments as about 235 million and over half a billion francs, respectively.

[14] The exact size of the Ottoman public debt and the proportionate shares held by French, German, and British creditors have never been firmly established. However, there is reasonable certainty that the French share amounted to about 2.4 billion francs and that this constituted at least 59 percent of the total debt. Cf. Sousa, p. 77, note 23; Feis, p. 320, note 8; Borchard and Wynne, II, 479; Gottlieb, p. 20; Adib Roumani, *Essai historique et technique sur la Dette Publique Ottomane* (Paris, 1927), pp. 321-23; and Rondo E. Cameron, *France and the Economic Development of Europe, 1800-1914* (Princeton, 1961), p. 264.

[15] On the background and functions of the BIO prior to the war cf. Feis, pp. 320-21; Borchert and Wynne, II, 400ff.; Gottlieb, pp. 20-21; Cameron, pp. 187-89, *passim*; Hallgarten, I and II, *passim*; Ahmed Emin, *Turkey in the World War* (New Haven, 1930), p. 161; and David S. Landes, *Bankers and Pashas* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), pp. 60ff.

Finally, note should be taken of the implications of the Capitulatory System. Under this system, which had evolved through the centuries into a veritable economic strait jacket for the Porte, all the great European powers enjoyed a variety of special privileges in the Ottoman empire, among them the right to veto any changes in the external tariff rates of that country.[16] During the pre-1914 period this right was used repeatedly by one or the other great power to restrict the Porte or another European state which, for reasons of its own, wished to see the customs revenues of the Ottoman empire increased—as Germany, for instance, desired after the turn of the century.[17]

Altogether, it is clear that despite the great advances the Germans had made since the 1880s, their economic and financial power in the Ottoman empire at the beginning of World War I was still effectively counterbalanced by that of the other European powers.

As for Germany's political influence in Constantinople in 1914, it is true that Berlin's diplomatic relations with the *Ittihad ve Terakki* regime—as with most previous Ottoman governments—were generally cordial. However, the Porte had by no means abandoned the traditional Ottoman policy of maintaining a balance between the great powers, as is amply demonstrated by the twists and turns of its diplomacy in the pre-July period.[18] It has often been alleged that by that time the Turks

[16] See Sousa, *passim*; Walther Lehmann, *Die Kapitulationen* (Weimar, 1917), *passim*; Max Kunke, *Die Kapitulationen der Türkei* (Munich, 1918), part II. Nebioglu's conclusion, p. 74, that by 1914 the capitulatory system had reduced the Ottoman empire "economically to a colony of virtually all of Europe" is justified.

[17] On Britain's and Russia's resistance to an increase of Ottoman customs duties from 8 to 11 percent ad valorem, which was desired by the Porte and Germany in connection with the Bagdad railroad project, see Blaisdell, pp. 158-70; and Chapman, pp. 43ff.

[18] While most of the standard works on the origins of World War I and a few specialized studies, such as Harry N. Howard, *The Partition of Turkey. A Diplomatic History, 1913-1923* (Norman, Okla.,

were no longer masters of their own house because of the entrenchment of German officers in their army, but the evidence hardly supports the conclusion. While it is certainly true that the dispatch in 1913 of a new military mission under Gen. Otto Liman von Sanders resulted in a substantial increase of Germany's general influence in the Ottoman empire, this did not convert that country into a reliable ally of the Reich, let alone a helpless satellite. Gen. Liman's mission, which grew to about 70 members before August 1914, was given a great deal of latitude in the modernization and reform of the Ottoman army, but since virtually all command functions were retained by the Turks, it is simply not true that the Germans controlled the Sultan's military establishment and hence the country at large. It should be noted, moreover, that from 1908 on the Porte was employing high-ranking British officers as advisers on naval matters, which included the defense of the Straits. By 1914 the British naval mission in Constantinople, headed by Rear Adm. Sir Arthur H. Limpus, had in fact almost as many members as the German military mission.[19]

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1931), include useful surveys of Ottoman prewar diplomacy, a more thorough treatment of that subject is definitely needed. The domestic situation in the Ottoman empire on the eve of the war is covered most authoritatively in Yusuf H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbi tarihi* [History of the Turkish Reform], 3 [9] vols. (Istanbul and Ankara, 1940-57), II, *passim*; and Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, 1961), *passim*. For information on the organization and programs of the *Ittihad ve Terakki* Party Tarik Z. Tunaya's compendium, *Türkiyede siyasî partiler 1859-1952* [The Political Parties of Turkey, 1859-1952] (Istanbul, 1952), is particularly useful.

[19] On the international repercussions of Liman's dispatch to Constantinople and the prewar activities of his mission, cf. Carl Mühlmann, *Deutschland und die Türkei 1913-1914* (Berlin, 1929), pp. 1-27; "Die deutsche Militär-Mission in der Türkei," *Wissen und Wehr*, XIX (1938), 847-55; Hans Herzfeld, "Die Liman-Krise und die Politik der Grossmächte in der Jahreswende 1913/14," *Berliner Monatshefte*, XI (1933), 837-58, 973-93; Hallgarten, II, 429-46; and Liman's own ac-

Some foreign observers in Constantinople, among them the American ambassador to the Porte, Henry Morgenthau, were impressed and disturbed in the prewar months by the apparent Prussianization of the Sultan's army, especially after they had witnessed a parade of goose-stepping Turkish troops.[20] Germany's own military leaders, on the other hand, were generally sceptical about the strength and preparedness of the Ottoman army. Only six weeks before the Sarajevo incident the chief of the Prussian general staff, Gen. Helmuth von Moltke, concluded that it was most inappropriate to reckon with "Turkey in the foreseeable future as an asset [*zugunsten*] for the Triple Alliance or Germany."[21] In connection with this remark, it should be added that in 1913, when it had sent Liman and his men to Turkey, Berlin had explicitly reserved the right to recall the entire mission in the event of a European war, a provision which hardly supports the conclusion that Ottoman belligerency on Germany's side, and the direction of the Ottoman army by German officers, were taken for granted in Berlin from late 1913 on.[22]

How little the German government was actually counting on the Ottoman empire as a natural ally in the foreseeable future was demonstrated most clearly during the weeks follow-

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count, *Five Years in Turkey* (Annapolis, Md., 1927), pp. 1-21. For an influential statement of the thesis that Liman's mission had the effect of delivering "Turkey into German hands," see Robert J. Kerner, "The Mission of Liman von Sanders," *Slavonic Review*, VI (1927-28), 12-27, 344-63, 543-60, VII (1928), 90-112. On the British naval mission see Arthur J. Marder, *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919* (London, 1961- ), I, 302.

[20] See Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (New York, 1918), pp. 46-47. As will be shown later on, Morgenthau's memoirs (which have been used as a major source by many Western authors) are of uneven quality.

[21] See Carl Mühlmann, *Das deutsch-türkische Waffenbündnis im Weltkriege* (Leipzig, 1940), pp. 13-14.

[22] See Liman's contract with the Porte in Mühlmann, *Deutschland*, pp. 88-92.

ing the Sarajevo incident. Although the international horizon was steadily darkening—not least of all because of Berlin's own policy—the German government did little if anything to assure itself of Ottoman assistance in the event the Austro-Serbian conflict erupted into a European war. Instead, it was a group of Ottoman government figures who first proposed a closer relationship between the two countries, and even these overtures (presented by the war minister, Enver Paşa, on July 22) were initially turned down by the German ambassador to the Porte, Hans von Wangenheim.[23] His negative reaction may conceivably have been influenced by his personal conviction that the Ottoman armed forces were as yet a negligible quantity, but all available evidence points to the conclusion that he acted in accordance with standing policy directives. As has long been known, the Kaiser personally overruled the ambassador on July 24 with the explanation that "at the present moment" (the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia had been delivered the previous evening) Ottoman interest in a connection with the Triple Alliance should be taken advantage of "for reasons of expediency."[24]

As a result of this sudden change in Berlin's policy—obviously made in response to the threat of imminent war—negotiations concerning the scope and nature of the proposed Ottoman alignment with the Triple Alliance were initiated in Constantinople, and on July 28 a formal Ottoman alliance proposal was presented to Berlin.[25] It should be emphasized that even after the German government had secured the agreement of the Ottoman negotiators to certain modifications in the original

[23] *Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch,* collected by Karl Kautsky, 4 vols. (Berlin, 1919), No. 117. See also Luigi Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914,* 3 vols. (London, 1952-57), III, 607-12.

[24] *Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch,* Nos. 141, 144. Mühlmann, *Deutschland,* pp. 40-41, emphasizes that Berlin had just previously learned from Liman that four or five Turkish army corps were sufficiently equipped for use in the field.

[25] *Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch,* No. 285.

draft treaty, the leading statesmen in Berlin proved remarkably hesitant to make a final commitment. As Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg wired to the Constantinople embassy on the evening of July 31, Wangenheim was to sign the alliance only if it was certain that "Turkey either can or will undertake some action against Russia worthy of the name."[26]

For reasons to be discussed below, the ambassador decided two days later that this condition was met. In the early afternoon of August 2 he and the Ottoman grand vizier, Prince Mehmed Said Halim Paşa, affixed their signatures to the treaty document. Reflecting the delays occasioned by Berlin's hesitant attitude, some sections of the treaty text were already obsolete at the moment it was signed. Articles 1 and 2 provided for Ottoman intervention on Germany's side if the latter became involved in a war with Russia in connection with the Austro-Serbian conflict—an eventuality which, of course, had already become reality. Under Article 3 Germany agreed to leave the Liman von Sanders mission "at the disposal of Turkey," while the Porte, in turn, assured the mission "an effective influence on the general direction of the [Ottoman] army." The treaty further obligated Germany to help protect the territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire and stipulated that the alliance was "secret" and would remain in effect beyond December 31, 1918 unless formally renounced by either party.[27]

The German-Ottoman alliance of 1914 was not the logical culmination of carefully laid German plans; it was a hastily made arrangement.[28] Much has been written about the fact

[26] *Ibid.*, No. 508. Interestingly enough, Bethmann Hollweg made this point once again the following day (*ibid.*, No. 547).

[27] The alliance terms were first published in *ibid.*, No. 733. The original treaty may be found in FO, *Verträge 94.*

[28] For detailed analyses of the alliance negotiations, cf. Mühlmann, *Deutschland,* pp. 28-43; and Albertini, III, 605-15. See also Fritz Fischer, "Weltpolitik, Weltmachtstreben und deutsche Kriegsziele," p. 340. That Berlin's willingness in July 1914 to risk a general war stemmed at least partly from its concern about Germany's economic and political

that the alliance negotiations were initiated and brought to fruition by a small clique of Ottoman ministers, and that several members of the Ottoman cabinet were neither aware of nor agreeable to the formal alignment of their country with the Reich. It has been suggested that the furtive activities of the pro-alliance group were not only highly improper but also indicative of the spell which the Germans had cast on some of the leading figures of the *Ittihad ve Terakki* regime.[29] It would appear, though, that Germanophile sentiments actually had very little to do with the decisions of the pro-alliance group at the Porte.

Of the three Ottoman cabinet ministers who were most directly involved in the alliance negotiations, two—the grand vizier, Prince Said Halim (who simultaneously also served as the minister of foreign affairs), and the minister of interior, Mehmed Talât Bey—had never shown any particular pro-German orientation. To be sure, Said Halim, the cultivated scion of an Egyptian princely family, was an indecisive man and allowed himself to be manipulated by his colleagues throughout much of his tenure as grand vizier (1913-17), but there is no evidence that his association with the pro-alliance group in July 1914 was involuntary or, for that matter, the result of German bribes or blandishments. As for Talât Bey, the ex-telegraph operator who had become one of the most power-

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prospects in the Balkans and Turkey (*ibid.*, pp. 342-43 and *passim*) is quite possible. But the recent assertion by Karl-Heinz Janssen, *Der Kanzler und der General. Die Führungskrise um Bethmann Hollweg und Falkenhayn 1914-1916* (Göttingen, 1967), p. 144 and *passim*, that Germany and Austria-Hungary ventured into war "only" because of their "Oriental interests and power positions," appears rather far-fetched.

[29] For representative samples of the thesis that many figures in the Ottoman government had been "bought" or otherwise turned into minions of Berlin, see Sir James E. Edmonds, *A Short History of World War I* (London, 1951), p. 104; Gottlieb, pp. 32-33; or Sydney N. Fisher, *The Middle East* (New York, 1959), p. 361.

ful figures in the *Ittihad ve Terakki* Party organization and, hence, in the cabinet as well, it has been conceded even by hostile critics that he was intensely nationalistic and personally incorruptible. The idea that German inducements had anything to do with his option for an alliance with the Reich should therefore be dismissed as well.[30]

The situation is less clear-cut with regard to the third main figure of the pro-alliance clique, the war minister Enver Paşa. It is well known that this youthful general (he was 32 at the beginning of World War I) admired Germany, which he knew from a two-year tour of duty in Berlin as Ottoman military attaché (1909-11).[31] However, even though Enver was definitely impressed by the spirit and might of the German army and even wore a mustache after the style of Wilhelm II, his reputation as the "Kaiser's man" is not altogether valid. In particular, there is now evidence to show that the onetime friendship between Wilhelm II and Enver had cooled considerably by the summer of 1914. Their estrangement had its origin in the *coup d'état* of January 1913 in Constantinople, which had returned the *Ittihad ve Terakki* Party to power, and during which the Ottoman war minister, General Nazim Paşa, had been shot dead in Enver's presence.[32] Wilhelm II reacted very unfavorably to this incident. Since he also sus-

[30] On the background and political careers of Said Halim and Talât see Ibnülemin Mahmud Kemal Inal, *Osmanli devrinde son sadriazamlar* [The Last Grand Viziers of the Ottoman Period], 14 vols. (Istanbul, 1940-53), XII-XIII, 1893-1972; Lewis, pp. 221-22; and their *curricula vitae* in FO, *Türkei 152 Nr. 2*, Bd. 18.

[31] The best brief survey of Enver's career is Dankwart A. Rustow's article "Enwer Pasha," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, rev. edn. (Leiden, 1960- ), II, 698-702. See also Enver's *vita* in FO, *Türkei 152 Nr. 2*, Bd. 18; and, for the opinions of contemporaries, Morgenthau, pp. 30-34, *passim*; Capt. H. Seignobosc, *Turcs et Turquie* (Paris, 1920), pp. 39-48; or Joseph Pomiankowski, *Der Zusammenbruch des Ottomanischen Reiches* (Vienna, 1928), pp. 38-41, *passim*.

[32] An excellent brief summary of the events leading up to the coup is given by Lewis, pp. 206-21.

pected that Enver was sympathetic to the promotion of an anti-dynastic policy in the Ottoman empire, he emphatically ordered that Enver be kept from returning to Berlin.[33] Moreover, there are indications that the Kaiser subsequently became very cordial with the new Ottoman ambassador in Berlin, General Mahmud Muhtar Paşa, a bitter rival of Enver. Even after Enver had taken over the Ottoman war ministry in January 1914, thus assuming a pivotal position in the government, the Kaiser continued to make critical remarks about him, many of which were gleefully communicated to the Porte by Muhtar.[34]

Although Enver's motives in supporting an alliance with Germany cannot be established with any certainty, his initial proposals to Berlin (on July 22) strongly suggest that both he and his like-minded colleagues at the Porte were guided primarily by sober calculations of Ottoman self-interest. As Enver explained to Wangenheim with remarkable candor, the domestic reforms planned by the Young Turks could be carried out only if the Ottoman empire were "secured against attacks from abroad," that is, if it won "the support of one of the groups of Great Powers." While some elements in the *Ittihad ve Terakki* Party favored an alliance "with France and Russia," he continued, a majority of the Party's committee, headed by Said Halim, Talât, himself, and the President of the Chamber of

[33] See FO, *Dt 127 Nr. 6*, Bd. 3, Jagow to embassy Constantinople, 1 Feb 1913, No. 38; Chelius to FO, 1 Feb Gottlieb, p. 32, has pointed out that "German High Finance" had "spurred on" the coup and concludes that Enver's success "was a victory for the Kaiser," but this is a rather oversimplified version of what actually happened. Cf. Hallgarten, II, 371-73.

[34] FO, *Dt 127 Nr. 6*, Bd. 3, Wangenheim to Bethmann Hollweg, 8 May 1913, No. 139; Jagow to Wilhelm II, 8 Jan 1914; Mutius to FO, 8 Jan, No. 14; Jagow to embassy Constantinople, 9 Jan, No. 7; Mutius to Bethmann Hollweg, 14 Jan, No. 16; Wangenheim to FO, 4 March, No. 105. See also Jackh Papers, No. 3, "Auszug aus einem Brief des Kapitän Humann . . . ," 1 May 1915; and Kanner Papers, II, 295, "Unterredung mit Professor Lepsius am 4. Oktober. . . ."

Deputies, Halil Bey, preferred a closer alignment with the Triple Alliance; for they did not wish to become the "vassals of Russia" and furthermore were convinced that the "Triple Alliance was stronger militarily than the Entente, and would prove the victor in case of a world war." The alliance proposal was thus quite bluntly presented from the very start as a matter of Ottoman self-interest, a point underscored by Enver's explicit warning that if Germany did not respond favorably, the Porte, "with heavy hearts," would have to associate itself with the Entente.[35]

Since the Kaiser immediately accepted the alliance proposal, it is, of course, impossible to tell whether Enver's warning was merely a bluff. What does seem clear, though, is that the pro-alliance group at the Porte made its choice for the Triple Alliance—that is, for Germany—primarily (and probably exclusively), on the basis of strict *raison d'état.* Although their decision for the Triple Alliance turned out to be a catastrophic mistake, it was the product of miscalculations regarding the actual strength of Germany and her allies rather than of unpatriotic submission to German wishes or pressures. This interpretation, it should be added, appears all the more warranted in view of the fact that between May and mid-July 1914 the Porte had made both an alliance proposal to Russia (through Talât) and a bid for closer relations with France (through navy minister Ahmed Cemal Paşa), only to be politely rebuffed in either case.[36]

[35] See *Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch*, No. 117.

[36] Cf. B. E. Schmitt, *The Coming of the War, 1914*, 2 vols. (New York, 1930), I, 91; Gottlieb, pp. 34-35; I. V. Bestuzhev, "Russian Foreign Policy February-June 1914," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1:3 (1966), 110-11 and *passim*. See also *Die Internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus. Dokumente aus den Archiven der Zarischen und der Provisorischen Regierung. . . .* M. Pokrovski, ed., ser. I, 5 vols. (Berlin, 1931-34), II, Nos. 295, 312, *Beilage* and *passim*; and *Documents diplomatiques français (1871-1914)*, 42 vols. (Paris, 1929-59), ser. 3, X, No. 504.

# CHAPTER II

## From Alliance Treaty to Intervention

FAR FROM signaling the beginning of "complete" or "almost complete" German domination of the Ottoman empire,[1] the alliance treaty of August 2, 1914 was from the outset an arrangement between diplomatic equals, notwithstanding the enormous disparity between the two countries in terms of military, economic, and financial power. The failure of the Germans to convert their alliance with the Turks into a "rider-horse" relationship will be demonstrated in detail in the course of this book. However, it might be noted here that throughout the war the Germans were handicapped most decisively in their policy toward the Turks by the simple fact that they considered Ottoman military assistance essential for their own war effort. While there were some German officials, notably in the diplomatic service, who had grave doubts about the worth of the Ottoman alliance, virtually all of the top military and political figures in the Reich came to regard the Ottoman ally as an indispensable partner in the struggle for survival and ultimate victory. It was, above all, this prevailing attitude in German government circles that gave the Turks the means to stand up to or even exploit their more powerful ally right up to the end of the war.

It has often been suggested that the Germans were not particularly interested in active Ottoman assistance as long as their own invasion of France seemed to be going well.[2] Such

[1] Allegations that the Ottoman empire fell increasingly under German control after the outbreak of the war are common in Soviet publications, but may also be found in many Western works. See, for example, A. D. Novichev, *Ekonomika Turtsii v period mirovoi voini* [Turkey's Economy During the World War] (Moscow, 1935), pp. 139-40; Shukov, VII, 572; Howard, pp. 102, 114; Gottlieb, pp. 57-60; Fisher, p. 363.

[2] For a rather melodramatic version of this thesis, see Gottlieb, pp. 57-58.

a conclusion is erroneous. Ottoman military help against both Russia and Britain was desired by Berlin from the very first week of the war. While the Prussian general staff and the Wilhelmstrasse had been remarkably hesitant in getting the Turks lined up on the side of the Central Powers, they radically changed their attitude once hostilities actually began. Confronted with the reality of a two-front war and a formal offer of assistance from the Turks, both Moltke and the civilian leaders at the Wilhelmstrasse during the first days of August abandoned their previous reserve and called for immediate Ottoman intervention against Russia. Moreover, even though the German-Ottoman alliance treaty of August 2 was formally directed against Russia alone, Moltke by August 5 began demanding prompt Ottoman assistance against the Western Entente powers as well.[3]

The desirability of stirring up trouble in and of launching military operations against Britain's Middle East possessions in the event of an Anglo-German conflict had long been publicly discussed in Germany and was a recurring theme in the Kaiser's famous marginalia, but there is no evidence that Berlin had any coherent action plans on hand when World War I broke out. Neither the correspondence between the Wilhelmstrasse and the German embassy in Constantinople, nor that between the Prussian general staff and Liman von Sanders' military mission, contains the slightest reference to any kind of contingency plan. The measures which were initiated in August 1914 to carry the war into Britain's Middle East possessions bore all the earmarks of hasty improvisation.[4]

[3] *Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch*, Nos. 662, 836, 876.

[4] According to Fritz Fischer, *Griff nach der Weltmacht* (Düsseldorf, 1961), pp. 132-38, *passim*, Berlin had been interested in "revolutionizing the Islamic world" since the mid-1890s. On the other hand, he concedes that the "decisive concretization" of such a program, that is, the formulation of specific action plans concerning the various Moslem regions under Entente control, did not occur until September 1914.

The only known plan for German-Ottoman action against the Entente that predated the conclusion of the alliance consisted of an oral agreement between Wangenheim, Liman, and Enver on August 1—the day Germany declared war on Russia. Meeting in the German embassy the three men agreed that once the alliance treaty was signed the Turks should assume a basically defensive posture on their Transcaucasian border and assemble the bulk of their land forces in Thrace for a joint offensive with the Bulgarian army against Russia, or, possibly, for operations against Greece. Since there was as yet no assurance whatever that Bulgaria would throw in its lot with the Central Powers or that Rumania would permit the use of its territory for the projected Turco-Bulgarian advance into Russia's flank, this agreement of August 1 had little more than symbolic value, *i.e.*, it at least put the Turks on record that they would actively support Germany's war effort.[5]

Wangenheim, though fully aware that the Turks would need at least a month just to get their forces in Thrace assembled, decided that under his latest instructions from Berlin he was now justified in signing the alliance treaty. As previously mentioned, he did so on the afternoon of August 2. Within the next 24 hours the Porte ordered full mobilization, but also issued an official declaration of Ottoman neutrality in the rapidly broadening European war.

Although it is difficult to establish exactly what went on at the Porte during the first days of August, a few salient points are clear. First, several Ottoman ministers were still altogether unaware of the fact that an alliance had been concluded with Germany. Second, those who had conducted the negotiations with Berlin, except for Enver, were obviously having second

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Cf. Egmont Zechlin, "Friedensbestrebungen und Revolutionierungsversuche," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B20/61, B24/61, B25/61 (1961), pp. 329, 361, 363-64, and *passim*.

[5] See FO, *Dt 128 Nr. 5 secr.*, Bd. 3, Wangenheim to FO, 2 Aug 1914, Nos. 406, 407.

thoughts about the advisability of prompt intervention. As Said Halim explained to Wangenheim on August 3, he was opposed to any overt action as long as Ottoman mobilization was not completed and Bulgaria's attitude remained in doubt. Moreover, there was acute danger that Britain would commandeer the battleship *Sultan Osman,* which was about to be delivered to the Turkish navy by an English shipyard.[6] Ironically, the very same day (August 3) the London government did requisition this ship and another, the *Reshadiye,* without any tangible provocation from Constantinople. However, it is now clear that Britain's action was more justified than has hitherto been assumed, for two days earlier, on August 1, Enver and Talât had offered to direct the *Sultan Osman* to a German North Sea port, a proposal immediately accepted by Berlin.[7]

Two days after the Porte had issued its declaration of neutrality, on August 5, Enver initiated talks with the Russian military attaché in Constantinople concerning a possible alignment of the Ottoman empire with the Entente. He told the attaché that the recently ordered mobilization of the Ottoman army was by no means directed against Russia. Indeed, the Porte was prepared to withdraw troops from Transcaucasia, to use the Ottoman army for the neutralization of "this or that Balkan state which might intend to move against Russia," and even to assist other Balkan countries "against Austria," provided that Saint Petersburg could arrange a reconciliation of the various Balkan states with each other and with the Ottoman empire. Such a reconciliation, Enver concluded, might be achieved if the Aegean Islands and Western Thrace were re-

[6] Bayur, III:1, 62-69, 99; *Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch,* No. 795.

[7] See FO, *Türkei 142,* Bd. 39, Wangenheim to FO, 2 Aug 1914, No. 404; Tirpitz to FO, 2 Aug; Zimmermann to Wangenheim, 3 Aug, No. 302; AHFM, *Türkei, Berichte 1913 X-XII, 1914,* Pallavicini to AHFM, 2 Aug, No. 386.

turned to Turkey, while Greece and Bulgaria (as well as Serbia) could receive territorial compensations elsewhere.[8]

There can no longer be any doubt that these curious overtures by Enver, which he repeated a few days later, were insincere. Quite aside from the fact that Enver's proposals provided a perfect cover story for the intended concentration of Ottoman troops in Thrace, it is now also clear that he kept the German embassy informed about his talks with the Russians.[9] Moreover, there is considerable evidence that he was working hard to speed up Ottoman intervention *against* the Entente.

Enver's commitment to the alliance with Germany expressed itself most concretely in connection with the so-called *Goeben* and *Breslau* affair. The dramatic escape of these two cruisers of the German Mediterranean Squadron (*Mittelmeer-Division*) from Sicilian waters to the Turkish Straits has been described by many authors, and no attempt will be made here to recount this colorful story in full detail.[10] However, inasmuch as there was a direct causal relationship between the progress of the German cruisers toward the Dardanelles and certain political developments in Constantinople, it will be necessary to delve rather deeply into some parts of the story.

The dispatch of the Mediterranean Squadron, and particu-

[8] On Enver's overtures and St. Petersburg's lukewarm responses cf. Howard, pp. 96-102; F. I. Notovich, *Diplomaticheskaya borba v godi pervoi mirovoi voini* [The Diplomatic Struggle During the Years of the First World War] (Moscow, 1947), I, 283-87; Albertini, III, 618-20; and C. Jay Smith, Jr., *The Russian Struggle for Power, 1914-1917* (New York, 1956), pp. 69-76.

[9] See FO, *Wk*, Bd. 19, Wangenheim to FO, 10 Aug 1914, No. 471; and *Dt 128 Nr. 5 secr.*, Bd. 3, same to same, 18 Aug, No. 529.

[10] For a fairly reliable account see Hermann Lorey, *Der Krieg zur See 1914-1918: Der Krieg in den türkischen Gewässern*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1928-38), I, 1-28. Among the reminiscences by former crew members Georg Kopp, *Das Teufelsschiff und seine kleine Schwester* (Leipzig, 1930) is quite useful. See also Marder, II, 20-41, for a review of British blunders.

larly of the *Goeben*, to the Straits had been requested by both Wangenheim and Liman after their August 1 conference with Enver. In their messages to Berlin they pointed out that the two cruisers would greatly enhance the capabilities of the Ottoman fleet in the Black Sea, where, according to Liman, a "free hand" was highly important for all future military operations. As a result of these requests the German admiralty on August 3 dispatched instructions to the commander of the Mediterranean Squadron, Rear Admiral Wilhelm Souchon, to take his ships to the Straits "at once." The wireless message reached Souchon at 0235, August 4, at which time his squadron was heading for the Algerian coast to disrupt the transfer of troops from North Africa to France. Being close to his target area, Souchon decided not to turn back immediately. Instead he shelled the ports of Bône and Philippeville, then set course for Messina, where he intended to refuel his ships. Since the *Goeben* was slowed down by defective boilers, the squadron did not reach Messina until the morning of August 5.[11]

In Constantinople, meanwhile, the whole project of moving the Mediterranean Squadron into Turkish waters had run into an unexpected political snag. While Enver, in his capacity as war minister, had already issued instructions to the military authorities at the Dardanelles to keep the Straits open for Souchon's ships, the grand vizier notified Wangenheim on August 4 that the uncertain attitude of Bulgaria and Rumania was causing him "the greatest concern," and that the *Goeben* and *Breslau* would therefore have to stay out of the Straits for the time being.[12]

Impressed by the grand vizier's objections Berlin on August

[11] *Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch*, Nos. 652, 712, 775; FO, *Dt 128 Nr. 5 secr.*, Bd. 3, Wangenheim to FO [Liman to Moltke], 2 Aug 1914, No. 406; same to same, 2 Aug, No. 407; Alfred von Tirpitz, *Erinnerungen*, rev. edn. (Leipzig, 1920), p. 302; Lorey, 1, 1-13.

[12] FO, *Wk*, Bd. 14, Wangenheim to FO, 4 Aug 1914, No. 426; *Dt 128 Nr. 5 secr.*, Bd. 3, same to same, 4 Aug, No. 429.

5 dispatched a telegram to Souchon: "At the present time [your] call on [*Einlaufen*] Constantinople not yet possible for political reasons." The admiral received this imprecise warning at 1100, August 6, but decided to sail to the Dardanelles anyway. According to the official German Naval History, Souchon sensed that the appearance of his squadron in Turkish waters would greatly strengthen the German position vis-à-vis the Porte, and assumed, in any case, that the "political" difficulties cited by Berlin did not necessarily apply to his squadron's entry into the Dardanelles (as distinct from a call on Constantinople itself). So on the same afternoon the *Goeben* and *Breslau* steamed out of Messina on the first leg of their eastward journey. With superior Anglo-French naval forces practically all around him, Souchon might of course still have tried to reach an Adriatic port of the Dual Monarchy, but since the Austro-Hungarian fleet was in no way prepared to come to his assistance, he wisely abandoned that alternative plan.[13] It should be noted in this connection that for the sole purpose of facilitating Souchon's escape into the Adriatic Berlin had urged Vienna on August 5 to declare war on Britain and France—the request being promptly rescinded three days later, when it became clear that Austrian assistance was no longer needed by the Mediterranean Squadron.[14]

Souchon's decision on August 6 to ignore Berlin's advisory telegram was a veritable stroke of luck, for the Porte had in fact already abandoned its negative stand by this time. Indeed, the German agencies in Constantinople had first learned of the

[13] See Lorey, 1, 14-15; Hans Sokol, *Oesterreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914-1918*, 3 vols. (Vienna, 1929-33), 1, 67-73; Tirpitz, p. 302; [Georg A. von Müller], *Regierte der Kaiser? Kriegstagebücher, Aufzeichnungen und Briefe des . . . Admiral Georg Alexander von Müller, 1914-1918*. Walter Görlitz, ed. (Göttingen, 1959), p. 44; FO, *Wk*, Bd. 15, Pohl to Wilhelm II, 5 Aug 1914.

[14] FO, *Wk*, Bde. 15-18, Tirpitz to FO, 4 Aug 1914; Jagow to Tschirschky, 5 Aug, Nos. 249, 250; Tirpitz to FO, 6 Aug; Jagow to Tschirschky, 8 Aug, No. 268.

Turkish policy switch in the predawn hours of August 6, but due to persistent communications problems, Berlin did not receive word of this development until the next afternoon, and Souchon himself apparently got no message at all.[15] Wangenheim was first apprised of the good news at 1 a.m., when the grand vizier called him to his office. Said Halim informed him that the cabinet had just "unanimously" decided to open the Straits to both Souchon's squadron and any Austrian warships which might come along, though the Ottoman empire would definitely continue to maintain its neutral status. Obviously sensing an opportunity for striking a hard bargain, the grand vizier then asked Wangenheim whether he was prepared to pledge Germany's acceptance of the following six proposals:

1. Germany promises its assistance in the abolition of the capitulations.
2. Germany agrees to lend its support in regard to the indispensable understandings with Rumania and Bulgaria, and it will see to it that Turkey secures a fair agreement with Bulgaria with reference to possible spoils of war.
3. Germany will not conclude peace unless [all] Turkish territories which may be occupied by its enemies in the course of the war shall be evacuated.
4. Should Greece enter the war and be defeated by Turkey, Germany will see to it that the [Aegean] islands are returned [to the Turks].
5. Germany will secure for Turkey a small correction of her eastern border which shall place Turkey into direct contact with the Moslems of Russia.
6. Germany will see to it that Turkey receives an appropriate war indemnity.

[15] On the futile efforts of the Constantinople embassy to establish radio contact with the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, see FO, *Dt 128 Nr. 5 secr.*, Bd. 3, Wangenheim to FO, 6 Aug 1914, No. 437.