JOHN ANTHONY PETROPULOS

Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833-1843

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Politics and Statecraft
in the Kingdom of Greece
1833-1843

POLITICS AND STATECRAFT IN THE KINGDOM OF GREECE 1833-1843

John Anthony Petropulos

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In Memory of my Mother
and
For my Father

Preface

THIS BOOK, originally a doctoral dissertation, is an exploratory study of political groups during the first decade of the kingdom of Greece. The reader may question the application of the term "party" to these political groupings. To be sure, they do not accord with the models derived from Western European political experience, and, because of this, some Greek scholars have refused to consider them as parties in any sense. But the term is shorter and more convenient than "political group" and it was regularly used by contemporaries. So long as one defines what "party" means in this early context (as the Introduction and Chapter II do), the use of the term seems justifiable as well as convenient.

The mass of Greek government papers for the early Othonian period (1833-44), located in the General State Archives of Greece, were unavailable when I was doing the research for this book and are only now in the process of being catalogued. Until this time-consuming process is completed and specialized monographs are written, a definitive study of neither the early Othonian period nor the early political parties can be written. Nor can a definitive study of the early Othonian period be written without full research on the parties and their role in events. With regard to the parties during the early Othonian period, this book is an attempt to raise questions which may lead to further specialized research and to provide tentative answers for further testing. It is also intended to open new paths for research on the antecedents of the parties in the 1820s and even back in the Ottoman period, while at the same time pointing the way to the next clearing operation—a study of the subsequent career and eventual demise of these particular parties after 1844. With regard to the Othonian period as a whole, this book is intended to demonstrate how the illumination of one facet of the period necessitates a revised overview of the entire period. Although no attempt is made in the book to compare the political experience of what was then a newly independent state with that of more recent ones or to treat the subject as a case study of political modernization, it is hoped that the book will have some value for those interested in comparative politics and the politics of modernization.

In the Appendix, I have included, besides a critical bibliography, a selected prosopography, so that the reader may easily identify the large number of Greeks mentioned in the book, and a translation, in its entirety, of a very illuminating and hitherto unknown document with special relevance to the parties. I wish to thank the directorate of the General State Archives of Greece for permission to publish this document for the first time. The translation of this document and the translations elsewhere in the text and notes, unless otherwise specified, are mine.

Since the book deals with a society using a different calendar and

alphabet from the West, a few remarks are necessary on citation of dates and transliteration of titles and names. In the nineteenth century, there was a twelve-day difference between the old-style (Julian) calendar, which the Greeks used, and the new-style (Gregorian) calendar of the West. In the text of the book, I have rendered all dates according to the new-style system, which the Greeks have since adopted. In the footnote references, I have cited dates just as they appear in the sources. When dates are rendered old-style, I have indicated this by having *o.s.* follow the cited date; when rendered according to both calendars, I have cited both dates, separating them with a virgule. Dates cited without any special notation should be assumed to be new-style.

Non-Greek titles have been cited in their respective languages and without English translation. Both in footnotes and bibliography, Greek titles have been cited first in transliteration, then in bracketed English translation. Abbreviated Greek titles, after first citations, have been rendered in English but with the continued use of brackets to indicate that the citation is in translation. The names of newspapers, which are cited in transliteration in both text and footnotes, are translated only in the bibliography.

I have transliterated Greek titles according to the system employed by the Library of Congress, which has become pretty much standard, but, with the exception of newspaper titles in text and footnotes, I have not included the *macron* sign over the long *e* standing for η (*eta*) or over the long *o* standing for ω (*omega*). I have attempted to employ the same system for Greek surnames (except in the Prosopography, where the *macron* is used). But I have made some modifications, primarily where strict adherence to the system would prevent the reader from approximating the Greek pronunciation of the names. I have, in the first place, exercised the option of rendering β (*beta*) with a *v* rather than a *b*. Other modifications are: *b* rather than *mp* for μπ (but only when μπ are initial letters of a name); *av* rather than *au* for the diphthong αυ; and *ev* or *ef* rather than *eu* for the diphthong ευ. In the early period of Greek independence, even the Greek spelling of some surnames was not standardized; for instance, one encounters both Palamides and Palamedes, Loidorikes and Lidorikes, Tzavelas and Tsavelas. In such cases, I have simply chosen arbitrarily. In the Prosopography of the Appendix, though nowhere else, I have included the *macron* sign over the long *e* (η) and the long *o* (ω), both to facilitate pronunciation and to assist those wishing to check such names in Greek reference works. My slightly modified system of transliteration has not been applied to the names of Greeks who chose to transliterate their names differently, e.g. Rangabe; and in the case of books written in the various languages of the West by Greek authors, the published rendering of their names has been left intact. Because he was a Russian subject, though of Greek origin, I have used *Catacazy*, a Westernized form of the Greek name Katakazes (other

Westernized forms frequently seen are Katakazi and Katakazy). Finally, in the case of Greek personal names familiar to the Western reader, I have retained the familiar form, e.g. Pericles rather than Perikles, Alexander rather than Alexandros, but Theokletos. I have deviated most from the Library of Congress system of transliteration in rendering Greek place names and terms. In the former case I have used, as much as possible, the spellings enjoying widest currency in general atlases and encyclopedias. In the latter case, especially Greek words of Turkish origin or, more precisely, Greek renderings of Turkish words, I have conformed to conventional, phonetic spellings. With respect to pure Greek words, I have adhered more closely to the Library of Congress system, but, with such words as *anaktovoulion* and *vouleuterion,* I have exercised the option of rendering β (*beta*) with a *v*, and I have used *enosis* instead of *henosis* because the former rendering has become common since the Cyprus question attracted world attention.

In this study, two distinct revolutions receive frequent mention—the great one of 1821-27, and the much briefer one of 1843. To distinguish between the two, without having to mention their dates on each occasion, I have capitalized all references—both noun and adjective—to the Revolution of 1821-27.

The major research for this book (in Greece and England) was made possible by a Rotary Foundation Fellowship, awarded and financed by Rotary International. In addition to all the Rotarians who contribute to this fund and all the officials in Evanston, Illinois, who assist Rotary Fellows, I wish to thank the Rotary Club of Lewiston-Auburn, Maine, which sponsored me for this fellowship, and Rotary District 285, which selected me for it. Their kindness and interest has continued ever since. Of course, the views expressed in the book are solely my own and in no way reflect on any of the individuals or institutions which helped me in its preparation.

The book is based largely on extensive research in the archival collections of a number of institutions—the Otho, Mavrokordatos, and Palamides Archives of the General State Archives of Greece, the Lontos Archive of the Benaki Museum, the Archives of the Greek Foreign Ministry, the Finlay Papers of the British School of Archeology, all in Athens, and the diplomatic correspondence of British envoys in Greece, located in the Public Record Office in London. To the governing authorities of these institutions I am grateful for permission to use the collections and to quote extensively in this book from them. More especially, I must acknowledge Constantine Diamantes, then assistant-director, now acting-director of the General State Archives, Angelos Papakostas, custodian of the archives of the Greek Foreign Ministry, and Eugenia Chadzidakis, wife of the director of the Benaki Museum—all three serious scholars who are thoroughly familiar with their respective collections and zealous in

their efforts to advance scholarship. They were helpful beyond all expectation, not only in familiarizing me with their materials but also in helping decipher some of the almost unintelligible documents that came up from time to time. For their courteous attention I also thank Emmanuel Protopsaltes, then director of the General State Archives, and Hans Rall, director of the Bavarian Geheimes Hausarchiv in Munich.

Without access to the treasure-house of published material in the Gennadius Library, Athens, with its ideal working conditions, the research for this book would have been far more difficult and much less pleasant. Its greatest asset was its staff. Peter Topping, then director, was always eager to help and was able to do so because of his impressive knowledge of Greek history, his familiarity with the vast collection in his library, and his long experience in the Greek academic world. I am deeply grateful to him, as I am to Eurydice Demetracopoulou, assistant-director of the Library, who familiarized me with much valuable material and gave continuous assistance.

Librarians elsewhere deserve recognition as well. Theodore Alevizos, librarian in the Harvard Library system, assisted me there. Porter Dickinson, Floyd Merritt, and Lena Page, all in the reference department of the Amherst College Library, were unsparing with their help in locating references and securing books through interlibrary loan. I also wish to express my gratitude to Harriet Dorman, secretary of the History Department at Harvard University, for technical advice and moral support; Rosa White and Laura Williams for painstakingly typing final portions of the manuscript; the late Evelyn Cooley, whose patience, endurance, and typing proficiency saw the manuscript through a number of revisions; and Roy E. Thomas of Princeton University Press for thorough and painstaking editing. Thanks are also due the History Department of Amherst College for help and cooperation in a number of ways.

Finally, I reserve for special mention and thanks William Langer, who made valuable suggestions and criticisms after reading the manuscript in dissertation form, and Robert Lee Wolff, who as thesis advisor gave valuable advice and rigorous criticism, combined with needed encouragement and kind consideration at moments when they counted most. The debt I owe my wife for tolerance, encouragement and help during my long courtship with the book is beyond measure. Loving thanks go to Ansia for zealous sorting and to Stephanie for not doing any damage. But, ultimately, I owe my greatest debt of gratitude to my mother, who made the Greek tradition a living and vital thing, and to my father, who put it in broad perspective. The book is in memory of her and in honor of him.

J. A. P.

Amherst, Massachusetts
March 1967

Contents

Preface vii

Glossary xv

Introduction 3

PART ONE · BEFORE 1833

I. The Setting: Bases for Political Divisions 19
1. Sectionalism and Nationalism 19
2. Social Structure and Social Groups 24
3. Westernization and Cultural Schism 37
4. European Intervention and Domination 43
5. Constitutionalism and Monarchy 48

II. The Revolutionary Period, 1821-27: The Origins of the Parties 53
1. The Pre-Revolutionary Political Tradition 53
2. Family Factions 62
3. New Aspirants for Power, 1821 71
4. The Military and Civilian "Parties," 1821-24 82
5. Personal Factions 88
6. The Foreign-Oriented Factions, 1825-27 96

III. The Kapodistrian Period (1828-31) and Interregnum (1831-32): The Crystallization of the Three Parties 107
1. The Policy of Kapodistrias 107
2. The Opposition to Kapodistrias: Mane, Hydra, and Karatasos Revolts 119
3. Interregnum and Civil War, October 1831–January 1833 125
4. The Crystallization of Three Parties 134
5. The Condition of the New Kingdom 144

PART TWO · THE ROYAL PERIOD OF ABSOLUTISM, 1833-43

IV. The First Regency, February 1833–July 1834 153
1. Statecraft 158
2. Antiparty Program 192
3. Political Developments 201
4. Political Opposition and Government Response 212

V. The Armansperg Regime, July 1834–February 1837 218
1. The Second Regency Period, July 1834–May 1835 218
2. The Office of Archsecretary or Archchancellor, June 1835–February 1837 233

3. Statecraft 235
4. Policy Toward the Parties 241
5. Character of the Opposition 256

VI. THE EARLY PERIOD OF OTHONIAN ABSOLUTISM AND "RUSSIAN" ASCENDANCY, 1837-40 270
1. System of Personal Absolutism 270
2. "Russian" Ascendancy 291
3. The Policies and Politics of Royal Administration 303
4. The Political Oppositions 320

VII. THE MAVROKORDATOS EPISODE AND THE NEAR EASTERN CRISIS OF 1839-41 344
1. International Crisis and Internal Turmoil 345
2. Background of the Mavrokordatos Episode 361
3. The Mavrokordatos Program and its Failure 385

VIII. THE LATER PERIOD OF OTHONIAN ABSOLUTISM: "FRENCH" ASCENDANCY (1841-43) AND THE "BLOODLESS" REVOLUTION OF SEPTEMBER 1843 408
1. The Internal Evolution of the "French" Party 412
2. The Political Opposition 422
3. The Revolution of 1843 434

PART THREE · THE MAKING OF A CONSTITUTION

IX. THE PERIOD OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, SEPTEMBER 1843–MARCH 1844 455
1. The New Location of Power 455
2. Political Divisions and Rivalries 466
3. Controversial Issues and the Breakdown of Tripartisanship 482

Conclusion 501

APPENDICES

I. MEMOIRS CONCERNING THE PHILORTHODOX SOCIETY INTRODUCED IN GREECE 519

II. SELECTED PROSOPOGRAPHY 534

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. UNPUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES 544
A. Official Archives by State—B. Archives of Private Institutions—C. Private Archival Collections

II. Published Primary Sources 555
A. Documents (Official and Unofficial)—B. Memoirs and Contemporary Accounts—C. Newspapers—D. Contemporary Tracts, Pamphlets, Accounts, etc.—E. Travel Accounts

III. Secondary Sources 593
A. General Histories—B. Topical Studies—C. Works of Special Relevance to the Parties—D. Specialized Studies on 1833-43—E. Studies on Bavarians in Greece

Index 613

Glossary

The English terms below have been included because they have a special connotation in the text beyond their accepted meaning.

Achaikon "party"—one of the two chief contending Peloponnesian Greek factions during Ottoman rule

agoyates, -es—muleteer

alliance—a horizontal association of equals

anaktovoulion—an unofficial body of palace officials, a nonstatutory royal cabinet as distinct from the statutory cabinet of government ministry heads

archchancellor (archikangellarios)—the highest governmental officer in Greece from June 1835–February 1837, namely Armansperg

archsecretary (archigrammateus)—(see archchancellor)

archon—an elected headman of a commune (see demogeron)

Areopagos—the highest court of appeal in Greece

armatolik—the position of armatolos; also the region officially policed and effectively controlled by an armatolos

armatolos, -oi—a military chieftain and mountaineer, often a former klepht-brigand, employed by the Ottoman authorities to guard important mountain passes and to fight brigands

autochthon—an indigenous Greek inhabitant of independent Greece, as distinct from an immigrant Greek (heterochthon)

Bavarianism—the policy and practice of employing Bavarian nationals in Greek state service

bey—a Turkish title signifying in this book a rich and influential notable of a district

beyship—a term applied to the governorship of Mane under Ottoman rule, especially between 1770-1821

boulouxides—the plural of a term applied to the chief military chieftains of Mane, who constituted a sort of provincial aristocracy

caloyer—monk

capitan-pasha—the commander of the Ottoman navy and governor-general of the Aegean Islands

captanlik—the position of captain or military chieftain, more especially of an armatolos; also the region policed and controlled by such a functionary

chef d'armes—the head of a privately recruited, local or district military force

chiliarchy—a military unit of a thousand soldiers commanded by a chiliarch

civilian "party"—one of the two major political divisions during the early part of the Greek Revolution, identified with the interests of the civilian notables

clientele—a hierarchical relationship of dependency

Constitutionalist—an opponent of the Governmentalists (Kapodistrians or Napists) avowedly in favor of a constitutional, parliamentary form of government; a term covering members of both the "English" and "French" parties in Greece

control board—the highest organ of fiscal control and administration in early modern Greece, an autonomous body acting independently of all ministries

Council of State—a consultative, royally appointed body of politically prominent Greeks in early modern Greece

demarch—the head of a deme

demarchal—pertaining to the deme

deme—the smallest administrative unit of independent Greece

demogeron—an elected headman of a commune, usually a landed gentleman whose influence was limited to his locale; a synonym for archon or elder

demotic—pertaining to the deme

dotation law—the law offering the sale of national land to Greek citizens who had contributed to the War of Independence

dragoman—an interpreter, often a Greek, who often functioned in fact as executive deputy in the office to which he was assigned

enosis—the union of Greek-inhabited lands with Greece

eparch—the head of an eparchy, a district or canton governor

eparchal—pertaining to the eparchy

eparchy—the intermediate administrative unit of independent Greece, a district or canton

ephor—the highest tax official and inspector of a province or district, directly under the jurisdiction of the ministry of economic affairs

faction—a term used in this book to denote a political grouping *limited to* a region of the state and united around a single family or person rather than by a set of ideas

first regency—the Bavarian regency during the minority of King Otho, consisting of Armansperg, Maurer, and Heideck, functioning from February 1833 to July 1834

fusionism (synchoneusis)—an unsuccessful attempt to achieve the fusion of all parties into a single national movement

gendarmerie (chorophyake)—a national police force

Governmentalist—a political follower of Kapodistrias, governor of Greece (1828-31) or an adherent of the "Russian" party; a synonym for Kapodistrian and (later) for Napist

Great Idea (Megale Idea)—the Greek irredentist ideal of liberating all Greeks from foreign rule and incorporating them into a greater Greece with Constantinople as its capital

heterochthon (neelys, neelydes)—a Greek, born outside of independent Greece, who settled there after the outbreak of the War of Independence (1821)

hospodar—either of the two princes appointed by the Ottoman government to rule over the Danubian (Rumanian) principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia respectively

Kapodistrian—a political follower of Kapodistrias or an adherent of the "Russian" party; a synonym for Governmentalist and (later) for Napist

kapos, -oi—the private policeman or guard of a local notable or community during Ottoman rule

Karytaino-Messenian "party"—one of the two chief contending Peloponnesian Greek factions during Ottoman rule

klepht—a Greek brigand and outlaw who became a kind of Greek Robin Hood and folk hero during the Ottoman period

kodza-bashi—a notable (see primate)

koumpariá—a ritual relationship between the families of a married couple and their best man *or* between the families of a godfather and his godchild

"major" plot—the Napist Greek intrigue to end the regency prematurely

military "party"—one of the two major political divisions during the early part of the Greek Revolution, identified with the interests of the irregular chieftains

"minor" plot—the intrigue of Franz, a Bavarian, to have Armansperg become sole regent of Greece

moirarch—a captain of the *gendarmerie*

morayannes—either of the two Peloponnesian Greek notables elected annually during the pre-Revolutionary period to serve on the pasha's advisory council in Tripolis, the capital of Peloponnesos

Morea—the Peloponnesos

Napist—an adherent of the "Russian" party in Greece

nomarch—the head of a nomarchy, provincial governor

nomarchal—pertaining to the nomarchy

nomarchy—the largest administrative unit of independent Greece, a province

otzak—hearth, meaning by extension the head (armatolos) of an important military house or family

palikar—a brave young man or hero, a term applied to klephts and armatoloi and more generally referring to irregular soldiers

party—a term used in this book to denote a political grouping extending beyond a single district and identified in some way with an ideological position

pasha—a title signifying in this book the Ottoman Muslim governor of a province during Turkish rule

pashalik—an Ottoman provincial governorship or province

phalanx—a reserve corps of army officers devised as reward for and recognition of distinguished military service during the War of Independence

Phanariot—a member of an unofficial Greek aristocracy, originating in the Phanar district of Constantinople and exercising great influence in the Ottoman empire during the eighteenth century

phara—a term denoting in Albania and Souli a small clan

Philike Hetairia—the extensive Greek secret society organized in 1814 for revolt against Ottoman rule and contributing to the outbreak of the Greek Revolution in 1821

Philorthodox—a term denoting the fervent loyalty of Greek religious conservatives to traditional Orthodoxy and applicable to the majority of Napists and adherents of the "Russian" party; more especially, the name of a secret society and plot in 1838-39

Phoenix society—a pro-Kapodistrias secret society

primate (proestos, -oi; prokritos, -oi; prouchon, prouchontes; kodzabashi)—a civilian notable and large landowner exercising local *and* regional influence

référendaire (eisegetes, -ai)—a palace official, usually Bavarian but sometimes heterochthon Greek, acting as a liaison between government bodies (ministries and Council of State) and the king, and probably intended as agents of royal control in those bodies; members of the anaktovoulion

regency majority—a grouping, within the first regency, of Maurer and Heideck, two of its three members, and Abel, an alternate regent

second regency—the Bavarian regency during the minority of King Otho, consisting of Armansperg, Kobell, and Heideck, functioning from July 1834 through May 1835

Sharia—the sacred law of Islam

streme (strema, stremmata)—a unit of land the approximate equivalent of one-fourth acre

synod—the highest ecclesiastical body of Greece

third series—the third installment of a 60,000,000 franc loan to the Greek state, guaranteed by Britain, France, and Russia

vekiles—either of the two Peloponnesian Greek notable officials sent to reside in Constantinople as spokesmen of Greek Peloponnesian interests

Vlach—a nomad or seminomad of Rumanian ethnic affinity in the Balkans, especially in Macedonia

voivode—the Ottoman Muslim head of an administrative district or canton during Turkish rule

vouleuterion—(see anaktovoulion)

Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece 1833-1843

Introduction

This book is a study of both political parties and statecraft during the first decade of the modern Greek kingdom (1833-43). As a study of parties, it is an attempt to treat them for the first time as an object of serious research—to locate and classify them, to determine their membership, and to analyze their institutional structure and societal function. As a study in statecraft, it seeks to determine the role of the parties in the process of statecraft and politics during the period 1833-43, when a newly established monarchy attempted to lay the foundations of a new state. It attempts to substantiate the hypothesis, suggested by my early research, that the parties, either as conditioning factors or as active agents, influenced the nature of more or less permanent state institutions in genesis and development, and hence helped determine the fundamental structure of the modern Greek state. In contrast with the parties, which have been grossly neglected, these institutions have received from historians factual elaboration and analysis as to structure and function. But such accounts have suffered from the failure to consider the parties as an influence in their genesis and development.

For reasons stated below, of the many groupings called "parties" or "factions" in the sources, only three—those most easily identifiable by their foreign affiliations—have been considered to merit this label and these will constitute the main subjects of this study. The first generation of political parties in independent Greece enjoyed a life-span of something like thirty years. They were conceived about halfway through the great War of Greek Independence (1821-27). They took definite form during the first period of settled government under President John Kapodistrias (1828-31). They lived out the rest of their existence under King Otho, first king of modern Greece (1833-62), losing their identity sometime after the Crimean War (1854-56).

Because of limited time for research abroad, I have excluded from consideration the constitutional period starting in 1844, even though party activity was brisk, and coverage of the period 1825-32 has been restricted to a merely exploratory and analytical account based largely on secondary and some published primary sources. Intensive research has been done on only the middle period—the period of absolutism, starting in 1833, when royal government got under way, and ending in 1843, when a successful revolution resulted in the establishment of a constitution. There are two reasons for selecting the middle period. Least is known about the parties during this time, their activities being less apparent under a nonconstitutional regime. Then, too, it was during this period that the basic structure of the Greek state was created. This period seemed to offer the best chances for testing and substantiating the hypothesis mentioned above.

Within the period of absolutism, five subperiods emerge, according to

the succession of governments and the shift of political primacy from one party to another: (1) the period of the first regency (1833-34); (2) the period of rule by Armansperg, first as regent, then as archchancellor (1834-36); (3) the first part of Otho's personal rule, which was characterized by the political primacy of the "Russian" party (1838-39); (4) the brief interlude of attempted political reform under the aegis of the "English" party (1841); and (5) the latter part of Otho's personal absolutism, this time with the "French" party in the ascendant (1841-43). These subperiods, each considered in a separate chapter, constitute the core of the book (Part Two).

But in order to understand the character and activities of the parties in the period of absolutism, it is necessary to delineate the major factors in Revolutionary Greece which make the character and activities of the parties intelligible (Chapter I), to trace the emergence of embryonic parties (1821-27) out of a situation of fluid political groupings and persistent social forms (Chapter II), and to describe the birth and consolidation of three parties between 1828 and 1832 under the Kapodistrian and post-Kapodistrian regimes (Chapter III). Finally, a kind of epilogue (Chapter IX) deals with the period of the constituent assembly (1843-44), first, because the positions taken on major constitutional issues make it possible to examine the relation of the parties to ideas and principles; second, because the temporary collapse of the three-party system, in conjunction with the temporary absence of certain previously operative factors, sheds indirect light on the reasons for the survival of the three parties between 1833-43 and dramatically illustrates the divisive intra-party factors which were less immediately apparent during the absolutist period.

The two following sections of this introduction will enumerate more specifically some of the major questions and problems with which this book is concerned and will explain the basic conceptualization employed. The first section will do so with respect to the parties' nature and function, the second with regard to their role in the process of statecraft and in the unfolding of political events.

The constant reference to parties (*kommata*) or factions (*phatriai*) in contemporary documents, Greek and non-Greek, indicates that they constituted a regular feature of the political picture. So persistently are they mentioned that one is all the more impressed with the lack of precision in the use of the terms. It is never obvious, or immediately apparent, what the accepted generic meaning of the terms was, how many parties there actually were, or whom and what, if anything, they represented. Later historians have not helped matters any. They have persisted in using these terms in their manifold contexts without ever clarifying the distinct meanings and their connections to each other.[1]

[1] Often the sources use the terms interchangeably, with no apparent difference in

The contemporary sources show a consensus on two points only—(1) that at the very least, parties were groups designed to secure public office for their members;[2] and (2) that the existence of parties was a misfortune for the nation, incompatible with public interest.[3] Beyond this primary

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meaning. In some cases, though, they casually imply a contrast, either in respect to size (a "faction" having smaller membership) or purpose (a "faction" devoid of all patriotic sentiment). Deliberate attempts to define or distinguish these terms are rare and seldom fruitful. For instance, *Athēna* (11 July 1837*o.s.*) defined a faction as "an understanding among men which didn't limit its machinations to the acquiring of offices and honors, as did the parties, but also cast its glance on the national government itself, trying either to conquer it or make it odious to the public." In short, a party made reasonable demands for place and position, while a faction wanted to monopolize or destroy power.

Concerning the lack of consistence in categorizing specific parties, I will cite only three examples, each a work of distinction and erudition: (1) George K. Aspreas, *Politike Historia tes Neoteras Hellados 1821-1921* [*Political History of Modern Greece*], 2nd edn. (Athens, 1924), 3 vols.; (2) George Finlay, *A History of Greece from its Conquest by the Romans to the Present Time, B.C. 146 to A.D. 1864*, ed. H. F. Tozer (Oxford, 1877), 7 vols.; and (3) Edouard Driault and Michel Lhéritier, *Histoire Diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos Jours* (Paris, 1925), 5 vols.

Aspreas talks about "foreign" and "indigenous" parties in one section (I, 29-30); three foreign-oriented parties ("English," "French," "Russian") in another (I, 74-79); and personal coteries in still another context (I, 193).

Finlay pretty consistently uses the categories of "Kapodistrian" and "Constitutionalist" parties (see for instance, VI, 72-106 passim); yet he has to lapse into talk about "English," "French," and "Russian" parties when he arrives at the years 1842-44 (VII, 171, 185). He refers to them as "the old parties under Mavrokordatos, Kolettes, and Metaxas," which makes us wonder why he has not mentioned them over so many pages or, if we are to assume they disappeared for a time, why he does not then explain why they suddenly reappeared.

Driault and Lhéritier (*Histoire*) generally talk about a Napist ("Russian") and a National party (II, 130, 194-95, 225), which they label "conservative" and "liberal" in another section (II, 227); yet they find themselves sometimes forced to talk about three foreign-oriented parties (I, 298, and II, 140), even though they don't feel that one of these ("English") merits the name "party" (II, 227). Significantly, however, they are not clear on why they don't feel that it qualifies for the name; or for that matter, why the others do.

[2] See, for instance, the Greek newspapers *Athēna*, 3 July and 11 July 1837*o.s.*; *Triptolemos*, 16 Sept. 1833*o.s.*; and *Ethnikē*, 1/13 Oct. 1834.

[3] The newspaper press almost unanimously declared itself against the existence of parties; for instance, *Triptolemos*, 16 Sept. 1833*o.s.*; *Ethnikē*, 11/23 Oct. 1834; *Sōtēr*, 25 Oct. 1834*o.s.*; *Anagennētheisa Hellas*, 25 Aug. 1836*o.s.*; *Athēna*, 4 Dec. 1837*o.s.*; and *Aiōn*, 25 June 1839*o.s.* Two quotations from these sources will give some idea why men believed, or at least said, that the existence of parties went counter to national interest:

"If the party heads restricted themselves to fighting the cabinet, the evil would probably not be too great. But worse yet, they fight, insult, slander, and rival each other so as to inherit the direction of affairs. . . . This war between them is the more frightening because it has the most frightful consequences. Party men, in order to increase and strengthen their parties, rouse some of the people against other segments of the people. They instigate the masses, they predict the worst prophecies,

definition and this negative evaluation, the sources diverge, even on the ostensibly simple matter of identifying particular parties by name.

The ostensibly simple matter of merely identifying and enumerating particular parties turns out to be anything but simple. How many parties were there? What were their names? Depending on context and concern, contemporaries tended to think and speak in terms of at least three distinct classifications. Sometimes they talked about an almost endless number of personal cliques, each as the personal projection of an individual leader.[4] At other times they saw politics as a three-way struggle between the "English," "French," and "Russian" parties, which they identified as the followings acquired by the three European powers with special influence in Greek affairs.[5] On still other occasions, talk went on

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they attribute the worst schemes to the government and other parties. Thus they precipitate the division of the nation, mistrust, disobedience, and reprehensible movements of the simple or the adventurous. . . ." (*Triptolemos*)

". . . if parties had not existed in Greece, not only would the nation have thrown off the yoke [of the Turks] much sooner, but the bases of our political community would have been broader and sounder. Parties everywhere and always become the obstacles of any nation's prosperity. But the time that they become most harmful . . . is certainly when the nation is occupied in setting the foundation of its governmental forms." (*Anagennētheisa Hellas*)

For similar sentiments, see a public talk by Regas Palamides, which was published with the title [*Speech of Regas Palamides, Deputy from Mantineia*] in reply to the speech of A. Metaxas, retiring minister of economic affairs, in the Chamber session of 23 Aug. 1845 (n.p., n.d.), p. 2; and a private letter from Philip Ioannou to A. Mavrokordatos, Athens, 1 Oct. 1837*o.s.*, no. 5423, Vol. 20 (1837-40), Mavrokordatos Archive, General State Archives, Athens. The latter, after reviewing the party situation, expressed his wish that he were back in "peaceful Germany."

On the other hand, there were a few exceptions to the general clamor against parties during the decade 1833-43: the newspaper *Hēlios*, 8 Aug. 1833*o.s.*; and *Athēna*, 11 July 1837*o.s.* In going against the tide, these articles offer two types of argument: (1) that parties existed automatically in any society and were hence inevitable, (2) that they were valuable as watchdogs, keeping an eye both on the government and each other. The reader should notice that both *Triptolemos* and *Athēna* were also cited above as participants in the antiparty campaign, which shows that they did not remain consistent.

[4] The newspaper *Hēlios* (4 July 1833*o.s.*), in a lead article, cited seven such personal coteries; and Philip Ioannou writes about "so many parties" (same citation as that of previous footnote). See also J. A. Buchon, *La Grèce Continentale et la Morée* (Paris, 1843), pp. 107-108; Theobald Piscatory to M. Guizot, Athens, 6 Sept. 1841 [7th report], in "Textes et Documents, La Grèce d'Othon," ed. Jean Poulos, in *L'Hellénisme Contemporain*, 2nd ser., IX (1955), 427; and Friedrich Thiersch, *De l'état actuel de la Grèce* (Leipzig, 1833), I, 182.

[5] *Hēlios*, 25 Aug. 1833*o.s.*; *Ethnikē*, 16/28 Oct. 1834; *Athēna*, 3 July 1837*o.s.*; and *Aiōn*, 6 Dec. 1839*o.s.* In addition to these newspapers, see the following items of personal correspondence: M. Argyropoulos to P. Argyropoulos, Pera, 26 Mar./7 Apr. 1841, no. 5857, Vol. 21 (1841), and Kolettes to Mavrokordatos, Nov. 1842, no. 6512, Vol. 22 (1842), both from Mavrokordatos Archive; Guizot's instructions to Piscatory, Paris, 16 May 1841, *L'Hellénisme Contemporain*, IX, 334; and J. Eynard to D. Chrestides, 17 Feb. 1843, published in *La Restauration Hellénique*

as if only two parties occupied the political arena—the *Constitutionalists*, ostensibly the advocates of constitutional government, and the *Kapodistrians* or *Governmentalists*, those faithful to the authoritarian system of John Kapodistrias, governor of Greece from 1828-31.[6] One person was likely to use the vocabulary of more than one classification scheme, even on the same occasion.[7]

To add to the complication, primary and secondary sources tended to speak of politics in terms of broader social groups, classified according to three deep-rooted divisions in Greek society involving differing ways of life. The first classification, a socio-economic one, distinguished between the *military* and *civilian* elements, or more precisely between military chieftains and landed primates. The second classification was regional, involving a three-way division between major geographical divisions of insurgent Greece (Peloponnesos, Rumely, and the Islands). The third classification rested on a cultural split between those distinguished for their allegiance to the secular, liberal West and those faithful to the other-worldly, authoritarian tradition of Byzantium.

Contemporaries did not usually go so far as to call these social groups "parties." Only in the case of the military-civilian elements did they make an exception, and even then, only for the early period of the Revolution when politics momentarily assumed class lines.[8] But they tended to think

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d'après la correspondance de Jean-Gabriel Eynard, ed. Edouard Chapuisat (Paris, Geneva, 1924), p. 154.

[6] In the first years of Otho's reign especially, this classification was used. The newspapers *Triptolemos* (2 Aug. 1833*o.s.*), *Sōtēr* (16 Aug. 1834*o.s.*), *Ethnikē* (14/26 Oct. 1834), and *Ho Hellēnikos Tachydromos* (nos. 42-43 and 59, 1837) made reference to the parties in these terms. In the later 1830s and early 1840s, probably to avoid the impression that only a part of the nation desired a constitution, most newspapers, excepting the anticonstitutionalist *Hellas* and *Ho Hellēnikos Tachydromos*, dropped this terminology. See also, in private correspondence, Philip Ioannou to Mavrokordatos, Athens, 15 Aug. 1838*o.s.*, no. 5520, Vol. 20 (1837-40), and S. Valetas to Mavrokordatos, Athens, 26 May 1842*o.s.*, no. 6355, Vol. 22 (1842), both in Mavrokordatos Archive.

[7] For instance, *Triptolemos* used the two-fold system in its issue of 2 Aug. 1833*o.s.* *Hēlios* wrote about seven personal coteries (4 July 1833*o.s.*) and wrote about their merger into three (25 Aug. 1833*o.s.*). Philip Ioannou (to Mavrokordatos, Athens, Vol. 20 [1837-40], Mavrokordatos Archive) referred to "many parties" (1 Oct. 1837*o.s.*), then to the Constitutionalist and Napist (15 Aug. 1838*o.s.*). Or see a reference to the effect that ". . . one was a Governmentalist, one a Constitutionalist, another English, another French, another Russian and so forth" in John Makrygiannes, *Apomnemoneumata* [*Memoirs*], ed. John Vlachogiannes, 2nd edn. (Athens, 1947), II, 120.

[8] For a historical account of the early years of the Revolution in terms of the "military" and "civilian" parties, see Spyridon Trikoupes, *Historia tes Hellenikes Epanastaseos* [*History of the Greek Revolution*], 3rd edn. (Athens, 1888), III passim. Concerning the marked tension between these two social groups, and its political implications, see Nicholas Dragoumes, *Historikai Anamneseis* [*Historical Reminiscences*] 2nd edn. (Athens, 1879), I, 20-21; and Antoine Grénier, *La Grèce en*

of these social groups in primarily political terms and to link up political parties with these social categories. In 1838 the newspaper *Aiōn* went as far as to interpret party rivalries, from the outbreak of the Revolution till the moment of publication, as an expression, through various phases, of a struggle between military and civilian oligarchies.[9] Some attempted to set up a correspondence between the three foreign-oriented parties and the three-way sectionalist feeling—the "English" as the party of the Islanders, the "French" as the party of Rumely, and the "Russian" as the party of the Peloponnesos.[10] In *L'Histoire Diplomatique de la Grèce*, Driault and Lhéritier attempted to make such a correspondence between the two-fold political classification on the one hand and regional and cultural factors on the other:

> There was in Greece, as everywhere, a conservative party and a progressive party; the one associated with the "Russian" party, offspring of the presidency of Capodistrias, powerful in the Peloponnesos through the influence of the Kolokotrones'; the other, a liberal and national party, powerful in Rumely and in most of the islands which were the cradle of liberty. It recognized John Kolettes as chief.[11]

George Aspreas, the Greek historian, described the "first parties" as an expression of conflict between the European and the indigenously Greek ethos. He cited two parties, the foreign (*xenikon*) and the indigenous (*enchōrion*), the former representing Westernized Greeks and the latter consisting of the traditionalists or vast mass of Greeks. According to him, this division continued throughout the reign of Greece's first

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1863 (Paris, 1863), p. 105. For an excellent secondary source, see Douglas Dakin, *British and American Philhellenes during the War of Greek Independence 1821-1833* (Thessaloniki, 1955), p. 163.

[9] In two consecutive lead articles of a historical nature (12 Oct. and 28 Oct. 1838*o.s.*), *Aiōn* based its whole analysis of the political past on the fact of tension between military and civilian elements. Indeed, the early rivalry between Prince Demetrios Ypsilantes and Alexander Mavrokordatos it interpreted along these class lines. "The primates were suspicious of Ypsilantes' inclination toward the soldiery," it wrote. "From this stems the first division of spirits and it continues through various phases until our present epoch. . . . The first element was essentially the military, and the second the political civilian oligarchy." The Constitutionalists it identified as descendants of the Mavrokordatists; the Governmentalists as heirs of the Ypsilantists with the Kolokotronists representing an intermediate stage.

[10] See, for instance, Thiersch, *État actuel*, II, 217. This correspondence, however, is more frequently made by the secondary sources, such as Karl Mendelssohn-Bartholdy (*Geschichte Griechenlands von der Eroberung Konstantinopels durch die Türken im Jahre 1453 bis auf unsere Tage* [Leipzig, 1870-74], I, 439-40), who identified the "English" party primarily with insular Greece, the "French" with mainland Greece, and the "Russian" with the Peloponnesos. See also Dakin, *Philhellenes*, pp. 89-90, and Nicholas Kaltchas, *Introduction to the Constitutional History of Modern Greece* (New York, 1940), p. 49.

[11] Driault and Lhéritier, *Histoire*, II, 227.

monarch (1833-62). And each party, as a matter of practical politics, sought as close an identification with indigenous culture as possible.[12]

This kaleidescopic perception of the parties, capricious in its shifting images, is obviously no basis for a systematic analysis of parties or for a synthetic description of party politics. Any such study must give primacy to one of the three classifications as *the* standard one. For three reasons, I have chosen to treat the "English," "French," and "Russian" parties as the basic political groupings. In the first place, this classification was the most universally held of the three and more consistently in use throughout the 1830s and the early 1840s than either of the other two. Second, the special status of England, France, and Russia in Greek affairs and the active exercise of patronage by their respective legations in Athens gave these groupings an influence and prominence unknown to the others. Third, other groupings tended to converge into these three. Personal coteries tended to merge into alliances roughly equivalent to the three foreign-oriented parties. On all but a few rare occasions the so-called Constitutionalist party tended to dissolve into its two constituent parts—the "English" and "French" parties.

Though for the sake of analysis and clarity it is necessary to give primacy to one of the classifications, it is also necessary to avoid oversimplification and to utilize the other classifications when they render an event or situation more intelligible. Once one has chosen a particular classification of political parties, one must relate it to the three deep-seated societal divisions cited above. Indeed, this book will attempt to analyze the socio-economic basis as well.

Since multiplicity of classifications reflects an objective fact—the fluidity of political groupings—this book will also attempt to clarify the relation between the various political groupings and hence the objective grounds for the validity of each classification: (1) Did the type of political division (multiple, three-fold, and dual) bear any relation to the levels of political activity (local, provincial, and national)? (2) With which of the three types (personal, foreign-oriented, Constitutionalist-Governmentalist) did the average individual identify himself most closely? (3) Speaking of national politics, in response to what kinds of stimuli did political divisions follow dual rather than three-fold lines?

A few words, then, about the nomenclature of these three parties. Generally the newspaper sources referred to them as "so-called English," "so-called French," and "so-called Russian." These names were descriptive in the sense that they indicated the foreign sympathies of each group.

[12] But what Aspreas observed was a cultural division which affected political alignments rather than a political division itself. As he himself admitted, the indigenous body of opinion could not be characterized, in the strict sense of the word, as a party, because it lacked both organization and a focal point. The same applies, however, to the other group as well. See Aspreas [*Political History*], I, 28-32. See also Grénier, *Grèce*, pp. 32, 96-97.

But they were also polemical terms, designed to suggest betrayal of national interests in return for foreign patronage and reserved for rival parties. Even when engaged in polemics, the press used these terms guardedly ("so-called French" rather than "French").[13]

A second set of labels, likewise originating as terms of abuse during the bitter civil war of 1831-32, derived from the names of individuals important only for their partisan fanaticism. Moschos, a turbulent military captain from Rumely, commanded a unit (*manga*) of irregulars within the army of Theodore Grivas, a disreputable though influential military figure in the Constitutionalist camp. This particular unit was called *moschomanga* (unit of Moschos). So irresponsible and cruelly did it behave when Grivas entered Nauplion in 1832 that its name became a byword for wanton brutality and a nasty name for the "French" party, to which Moschos so vociferously expressed his loyalty. Members of the "English" party came to be known as *Parlaioi* (adherents of Parlas) by association with Basil Parlas, a fanatical Anglophile who led an armed attack on the Governmentalist gendarmes of Nauplion in 1832. Napas, a large-framed and fanatical Russophile, who clashed with French forces in Nauplion in 1833, lent his name to the "Russian" party which came to be known as the *Napist* party. Of this set, only the term Napist stuck and even gained a measure of respectability, although the Russophiles preferred to call themselves Governmentalists. The terms "parlaioi" and "moschomangites" were almost never used in newspapers or private correspondence during the royal period.[14]

Throughout the decade of the 1830s the press engaged in a running debate on whether parties actually existed in Greece.[15] In this debate the

[13] For instances of the widespread journalistic practice of prefacing the foreign party names with "so-called" (*legomenon*), see *Athēna*, 3 July 1837 and 26 July 1841*o.s.*, and *Aiōn*, 6 Dec. 1839*o.s.* In the polemics of the press, other descriptive labels of a deprecatory kind were also used. The "French" newspaper *Sōtēr* constantly called the "English" party the "party of intrigue" (*radiourgikon*), trying to identify it with a Greek élite group called the Phanariots, who had a reputation for intrigue, and the "Russian" the "antinational party," because of its alleged efforts in behalf of a foreign power (5 Aug. 1834 and 25 Oct. 1834*o.s.*). The pro-"English" *Ethnikē* called the "French" party the "party of turbulence," referring to its heavy representation of military elements, or the "party of Ali-Pasha-ism," referring to the earlier association of its leader, Kolettes, with the intrigue-ridden court of Ali Pasha of Janina (10/22 Mar. 1835 and 24 Mar./6 Apr. 1835).

[14] See "Moschos," "Parlas," and "Napas" in *Megale Hellenike Enkyklopaideia* [*Grand Hellenic Encyclopedia*], 24 vols. (Athens, 1926-34).

[15] For instances of the thesis that parties did exist, see *Triptolemos*, 29 July 1833*o.s.*; *Sōtēr*, 11 Oct. and 18 Oct. 1834*o.s.*; *Ethnikē*, 7/19 Mar. 1835; and *Aiōn*, 6 Dec. 1839*o.s.* Representing the other side of the debate were *Anagennētheisa Hellas*, 25 Aug. 1836*o.s.*; *Aiōn*, 28 Oct. 1838*o.s.*; and *Athēna*, 8 Jan. 1836, 3 July 1837, 15 Jan. 1838, and 20 Apr. 1838*o.s.* The reader will notice that *Aiōn* shifted its position; within issues of each other (nos. 63 and 65, 1837), *Sōtēr* did too. This was characteristic. Indeed, the former position was usually that of progovernment newspapers that were attempting to justify the presence of Bavarians in the administra-

existence of groups in search of public favors and political power was never in question. The issue was whether these groups merited the name of "parties"; that is, whether they fulfilled the terms of the definition implied by current educated usage. No one attempted any systematic formulation of the concept, but the generic meaning of the term, as used by Westernized intellectuals at least, becomes apparent from scattered references. A survey of the language of four contemporary observers will permit a formulation of the concept, which in turn will provide us with important questions to ask about the nature of the political groups with which we are concerned.

A more or less formal approach to the question was provided by Michael Petrokokkinos, a secondary school teacher, in a speech which he delivered in 1833.[16] He started with a definition.

> Politically a thing is called a stand [*stasis*] or faction [*phatria*] when some individuals wish a certain element to prevail in the nation instead of another, or want the government to take the form of a despotism, aristocracy, or democracy. All the individuals comprising the party know what they want and what purpose they strive for. Inhabiting various cities of the realm, unacquainted with each other personally, they share nevertheless a common set of objectives.

Groups in England and France, he asserted, met the terms of his definition. Even the most insignificant person believed that the prosperity of the nation depended on the supremacy of his party.

Petrokokkinos then proceeded to his main point—Greece had no "parties." Ask a soldier why he belonged to the so-called party of Theodore Kolokotrones, a military hero of the Greek Revolution and an influential party figure, and he would reply, "Because he drew pay from Kolokotrones as a soldier in his private army." Take away the leader of a so-called party and nothing remained but a mere collection of individuals. No fundamental political differences divided the Greeks. Now that independence had been won, they merely wanted peace, order, and law.

Early in 1838, the liberal Greek newspaper *Athēna* devoted a lead article to the question of parties:

> Systematic factions [*phatriai*] or parties [*kommata*] exist and sustain themselves on a foundation of political principles. Only such entities can be called parties. By itself, competition for political office makes neither a faction nor a party. Only this competition exists in Greece today and it will always exist by the very nature of things. But whoever

tion or the Crown's denial of a constitution; the latter was the position of those who argued that partisan strife had subsided enough to allow the Greeks control of their own affairs.

[16] Published in *Hēlios*, 11 July 1833*o.s.*

> considers this competition evidence of the existence of parties does not know the real meaning of the term in any language.

On another occasion, it defined parties as "unions of men, having the same interests and beliefs, which conflicted with the interests and beliefs of other similar unions."[17]

Unlike these two statements, the third and fourth references to parties came from correspondence of a confidential nature. Constantine Zographos, a prominent political figure with long experience in party politics, was foreign minister of Greece when he wrote his remarks to a friend early in 1839.[18] He made essentially the same point as Petrokokkinos and *Athēna.* The division into these parties, he wrote, was based upon differences of material interests and personal relations rather than upon differences of political principles and beliefs. A body of public opinion, reflecting the interests and needs of different classes of Greek society, he said, had not yet formed because classes themselves had not yet issued as distinct entities from the chaos of the Revolutionary decade (1821-32). In short, he was adding that the parties *could not* reflect differing political ideas because social fluidity had not permitted the formation of distinct interest groups and the consequent articulation of group differences on substantive political issues.

The fourth reference comes from the correspondence of Theobald Piscatory,[19] a French diplomat who, albeit not Greek, knew Greek conditions intimately and at first hand as a result of his Revolutionary services as a philhellene. Returning to Greece in 1841 on an official mission this time, he denied the existence of "real" parties because he could discover no differences among the so-called parties on questions most vitally affecting the country. All displayed loyalty to the king, ardently sought the liberation of their brethren still under Ottoman domination, and urgently desired an end to administrative breakdown. In the one case where he was willing to admit the possible existence of a "real" party, he cited as characteristics "cohesiveness, a common interest centered about an ecclesiastical issue, and strong organization," but he also pointed out, in qualification, that the party was small in numbers.

From these four statements there emerges a conception of "party," obviously drawn from contemporary conditions of Western Europe (England and France), in terms of which to discuss the Greek political groups whose existence all acknowledged. By inference if not by open assertion, all four observers judged the so-called parties as groupings resting upon the personality of an influential leader and the personal relations existing among the members. But all four also shared a concep-

[17] *Athēna,* 15 Jan. 1838*o.s.* The other occasion was its issue of 11 July 1837*o.s.*

[18] Zographos to Mavrokordatos, Athens, 19 Feb./3 Mar. 1839, no. 5579, Vol. 20 (1837-40), Mavrokordatos Archive.

[19] Piscatory, Athens, 20 June 1841 (1st report) and Athens, 30 July 1841 (4th report), *L'Hellénisme Contemporain,* IX, 339-40, 410.

tion which required of "real" parties three characteristics: first and primarily, representation of ideas; second, structure or organization; third, command of a popular following. All four observers stated these characteristics only to point out their absence in the case of Greek groupings. But the question of whether these characteristics were totally absent is an open one which was disputed even then. For that reason, I will write about the parties with these questions in mind and address myself explicitly to them again in the conclusion. Since they are important, they deserve at this point separate attention.

Did parties represent ideas? Those who answered negatively[20] could argue in two ways. They might, like the four observers cited, insist that there were no important differences of opinion which the so-called parties might reflect. Or they might point to the frequent defections and changes of party allegiance as evidence that expediency rather than conviction determined party membership.[21] But such a negative reply was challenged, though by no means refuted, by the persistence of such party classifications as Constitutionalist-Governmentalist, liberal-conservative, or European-traditional, and also by apparent motivation behind some of the sources.[22]

As a basis for some sort of judgment, the following questions must be considered: Were there issues which divided segments of Greek society? If so, to what extent did the parties reflect such divisions of opinion? If so, on what level did the differences of opinion take place—on the level of cultural allegiance or way of life, which went beyond the category of strictly political ideas; on the intermediate level of political principles,

[20] For negative opinions, besides that of Piscatory (Athens, 20 June 1841 [1st report], *ibid.*, IX, 340), see *Hēlios*, 11 July 1833*o.s.*; *Philos tou Laou*, 3 June 1838*o.s.*; and *Athēna*, 15 Jan. and 20 Apr. 1838*o.s.*

[21] Speaking in this case specifically about a Napist but with the implication that the point applied to a man of any party, Piscatory wrote (Athens, 30 July 1841 [4th report], *L'Hellénisme Contemporain*, IX, 410): ". . . a personal interest makes one quit the [Napist] party to enter the national party. To do this one does not have to change one's principles or language. One quarrels with some to accommodate himself with the others. This is what just occurred to one of the members of the Kolokotrones family and to his friends." In another instance (Athens, 20 Aug. 1841 [5th report], IX, 413) he wrote: ". . . clients often seek two protectors at the same time or desert one to try for another."

[22] Respectable as these authorities are, one must treat their judgments critically. All disapproved of parties, whether in principle or by interest. The French, like any other foreign mission, did not wish to antagonize differing segments of Greek opinion by becoming associated exclusively with the ideological position of any particular group. Petrokokkinos and Zographos could not admit the ideological basis of parties without implying their permanence and justifying their existence as genuine expressions of public opinion. Moreover, basing their observations of party differences on the example of England and France, where such basic questions as the merits of aristocracy and democracy were vital and where conflicting dynastic claims had arisen, they considered whatever differences might exist among the Greeks as trivial by comparison.

such as forms of government, relations between church and state; or on the level of public policy or substantive issues of immediate concern, such as proposals for a national bank, ways and means to curb brigandage, trade with the Ottoman empire?

Were the parties organized into a system so as to unite men from various parts of the country, men who might not know each other personally? This question never attracted any real debate. But Petrokokkinos implied a negative answer by his observation that, without its leader, a party would not hold together, whereas Piscatory made an exception for at least one party.[23] The crucial question, on this issue, is whether organization was absent or whether it was often considered absent because it did not conform with the expected European pattern.

This question is crucial to an understanding of the period. A major contention of this book is that the persistence of parties, in spite of royal efforts to undermine and destroy them, is intelligible only in terms of a positive answer to this question.

To what extent did the parties enjoy popular support and command the loyalties of the average individual? This question came up for repeated debate in the press, as people felt it expedient to argue for the seriousness or for the negligibility of factionalism throughout the body politic. As a result, there exists much conflicting testimony. For instance, the newspaper *Ethnikē* expressed this view in 1834:

> Fortunately, the whole nation was never divided—among the four or five party leaders—as many have often said. Most of the Greeks always remained neutral to them in their passions and wars. Only a few friends and acquaintances were the faithful and firm followers of the party leaders. . . .

Yet a few months later that same newspaper, in order to justify the presence of so many non-Greeks in public service, asserted the rareness of qualified Greeks without the stigma of party affiliations. If *Ethnikē* partially contradicted its previous assertion, others went further. Maurer, one of the three regents during the minority of the king, asserted that in 1831-32 the whole Greek nation had split up into parties, and the newspaper *Sōtēr* claimed ". . . there is no one in Greece who, even involuntarily, does not belong to one of the various political parties which divide Greece." It is the view of this book that this question is intimately related

[23] Petrokokkinos, in *Hēlios,* 11 July 1833*o.s.* Piscatory's exception was the following (Athens, 6 Sept. 1841 [7th report], *L'Hellénisme Contemporain,* IX, 436): "The difference which exists therefore in Peloponnesos between the Russian and English parties, on the one hand, and the French party, on the other, is that men who, in the various provinces, constitute the force of the first two parties, are nothing without the chief who has great influence, while the man who would put himself at the head of the French party could guide the chiefs but could not destroy their influence."

to an evaluation of the function of parties in Greek society as well as an understanding of their socio-economic foundation.[24]

For the period of absolute rule (1833-43), one should not expect to encounter the features characteristic of political parties in modern parliamentary democracies, such as open campaigning for office on a party platform with a party list of candidates, the formation of a homogeneous government of one party, the formal recognition of an opposition constituted by the party or parties temporarily removed from power, or a clearly delineated group of voting blocs by party in the legislative assembly that finally appeared in 1844. But if they did none of these things, what role did they play in the political and social spheres?

Secondary accounts fail to treat the parties as a structural part of their political analysis. It is one thing to devote a few paragraphs to a discussion of the parties and quite another to describe state policy, institutional development, social conflict, and political opposition in terms of party behavior. A few examples of what such failure means will suffice. The refusal of the king to grant a constitution has so often been explained in terms of mere personal inclination, parental influence, and official Russian opposition. The exclusion of influential Greeks from high office, which in the case of party leaders took the form of appointment as ministers plenipotentiary to foreign courts, and the employment of Bavarians and philhellenes so often look like a mere case of Bavarian ethnocentrism and lack of Western appreciation for indigenous talent. The creation of a centralized administration which ignored traditional privileges of local self-government and a caesaropapist system which transformed the church into an arm of the government too often seem like the work of doctrinaire Bavarians. Valid as such assertions may be, they are only half-truths. They ignore the basic fact that the Greek Revolution had failed to produce a sufficient concentration of power to prevail over the centrifugal forces which the parties reflected and strengthened in a markedly unhomogeneous society.

Even a recent history, which acknowledged this fact and underlined the connection of the ruling oligarchies to the party complex, failed to draw the full implications of its insights when evaluating both particular acts and general opportunities of royal policy. Just because the Crown did not suffer the limitations of representative government and formally enjoyed absolute power, the author of this history ignored the informal but none the less real power of social and political groups to seriously limit the area of effective royal authority. Consequently, he seems not to

[24] *Ethnikē*, 1/13 Oct. 1834 and 7/19 Mar. 1835. George Ludwig von Maurer, *Das griechische Volk in öffentlicher, kirchlicher und privatrechtlicher Beziehung vor und nach dem Freiheitskampfe bis zum 31. Juli 1834* (Heidelberg, 1835), II, 19-21. *Sōtēr*, 11 Oct. 1834*o.s.* See also Makrygiannes [*Memoirs*], II, 120.

have understood the motivation behind several royal attempts to remove such curbs. For instance, he believed royal authority sufficiently secure to permit the existence of potential, if not actual, instruments of party rivalry, such as an autonomous church and decentralized administration. Indeed, with regard to the regency which exercised royal power from January 1833 to June 1835, he wrote: "They, perceiving whatever they believed good and useful for the land, had their hands free to do it. They were unchecked and not worn down by myriads of party demands."[25]

Only the historian George Aspreas, in his [*Political History of Greece*], has consistently analyzed and described political developments in terms of the parties. He clearly perceived the role of the parties as a political opposition. He understood that the parties, by their very existence as a source of disorder and insubordination, conditioned royal policy in a variety of ways intended to destroy them or nullify their influence. His brief treatment of this period did not permit more than the more obvious illustrations of these points. But it sufficed to inspire the attempt in this book at analyzing statecraft and policy of the Crown as a partial function of an existing party situation.[26]

[25] T. N. Pipineles, *He Monarchia en Helladi 1833-1843* [*The Monarchy in Greece 1833-1843*] (Athens, 1932), p. 109. For other instances of the same shortcoming, see the two following quotations from the same source:

"Permanent in its destiny and essence, powerful because free from all dependence on political bodies, free from the need to use electoral machinery to mobilize the masses, the monarchy, supporting its power on other bases, had no need to fear an organized and autonomous church, and if it had reason not to allow the church to interfere in secular matters, it had no need to exploit its [the church's] influence on the faithful" (p. 82).

"On the other hand, the existence of a strong and permanent monarchical power, not forced to exploit public and local influences during elections for the mobilization of popular support, ought to have, without fear of disintegration, granted broad decentralization and local self-government" (p. 88).

[26] For instance, Aspreas [*Political History*], I, 129-30, 139, 143, 146.

Part One
Before 1833

CHAPTER ONE

The Setting: Bases for Political Divisions

1. Sectionalism and Nationalism

The territory finally incorporated within the borders of independent Greece in 1832[1] consisted of three basic geographical units: (1) the *Morea* or *Peloponnesos*, the large southern peninsula; (2) *Rumely* or *mainland Greece*, separated from the northern territory of Epirus and Thessaly by a lateral frontier running from Arta in the West to Volos in the East and including Euboea, an island usually considered more continental than insular because of its accessibility from the mainland; and (3) numerous *Aegean Islands*, including the Northern Sporades (Skiathos, Skopelos, and Skyros), the Cyclades (Syros, Andros, Tenos, and Naxos), and the so-called maritime islands of Hydra and Spezza lying immediately off the northeastern coast of the Peloponnesos.

Geography largely determined the type of contributions made by each section to the Revolution. Blessed with several fertile valleys and coastal plains, the Morea was the breadbasket of insurgent Greece and the greatest source of its tax revenue. Thanks to a highly developed system of local autonomy under Ottoman rule, its native leaders provided considerable political experience and skill. Because less exposed to the enemy than either the islands or the mainland, it became and remained the center of the Revolution.

Rumely, where the mountains were higher and more formidable than in the Peloponnesos, was divided by the southern spurs of the Pindus range into two distinct and separate parts—East and West Rumely, each facing away from the other. The chopped-up terrain and the difficult communications had made this the home of brigands and the setting for guerrilla warfare. With a long tradition of heroism, the Rumeliots lent their martial skills to the cause. Because their provinces lay athwart the overland routes from the sources of supply to the center of the revolt in the Peloponnesos, they bore the brunt of the annual Turkish campaigns. Early in the Revolution, they learned what devastation meant.

Of the Aegean Islands, only three contributed significantly to the war effort—Hydra, Spezza, and Psara, the last lying southeast of the Northern Sporades toward Asia Minor. Without their naval and financial contribution, the Revolution could not have succeeded. Unable to support any significant vegetation, these three barren rocks had long served as refuge

[1] The convention of Constantinople (21 July 1832), to which Britain, France, Russia and the Ottoman empire were signatories, conceded definitively to the new Greek state a northern boundary running from Volos in the East to Arta in the West. See Edouard Driault and Michel Lhéritier, *Histoire Diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos Jours* (Paris, 1925), II, 87-93.

from the Turks and as pirates' nests. During the Napoleonic wars, when naval blockades placed a premium on the services of privateers and smugglers, the inhabitants of these islands had gained virtual control of the carrying trade in the Mediterranean and had made vast profits. Later their privately owned ships, supported by their own capital, made up the bulk of the Revolutionary navy. Such captains as Constantine Kanares of Psara and Andrew Miaoules of Hydra became heroes in spectacular victories over the much larger Turkish navy. By maintaining control of the seas most of the time, these islands protected insurgent Greece from the sea.[2]

In view of the geographical barriers of sea and mountains, it is not surprising that localism and sectionalism should have been strong. The force of nationalism in 1821 was still new, and town, village, or district still commanded primary loyalty. Traditionally, administration had conformed to geography and had intensified sectionalism. What became independent Greece had never constituted a single unit within the Ottoman empire. Not even each of its acknowledged geographical divisions had enjoyed administrative unity. Moreover, Ottoman rule had favored sectionalism in two ways—by allowing communities and regions a large degree of autonomy and by never attempting to introduce any widespread uniformity of administration.[3]

The strength of this heritage became apparent at the outbreak of the Revolution. Within six months, three areas of political authority appeared: a Peloponnesian senate, made up of native magnates who announced themselves the supreme authority of the peninsula; an assembly of Western Rumely, sitting at the strategically placed coastal town of Mesolongi; and the Areopagus, a similar assembly for Eastern Rumely.[4] The members of the first national assembly, held in December 1821 at Epidaurus, came as delegates of their regional governments, not as representatives of constituent parts of a unified state. They managed to have the assembly recognize the regional governments which they represented

[2] For an excellent brief account of the geographical factors in the Greek Revolution and the distinctive contribution of each major region of insurgent Greece, see C. M. Woodhouse, *The Greek War of Independence* (London, 1952), pp. 58-65.

[3] On the weakness of nationalism in general, even during the Revolution, see George Finlay, *A History of Greece from its Conquest by the Romans to the Present Time, B.C. 146 to A.D. 1864*, ed. H. F. Tozer (Oxford, 1877), VI, 231. For a vivid —because it is extreme—case of localism among Peloponnesian mountaineers, see Thomas Gordon, *History of the Greek Revolution* (Edinburgh, 1832), II, 189. On the character of Ottoman administration, see H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, Vol. I, Part I (Oxford, 1950), 159-61, 208-16.

[4] For the latest account of the organization of three regional authorities, see George D. Demakopoulos, *He Dioiketike Organosis kata ten Helleniken Epanastasin 1821-1827* [*The Administrative Organization during the Greek Revolution*] (Athens, 1966), pp. 62-85.

and set up national organs of government too weak to exercise any real control.[5]

The existence of regional authorities per se need not have aroused any misgivings, had they not been accompanied by two other products of sectionalism: suspicion of any nationwide authority and interregional jealousy. Suspicion of centralized power, a legacy from Turkish days when that power was alien, accounts for the initial preference for a strong legislature, where each region could defend its rights, combined with a weak executive unable to encroach upon sectional rights. Some, usually foreigners, accepted sectionalism as a justifiable concern for one's region and recommended a federal system as a way of encouraging local initiative and fostering voluntary cooperation. Most Greek leaders, however, regarded sectional sentiment with disfavor and feared lest federalism and decentralization doom the Revolution by leaving them disunited before a mighty foe. A situation of crisis, they believed, required a strong executive. At least in theory and when things were going badly against the Turks, most Greeks favored centralization and integral unity.[6]

Sectional jealousies played an important role in politics. Rumeliots and Peloponnesians came heartily to dislike each other. The Rumeliots looked on the more prosperous and peaceable Peloponnesians as untrustworthy and effete. The Peloponnesians regarded their northern brothers as backward and boorish. The Islanders displayed an insular contempt for all mainlanders. There were also intraregional jealousies, the one most damaging to the war effort being that between Hydriots and Spezziots.[7]

Intersectional jealousies reached such a peak at the end of 1824 as to cause the second civil war of the Greek Revolution, when Rumeliots and Islanders combined to put down the Peloponnesians.[8] This Rumeliot occupation of the Peloponnesos left bitter memories there and intensified ill feelings between the two sections even more. Sectional strife diminished rapidly thereafter, under the impact of a new and more serious Turkish threat, and it never assumed such proportions again. Nevertheless, to keep sectional jealousies from flaring up, the central government

[5] Nicholas Kaltchas, *Introduction to the Constitutional History of Modern Greece* (New York, 1940), p. 53; Finlay, *History*, VI, 236-47; and Woodhouse, *Greek War*, pp. 74-78.

[6] For an example of one foreigner who favored a federal system for Greece, see John Comstock, *History of the Greek Revolution* (New York, 1825). On the Greek attitude, even among those most bound by sectional loyalties, see Kaltchas, *Constitutional History*, pp. 41, 46-48.

[7] On intersectional jealousies and suspicions, see Woodhouse, *Greek War*, p. 82; and W. H. Humphreys, "Journal of a Visit to Greece," *A Picture of Greece in 1825; as Exhibited in the Personal Narratives of James Emerson, Count Pecchio, W. H. Humphreys* (New York, 1826), II, 193-94. On Hydra-Spezza difficulties, see James Emerson, "Journal of a Residence among the Greeks in 1825," *ibid.*, I, 123-24.

[8] Humphreys, *ibid.*, II, 193-94. For more information and documentation on the second civil war, see pp. 87-88 below.

had constantly to exercise care in making job appointments, to see that each section had a satisfactory quota.[9]

The great influx of Greeks not native to the insurgent provinces gave rise to sectional jealousies of another sort—between natives or *autochthons* and immigrants or *heterochthons*. The latter came from any of the three general regions which Greeks then inhabited: (1) the Balkans and Asia Minor, under Ottoman rule; (2) the Ionian Islands, lying off the western coast of the lower Balkans, under British rule since the treaty of Vienna (1815); and (3) the colonies of the Greek diaspora throughout Western Europe. The influx during the Revolution came in three waves. The first wave consisted of idealistic and patriotic volunteers who came from places where Ottoman power was too great to permit revolt or from the merchant communities of the Greek diaspora where there was no Turkish overlord against whom to rebel. A second wave (1822-26) came as refugees from places where the Ottomans had snuffed out revolt. Many were civilians who had survived Turkish massacres, such as merchants from the islands of Chios and Psara or princely families from the Danubian principalities. Others were fighters who came in groups to offer their services once their own attempts at home had proved unsuccessful. Such were the warlike Souliots of Epirus, who were expelled from their homeland by the Turks in 1822, the Cretans, whose revolt was temporarily suppressed in 1824, Thessalians and Macedonians, and even Bulgarians. A third wave came during the administration of President John Kapodistrias, a native of the Ionian Islands (1828-31). Many Ionian Islanders were attracted by him, not only because of his high regard for them and their trust in him, but also because the Islanders, continuously under Venetian rule from Byzantine times until 1797 and never under Ottoman domination, were more Westernized than the authochthons and better qualified for the functions necessitated by the establishment of a new Greek state.[10]

Antiheterochthon prejudice became apparent in the opening months of the Revolution, when such heterochthons as Demetrios Ypsilantes, Alexander Mavrokordatos, and Theodore Negres first made contact with the indigenous elements. Autochthons attempted to establish legal disabilities against the newcomers. For instance, in 1825-26, some of the warriors of Western Greece organized an autochthon movement to curb

[9] Kaltchas, *Constitutional History*, p. 74; and George Ludwig von Maurer, *Das Griechische Volk in öffentlicher, kirchlicher und privatrechtlicher Beziehung vor und nach dem Freiheitskampfe bis zum 31. Juli 1834* (Heidelberg, 1835), I, 451-52.

[10] Concerning the first category, see Maurer, *Griechische Volk*, II, 31-38, 41-42. On the second, see *ibid.*, I, 50; Humphreys, *Picture of Greece*, II, 215; and F. Thiersch, *De l'état actuel de la Grèce* (Leipzig, 1833), I, 225-27, who estimates Souliot survivors in Greece at 1,200, armed Cretan refugees at 4,000 (without families) and fighting men from the Olympus region of Greece at 2,500. On the third category, see Maurer, *op.cit.*, II, 42-43.

the growing influence of the Souliots in their native provinces.[11] The problem was to assume greater dimensions in the royal period.

One ought not exaggerate the extent of sectionalism. The Greeks soon abolished the initial regional authorities. Moreover, nationalism, though relatively a new sentiment compared with age-old sectionalism, was clearly in the ascendant and infectious. Time was with it. The longer the Revolution continued, the greater the sense of participation in a common enterprise and the sense of belonging to something bigger—the nation. As far as the authochthon-heterochthon controversy was concerned, it was mitigated to a large extent by considerations for the Great Idea (*Megale Idea*). This ideological expression of nationalism envisaged the liberation of all Greeks from Ottoman rule and their incorporation into a nation-state with its capital in Constantinople or merely the restoration of the Byzantine empire on the ruins of the Ottoman state. This ideal had been the inspiration of the *Philike Hetairia*, the secret society which was organized in 1814 by Greek merchants in Odessa and which planned the Greek Revolution. By 1821 the society, with all the paraphernalia of oaths, initiations, and hierarchical ranks, had branches among Greeks throughout the Ottoman empire and had used its extensive organizational apparatus to propagate the Great Idea.[12]

The population of the new Greek state came to about 800,000, only about one-fourth the total Greek population in the Near East living under Ottoman rule or on the British-dominated Ionian Islands. The new Greek state was therefore considered only a rump state. Many authochthons realized that, unless they overcame their prejudices and treated heterochthons fairly, they would so alienate the Ottoman and Ionian Greeks that the Great Idea would become totally impracticable.[13]

[11] Thiersch, *État actuel*, I, 229-30.

[12] Concerning the Great Idea, Thiersch (*ibid.*, I, 198-99) wrote that even the "last class" in Greece claimed Constantinople as the real capital of the Greeks. On the Philike Hetairia, its vast organization and its role in planning the Revolution, the major works are: John Philemon, *Dokimion Historikon peri tes Philikes Hetairias* [*Historical Essay concerning the Philike Hetairia*] (Nauplion, 1834); (2) Takes Kandeloros, *He Philike Hetereia* [*The Philike Hetairia*] (Athens, 1926); (3) *He Philike Hetairia. Anamnestikon teuchos epi te 150eteridi* [*The Philike Hetairia. Memorial Volume on the 150th Anniversary*], ed. Emmanuel G. Protopsaltes (Athens, 1964); and (4) *Philike Hetairia. A. Paranoma Ntokoumenta. B. Apomnemoneumata Agoniston (E. Xanthos–G. Leventes)* [*Philike Hetairia. A. Illegal Documents. B. Memoirs of Contestants. . .*], ed. Tasos Vournas (Athens [1965]).

[13] Leften Stavrianos (*The Balkans since 1453* [New York, 1959], p. 281) estimates that the total Greek population at the beginning of the nineteenth century was 3,000,000. Finlay (*History*, VI, 2) estimated it at 3,500,000 at the outbreak of the Revolution: 1,000,000 in the Balkans, 1,000,000 scattered in Crete, Cyclades, Ionian Islands, and Constantinople, and 1,500,000 in Asia Minor, Cyprus, the trans-Danubian principalities, Russia, and other countries. Driault and Lhéritier (*Histoire*, II, 110) estimated the total population of Greece at independence at 509,061, and at the following population figures for the three major sections of Greece: 247,804 (Peloponnesos); 98,744 (Continental Greece); and 162,513 (Islands).

2. Social Structure and Social Groups

Under Ottoman domination, the primary social divisions among Greeks were the same as those that characterized Ottoman society as a whole—the horizontal division between rulers and ruled. To be sure, all Greeks theoretically fell into the second category so far as Muslims were concerned. But thanks to the Ottoman practice of allowing religious and local autonomy, Greek-ruling élites did exist vis-à-vis Greeks and other Orthodox Christians. One's status, first and foremost, had depended on one's relationship to the Ottoman administration—whether one held a position recognized by the Ottoman overlord or whether one simply worked and paid taxes. It depended, in other words, on the power which state recognition allowed one to exercise over other Greeks. A second criterion of status, vis-à-vis other Greeks, was the loyalty or respect one commanded by virtue of either real or imagined embodiment of accepted cultural values.

Of the Greek élite groups based on the first criterion, there were those who functioned as part of the central administration: the ecclesiastical leaders (bishops) and secular leaders (Phanariots). The provincial élites were basically three, each dominant in a particular region of what eventually became liberated Greece: (1) primates or landed gentlemen, dominant in the Peloponnesos; (2) *armatoloi* or military commanders, characteristic of Rumely; and (3) shipowners and capitalists, primarily in the Islands. As an élite, the ecclesiastical hierarchy had its official status reinforced by its acknowledged position as cultural and spiritual leaders. But the *klephts*, those brigand and outlaw rebels against constituted authority, whether that authority was Greek or Turkish, held an élite or at least semi-élite position solely because of the respect which they commanded among the folk and the values which they shared with the people.[14]

Ecclesiastical Leaders

To understand the importance of the upper clergy in the Ottoman empire, it is essential to understand what type of state the Ottoman empire was and the special role of the Orthodox church in it. In the political tradition of the Near East, the Osmanlis preferred to deal with communities rather than with individuals. As Muslims they believed that the distinctive feature of a people was its religion rather than its nationality. Their Sacred Law (*Sharia*) elaborated rules of behavior for Muslims but said nothing about the internal governance of non-Muslim communities. Hence the Osmanlis had organized their state into a series of parallel religious communities called *millets*. One of these was the Ortho-

[14] On the extent of social differentiation among the Greeks, see Finlay, *History*, VI, 9.

dox millet ruled by the traditional religious leader of Byzantine Greeks, the patriarch of Constantinople.[15]

As Muslims did not distinguish between religious and secular, the Osmanlis allowed the patriarch and his hierarchy powers which went beyond the merely religious. As an agent of the Turkish power, the patriarch became what he had never been so long as a Byzantine emperor existed—a political chief vested with far-reaching judicial, fiscal, and administrative powers, which he delegated to his bishops, archbishops, and metropolitans. As responsible heads of their flock, he and his hierarchy were liable to execution in the event of insurgency. In 1821, there were forty-one bishops, archbishops, and metropolitans in the territory that became insurgent Greece. Since the power of the church was normally exercised at their level of administration, the type of authority which they exercised is worth examination.[16]

In judicial matters the bishop was the counterpart of the Muslim judge or *kadi.* As the kadi heard cases between Muslims or between Muslims and non-Muslims, according to the Sharia, the bishop listened to cases between the Orthodox according to the canon law of the church or the civil Byzantine law as recorded in the manual of Armenopoulos, a fourteenth-century jurist of Thessaloniki. Nowhere were the bishops permitted to judge criminal cases. Everywhere cases of marriage, divorce, and wills between Orthodox adherents fell within their exclusive jurisdiction. Otherwise their judicial powers differed from place to place. Usually they acted as mere arbitrators among people who preferred their judgment to that of anyone else. In short, the unofficial authority of the bishops extended beyond their acknowledged duties. The notaries, to whom people went for the preparation of official documents such as deeds or wills, were usually ecclesiastical officials under the bishops' control. The bishops were often asked to act as guardians of minors, to sign documents in order to give the documents greater authority, and to intervene with the Turkish or Greek secular leaders in order to seek redress of individual grievances. As unofficial advisers and defenders, they were in many ways the real rulers of the people, but only so long as the Turks sanctioned their authority from above and the people gave their confidence from below. When these two conditions were no longer present during the Revolution, the power of the church hierarchy collapsed.[17]

Phanariots

"Phanariot" means resident of *Phanar* (lighthouse), the name of a district in Constantinople where the patriarchate has been located since

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 8, 10; or more comprehensively though generally, Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, Vol. I, Part II, 212-16.

[16] Driault and Lhéritier, *Histoire*, I, 102; Finlay, *History*, VI, 7-8; and Kaltchas, *Constitutional History*, pp. 27-28.

[17] Maurer, *Griechische Volk*, I, 89-91, 93-97, 104f.

1601. Gradually the term came to apply to a few select families, wealthy, well-bred and proud, a type of unofficial aristocracy which came in the eighteenth century to fill important posts in the Ottoman administration. They rose to such power because of what they had to offer—their European cultivation and their knowledge of languages, European and oriental. Since Turkish officials usually knew only Turkish, Arabic, and Persian, the Phanariots were indispensable to these Turkish officials in their dealings either with Greek subjects or European powers. They occupied four offices of great importance: two as interpreters or *dragomans* and two as princes or *hospodars*. The Dragoman of the Fleet was the executive deputy of the *capitan-pasha*, commander of the Ottoman navy and governor-general of the Aegean Islands. Representing his superior in the latter capacity, the Dragoman was the real governor of those Islands. The Dragoman of the Porte, chief interpreter, actually became a type of foreign minister for European affairs. After 1711, when the native Rumanian princes cooperated with the Russians against their Turkish overlord, Phanariots occupied as hospodars the separate thrones of the Danubian principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. Their influence there explains why the first bid for Greek independence in 1821, an unsuccessful one, took place in the Danubian principalities.[18]

With the exception of the Islands, the Phanariot class had never exercised any direct influence over what became insurgent Greece. There they became important only after the outbreak of the Revolution when, as eager volunteers or care-worn refugees, they migrated to the liberated provinces. Among the immigrant Phanariot families were the Ypsilantes', Mavrokordatos', Argyropoulos', Soutsos', Karatzas', and Katakouzenos'. One was Michael Soutsos himself, the hospodar or virtually independent governor of Wallachia in 1821, when the revolt broke out. They were a distinguished group, many of them related to each other, all trying to make the best of their primitive surroundings by reviving a bit of the elegant social life they once had known. The memoirs of Alexander Rangabe, scion of one of these families and talented *litérateur*, give an intimate picture of this group. But they were resented in free Greece. Their way of life seemed frivolous, their titles violated the egalitarian

[18] For excellent general accounts of this group, see any of the following: Robert Lee Wolff, *The Balkans in Our Time* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), pp. 61-63; Stavrianos, *Balkans*, pp. 270-72; Driault and Lhéritier, *Histoire*, I, 102-103. For a closer though less comprehensive look, see Maurer, *Griechische Volk*, I, 9-10, 22-24, 91-93. Older standard studies are M. P. Zallony, *Essai sur les Fanariots* (Marseilles, 1824); P. E. Giannopoulos, *Hoi phanariotai* [*The Phanariots*] (Athens, 1929); and N. Iorga, "Le despotisme éclairé dans les pays roumains au XVIIIe siècle," *Bulletin of the International Committee of Historical Sciences*, IX (1937), 100-15; supplemented by an unpublished dissertation by H. W. Held, "Die Phanarioten, ihre allmähliche Entwicklung zur fürstlichen Aristokratie bis zu deren Untergang 1821" (Bern, 1920), and a more recent article by J. Gottwald, "Phanariotische Studien," *Leipsiger Vierteljahresschrift für Südosteuropa*, V (1941), 1-58.

sentiments of the people, and their European manners seemed alien. Being a Phanariot was a great drawback politically, as Alexander Mavrokordatos soon found out, and in the press "Phanariot" became a term of reproach.[19]

Primates

Ottoman provincial administration functioned on three levels: that of the province or *pashalik*, that of the district or *eparchy*, and that of the commune (either a town or a collection of villages). In differing proportions on each level, two parallel authorities functioned: that of the Turks as agents of the ruling race and appointees of the central government; and that of the Greeks, in areas inhabited exclusively (Islands) or predominantly (Rumely and Morea) by Greeks, as chosen representatives of the local population. A pasha, appointed by the sultan, ruled over the province, and a *voivode*, appointed by the pasha, over the district. Ostensibly, the administration of the Aegean Islands would seem to present an exception, but not really. Each island was the equivalent of an eparchy, and the whole complex of islands a type of pashalik under the capitan-pasha, commander of the Ottoman fleet.

Exercising an autonomy going back to pre-Ottoman days, the communes elected their own officials, who were known variously as elders, *demogerons*, and archons. These men did not simply administer the affairs of their respective communes. From each commune at least once a year they met before the voivode as an advisory district assembly. Among other things, this assembly elected one or two of its members for the voivode's executive council, a standing body subject to reelection annually. Those who served on the voivode's council were therefore eparchal leaders and were distinguished from elders of mere local importance by such names as primates or notables (*proestoi, prokritoi, prouchontes,* or *kodza-bashis*).

This system was designed primarily to serve the fiscal needs of the empire. The imperial government would specify in advance the contribution of each province. The pasha would estimate the province's expenses for the coming year, add this sum to the amount specified by the imperial government, and allot the quota among the districts. In each district the voivode would confer with his council and call the assembly in order to determine the eparchal budget and distribute the tax burden among the communes. Finally, the communal elders would assess each family according to its ability. With the ecclesiastical officials, the primates and elders also enjoyed some judicial duties, whose extent depended on local custom.

[19] On the difficulties of adjustment of, and the popular resentment against, the Phanariots, see Alexander R. Rangabe, *Apomnemoneumata* [*Memoirs*] (Athens, 1894), I, 1-19 and passim; Maurer, *Griechische Volk*, II, 31-32; and Thiersch, *État actuel*, I, 229.

The system worked to the mutual advantage of the Ottoman authorities and the Greek taxpayers. For the former, the system had the merit of locating a select few who could prevail upon the mass and who could serve as virtual hostages for the good behavior of that mass. For the latter, it lessened contact with Turkish officials and permitted local autonomy. The intermediaries, that is, the primates and elders, carried the heavy burden of mediating between demands from above and complaints from below. Their lives were often in danger, especially when Turkey's foreign wars encouraged internal revolts, but they were rewarded for their risks by possessing power and the means of enrichment.

The primates were strongest and most prominent in the Peloponnesos where the system of regional autonomy found its greatest elaboration. The primates did not simply sit in a voivode's council. From all over the Peloponnesos they met annually as a provincial assembly to advise the pasha. Two of them, elected by this assembly, sat permanently in Tripolis, the centrally located Peloponnesos capital, on the pasha's advisory council for one or more annual terms. Each official was called a *morayannes*. Two others, each named a *vekiles*, served as virtual ambassadors of the Peloponnesos in Constantinople, where they could often exercise influence to obtain a new pasha or correct some injustices.[20]

In Peloponnesos, the primates constituted a distinct economic group among their fellow-Greeks. In the first place, they were large landowners. With the monasteries, they owned one and a half million *stremes* (*stremmata*) (four stremes to an acre) or one-third of the land estimated as the Greek portion of arable land in Peloponnesos. Since the other three million belonged to Turkish magnates, the mass of Peloponnesian Greeks were mere landless tenants on the property of their Greek or Turkish masters. Second, they engaged in tax-farming, the lucrative business of paying the imperial treasury a fixed sum in advance and then in practice taking for oneself all that one could collect. Since the tax-farming contracts usually applied to whole districts and sold at a great price, only the primates among the Greeks could afford to pay for them. Third, toward the close of the Turkish period they engaged more and more in commerce. As tax-farmers, who collected from the peasants in kind, they held a virtual monopoly over the saleable material. Only they had the means to get the produce to the market ports, to store it there, and to sell

[20] The most complete and authoritative work on Ottoman provincial administration in the Peloponnesos and the role of the primates in it is that of Michael B. Sakellariou, *He Peloponnesos kata ten Deuteran Tourkokratian 1715-1821* [*Peloponnesos during the Second Period of Turkish Rule*] (Athens, 1939), pp. 84-96. For an unfavorable and unfair treatment of the primates, see Takes A. Stamatopoulos, *Ho Esoterikos Agonas kata ten Epanastase tou 1821* [*The Internal Struggle during the Revolution of 1821*] (Athens, 1957), I, 79ff. Maurer (*Griechische Volk*, I, 59-89) gives a fairly detailed account of primate administration in the Peloponnesos as well as in the other two major sections of Greece. See also Finlay, *History*, VI, 14, 25, and Kaltchas, *Constitutional History*, pp. 28-31.

to the foreign merchants in the bulk desired. Their monopoly allowed them to control prices and hence multiply the cash value of the taxes collected. Thanks to the French Revolution and its foreign wars, they were able to drive out foreign competition, especially that of French merchants who had formerly dominated Peloponnesian commerce.[21]

The Peloponnesian primates were very much a social class—self-perpetuating, cohesive, and alike in their style of life. Though they were theoretically elected to office, only a fraction of the population in a commune possessed the franchise and that fraction voted by acclamation rather than by secret ballot. The system itself favored their continuance in office, because only men of affluence and experience could carry out the duties of a primate. Power tended therefore to become hereditary. Only some extraordinary event, like the revolt of 1770, could dislodge a family from its position.[22]

As in most traditional societies, marriage served as a means of cementing bonds between families. Virtually all the primates were related to each other by blood. Their mobility and the experience of acting collectively added to the cohesiveness of blood. Like pashas, each of the primates maintained a type of court consisting of a secretary, who handled all correspondence, a doctor, a priest, sometimes a police guard, and a large number of servants. This style of life set them off from other Greeks as superior. But the abject servility demanded by the Turk and the pasha's power of life and death, frequently exercised, served as painful reminders of their inferior status vis-à-vis the Turks. Such isolation, from both fellow-Greeks and Turks, must have bred greater social solidarity among them.[23]

Social unity could not prevent bitter factional strife among the Peloponnesian primates. The prize of political supremacy was too valuable not to excite competition among them. Their factionalism was too important a source of Greek weakness for the jealous Turkish magnates not to exploit it. Very often blood was shed in factional strife, leaving bitter memories which neither common social interests nor the challenge of a new class of captains could efface.[24]

[21] Maurer (*Griechische Volk*, II, 24) defines the primate class, everywhere except in the islands, as that group "basing their power on immoveable property." He is also aware of their tax-farming activities (I, 523) as is Finlay (*History*, VI, 24-25), who has a clearer understanding of their mercantile activities as well. But the most exhaustive account, thus far, of the primates' economic role in the Peloponnesos is that of Sakellariou [*Peloponnesos*], pp. 48-49, 217-20. See also Stavrianos, *Balkans*, p. 280.

[22] Kaltchas, *Constitutional History*, p. 32; Maurer, *Griechische Volk*, I, 54-55; and Sakellariou [*Peloponnesos*], p. 94.

[23] On kinship ties, see Sakellariou [*Peloponnesos*], p. 220; and Thiersch, *État actuel*, I, 222. On their style of life, see Finlay, *History*, VI, 26, and Maurer, *Griechische Volk*, I, 47.

[24] Gordon, *Greek Revolution*, I, 143-44.

Kodza-bashi, like Phanariot, became a term of contempt during the Revolution, when the people were free to express their antipathy toward their former masters, who had often oppressed them more than the Turks had.[25] They were commonly known as "Turk-worshippers" or "uncircumcised Turks," not merely because of their long association with the Turks in the administration but because of their outward cultural affinity to the Turks. The memoirs of Chrysanthopoulos Photakos, an opponent of the primates, reflects the popular judgment:

> The khoja-bashi imitated the Turk in everything, including dress, manners, the household. His notion of living in style was the same as the Turk's, and the only difference between them was one of names: for instance, instead of being called Hasan the Khoja-Bashi, he would be called Yianni, and instead of going to mosque he would go to church. This was the only distinction between the two.[26]

Independently, George Finlay, the English philhellene and historian, describes the haughty bearing of George Sisines during the Revolution. The pomp of his household, the title of *bey* assumed by his sons, the insistence on having the peasants kneel when addressing him—all these things reveal that what the primates found wrong with the Ottoman empire was not its institutions but the Turks' domination of those institutions.[27] Regardless of what the people felt, however, the primates had borne the brunt of Turkish rule and had probably suffered its insecurities more than the people.

Captains (Klephts, Armatoloi, and Kapoi)

The practice of carrying arms served as the basis for a separate social group. Its members might be property-owners or not, officials or outlaws, separated by geography, but they all enjoyed military power and shared an ethos which exalted the military virtues and despised work on the soil. Such people found their natural abode in the mountains, secure from encroachment by any of the usual enemies (central authority, alien race,

[25] Gennaios Kolokotrones, *Apomnemoneumata* [*Memoirs*], ed. Emmanuel G. Protopsaltes (Athens, 1955), p. 49; and Thiersch, *État actuel*, I, 218.

[26] Leicester Stanhope, "Report on the State of Greece," *Greece in 1823 and 1824: Series of Letters and other Documents on the Greek Revolution*, new edn. (London, 1825), p. 237; Edward Blaquière, *The Greek Revolution, its Origin and Progress* (London, 1824), p. 290: "The primates are more prone to Turkish customs of every kind than any other class of Greeks"; and Sakellariou [*Peloponnesos*], p. 135. The quotation, translated by Arnold Toynbee and cited in his *A Study of History* (London, 1954), VIII, 683, is taken from Photios Chrysanthopoulos Photakos, *Apomnemoneumata peri tes Hellenikes Epanastaseos* [*Memoirs of the Greek Revolution*], ed. Stavros Andropoulos (Athens, 1899), I, 33-34.

[27] The affluence and Ottomanization of the Sisines family seems to have been sufficiently pronounced to attract widespread attention, as witnessed by the following specific references to it: Finlay, *History*, VI, 336; Stanhope to Bentham, 11 May 1824, in *Greece in 1823-24*, p. 204; and Thiersch, *État actuel*, I, 14-15.

settled population) and free to ignore the solemn prohibition by the Sharia against the bearing of arms by non-Muslims. The many mountains of Greece bred these people, especially the precipitous Pindus range running from Rumely northwest into Epirus and Albania, but also the formidable mountain country of Mane in southeast Peloponnesos.[28]

There were roughly three distinct military types: klephts or brigands, armatoloi or militia men acknowledged by the empire, and kapoi or a type of police force hired by local or provincial authorities. The élite of any one of the three types were the captains. The rank and file were called *palikars*, meaning brave young men.

Klephts were outlaws who formed into bands and lived on plunder. Criminals, debtors, misfits, adventurers, victims of tyrannical officials—from generation to generation these types fled to the mountains. They sometimes robbed, tortured, even murdered fellow-Greeks—affluent ones, however, rather than simple peasants. More often they raided the Turks, from whom they were divorced by religion and nationality as well as by social class. They enjoyed the support of the generally oppressed common folk, from whose ranks they came, because they represented opposition to established authority. A whole oral tradition of folk poetry testifies to the sympathy they evoked and the reputation for patriotism they acquired.[29]

The geography of Rumely favored brigandage, and there it was perennial. In the Peloponnesos, where brigands could more easily be suppressed by the authorities, they usually clustered in a few select regions, such as Kalavryta, Karytaina, and southeast Laconia on the fringes of Mane. Mane and the Ionian Islands offered safer refuge in case of emergency.[30]

The armatoloi differed from the klephts in having their habit of bearing arms officially acknowledged, and so made lawful, by the Ottoman authorities, who employed them to guard passes, keep communications open, and maintain general order. The system of armatoloi was in part a concession to the demands of the mountain population for the right to maintain their own means of self-defense, and in part a Turkish device for curbing brigandage, either by suppression or by recruitment of brigands into armatoloi ranks. Indeed, the line between klephts and armatoloi was in practice not always clear. Armatolism became a disguised form of thievery when landlords in the plains had to buy immunity from the pillaging with which the armatoloi threatened them. On the other hand, brigands changed status overnight by enlisting in the ranks of the armatoloi or the mercenary troops of a pasha. The action of the imperial

[28] On klephts and armatoloi, see Tasos Vournas, *Harmatoloi kai Klephtes* [*Armatoloi and Klephts*] (Athens, 1958). Finlay (*History*, VI, 163) cites Aetolia and the Pindus region of Rumely especially as "the land of armatoloi."

[29] Driault and Lhéritier, *Histoire*, I, 104-05; Finlay, *History*, VI, 22-24; Maurer, *Griechische Volk*, I, 44-46, 497-500, II, 24-26; and Sakellariou [*Peloponnesos*], p. 136.

[30] Finlay, *History*, VI, 22; and Sakellariou [*Peloponnesos*], p. 141.

government in the eighteenth century blurred the distinction even further. It encroached upon the traditional privileges of the armatoloi by employing brigands against them, and the pursued armatoloi often took to the mountains as brigands.[31]

Unlike klephtism, armatolism involved communities of people, not just bands under individual leaders. The region policed by a group of armatoloi was known as an *armatolik* or *captanlik*. Each was a complex of so-called head-villages (*kephalochoria*) or free villages, enjoying complete autonomy, which meant being spared any resident Ottoman officials or Turkish settlers. The leader of the band was called a *boulouk-pasha* or an *otzak*. He ruled as well as protected his village or group of villages. Like his counterpart the elder of a peasant commune or the voivode of a province, he was responsible for the collection of the taxes, which he farmed out at a profit to himself, and he was elected by the residents, though "election" usually meant acknowledgement of the person able to provide for, and command the respect of, most retainers.[32]

The two most famous aggregations of such captanliks were Souli, whose inaccessible peaks overlooked the Acheron River in southern Albania, and the Peloponnesian district of Mane. Both these virtually independent republics, which paid only a token tribute, supported native military aristocracies. In Souli, only a few families enjoyed the right to carry arms. These families provided the captains of clans and ruled like feudal superiors over the peasants, whose sons often found social advancement by joining the ranks of a Souliot captain. When the Revolution proved unsuccessful there, Souliot captains such as the Botsares' (Markos and Notes) and Kitsos Tzavelas migrated to Western Rumely, where they and their contingents became an important political factor. The traditional feud between the Botsares' and the Tzavelas' was to play a role in the rise of the "English" and "Russian" parties in West Rumely.[33]

In Mane there was also a sharp social cleavage between the aristocracy of captains or *boulouxides*, who inhabited the characteristic stone fortresses which dotted Mane, and the *phamelis*, followers of the boulouxides who were allowed to carry arms but lived in hovels and held inferior status. By 1821 the two chief boulouxis families were the Mavromichales', who dominated Western Mane, and the Tzanetakes', who controlled Eastern Mane. Traditionally, the families rivaled each other for the leadership or beyship of Mane. The last bey before the Revolution was Petros Mavromichales (1781-1821), leader of a huge family. At the outbreak of the Revolution, Mavromichales, better known as Petrobey, assumed the

[31] Finlay, *History*, VI, 19-22; Maurer, *Griechische Volk*, I, 5-8, 497-98; and John Vlachogiannes, *Klephtes tou Moria . . .* [*Klephts of the Morea, Historical Study based on New Sources 1715-1820*] (Athens, 1935), p. 13.

[32] Maurer, *Griechische Volk*, I, 44-47, 83-84.

[33] Driault and Lhéritier, *Histoire*, I, 105-06; and Finlay, *History*, VI, 36-52, 79-91.

commanding role in the liberation of the southern Peloponnesos. The move in this direction was no coincidence. The Maniats had always looked longingly down at the rich lands of Messenia from their peaks, and now they simply filled part of the power vacuum left there by the many departed Turkish magnates. From even before the Revolution, Petrobey enjoyed an alliance with Panagiotes Benakes, a rich primate of Kalamata, through the marriage of Benakes' sister to Petrobey's brother.[34]

Smaller armatoliks, without the cohesion of Souli or Mane, characterized the provinces of West Rumely, especially the region of Agrapha. Everywhere in West Rumely, alliances between virtually independent captains formed and reformed, each time establishing some sort of balance of power between them. The region therefore had many captains to offer the Greek Revolution. The most prominent were Andrew Iskos, the Stratos' (John and Nicholas), and the Grivas' (Phloros, Stavros, Theodore, and Gardikiotes) in the westernmost and wildest province of Acarnania; George Varnakiotes and Staïkos Staïkopoulos of Aetolia; Papakostas and Mitsos Kontogiannes of Phthiotis. Here, as among captains generally, the idea of a nation had only begun to penetrate their consciousness. Their main political objective was simply that of expanding the boundaries of their captanliks and consolidating their own power within them. What was better than to become a pasha and how did one go about doing so but by the traditional manner of bargaining, either with Muslims or Christians, Turks or Albanians? That is why Finlay could report occasional desertions to the Turks of such captains as Varnakiotes, Iskos, Rangos, and Valtinos.[35]

In East Rumely, Greek primates were stronger than in West Rumely, and Turkish magnates were present, at least in Attica and Boeotia. Here the authority of the Turks fell more heavily on the Greeks, and local autonomy was not so well developed. As a result, at the outbreak of the Revolution few captains existed to take over. Those who ultimately became influential in this region were military parvenus—men who obtained wealth and power through the military profession opened up to them by the Revolution. The four chief ones merit attention. Nicholas Kriezotes, the chief force in Euboea by the end of the Revolution, had been a shepherd in Asia Minor. Vasos Mavrovouniotes, a Montenegrin, had started out as a brigand in Asia Minor and established an influence which extended throughout East Rumely. John Mamoures, who dominated the central Rumelian region of Phocis, owed his power to his adoption by

[34] Finlay, *History*, vi, 26-27; Maurer, *Griechische Volk*, i, 70-76 (administration), and i, 179-82 (social system).

[35] On Agrapha, where the armatoloi were hired by the Turkish authorities to guard the strategic passes of Mt. Pindus, see Finlay, *History*, vi, 18-19, 22. On desertions, see *ibid.*, p. 274. For descriptions of the various captains cited, see Chap. III below in sections on the "French," "English," and "Russian" parties.

John Gouras, the revolutionary captain who died in battle in 1826. John Makrygiannes, one of the finest figures of the Revolution and the author of splendid memoirs, was born into a peasant-shepherd family of central Rumely.[36]

After much debate among Greek scholars, it seems quite certain now that those Peloponnesian chieftains who distinguished themselves during the Revolution had been mere kapoi in spite of their contrary assertions. A *kapos* was anyone who served as a member of a primate's personal armed force. He differed from the armatolos with respect to his employers, his duties, and the extent of his power. His employer was a primate rather than the Turkish authorities. He policed the lands of the primate and asserted the primate's authority. He only sometimes took on the chief duty of an armatolos, namely pursuit of brigands. Unlike the armatolos chieftain, a kapos chief was in no sense a ruler.[37]

That the leading Peloponnesian chieftains of the Revolution had been kapoi rather than armatoloi is important for two reasons. It explains the bitterness of the struggle between captains and primates during the Revolution—the captains smarting under the humiliation of having served them, the primates indignant that these upstarts should wish to challenge their own power. It also means that kapoi were not members of a ruling group in their capacity as kapoi. Insofar as they were also brigands, and distinguished ones at that, they wielded some influence over the peasants. Otherwise they are mentioned here because they became a very important class during and after the Revolution.

Among the Revolutionary leaders who had served as kapoi were none other than Theodore Kolokotrones himself, scion of a famous klepht family and leader of the military "party" in the Peloponnesos during the Revolution; Demetrios Koliopoulos, better known as Plapoutas; Niketas Stamatellopoulos, otherwise known as Niketaras; and Basil Petimezas. The first three served the Delegiannes', primates of their native Karytaina; the last, the Zaïmes' of Kalavryta. After they had risen on the social ladder, they tried to draw a curtain over their humble past by referring to themselves by the proud name of armatolos. These men, however, were only part-time kapoi, temporarily abandoning brigandage, perhaps to escape repression, perhaps to make a little money. In 1806, the Turks undertook an all-out campaign to suppress brigandage. The above persons had to flee. In the Ionian Islands, a traditional place of refuge from the Turks, they enrolled in light regiments, designed by the British rulers for the Greeks and commanded by Richard Church, the English philhellene who was to serve with distinction in the Greek Revolution and then settle permanently in Greece. During their long exile, they learned much about the outside world, came into contact with Souliots and

[36] See Chap. III below in sections cited in n. 35 above.

[37] Finlay, *History*, VI, 26; Sakellariou [*Peloponnesos*], p. 142; and Vlachogiannes [*Klephts*], pp. 26-33.

Rumeliots who, like themselves, were refugees, and probably shed some of their provincialism.[38]

Merchant Capitalists

The only two places in insurgent Greece where a merchant capitalist group, clearly distinguishable from a landed proprietor class, constituted a ruling group were Hydra and Spezza. Like many of the other Aegean Islands, Hydra and Spezza enjoyed complete autonomy, that is, they merely paid an annual fixed tribute and never allowed the Turks to settle among them. They also practiced municipal self-government, which means that they elected their own notables or primates to conduct their affairs. But in Hydra and Spezza, where everyone depended on commerce for his livelihood because agriculture was unprofitable, the primates were capitalists. The inhabitants belonged to three categories: notables, skippers or captains, and sailors. A notable enjoyed his title by virtue of being wealthy enough to build himself a large home and retire from the actual sailing of his own ships. The title was not hereditary. Until the end of the Napoleonic wars, classes were fluid because fortunes were easily made and lost. Thereafter, when commerce became stagnant, the number of notables became almost stationary and relative incomes remained fixed. The wealthiest Hydriot family by far were the Kountouriotes', Lazaros and George; the wealthiest Spezziot probably Nicholas Botases, whose ships had played such an important role in Black Sea commerce.[39]

The People

There was little social diversification among the ruled in any one region. They did the work, and the type of work available was usually a matter of geography. In the Peloponnesos, the peasants were most prominent because the land was fertile, and best off because the population was thin. Though they may have cultivated the same plot of land for generations, they usually had no title to the land. Thus they depended on their Greek or Turkish landlord, though legally they were free. Peasants in the mountain regions, which meant most of the Rumeliot ones, were small freeholders, getting less from the land than their Moreot brothers but exercising greater independence. Since his plot was small and grazing was standard, the Rumeliot usually combined shepherding with his culti-

[38] On Kolokotrones, *et al.*, see the section on the Kolokotrones faction in Chap. II below. For an account of the Ionian regiments, see "Introduction," John Makrygiannes, *Apomnemoneumata* [*Memoirs*], ed. John Vlachogiannes, 2nd edn. (Athens, 1947), I, 2: "The Greek troops serving in the Ionian Islands were military schools for whole phalanxes of men, among whom were Kolokotrones, Niketaras, Petimezas, many Rumeliots and Epirots."

[39] For a summary of the Greek commercial revival of the eighteenth century, see Stavrianos, *Balkans*, pp. 274-79; or Maurer, *Griechische Volk*, I, 49-53. On the merchant classes of Hydra and Spezza more especially, see Finlay, *History*, VI, 30-33, 166; Stavrianos, p. 275; and Woodhouse, *Greek War*, p. 59.

vating duties. Those who were primarily or solely shepherds were more mobile than peasants. Indeed, the Vlachs, those people of Rumanian origin, were nomads. Shepherds were familiar with remote and brigand-infested regions and were thus important either in protecting brigands or assisting the authorities to pursue them. Usually they did the former.[40]

In the Islands, the working people were the common sailors. Under the system of Hydra and Spezza, where everyone who participated in a voyage shared the profit, the sailors prospered until the peace of 1815, which caused a fall in the price of grain in Europe and freight in the Mediterranean. In 1820 the harvest in Western Europe reduced gains even more and left a large number of sailors in both islands unemployed and a great source of unrest.[41]

Petty merchants and artisans, an urban class or people of the bazar, played no significant part in the Revolution, nor were they very different in mores and mentality from their rural brothers. A much more important group connected with overland trade were the muleteers or *agoyates*. Since everything in those days was transported by pack-horse or mule, these men were very numerous and somewhat cosmopolitan, some knowing smatterings of various languages. Every class, dependent on them, considered it good to conciliate them. They were important most of all as conveyers of information and new ideas as well as goods.[42]

Members of the lower clergy usually had more in common with their fellow villagers than with their ecclesiastical superiors. Most were men with no schooling, natives of their parish, married men who plowed their fields during the week. During the Revolution, they often fought beside their brothers. The monks, though equally illiterate and socially inferior, were more influential than the priests because they were often more mobile and hence, like the agoyates, valuable go-betweens for conspirators or mere political allies.[43]

What did the ruled expect from the Revolution and why did they take up arms? For many, of course, there was no choice. Primates as well as captains often forced reluctant peasants to fight who were tied to the land and could not yet make much practical sense out of nationalism. In Rumely, captains sometimes pursued a scorched earth policy against their own peasants so that, uprooted, the peasant would have to join the ranks. But other peasants took up the sword willingly, at least in their own districts, and so long as it was not harvest season. They wanted land and believed that the fertile land left by the Turks would become theirs as their reward for fighting. Among the more ambitious, the Revolution was

[40] Finlay, *History*, VI, 12-13, 119; and Thiersch, *État actuel*, I, 220-25.

[41] Finlay, *History*, VI, 168-69.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 19; and Thiersch, *État actuel*, I, 222-24.

[43] Stanhope to J. Bowring, Argos, 14 Apr. 1824, in *Greece in 1823-24*, p. 179: "Almost every captain has some priests among his soldiers. . . ." See also Stavrianos, *Balkans*, p. 281; and Thiersch, *État actuel*, II, 184-85.

a chance to win wealth, power, and social advancement by joining up with some captain and eventually advancing to the command of a force oneself. In the Islands, where the depression caused widespread unemployment, the sailors were enthusiastic supporters of the Revolution, partly because fighting was a form of employment and might bring in valuable spoils.[44]

3. Westernization and Cultural Schism

Virtually all Western sources attest to the striking cultural contrasts among Greeks during and even after the Revolution. In matters of dress and style of life the contrasts were most noticeable. Some, in the manner of Europe, wore the black redingote, slept on beds and sat in chairs, and took their meals with their wives. They spoke at least one European language. Others, the vast majority, slept on mats or out-of-doors and squatted on pillows. They kept their wives well covered and lived socially apart from them. Of these, the mainlanders wore white kilts (*fustanelles*) in the manner of the Albanians, while the Islanders generally wore the baggy trousers (*vrakes*). Differences in the realm of ideas were harder to define but no less real. For instance, those who enjoyed any contact with Europe thought of statehood in terms of nationalism, centralization, bureaucracy, perhaps constitutionalism. For the indigenous elements, the machinery of the Ottoman state—pashaliks, captanliks, maybe theocracy—was quite satisfactory if possessed exclusively by Greeks in general or by a particular class of Greeks.[45]

However varied and complex the cultural contrasts, they tended to run along East-West or indigenous-European lines. Since the age of exploration at least, European society had been radiating its culture. It assumed, and convinced others, that its culture was synonymous with civilization and that the degree of civilization achieved by any other society de-

[44] Finlay, *History*, VI, 169-72, 200; Maurer, *Griechische Volk*, I, 499-500; and Stavrianos, *Balkans*, p. 280.

[45] "No people is composed of such different levels of civilization, customs, and interest as those which inhabit the kingdom of Greece" (Thiersch, *État actuel*, I, 217). Compare this with the statement written by an equally acute French observer a decade later, concerning Athens, the most Westernized city in Greece: "The customs of the Orient have not yet contracted a marriage with the customs of the Occident; they co-exist separately, without being either blended or erased" (Jean Alexandre Buchon, *La Grèce Continentale et la Morée* [Paris, 1843], p. 62). See also Maurer, *Griechische Volk*, II, 22-23; Henry M. Baird, *Modern Greece* (New York, 1856), pp. 71-72, 88, 190-91; and Antoine Grénier, *La Grèce en 1863* (Paris, 1863), p. 32. On the indigenous political dream of a restored Byzantine empire, see Finlay, *History*, VI, 7; on the more limited political goals of the primates, see Woodhouse, *Greek War*, p. 133, and Kaltchas, *Constitutional History*, pp. 42-43. On the two ideological currents of Byzantine oecumenism (Greek domination of the Ottoman empire) and liberal nationalism (the formation of a National State), see Dionysios Zakythenos, *He Tourkokratia* [*Turkish Rule*] (Athens, 1957).

pended on how closely that society approached European standards.[46] At the time, the Greeks themselves acknowledged the East-West character of the contrast. Among later historians, George Aspreas has treated the early history of independent Greece as a conflict between an indigenous (enchorion) and foreign (xenikon) "party"; and W. Alison Phillips has cited this cultural difference as a basis for the rise of civilian and military "parties" in the early years of the Revolution.[47]

Generally speaking, Westernizers were drawn from three distinct though overlapping groups: (1) the mercantile elements, including those living in commercial centers of the Near East, such as Constantinople, Smyrna, and Chios, as well as those of the Greek diaspora settled in European cities such as Venice, Marseilles, London, Vienna, and Odessa; (2) the Phanariots, who started out as merchants and owed their important positions in the Ottoman state to their familiarity with Europe; and (3) graduates of European universities, professional men (mainly doctors, lawyers, secretaries, writers, and journalists), usually sons of merchants, but in some cases sons of captains and primates as well. Besides the mass of the people, the captains, primates, and most of the upper clergy were traditionalists. The peasants, at least, were traditionalists because they knew no culture but their own indigenous one. Many of the captains, primates, and clerics, however, had had some contact with the West, though usually through Westernized Greeks or Russians rather than directly.[48] Theirs was therefore a conservatism in the literal sense of wishing to conserve a way of life which presumably was being challenged. Their experience pointed up a simple though important truth—that contact with the West did not necessarily evoke approval of the West. Indeed, centuries of contact between Greeks and Westerners had resulted in a strong tradition of xenophobism. The background of this tradition merits attention.

The schism between Western and Eastern Christianity in 1054 and the Latin conquest of Constantinople in 1204 did irreparable damage to relations between Europe and Byzantium. "It is better to see in the city [Constantinople] the power of the Turkish turban than that of the Latin

[46] For instance, "Politically speaking the Greeks were Asiatics, and all their oriental ideas, whether social or political, required to be corrected or eradicated, before they could be expected to form a civilized people upon civilized European principles" (William Mure, *Journal of a Tour in Greece and the Ionian Islands* [Edinburgh and London, 1842], II, 216). See also Baird, *Modern Greece*, pp. 85, 88, passim.

[47] George K. Aspreas, *Politike Historia tes Neoteras Hellados 1821-1921* [*Political History of Modern Greece*], 2nd edn. (Athens, 1924), I, 29-30; and W. Alison Phillips, *The War of Greek Independence 1821 to 1833* (New York, 1897), p. 118. John Comstock, (*History*, pp. 171-73) sees the nation in 1821 as divided between *Hetairists*, Europeanized members of the Philike Hetairia, and ephors or primates, the indigenous ruling groups.

[48] For example, Thiersch (*État actuel*, II, 217) writes: ". . . one finds European profusion in the homes of the archons. . . ."

tiara." These famous words, uttered by Lukas Notaras, a prominent Byzantine, dramatize the sentiment of at least an important segment of the Greek population in the fifteenth century, as they faced the alternatives of conquest by the Muslim Turks or submission to the Papacy in return for military aid. After conquering Constantinople in 1453, Sultan Mohammed II capitalized on this sentiment by giving the Greeks autonomy under their patriarch in Constantinople. The legacy of hatred toward the West was kept alive during the Ottoman period by the militant missionary activity of Catholics and the ostensible sympathy of some few clerics for Protestant ideas.[49] Ultimately the European Enlightenment strengthened that legacy, but only because it, unlike either Catholicism or Protestantism, captivated the most influential segment of Greek society.

The Enlightenment coincided with the Greek economic revival, which brought Greek merchants in contact with Europe and weaned them from the other-worldly spirit of traditional Greek society. The works of Locke, Descartes, Leibnitz, Rousseau, and Voltaire were translated into Greek not long after their appearance in Europe. In the religiously oriented curricula of the Greek schools, mathematics, science, and secular literature were being introduced, and Greek students were travelling to Europe to continue their studies. Even the church was becoming humanized. Though there were always conservatives around to object, the patriarchate, largely in the hands of the Phanariots, became one of the chief propagators of the new learning. It maintained a distinguished school, organized a publishing house, and set up grants to enable the clergymen to study in Europe. The traditional anti-Western feeling was giving way to admiration for the West.[50]

As it did elsewhere, the French Revolution caused a serious rift in Greek society. Following the lead of Russia's Catherine II, the patriarchate of Constantinople now became a center of reaction. The conservative clerics gained the upper hand, and often those who had started out as liberals turned conservative. Two aspects of this reaction were the revival of anti-Western sentiment and an accompanying defense of Ottoman rule. Both attitudes found classic expression in an anonymous pamphlet entitled *Paternal Instructions* (1798). It justified the Ottoman empire as a divinely sanctioned instrument for the protection of Orthodoxy from Western

[49] Michael Dukas, *Historia Byzantina*, ed. I. Bekker (Bonn, 1834), XXXVII, 264, as quoted by A. A. Vasiliev, *History of Byzantine Empire 324-1453* (Madison, 1952), p. 647. Arnold Toynbee (*A Study of History* [London, 1934-54], VI) gives an excellent account of the intrigues centered about the figure of Patriarch Cyril Loukares, revealing because of its description of Catholic missionary activity in the Ottoman Empire, Protestant attempts to maintain relations with the patriarch of Constantinople, and indigenous Greek hostility to both Western enterprises.

[50] Maurer, *Griechische Volk*, I, 18-28; and Stavrianos, *Balkans*, pp. 146-49; but a much fuller account of the eighteenth-century Greek enlightenment appears in Constantine Th. Demaras, *Historia tes Neohellenikes Logotechnias* [*History of Modern Greek Literature*], 2nd edn. (n.p., n.d.), pp. 103-92.

heresies. Because of its new attitude, the church forfeited its cultural leadership among the Westernizers and broke its alliance with the Phanariots, most of whom remained loyal to the new doctrines, especially that of nationalism.[51]

Leadership of Greek liberalism fell appropriately to Adamantios Koraes, son of a Chiot merchant and product of a European education. Though trained to become a doctor, Koraes settled permanently in Paris to assume no less a task than the cultural regeneration of his people by reforming the language, translating the ancient classics into modern Greek, and prefacing each translation with a long didactic introduction. He preached the virtues of individual liberty, constitutionalism, republicanism, and nationalism. An ardent admirer of Europe, his hopes for Greece did not end with mere liberation from the Turks. He sought for the Greeks entry into the European family of nations and participation in European culture. Like other liberals he turned his back on the medieval period of Greek history as one of superstition and ignorance. His influence, both during and after his lifetime, was tremendous, precisely because he articulated the aspirations of an important segment of the Greek community. So it was altogether fitting that he should reply to the patriarchal pamphlet in his own tract entitled *Brotherly Instructions* (1798). He denounced Ottoman rule as barbaric and castigated the clergy for supporting the status quo.[52]

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, then, a cultural conflict, which had begun as a clash between two societies, had become a cultural schism within the bosom of Greek society because one segment, small but influential, had adopted as its own the dominant cultural values of the West. Knowing the West personally, as so many of them did, impressed as they were with its large and wealthy cities, its technical and scientific progress, its rule of law and efficient administration, they were ashamed and disgusted by conditions at home. Bad roads, unsanitary conditions, extortion and confiscation, ignorance and superstition—all these they blamed on four centuries of Ottoman rule. They were intolerant of conservatives and looked upon everything defended by conservatives as barbaric, backward, and medieval.[53]

[51] Demaras [*History of Literature*], p. 142; and Stavrianos, *Balkans*, pp. 151-52.

[52] The finest biography of Koraes is a separate work devoted exclusively to him by Constantine T. Demaras, *Ho Koraes kai he epoche tou* [*Koraes and his Age*] (Athens [1953]) and the standard one in English is by S. G. Chaconas, *Adamantios Korais: A Study in Greek Nationalism* (New York, 1942). For brief portraits and biographical sketches, see also Demaras [*Greek Literature*], pp. 195-214; Kaltchas, *Constitutional History*, pp. 10-18; and Stavrianos, *Balkans*, pp. 148-49, 152, and 278.

[53] Contemporary Greek newspapers, edited largely by such Westernizers, reflect this adulation of the West combined with shame of indigenous conditions; for instance *Hēlios*, 7 July 1833*o.s.* ("Wretched Greece! without the faintest notion of the perfections of wise Europe"), *Triptolemos*, 29 July 1833*o.s.* (on the superior state of European agriculture), and *Sōtēr*, 18 Jan. 1834*o.s.* See also Stavrianos, *Balkans*, pp. 277-79.

During the decade preceding the outbreak of the Revolution, as plans for liberation got underway and revolutionary sentiment gathered momentum, the cultural conflict subsided. Virtually no one argued for Ottoman rule. Opinions differed only on matters of timing and planning. But once Turkish rule was overthrown, the question of what should take its place excited dissension, dissension growing out of the cultural schism.[54]

The revolutionary situation gave the Westernizers the upper hand. The success of the Revolution depended ultimately on Europe—on official Europe for diplomatic recognition if not outright diplomatic support, on unofficial opinion for money and moral support. Westernizers could therefore argue for their objectives on strictly utilitarian grounds, namely that Europe must be favorably impressed. Conversely, the church, logical leader of any conservative program, suffered serious disruption. Since their office carried responsibility for the good conduct of the Greeks, eighty bishops, including the patriarch of Constantinople, Gregory V, were executed by the Turks. The rest fled to insurgent Greece as humble petitioners for placement and sustenance rather than as potential leaders. Bishops like Germanos of Patras gave counsel, and priests, like Gregory Dikaios, better known as Papaphlessas, took up arms, but they acted as individuals, not as a corporate body that knew what type of society it wanted. Moreover, since the Revolution was successful only in a part of the Ottoman empire, the church became divided between two separate political authorities. Because the patriarch was an appointee of the sultan, who forced him to excommunicate the rebels, the office lost all moral authority over the free Greeks.

What, in particular, did Westernizers like Mavrokordatos or Negres want for Greece? No one ever issued any program, but, inferring from statements and judging from the Revolutionary constitutions, one can detect at least four objectives: (1) a constitutional state, in which a constitution would guarantee individual liberty as well as public good and in which a popularly elected assembly would register the will of the nation; (2) a secular state, in which the church would merely minister to the spiritual needs of the nation and simply constitute one of several state institutions; (3) a legal-bureaucratic state, in which justice would be rendered according to Western law codes and administration conducted along Western lines; and (4) a state with a regular army, that is, an army armed, dressed, drilled, and organized according to Western practice. All but the first objective, which seemed to offer protection to sectional and corporate bodies, clearly encroached upon the established rights of powerful groups. The second objective would deprive the clergy of its judicial powers and reduce it to political impotence. The third would render useless the political experience of the primates because their

[54] For a good statement on this conflict between those who wished to preserve the Ottoman empire intact in order to inherit it gradually and those who advocated immediate resort to arms, see Woodhouse, *Greek War*, p. 41.

experience applied only to the traditional system. The fourth would reduce the captains, private military entrepreneurs possessed of private armies which they hired out to the state as integral units under their command, to mere salaried servants of a bureaucratic state military establishment, appointed on a purely individual basis, operating within a centralized chain of command, and because transferable from one assignment to another, no longer enjoying either personal or permanent ties with the men under their command.[55]

These issues did not engage much debate during the Revolution because everything was so provisional. They were bequeathed to the new king and his regency. But hints of these issues and symptoms of the cultural schism did appear. In the first place, very suddenly and in a relatively small area, the extremes met and reacted. There were parts of the Ottoman empire where Westernization among the Greeks had gone much farther than in what became insurgent Greece. There was bound to be a reaction among the autochthon elements. For instance, Makrygiannes' memoirs are full of tirades against the "man-eating" Westernized Greeks: "Behold the great learning possessed by all those who went to Europe and came to govern us—[they wanted] the Rumeliots to become their helots."[56] Second, the many philhellenes who came to Greece did not receive the hearty welcome they had a right to expect. Especially the captains, who resented their suggestions for the creation of a regular army, viewed them with suspicion as opportunists who had come "to eat our bread."[57] Finally, in 1828 came the first of the American and English Protestant missionaries. Even though they came ostensibly to contribute to the educational system by opening schools and publishing books, many Greeks suspected them of wishing to proselytize and to undermine Orthodoxy. Their presence was bound to reopen the cultural conflict. Even the slightest departure in religious observance was likely to arouse the prejudice of the masses, a consideration which did not escape the notice of the demagogues. The religious spirit was still so deeply engrained in Greek society that in this realm a Western innovation was likely to evoke a reaction from the ambivalent or semi-Westernized Greek. Moreover, Orthodoxy and nationality were so closely associated in the minds of even the religious skeptics that the weakening of the former was considered a blow against the latter.[58]

[55] For instance, see Kaltchas, *Constitutional History*, pp. 34-57.

[56] Makrygiannes [*Memoirs*], II, 13.

[57] Humphreys (*Picture of Greece*, II, 184-85) in 1825 accuses only the government of resentment against the philhellenes; Maurer ([*Greek People*], II, 33-35) perceives it as a more widespread national phenomenon based upon the intense competition for public place and position.

[58] On the identification of Orthodoxy and nationalism, see Finlay, *History*, VI, 7; on the missionaries in Greece, see Theodore Saloutos, "American Missionaries in Greece: 1820-1869," *Church History*, XXIV (1955), 152-94, and unpublished article by John Petropulos, "American Missionary Activity in Greece."

4. European Intervention and Domination

The rulers of Europe responded to the news of the Greek Revolution with marked disfavor. Like the revolts in Spain and Naples, which had broken out in 1820, it smelled of radicalism and violated the principle of legitimacy. Even worse, it reopened the nightmarish "Eastern Question": what to do with the rapidly declining Ottoman empire. This problem of European diplomacy posed two dreadful possibilities: either an upset in the European balance of power, if one state unilaterally conquered a part or the whole of the empire; or hopeless complications probably leading to a European war, if the interested states attempted a negotiated partition. A third solution—the creation of small, independent successor states—was still new in 1821 and too radical for serious consideration. To support the territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire was the fourth and safest option, particularly appealing because it accorded well with the general dedication of European diplomats to the status quo. In 1821 Russia, for over a century the traditional enemy of Turkey, was feared in Europe as the state most likely to exploit the Greek situation for her own advantage, but Tsar Alexander I had no taste for the European entanglements that such an adventure might entail. So the Concert of Europe, consisting of Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, tried to ignore the Greeks and hoped that the sultan could snuff out the revolt.[59]

From the very beginning it was clear to the Greek leaders that the success of their cause depended on the support of at least some European powers. Money and arms they might obtain privately, but only official Europe could secure the eventual acquiescence of the sultan and admit an independent Greece into the European family of nations. Greek words and acts were calculated to impress Europe. Greek leaders insisted repeatedly that theirs was no ordinary revolution, inspired by demagoguery or Jacobinism. It was rather a crusade of Christians against Muslims, the attempt of a Greek nation to remove the barbaric Turkish yoke and revive the culture of its famed ancestors. The Greek constitutions, at least in part, were calculated to impress liberal European opinion. For official Europe, the Greeks devised more special methods: one, the offer of a crown to the scion of some distinguished family, preferably royal; and the other, the more intricate game of exploiting the mutual jealousies of the powers in an attempt to secure their assistance. A major objective in this game was to excite Russian-British competition for popularity among the Greeks. Owing to a century of intermittent Russian propaganda and the sharing of a common Orthodoxy with the Russians, Russia started out with a virtual monopoly of Greek good will. Alexander Mavrokordatos, one of the Revolutionary political leaders, shrewdly and persistently broke that monopoly by building up a reputation for England as a potential

[59] Driault and Lhéritier, *Histoire*, I, 143-67, or more briefly, Stavrianos, *Balkans*, pp. 286-88.

benefactor, and so let Russia know that it would have to make a renewed bid for continued popularity.[60]

Eventually it even became habitual for the Greek leaders to consider the impact of their words and acts on Europe. It became natural for Greeks to pick their favorites among the European powers and to be categorized according to their choice. Such groupings eventually became a basis of emerging political parties.[61]

Many factors contributed to the eventual intervention of Europe in the Greek Revolution. Aside from stimulating private donations of money and supplies for the Greeks, philhellenism mobilized so strong a public sentiment that even the diplomats could not entirely ignore it. Turkish atrocities, such as the massacre of Chios (1822), had a way of getting publicized in Europe, whereas equally savage acts committed by the Greeks got scanty attention. In Russia, where philhellenism was absent, the feeling of sympathy for coreligionists took its place and, through members of his court, exercised a strong influence on the tsar. Commercial considerations could not be ignored either. Greco-Turkish naval hostilities disrupted trade in the eastern Mediterranean and thereby affected the British, French, Austrians, and Russians. The most important factor, however, was a military one, namely the tenacity of the Greeks in thwarting repeated Turkish attempts to crush the revolt. Thanks largely to terrain, they were even able to survive the almost fatal intervention of Egyptian forces in behalf of the sultan.[62]

In February 1825, Mohammed Ali, vassal of the sultan though virtually independent ruler of Egypt, broke the Greco-Turkish stalemate. With 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, his son Ibrahim invaded the southwestern Peloponnesos from the sea. Before this well disciplined, Westernized army which had been trained by Colonel Sèves, a veteran of Napoleon's expedition to Egypt (1798-1801), the Greek irregulars fled in battle after battle. Ibrahim conducted a devastating campaign, which did not spare even the civilian population. In no time he captured the key fortresses of the peninsula, but without destroying the Greek army. It simply fled to the many mountain fastnesses, where regular troops were virtually useless and where the dispossessed civilians swelled its ranks.

[60] For a good account of this maneuvering of the Greeks for European support, see Kaltchas, *Constitutional History*, pp. 35-41.

[61] In the first year of the Revolution, Kolokotrones dispersed an armed mob ready to commit violence against the assembled primates with a warning that such action would create in Europe the impression that the Greeks were Carbonari (Karl Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, *Geschichte Griechenlands von der Eroberung Konstantinopels durch die Türken im Jahre 1453 bis auf unsere Tage* [Leipzig, 1870-74], I, 225). Or to take another example, Makrygiannes ([*Memoirs*], I, 230) writes: ". . . there were foreigners here [in Greece], Europeans who were observing us, and I wanted them to see that we really thirst for liberty and laws, that we are not plunderers."

[62] Woodhouse, *Greek War*, pp. 85-94.

With the exception of the coastal cities, Ibrahim was at any given time master of only the spot occupied by his army.[63]

European intervention, when it came in 1826, took place under the aegis of Britain, in part because George Canning headed its government (1822-27), in part because the Greek government appealed to Britain for mediation in August 1824 and again in 1825, in part because Russia had lost its chance after antagonizing the Greeks in 1824 by proposing the establishment of three autonomous principalities rather than a united and independent Greek state. Already Canning had shown the Greeks favor. In 1823 he had recognized them as belligerents and in 1824 he had deigned to reply to their appeal. He was not a philhellene. He simply feared that Russia might take unilateral action against the Ottoman empire. By 1825 he believed a settlement absolutely necessary and considered the time ripe for negotiation with Russia when Tsar Nicholas I ascended the throne at the end of 1825. The conservative Russian sovereign felt for the Greeks the same antipathy that he felt for all rebels, but he was shrewd enough to realize that Russia could not afford to let England, already its great rival in the Near East, win the popularity and hence the influence which it had traditionally exercised among the Greeks. Mavrokordatos' policy was bearing fruit. This mutual jealousy between Britain and Russia produced the so-called St. Petersburg Protocol of 4 April 1826, by which the two powers agreed that Britain was to offer its mediation between Greeks and sultan on the basis of Greek autonomy under Ottoman suzerainty.[64]

The Protocol provided for its submission to the other three major European powers for either approval or adherence. Without qualms, Austria and Prussia refused their assent and hence deprived themselves of any real influence in Greece for decades thereafter. France, on the other hand, was jealous of English and Russian interference in the Near East, where it had traditionally played an active role, and so decided to associate itself with its two rivals in order to deprive them of the sole direction of affairs. Thus the St. Petersburg Protocol got transformed into the Treaty of London (6 July 1827). In recognition of British leadership, the treaty was negotiated in London by the British foreign secretary and the ambassadors of Russia and France. This so-called Conference of London was to function off and on during the royal period.[65]

[63] Douglas Dakin, *British and American Philhellenes during the War of Greek Independence, 1821-1833* (Thessaloniki, 1955), pp. 132-33; Finlay, *History*, VI, 349-72; and Woodhouse, *Greek War*, pp. 106-15.

[64] On the British official attitude toward the Greek Revolution and events leading up to the Protocol of 4 Apr. 1826, see C. W. Crawley, *The Question of Greek Independence. A Study of British Policy in the Near East, 1821-1833* (Cambridge, Eng., 1930), pp. 30-62; also Driault and Lhéritier, *Histoire*, I, 259-74, 303-21; Finlay, *History*, VII, 6-11; and Phillips, *War*, pp. 237-48.

[65] For the only satisfactory account of French involvement and its motives, as well

In accordance with the treaty, the three powers offered the belligerents their mediation in August 1827. Because of a military situation now favorable to the Turks, who had reconquered Mesolongi in April 1826 and Athens in June 1827, the Greeks willingly accepted the proffered mediation and the Turks did not.[66] In the meantime, the three powers instructed the admirals commanding their respective fleets in the Mediterranean to impose an armistice. Since their instructions were not clear, Sir Edward Codrington, the British admiral, took matters in hand to suit his own philhellenic sentiments. As senior admiral and commander of the largest fleet, he took the lead and his Russian and French colleagues followed. After establishing a blockade of insurgent Greece, he hunted down the combined Egyptian-Turkish fleet in the bay of Navarino. Ostensibly, at any rate, the great naval battle of Navarino, which took place on 20 October 1827, began by accident. By the end of the day, the Egyptian-Turkish fleet lay at the bottom of the sea. The Treaty of London and the battle of Navarino together constituted a major turning point in the history of the Greek Revolution. The former served notice that the European powers would not allow the reduction of the Greeks to their former subjection and the latter committed them inextricably to autonomy for the Greeks as a bare minimum at least.[67]

Thanks to the three European powers, the fortunes of the Greeks changed overnight. Turkish troops left Rumely to strengthen the Danubian provinces against an imminent Russian invasion. The London Conference authorized a French expedition to the Morea, the prospect of which induced Mohammed Ali to agree to evacuate his troops peaceably. Through the direct action of the powers, insurgent Greece was reliberated and enabled to take the offensive in Rumely, which it did on the correct assumption that the powers would not exclude from the new state territory in insurgent military possession.[68]

But Allied intervention was not an unmixed blessing. It involved domination as well as liberation. From the autumn of 1828, when London, Paris, and St. Petersburg respectively despatched representatives to insurgent Greece, the three powers kept permanent residents in the Greek capital, men who willy-nilly became centers of intrigue and patrons of respective Greek factions. The Allied admirals also exercised their influence in Greek internal affairs, and of course, the London Conference,

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as a good account of the events leading up to the Treaty of London, see Driault and Lhéritier, *Histoire*, I, 241-58, 365-79. See also Crawley, *Greek Independence*, pp. 34, 63-78.

[66] Woodhouse, *Greek War*, pp. 122-23.

[67] On the battle of Navarino and its consequences, see Crawley, *Greek Independence*, pp. 79-97; Driault and Lhéritier, *Histoire*, I, 379-95; Finlay, *History*, VII, 16-20; Phillips, *War*, pp. 268-80; and Woodhouse, *Greek War*, pp. 123-28.

[68] Crawley, *Greek Independence*, pp. 105, 107-108, 112, 116; and Woodhouse, *Greek War*, pp. 131-32.