FREDERICK S. STARR

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To *my wife,*
my family,
and my teachers

Contents

Preface

This book deals with that great set piece of pre-Revolutionary Russian history, the turbulent period of renewal and innovation that followed the crushing Crimean defeat of 1855. It was by no means unusual for change to occur in Russia through dizzying leaps of statecraft rather than a plodding process of evolution. Yet, never since the time of Peter the Great had so many changes been introduced as in this brief span of scarcely more than a decade. Some twenty-four million male serfs owned by the gentry, the crown, and the state were legally emancipated from their long bondage; a judicial system and a legal profession were created virtually *ex nihilo*; the draconian terms of military service were reduced and the army overhauled from top to bottom; the censorship was reformed; the universities received new statutes; a state bank was established; and scores of matters as petty as the cut of a state copy clerk's uniform were altered in accordance with the spirit of the day. Surely these years amply merit their repute as the "Era of Great Reforms."

My focus will be on one of these reforms: the effort to re-

constitute the decrepit system of provincial government under which most Russians lived. This restricted range of enquiry seems justified since few areas of governmental activity reveal so clearly the fundamental character of a state as does the manner in which it seeks to organize public functions and civic life in the local communities. Indeed, the attitudes and institutions that define local government constitute a unique index to the mind and structure of a state as a whole.

This particular episode in the history of the Russian state has generally been subsumed under the broader issues of the emancipation debate and the evolution of the land-owning gentry class. This frame of reference has led scholars to valuable insights on the social makeup of the provincial and district councils, or *zemstvos*, the creation of which was such a major legacy of the reform era. At the same time, it has contributed to a general underestimation of the breadth and intensity of the impulse for local reform *per se*, a concern shared by gentry abolitionists, by planters who vigorously opposed emancipation, by westward-looking publicists, and by many stolid bureaucrats within the St. Petersburg ministries and in the provinces. In order to correct this picture I have devoted a major section of this book (Chapter I) to a review of provincial government during the period from 1825 to 1855.

In the course of those years the problem of administering Russia became so acute that it impinged upon the lives of Russians from many levels of society occupying diverse positions of responsibility. The second chapter follows the process by which this issue entered the arena of public debate and how concern over it was manifest in various ideological currents not related exclusively or even directly with the serf question.

The diverse strains of reformist thought and action that coalesced around the issue of provincial rule divide themselves neatly into two sweeping categories: "decentralization," a term which I shall employ in reference to govern-

mental programs that granted provincial bureaucrats more powers and initiative without turning functions over to local public control; and "self-government," which required that local elective bodies so far as possible be empowered to manage public affairs in the provinces and districts. These categories, devised and accepted by the reformers themselves, correspond to two of the three paths by which the Russian autocracy could conceivably have reorganized political power during the reform era; it could give its own local agents more power and initiative; it could invite the local public and particularly the gentry to take a broader role in provincial affairs; or it could attempt to improve the system by exerting more authority directly from Petersburg through bureaucratic or elected agents.[1] Chapter III of this book deals with attempts to follow the first alternative by legislating a program of administrative decentralization, while Chapter IV does the same for public self-government; in Chapter V the third option is considered as the central government renewed its interest in controlling local affairs directly from the capital.

To avoid confusion over my employing for analytic purposes terms made current during the period under study, it may be helpful to keep in mind the more precise synonyms "deconcentration" for decentralization and "devolution" for self-government. I have endeavored to use these modern expressions in those cases where the views of contemporaries themselves are not at issue.[2] The reason for retaining the original terms in all other cases is that their use by the reformers themselves links state development in Russia after 1855 with western European development slightly earlier in the nineteenth century, and at the same time relates talk of local organizations in Russia during the reform era

[1] The second and third of these alternatives follow closely the analysis of Alfred J. Rieber, *The Politics of Autocracy: Letters of Alexander II to Prince A. I. Bariatinskii, 1857-1864*, Paris and The Hague, 1966, p. 55.

[2] I am indebted for these terms to Henry Maddick, *Democracy, Decentralization and Development*, London, 1963, pp. 23ff.

with many similar discussions in developing nations today. The former relationship was first perceived several decades ago by Robert C. Binckley in his provocative *Realism and Nationalism,*[3] while the latter has been noted in general terms by several modern political scientists. Due to lack of detailed information on the Russian side it has been impossible until now to explore these parallels further. It is hoped that this book will stimulate investigation of these important issues but, as Gogol said of his novel, *Dead Souls,* it pretends to be nothing more than a front porch to such greater works. My more limited purpose is to examine the process by which a serious malfunction developed in the tsarist autocracy, how it came to be recognized and dealt with, and how the legislative solutions were in turn reintegrated into the realities of a fast-changing nation that was still bound firmly by old habits.

Section VI of the Bibliography which lists some of the major books and articles that I have cited suggests the extent to which my book is indebted to the work of others. Beyond that formal compendium I should like to express my deep gratitude to several individuals from whose counsel and generous assistance I have particularly benefited. Among them I should like especially to thank my Princeton teachers and colleagues, Professors Cyril E. Black and James H. Billington, who, in their different ways, have repeatedly demonstrated that the study of history may still aspire to a position of preeminence among the humane arts. Dr. Nikolai Andreyev and Dr. Peter Squire of Cambridge University patiently encouraged the early stages of this project, and Professors Richard Wortman of the University of Chicago, Charles Ruud of the University of Western Ontario, and Gregory Guroff of Grinnell College offered valuable criticism on later drafts. Mr. Robert V. Abbott kindly allowed me to peruse his research on the Russian adminis-

[3] Robert C. Binckley, *Realism and Nationalism, 1852-1871,* New York, 1935, p. 180.

trative police and Dr. Zdenek David provided invaluable bibliographic advice. Three distinguished senior Soviet scholars to whom I am grateful for sharing an expertise that can only arouse awe in the aspiring historian of Russia are Professors Naum G. Sladkevich and Sergei S. Okun of Leningrad State University and Professor Peter A. Zaionchkovskii of Moscow; due to their interest and concern I was permitted access to invaluable archival materials in the Soviet Union. Finally, I should like to express my gratitude to the administrators of the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants, the Foreign Area Fellowship Program, the Fulbright-Hayes Program, and Princeton University's Council on International and Regional Studies for their sustaining support.

S. Frederick Starr
Princeton, 1971

Decentralization and Self-Government in Russia, 1830-1870

I The Undergoverned Provinces, 1830-1855

There is nothing more strange than the entirety of the internal administration of any province of Russia.[1]

Sergei Uvarov, 1827

In the last century the province of Kherson on the Black Sea coast was a prosperous region noted for its mild climate and its horses. Its capital, the town of Kherson, was a sleepy community dominated by the cathedral, the tomb of Catherine II's favorite, Potemkin, and the province's administration buildings. The latter, ample stone structures, housed the headquarters of all the region's public agencies, the treasury, and the board of taxes. For two generations before 1861 these same buildings had been the scene of a systematic embezzlement of public funds by civil servants. During 1860, for example, 760 rubles vanished from the accounts of the poor relief agency. In the same year another agency succeeded in spending 150,000 rubles for a bridge

[1] Sergei Uvarov, "De l'administration de la plupart des gouvernement de la Russie centrale," *Materialy sobrannye dlia vysochaishei uchrezhdennoi komissii o preobrazovanii gubernskikh i uezdnykh uchrezhdenii*, 3 vols., St. Petersburg, 1870, I, Pt. iii, p. 70. Hereafter cited as *MSVUK*. (All translations throughout the book are mine unless other sources are cited.)

in the Odessa district without so much as the foundations to show for it.[2]

No public institution in the province was immune from corruption. Like all provinces, Kherson had a small hospital under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in St. Petersburg, 625 miles to the north. The hospital was a modest institution and rarely housed more than four or five patients at a time. As was the custom, the doctor treated horses and cows during the frequent periods of idleness his official duties allowed him. In 1860 officials in the Kherson office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs quietly paid local merchants 825 rubles, or the annual salary of three clerks, for soap with which to wash the hospital's linen; secure in the knowledge that the expenditure had gone unnoticed, they allocated 104 more rubles for the same purpose in January 1861, and ten to twenty rubles more in each of the following months.[3]

If we are to believe contemporary accounts, the situation in Kherson was exceptional only in that the evil-doers were finally brought to justice. Otherwise, similar stories could be told of most provinces in the empire.[4] So widespread was this corruption that Nikolai Gogol could exploit it as a fact of common knowledge in his grotesque but disturbingly realistic stories and plays. "Of course I take bribes," declared the district judge in *The Inspector General* (1836) "but there are bribes and bribes." The mayor in the same play accepted this distinction and philosophized that "There is no man who has no sins in his past. This is the way things were arranged by God himself."[5] Such lines were cal-

[2] P. Zelenyi, "Khersonskoe dvorianstvo i Khersonskaia guberniia v 1862-om godu," *Severnyi Vestnik*, VIII (August 1889), 59.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58.

[4] See M. O. Gershenzon, ed., *Epokha Nikolaia I*, Moscow, 1910, Chap. III. Also *Materialy ob ustroistve upravleniia zemskimi povinnostiami*, B. E. Trutchenko, ed., St. Petersburg, 1861, p. 25; and V. A. Shompulev, "Provintsialnye tipy 40-kh godov," *Russkaia Starina*, CXV, August 1898, pp. 331-35.

[5] N. G. Gogol, *Sobranie khudozhestvennykh proisvedenii v piatikh tomakh*, 5 vols., Moscow, 1961, IV, 13.

culated to amuse or appall, but certainly not to shock the audience with unexpected revelations. Poorly managed institutions and the consequent bribery and peculation had left their mark on the public.

The fact of large-scale mismanagement and corruption in the provinces is too well documented to be doubted. Its importance for the succeeding period, however, has been questioned. The most recent Soviet specialist on the subject acknowledges the existence of chaos in the provinces but minimizes its impact on the state and society as a whole.[6] In his view, the reforms in provincial government introduced in the sixties are to be explained primarily in terms of the emancipation of the serfs in 1861. This hypothesis inclines him to consider only briefly the concrete problems of regional administration in Russia before passing on to the more dramatic political conflicts in Petersburg at the time of the abolition of serfdom.

Such a perspective distorts the motives of many of the reformers and drastically oversimplifies the dynamics of change in mid-nineteenth century Russia. Unfortunately, it is reinforced by much of the historical writing on the decades before 1861. The primary thrust of research on the reign of Nicholas I has been on the state apparatus in Petersburg and its leading functionaries. The closest attention that the provinces have been afforded has resulted from the populist interests of a variety of writers rather than from a balanced view on the role of the provinces in the state and society of Russia. Accordingly, the only institutions studied are those of the rural peasantry, and the term "society" is understood in its ethnographic rather than its political sense. For opposite reasons, both the "statist" and the "populist" views see the Russian provinces primarily as the stage on which the Russian *Volk* waged its age-old battle against serfdom.

In fact, historical writings on the period have considera-

[6] V. V. Garmiza, *Podgotovka zemskoi reformy 1864 goda*, Moscow, 1957, p. 20.

bly underestimated the importance of the provinces to Russian life. The themes of contemporary literature present a different picture. Gogol's *Dead Souls* (1842), Aksakov's *A Family Chronicle* (1856), and all but one of the novels of Turgenev are set squarely in the provinces at the estates of the middle and lower gentry. Although critics were increasingly impressed by the young Dostoevski's use of urban themes, scores of readers relished the mood of corruption and motley confusion presented by the brilliant vice-governor of Riazan and Tver, Mikhail Saltykov, in his popular *Provincial Sketches.*[7]

The preponderance of provincial themes in the literature suggests that the hegemony of the two capitals in Russian life was far from complete, and the population statistics of the middle years of the century indicate that in this respect literature accurately reflects reality. Though extremely crude and approximate, the census data of the years preceding 1861 indicate the extent to which Russia retained its nonurban character. In the 1840s, majestic Petersburg, Catherine II's "Northern Palmyra," was less than half the size of Paris.[8] As late as the 1850s this center of Russian political life did not have numbered streets, and buildings were identified merely by the names of their owner. Despite Peter I's hopes, so much of the city was built of wood that when Otto von Bismarck arrived in Petersburg in 1859 he was confronted with a ban on cigar smoking in the streets.[9] In 1849 Moscow still had only 349,000 inhabitants[10] and open country began within view of the Kremlin walls.

[7] On Saltykov's administrative career see N. V. Iakovlev, *M. E. Saltykov-Shchedrin v Tveri, 1860-1862*, Kalinin, 1961, and Baron N. V. Driesen, "M. E. Saltykov v Riazane," *Istoricheskii Vestnik*, XXI (February 1900), 598-622.

[8] A. G. Rashin, *Naselenie Rossii za 100 let (1811-1913); statisticheskii ocherk*, Moscow, 1956, p. 90.

[9] *Vest*, No. 13 (1863), 4-5. In this article entitled "Bureaucracy and Sidewalks," the absence of sidewalks, water, and public lighting in Odessa is also criticized.

[10] Rashin, *Naselenie* . . . , pp. 90, 114.

At the end of the Crimean War the combined populations of Petersburg and Moscow did not make up even two percent of the seventy million people of European Russia.[11] Both cities were expanding steadily, but their greatest growth did not come until the 1870s. Two years after the emancipation of the serfs a journalist could still ask seriously, "Are there cities in Russia?"[12]

In a country in which four of every five people were peasants, the raw statistics on population distribution must be further refined to be of significance to political and administrative history. After all, except that they represented a permanent threat of spontaneous revolt, the serfs were without political weight in the state. Even if they had been invited to take an interest in the life of the society of which they were a part, which they decisively had not been, their low literacy rate would have barred them from participation in all but the most rudimentary practical matters.[13] Nor was political participation the prerogative of all nonserfs. Due to impediments imposed by the government and the poverty of most members of the so-called urban classes, the political significance of this group was minimal.[14] Similarly, the Orthodox clergy was excluded from taking a political role in local society. And the few statesmen who advocated wider civic involvement for the clergy had to apologize for their general ignorance and backwardness.[15]

Thus, the Russian political community was confined to that amorphous group of landlords, small farmers, military

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

[12] *Vest*, No. 13 (1863), 5.

[13] Rashin, *Naselenie. . .* , p. 291, reports that the average rate of literacy in 21 provinces in the 1880s was 10.8 percent.

[14] When the government of the city of Petersburg was reorganized in 1845 the merchant and trading classes played no part and took no interest in the proceedings, which were conducted in the Ministry of Internal Affairs under N. Miliutin. William Bruce Lincoln, "Nikolai Alexandrovich Miliutin and the Problems of State Reform in Nikolaevan Russia," Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1966, pp. 93ff.

[15] TsGIA-SSSR, f. 1143 (1863), op. vi., d. 82, 817-23, *Memoriia No. 8*, July 29, 1863. (See Bibliography, Archival Sources)

officers, and upper civil servants known grandiosely as the gentry. In the late 1850s members of this service class numbered 886,000, or about one and one-half percent of the population.[16] In spite of their small numbers, the Russian gentry held a near monopoly of political skill and power in the tsar's empire. Yet this statement cannot be applied to the gentry as a whole. Thousands of members of this class were, from the standpoint of culture and education, virtually indistinguishable from the peasantry, even to the point of wearing peasant beards.[17]

Where did members of this exclusive political class live? A constant accusation of western visitors was that they circulated idly about the court in Petersburg, to the neglect of their estates.[18] Undoubtedly, scores of noble courtiers were much in evidence at the Winter Palace and at the royal estate of Tsarskoe Selo. But the overwhelming majority of the gentry lived not in the two capitals but in the provinces. In 1831 the gentry domiciled in Petersburg numbered 42,900; in the years 1834 to 1840 the gentry population of Moscow stood at 15,700.[19] During the years 1830 to 1835 the total population of Russia stood at about 48 million, and the number of gentry at approximately 720,000.[20] Accordingly,

[16] Jerome Blum, *Lord and Peasant in Russia, from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century*, Princeton, 1961, pp. 375ff.

[17] In spite of such notable nongentry intelligentsia as N. Polevoi, N. Pogodin, A. Grigoriev, and V. Belinskii, this group was insignificant in number throughout the reign of Nicholas I.

[18] Baron August von Haxthausen, *Studien über die innern Zustände, das Volksleben, und insbesondere die ländlichen Einrichtungen Russlands*, 3 vols., Hannover and Berlin, 1847-52, III, Chap. 2, contains a lengthy critique of the Russian gentry's way of life.

[19] Rashin, *Naselenie . . .*, pp. 124, 126. The nobility of Petersburg was 9.5 percent of the total urban population and in Moscow only 4.5 percent. These statistics contradict the widespread contemporary impression of Moscow as a city of the aristocracy. See Ivan Golovine, *Russia under the Autocrat, Nicholas the First*, 2 vols., London, 1846, I, 111.

[20] The total population recorded in the 1838 census was 48,825,400 (Rashin, *Naselenie . . .*, p. 29). The percentage of gentry in the population is taken as 1.5.

only about 8 percent, or one out of twelve gentry in the middle of Nicholas' reign, were living under the direct supervision of the central authorities. Even if the figure of 92 percent of the class living in the provinces is adjusted by the subtraction of the large number of those who were only technically gentry but were actually undistinguishable from peasants, we still have a preponderance of the politically relevant members of Russian society living under the wing of provincial rather than central institutions.

Under such circumstances, the day-to-day functioning of the organs of provincial government assumed an importance that it would not have had in a more highly urbanized and geographically concentrated society. The provincial resident's most frequent contact with governmental authority would have been through the local agencies of the ministries rather than with the central authorities themselves. For him, the Russian state was embodied most immediately in its provincial administrative apparatus.[21] Policies could be announced with pious resolution at the parade grounds in Petersburg, but they became concrete facts in the lives of most Russian subjects only when applied at the provincial level.

The ability of provincial administrations to execute policy thus became the prime determinate of the success of domestic rule in Russia. During the reign of Nicholas I many changes affected the performance of local administrations. The cumulative impact of these changes was to be so pernicious as to call forth a broad-based reform movement after 1855.

THE GROWTH OF BUREAUCRACY

No characteristic of the administrative apparatus of Nicholas I stamped its mark more firmly on the minds of

[21] "The *chinovnik* is the incarnation of the government." D. K. Schedo-Ferroti (pseud. for Baron Firks), *Études sur l'avenir de la Russie*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1857, I, 8-9.

contemporaries than the seemingly boundless growth of the civil service. The weird image of Gogol's hunched scribe Akakii Akakevich, rising posthumously in the Petersburg sky to haunt the administrator under whom he worked, was transformed into a symbol of the era. Dmitrii Tolstoi, later Minister of Education, observed the shadow cast over government by the bulging chancelleries and declared bureaucrats to be "no less strong and much more dangerous than the Poles."[22] The French *bon vivant,* the Marquis de Custine, visiting Petersburg in 1839, considered the "machines inconvenienced with souls" to have become the very essence of the Russia of Nicholas I.[23]

The overriding importance which contemporaries assigned to the mushrooming of bureaucracy readily became a historian's shibboleth, admitting of no challenge and requiring no proof. I. Kataev, in a book devoted to the prereform bureaucracy, did not deem it necessary to investigate the actual number of civil servants during the reign of Nicholas.[24] This has recently been done in a masterly fashion by Professor Pintner, but his study focuses primarily on the composition of the central bureaucracy.[25]

Part of the cause of this lacuna in research was pointed out by the eminent scholar, Vasilii Kliuchevskii. Although thoroughly familiar with the available sources, he had to acknowledge that "Unfortunately, we do not have precise statistical evidence with which to measure the growth of the bureaucracy."[26] During much of Nicholas' reign detailed

[22] D. N. Tolstoi, "Zapiski grafa Dmitriia Nikolaevicha Tolstogo," *Russkii Arkhiv,* XXIII, No. 2, 1885, p. 40.

[23] Astolphe Louis Léonor, Marquis de Custine, *A Journey for Our Time,* Phyllis Penn Kohler, ed. and trans., New York, 1951, p. 55.

[24] I. M. Kataev, *Do-reformennaia biurokratiia po zapiskam, memuaram i literature,* St. Petersburg, 1914.

[25] Walter M. Pintner "The Social Characteristics of the Early Nineteenth-Century Russian Bureaucracy," *Slavic Review,* 29, No. 3 (September 1970), 429-43; Hans-Joachim Torke, *Das russische Beamtentum in der ersten Halfte des 19. Jahrhunderts, Forschungen zur osteuropaischen Geschichte,* Berlin, 1967, Vol. 13, 133-37.

[26] V. O. Kliuchevskii, *Sochineniia,* 9 vols., Moscow, 1956-59, v, 271.

civil service lists were kept, but only a partial set of these is preserved in Soviet archives.[27] Pintner has shown the excellent use to which these can be put, but serious problems are nonetheless present. First, they are incomplete even for single agencies, and the principle of selection is erratic to the extreme. Second, the numerous petty clerks at the lowest two ranks are not included. Third, these records are so incomplete for the early part of Nicholas' reign that it is difficult to make valid growth calculations. And finally, there must be serious question of the accuracy of all records kept by officials whose thoroughness and even honesty was generally doubted by contemporaries.

A second class of data is available in the official *Adres-Kalendar*, published annually by the Academy of Sciences, and in other more reliable lists issued by individual ministries.[28] The Ministry of Internal Affairs' *List of Chinovniks* for 1829 indicates that the overall staffing of top provincial offices was nearly uniform in all of the fifty provinces of European Russia, regardless of their area or population. In 1829 the principal local officials were the civil governors who kept staffs of only two or three assistants.[29] Equally modest were the advisory staffs to the Provincial Directorates (*gubernskie pravleniia*) which varied between five and six members.[30] Thus, the top provincial officers for the

[27] TsGIA-SSSR, f. 1349.

[28] The *Adres-Kalendar* issued by the government beginning in 1844 provides the names of only the principal officeholders in the provinces and excludes their staffs. Another potential source, the *Spisok glavnykh nachalnikov, chlenov sekretarei, i stolonachalnikov gubernskikh i uezdnikh prisutstvennykh mest*, St. Petersburg, 1851 and 1858, lists only centrally appointed officeholders and is not available for the 1820s and 1830s.

[29] *Spisok chinovnikam ministerstva vnutrennykh del i ego vedomstv*, St. Petersburg, 1829.

[30] The civil governor of Vladimir had three assistants including a secretary, a titular councillor, and a collegiate assessor. Voronezh's governor had three aides (p. 180), Kostroma's, had two (p. 380), and Viatka's, had two (p. 207). *Ibid.*, Vladimir, 6; Voronezh, 6; Kostroma, 5; Viatka, 5.

Ministry of Internal Affairs in the late 1820s never numbered more than nine.

A startling growth occurred in the following decades. The government of Kostroma province, which had managed in 1829 with an advisory staff of 7, in 1848 required 54 officials to do essentially the same work;[31] the governor's chancellors and the Directorate in Viatka grew from 8 in 1829 to 38 by 1863, while those of Voronezh expanded from 9 to 54 between 1829 and 1862.[32] As a control, it should be noted that the rate of population growth in the same provinces for the period from 1830 to about 1860 was in the area of 10 to 50 percent.[33] Top provincial offices for this one ministry, then, increased in number fourfold and even eightfold in an approximately thirty-year period, during which time the population did not expand by more than half. In some provinces the growth was registered within a few hectic years. In Vladimir, for example, the governor's staff of aides was enlarged from 14 to 21 in the two years between 1849 and 1851, and the general force of ranked civil servants in the Provincial Directorate from 85 to 114.[34] It should be noted, moreover, that these figures do not include the army of clerks and scribes who had to copy, mail, and file the reports drawn up by the officials.

A similar growth took place in staffs at the district level. In 1829 few districts in the country required more than six officials to handle the affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Adding an equal number of representatives from the ministries of Finances and Justice—whose staffs, however, were often smaller—a total of approximately eighteen offi-

[31] *Spisok o chinovnikakh Kostromskoi gubernii*, Kostroma, 1848 (pages not numbered).

[32] *Spisok lits, sostoiashchikh na sluzhbe v Viatskoi gubernii na 1864*, Viatka, 1864 (?), (pages not numbered); *Spisok dolzhnostnykh lits Voronezhskoi gubernii na 1851 god*, Vladimir, 1851 (pages not numbered).

[33] Rashin, *Naselenie . . .*, pp. 28, 29.

[34] *Spisok chinam, sostoiashchim na sluzhbe po Vladimirskoi gubernii na 1848 god*, Vladimir, 1849; *Spisok chinam, sostoiashchim na sluzhbe po Vladimirskoi gubernii na 1851 god*, Vladimir, 1851.

cers is reached. By 1853 three sample districts of the steppe province of Orel had 41 to 42 people working in the same offices. A typical Chernigov district in 1857 had 44 ranked civil servants of all ministries, and another in Kursk required 43. A single district in Vladimir province employed a 48-man staff to conduct its affairs in 1851.[35] The unusually low figures of 20 and 26 officials in two Viatka districts were not repeated outside of the far north and the southeastern border where the steppe merges with desert.[36] Thus, the local representatives of the three principal ministries in the approximately five hundred districts of the country more than doubled in number within the two decades after 1829.[37] Taking the entire period of Nicholas' reign it appears that there was a two to eightfold growth of the total staff of provincial and district governments with the greatest expansion occurring in the provincial offices.

To accommodate this mushrooming, a corresponding expansion took place within the government's central organs in Petersburg. Again, the irregularity of the statistics for the early part of the period renders difficult any precise appreciation of the magnitude of change. But to take as an example a single division of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Economic Department, the number of its staff members

[35] *Spisok chinam grazhdanskogo upravleniia Orlovskoi gubernii na 1853 g.*, Orel, no date: Kromy district, 40 (pp. 69-73); Malo-arkhangelsk, 42 (pp. 73-77); Sevsk, 41 (pp. 61-69). These figures include the district towns as well; the district town administration was also included in the 1829 figures. Excluding the district town administration, the district figures are Kromy, 29; Malo-arkhangelsk, 28; Sevsk, 24 (1853). Unfortunately, the 1829 data are not broken down further. *Spisok dolzhnestnikh lits Chernigovskoi gubernii na* 1857, Chernigov, n.d. Gorodnitskii district, 41 (plus 5 teachers, pp. 39-44). *Spisok chinam, sostoiashchim na sluzhbe po Kurskoi gubernii, 1859*, Kurski, n.d. (pages not numbered), Belgorod district, 43; *Spisok chinam . . . Vladimirskoi . . . 1851*: Murom district, 48 (pp. 52-57); Suzdal district, 42 (pp. 34-38).

[36] Urzhum district, 20; Malmyshsk district, 26. *Spisok lits, sostoiashchikh na sluzhbe v Viatskoi gubernii, 1859*, Viatka, 1859, pp. 204-13.

[37] The incomplete *Adres Kalendar* lists reflect a similar magnitude of change; cf. Torke *Das russische Beamtentum. . . .*, p. 135.

with titles listed in the Table of Ranks expanded from 63 to 115 in the decade 1839-1848.[38] Each of these officials would have required in turn more secretaries and helpers. A similar explosion took place within the Ministry of Finances.[39] The new Ministry of State Domains grew rapidly after its foundation in 1837-1838, and the Chief Communications Administration, a quasi-ministry, enlarged its staff repeatedly as functions were transferred to it from other ministries between 1832 and 1847.

It is not enough, however, to point out this startling proliferation of bureaucracy without taking notice of its causes and consequences. Clearly, the impression created by a large staff would be different if it labored to broaden the public services of a province than if it was serving ends largely unrelated to the needs of the region. Official data on government expenditures indicate that the provincial public received few direct benefits from the expanded bureaucracy.

During Nicholas I's reign the cost of governing the Russian state rose precipitously. In the sixteen years between the monetary reform of 1839 and the end of his reign the budget grew by 172,233,000 rubles, or 51 percent, and in the period 1825 to 1839 the rise had been no less startling.[40] Most of this growth was covered by foreign loans, but borrowing alone did not suffice. To meet the deficit, taxes levied in the provinces soared in the half-century after 1814.[41]

[38] *Obshchii sostav ministerstva vnutrennykh del*, St. Petersburg, 1839, pp. 26, 31, 1848, pp. 37-50; *Spisok chinam ministerstva vnutrennykh del*, St. Petersburg, 1857, pp. 93-112, 1862, pp. 119-38. These lists do not include the army of copy clerks required to process the documents prepared by the expanding corps of officials.

[39] *Ministerstvo finansov, 1802-1902*, 2 vols., St. Petersburg, 1902, I, 628-29, shows that the Ministry of Finances required 14,696 rubles more to maintain it in 1854 than in 1840.

[40] Torke estimates a fourfold increase for all central agencies from 1805 to 1851, *Das russische Beamtentum* . . . , p. 135.

[41] S. Ia. Tseitlin, "Zemskaia reforma," *Istoriia Rossii v XIX veke*,

How were these public funds spent? Due to the dispersal of data among the archives of ten different governmental agencies it is difficult to arrive at even an approximation of the amount of tax money spent in any one province. The fact that the growth in expenditures at the local level was modest at best must be deduced instead from the available data on the total governmental budget, broken down by ministries and principal agencies. These indicate that the annual expenditures of several important branches of the government either remained static or registered only a slight absolute increase in the period from 1839 to 1854. Among these were the Orthodox Church, the postal service, and the ministries of Justice and Education, all of which together show an absolute growth of less than a million rubles. These agencies all performed functions closely related to the life of the provincial population. Most important, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, whose role in local life exceeded that of all other central organs of the government, did not substantially enlarge its expenditures over the same years, in spite of a 9 percent growth in the population!

In stark contrast is the military budget. The militarization of Russian life during the reign of Nicholas "The Stick" is well known. Though Russia was not engaged in any full-scale wars between the departure of Napoleon from the European scene until the outbreak of the Crimean War, it remained a nation in arms. To ensure the tranquility of the continent, Alexander I had adopted the formula that Russia's army should be equal in numbers to the combined strength of the Prussian and Austrian armies. When after 1815 Prussia, too, continued to adhere to the principle of a mass army, Russia's self-assigned task became all the more onerous. Added to this burden was a series of small-scale campaigns against Turkey (1828-30), Poland (1830), and

9 vols., St. Petersburg, 1906, III, 186-87n puts the figure at 1.6 times. Garmiza, *Podgotovka* . . . , p. 34, n.6, argues that taxes increased by a factor of six.

Hungary (1849) and continual western diplomatic pressure on several fronts that served to justify a costly military policy in the minds of the tsar and his advisers.[42]

In 1840 the military consumed half of the state's annual budget. Fourteen years later the expenditures of the army and navy had doubled. The Ministry of Finances, which was charged with the processing of all state taxes after their collection, increased its operating budget at the same time from 30,034,000 to 44,727,000 rubles. Further, the annual interest charges on foreign loans increased by 32,507,000 rubles between 1840 and 1854. Together, the direct military bill, the expenses of the finance ministry, and the interest on foreign loans account for all but nine million of the 172,223,000 ruble growth in the annual budget.[43]

Besides expenditures which appeared in the budget of the central government, there were other military expenses which were paid through locally levied taxes and services. Chief among these was the quartering of troops at the expense of the provinces. The original military function of Peter I's provincial divisions is still evident in the nineteenth-century quartering system. When a military unit was in permanent garrison in a particular province it was the duty of the locality to provide it with basic accommodations and rations. These and other so-called natural duties were paid in labor or goods. By their very nature it was—and is—impossible to determine their exact cost to any given province. But whatever the actual value may have been of

[42] John Shelton Curtiss, *The Russian Army under Nicholas I, 1825-1855*, Durham, N.C., 1965, pp. 100ff.

In contrast to Russia, the economizing English Parliament forced through a severe reduction of British armed strength; between 1815 and 1821 the British army was slashed from its strength of 685,000 to 100,000. Richard A. Preston and others, *Men in Arms: A History of Warfare and Its Interrelationships with Western Society*, New York, 1956, p. 201.

[43] *Ministerstvo finansov . . .*, I, 628-29. The proportion of the budget going to military expenses had reached 50 percent first during the war years at the beginning of the 19th century.

the goods and services provided under the quartering duty, we can be sure that it was great and that the burden did not fall equally on every province. When the provincial reform idea gathered momentum after the Crimean War this archaic system became a major focus of criticism.[44]

To be sure, the provincial populace of Russia did receive certain new services in return for the general tax increases. When the new Ministry of State Domains was established, provision was made for a national system of fire insurance which, however, was inadequately implemented; the gentry benefited from the founding of a special estate bank in 1833; a modest number of new gymnasiums were founded in provincial and district capitals; a new Council on Manufactures in the Ministry of Finances promoted internal trade while a Commercial Council with five local branches was created to foster foreign trade. But for most improvements bearing directly on their own lives the provincial populace was expected to look to its various corporate institutions, to special taxes levied by the provincial estates, and to *zemskii* or local public taxes.[45]

Two aspects of the nonstate tax system should be noted. First, responsibility for collecting these taxes, as for all others, lay with the executive police and even their disbursal was entrusted not to those upon whom they were levied but to the police or other local representatives of the central organs. The road and building commissions established in 1833 and 1849 were typical: though both contained *de jure* representatives of the body of provincial taxpayers, their work, according to the report of the gov-

[44] D. P. Gavrilov, ed., *Materialy i svedeniia o sushchestvuiushchem poriadke i sposobakh otpravleniia naturalnykh zemskikh povinnostei v tsentralnykh guberniiakh imperii* (Ministry of Finances), St. Petersburg, 1860, pp. 16-20.

[45] The precise definition of the word "zemstvo" and of "zemskii" taxes was the subject of heated debate during the 1850s. In the 1840s its meaning was closer to "public" than to the German "land" with its geographical overtones.

ernment's own investigating commission, was actually controlled by police and civil servants and by the ministries to which the latter were responsible.[46]

A second aspect of the nonstate tax system is that the portion of the local gentry legally empowered to participate in its administration was reduced by governmental decree in 1831. In that year participation in the provincial and district gentry assemblies from whose members elective offices in the tax agencies were filled was restricted to those landlords who owned 100 or more male serfs or 8,000 acres (3,000 *desiatiny*) of land.[47] The stated purpose of this decree was to elevate the authority of the gentry. Its obvious effect, however, was to deprive large numbers of that class of a role in public affairs at the very time when the provincial civil service was undergoing an unprecedented expansion. Most provincial gentry responded to this provocative measure with their habitual indifference. After all, the corporate organization of the gentry had been established by Catherine the Great more to satisfy the administration's need for personnel than to stimulate political activity by the gentry. But a powerful minority felt otherwise. They enjoyed the right to petition the throne, but this was a frustrating and fruitless process.[48] So keen was the feeling of ineffectiveness that when the marshals of the provincial gentry gathered in Petersburg in 1833 for the dedication of the Alexander monument, they expressed their discontent not to the Tsar but to the Minister of Internal Affairs.[49]

Such demonstrations serve to summarize the situation that was developing. Its elements, as we have seen, were the

[46] *Materialy po zemskomu obshchestvennomu ustroistvu (Polozhenie o zemskikh uchrezhdeniiakh* (Ministry of Internal Affairs), 2 vols., St. Petersburg, 1885-86, I, 38-47.

[47] Blum, *Lord and Peasant . . .*, p. 353.

[48] A. I. Skrebitskii, ed., *Krestianskoe delo v tsarstvovanii Imperatora Aleksandra II-ogo. Materialy dlia istorii osvobozhdeniia krestian*, 4 vols., Bonn, 1862-68, I, 776.

[49] A. Romanovich-Slavatinskii, *Dvorianstvo v Rossii ot nachala xviii veka do otmeny krepostnogo prava*, 2nd edn., Kiev, 1912, p. 447.

numerical growth of the local civil service, the steady increase in taxes and imposts which yielded no direct return in services to the provincial taxpayer, and the restriction of the right to participate in local civil affairs to only the wealthiest minority of the gentry class. All of these factors forced upon the provincial gentry in general a heightened awareness of the Russian state and of its claims on the provinces.

If the growth of the bureaucracy amplified the state's impact on the public, it had equally significant consequences for the government itself. The burgeoning administrative apparatus created vexing problems of both personnel and procedure. During the reign of Nicholas I these problems were felt in the central chancelleries in Petersburg, but were especially acute in the provinces. So serious were they, in fact, that doubts arose within the government itself whether the administration could effectively fulfill its local functions and make good its claims on the provinces.

Although the civil service underwent a great expansion, the rapid increase in numbers does not in itself account for its chaotic condition. In Prussia, by comparison, the provincial administration was substantially enlarged in the same period but without most of the problems that plagued Russia. Among these problems none was more serious than the backwardness and incompetence of the green-uniformed army of clerks and scribes and "executive" police. Year by year this personnel problem grew more pressing. Eventually the search for a solution led to the consideration of alternative forms of local administration.

A conspicuous aspect of Russian society in the early nineteenth century was the absence of a literate middle class from which qualified recruits for administrative posts could be drawn. Unlike the nations of western Europe with their ample class of *Fachleute*, Russian society had no secure middle group from which the government could recruit office workers and the like. This inadequacy was poignantly described by the civil governor of Kaluga province in his

annual report for 1848. With rare and disarming frankness, he told his superiors that his administration was in trouble, in spite of his own "constant and unflagging efforts." For years, he wrote, he had attempted to form a staff but had failed, "due to the difficulty of finding educated people to serve in the district institutions." So bad was the situation that many of his clerks, aides, and police were farmers who worked their fields on weekends and eventually retired to their small holdings.[50] In Vladimir the situation was equally bad, with most of the nonelective police posts being filled by draftees impressed into civil service from the local garrison.[51] And yet Kaluga and Vladimir were far better provided with educated personnel than were many more sparsely settled areas in the north, east, and south. Even in Kaluga, however, official documents were riddled with misspellings and made illegible by sloppy handwriting.

Carelessness was the least of the undesirable effects of this situation. Though civil servants generally devoted their entire careers to their administrative duties, by functional standards they did not constitute a professional corps.[52] The large-scale recruitment of nearly uneducated rural folk into the ranks of officialdom drastically retarded the development of a sense of professionalism within the civil service. Clerks in public offices rarely comprehended the general purpose of the institution which they served and hence could not share in the awareness of common objectives that alone can bind a diffuse administrative apparatus together. Baron Haxthausen was conscious of this problem and characterized the Russian civil servant of 1843 as "ungifted" and "insecure."[53]

An essential element in the modern bureaucracy is that it possess a virtual monopoly of certain administrative

[50] TsGIA-SSSR, f. 1281, op. 4, d. 43.

[51] TsGIA-SSSR, f. 1281, op. 6, No. 44, p. 25.

[52] Pintner argues the case for professionalization on the basis of the career patterns of civil servants rather than on functional grounds, "The Social Characteristics . . . ," pp. 441-42.

[53] TsGIA-SSSR, f. 1180, d. 81, p. 383.

skills.[54] But members of Nicholas' provincial and central bureaucracy were so poorly trained in their work that measures had to be taken by the state itself to educate them to their duties. The Ministry of Justice founded a legal academy in 1835 to train its future judges and lawyers. For its future administrators the Ministry of Finances formed the Technological Institute (1825) and the School of Mining Technology (1834). Conspicuously lax in this regard was the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which was increasingly responsible for all provincial administration. Even if this ministry had acted promptly in the 1830s, a generation would have to elapse before provincial capitals felt the benefits of more competent officials.

The mere improvement of educational facilities would not alone have made the provincial service attractive to an ambitious young man. A life of poverty awaited him. When new provincial organs of government were instituted in 1775, salary levels were already low. Then, by offering pay only in *assignats* at a time when their purchasing power was plummeting, the situation was further worsened. By 1816 salaries were so depressed that representatives of the ministries of Internal Affairs, Justice, and Police convened to study the problem. In 1820 the governors general took up the issue at the request of Alexander I. Though they approved a substantial increase in salary levels, the treasury rejected the proposals because of the state deficit. Equally well-intentioned calls for change were raised in 1824, 1826, 1834, and 1835, but each time budgetary considerations prohibited increases on the scale proposed.[55]

By the 1840s the Minister of Internal Affairs, Count Perovskii, had to admit that salaries of members of the Pro-

[54] See Reinhard Bendix, "Bureaucracy and the Problem of Power," *Reader in Bureaucracy*, Robert K. Merton, ed., New York, 1952, pp. 114-35, 118ff.

[55] E. Anuchin, *Istoricheskii obzor razvitiia administrativnykh-politseiskikh uchrezhdenii v Rossii s uchrezhdeniia o guberniiakh 1775 g. do poslednego vremeni* (Ministry of Internal Affairs), St. Petersburg, 1872, p. 41.

vincial Directorates were "so poor that they do not suffice for the most essential needs of man."[56] More than a few local administrators sought temporary—and illegal—relief by dipping into pension and philanthropic funds to pay their executive police.[57] But when the Crimean War brought a general price rise that turned the already deflated salaries into a pittance even this "green-collar crime" was unavailing.[58] In rural Russia economic life was largely uncomplicated by the daily need for currency, but such desperate conditions nonetheless severely hampered the development of a modern class of civil servants and invited graft, bribery, and embezzlement.

Budgetary considerations alone do not explain the miserably low pay levels. Count Krankrin, Minister of Finances, hinted at a more important factor when he observed to Nicholas that, considering the low place of the civil servant in society, there was no basis for the accusation that his salary was inadequate.[59] Clerks, in other words, did not deserve more than they received. And since no substantial middle class existed in Russia, the government saw no reason to pay men as if they belonged to such a group. Consequently, for years after Peter I the tendency was to raise top administrators to the gentry and to consider the remaining clerks as on the same level as military conscripts or state peasants.

With the expansion of the civil service, however, the existence of a new group, neither peasant nor gentry, had finally to be acknowledged. The gentry-bureaucrat-novelist, Mikhail Saltykov, contemptuously referred to its members as "a special breed of proletariat," while others described them with stronger invective.[60] The first step toward the

[56] TsGIA-SSSR, f. 1149 (1843-44), d. 94, p. 12.

[57] TsGIA-SSSR, f. 1389, op. 3, 11, p. 60.

[58] On the influence of the Crimean War see TsGIA-SSSR, f. 869, op. 1, d. 393, p. 3.

[59] *Ministerstvo finansov* . . . , I, 207.

[60] Cited by K. K. Arseniev, ed., "Materialy dlia biografii," *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii M. E. Saltykova*, 12 vols., St. Petersburg, 1905-06,

legal recognition of this group was taken in 1832 with the establishment of a special rank of "honorary citizenship," with privileges roughly comparable to those of the merchant guild.[61] To distinguish "honorary citizens" from the gentry, the government raised the service level for entry into the hereditary gentry to the fifth grade on the fourteen-level Table of Ranks and then, in 1856, to the fourth.

These measures drew a hard line horizontally through the state administration. They underscored the division that had long existed between higher and lower civil servants and redefined it in social terms. As a consequence, they reduced the possibility that subordinate officers would identify their own interests with the aims of the bureaucracy as a whole. At the same time, the new ruling affected adversely the incentives within the system. New "honorary citizens" enjoyed freedom from bodily punishment, were exempted from military service, and were spared the degradation of the "soul tax." Having achieved this measure of security and faced with the risk involved in taking the large step to the next rank, most civil servants were inclined to remain content with their lot. The few who resolved to compete for the superior ranks were shrewd enough to realize that the battle could not be waged successfully in the obscurity of a district or provincial office; from members of this rising group came ever-mounting pressure for positions in the capital and for the "exposure" to the notice of higher officials which such posts alone could provide.[62]

Recent research into the nature of bureaucratic organizations has clarified their potential role as a stabilizing element in society. By enrolling their worst critics into their own ranks bureaucracies neutralize possible threats to their habitual patterns of operation. True assimilation implies

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I, lxviii, lxvix. See also V. P. Bezobrazov, "O soslovnykh interesakh," *Russkii Vestnik*, III, No. 3 (1858), 89.

[61] A. A. Kizevetter, "Vnutrennaia politika v tsarstvovanii Nikolaia Pavlovicha," *Istoriia Rossii v XIX veke*, I, 211-12.

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 210.

that a degree of power has been transferred to a new element. This can be avoided through "cooptation," that is, by involving discontented social groups in the bureaucracy's work without surrendering any real authority to them. By this means potential critics become the virtual prisoners of an administration.[63]

Russia's expanded provincial civil service was unsuccessful either in assimilating or in coopting its critics during the reign of Nicholas I. True, the fact that elected officials such as the marshals of the provincial nobility wore civil service uniforms and wrote on ministerial stationery does imply a degree of "bureaucratization of society's representatives," as Alexander Kizevetter claimed.[64] Those few gentry who for one reason or another accepted office generally held on to it for years, their fellow lords gratefully reelecting them whenever their three or six year terms of service expired.[65] Needless to say, this situation did much to undermine the prestige of the gentry assemblies and the willingness of intelligent landlords to take an active part in them. Most gentry sought by all means to avoid election. Frequently, those who could not escape election simply failed to fulfill their duties.[66] This evasion of responsibility can be blamed in part on the social stigma attached to work in provincial agencies. Why should a hereditary gentry seek election to a post where he would work alongside a professional administrator of humble origin? This theme sounded clearly in a play entitled *The Chinovnik*, which delighted St. Petersburg audiences in 1856. It depicts the fate of a dedicated administrator, Nadimov, who appears at a local estate whose proprietress is an unmarried gentry woman. As a

[63] On the concepts of cooptation see Philip Selznick, "Co-optation: A Mechanism for Organizational Stability," Merton, ed., *Reader . . .*, pp. 135-40. See also Robert Michels "Assimilation of the Discontented into the State Bureaucracy," *ibid.*, pp. 140-41.

[64] Kizevetter, "Vnutrennaia politika . . .," p. 210.

[65] Romanovich-Slavatinskii, *Dvorianstvo v Rossii . . .*, Chap. v, Sec. 3, Pt. v.

[66] *Ibid.*, pp. 507-14.

provincial civil servant he is treated in a patronizing fashion and is not invited to dine at the same table with the proprietress and her gentry guests. Only at the end of the play are the barriers thrown down and virtue rewarded, when Nadimov wins the hand of the lady of the house.[67]

Merely to give official posts to critics, however, did not ensure that they would be assimilated. Once within the civil service many were frustrated by the glacial slowness with which promotions came and by the heavy torpor which reigned in the chancelleries. Otto von Bismarck perceived the results of this at a meeting of the gentry of Petersburg province in 1861-1862: "These debates and votes on . . . principles which so little agree with the existing structure of the empire leave an impression all the more strange because one can see by the uniforms in which the members appear that the majority of them occupy high positions in the military and civil service."[68]

As early as the 1840s this problem of assimilation had become chronic. In that decade a generation of young men began to point out the faults of the administration of which they were a part. Such criticism drew attention to them, and occasionally, if the critics happened to be well connected in learned circles, actually served to promote their careers. So bitterly did the brilliant young Nikolai Miliutin criticize the civil service that the bureaucracy became a kind of negative springboard for his own advancement within it.[69] It is no accident that it was Miliutin who later envisaged the proposed *zemstvo* provincial organs as a means of neutralizing the strivings of the government's critics in the hinterland. In 1862, Miliutin proposed to his fellow officials that the new organs whose establishment they were considering could serve as "safety valves" for the

[67] Count Vladimir Sollogub, "Chinovnik," *Russkii Vestnik*, I, No. 3 (1856). See also Pintner, "The Social Characteristics . . . ," pp. 431-32.

[68] B. E. Nolde, *Peterburgskaia missiia Bismarka, 1859-1862*, Prague, 1925, p. 256.

[69] Lincoln, "Nikolai Alexandrovich Miliutin . . . ," p. 111.

hostility of provincial critics. The *zemstvos*, in other words, should fulfill the cooptative function that the bureaucracy itself had abdicated.[70]

THE IDEAL OF CENTRALIZATION

The critics whom Miliutin had in mind were demanding changes. Some demanded changes in the emancipation statutes issued the year before. All demanded changes in the day-to-day functioning of the provincial bureaucracy. Probably no single aspect of prereform Russia irritated the public at large quite so much as the ordinary workings of local administrations.

A poignant briefing paper issued in 1843 by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Count Lev Perovskii, brought the question of procedure in local agencies to the attention of the tsar. Modern research could scarcely evoke the situation more clearly:

> The mechanical work of writing has long since exceeded the physical capabilities of the staff of the Provincial Directorates. The accepted procedures for deciding issues and the forms of processing papers are extremely burdensome, due to their great complexity and slowness. The essence of matters is choked out by formalism . . . [the Provincial Directorates have become], in the public mind, places for civil servants who are not wanted in any other department.[71]

Perovskii bolstered his argument with statistics. For the period 1839 to 1843 the number of papers written and processed per annum in each of nineteen sample provincial gov-

[70] V. V. Garmiza, "Iz istorii razrabotki zakona o vvedenii zemstva v Rossii," *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta*, No. 1 (1958), 131-45.

[71] L. Perovskii, "O neobkhodimosti nekotorykh uluchshenii po gubernskim pravleniiam," 1843, TsGIA-SSSR, f. 1149 (1843-44), d. 94, p. 12. A shortened version of this document was published in *MSVUK*, I, otd. 2 (see also Torke *Das russische Beamtentum* . . . , pp. 211-13).