

KARL H. POTTER

The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2

*Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology:
The Tradition of Nyaya-Vaisesika up
to Gangesa*



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Vol. II

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Vol. II: Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology:
The Tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika
up to Gaṅgeśa

EDITED BY

KARL H. POTTER

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CONTENTS

PREFACE xi

PART ONE :

INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA (*Karl H. Potter*)

1. Historical Resumé	1
2. Theory of Value	18
3. Nature of a Philosophical System	38
4. Relations	47
5. Substance	69
6. Qualities and Motions	112
7. Universals, Individuators, and Absences	133
8. Meaning and Truth	147
9. Logical Theory	179

PART TWO :

SUMMARIES OF WORKS

1. Kaṇāda	211
Vaiśeṣikasūtras (<i>Masaaki Hattori</i>)	212
2. Gautama	220
Nyāyasūtras (<i>Karl H. Potter</i>)	221
3. Vākyakāra	238
4. Kaṇandikāra	238
5. Vātsyāyana	239
Nyāyabhāṣya (<i>Karl H. Potter</i>)	240
6. Candramati	274
Daśapadārthaśāstra (<i>Masaaki Hattori</i>)	275
7. Bhāvivikta	281
8. Praśastapāda	282
Padārthadharmasamgraha (<i>Karl H. Potter</i>)	282
9. Uddyotakara	303
Nyāyavārttika (<i>Karl H. Potter</i>)	304
10. Ātreya	337
11. Prīticandra	338
12. Aviddhakarṇa	338
13. Śaṅkara (Svāmin)	340
14. Viśvarūpa	341

15.	Dhairyarāṣī	341
16.	Jayanta Bhaṭṭa	341
	Nyāyamañjarī (<i>Karl H. Potter,</i> <i>J. V. Bhattacharya, U. Arya</i>)	343
	Nyāyakalikā (<i>J. V. Bhattacharya</i>)	394
17.	The Nyāyaratnakāra	395
18.	Trilocana	396
19.	Bhāsarvajña	398
	Nyāyasāra (<i>Karl H. Potter</i>)	400
	Nyāyabhūṣaṇa (<i>B. K. Matilal</i>)	410
20.	Sānātani	424
21.	Vyomaśiva	424
	Vyomavatī (<i>V. Varadachari</i>)	425
22.	Vācaspati Miśra	453
	Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā (<i>B. K. Matilal</i>)	455
23.	Adhyāyana	484
24.	Vittoka	484
25.	Narasimha	484
26.	Śrīdhara	485
	Nyāyakandalī (<i>Karl H. Potter</i>)	485
27.	Śrīvatsa	520
28.	Aniruddha	521
29.	Udayana	521
	Lakṣaṇāvalī (<i>Karl H. Potter</i>)	523
	Lakṣaṇamālā (<i>S. Subrahmanya Sastri</i>)	525
	Ātmatattvaviveka (<i>V. Varadachari</i>)	526
	Nyāyakusumāñjali (<i>Karl H. Potter</i> and <i>Sibajiban Bhattacharya</i>)	557
	Nyāyapariśiṣṭa	588
	Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikāpariśuddhi	588
	Kiraṇāvalī (<i>B. K. Matilal</i>)	589
30.	Aparārkadeva	603
	Nyāyamuktāvalī (<i>S. Subrahmanya Sastri</i>)	604
31.	Śrīkaṇṭha	612
32.	The Vṛttikāra	612
33.	Vallabha	613
	Nyāyalilāvati (<i>J. N. Mohanty</i>)	613
34.	Varadarāja	629
	Tārkikarakṣā with Sārasaṅgraha (<i>Karl H. Potter</i>)	629
	Nyāyakusumāñjalibodhanī (<i>G. Bhattacharya</i>)	640
35.	Śivāditya	642
	Saptapadārthī (<i>Karl H. Potter</i>)	643

Nyāyamālā (<i>S. Subrahmanya Sastri</i>)	645
36. Vādīndra	646
Mahāvidyāviḍambana (<i>E. R. Sreekrishna Sarma</i>)	647
Kiraṇāvalīdarpaṇa (<i>G. Bhattacharya</i>)	652
Kaṇādasūtranibandha	658
37. Bhaṭṭa Rāghava	659
38. Divākara	659
39. Vādi Vāgīśvara	660
40. Nārāyaṇa Sarvajña	663
41. Keśava Miśra	663
Trakabhāṣā (<i>Karl H. Potter</i>)	664
42. Ānandānubhava	667
43. Prabhākaropādhyāya	667
44. Abhayatilaka	668
45. Sondaḍopādhyāya	668
46. Maṇikaṇṭha Miśra	668
Nyāyaratna (<i>V. Varadachari</i>)	669
47. Śāśadhara	682
Nyāyasidhāntadīpa	682
48. Taraṇi Miśra	684
49. Jagadguru	684
50. Raviśvara	685
51. Nyāyabhāskarākāra	685
52. Viṣṇumiśra	685
53. Vidyādharamiśra	685
54. Śrīkara	685
55. Bharadvājavr̥ttikāra (?)	685
56. Candrānanda	685
FOOTNOTES	687
INDEX	717

PREFACE

The present volume provides a detailed resumé of current knowledge about the classical Indian philosophical system of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in its earlier stages. Specifically, it covers the literatures of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika from their inception in the respective *sūtras* up to the time of Gaṅgeśa, that is, about A.D. 1350. This dividing point is regularly accepted in the tradition, since with Gaṅgeśa it is felt that a new start is made within the systems, the result coming to be known as Navyanyāya, “new” Nyāya. We hope that a volume will follow covering the remainder of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature from Gaṅgeśa to the present.

A volume already published, *Bibliography of Indian Philosophies* (New Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1970), provides a useful guide to the literature, both primary and secondary, on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, and citations in the present book make constant references to the *Bibliography*, such references usually appearing in the form of “B” followed by the number of entry cited.

The form of this book features an extended introductory section followed by summaries of works belonging to the system’s literature. These summaries are arranged in relative chronological order to assist the reader in tracing the development of the school’s thought. Summaries have been solicited from scholars around the world—Indian, Japanese, and American scholars have collaborated in the undertaking. This international aspect of the book is one of its pleasantest features, serving to put philosophers and Indologists around the world in closer touch with one another.

A few words of explanation and advice as to how to use this book may be in order. Perhaps the first and foremost thing that needs to be said is that this volume is not intended to be analytically definitive: it invites the attention of philosophers and scholars rather than making such attention unnecessary. The thinking behind the preparation of this volume has been that philosophers without extended training in Sanskrit and Indian studies are not in a very good position to appreciate the contributions made by classical Indian philosophy toward the solution of perennial philosophical problems. This is partly due to the fact that the tradition in which the Indian schools arise and grow is foreign to Western philosophers, but our thinking is that this fact is an avoidable hazard. It is also partly due to the type of translations that have been produced by Indian

and Western Sanskrit scholars; these translations, while usually accurate, are not always philosophically perspicuous, which is to say that they do not always bring out what a professional philosopher will find most interesting and identifiable in the material. The production of an acceptable translation is, and ought to be, a serious and extensive scholarly problem, and the summaries in Part II of this book are in no way intended as surrogates for such translations. Nevertheless, we think that philosophers should be provided with a tool for introducing Indian thought into their courses on problems of philosophy, history of thought, etc., and that the translations and other materials currently available to them do not make it really possible for them to work up Indian thought without more training than most philosophers are willing or able to expose themselves to. Our aim here, then, is to provide the philosopher with an account of the systematic thought of India which is less detailed than an accurate translation, but more detailed than the standard introductory textbook on Indian philosophy.

It is to be stressed that the work is addressed to philosophers primarily, and Indologists secondarily. Of course we hope that the materials here presented will, within the limits of our intent, be adjudged sufficiently accurate in terms of scholarship. The editor has endeavored to obtain the work of some of the leading scholars of the system to furnish summaries. However, these summaries omit large portions, may well omit sections which others deem of primary importance, and will otherwise deviate from the evaluations likely to be made by the Sanskritist. In order that there be no misunderstanding it is well to mention these points here. These summaries, then, are not substitutes for scholarship, but guides and markers for further study on the part of trained scholars.

In studying the philosophy of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school one finds that a fair amount of the literature occurs in the *sūtra* or commentary form so well known in India. The reader should bear in mind that, in the summary of one of the *sūtras*, say, what is summarized is no more than what is actually said there; if the summary seems imprecise and laconic, that is because (if we have done our work well) the *sūtra* has those features. It is characteristic of this tradition that the commentators spell out what they believe to be the intent of the authors of the *sūtras*; thus the reader should, if he is tracing the thought of the school on a given topic, be careful to read the summaries of the commentators in conjunction with that of the *sūtra*. The index provided is intended to enable the reader to identify all the passages summarized here which bear upon a

given topic, and he is advised to use it frequently. Sometimes, too, an author will comment on a topic in a part of his work unrelated to any logical development that the ordinary reader can discern; here again the reader may well miss this contribution unless he uses the index.

This volume has been in preparation for a number of years. Work on it began in the early 1960s. The editor wishes to thank the American Institute of Indian Studies for awarding him a Fellowship in 1963-64 which enabled him to visit prospective contributors and utilize the resources that India provided for furthering his work. Later on, in the summer of 1967, he received a Summer Session grant from the University of Minnesota which enabled him to use the Widener Library to locate out of the way secondary materials in preparing his introductory section. He is extremely grateful for both these opportunities.

1977

KARL H. POTTER

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY
OF NYĀYA-VAIŚEŚIKA

HISTORICAL RESUME

A full-scale philosophical system is generally expected to speak to problems in the following areas: metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and theory of value, logic, and philosophical method. The system of Indian philosophy known as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is such a full-scale system. Its contribution in each and every one of these areas is extensive, interesting, and usually of fundamental importance, as this introduction will attempt to show.

Metaphysics: Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika offers one of the most vigorous efforts at the construction of a substantialist, realist ontology that the world has ever seen. It provides an extended critique of event-ontologies and idealist metaphysics. It starts from a unique basis for ontology that incorporates several of the most recent Western insights into the question of how to defend realism most successfully. This ontology is “Platonistic” (it admits repeatable properties as Plato’s did), realistic (it builds the world from “timeless” individuals as well as spatio-temporal points or events), but neither exclusively physicalistic nor phenomenalistic (it admits as basic individuals entities both directly known and inferred from scientific investigations).¹ Though the system has many quaint and archaic features from a modern point of view, as a philosophical base for accommodating scientific insights it has advantages: its authors developed an atomic theory, came to treat numbers very much in the spirit of modern mathematics, argued for a wave theory of sound transmission, and adapted an empiricist view of causality to their own uses.

Epistemology: Whereas in “modern” philosophy of the West the idealist critique of substance initiated by Berkeley has never been seriously challenged, the philosophers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school entered the controversy very early in its history against Buddhists who used Berkeleyan arguments. The resulting polemical battle may well represent the most important confrontation in philosophical

literature between so-called naive realism and the threats to it from idealist sources. Nyāya offers an account of perception which makes sense of our belief in an external world, yet promises to explain the fact of perceptual error without allowing that opening wedge of idealism, the admission that the mind creates certain parts of our world (and so why not all of it?). The intricacy of this discussion between Nyāya and Buddhism brings out many fascinating and little understood aspects of the two views and what they require from their adherents.

Ethics and Theory of Value: The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system provides no startling new ideas over and beyond what is generally acceptable to Hindus, but it presents many carefully gauged arguments for the standard position, involving belief in transmigration, *karma*, and the possibility of liberation from future rebirths. It does not discuss questions of "ethical theory" as we understand that term in contemporary philosophy, since that was the business of others (Mīmāṃsakas) in the peculiar division of labor adopted by the ancient Indian thinkers. However, it endorses many of the general ethical attitudes of Hindu sages, questioning some in passing. On one point Nyāya is recognized by Hindus to have provided a definitive treatment, and this is on arguments for the existence of God.

Logic: Nyāya grew in part as a theory of philosophical debate, and among Hindus has been accepted as the system which specially studies the theory of arguments good and bad, in keeping with the division of labor principle alluded to in the previous paragraph. This does not mean that all Hindu philosophers accepted every point in the Nyāya account, but they certainly tended to look to Nyāya for definitive treatment and detailed discussions of intricate points. Nyāya had its great rival, however, in the logic developed by the Buddhists, and from this controversy developed one of the most comprehensive logical theories the world has known. Indian logic is never conceived as "formal" in the Western sense, but as an account of sane processes of reasoning it has few equals in the West for attention to detail.

Philosophical Method: Topics in this area are of the greatest current interest to philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition. Western philosophers sometimes seem to suppose that the "linguistic turn" in recent philosophy is a unique phenomenon, a turning-point in the history of philosophy. Perhaps it is, but if so it took place many centuries ago in India, where attention to grammar was commonplace by the 4th century B.C. The Nyāya theory of language, of meaning and the meaningfulness of words and sentences, shows

subtlety at the levels of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. Nyāya also gave prolonged attention to defense of the empirical theory of validity and truth, opposing uncritical use of intuition and authoritarian appeals to revelation.

I. *Who were these Philosophers?*

The present volume covers the first part of the history of the school of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, up until the beginning of so-called Navya-nyāya in the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa. The reader will be able to find below summaries of what we know about these ancient philosophers. In this section I provide only a brief survey designed to give a nodding acquaintance with the most important of them so that they can be referred to as we proceed.

Gaṅgeśa flourished around A. D. 1350. This volume, then, deals with the system as it is presented and developed by some 55 authors who flourished prior to A. D. 1350, and who wrote some works of which we know or have heard. Many of these authors are practically nothing but names to us at present, and it is quite possible that we shall never learn more about them. Of the 82 works whose titles are known to us, only 51 are available now; the remaining ones, if we know anything about them, are known through fragmentary references taken from the works of philosophers who addressed polemics toward their views.²

Of the 50 works available in manuscript, 33 have been edited, some more than once, and 11 have been translated—wholly or partially—into English. In our treatment in this volume we have been able to provide summaries of the contents of 30 of these works. However, many of the works we have been unable to summarize are late commentaries of apparently less interest than some of the more original works that are better known.

As with several of the major Hindu philosophical systems, there is a tradition that looks back to a basic work in which the principles of the system were supposedly first enunciated. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika were frequently listed as two systems,³ partly perhaps because there are two sets of *sūtras* or aphorisms from which the two schools issued. It is uncertain whether these works were the work of one author or many, and it is probable that the development of the doctrines they summarize took place over several centuries. Of the two, the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, attributed to a probably fictitious person named “Kaṇāda” (perhaps “atom-eater”) or “Ulūka” (“owl”), seem to represent the somewhat earlier stage of development. The date of Gautama or Akṣapāda (“eyes in his feet”), to whom the

Nyāyasūtras is attributed, is variously estimated from as early as the 6th century B.C. to the 2nd century A.D., the reason for the discrepancy being apparently that these *sūtras*, which achieved their present form around the time of Nāgārjuna and very possibly were fashioned by a chief architect of that period, are attributed to a traditional personage who must have lived very long ago, since he is known to the authors of Vedas and epics which date back many centuries before Christ. In any case, it seems likely that traditions which associate Kaṇāda with Banaras and Akṣapāda with Mithilā (North Bihar) may be accepted; Banaras was an ancient seat of learning, and many of the most influential later scholars of the system came from or were instructed in Mithilā.

The style of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* is laconic, and several parts of it are extremely difficult to interpret. Apparently later Vaiśeṣika authors found them difficult to understand also, as commentaries on these *sūtras* before Vādīndra (fl. 1225) have been lost and apparently more or less forgotten. The style of the *Nyāyasūtras*, by contrast, is somewhat more discursive, particularly in its third and fourth books, which has led some to guess that these are of later origin. However, it is several centuries before the first extant commentary on these *sūtras* was composed by Vātsyāyana or Pakṣilasvāmin (450-500), who is also known as "Drāmiḍa," suggesting his home was in the Deccan or the south of India. The *Nyāyabhāṣya*, as this commentary is known, became the basis for a great many subcommentaries in the next few centuries, and indeed on until the present. Whether Vātsyāyana accurately understood the meaning of the aphorisms on which he comments, it is his account of Nyāya which provides the springboard for many of the subsequent developments in the system.

This is not to suggest, however, that each new sub-commentator did not innovate. They certainly did so, for they were under constant pressure from a remarkable series of philosophical Buddhists, who selected Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as their prime target in controversy. Scholars are still not absolutely certain about the relative chronology of this period, but it would appear that Buddhist logic of a serious sort began with Vasubandhu, who was more or less contemporaneous with Vātsyāyana; it was developed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, defended by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, and refined by Ratnakīrti and Jñānaśrimitra, and that this period found constant challenge and response between these philosophers and the contemporary Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers.

Part of the difficulty in piecing together the history of this period is due to the fact that the historian must command several languages

to be in full command of his materials. The original language of all these philosophers, Hindu and Buddhist, was classical Sanskrit, but for many of the Buddhist works the scholar must rely on Tibetan and/or Chinese versions, then reconstruct the original. It is probable that many as yet unknown works of these times are hidden away in Tibetan lamaseries, for occasional forays have brought to light a number of works previously unknown or only heard of, and there must be many more waiting to be discovered.

It is understandable that the Sanskrit works which Chinese monks translated and carried to China during these times were mainly Buddhist. Only two Hindu texts are known to have been translated; one of them is a treatise called *Daśapadārthaśāstra* by a Candramati (or Maticandra) who probably dates from about Vātsyāyana's time. His work is a version of the Vaiśeṣika system, and Frauwallner has argued that it was to refute his version that Praśastapāda wrote the work which is probably, even more than the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, the definitive treatise on Vaiśeṣika tenet.⁴ Praśastapāda's work is called *Padārthadharmasamgraha*; while it alludes frequently to the *sūtras*, it can hardly be called a commentary on them, being an independent exposition of the fundamental tenets of the system with some detailed notes on certain topics. Scholars have argued whether Praśastapāda got his theory of inference from Dignāga the great Buddhist logician, or vice versa. It appears fairly certain that Praśastapāda and Dignāga were separated by no more than a century. Frauwallner dates Praśastapāda 500 to 600. Approximately contemporary with him is the Naiyāyika⁵ Uddyotakara, whose commentary on *Nyāyabhāṣya* is the oldest now available. Uddyotakara clearly knows of Dignāga's views and attacks them. His *Nyāyavārttika* is philosophical work of great skill in dialectic; he was a consummate philosopher, although some modern scholars judge him too fond of sharp practices in argumentation.

At this point, unhappily, a 300-year gap sets in as far as available texts are concerned. From Buddhist sources, however, we know that the period was alive with philosophical controversy. Śāntaraḥṣita (ca. 700) refers to several old Naiyāyikas and considers some of them to be "pillars" of the system—notably Bhāvivikta, Aviddhakarṇa, and Śaṃkarasvāmin. Bhāvivikta may be prior to Uddyotakara, but the other two must fall within this 300-year gap. Fortunately, Śāntaraḥṣita and his commentator Kamalaśīla provide extensive references to the views of several of these philosophers.

The next available texts of the system come from a new direction—Kashmir. One of the most interesting personalities among

our group of philosophers is Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (840-900), the author of a *Nyāyamañjarī* (and apparently a summary of it called *Nyāyakalikā*). Jayanta came from a Bengali family which had migrated to Kashmir several generations previously; he was an orthodox Brahmin who zealously defended the authority of the Vedas and saw the refutation of Buddhism as a religious cause. Yet he was no fanatic; he held that differences among religious sects are unimportant since they all seek the same end, namely liberation: all serious (i.e., Hindu?) faiths should be tolerated. Furthermore, Jayanta was capable of retaining his sense of humor under adversity: he tells us that as he writes *Nyāyamañjarī* he is being held prisoner in a cave and "I have beguiled my days here by this diversion of writing a book." The book turns out to be one of the acknowledged masterpieces of Sanskrit style, replete with light turns of phrase to offset the dry character of his subject matter. An "allrounder," Jayanta also wrote a play and was well trained in grammar and aesthetics.

Another Kashmiri Naiyāyika is Bhāsarvajña (860-920), the author of *Nyāyasāra* and a commentary on it called *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*. The importance of the latter work for the development of the system is difficult to overemphasize. The *Nyāyasāra*, a brief and rather straightforward summary of Nyāya doctrines with a few remarkable features, is a standard text. The *Bhūṣaṇa*, however, is a long work that was thought to be lost until quite recently. The work has now been published, and its appearance is one of the most exciting events in the history of scholarship on Indian philosophy, for the doctrines in this work are apparently highly extraordinary and original. Later philosophers continually refer to the view of the "Bhūṣaṇakāra," or sometimes to a group of Naiyāyikas they call "ekadeśins"—meaning "a section of the school," apparently referring to the followers of the Bhūṣaṇakāra. Since many of the opinions of this section involve throwing out whole categories of time-honored importance within the system, it is understandable that Bhāsarvajña's views provide the basis for what is perhaps the only serious factional split within the system, one that lasts on and is referred to till the end of our period. Bhāsarvajña's theories may well turn out to have inspired some of the reforms currently attributed⁶ to the Navya-naiyāyika Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, for instance.

This brings us to the 10th and 11th centuries, a period during which the Nyāya-Buddhism conflict reached its climax. Indeed, after this period Buddhism, for whatever reasons, is no longer a force in India. Naiyāyikas like to think this occurred because of the force of their polemics.

Three commentaries on Praśastapāda's classic Vaiśeṣika treatise were written during this period: the *Vyomavati* of Vyomaśiva (900-960), the *Nyāyakandalī* of Śrīdhara (950-1000), and the *Kīraṇāvalī* of Udayana (1050-1100). These are lengthy, technical accounts defending complex ontology with exceptional subtlety. As for commentaries on the Nyāya literature, two authors stand out prominently. One is Vācaspati Miśra (900-980), a rather unique phenomenon in Indian philosophy, for he managed to compose treatises defending no less than five different and mutually incompatible systems of thought, treatises each of which has become a classic within its tradition. His contribution to Nyāya is a commentary on Uddyotakara's work: its title is *Nyāyavārttika Tātparyatikā*.

On Vācaspati's work Udayana (1050-1100) composed still another commentary called *Parīśuddhi*. Many modern scholars believe that Udayana deserves the title of the greatest philosopher of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school; he certainly stands as one of the most important figures. Besides *Kīraṇāvalī* and the *Parīśuddhi* he wrote five other works on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and fortunately they are all preserved. Two of them are brief presentations of the basic definitions of Nyāya concepts (*Lakṣaṇāvalī* and *Lakṣaṇamālā*). A third is a development of the topic of how to win or lose a debate, a topic Gautama treated in the fifth book of his *sūtras*: Udayana gives it a full-scale treatment in his *Nyāyaparīśiṣṭa*.

The other two works are perhaps Udayana's most important contributions. One of them is entitled *Ātmatattvaviveka*, "Discrimination of the Reality of the Self", a broadside against Buddhism from which, according to confirmed Naiyāyikas, Buddhism never recovered. This text badly needs translating; it may well be that its brand of analysis would prove more interesting to contemporary philosophers than any of the works so far available in all of Indian thought. In it Udayana not only gives arguments for the existence of the continuants the Naiyāyikas call "Selves"; he also considers and refutes fundamental principles of Buddhist analysis such as the principle that whatever is real has only momentary existence, the Buddhist denial of an external world independent of the mind, the very important Buddhist view that substances are nothing but bundles of qualities, and the Buddhist account of causation which is akin to that of Hume and Kant.

Udayana's *magnum opus*, according to many critics, is yet another work, entitled *Nyāyakusumāñjali*. This work contains by general acclaim the definitive treatment of the question of how to prove God's existence. It is still regularly studied in Indian curricula. As

Udayana develops the question of God's existence it turns out to involve most of the central topics of philosophy—e.g., the nature of successful argument (since arguments for God go beyond the reach of the senses), the nature of causation *re* the cosmological argument and the need for a creator, and so on.

So monumentally does Udayana loom in the history of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that writers in this tradition over the next few generations are overshadowed by comparison. Indeed, some historians of the school hold that it is a mistake to break “old” and “new” Nyāya at Gaṅgeśa; Udayana, himself, pioneered the new techniques that Gaṅgeśa so expertly wielded. There is no doubt that much of the discussion during the period between the two—a period of about 250 years—was devoted to refining Udayana's definitions and analyses, though Udayana was by no means followed slavishly, and new ideas continued to be broached and older ones resuscitated.

Too, part of our difficulty is that this post-Udayana, pre-Gaṅgeśa period has not been studied nearly as extensively as that prior to Udayana. One or two short handbooks have been translated: that of Śivāditya called *Saptapadārthī* presents a succinct account of Vaiśeṣika, useful for students who study in India by rote methods, and Keśava Miśra's *Tarkabhāṣā* is a similarly useful handbook for students of Nyāya. Of the more original works of this period none are available in translation. One is Śrivalabha's (or simply Vallabha's) *Nyāyalilāvati*, written during the first part of the 12th century. Another is the *Mahāvīdyāvīḍambana* of Bhaṭṭa Vāindira (1175-1225), which contributes importantly to the development of logical theory by exhaustively and critically studying the question of that sort of argument called *kevalānvayī*, where what is being proved is the existence of universal properties or things satisfying them. As we approach Gaṅgeśa's time a number of works are written, none of them well-known to scholarship, which may well contain much of what Gaṅgeśa systematizes. Notable in this group are the *Nyāyaratna* of Maṅikaṅṭha Miśra (1275-1325) and the *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa* of Śaśadhara (1275-1325).

For ease of reference the table on the next page summarizes the names of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors, their works, dates, and places of origin where known.

T—Translated

E—Not translated, but has been published

M—Not published, but manuscript(s) available

NYĀYA-VAIŚEŚIKA BEFORE GANGEŚĀ—CHECK
LIST OF AUTHORS AND WORKS

<i>Name</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Works</i>
1. Kaṇāda	?	Banaras?	Vaiśeṣikasūtras (T)
2. Gautama	?	Mithilā, then Kathiāwār?	Nyāyasūtras (T)
3. Vākyakāra	?	?	Vaiśeṣikasūtravākya
4. Kaṭandikāra	?	?	Vaiśeṣikasūtravākya- kaṭandī
5. Vātsyāyana	450-500 (Oberhammer)	Deccan?	Nyāyabhāṣya (T)
6. Candramati	450-500 (Frauwallner)	?	Daśapadārthasāstra (T)
7. Bhāvivikta	520-580 (Frauwallner)	?	Nyāyabhāṣyaṭīkā
8. Praśastapāda	550-600 (Frauwallner)	?	Padārthadharmasam- graha (T)
8a. (Praśastamati)			Ṭīkā on Vaiśeṣika- sūtras, Vākya
9. Uddyotakāra	550-610	Srughna near Thāneśvar	Nyāyavārttika (T) and Bhāṣya
10. Ātreya	?	?	Rāvaṇabhāṣya on Vaiśeṣikasūtras
11. Prīticandra	600-650	?	?
12. Aviddhakarṇa	620-700	?	Nyāyabhāṣyaṭīkā
13. Śaṅkara (svāmin)	675-725 (before Śāntarakṣita)	?	Sthirasiddhi
14. Viśvarūpa	800-850 (Steinkellner)	?	Nyāyabhāṣyaṭīkā
15. Dhairyarāśī	800-850 (Steinkellner)	?	?
16l Jayanta Bhaṭṭa	840-900 (Steinkellner)	Kashmir	Nyāyamañjari (E: partially T) Nyāyakalikā(?) (E) (Āgamaḍambara)
17. Nyāyaratnakāra	840-900 (Kavirāj)	Kashmir?	Nyāyaratna
18. Bhāsarvajña	860-920 (Suali)	Kashmir	Nyāyasāra (E) Nyāyabhūṣaṇa (E) (Gaṇakārikās)
19. Trilocana	(870-930)	Karnāṭa country?	Nyāyaprakīrṇaka Nyāyamañjari Nyāyabhāṣyaṭīkā

<i>Name</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Works</i>
20. Sānātani	900-960? (D.C.Bhattacharya)	Bengal	G on Nyāyasūtras(?)
21. Vyomaśiva	900-960 (V. Varadachari)	“from South” “Kashmir” (D.R. Sastri)	Vyomavati on Padār- thasaṃgraha (E)
22. Vācaspati Miśra I	900-980 (Thakur)	Mithilā	Nyāyavārttikatāt- paryatikā (E) Nyāyasūcinibandha (E) G on Nyāyaratna
23. Adhyāyana	950-1000? (Steinkellner)	?	Ruciṭikā on Nyāya- bhāṣya
24. Vittoka	950-1000? (Steinkellner)	?	?
25. Narasiṃha	950-1000? (Steinkellner)	?	?
26. Śrīdhara	950-1000	Bengal	Nyāyakandali on Padārthadharmā- saṃgraha (T)
27. Śrīvatsa	1000-1050 (D.C.Bhattacharya)	Mithilā (?)	?
28. Aniruddha	1025-1075? (Jetly)	?	Vivaraṇapañjikā on NS, NBh, NV and NVT (M)
29. Udayana	1050-1100 (Frauwallner)	Mithilā	Lakṣaṇāvalī (E) Lakṣaṇamālā (E) Ātmatattvaviveka (E) Nyāyakusumāñjali (partially T: E) Nyāyapariśiṣṭa (E) Nyāyavārttikatāt- paryatikāparīśuddhi (partially E) Kiraṇāvalī on Padār- thadharmasaṃgraha (E)
30. Aparārkadeva	1075-1125 (Subrahmanya Sastri)	Konkan	Nyāyamuktāvalī on Nyāyasāra (E)
31. Śrīkaṇṭha	1075-1125 (D.C.Bhattacharya)	?	Pañcaprasthānyāya- tarka on NS, NBh, NV, NVT, and NVTP (M)
32. Vṛttikāra	1100-1150 (Thakur)	Bengal	Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛtti (M)
33. (Śrī) Vallabha	1100-1150 (D.C.Bhattacharya)	Mithilā	Nyāyalīlavati (E)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Works</i>
34. Varadarāja	1100-1150 (V. Varadachari)	? Kashmir or Āndhra	Tārkikarakṣā (E) Sārasaṃgraha on Tārkikarakṣā (E) Nyāyakusumāñjali- bodhanī (E) G on Kiraṇāvali (M) ? Nyāyadīpikā (M)
35. Śivāditya	1100-1150 (D.C.Bhattacharya)	?	Saptapadārthī (T) Lakṣaṇamālā Hetukhaṇḍana Upādhivārttika Arthāpattivārttika Nyāyamālā (E)
36. Vādindra	1175-1225 (D.C.Bhattacharya)	Daulatabad	Mahāvīdyāvidambana (E) Kiraṇāvalīdarpaṇa (partially E) Kaṇādasūtraniban- dha (M) Vaiśeṣikasūtravyā- khyā (E) (Summary of previ- ous item) ? G on Lakṣaṇāvali Nyāyasāravīcāra (M)
37. Bhaṭṭa Rāghava	1200-1250 (D.C.Bhattacharya)	Daulatabad	Nyāyasāravīcāra (M)
38. Divākara	1200-1250 (D.C.Bhattacharya)	Mithilā	Nyāyakusumāñjali- parimāla (M) Nibandhodyota (on Pariśuddhi?) (partially M)
39. Vādi Vāgīśvara	“before Ānandānu- bhava” (E.P. Radhakrishnan)		Mānamanohara (M) Nyāyalakṣmīvilāsa
40. Nārāyaṇa Sarvajña	1225-1275 (D.C.Bhattacharya)	?	?
41. Keśava Mīśra	1225-1275 (D.C.Bhattacharya)	Mithilā	Tarkabhāṣā (T)
42. Ānandānubhava	1230-1280		Nyāyakālanīdhi on Nyāyasāra (E) (Advaita works)
43. Prabhākaraopā- dhyāya	1230-1280 (D.C.Bhattacharya)	Mithilā	?
44. Abhayatilaka	1275-1325 (Jetly)	?	Nyāyālamkāra on NBh, NV, NVT and NVTP (M)
45. Sondaḍopādhyāya	1275-1325 (D.C.Bhattacharya)	Mithilā	?

Name	Date	Place	Works
46. Maṇikanṭha Miśra	1275-1325 (D.C.Bhattacharya)	Mithilā	Nyāyaratna (E) Nyāyacintāmaṇi
47. Śaśadhara	1275-1325 (D.C.Bhattacharya)	Mithilā	Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa (E) Nyāyamimāṃsāpra- karaṇa (M) Nyāyanaya (M) Śaśadharamālā (M)
48. Taraṇi Miśra	1300-1350 (D.C.Bhattacharya)	?	Ratnakośa (M)
49. Jagadguru	"before Gaṅgeśa" (D.C.Bhattacharya)		G on Nyāyakusumā- ñjali
50. Nyāyabhāskarakāra	"before Gaṅgeśa" (D.C.Bhattacharya)		Nyāyabhāskara
51. Raviśvara	"before Gaṅgeśa" (D.C.Bhattacharya)		?
<i>Questionable, or dates unknown</i>			
52. ?			Bhāradvājvṛtti on Vaiśeṣikasūtras
53. Viṣṇu Miśra			
54. Vidyādharamiśra			
55. Śrikara			
56. Candrānanda			Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛtti (E)

II. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika: Two Schools or One ?

Although there are two sets of *sūtras*, there is no doubt that each of the two schools accepted a great deal of what the other taught. The extent to which, for example, Uddyotakara utilized Vaiśeṣika doctrines in his Nyāya commentary has been shown to be of no mean proportion. At least one author appeals explicitly to the principle that if of the two sister schools one does not speak against the other's view it should be accepted that the two agree on the point.⁷

In the light of this it seems unnecessary to speculate about just when "syncretism" between the two schools occurred. One scholar has suggested that Śivāditya's *Saptapadārthī* is the first syncretic work, since Śivāditya attempts "to combine the two systems...in one manual by a symmetrical representation and arrangement".⁸ In this special sense later handbooks such as *Tārkikarakṣā* and *Tarkabhāṣā* may also be called "syncretic." However, apart from this stylistic point, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika have from the first considered themselves as mutually supportive, Nyāya specializing in epistemology and methodology, Vaiśeṣika in metaphysics.

There were occasional points of disagreement between the philosophers of the two schools, however. Many of these were quite minor, and others are on points where even within each school there

is by no means unanimity. Umesh Mishra⁹ has provided a useful list of these points of disagreement. Despite this, there seems no reason whatsoever not to treat Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers together under the same cover; on practically all fundamental questions they agree in opposing the various other systems of Indian thought.

III. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Other Systems of Indian Philosophy

Besides the Buddhists, the Naiyāyikas jostled on occasion with philosophers representing several of the Hindu systems, notably the Vaiyākaraṇas, Mīmāṃsakas, Sāṃkhya, and Advaita Vedāntins. There are very few references to the Jains in the works of our period; other varieties of Vedānta did not arise until the close of our period or even after that, though in the subsequent period of Navya-nyāya there was controversy with logicians of the Dvaita school of Madhva, for example.

Vaiyākaraṇas: These philosophers developed the theory of meaning in early times. Scholars are now working on the views of these Grammarians, and we may be confident that the results of their researches will yield many insights into the origins of some of the speculations of the systematic schools such as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. There is reason to believe that many of the typical tendencies in Hindu thought had their antecedents in grammatical theories, though the influence went more or less unnoticed by the philosophers themselves. An occasionally more insightful philosopher such as Jayanta, however, expert in grammar as well as his own philosophical tradition, provides us with much material for deeper analyses of the sources of Nyāya views on meaning and truth. We shall deal with some of these views below.

Mīmāṃsakas: As mentioned above, Pūrvamīmāṃsā had as its business in earliest times what may be likened to ethical theory, namely the exegesis of the scriptural injunctions which constituted the moral precepts accepted by the community and enshrined in the Vedas. In the course of this work the Mīmāṃsakas also developed characteristic views on meaning, validity, and truth, sometimes at odds with those of the Grammarians. Of particular importance to Nyāya was their theory about the nature of sound, which the Mīmāṃsā views as an eternal substance manifesting itself here and there as words and noises. Utilizing this theory, they were able to defend the eternity and authority of the Vedas. They were roundly attacked by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika for this view, and the number of arguments that can be culled from the literature for and against the

eternity of sound seems endless. This had its importance for logical theory, for in the heat of this battle both sides were forced continually to re-examine the nature of their arguments, and one hears that many debates were held, no doubt regulated by the rules of debate which we find promulgated in one form or another in such books as the *Nyāyasūtras*.

Mīmāṃsā does not really flower into a philosophical system in the full sense until the time of Kumārila (620-680) and Prabhākara (650-720), that is, until approximately the time of the 300-year gap we referred to in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature. In studying the polemics between Buddhism and its realistic opponents during this gap, scholars have been able to replace the lacking Nyāya works with Kumārila's *Ślokovārttika*, for in it the author sets out many of the characteristic Nyāya doctrines and arguments. But there are important differences, particularly in epistemology, separating Nyāya and Kumārila. Much the same sort of thing can be said about the views of Prabhākara, which in some respects might be held to provide a *via media* between Buddhism and Nyāya. Epistemologically Prabhākara is if anything even more uncompromisingly realistic than Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika; but ontologically he shows tendencies to nominalism which did not fit with Nyāya predilections.

Sāṃkhya: This system is one of the oldest among the Hindu schools. In some form or other, Sāṃkhya appears to date back several centuries before Christ, and many scholars have suggested affinities between early Sāṃkhya and Buddhism. The Mahābhārata, probably the older of the two great Indian epics, presents Sāṃkhya philosophy in many places, notably in the mouth of Kṛṣṇa in the *Bhagavadgītā*. It is not always easy to identify the source of opponents' arguments in the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts, but clearly Vātsyāyana addresses himself to Sāṃkhya arguments in several places and implies that the *Nyāyasūtras* also were directed toward that quarter. The most important controversy between Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya is over the nature of causation, a topic which can be viewed as crucial to all other problems of metaphysics and epistemology. The Sāṃkhyas were the champions of the view that the effect exists in potency already in its cause, which merely needs to be nudged in order to make the effect manifest to observation. The Sāṃkhya, to be sure, conceived this version of change to be a process which takes place in the real world external to our minds; yet merely to describe the view serves to suggest why the Naiyāyikas looked askance at it, for it suggests that an effect is so because we the observers, are aware of it when previously we were

not. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika proposes instead a view of causation according to which the effect does not exist until the moment of its origination. This view has more affinity with Buddhism than with most of the other Hindu systems, for the Buddhists believed that the effect came into being after the cause. However, the crucial difference still remains that the Naiyāyika believes in real continuants, while the Buddhist explains continuants away as mere appearance; in reality all there is for Buddhists are momentary events.

It appears also that the Sāṃkhya thinkers were among the first to propose systematic techniques which warrant the title of "logic," and it was their logical theories which were prevalent in the period prior to the compilation of the *Nyāyasūtras*.¹⁰ Frauwallner thinks that some of the puzzling aspects of the classification of types of inference are cleared up by referring to this old Sāṃkhya logic, which seems to have remained prominent until the 5th century or so.

Rather little is heard of Sāṃkhya in our texts during the later centuries. Sāṃkhya seems to have had few defenders. Vācaspati Miśra wrote a commentary on the *Sāṃkhyakārikās* in the 10th century, but after that until the so-called *Sāṃkhyasūtras* composed apparently in the 13th or 14th century there is practically speaking no Sāṃkhya activity at all. It would seem that many of the Sāṃkhya ideas were absorbed during this period into the thought of the Vedānta schools.

Advaita Vedānta: Considering the importance of this school in recent times, when it has become so prevalent as to be frequently mistaken for the only kind of Indian philosophy extant, it is interesting to notice how long it takes this school to catch the attention of the Nyāya writers. We find an occasional reference to the Advaitin Maṇḍana Miśra in works of the 9th and 10th century, but I have found no reference in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature of that period to Śaṃkarācārya, acclaimed nowadays as India's greatest philosophical mind. In fact, it is not until the time of Udayana that Advaita clearly begins to call for attention on the part of the Naiyāyikas. There is a tradition that Udayana once defeated in debate one Śrīhira, whose son was Śrīharṣa, the author of several famous literary works. Śrīharṣa, who may be held to have lived around 1075-1125, avenged his father by writing a barbed critique of Nyāya called *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*. This work espouses Advaita, albeit a rather negative version of Advaitic teachings more akin to that of Śaṃkara's pupil Sureśvara than to the more positive teachings of Maṇḍana or Padmapāda, say. Several Naiyāyikas were moved to write answers to Śrīharṣa's polemic. It is quite unusual in the history of

Indian thought to find members of one school writing commentaries on a text of another school with an eye to refuting its arguments, Refutations of other schools are the business of the day in Indian thought, but one normally appends one's arguments to a text which sets forth the truth as one sees it, introducing and confuting opponents who dare to challenge the master. A *Ṭikā* by the Divākara listed above was the only one of these anti-Śrīharṣa commentaries that we know to have been written on the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* prior to Gaṅgeśa, but quite a few Navya-naiyāyikas also wrote such commentaries. And in any case after the time of Śrīharṣa, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika could not ignore Advaita, though even then one remains surprised at the infrequency with which Advaita views are attacked. It is perhaps noteworthy that at least one of the writers of the post-Udayana period, Ānandānubhava, was apparently an Advaitin who dabbled in logic; the bulk of his writings were in Vedānta, but he wrote at least one occasional commentary on a Nyāya text. Does this presage the modern reconciling tenor of Vedāntins, who tend to see other systems as partial approximations to the full monistic insight, or as necessary stages in a dialectic leading to Advaitic enlightenment?

Jainism: References to Jain views in the classical Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts are very rare. Jain writers did on occasion write on Nyāya topics during the latter part of our period. One of these was Abhayatilaka (1275-1325); there were others later on in the post-Gaṅgeśa period.

Cārvāka: It is clear that from the time of the Buddha and Mahāvīra onward for many centuries there were skeptics who found the pretensions of Brahminical philosophy with its faith in spiritual values a belief without substance. Just about all the works of these "materialists," as they are usually called by Indian writers, have been lost or destroyed. Yet, the frequency with which our writers address themselves to skeptical doubts indicates their need to justify each plank in their philosophy not only to believers, Hindus like themselves, but to nonbelievers as well.

IV Was there any Influence from or to Western Philosophy

This question was asked frequently by scholars of a number of decades back who were struck by what they considered strong affinities between Nyāya and Aristotelian logic. Since it has become clear that these affinities are the result of inadequate information or reflection, the quest for evidence of mutual influence has died away. The truth is that (as far as philosophical ideas are concerned)

there is very little, if any, evidence of direct borrowing by Indians from the West until near-contemporary times. As for the influence of Indian thought on the West, there is no doubt that Neoplatonism owed a good deal to Oriental mysticism, and other relationships can be attested to throughout the centuries.

Restricting ourselves to the field of logic, Frenkian¹¹ has found specific influences of Indian logical speculations on Greek thought as early as the second half of the 4th century B.C. "Firstly, the image of the coiled rope taken for a snake was used as illustration of the doctrine of Carneades in the 2nd century B.C. Secondly, the quadrilemma seems to have been employed by Pyrrhon, the founder of the Greek skeptical school of philosophy in earlier times, in the 2nd half of the 4th century B.C."¹² He also points out that Sextus Empiricus, though he alone, uses as example of inference the Indian stock argument about there being fire on the mountain because there is smoke. The first two of these characteristically Indian allusions—the rope-snake illusion and the quadrilemma—are more Buddhist than Hindu, at least in those early days of which Frenkian speaks. But the smoke-fire illustration of inference must have been well-known in proto-Nyāya before the time of Sextus Empiricus (2nd to 3rd century A.D.), though it is of course possible that Sextus thought it up on his own. All in all, we must be sober in our judgments on this exciting possibility of mutual East-West influence; repeated efforts by reputable scholars have found precious little to show any conscious borrowing.

THEORY OF VALUE

Philosophical system building in India is almost invariably connected by its creators with the gaining of perfection, which has various names in Indian thought but which we shall here call regularly "liberation." One topic reviewed below is the extent to which this commitment to liberation is mere windowdressing in the case of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which some critics view as studying logic and debate for their own sake. We shall have occasion to look at the religious affiliations of our philosophers in this connection, and to attempt to gauge the relevance of their religious convictions to their philosophy. Then, after summarily reviewing the general Hindu lore that lies behind all Indian thought, we shall turn to consider particular Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories about the nature of liberation and the other characteristic topics in the Hindu theory of value such as *karma* and transmigration, the abilities of yogis and sages, the question of human versus divine freedom, and the relative worth of the various paths to liberation.

I. What is the Place of Spiritual Values in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ?

The answer to this question has implications not only for our understanding of the philosophy of the system but also for assessing its historical origins. Generally speaking, Western scholars have tended to discount the reference in the texts to liberation, while Indian scholars have tended to take them seriously. Thus Faddegon writes that the Vaiśeṣika "owes its origin to a purely theoretical attitude of mind and not to that craze for liberation which dominates nearly all forms of Indian thought"¹; but Gopinath Kaviraj suggests that even for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas "the external world...has only a moral value...Hence, the same moral end...which occasions the rise of subjective phenomena acts also as a motive for the origin of the objective order."² These two quotations represent extreme views;

most scholars adopt positions somewhere between. Not all Western scholars are as skeptical as Faddegon about the moral import of the system: Ingalls writes, "It has often seemed to me that the teachings of the early Nyāya might better be called a philosophy of man than an exposition of logic."³ And not all Indians have accepted the claims of the classical writers connecting *mokṣa* with philosophy; e.g., Daya Krishna writes: "...many schools of philosophy have literally nothing to do with *mokṣa*. Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā would predominantly come within this group."⁴

It is important, I believe, to separate the historical question here from the methodological one. As for the latter, I think there is very little reason to accept either Faddegon's or Kaviraj's extreme position. There is no question about the sincerity of moral conviction implicit in the writings of the authors we are concerned with. Doubts on this score might only begin to be raised as we approach the close of the period, where there is a tendency to write short monographs on limited topics in logic and methodology, topics which can be handled without any reference to ultimate purposes. As we shall see below, it is possible that the earliest philosophers of this school were not monotheists, but it is only a Western prejudice which draws from this the conclusion that they were amoral or uninterested in spiritual values. They have a great deal to say about liberation, *karma*, and life, and they quite frequently make rather explicit the connections they assume hold between their epistemological and ontological speculations and the quest for perfection.

On the other hand, I find nothing to warrant Kaviraj's view that in some basic sense Nyāya is a kind of idealism. These writers are explicitly concerned to controvert idealism in all quarters. It is only if we view philosophy as subordinate to religion that we might come to a view such as Kaviraj's. But there is no evidence that these philosophers took such a view of philosophy. The question of just what the relation is between philosophical investigations and the proper way to live is one that we shall raise below, where we shall see that while the Naiyāyikas did not equate the good life with the reflective life, they did feel that one would not find his appropriate path eventually culminating in liberation without understanding the truths about reality enshrined in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine, and without mastering the methods of investigation taught in the system.

The historical question is much more difficult to settle. The most recent and thorough review of it has been made by Oberhammer.⁵ He traces the origins of Nyāya to an old "*vāda* tradition," a

theory about how to carry on and win in discussion, which he feels probably existed independently of *ātmanvidyā*, or theory of the self and its perfection, in the days prior to Vātsyāyana. It was Vātsyāyana, he argues, who made special efforts to wed these two disparate strands which only sit uneasily side by side in the *Nyāyasūtras*. For example, in the old theory of discussion the topic of the proper instruments of true knowledge (*pramāṇa*) has only a secondary importance, since though to win a debate one needs to know which arguments carry weight and which do not, the place to look to decide which arguments are persuasive is to the judge, not to theories about the nature of the world or spiritual values. If one's intent is merely to evaluate the worth of arguments, then one need not worry about whether they are productive of true judgments. Thus Nāgārjuna, engaged in a negative dialectical refutation of all positive philosophies, feels no need to limit his reasoning to arguments involving acceptable instruments of true knowledge. The Naiyāyika, on the other hand, insofar as he does plan to use argument to establish positive propositions about how things are, must appeal to a theory about which kinds of evidence are trustworthy.

Vātsyāyana identifies what he calls "the science of argument" (*nyāyavidyā*) with an ancient science called *ānvīkṣikī*, referred to by Kauṭilya in the *Arthśāstra*, a famous tract of perhaps the 2nd century B.C. apparently written by a royal minister for the edification of princes. In this work *ānvīkṣikī* is mentioned as an essential part of the curriculum of the young ruler, and scholars have speculated as to what the term means and what sort of an intellectual climate its mention implies. The term may be translated, perhaps, as "investigation"; it occurs elsewhere in Sanskrit literature, where it sometimes means the study of the Vedas. Hacker⁶ thinks it is misleading to construe it as referring to philosophy, and suspects that Kauṭilya had in mind that princes should be trained to argue intelligently, and that by referring to the logical aspects of what was taught by philosophers at that time they would find a guide for what they needed. It is possible that the reference is to a form of the Nyāya school, or Vaiśeṣika, but more likely it refers primarily to some form of that early Sāṃkhya logic which we had occasion to mention above. In any case, Vātsyāyana tries to identify this *ānvīkṣikī* with the logical side of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and according to Oberhammer⁷ he is the first to make extended efforts to show that Nyāya is also a science of the self, that is, a means to that self-knowledge which is propaedeutic to liberation. Vātsyāyana does seem to make extended efforts to apply notions probably drawn from the yoga system of Patañjali to

the topic of the things one must know (*prameya*). But D. N. Shastri⁸ sees no evidence that *ānvīkṣikī* did not always include the science of the self, despite the analyses of Oberhammer and of Jacobi⁹ before him.

These matters bear upon several others: one is the makeup of the *Nyāyasūtras*. Another is the attitude of early Indians toward logic. Vidyabhusana was of the opinion that logicians were looked on with disfavor in early times because then "Nyāya was pure logic" and "had no relation with the topics of the Vedic Saṃhitā and Brāhmaṇa."¹⁰ However, there were other branches of learning which were unconnected with the Vedas—e.g., grammar—and which so far as we can tell flourished in the same period.

II. Religious Affiliations of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

The connection of this question with the previous one is probably more apparent to a Westerner than to an Indian. One does not have to believe in one God to accept moral and spiritual values in India, though not all Indians in later times would assent to this statement.

Tradition has it that Naiyāyikas are Śaivite and Vaiśeṣikas are Pāśupatas. The *Yuktidīpikā*, a Sāṃkhya treatise written around A.D. 550, tells us that the Pāśupatas introduced God into the Vaiśeṣika system, going on to suggest that God has no business being there.¹¹ Pāśupata is a sect of Śaivas (worshippers of Śiva) who worship him as "Lord of Beasts" (*paśupati*). They are usually traced back to the teacher Lakulīṣa (A.D. 100), reputedly a native of Gujarat, who established a line of teachers who taught around Mathurā in the Ganges plain. It was an extraordinary sect, whose practices included bathing in ashes, honoring the god by dancing, laughing, and lowing like a bull, and it advised its more advanced devotees to go about behaving like madmen and to perform acts which the populace generally looked upon as improper. Ingalls has compared them with the Greek Cynics.¹²

However, as is the way with some of the Indian traditions, it is difficult to find much evidence that the Vaiśeṣika philosophers were Pāśupatas, though there is evidence that some of the Naiyāyikas were, all of which may tell once again in favor of the essential identity of the two schools. Uddyotakara is sometimes referred to as Pāśupatācārya, and Bhāsarvajña (whose version of Nyāya is closer to Sāṃkhya than to Vaiśeṣika) wrote a work called *Gaṇakārikā* expounding Pāśupata tenets.

There is plenty of evidence, on the other hand, that Naiyāyikas are generally worshippers of Śiva rather than Viṣṇu. As far as I know there is no evidence to suggest that any of our philosophers up to near the end of our period were Vaiṣṇavites. And several writers are of the opinion that the religious sources of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika were more or less the same. Kaviraj writes that the source of bondage between the schools is through “the original Śivāgama or its philosophical counterpart, the so-called Īśvaravāda, out of which not only the present form of Yoga and Nyāya, but the later Śaiva philosophies also may have well arisen and gradually crystallized themselves into independent systems.”¹³ This *īśvaravāda* or doctrine of a supreme God Kaviraj takes as referring to Śaivism rather than Vaiṣṇavism: Īśvara is originally a name of Śiva, while the name for Viṣṇu would be Puruṣottama, he explains. Bhandarkar¹⁴ has found an inscription at Kedāreśvara temple at Belgami in Mysore State which suggests that Nyāya was looked upon as a specific Maheśvara sect. He also reminds us of a passage in the *Vāyupurāṇa*, probably dating from the 4th century, in which it is said that Lakuliśa had three pupils: Akṣapāda, Kaṇāda, and Vatsa. This leads Bhandarkar to suggest that the schools were the same from the start.

This is all very well, but we must consider also the fact that both sets of *sūtras* are very chary of reference to God. The author of the *Yuktidīpikā* can only find one passage in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* that might conceivably be construed as referring to God, and it seems certain that it was not intended to.¹⁵ And there has been considerable speculation about the section in the fourth book of the *Nyāyasūtras* which refers to God—it is as possible that it attacks as that it defends monotheism.¹⁶ By the time of Praśastapāda, however, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika was thoroughly monotheistic: the *Yuktidīpikā* thinks it was worked over by Pāśupatas and molded into the form Praśastapāda presents.¹⁷

Whatever the truth be about the view of the authors of the two sets of *sūtras* on God, it is likely that they accepted, along with the rest of the Hindus, the belief in the gods which was second nature to everyone in those times. There is no reason why a philosopher should refer to the gods, except perhaps in his invocation, unless he has particular roles in mind which the gods, or God, must play in his philosophy. In the case of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika God's role turns out to be that of a general condition of all action, and in particular the agent who sets the world in motion at the beginning of each cycle by bringing about the first collisions of atoms. The technical aspects of God's functioning presumably did not occur to the earliest

formulators of these theories, engaged in developing the fundamentals of the mechanics of atomism and causation, and it is only when they discovered that they needed additional agents besides humans that they were moved to postulate a super-self, God, who can fulfill the requirements.

So special is the role that God plays in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that other monotheistically minded philosophers in India find the Nyāya conception of Him a thin one indeed. Yet, the origins of other systematic philosophies of the same period show more or less the same phenomenon. The *Sāṃkhyakārikās* of Īśvaraḥṣṇa, a 4th-century work, shows no monotheistic inclinations, and Pūrvamīmāṃsā explicitly denied to God the role of creator of the Vedas. Mahāyāna Buddhism had its Bodhisattvas, but their importance increases in much later stages of the Buddhist religion, paralleling similar developments in Hinduism and extending into the form it takes in Tibet, China, and Japan. The Jains also had their sages, the Tirthaṅkaras, but believed in no supreme deity. Monotheists represented only one philosophical theory among many at that time, as far as evidence shows.

It is, then, a later prejudice which connects belief in one supreme God with sincerity of spiritual convictions, or in the case of Western critics it reflects an imposition of foreign assumptions.

III. *The Connection between Philosophy and Liberation*

There are nevertheless those who doubt that Indian philosophy, and notably Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, really has anything to do with the search for liberation, despite the many statements of the philosophers themselves that there is a connection. Part of the difficulty here lies in conceiving accurately what the connection can be between theoretical pursuits and practical ones. Daya Krishna¹⁸ notes rightly that speculation is rarely viewed as *constituting* the path to freedom, and concludes that it therefore has nothing to do with freedom. He also points out that writers in all sorts of fields, not only philosophers, attempt to link their writings to the search for liberation, but concludes that, although it is fashionable to pay lipservice to this goal, in fact this is one of those traditions that live by common assent but have no substance whatever. I think it is not necessary to answer these doubts in detail immediately; we may allow the true picture to emerge from the writings themselves and the summary of them which I shall attempt in the remainder of this chapter. The first part of Daya's argument must be met by showing what

the path to liberation is according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and how theoretical speculation gets involved in the life of the freedom seeker. This is the burden of what is immediately to follow. As for the charge that belief in *mokṣa* is a matter of lip service without sincere conviction, I think it will become apparent from the nature of the arguments used by Naiyāyikas, if not from the proportional attention they pay to the topic, that liberation is always on their minds even if not always uppermost in the question of the moment.

IV. *The Hindu Theory of Value: Important Concepts*

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of value must be considered as a version of the more general theory which is accepted in a general way by all varieties of "Hinduism"—a term which is difficult to define but serves to distinguish the vast majority of Indian religious sects and cults from—especially—Buddhism, Jainism, and foreign religions such as Islam and Christianity. Since any number of works set forth the fundamental tenets of Hinduism in considerable detail¹⁹ it will not be necessary to spend much time here on this, but merely to remind the reader that in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika he is dealing with a system squarely within traditional assumptions.

A. *Aspects of the Good Life*: Hindu texts set forth several "aims of life" (*artha*) the relationships among which are variously explained by different authorities. The aims of life are usually said to be four: *artha* or material prosperity, *kāma* or affective gratification, *dharma* or right conduct, and *mokṣa* or liberation. The order in which these four are listed varies; however, liberation is universally accepted as the highest end by those who accept it at all. In ancient times Pūrvamīmāṃsā did not accept liberation as an end, preaching that the ultimate purpose in life was to attain heaven through performance of acts prescribed in Vedic injunctions and avoidance of those acts proscribed by the same sacred scriptures. In later times virtually all Hindus accepted the supremacy of liberation to *dharma*. Each of the four "aims" has a literature which is traditionally attached to it : for *artha*, the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya (referred to above); for *kāma*, the *Kāmasūtras* of Vātsyāyana (probably not our Pakṣilasvāmin) and other handbooks of erotics and aestheticism; for *dharma*, the various *Dharmaśāstras*, notably that entitled "The Laws of Manu"; and for *mokṣa*, the philosophical literature, particularly that part of it which advises methods for seeking and gaining liberation. Many handbooks devoted to one of the other "aims" indicate that attention to their teachings will aid one in achieving liberation; this

suggests that the general Hindu view is that liberation transcends the others without implying that commitment to them will work against eventual self-perfection.

B. *Karma and Saṃsāra; Preexistence and Transmigration: Mokṣa*, the supreme end of life, is liberation from the bondage of *karma*, from the circle of birth and rebirth (*saṃsāra*). This is the minimal meaning of *mokṣa*; we shall see below how Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and other schools further interpret it. Here we are interested in the view of life presupposed by all the Indian theories, including Buddhism and Jainism.

Most Indians who reflect on the matter are of the opinion that they existed prior to the birth of their present body, and that they have existed "beginninglessly." Just what is referred to by the "they" is a matter of philosophical controversy. Nevertheless, the only important opposition to the doctrine of preexistence comes from the Cārvākas. As for beginninglessness, this is also generally accepted, although there is disagreement about some of the details, for example, about whether there is a period of rest (*pralaya*) between cosmic cycles. All these matters are subjects of discussion and argumentation, contrary to what some scholars suppose; we shall see the kinds of arguments used by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholars.

As for the manner in which human beings exist, this requires a somewhat different mode of speech when we are considering Buddhism than when we are considering Hindu theory, since the Buddhists do not believe there is any continuing self or soul underlying the series of momentary states called the person. Keeping this difference in mind, we can nevertheless assert that Hindus, Buddhists, and Jains alike held that one's actions influence subsequent events in one's history; and that this happens in a perfectly mechanical manner—what one sows, one will eventually reap. To be sure, we need to qualify this somewhat for later stages of Indian thought, particularly certain types of later Vedānta, where God is granted the ability to save individuals regardless of their *karma*. However, this qualification hardly affects the period under study in this volume.

In particular, the "weight" of an individual's *karma* was held to be passed from embodiment to embodiment and to determine the particular form of rebirth the person suffered. It is important to realize that both "good" and "bad" deeds create *karma*; even refraining from performing an action may add to the weight of one's *karma*. Thus one cannot gain liberation by good deeds alone, though the performance of good works constitutes an important element in most accounts of the path to liberation. Nor can one gain liberation by

inaction, though at a certain stage in life it is thought appropriate to retire from worldly activities in favor of more spiritually directed ones.

As one lives out each embodied lifetime, he works off the *karma* that has accrued from his past actions, but accretes more of it in the course of his present activities. The problem of liberation, then, is to bring it about that *karma* no longer "clings" to one. The achievement of this stage is frequently termed "enlightenment," an appropriate term in its literal meaning as well as in its more usual sense of self-understanding. Since the *karmic* machinery is a natural fact, it is usually understood that an enlightened person will still have to work off the *karma* which clings to him from deeds prior to his enlightenment. Thus, for example, the Buddha is held to have achieved enlightenment (*bodhi*) after several weeks of reflection under a tree, but he lived on to spread his wisdom throughout the Ganges plain before he passed on several decades later. In his post-enlightenment stage, then, Gautama the Buddha corresponds with the type of person Hindus call *jīvanmukta*, "liberated while living." Not all Hindus accept the doctrine of liberation while alive, but it is a very common notion.

C. *Yoga—the Path to Liberation*: How to achieve the good life? This practical issue is the topic of a vast literature, including the types of tracts mentioned earlier pertaining to the four "aims of life" but essentially involving all serious pursuits, which are regularly connected to ultimate values just as they are in Western thought. Thus, for example, the *Laws of Manu* treats many types of practical problems, and one seeking to perfect himself cannot afford to ignore its sort of advice. Different types of living are enjoined for different sorts of personality, and for individuals of differing occupations and roles in society. The Vedas, the ancient sacred scriptures, speak especially to the Brahmins, for whom they prescribe many rites and duties. In ancient times it was apparently accepted that Brahmins were the main authority on spiritual matters and that this suggested their superior spiritual attainments. In later times this assumption was brought into question; indeed, the introduction of the notion of liberation to replace the Vedic view of *dharma* as the final aim is taken by some scholars to be an important early episode in this revolt against Brahminical pretensions.

Thus, the teachings about how to perfect oneself are exceedingly various; it is impossible to catalogue them in any succinct fashion. Western readers may have been exposed to one classification of paths if they have read the *Bhagavadgītā*; though the account of paths

expounded there has been influential, it should by no means be mistaken for the only Indian account. Nevertheless, it is a handy place to begin.

The *Gītā* teaches that there are three kinds of path to liberation: the way of *karma*, the way of knowledge, and the way of devotion. It is rather vague as to which of these is the preferable way, if any; perhaps it means to suggest that there are different ways for different sorts of people. It is also not clear whether they are to be viewed as mutually exclusive. The *Gītā* places great importance on the attitude of nonattachment (*vairāgya*) to the fruits of one's actions, which is developed early in the poem in particular connection with the way of *karma*. Here we are taught to participate in worldly activity in performing appropriate actions, but to do them without thought of personal advantage. A bit later we are shown the ideal of the man of stable insight (*sthitaprajña*), who sits meditating apart from ordinary men. He is the one who seeks true knowledge and liberation through it. Some commentators think the *Gītā* means us to understand that the way of *karma* is preparatory to the way of Knowledge; others think these two paths are to be combined. This controversy bulks large in the writings of Vedāntists.

The *Gītā* further specifies a way which it at one point characterizes as the "easy" way to liberation, which is to devote oneself to God and think of nothing but him. This has certainly tended to be most popular path in the past few hundred years, and numerous methods of devotion have been developed, such as the continuous chanting of God's name, community sings, and various odd and antinomian practices such as were apparently practiced by the Pāśupatas.

The general term for a path is *mārga*, but the *Gītā* uses the term *yoga* in this connection. A *yoga* is a discipline. A classical form of *yoga* is that set forth in the *Yogasūtras* of Patañjali (4th c.?) ; it consists of seven stages of discipline beginning with the performance of righteous acts, going on to breath-control and resulting control of the mind (and as a sidelight control of the body), and culminating in a state called *samādhi*, divided into a higher and a lower type: the lower type is the mystic's trance, the higher is liberation itself, the difference being that once one gains the higher he never loses it. An adept of such a method is known as a *yogi*, and *yogis* are generally credited with exceptional powers of concentration and control, abilities which are viewed by most Westerners with a modicum of incredulity. *Naiyāyikas*, who as we shall see are as scientifically minded as any Indians are, credit *yogis* with exceptional abilities (see below), though one may sometimes discern qualms.

V. *The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Conception of Liberation*

Mokṣa, meaning freedom, is not the only term used by Indian philosophers to characterize the ultimate end of life. The Buddhist term *nirvāṇa* is probably better known to most readers. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika two other terms appear: *niḥśreyasa*, literally “having no better,” and *apavarga*, meaning an end or completion.

1. *The Developed Doctrine*: As we shall see during our survey of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika topics, there is a tendency in maturer stages of the system to formulate increasingly technical definitions of key items. Liberation likewise receives this treatment. As an example, we may consider Śivāditya’s definition of liberation as the absence of sorrow together with the posterior absence of false knowledge which is the cause of sorrow, which posterior absence is produced by true knowledge. This definition uses the technical notion of “posterior absence” (*dharmaṃsa*; the absence of something after it has existed and come to an end) and is otherwise built according to a pattern which becomes standard in Navya-nyāya.

Śivāditya’s definition as it stands accords with the account of liberation usually credited to Vaiśeṣika, but not to Nyāya. It is completely negative; it does not attribute any consciousness or feelings whatsoever to the liberated self. This negative conception has called forth the gibe that freedom for the Vaiśeṣikas is being like a stone.²⁰ The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, are supposed to credit the freed self with an experience of everlasting bliss. Just how far this tradition can be substantiated by the writings of our philosophers will be explored in the next section.

2. *Development of the Conception of Liberation*: The *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* present liberation as a state where the two necessary conditions for the arising of another body are absent. These two conditions are said to be the conjunction of the internal organ with the self, and a certain “unseen force” (*adr̥ṣṭa*) which is instrumental in producing transmigration. It is probable that Kaṇāda equates this unseen force with the accumulation of *karma* which he mentions in a later *sūtra*. If so, a person may be held to be liberated either when his *karma* becomes inoperative or when his internal organ is disjoined from his self. The latter condition is achieved in *samādhi*.

Vātsyāyana contributes a lengthy discussion, centering around the question whether liberation is a blissful state or not. He defines *apavarga* as a condition involving attainment of bliss, and says it is called “Brahman,” thus, linking his discussion to the conception of the Upanishads. However, he immediately turns on those²¹ who

say that the self experiences pleasure when liberated. Among his reasons we may note this: pleasure is a positive feeling toward which men characteristically develop passions of attachment or aversion. If to practice a path with an eye to obtaining liberation involves attaching oneself to the gaining of eternal pleasure, then liberation can never be achieved, since any path to liberation involves non-attachment. As we saw above, Vātsyāyana apparently has no objection to renaming absence of pain "bliss," and in this way perhaps can resolve the contradiction in his account.

Whereas the *sūtrakāras'* accounts were compatible with the conception of liberation as a state, perhaps of *samādhi*, achieved through yoga while the body lives, Vātsyāyana's discussion clearly suggests that he conceives of liberation as setting in when the last embodiment of the freed self has died. Praśastapāda's view is the same. Uddyotakara explicitly distinguishes two kinds of perfection: lower, when one is still working off old *karma*, and the higher, when all the old *karma* has been worked off.

So far, except for Vātsyāyana's puzzling use of the word "bliss," there has been nothing to suggest a divergence between the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika conceptions. It is with the radical Bhāsarvajña that a real change is wrought within the system. He specifically denies that the purely negative description of liberation can be correct, and asserts that it is a state not only of pleasure but also of consciousness, as against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas like Uddyotakara and Praśastapāda who say that the self loses all its qualities in the highest stage of freedom. No one wants such a state, says Bhāsarvajña.

The review of various theories about liberation given by Vyomaśiva concludes with a theory held by various schools of Śaivism, including the Pāśupatas, that the self acquires the qualities of Śiva upon being liberated, these being qualities such as eternal knowledge and pleasure. It is likely that this is a reference to Bhāsarvajña's view, though Vyomaśiva is not given to naming his sources. Vyomaśiva's own view follows that of Praśastapāda; release occurs after the old *karma* wears off and involves annihilation of the specific qualities of the self. He refers to liberation as a "prosperous" state and suggests that the word "bliss" should be construed as "absence of sorrow."

Śrīdhara's list of current theories is not as extensive or suggestive as Vyomaśiva's. His refutation of those who believe that liberation is blissful does not discriminate Bhāsarvajña's view from that of the Vedāntins, etc. He evidently believes in *jīvanmukti*, liberation while living, since he cites the Vedas and (surprisingly)

the *Sāṃkhyakārikās* as authorities for the view and bases some of his arguments on the actuality of that state.

Udayana defines liberation as the final cessation of sorrow, but his way with other conceptions is original. He teaches that we must pass through various stages of realization corresponding to the freedoms taught in other systems before finally reaching the highest state of indifference (*kaivalya*) which is the Nyāya version. Udayana calls this "final Vedānta." As against orthodox Vedānta he evidently feels that they identify liberation too readily with some kind of direct experience. On Udayana's view such an experience is not enough; one must also have a Naiyāyika's discursive knowledge of reality as well as a truly devotional attitude.

Aparārkadeva, the commentator on Bhāsarvajña, further explicates that view, arguing that bliss is not just the absence of sorrow as Vyomaśiva and others think. However, he agrees with the normal Naiyāyika view that bliss is not an eternal quality of the self, since if it were there would be no bondage and nothing to be liberated from. Though he does not spell it out, this would seem to imply that the bliss of the liberated self is a positive quality acquired by the liberated self, perhaps from identification with Śiva.

One final note : Udayana, it is said, departed from tradition by acknowledging that liberation for all (*sarvamukti*) is possible and a legitimate end to strive for, reminding us of the Buddhist notion of the *bodhisattva* who delays liberation in order to work for the salvation of all. Śrīdhara, on the other hand, denies this view, and Śrīvallabha later on also rejects it.

It would appear from our rapid survey that the tradition, reported for instance in the *Sāṃkaravijaya* of Mādhava, that Naiyāyikas generally take a positive view of liberation and Vaiśeṣikas a negative one, is true only for that section of Nyāya which follows Bhāsarvajña. Just whether he was the originator of that interpretation is not clear from the evidence.

VI. Arguments for the Possibility of Liberation

Granted that the above is what our philosophers mean by the terms for "liberation," why should we believe there is any such state? Doubts about the possibility of complete freedom are not limited to Westerners; early Indians apparently suffered from them too. The *Nyāyasūtras* discuss several doubts which were raised, and this discussion is reviewed and continued in the subsequent literature. One doubt is that we do not live long enough to prepare for liberation,

since the Vedas teach that Brahmins must finish all their other duties before retiring to practice a path. Another is that human nature is naturally so imperfect that no amount of striving will completely rid us of our faults. Furthermore, we cannot help becoming attached to things in the course of living, and since attachment automatically produces bondage we will never become free. Gautama's response to these doubts is that the scriptural passages which cause the doubts can be construed in other ways compatible with liberation, indeed that properly understood the Vedas encourage a man to retire to meditate and liberate himself. As for the doubts about man's evil proclivities, Gautama's answer resembles that of his famous predecessor Gautama the Buddha, who pointed out that happily we know the causes of our imperfection and so can treat the disease; and this answers the last difficulty also, since true knowledge of the causes of attachment will enable a man to practice a method of ridding himself of it. Jayanta adds that just as heat renders a seed ineffective, true knowledge makes one's past deeds ineffective, so that no new *karma* is produced.²²

Later writers felt the need of more rigorous arguments in favor of the possibility of liberation, not perhaps so much because skepticism became stronger but rather because as the system developed it became more enamoured of its method, which involved providing definitions and arguments for everything thought worth discussing.

The classical Nyāya argument for liberation is inferential: "whatever comes into being successively is perishable, like the wheel of fire," or in a slightly different form, "the series of sorrows in the self finally gets cut off, because it is a series, like the series of flashes constituting lamplight." Udayana says everyone accepts this argument. Śrīdhara, however, does not accept it, since he thinks there is a counterexample to be found in the series of colors belonging to atoms of earth, which he takes to be an endless series. Udayana's answer to this is that inference equally well proves that the series of colors of earthy atoms also comes to an end.

VII. *The Path to Liberation: Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika View*

We come now to consider precisely how the Naiyāyikas think liberation should be sought, and in particular what relevance philosophical investigations have to the quest.

1. *Causes of Bondage and Liberation:* The *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* present the following picture of the path to be followed in seeking freedom: one should behave according to Vedic precepts; this produces merit

(*dharmā*) and eventually exaltation (*abhyudaya*), whereas impure behavior produces demerit (*adharmā*). Bondage (*saṃsāra*), however, is caused by both merit and demerit (*adr̥ṣṭa = karma*). It is because of our attitudes of desire and aversion that we act in ways which produce more *karma*, and these attitudes have as a necessary condition the contact between the internal organ (*manas*) and the self of the individual person. It becomes clear that the method of liberation involves gaining control over one's internal organ. Yoga is the control of that organ so that it does not come into contact with the external sense organs (*indriya*); when such contact ceases, there are no more feelings of pleasure and pain for the individual, and this in turn stifles any desires or aversions. Eventually the trance-like state, which as we have seen Gautama likens to deep sleep, sets in, and when this separation of self from internal organ is achieved and the old *karma* lived out, the self is completely liberated from bondage, since there is no way for *karma* to come again to operate on him.

What is not clear from Kaṇāda's account is how knowledge, is related to this process. Gautama's *Nyāyasūtras* makes this more explicit. In his second *sūtra* he presents a fivefold chain of causal conditions leading to bondage. The chain begins with wrong knowledge (*mithyājñāna*), which is a necessary condition for faults (*doṣa*), which are in turn productive of activity, which results in (rebirth) which is the cause of sorrow. This is reminiscent of the twelvefold chain of Buddhism (*pratītyasamutpāda*), which leads from ignorance (*avidyā*) to rebirth and misery in a somewhat more complicated series; according to the Buddha's chain the last member of the series, rebirth, is responsible in turn for the first member, ignorance, so that the whole thing is likened to a wheel. We may suppose that Gautama's version is also wheel-like. In any case, it is clear from what Gautama goes on to say that one seeking liberation from sorrow is to break into this chain by replacing wrong knowledge with right knowledge; thus, the necessary condition for faults being lacking, they in turn will not arise, and activity as a result will not either, nor will birth nor sorrow. And absence of sorrow is liberation.

This true knowledge, Gautama explains, is to be achieved by the classical methods of concentration, meditation, and yoga, but he significantly adds that one may get it by discussion with others. It is this latter means that the Nyāya system is especially concerned to expedite; thus it is necessary to have a complete set of rules for the carrying out of proper discussions which will conduce to true knowledge.

The "faults" of which Gautama speaks he lists as three: attrac-

tion, aversion, and delusion. The last-mentioned is again a significant addition. Kaṇāda speaks primarily of mistakes in attitude, whereas Gautama is concerned about failure of understanding. Gautama also uses the term *kleśa* in a later section to denote wrong attitudes. He explains that *kleśas* are not natural events but are caused by wishful ideas (*saṃkalpa*). These wishful ideas are born from delusions that normal humans are subject to. Vātsyāyana gives a striking example when he cites the fact of male attachment to the female body; that the body is attractive is a misconception which he recommends eliminating by paying attention to the displeasing aspects of the body. But to develop an aversion to the body would be equally wrong; what is to be practiced is an attitude of nonattachment, and it is clearly the opinion of Gautama and Vātsyāyana that this attitude can only be cultivated when things are seen as they really are and not otherwise. Thus knowledge of truth, while not in itself the path to liberation, is an essential part of the procedure of gaining it.

This general picture is accepted and developed by all the subsequent writers. There are occasional interesting modifications. For example, Candramati, perhaps concerned that the above account may be construed as enjoining one to abstain from meritorious actions, explains "merit" as having two varieties: the kind which produces positive activity, and the kind which produces cessation of activity (*nivṛtti*). The acquisition of merit of the latter kind results in a state of delight in perfect cognition free from attachment. Presumably we are not, however, to identify this state with liberation, but rather with an advanced stage of yoga.

As is to be expected, the later writers, presupposing the account summarized above, proceed to the details of precisely how wrong knowledge is produced and the methods by which it is to be eradicated. Some of our writers occasionally allude to implications of their theories for the general Hindu theory of value. For example, after the time of Vedāntins like Maṇḍana Miśra, Bhāskara, and Śaṅkara, the question of the relative importance of knowledge and action becomes more frequently raised, perhaps because of Śaṅkara's radical endorsement of the path of knowledge to the exclusion of action. The more traditional view, that one must tread a combined path of knowledge and action (*jñānakarmasamuccayavāda*), defended in Vedānta by Bhāskara, is attributed to the author of the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*,²³ and is defended in *Vyomavati* and *Nyāyakandalī*. The nub of the discussion centers over whether one must still perform the actions prescribed in the Vedas even after he has embarked on a discipline

leading to liberation. Śaṅkara's answer is no, that one must only attend to the Vedas up to the stage of adept (*adhikārin*) but not afterwards. By comparison, Naiyāyikas tend to be surprisingly conservative. Udayana may perhaps constitute an exception to this general assessment. He points out that activity prescribed by the Vedas is intended to gain advantage for the agent, and that insofar as that is the case one cannot, for example, explain the actions of ascetics as enjoined, since they do not act purposively. Udayana is no antitraditionalist, however; he spends more than one extended passage complaining about the deterioration of general *dharma* brought about by decay of faith and self-control.

The most important modification of the traditional view of the path to liberation in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is the introduction of the notion that God must at least permit, if not be operative in, the process. The first of our writers clearly to include God in the description of the path is Praśastapāda, whose introduction specifies that merit together with God's injunctions produce the knowledge about reality which is necessary for liberation. However, in later reviews of the same topic this reference is absent; one may safely say that God is not much on Praśastapāda's mind. Uddyotakara brings in God as the creator of merit and demerit, but nothing he says implies any interruption of the machinery by which the self earns good or bad *karma* by his actions. It is probably with Bhāsarvajña that God begins to play a more positive role, although from the *Nyāyasāra* all we can glean is that knowledge of God is the touchstone to the removal of wrong attitudes. But none of this is particularly surprising: God is taken to be the author of the Vedas, after all, and thus plays a role of importance for any interpretation of paths which admits that the Vedas are relevant.

The fact is, as Ingalls remarks, that "among the beliefs concerning man which are essential in the old Nyāya is a belief in the efficacy of human effort. . . Any statement which involves *karmavaiṣalya-prasaṅga*... or *akṛtābhyaṅgamaprasaṅga*... is *ipso facto* wrong. This belief... is common in India."²⁴ The lengthy Sanskrit terms in this quotation are ways of formulating the notions, which Naiyāyikas hold to be faulty, that what men do has no regular connection with their deserts, either because the deserts vary or because the whole process is out of their hands, being controlled by a superior power. In short, the Indians generally believed in freedom of the will at least to the extent that men were not conceived to be pawns in the hand of a superior power.

VIII. *Advanced Spiritual Practitioners: Yogis, Sages, etc.*

That certain individuals have remarkable powers because of their spiritual advancement is a generally accepted notion in India. The Naiyāyikas do not question it, and our philosophers make occasional comments clarifying precisely what claims of special powers they are willing to endorse. The reader will not find case histories of yogic experiments here, but we can sift out a few general abilities credited to men with special powers and gifts.

Kaṇāda says that sages (*ṛsis*) and "perfected beings" (*siddha*) have special powers of awareness. It is a stock Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory that yogic perception is different from ordinary perception and deserves special treatment. The reason for its needing special treatment is that yogis are held to be able to occupy several bodies at once, as well as to have transtemporal experiences. According to some of our philosophers this ability gained through yoga enables an individual to achieve immediate liberation. Since a yogi has the power to move his internal organ into contact with a number of bodies simultaneously and to bring it about that the *karma* accreted from past deeds gets worked off faster than it would take for normal individuals, he can do what would otherwise be inexplicable, namely work off past *karma* at more or less the same time as he achieves enlightenment. This account is detailed especially in *Vyomavati*.

About the sages, among whom are normally included those reputed to be the original redactors of the Vedas (God, of course, is the Vedas' author), we hear from Praśastapāda that, like the gods, they have bodies produced by meritorious *karma*. In this they contrast with ordinary humans, whose bodies are produced by a mixture of good and bad *karma*, and with insects, whose bodies are produced by predominantly bad *karma*. Sages have a regular intuitive ability called *prātibha* which ordinary humans manifest only occasionally. This ability gives them knowledge about past and future as well as present but removed events. The *siddhas* or perfected beings referred to by Kaṇāda, Praśastapāda says, have both perceptual and inferential knowledge of the workings of *karma*. Special drug-induced insights are also attributed to these people. Jayanta says that both yogis and sages can see *dharma*. But later writers have less to say about the special powers of these exceptional types.

IX. *Arguments for Pre-existence and Immortality*

As indicated above, Naiyāyikas were fond of defending stan-

dard Hindu doctrines with arguments that could be tested against the rigorous requirements which they established in their theory of inference. I note here a few such arguments without, again, considering at the moment the question of their rigor, since we are not in a position yet to compare them with appropriate standards of criticism.

In connection with the proof that an individual's self or soul is eternal, Gautama provides some arguments for its preexistence. (1) "Because the new-born infant experiences joy, fear, and sorrow—which could follow only from the continuity of remembrance of what has been repeatedly gone through before (the self existed before)," (III.1.18) (2) "(The self must be regarded as eternal) because of the desire for milk from the mother's breast, which is evinced (on birth) after death, and which can only be due to repeated feeding (in the past)." (III.1.21)²⁵ Commentators on this passage add further variations. Uddyotakara argues that the same self is child and man, because of its smile, and Vācaspati points out that the child's fear of falling can only be explained on the hypothesis that it has fallen before and remembers it.

Now the obvious answer to these arguments is that the phenomena alluded to—reactions of joy and fear, of attraction to the mother's breast—are natural, that is to say, they are events occurring in the body and needing no appeal to an agency inside to explain them. Gautama considers this answer. For example, he has an opponent say that reactions of joy and fear are like the opening and closing of a flower, and his answer is to the effect that the opponent is eventually unable to say what these motions of the flower are due to, and will have to assent to the principle that motions are caused by conscious agents. This principle provides the basis also for the main Nyāya argument for God's existence, as we shall see.

Again, an opponent argues that the attraction of the child to its mother's breast is like the attraction of iron to a magnet, and needs no conscious agency. Gautama's answer is too short to be completely intelligible, and the commentators labor to interpret it. Vātsyāyana's interpretation is this: iron, alone among metals, is attracted by magnetism. As there is a special factor among the causal conditions of the phenomenon of magnetism which limits the kinds of metals which are attracted by magnets, so there is a special factor among the causal conditions of the phenomenon of breast-feeding which limits the kinds of objects which are attracted to the breast. Now what is the special factor in each of these cases? Vātsyāyana has no opinion to offer about the explanation of magnet-

ism, but as for the child's response to the breast he says that the special factor here is the memory on the child's part of this sort of experience in the past, and that this hypothesis is "entrenched"²⁶ in our actual experience that desire for food proceeds from our memory of past experiences.²⁷

NATURE OF A PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM

What is a philosophical system? A *system* is a set of concepts which are interrelated so as to explain what needs to be explained fully, accurately, and with no waste motion. In India a *philosophical* system is one which is pertinent to the ultimate supreme value of mankind, the gaining of liberation. Expanding on this a bit, we can discern several criteria that an Indian philosophical system will try to satisfy.

The statements in which the interrelated concepts which comprise the system are expressed must all be true. What is sought is truth; what truth is is itself a philosophical question. A philosophical system must commit itself to a theory of truth and then justify it by showing its place within the system itself. Since of two contradictory statements only one can be true, it follows that a satisfactory philosophical system must contain no mutually contradictory statements.

The system must explain everything which is relevant to the problems involved in achieving liberation. That is not to say, as we have seen, that the system itself is the mechanism of liberation, though Naiyāyikas at any rate feel that its construction is a necessary ingredient in the identification of the path to freedom. Thus the system does select, from among the indefinitely many things it might pay attention to, those things which are pertinent to human aims. However, this is not as restrictive a criterion of relevance as one might at first think. Since others have different conceptions of what is the ultimate value, or other versions of what liberation consists in, their mistaken views must be addressed and corrected by reference to one's own philosophical system, either through arguments formulated in the opposition's own terms or in some other fashion.

It is obvious that there are difficulties in the way of formulating truths in a system that utilizes concepts which were created by others

for the purpose of expressing what are, in fact, falsehoods! It is for this reason that one must be more circumspect about the relations between one's system and the world it attempts to explain. We'd better back up and start again.

Let us think of the world to be explained as a set of sentences expressed in everyday language, with no selectivity imposed upon it other than the criterion of relevance mentioned above. That is to say, we are to think of an indefinitely large set of sentences, some no doubt true, some false, some perhaps confusedly or improperly formed so that their truth or falsity is difficult to assess. All that is necessarily common to the sentences in this set is that they are intended to be descriptive, and that in some way or other the question of their status (true? false? neither?) is or might become relevant to the attainment of liberation.

Now let us think of a philosophical system as another set of statements which contains "translations" of the sentences in the first set. The concepts which are utilized within the translations are not necessarily found expressed in the sentences to be explained. The system maker is not bound to honor every commonsense or ordinary-language hunch or habit about these things. Yet, he must of course choose wisely in formulating his system, so that no contradictions within the system crop up, so that no falsehoods are contained or implied in the system, so that all the true sentences in the original set are paralleled by truths within the system, and so that this is all achieved by the smallest number of basic concepts. Thus, beside the criterion of relevance to human concerns, the other criteria in philosophical system making are those of accuracy, adequacy, and economy.

A system is successful if it fully satisfies the above criteria. But since the concepts and, indeed, the language the system maker chooses may not be known or intelligible directly to others, he will need to have ways of informing them of what he is doing. A convenient example is that of a map, which is a kind of system in the sense I am characterizing. A map may provide accurately, adequately, and economically the information sought to be provided by an indefinitely large set of signposts, verbal directions, and so forth uttered and written in everyday speech. But someone on his way to a new locale and needing directions may not find it helpful to have a map thrust into his hands when he asks for guidance, unless the map also contains, or he is otherwise provided with, directions for using it couched in language he can understand. Thus the philosopher cannot merely concentrate on constructing an accurate, adequate, and economical

system. He must also attempt to convey to the rest of mankind a sense of what he is doing and has done. He must demonstrate to them that his system really is a map of the required territory.

A philosopher is thus speaking at several different levels—or if you like, in several different languages—at once as he goes about his business. Beside the ordinary speech in which everyday activities are carried on, and the technical vocabulary of the system which he learns to master as he constructs it, he must utilize a third sort of language, one which serves to link his activities with that of others. A procedure frequently practiced in this connection by philosophers is that of providing “explications” of the technical concepts utilized in the system. These explications are sometimes the cause of misunderstanding. It is clear that they are not intended, as definitions sometimes are, to state two equally tenable ways of describing something in one language. Dictionary definitions may be intended to satisfy the requirement of interchangeability *salva veritate*; the definition “bachelor = df. unmarried male” suggests that wherever one of these expressions turns up the other may be substituted for it without changing the meaning of the sentence. But an explication of a technical term in our sense is not like this at all, since it links terms drawn from two distinct “languages”—ordinary language and the language of the system.

Nor is this kind of explication to be confused with yet another that may also be promulgated by the philosopher. In building a system one characteristically defines a number of his technical concepts in terms of others, with a small number being considered primitives for the system. The structure of defined terms and primitives properly interrelated constitutes the system itself, indeed, since the interrelated terms are the statements of the system. Nyāya, we shall see, develops later on toward *this* conception.

What has been said will perhaps adequately suggest for the moment the nature of the relation between a system and the world it explains. Now let us consider the steps involved in constructing such a system. We may do this by reviewing several sorts of choices one is called upon to make, choices which raise fundamental problems of philosophical conviction and taste.

Incidentally, in reviewing these choices we are, fortunately, able to operate under many of the same assumptions for India as Western philosophers make. The reason, as we shall see in a moment, is that both Sanskrit and the common Western languages—English, German, French, etc.—share the characteristic of being fundamentally subject-predicate languages, that is to say, they all formu-

late most of their sentences in subject-predicate form. Thus, we may refer to this form in identifying the kinds of choices system builders are called upon to make, and these references are as legitimate for Indian philosophy as for Western.

What methodological choices must a philosopher make, then? First, he must make a decision about the kind of *logic* he will avail himself of. This is not only a question of whether he will respect the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle; it may involve that. But it is also a question of whether he chooses to let all his terms name, and what sorts of things they will be allowed to name. Thus, for example, one philosopher may limit the referential terms within his system to those which occur in the subject, not the predicate, place in the systematic statements, construing predicates as indicating arrangements among their subjects, which arrangements are not to be considered additional entities. Another philosopher may feel that no such distinction is warranted or needed. The question, notice, is not whether or not it is the case that predicates name—no such question can be raised, since we are not concerned with a language already given but with one we propose to construct. The guiding considerations are rather, for example, whether we plan to link reference within the system with ontological commitment, so that if asked what things exist we have a ready answer at hand merely by considering which concepts appear in the subject places of statements within the system. It also may reflect a philosopher's feelings about abstractions; if he is suspicious about admitting universals, or classes, or whatever, among the entities his system recognizes, he may choose to link classification with predication and have only his nouns (terms in the subject place) refer to individuals. These considerations may be viewed as a matter of taste, although philosophers tend to feel strongly on such matters and sometimes can trace their feelings to well-grounded hypotheses, e.g., that a system admitting such-and-such kinds of entities is more likely to contain hidden contradictions than other systems, or that it is less powerful or economical.

Second, a philosopher engaged in constructing a system will wish to decide whether he wishes to restrict the things spoken of in his system in certain ways. For example, he may wish not to allow as fundamental elements in his system any entities which are spatiotemporally extended; he wants to rebuild the world from events occurring at one point in space-time each. Or he may allow spatial, but not temporal, extension, or vice versa. A different sort of choice is that between a system built from physical entities and one built from

phenomenal entities. The physicalist tries to translate sentences in ordinary speech about our experiences without exception into systematic statements confined to terms referring to (or defined in terms of other terms referring to) the kinds of things physics investigates. A phenomenalist, on the other hand, hopes to manage the reverse, to explain all the physicist's reports in terms of concepts reflecting modes of awareness such as the colors, feels, and other observational reports which are held to verify the physicist's conclusions. Again the reason a philosopher makes one choice on these matters rather than another may be as vague as intuition or as precise as a formulable hypothesis about the fashion in which the wrong choice will certainly violate one of the criteria of system making. It might be well to note, also, that choices of this sort are not always necessary in the sense that the alternatives need not be mutually exclusive. Nyāya, for example, allows both physical and phenomenal terms into its system.

Finally, a philosophical system builder must decide which primitive notions he is going to start with. Not that he discovers which they are by some special sort of intuition; he discovers it by hard work. It is the interrelating of the primitives which constitutes the economy of the system and which accounts in part for its adequacy and accuracy as well. For the more powerful a basis for a system is, the more decisions it will make about which among the sentences to be translated are the true ones.¹

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as a Philosophical System

The sketch given above of a philosophical system of course represents a very advanced stage of self-awareness on the part of philosophers about what they are up to. Philosophers develop this kind of self-awareness about method over the course of history. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is no exception. I think it can be seen that a sophisticated account of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika will construe it as a system of the kind described, but it is also evident that the early Naiyāyikas were less aware of the principles of system construction than were the practitioners of Navya-nyāya. However, to do justice to Nyāya we should view it in the light of what it has become and not only how it began. And the distortion of historical perspective involved is not as serious as one might suppose.

We have seen, in the previous chapter, the nature of the human concern which provides the Naiyāyika with a criterion of relevance. As early as the *sūtras* the selection of certain topics as philosophically

relevant is commonplace; the lists of categories (*padārthas*) given by Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika reflects this selectivity. The Vaiśeṣika categories are intended to provide an exhaustive catalogue of all the things that need to be referred to in a discussion about the nature of the world and the place of liberation in it, and the Nyāya list is constructed in the same way. The lists are rather different. Vaiśeṣika countenances 6, later 7 varieties of entity; they are the "reals," the stuff of which everything else is made. Nyāya's list of categories, some 16 of them, ranges wider. It began as a list of topics for a manual of debate or discussion, for the reader will recall that Gautama viewed discussion as one means toward liberation, and the means particularly within his province. The ontological categories of Vaiśeṣika come later on to be incorporated within one of the Nyāya 16, namely under the category of *prameya*, the objects which are to be understood correctly. The Nyāya list of categories also commits it to an interest in the ways of knowing—thus to epistemology and logic—as well as a good many other things connected with the discovery of truth through discussion and debate.

Recognition of the other criteria of system making that were listed above is demonstrated in the writings of our philosophers. Concern about accuracy is contained in the extended attention given to the questions of validity, the means of knowing, and the nature of illusion. Consistency is clearly appealed to constantly in the Nyāya theory of inference, and there is no reason to think that contradiction is viewed any differently from the way in which Western philosophers from the Greeks on have viewed it. Inadequacy, that is to say, the inability of the opponent to explain something which clearly needs explaining, is a common ground for refutation, and likewise the ability of a hypothesis to explain more than its alternatives is made the basis of acceptance. There is a Sanskrit word for lack of economy, *gaurava*, meaning "heaviness," which is considered a fault by the later writers of our period and by Navya-naiyāyikas. Simplicity as a criterion may be construed in numerous ways, however, and it is so in India as elsewhere.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is frequently referred to as the philosophy which is closest to common sense. The suggestion is that they were the arch-empiricists among the Indians. Murti writes "We are all Naiyāyikas first and continue to be so unless by a special effort we free ourselves from the empirical habits of our mind."² No doubt the Naiyāyikas were as empirical as most Indian theorists, if only because they made all truth-claims about things within reach of the senses turn ultimately on direct observation. But they were at the

same time among the most imaginative of systematic philosophers in their constructions. We shall see below the extent to which they developed such matters as the theory of relations, of universals, and of absences far beyond anything one could hope to find presaged in common sense. However, Nyāya may be admitted to be closer to common sense than other theories in that they considered the range of relevant common-sense sentences which needed systematic translation to be much wider than did most other systems. This is mainly because of their belief that intellectual discussion can pave the way for spiritual realization, a belief which certain other philosophers do not share. Given that intellectual doubts about liberation are obstacles to progress toward human perfection, it becomes clear why the Naiyāyika believes that nothing short of a full-scale account of the nature of the external as well as the psychical world will do. Both these parts of the world must be shown to be such as to allow the possibility of liberation.

With these beliefs and attitudes in mind we can turn to the decisions system makers must make which were mentioned above. First, as to questions of logic. The old Naiyāyikas groped for a system, perfected by the Navya-naiyāyikas, in which each technical term, whether subject or predicate, has a referent. Thus, they do not limit the referential terms in a syntactical manner, and they do not construe ontology as determined by the list of things named by nouns only. In this they resemble the bulk of Western philosophers. However, they were perhaps more consistent in this choice than many Western philosophers in that they were led to construe even what we now call "logical connectives" as naming entities. Western philosophers tend to distinguish terms like "and," "or," and "not" as differing in kind from referential terms like "man" or "walks." They came to a sort of reckoning over the little term "is" as used in a sentence such as "the sky is blue." Does "is" refer here? If so, to what? And if not, why do other verbs refer? The Naiyāyikas fail to distinguish logical terms from others: to them "is" denotes positive being, "not" denotes negative being, i.e., absences, "and" and "or" denote certain complex relations.

Furthermore the Naiyāyikas were not suspicious of repeatable entities such as universals. Their logic countenances them among individuals as referents of either nouns or verbs. The reasons why they do so are reviewed by them in their arguments, and are summarized below.

Although Nyāya admits universals among its elementary entities, one should not leap to the conclusion that its logic is intensional

in the more rigorous senses of the word. If we use the term “intentional” to speak of a system in which two distinct terms may have the same content, that is, range over exactly the same entities, and “extensional” to speak of systems which do not allow difference of entity without difference of content, then we must conclude that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is an extensional system. In fact, the principle of extensionality is explicitly formulated by Udayana among the so-called impediments to universalhood (*jātibādhalā*).³ By the same token, the temptation to construe Nyāya as speaking of classes—a temptation that becomes strong when we consider its definition of number (which resembles that of *Principia Mathematica*) must be resisted for precisely the same reason: that classes do not satisfy the principle of extensionality.

The second kind of choice we noticed system makers must face is that concerning the elements of the system. Here the Vaiśeṣika ontology seems clearly guided by a straightforward rule of thumb, which is that the basic elements must be conceived of as without parts; they have no constituents. This leads them to view the ultimate components out of which material things are produced as atomic. However, they also view space, time, selves, and internal organs as elements, as well as various properties and relations. The Vaiśeṣika ontology is, by comparison with some that have been proposed, a very rich one: it begins from over 40 kinds of basic elements. But then, it promises to explain rather more than many systems do, and furthermore, as we just saw, it allows predicates to denote as well as subjects, thus necessitating the admission of relations as well as *relata* into the system’s basis.

As for the choice between realism and particularism, that is, between a basis which allows spatiotemporal repeatable elements as opposed to that which restricts itself to events, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is flatly on the side of realism. Belief in substance, i.e., in continuants through space and time, is a basic plank in their philosophical platform.

It was mentioned previously that Nyāya’s basis is both physicalistic and phenomenalistic. Not only are physical atoms elements of the system, but so too are colors, tastes, sounds, and smells. One implication of this is that the Nyāya accepts no so-called principle of acquaintance in arriving at its position. Items which are known to us only by inference are perfectly admissible as elements of the system side by side with those which are directly perceived. The existence of several of the basic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories are held to be demonstrable only by inference: e.g., space, time, and the internal

organ, as well as inherence, one of the basic Nyāya relations. To be sure, there are those among our philosophers who later on argue that some or all of these too can be directly perceived at least by yogis. Nevertheless, no Naiyāyika ever argues that admissibility as an element is contingent upon being the object of direct awareness.

As for the final choice, that of the primitives of the system, we shall be studying these as we work on through the details of the system.

One final matter, on which Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika once again parallels other philosophical systems. We saw that a philosopher engaged in systematic philosophy must not only construct the system but also communicate with others what he has done, and that this is frequently done by means of explications which connect terms within the system with ordinary language. There is even a small-scale theory of explications developed, mainly by the later writers, giving principles by which such explications can be criticized. An explication, or "definition," must be such that it neither overextends so as to apply to unintended things, nor underextends so as to fail to apply to things intended. And, obviously, a definition which applies to things directly contrary to what is intended is unsatisfactory.

As is to be expected, these definitions are not intended to completely characterize the *definienda*; they merely serve to pick out from among things that might be confused with the thing which is being defined. In this way they are said to indicate *differentia* (*asādhāraṇadharmā*) of the *definiendum*. It is important to keep well in mind, though, that the *differentia* are properties alluded to in ordinary, not systematic, parlance. In a definition of this kind, the technical term from the system is the *definiendum*, and terms whose meaning is known to the public constitute the *definiencia*. This is why it would be wrong to suppose that definitions in Nyāya serve to identify the "essence" of the things being defined, as Biarreau rightly notes, and it also explains what she finds rather puzzling, namely the nonchalance earlier Naiyāyikas exhibit toward problems of definition.⁴ It is typical of philosophers constructing systems that they should tend to feel that the worth of their constructions will ultimately stand or fall on its overall ability to explain, and not on the individual correlations between its terms and those of common sense. In this way Naiyāyikas are committed to a kind of "holism" in Quine's sense.⁵

RELATIONS

We shall not delay any longer getting into the system itself. First of all, we shall survey the ontological categories of the Vaiśeṣika, which are accepted also by Nyāya. Later on we shall turn to problems of epistemology. Inevitably, whichever way we choose to expound this system, it will turn out that we must refer to material as yet unexplained in order to fully illuminate what is under discussion at the moment. That is the way with a philosophical system; were it not so, the more unsystematic one's philosophy must be. Thus, as we have chosen to treat metaphysics before epistemology, certain things will need to be referred to in earlier chapters which will only receive full treatment in later ones. For example, given this decision about the order of exposition we shall not discuss the theory of inference until later, and so I shall sometimes need to refer the reader to material developed in the section on inference in order to fully clarify an argument which is put forth in defense of a certain ontological category. Likewise, questions about the experiential basis for ontology, though they will come up in the section on ontology, will have to await full resolution until the theory of perception can be developed more fully.

A sizable group of the sentences Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika wishes to translate into its system concern the makeup of the external world, those objects with which we deal in our everyday affairs. Since it is attachment to the agreeable characteristics of these objects which breeds *karma* and *saṃsāra*, a prime purpose of philosophy is the successful analysis of the makeup of these things, so that the aspirant for liberation may truly understand the sources of the attraction and be able to adopt a suitably disinterested attitude to them.

In order to provide technical terminology with which to translate suitably sentences about objects and their constitution, the Vaiśeṣikas propose a number of types of basic elements of their system,

together with relations to connect them in such a way as to build larger objects. The relations, as we have seen, are included among the basic elements, so that in choosing just these elements the Vaiśeṣikas are at the same time working out their choice of primitive terms.

The sentences of the system, as well as those of ordinary language which the systematic ones will translate, are taken to be in subject-predicate form. Thus, some of the elements may occupy the subject place only, others may occupy the predicate place only, and many can play either role depending on context. Do not think, however, that the Vaiśeṣika thinks of his basic elements as terms; they are real entities, existing independently of our thinking, as we shall see later on. The system, though we may speak of it as a language into which another language is being translated, is in a fact a map of the nature of things itself. We may think of the matter this way. In the real world there are substrata (*dharmin*), properties (*dharma*), and relations (*sambandha*), each having appropriate subdivisions. The entities combine in the world so as to produce further entities; they also are related so as to constitute what we may call facts. The minimal form of a fact, call it an "atomic fact" if you will, consists of a substratum connected by a relation to a property. More complex relationships are also found. The "sentences" of the system are linguistic entities which reflect the form of such facts. The terms of these sentences must denote elements of the system, or else be expandable into sentences whose terms each denote an element.

Naiyāyikas are fond of a saying which is sometimes found at the head of their works: "whatever is, is knowable and nameable" (*astitva jñeyatva abhidheyatva*). A bit of thought about this maxim suggests how clearly they conceive their task in the manner I have been suggesting. The knowability and nameability, as well as the existence, spoken of in this saying must be understood as existence, knowability, and nameability *within the systematic language*. Otherwise contradictory views could both be true, since it is possible to name both *x* and its nonexistence. But the things which really exist, namely the basic elements and their products, are named by terms in the systematic language, whereas the things which other people think exist but which actually do not are not named at all within the system. In addition, other philosophers have hypotheses granting existence to certain kinds of things (e.g., darkness, as we shall see) which they misconstrue. Darkness exists, but its name within the system is not "darkness" but something else—"absence of light," according to some of the Naiyāyikas.¹

It cannot be emphasized too strongly how important to the

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's program is the postulate that substrata and property are different entities entirely (*dharmadharmibheda*).² We shall return to illustrate the importance of this for a realistic epistemology in Chapter Eight. The Naiyāyika is always careful to distinguish combinations of elements which produce further elements from mere aggregations of elements, which do not "produce" at all in the technical sense adopted by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. This being the case, it may be well for us to have some terminology of our own to distinguish those things recognized by Vaiśeṣika as belonging to one of the categories from those aggregates which are not. So far I have used the term "element," but this is somewhat unfortunate, for we shall need this term to distinguish certain types of substances from others. Therefore, I wish to introduce here the term "individual," which will refer to any entity belonging to one of the Vaiśeṣika categories, and is to be contrasted with "object," which I shall use to speak of aggregates as well as what were called "facts." An individual has no parts in the strictest sense: it is not a sum of any other individuals.

The *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* distinguish 6 kinds of individuals. They may be referred to in English expositions as: (1) substance; (2) quality; (3) motion; (4) universal; (5) individuator; (6) inherence. Later on a seventh category of individuals was added, that of (7) absence. The Sanskrit term translated by "category" is *padārtha*, literally a thing to which words refer. As pointed out previously, the individuals may be thought of as the *denotata* of the terms in the systematic language, which is just what is implied by the use of this word.

Of these 7 categories that of inherence is comprised by a relation or relations exhaustively: category (2), that of qualities, contains in its list of types of quality several of which are relational, namely contact, number, separateness, and disjunction. Later on Nyāya theory developed the notion that anything could function as a relation by linking itself to another thing. Since the Naiyāyikas' choice of individuals is in large measure guided by their conception of how such individuals are to combine to form facts, we had better start our review of ontology by examining their theory of relations.

First a few technical terms. A notion we may concede to be primitive for Nyāya is that of a "locus" (*āśraya* or *adhikaraṇa*). The best a Naiyāyika can do to explain what a locus is to say that it is that which we say things reside "in" or "on" or "at." It is not spatiotemporally conceived, although spatiotemporal difference implies different loci. According to Praśastapāda the first 5 categories

are loci, and Śivāditya echoes this when he defines *x's being a locus* (*adhikaraṇatva*) as *x's* property of having a universal resident in it. Any two things related in such a way that one is resident in (on or at) the other can be called a resider-residence-relation (*āśrayā-śritasambandha*).

A related pair of terms which has an epistemological connotation is that of "qualifier" (*viśeṣaṇa*) and "qualificand" (*viśeṣya*). A thing qualifies another when we conceive it to. Praśastapāda limits qualifiers to the first 5 categories, but Uddyotakara and later writers appeal to a relation called "qualifier-qualificand-relation" (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyasambandha*) which, e.g., connects inherence to its *relata* or absences to their loci. This is perhaps the first self-linking connector (*svarūpasambandha*).³ According to the *Nyāyalīlāvati* "qualifier" and "qualificand" have no fixed meaning; sometimes the distinction indicates relative importance, sometimes that one is contained within the other, sometimes that one is the locus of the other. Sometimes, Vallabha says, the relation is not even real. This admission lets in a host of epistemological problems which we shall have to postpone for now.

In Navya-nyāya further useful technical terminology was developed to handle relations, as their awareness of the importance of relations for their system increased. Some of these terms begin to be used in the latter part of our period. For example, the term "limitor" (*avacchedaka*), though found in early texts, begins to assume its technical sense in *Nyāyalīlāvati* and *Saptapadārthi*. Vallabha says that the universals inhering in earth atoms are the limitors of the inherence causes of smell, and Śivāditya defines a moment as time limited by a motion. The terms *anuyogi* and *pratiyogi*, used to differentiate the *relata* related by relations which point only one way, so to speak, are found used in this way by Bhāsarvajña, for example, but are not frequent until the later literature. But the directionality of inherence and contact is implicit in the theories of the older writers.

I. Inherence

Kaṇāda explains inherence as the cause of the notion that something is "here" in a locus, and connects its function to causality. He also conceives that there is only one inherence, since there is no indication that different inferences connect different pairs of things related by inherence. The theory of a single inherence carries on until Navya-nyāya times.⁴ As for the definition of inherence, however, our philosophers begin immediately to improve on Kaṇāda's definition.

Vātsyāyana says that inherence relates two things when one can-

not occur without the other. The definitive form of this account is provided by Praśastapāda, who defines inherence as the relation between two inseparable (*ayutasiddha*) things related as located to locus. He further explains that "inseparability" means different things for noneternal entities than it does for eternal ones. Two entities, at least one of which is noneternal, are inseparable if all loci of one are loci of the other, while two eternal entities are inseparable if all motions that occur within one occur within the other.

Inherence relates qualities, motions, universals, and individuators to substances. It also relates universals to qualities and universals to motions. Finally, it relates composite individuals to the "parts" which are the composite individuals' cause.

Praśastapāda has a number of further interesting things to say about inherence. For one thing, he follows Kaṇāda in saying it is "marked through our knowledge," i.e., that its presence is in some manner dependent on our attending to it. Does this mean that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realistic epistemology is jeopardized? We shall return to this question. For another, inherence has no universal inhering in it, nor any individuator individuating it. This is not surprising, since there is only one inherence. But Praśastapāda is also aware of the possibility of infinite regress, were inherence to be related to a universal inherenceness by inherence. Which leads us to a basic question: what relates inherence to its *relata*? Praśastapāda's answer is that it is related to them by the relation of identity (*tādātmya*). Furthermore, what happens to inherence when its *relata* are destroyed or disappear? According to Praśastapāda inherence is unaffected. It may be likened to a glue which glues together whatever inseparable things happen to fall into it. If there are no such things, the glue exists in potency, ready to glue but not, at the moment, gluing! Uddyotakara argues that if it were not independent of its *relata* in this way it could not do its job.

Praśastapāda thinks that inherence is not directly perceived, but is known through inference. This is consistent with his idea that it is somehow dependent on our knowing about it. But Uddyotakara and the Naiyāyikas generally hold that inherence is directly perceptible. Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña are equally explicit about it, although the latter characteristically differs in details, holding that inherence is only sometimes perceptible. The commentators on Praśastapāda mention the view that inherence is perceptible as the view of "others," and scholars say that this is one of the few differences between the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya systems. Vallabha is apparently trying to adjudicate this discrepancy when he argues that,

though inherence is not perceived, it is inferred as closely involved in judgments of perception and so seems to be perceived because of this involvement. Faddegon compares the Vaiśeṣika theory of relations with that of certain 19th century philosophers such as Sigwart and Windelband, who divide relations into 3 sorts: (1) reflective relations, produced by mental classifications, (2) constitutive relations, which are in the things themselves, and (3) modal relations, relating our ideas and feelings and their contents. He says that Vaiśeṣikas thought inherence was a reflective relation, while Mīmāṃsakas, for example, took it as constitutive.⁵ However, despite what Praśastapāda says about inherence being dependent on our knowing, I think Faddegon is mistaken in attributing to Vaiśeṣikas the view that inherence is mind-dependent in the sense that European logicians had in mind. There are various ways in which an entity may be mind-dependent, and not all of them are inconsistent with direct epistemological realism.

Certainly our philosophers did hold that inherence not only related objects known by us, but also entered into the relations between our knowing apparatus and its objects. Uddyotakara lists 6 different kinds of relations between the sense organs and their objects, one of which is inherence, another being the qualifier-qualificand-relation mentioned earlier. The rest of his 6 are direct contact and 3 indirect relations involving inherence and contact in combination.

II. Other Relations: Contact, Self-Linking Connectors

Besides inherence, relations between individuals within the Nyāya scheme boil down to contact, self-linking connectors, or some indirect relation combining those three. If difference is to be counted a relation, it should be added too.

Contact (*saṃyoga*) is one of the qualities, and we shall discuss it in greater detail. Here we need only note that it is capable of relating two substances at least one of which is material (*mūrta*). Given two such substances, contact is a quality of an ordered pair of them, inhering in it (the pair) as any quality does in the substance it is a quality of.

Disjunction (*vibhāga*) is also a quality, inhering in pairs of individuals which (individuals) have just parted from contact with each other. Separateness (*prthaktva*) is yet another quality which may reside in pairs of separate substances. Still another is number (*saṅkhyā*), at least those numbers higher than one.

Otherness, i.e., difference in nature, is construed as a variety of

absence, the seventh category. We shall have a closer look at it subsequently.

All other relations are either complexes of the simple ones, or are instances of self-linking connectors (*svarūpasambandha*). The theory of these relations is worked out in great detail in Navya-nyāya. There is little attempt by the classical philosophers of the school to work out such a theory in any systematic way. But several such relations have an important place in the system's defense of certain fundamental theses.

We noted in passing above that the relation between knowledge and known (called qualifier-qualificand-relation) may have been the earliest self-linking connector. Another case which gets regular recognition is the relation between an absence and its "counterpositive," i.e., the thing that is absent. For example, *absence of pot* is an individual, the nonexistence of a certain pot—or of pots in general. There is no such thing as pure absence—absence of everything or absence of nothing in particular. Every absence has a counterpositive, something which is absent. Here the counterpositive is the particular pot—or the universal "potness" if the absence is of pots in general. But what is the relation between an absence and its counterpositive? Is it inherence, or contact, or what? These scholastic sounding questions might not be raised by the Naiyāyikas themselves, but are caused to be raised by critics of the system, especially of that part of it which pertains to absences, which play an important role in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. And since they are caused to be raised, e.g., by Buddhists, the Naiyāyikas feel they must answer them. The answer is that an absence needs no further relation to relate itself to its counterpositive, that is to say, it just *is* that absence, of that particular thing and no other. It did not get that way in dependence on something else, though our having noticed it at all no doubt had a cause, and the pot may have been removed or destroyed by causal factors. But its *nature* is not dependent on something else, and that is why it is its own connector.

Similarly, when the question of the relation between inherence and its *relata* is raised, as it was by Śaṅkara and others (not to speak of Bradley), this same answer is given. There is no infinite regress, for while two inseparable things need inherence to be related to each other, inherence just *is the* sort of thing which relates inseparable pairs of entities of appropriate kinds.

Still another use for self-linking connectors was apparently emphasized by Trilocana, who found himself being asked, in connection with the theory of inference, what the relation was between two

universals one of which "pervaded" the other. Pervasion between universals is the key to the answer to the problem of induction, according to Nyāya; clearly it is important to allay any suspicions of a regress here. Trilocana appeals to a connection he calls *svābhāvīkasambandha*, a natural relation between the universals.

Praśastapāda, we noted, referred to this kind of relation as "identity" (*tādātmya*). Strictly speaking, identity cannot be a relation within the system, since the system may contain no two identical things, in consonance with the principle of extensionality. And indeed formal relations, like identity and difference, do *not* occur as individuals in the system. A relation must relate two distinct things, and it must be distinct from them. But must it be distinct from *each of them*? Apparently not, for a self-linking connector is precisely one thing x relating itself to another, y . If we are to say there are three things here, x , y and the connector, we shall have to say that, though the connector is not different from x , it is different from y , thus, it is a distinct thing from its *relata*. Later on the Navya-naiyāyikas puzzled over some of the implications of this.⁶

III. Causal Relations

Among the sentences needing accurate systematic translation, sentences about the causes of things are perhaps the most important of all. Since the point of philosophizing is to prepare the way for liberation, it is a crucial part of the philosopher's understanding that he understands the causes of bondage, and, therefore, the causes of liberation.

The Naiyāyika views causation as a relation between individuals, not solely between events. However, some individuals are momentary; but not all are. On this last point Nyāya jousts at length with the Buddhists, culminating in Udayana's attack in his *Ātmatattvaviveka*. Some scholars trace this polemic all the way back to the *sūtras*. It seems unlikely, however, that Kaṇāda and Gautama were concerned so much with Buddhism as they were with Sāṃkhya, which was the most influential tradition of their period. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has in common with Sāṃkhya the conception that there are individuals which are not momentary but continuants; they differ, however, on the relation between continuants which are causes and those which are their effects.

To understand the development of the Nyāya theory of causation we may first inspect its fully developed form, as we get it in Udayana, whose treatment is accepted as definitive by practically all subsequent Naiyāyikas, including those of the new school.

The causal factors involved in the production of an effect are usually quite numerous, and it is only the full collection of factors (*sāmagrī*) which is a sufficient condition for the production of the effect. When that full collection is operative, the effect arises. The effect is not one of those causal factors: the effect is not included within the cause, since new features arise which are not found anywhere within the causal factors or at any rate not in the particular combination in which they are productive. Among the several factors which make up the full collection some will appear more prominent to the observer than others. These others may be referred to as "accessory" causes, but their presence is just as necessary as the more prominent ones.

Indeed, the members of the collection are each necessary conditions. Plurality of causes—more than one sufficient condition for a single effect—is unreal. Therefore, the arguments of others, e.g., Mimāṃsakas, that a proper explanation of causality involves the postulation of a special category of power or causal efficacy (*śakti*) may be dismissed. Furthermore, certain Buddhist terms meaning "efficiency" can be construed just to mean the presence of all the accessories; thus the efficiency of an event (Buddhists hold that *only* events have efficiency) consists in its being accompanied by the other factors necessary and sufficient to produce an effect.

Naturally, only noneternal things can be produced and so become effects of causes. Both eternal and noneternal individuals may be causal factors. However, Udayana holds that causality is a relation between universals, not particulars. He is even willing to admit causality as a special additional category, although he does not insist upon it. He defines causality as "being a universal which is regularly connected with an earlier time (*pūrvakālaniyatajātīyatva*)," which amounts to saying that the relation between cause and effect is a relation of temporal precedence together with constant conjunction. The Naiyāyika interprets "constant conjunction" as a relation between properties. Whereas in English we should say that a causal relation is present when it is true that "whenever a thing of type *A* occurs, a thing of type *B* occurs". Udayana interprets this as a relation between the properties *A-ness* and *B-ness*, in accordance with his ontological predilections.

A generally accepted Nyāya classification divides causal factors into 3 varieties. (1) First, there is what is called the "inherence cause" (*samavāyikāraṇa*). When Kaṇāda talks about a cause he usually has this kind of causal condition in mind. Thus, a substance is the inherence cause in the production of its qualities and motions, since the effects inhere in the substance. Furthermore, when a pot

is produced from pot-halves or a cloth from threads (two favourite Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika examples) the pot-halves and the threads are respectively the inherence causes of the pot and the cloth because the latter, which are the effects, inhere in the halves and the threads. It is important to recognize that the Naiyāyika does not hold that the halves or the threads are the material out of which the pot and the cloth are respectively composed. Such an account involving a "material cause" (*upādānakāraṇa*) is Sāṃkhya's, not Nyāya's.⁷ Eternal substances may be inherence causes, as well as noneternal ones; e.g., selves are the inherence causes of their cognitions and feelings.

(2) A second variety of cause is called merely the "noninherence cause" (*asamavāyikāraṇa*). An individual which is not inhered in by the effect, but which is "closely related" (*pratyāsanna*) to the inherence cause, may function as a noninherence cause. For example, in the production of a pot from pot-halves the contact between the pot-halves, which inheres in the pot-halves, is the noninherence cause of the pot. Or when a cloth is being woven, the colour of the threads, which inheres in the threads, is the noninherence cause of the colour of the cloth. The examples make it clear that the "close relation" is a matter of degree. Vyomaśiva divides noninherence causes into two kinds: (a) "small" (*laghvī*), where the noninherence cause inheres in the same substance that the effect inheres in—e.g., the contact of the pot-halves, or one sound (wave) which precedes the next sound (wave), since they both inhere in the one *ākāśa* : (b) "big" (*bṛhatī*), where the noninherence cause inheres in the same substance that the effect inheres in, e.g., the colour of the threads. But the "close relation" may be still looser. The *Daśapadārthasāstra* counts the internal organ as the noninherence cause of the psychic qualities of that self with which it is in contact. Many individuals belonging to the second category — the qualities — may be noninherence causes, although according to Praśastapāda and his commentators some of them are not causal factors at all.

(3) The first two varieties of causal factors are together necessary but not sufficient to produce an effect. Furthermore, in some cases of causation the first two sorts of factors are entirely absent. For example, in the production of absences — the destruction of a middle-sized substance like a pot, for instance — since the effect does not inhere in anything there is neither inherence nor noninherence cause. So the third variety of causal factor is in many ways the crucial one, on the authority of the Naiyāyikas. It is called the "instrumental cause" (*nimittakāraṇa*).

Clearly all other causal factors not included in the first two varieties must be included here if the classification is to be exhaustive. So, for example, in producing a pot from pot-halves the presence of a potter at the appropriate time and place, the absence of any obstructions to his completing his task, as well as the specific movements which he makes his hands and stick go through, are all to be included within this third variety. So the Naiyāyikas further subdivide this category into two: (a) general instrumental factors (*sādhāraṇakāraṇa*), like the presence of time, place, and absence of obstructions, and (b) specific instrumental factors (*asādhāraṇakāraṇa*), including the particular movements of the potter's hands and stick as well as any qualities which are specific to just this kind of effect, such as number in counting, size in measuring, etc.

We should also note a rather honorific word used for “(causal) condition *par excellence*.” The general word for “cause” in Sanskrit is *kāraṇa*; this special word is *karāṇa*. What is the *karāṇa* or “condition *par excellence*” of an effect? Several interpretations are found offered by our writers. One, suggested perhaps by Uddyotakara, has it that the supreme cause is the most effective cause, the event which immediately precedes and brings about the production of the effect. Sometimes this event is called the “operation” (*vyāpāra*). Thus, in chopping down a tree the last contact of the axe with the tree before the tree begins to fall might be considered to be the causal condition *par excellence*. In this interpretation this condition is an event. A second view is proposed by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa: he holds that the honour of being called the supreme cause can only properly be awarded to the whole collection of causal conditions—the sufficient condition itself. His view is pretty well ignored by subsequent Naiyāyikas, however. A third view, popular in Navya-nyāya, is that the cause *par excellence* is not the event which immediately precedes the production of the effect, but rather the individual whose operation constitutes that event. Thus, in our example it is the axe which is the cause *par excellence*, the *karāṇa*.⁸

To this picture of the developed Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causal relations we may next append a few historical comments. As was mentioned, the major opponents of our philosophers on causation were the Buddhists on the one hand, Sāṃkhya on the other. Sāṃkhya views causality as a relation among continuants, as Nyāya does, but conceives the relation differently. The Buddhists reject continuants *in toto* and view causation as a relation among events.

Sāṃkhya conceives that causality is a connection between a cause which contains the effect in a potential state, and the effect which is

the same thing now “manifested” (*vyakta*), i.e., apparent to our inspection. Favourite examples are the oil of the sesame seed, first contained within the seed and then spilled out when the seed is broken open, or, with a somewhat different thrust, the production of curds from milk. In both cases the effect is contained in the cause. Sāṃkhya generalizes this conception of causation to the relation between the unmanifest matter (*prakṛti*) which is the ultimate cause of all worldly effects, and its transformations into the manifest mental and physical modes with which we are acquainted in life.

Gautama is aware of the view that change is modification of already existing stuff, rather than replacement of something old by a new thing. Oddly, he discusses this in connection with a grammatical point about the change in suffixes due to variation of a stem in syntactical function. The related point about whether the sounds constituting the words are manifested or produced is a topic which goes far back into the earliest history of Indian thought. The Naiyāyikas hold that sounds are produced in the substance called *ākāśa*. Sounds are qualities for Nyāya, and are produced in a series, one being destroyed as the next arises. Others, notably Mīmāṃsakas but also including Sāṃkhya, held that sound itself is a substance, and that different sounds are modifications of this eternal sound-stuff. Many of the arguments about the theory of sound turn on this difference among the systems over causality.

Sāṃkhya writers such as Īśvarakṛṣṇa offered several arguments in favour of their view that the effect is contained in the cause. Among the most important of these are the following. (1) The effect must exist in the cause, since a nonexistent thing cannot be produced. This corresponds to the ancient maxim of classical Western philosophers, *ex nihilo nihil fit*. (2) What prevents a cause from producing anywhere and all the time, or in any random fashion you please? There must be some factor which limits the effectiveness of the cause to producing its effect at the proper time and place, and this factor can only be the presence of the effect itself in potency. (3) A given type of effect can only be produced by a certain type of cause, e.g., milk produces curds, but other liquids cannot. This shows that the peculiarity of that liquid which is competent to produce curds is due to the presence within it, but not in the other liquids, of the effect in its potential state.

The Nyāya attitude to these arguments, as exemplified in Śrīdhara’s *Nyāyakandalī*, is as follows. The first argument is in the nature of an undefended pronouncement. Who says a nonexistent thing cannot be produced, and why? Experience shows us that nothing

is commoner than production of previously nonexistent things from causal factors none of which can be shown to "contain" the effect within them. If the effect already exists, why can it not be produced for inspection? Śrīdhara professes not to understand the notion of the existence of the effect "in potentiality." How is this different from "notexistent yet," i.e., from the effect's nonexistence at a time prior to its production?

To take the second and third arguments together, Śrīdhara admits that an effect regularly shares some attributes with its cause; but it does not share *all* its attributes with the cause. The Sāṃkhyas apparently cannot conceive how else the peculiar ability of milk to produce curds can be explained, but the Naiyāyika finds the explanation readily enough in the notion of conditions which are individually insufficient but jointly sufficient to cause the origination of the effect. And the two theories are not as far apart here as one might suppose. For Sāṃkhya readily admits that something changes when milk produces curds: certain qualities at least arise—sourness, solidity—which were absent in the milk. And the Naiyāyika admits that the inherence cause—the milk—shares a number of qualities (e.g., a certain chemical composition) with the curds. Both assert that in order that milk produce curds there must be some extraneous causal conditions present which determine that the causal change takes place now and here. Sāṃkhya does not choose to call these **extraneous factors** by the name "cause," and Nyāya does.

Śaṃkarasvāmin presents a counterargument of some interest. It is a matter of experience that one thing can produce several different effects, but it cannot do so unless some of the other circumstances differ. These differing circumstances are the Naiyāyikas' "accessories," and this shows that the Sāṃkhya account is inadequate in that it fails to explain certain observed facts. Trilocana, thinking along the same lines, distinguishes two kinds of causal efficiency (*sāmarthya*): an internal kind, stemming from the entity we call the "cause" and which within the system is merely one of the causal factors, and an external kind, stemming from the accessories. What is being proposed, then, is that the ordinary, common-sense use of the term "cause," which is notoriously unclear, be abandoned within the system and replaced by the clear-cut notion of a totality of causal conditions which are jointly sufficient for production of the effect. Then to connect the resulting theory with ordinary speech we may resort to the language of "accessories" and the distinction Trilocana proposes.

Viewed in this light, the refusal of the Naiyāyika to limit the term

“cause” to the inherence cause, as Sāṃkhya does, becomes not merely a verbal matter but one of deep philosophical importance. Nyāya claims that its way of speaking about causes within the system satisfies the criteria of systembuilding better than its alternatives; this is by no means a verbal claim, but one crucial to the success of the system.

The conception of the *sāmagrī*, or totality of causal conditions, is also the main element in Nyāya’s answer to Buddhist arguments. However, the matter is complicated by introduction into the discussion of causality of the closely related, indeed inseparable, question of the viability of an event ontology.

Kaṇāda seems not to address any arguments to Buddhists, and it is not at all clear that Gautama is concerned to refute them in any detail. He does make reference to one of the major Buddhist arguments for their thesis that only events exist. This is the argument from the unintelligibility of the past and the future, and therefore of the notion of a continuant, of something which did exist and will go on existing. Gautama’s reference suggests that he does not fully grasp the implications of that argument, since his answer is merely that we can infer the reality of past and future on the ground of the admitted reality of the present. The nub of the Buddhist’s argument is that the notion of “present” is itself dependent on the notions of past and future; thus, temporal distinctions are “constructions” and temporal succession is not real. Vātsyāyana’s comment on Gautama’s passage helps some: it is our direct experience of process which enables us to infer the reality of time. He clearly recognizes that the Buddhist’s argument is weighty if they are allowed to treat motion as the successive occupation of points in space in a series of discrete moments. This discussion nicely reflects its parallels in Zeno and Russell.

The first explicit reference to the Buddhist’s thesis of “momentariness” (*kṣaṇikavāda*) among our writers occurs in Vātsyāyana, who introduces this position in passing during a discussion of Sāṃkhya theories. But it is Uddyotakara who first develops extensive polemics on this point.

Uddyotakara’s arguments are as follows: (1) Buddhists accept *karma*, transmigration, and liberation; they have a theory of value much the same as Naiyāyikas do, except that they tend to internalize the sources of bondage to a greater extent. Thus Buddhists make much of the notion of “seeds” (*bīja*) or “traces” (*vāsanā*) which carry out the force of *karma* previously earned on subsequent thoughts and actions. But the notion of a trace is incompatible with the Buddhist theory of momentariness, since on that theory each momen-