

BEN-AMI SHILLONY

# Revolt in Japan

*The Young Officers and the February 26,  
1936 Incident*



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FEBRUARY 26, 1936 INCIDENT



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BEN-AMI SHILLONY

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**To Lena**



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## PREFACE

ON THE snowy morning of February 26, 1936, about 1,400 Japanese troops, led by junior officers, seized the center of Tokyo and murdered a number of prominent officials. The rebels announced that they would not retreat until a new cabinet bent on carrying out sweeping reforms was set up. After three days of hectic negotiations, an Imperial order was issued for the suppression of the rebellion, the government called in reinforcements, and appeals were directed to the soldiers to defy the orders of their commanders and surrender. On February 29 the rebels sent their soldiers back to the barracks and surrendered to the authorities. Two of them committed suicide. The rest preferred to carry their case to the courtroom. They were secretly court-martialed and most of them, together with their civilian collaborators, were sentenced to death and executed. The soldiers who had participated in the rebellion were pardoned and sent to Manchuria.

This most dramatic internal disturbance in twentieth-century Japan, coming as it did at the midpoint between the Manchurian Incident and Pearl Harbor, has fascinated many Japanese historians, novelists, and playwrights, as have its protagonists, the Young Officers. Like lightning at night, the rebellion illuminated things which had hitherto been shrouded in darkness. Intricate connections, clashing interests, ideological conflicts, and factional strife came to the fore, momentarily shattering the image of the harmonious Imperial Army. But it was only after the war that various bits of information could be pieced together into a coherent story of the rebellion, and even then certain aspects of it remained unrevealed.

The Young Officers' Movement in Japan, which existed from the mid-1920s until 1936, was a loosely-connected or-

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ganization of company-grade officers mainly of the Army. Its leading members were sons of high-ranking military figures, but the movement itself echoed the frustrations of the rural population, as reflected in the demoralized recruits from the countryside. The ideology of the Young Officers drew on both the tradition of the *shishi* and the revolutionary concepts of the West. Like the *shishi*, who had carried out the Meiji Restoration some seventy years earlier, the Young Officers professed direct allegiance to the Emperor and intended to overthrow the government, which was allegedly usurping his power. Like the leftwing radicals, the Young Officers regarded the capitalist state as a device by which a few rich people exploited the "masses." Their vision of the Shōwa Restoration, influenced by the teachings of Kita Ikki, implied that political and economic power should be "restored" to the Emperor and the people. This would be done by abolishing the "privileged classes," redistributing wealth, and having the state, rather than big business, control the economy.

The Young Officers planned to achieve this goal by a military coup d'état. They wanted to eliminate the "villains" around the throne, "awaken" the nation, and, by instigating a disturbance, enable the reformist generals in the Army to assume power. The strongest support for the Young Officers' Movement came from the *Kōdōha* faction, which since 1934 had been interested in regaining power in the Army and sympathized with some of the reformist ideas of the Young Officers. The Young Officers' most prominent sympathizer was Prince Chichibu, the younger brother of the Emperor and a potential successor to the throne. The Young Officers obtained indirect support from Mitsui and some lesser financial concerns.

At first the Army authorities treated the Young Officers' Movement favorably, hoping that it could provide an outlet for radical officers who might have otherwise turned to communism. But later, as the Young Officers became in-

volved in acts of terrorism, this attitude changed and the Army decided to suppress the movement. An attempt to transfer the First Division, in which most of the Young Officers served, to Manchuria triggered the uprising of February 26, 1936.

The sources on which this research is based can be divided into five categories:

1. Official documents. These include the unpublished records of the Martial Law Headquarters, the police interrogation of the rebels and their accomplices, the verdict, police records, as well as public announcements made before, during, and after the rebellion.

2. Writings of the rebels and their friends. In this category there are the prison diaries and testaments of the rebels, pamphlets, letters, and memoirs by former Young Officers and those who knew them.

3. Diaries and memoirs of people who were connected with the affair or who witnessed it. This category includes a variety of materials, from the diary of Prince Saionji (written by his secretary) to the reminiscences of an enlisted soldier.

4. Various other sources, such as newspaper reports, magazine articles, radio broadcasts, biographies, symposiums, etc.

5. Interviews with former Young Officers and people who had known the rebels.

I am indebted to many people for helping me in this research, which was in its original form a doctoral dissertation at Princeton University. My first and foremost thanks go to my teacher Professor Marius B. Jansen, who has guided me in this work and given me the benefit of his encouragement and advice. I am thankful to Professor James B. Crowley of Yale University for his thoughtful remarks. I am indebted to Professors Henry D. Smith II of Princeton University and George M. Wilson of Indiana University

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The staffs of the Gest Library at Princeton, the National Defense College Library in Tokyo, and the National Diet Library in Tokyo were most helpful in providing me with books and other materials. I owe a special debt to my friend

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My warmest thanks go to my wife, who in addition to her own studies for the Ph.D. degree and the care of two children, provided me with constant inspiration and thoughtful advice. To her is this book dedicated.

B.S.

*January 1973*

*Jerusalem*

# Revolt in Japan

THE YOUNG OFFICERS AND THE  
FEBRUARY 26, 1936 INCIDENT

. . . NEITHER BE LED ASTRAY BY CURRENT OPINIONS NOR MEDDLE IN POLITICS, BUT WITH SINGLE HEART FULFIL YOUR ESSENTIAL DUTY OF LOYALTY, AND BEAR IN MIND THAT DUTY IS WEIGHTIER THAN A MOUNTAIN, WHILE DEATH IS LIGHTER THAN A FEATHER. . . . IF YOU AFFECT VALOR AND ACT WITH VIOLENCE, THE WORLD WILL IN THE END DETEST YOU AND LOOK UPON YOU AS WILD BEASTS.

—*Imperial Rescript to  
Soldiers and Sailors, 1882*

THE FEBRUARY 26 INCIDENT WAS NOT ONLY THE GREATEST POLITICAL INCIDENT OF THE SHŌWA ERA, BUT ALSO ITS GREATEST CLASH BETWEEN SPIRIT AND POLITICS. IN THIS CLASH POLITICS WON AND THE SPIRIT LOST.

—*Mishima Yukio, 1968*

## CHAPTER I

# The Roots of Frustration

JAPAN'S dream from the time of the Meiji Restoration, to become "a rich country with a strong military" (*fukoku kyōhei*), seemed to be almost fulfilled at the end of World War I. From a small, undeveloped Asian nation, Japan rose, within one generation, to become the richest, most advanced, and most powerful country in East Asia. Having defeated China in 1895 and Russia ten years later, Japan secured for herself hegemony over an area stretching from Taiwan to Manchuria, including Korea, which was annexed in 1910. As an ally of Great Britain, Japan joined the war against Germany in 1914 and seized the German-held territories in China and the Pacific. World War I gave Japan an enormous boost by opening the colonial markets in Asia, which had been cut off from Europe. When the Russian Revolution broke out, Japan bore the burden of the military intervention in Siberia, hoping to extend her influence over all Northeast Asia.

But the years which followed World War I were disappointing. Japan was obliged by the Powers to return Shantung to China. The Siberian expedition ended as a fiasco. The United States challenged Japan's naval predominance in the Western Pacific and imposed restrictions on immigration which were insulting to Japan. Great Britain did not renew her treaty with Japan, siding instead with the United States. Most ominous of all was the threat posed by rising Chinese nationalism to Japan's strategic positions and economic investments on the mainland. When, in 1931, the Chinese Nationalists were about to reassert Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria, Japan seized that area and made it into an independent state—Manchukuo—controlled by Japan.

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Manchuria provided Japan with a buffer zone against both Russia and China as well as with important raw materials, but these advantages appeared to be offset by the diplomatic isolation in which Japan found herself following the Manchurian Incident and by the constant need to defend Manchukuo's borders. Thus, although not humiliated by defeat, Japan in the 1930s was a dissatisfied nation, regarding herself as lacking the privileges to which the status of a Big Power seemed to entitle her.

Japan's international frustrations were magnified by economic difficulties. The boom of the war years created a severe inflation, epitomized by the rice riots of 1918. The earthquake of 1923 destroyed most of Tokyo. Then, as the Japanese economy was starting to recover, the world-wide depression of the late 1920s hit her. Most affected were the rural areas, especially those which were producing raw silk for export. In addition, a severe famine struck northeastern Japan in the early 1930s, augmenting the misery and distress. The international trade rivalries which accompanied the depression demonstrated to Japan that her growing industry was overly dependent on foreign raw materials and foreign markets, both of which could be denied to her by her rivals.

These disappointments undermined the moral position of Japan's political leadership. The democratization of the power structure, achieved through universal manhood suffrage and the emergence of party cabinets, brought to the fore new leaders who lacked the purposefulness and moral authority of the Meiji oligarchs. The party politician, anxious to get re-elected and in constant need of money, appeared to be in flagrant contrast to the ideal Confucian statesman, who was supposed to rule by virtue. As the parties depended on financial contributions from big business, and big business depended on preferential treatment by the government, the rise of party cabinets in Japan was accompanied by an increase in political corruption. The parties themselves, in the course of their rivalry, together with the

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press, exposed this corruption and eroded public faith in the parliamentary system.

The delicate balance between traditional values and Western techniques, which had been attained in Meiji Japan, seemed now to crumble before the onslaught of new influences from the West. Instead of the rationalism and positivism, for which the Japanese had always admired Europe, there came after World War I the new Western gospel of revolution. Communism, although never numerically significant, gained many followers and sympathizers, especially in the universities, and was influential among intellectuals.<sup>1</sup>

Japanese conservatives abhorred communism, because it negated *kokutai*, the national polity, according to which the nation was one family with the Emperor as its head. Communism rejected the Imperial system, called for a class struggle, and professed allegiance to Japan's foremost enemy, Russia. The government outlawed the Communist Party, and made repeated attempts to stamp out its underground existence. Yet, many of the patriotic critics of the government claimed that as long as there was suffering in Japan, there would always be social unrest. The best way to check the spread of revolutionary ideas and restore social harmony, they said, was to eliminate the roots of exploitation and injustice. These right-wing radicals objected to both the capitalist system and its left-wing opponents. Their aim was to restore *kokutai* on a popular basis, through a national reform. This slogan of a national reform, first voiced by radical-rightist civilians, was later adopted by military officers and became popular among the lower echelons of the armed forces.

The modern Japanese military was a new institution with an old tradition. It was created after the Meiji Restoration

<sup>1</sup> Formal membership in the Japanese Communist Party never reached 1,000 in the prewar era. Robert A. Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p. 45.

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to serve as a force of the central government and was based on conscription. The victories over China and Russia enhanced the prestige of the Japanese military, giving it an image of invincibility. These victories convinced many military men that morale and a spiritual dedication were more important than armaments. The "spiritual training" (*seishin kyōiku*) of officers and men was henceforth stressed in all levels of military education. The content of "spiritual training" was traditional and drew on the values of *bushidō* and the reverence for the Emperor. The Japanese military became not only the sacred sword of the nation, defending it against all external foes and enhancing its glory, but also the repository of all that was considered noble and good in Japanese tradition. The fusion of modern Western technology with traditional Japanese values was nowhere so striking as in the armed forces of Imperial Japan.

The Meiji leaders made the military directly subordinate to the Emperor, in order to keep it free of external interference and civilian control. The Constitution of 1889 designated the Emperor as commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, with the power to determine their organization and strength. As the Emperors themselves did not take an active role in the affairs of state, this actually meant that the military advisers to the Emperor, i.e. the chiefs of the Army and Navy, were outside the control of the civilian government. Yet, the military could not be totally independent. It needed the authorization of the Emperor, who could be influenced by his civilian advisers and it was dependent on ever-growing budgets, which had to be approved by the Diet. The military had to coordinate its activities with the civilian branches of the government through the offices of the War and Navy Ministers. These ministers were always generals and admirals in active service, but at the same time they were also members of the civilian cabinet and had to abide by its decisions.

As long as the same elite of Meiji oligarchs wielded pow-

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er in both the military and the civilian bureaucracy, cooperation between them was smooth. But, with the gradual disappearance of the Meiji oligarchs after World War I and the appearance of new power elites, mutual trust was often lacking. The party cabinets tended to compromise with the Big Powers and with China, much as they compromised with big business at home. The result was a "passive" government policy in both external and internal affairs. Many military officers regarded such a policy as weak-kneed at best and treasonous at worst. Instead, they demanded "positive measures" and a "vigorous" policy, both at home and abroad.

This built-in tension between the military and civil authorities came to the fore in the controversy over the London Naval Treaty of 1930. The treaty, which imposed on Japan an unfavorable ratio of naval craft vis-à-vis both the United States and Great Britain, was opposed by the Naval General Staff as being detrimental to the security of Japan.<sup>2</sup> But Prime Minister Hamaguchi, declaring the matter a political rather than a military affair, overruled the objections of the Naval staff to having the Emperor sign the treaty. This act was hailed by the liberals as a bold assertion of civilian control over the military. But many officers, as well as civilian conservatives, viewed it as a blatant disregard of national interests by party politicians and as a shameless manipulation of the Emperor by the "traitors around the throne." The fact that Hamaguchi was the head of a "Mitsubishi cabinet," in which two ministers, Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijūrō and Finance Minister Inoue Junnosuke,

<sup>2</sup> American naval experts admitted later that the 7:10 ratio, as demanded by the Japanese, was enough for protecting the U.S. and Hawaii, whereas a 6:10 ratio, as demanded by the U.S. and finally agreed upon, was necessary for attacking Japan in case of war between the two nations. Paul W. Schroeder, *The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 7, n. 11; James B. Crowley, *Japan's Quest for Autonomy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 46.

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were married to daughters of the Iwasaki family (which owned the Mitsubishi interests), seemed to prove the charge that greedy politicians seeking to advance their personal goals were selling out the nation and usurping the Emperor's power. In late 1930, Hamaguchi was fatally shot by a rightist fanatic. The following year the Army, acting on its own initiative, seized Manchuria, and by doing so enhanced its power and prestige.

The Japanese military were also concerned about internal developments. The plight of the farmers meant undernourished and distressed recruits, whereas the economic recession made it difficult to obtain bigger military budgets. Leftist ideologies seemed to undermine patriotism, and communism always smacked of Russian espionage. The Army was ready to extend tacit support to various right-wing groups, both civilian and military, which could check the spread of left-wing ideologies or pressure the government for a stronger policy at home and abroad. The young officers harbored all the concerns and anxieties of the military authorities, but they were even more fanatic in their demand for a national reform. Sensitive to the social conditions of the people and influenced by the revolutionary ideas of their time, they were not content with safeguarding the autonomy of the armed services, but wanted the military to initiate and lead a national reorganization of Japan.

Some of the young officers came from poor families and their radicalism was derived from their pre-military experience. Others became radicals in the ranks, as a result of their contact with the enlisted soldiers. In the Japanese Army, the company commander was a father figure to his men. His authority was absolute and the soldiers would follow him to death, if ordered to do so. But the company commander was also responsible for the soldiers' welfare and had to be concerned with their needs. This close relationship between officers and men, which contributed to the courage and determination of Japanese soldiers in

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war, also exposed the company-grade officers to the miserable conditions in the countryside. The rural distress, as reflected through the dispirited soldiers, made many young officers conclude that they were dedicating themselves to the defense of a nation that was disintegrating socially and spiritually. This professed contrast between the heroic efforts of the military to safeguard the nation externally and the failure of the political leadership to provide decent living conditions and a moral example to the people, turned many young officers in Japan into radicals.

In a magazine interview in early 1936, some of the young officers who were soon to take part in the February 26 Incident said: "How can we ask our soldiers to stop worrying about anything else and think only about their duty in war, when their families are suffering and they are unable to do anything about it?"<sup>3</sup> A 1935 pamphlet entitled "An appeal to all the young officers in the Imperial Army and Navy" said: "Look at your soldiers, now wearing the sacred uniform of the Imperial Army or Navy. When they are discharged, they will have to sell their fields and sell their sisters in order to survive. . . ."<sup>4</sup> The idea that the sister of a soldier in the Imperial Army had to be sold into prostitution was outrageous. Lieutenant Takahashi Tarō of the February 26 rebels wrote in his prison testament: "It happened

<sup>3</sup> The interview was published in the March 1936 issue of *Nihon Hyōron*, which went on sale in mid-February 1936, under the title "Seinen shōkō undō to wa nani ka?". The magazine did not identify the young officers interviewed. But the man who conducted the interview, Wada Hidekichi, revealed after the war that they were Kurihara and his friends from the First Infantry Regiment, who later took part in the February 26 Incident. After the outbreak of the rebellion, this issue of the magazine was confiscated. Many of today's collections of the *Nihon Hyōron* have the pages of that interview torn out. The interview is reproduced in its uncensored form in *Gendai-shi shiryō*, v, 764-774. The above quotation is from p. 768.

<sup>4</sup> "Zen kōgun seinen shōkō ni geki su," in Hata Ikuhiko, *Gun fua-shizumu undō-shi* (Tokyo: Kawade Shobō, 1962), appendix 10, pp. 273-274.

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to me often that during a conversation with one of my soldiers about his home, he would murmur 'my sister . . .' and then fall silent, lower his eyes, clinch his fists, and have tears running down his face."<sup>5</sup>

There was the fear that the plight of the people was bound to produce a revolutionary situation, which would be exploited by destructive elements. Asahi Heigo, a radical rightist, who in 1921 assassinated the head of the Yasuda business concern, wrote in his testament: "The discontent of the needy masses who have been mistreated for long years . . . is now being stirred up. . . . There is a growing likelihood that the desperation of the people will take account of neither the nation nor the Emperor."<sup>6</sup> Fujii Hitoshi, a leading figure of the Young Officers' Movement in the Navy, warned in 1930 that the internal situation in Japan was similar to that of France before the French Revolution and of Russia before the Russian Revolution. "The Navy," he said, "is now preparing for a war with the United States, but what significance would a victory over the United States have if it were followed by a leftist revolution at home?"<sup>7</sup>

The reason for Japan's malaise seemed to be Japan's desertion of her true self, and her blind imitation of Western practices. Muranaka Kōji, one of the leaders of the February 26 rebellion, wrote in prison: "Since the last years of the Meiji period, Japan has been turning her back on her lofty ideals and absorbing instead Western ideas. We have abandoned our ancient *kokutai* and are now led by people who don't know their way and flounder aimlessly among such

<sup>5</sup> Kōno Tsukasa, ed., *Ni ni roku jiken* (Tokyo: Nihon Shūhōsha, 1957), p. 275.

<sup>6</sup> Ryusaku Tsunoda, Wm. Theodore de Bary, Donald Keene, eds., *Sources of Japanese Tradition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 767-768.

<sup>7</sup> The letter is quoted in the police report "Uyoku shisō hanzai jiken no sōgōteki kenkyū," reproduced in *Gendai-shi shiryō*, iv, 1-292. The quotation is from p. 56.

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foreign philosophies as democracy, liberalism, socialism, and communism.”<sup>8</sup>

It was not only the political leaders who were blamed for this situation. Indeed, the whole power elite of Japan was condemned as rotten, corrupt, and selfish. The manifesto of the May 15, 1932, rebels said: “Japan suffers because political parties care only about attaining power, because the *zai-batsu*, in collusion with the political parties, squeeze our sweat and blood and because the government supports all this.”<sup>9</sup> And the aforementioned “Appeal to all the young officers” blasted: “Look at the traitors who constitute our National Diet! Behold their treacherous behavior! They think only of themselves as if they were gods. . . . Watch this gang, which systematically devastates our country in the name of liberalism!”<sup>10</sup> The greatest act of treason of the ruling clique was the ratification of the London Naval Treaty. This was cited by both the May 15, 1932, rebels and those of February 26, 1936, as major grounds for their actions.<sup>11</sup>

The conclusion was that unless something drastic were done at once, Japan was doomed. This sense of impending doom haunted the Young Officers and the radical rightists throughout the 1930s. After Lieutenant Colonel Aizawa killed General Nagata Tetsuzan, his prosecutor admitted: “He came to the conclusion that evils were accumulating in all spheres of life . . . to such an extent that if the state failed to be quickly reformed, Japan would be ruined.”<sup>12</sup> Captain Kōno Hisashi, of the February 26 rebels, wrote in his testament that he had joined the rebellion out of a conviction that if the situation remained unchanged, “our Imperial nation would soon be annihilated.” His friend, Lieutenant Kurihara Yasuhide, wrote: “At such a grave moment to our nation, we could not remain passive and wait. We felt we had

<sup>8</sup> Muranaka Kōji, “Tanshin roku,” *Gendai Nihon shisō taikēi*, vol. 31: *Chōkokka-shugi* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1964), p. 186.

<sup>9</sup> “Uyoku shisō,” p. 103.

<sup>10</sup> “Zen kōgun,” p. 274.

<sup>11</sup> “Uyoku shisō,” p. 174; Kōno, *Ni ni roku jiken*, p. 200.

<sup>12</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, Tokyo, January 29, 1936.

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to abandon our wives, our children, and our friends and dedicate ourselves to the cause of Japan.”<sup>13</sup>

The Army itself was responsible, to a large extent, for these apocalyptic views. Since 1933, it had been warning about “the approaching crisis of 1936.” According to an official Army publication of October 1934, this crisis would involve the following dangers: The London Naval Treaty would expire and the United States would embark on a large-scale rearmament which would threaten Japan’s position in the Pacific; China would take advantage of this and attempt to regain Manchuria by force, while Russia, strengthened by her second Five-Year Plan, would assist China. This would probably lead to a war between Japan on the one hand and China and Russia on the other hand. In addition, the Western Powers would take hostile actions against Japan, because of her refusal to give up her mandated islands in the Pacific.<sup>14</sup> As it turned out, these fears proved by 1936 to be imaginary. The London Naval Treaty expired, yet the United States was absorbed by her economic problems and did not embark upon a massive naval rearmament; the Soviet Union and China, although stronger than before, had their internal problems and did not attempt to wrest Manchuria from Japan; and Western Europe, preoccupied with the growing danger of Germany, could not care less about Japan’s mandated islands in the Pacific. Even the economic situation in Japan showed signs of improvement. It is indeed ironic that the only crisis which occurred in Japan in 1936, namely the February 26 rebellion, was the result of a desperate attempt to save Japan from threats which failed to materialize.

<sup>13</sup> Kōno, *Ni ni roku jiken*, pp. 211-212, 225-226.

<sup>14</sup> “Kokubō no hongī to sono kyōka no teishō,” in Hata, *Gun fuashizumu*, appendix 6, pp. 253-270.

## CHAPTER II

# The Young Officers' Movement

### *Founding of the Movement*

The Young Officers' Movement (*Seinen shōkō undō*) was a loosely-knit organization, comprising a hard core of dedicated activists and a larger following of a few hundred "comrades" (*dōshi*) and sympathizers. Its members maintained connections with each other and some of them were in contact with civilian organizations of radical rightists. Although the Young Officers' Movement was a clandestine association, it was tolerated and often supported by higher military echelons. At first, the military authorities favored it, because they hoped that by attracting radical-minded officers, the new movement would check the spread of left-wing ideologies within the ranks. Then in the early 1930s, middle-echelon officers of the Army's central headquarters offered the Young Officers an active part in their planned coup d'état. Although the plot failed to materialize, it made the Young Officers believe that if they caused an upheaval, their superiors would step in and carry out a national reform.

The Young Officers' Movement was born in the Military Academy in Tokyo in the mid-1920s. This was the time of the "Taishō democracy," when Japan's foreign policy was in its most internationalist stage, when the system of party cabinets had been established and when Western influence reached its peak. It was also a time of growing social unrest, spurred by the economic crises and the great earthquake of 1923. The cadets were not immune to outside influences. They brought the frustrations and anxieties of their homes into the Military Academy (*Shikan gakkō*), where they had

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the opportunity to share them with other young men with similar aspirations. Like the civilian colleges, the Military Academy was a place where ambitious and intelligent young men were brought together to be trained for positions of leadership.<sup>1</sup> Like college students, the cadets discovered the gap between the ideals which they were being taught and the real world they were about to enter, and, like them, they had the time and the protective surroundings to engage in subversive activities.

The man who stood at the head of the Military Academy in the mid-1920s was General Mazaki Jinzaburō. Born in Saga in 1876 and graduated from the Military Academy in 1898 at the top of his class, Mazaki was made head of the Military Academy's Regular Course (*honka*) in 1923 and later served as Chief of the Academy until 1927. At a time when many Japanese officers, influenced by the lessons of World War I, demanded more stress on mechanization and modern logistics, Mazaki wanted the cadets to have, first of all, the patriotism and spiritual commitment necessary in leading men in war. His emphasis on "spiritual training" and "Japanism" in the curriculum of the Military Academy made him popular with the cadets and later gave him the reputation of having rescued the Academy from communist influences.<sup>2</sup>

One way of imbuing the cadets with patriotism was to have them attend lectures at the Institute for Social Research (*Shakai kyōiku kenkyūjō*, usually known as the *Daigakuryō*). This was a nationalist educational institute, established in 1923 by Ōkawa Shūmei, Yasuoka Masaatsu, and others, to counter the influence of left-wing institutions with similar names. The lectures at the *Daigakuryō* were

<sup>1</sup> The cadets spent two years at the Preparatory Course (*yoka*) of the Military Academy, then they were sent for half a year's service with regular units. After that, they would return to the Academy and take the one-year-and-ten-months Regular Course (*honka*). The Military Academy was at Ichigaya Heights in Tokyo.

<sup>2</sup> Yamaura Kan'ichi, "Mazaki Taishō to kataru," *Chūō Kōron*, vol. 51, no. 3 (March 1936), pp. 77-78.