Piracy and the English Government 1616–1642

David D. Hebb

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

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

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

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

Map 2 Sally, 1637, showing Rainsborough's seige lines, from John Dunton, *A True Journal of the Sally Fleet*

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AGS	Archivo General de Simancas, Spain
APC	*Acts of the Privy Council of England*
BIHR	*Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*
BL	British Library
CLRO	Corporation of London Record Office
CRO	Cornwall Record Office
CSPV	*Calendar of State Papers Venetian*
DNB	*Dictionary of National Biography*
EHR	*English Historical Review*
Econ. Hist. Rev.	*Economic History Review*
HLRO	House of Lords Records Office
HMC	Historical Manuscripts Commission
KAO	Kent Archives Office
MM	*The Mariner's Mirror*
PRO	Public Record Office
TRHS	*Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*

CONVENTIONS

All quotations cited in this book have been modernized, except where the original spelling or punctuation has been thought necessary to convey the style of the writer or particular sense of the document. Also, contractions have been extended except where the original form is required for reasons of style or sense.

The dates of English documents are Old Style, but with the year regarded as beginning on 1 January. Continental documents dated in the New Style have been cited this way. In any case where uncertainty may arise, both Old and New Style dates are given: for example, 1/10 January, or 7 March 1620/21.

Two forms of citations of manuscripts in the Public Record Office documents are used. So that the reader may more conveniently refer to the source, I have cited the document or item number for manuscripts which have been calendared, rather than the folio: e.g., PRO, SP 14/90/24. For uncalendared manuscripts, I have cited the document by folio number, e.g., PRO, SP 84/77/f.124.

The translations of French and Spanish documents are my own while my translations of Dutch documents have been corrected and improved by Dr A.H. Marshall.

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INTRODUCTION

When James I observed that piracy[1] had become 'too deeply rooted among' his English subjects he was at once both wiser and more foolish than he knew.[2] From the time of Elizabeth I, the English had been perceived as a nation of pirates. This image persisted into the reign of James I, has been sustained in literature, and has now become fixed in the popular mind.[3] The lives of famous English pirates and their exploits have been related many times, and their social and economic background analysed meticulously and well by academic historians.[4]

However, English piracy was not entrenched as deeply as James I believed. On the contrary, in the early 17th century English piracy declined sharply.[5] Indeed, at the very time James was

[1] Piracy is defined in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, pp. 900, 1389, as 'The practice or crime of robbery and depredation on the sea or navigable rivers, etc., or by descent from the sea upon the coast, by persons not holding a commission from an established state.' This form of predation differs from privateering which is 'by armed vessels owned and officered by private persons, and holding a commission from the government, called "letters of marque" '. Privateering in the early Stuart period has been covered carefully and well by J.C. Appleby, 'English Privateering during the Spanish and French Wars, 1625–30' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Hull, 1983); I wish to thank Dr Appleby for the many useful comments he has made.

[2] *CSPV*, 1619–1621, p. 356.

[3] See C.M. Senior, *A Nation of Pirates: English Piracy in its Heyday*; N. Williams, *The Sea Dogs*; P. Newark, *The Crimson Book of Pirates*.

[4] R.O. Moore, 'Some Aspects of the Origin and Nature of English Piracy, 1603–25' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Virginia, 1960); C.M. Senior, 'An Investigation of the Activities and Importance of English Pirates 1603–40' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Bristol, 1973). I wish to thank Dr Senior for the generous advice he has given me.

[5] Senior, *Nation of Pirates*, pp. 145–52, convincingly shows that English piracy had declined in the second decade of the century, and this trend continued.

complaining about the piratical nature of his subjects, they were much more often victims of foreign pirates rather than perpetrators of piracy.

The expansion of the English merchant marine, which virtually doubled between 1582 and 1629, and the development of Atlantic and Mediterranean trade routes made English shipping much more vulnerable to piracy.[1] However, the damage to English shipping from foreign pirates has escaped the notice of historians, and the attempts of the English government to counter or suppress pirates has not been appreciated by scholars.[2] This book attempts to redress this deficiency; an assessment of English losses to piracy between the years 1616 and 1642 will be provided as well as a description of the diplomatic, political, economic, and social consequences of piracy in this period.[3]

The beginning and ending dates of this study need a word of explanation. Piracy changed dramatically in the second decade of the 17th century. Pirates from the Barbary states began to operate in the Atlantic. For example, in 1616 a fleet of pirates from Algiers raided Santa Maria in the Azores and carried away hundreds of the island's inhabitants. This expansion had consequences, and certainly from this year English shipping began to suffer and the government became aware of the pirate threat. The ending date was chosen for more familiar reasons. First, the outbreak of the Great Rebellion disrupted government policy. From 1642, king and parliament were so preoccupied with political and military matters that attempts to deal with the problem of piracy effectively ceased for several years. Second, the Civil War altered the problem of piracy. The war substantially increased naval resources available to the government, and though foreign pirates continued to be a source of trouble, they were less of a threat than formerly.

Originally, I intended to analyse the problem of piracy in terms of protection rents and costs along the lines suggested by Professor

[1] R. Davis, *The Rise of the English Shipping Industry: In the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, p. 10, and by the same author, 'England and the Mediterranean, 1570–1670', in *Studies in the Economic History of Tudor and Stuart England*, ed. F.J. Fisher, pp. 117–37.

[2] Only D.G.E. Hurd, 'Some Aspects of the Attempts of the Government to Suppress Piracy During the Reign of Elizabeth I' (unpublished MA thesis, University of London, 1961), is directly concerned with this topic.

[3] Senior, *Nation of Pirates*, p. 145. E.G. Friedman, *Spanish Captives in North Africa in the Early Modern Age*, p. 13, is able to show that pirate attacks on Spanish vessels in the Atlantic increased eight-fold in the two decades after 1610.

Lane and developed by other economic historians.[1] This form of analysis identifies and calculates the amount traders have to pay directly or indirectly to protect their goods against the various forms of organized violence. Lower protection costs may give a group of traders or the traders of one nation a comparative advantage. However, greater familiarity with the source material revealed insoluble difficulties in applying this approach to the actions of pirates against English shipping in the early 17th century. The absence of a series of marine insurance records, for example, makes it impossible to calculate ship losses with the precision required by this approach. Moreover, the organization and financing of the navy make it exceedingly difficult to define and apportion protection costs rationally. For example, what portion of expenditures on a warship, like the *Sovereign of the Seas*, should be considered as a protection cost if the great size of the vessel and costly decorations were primarily a consequence of royal psychological needs or aesthetic desires?

Even were suitable evidence available, an analysis of protection costs would provide only a limited, static picture. It would not show why the government responded or how effectively. Consequently, a different and more dynamic approach to the study of piracy has been employed in this book. Estimates of economic damage caused by pirates have been made, but other costs, including the social damage and political implications of piracy are explored and evaluated so that a more comprehensive assessment of the problem can be presented.

Piracy was not the chief national or international problem faced by the Stuarts, but as Sir John Digby advised James I, it was like a thorn in the foot – painful and crippling – hurtful enough to compel one to seek a remedy.[2] The responses of the government to the problem of piracy form the second, major theme of this study. Sometimes naval force was employed while at other times diplomacy or appeasement was favoured. The reasons for the adoption of these very different policies are explored and related to broader governmental concerns. In a sense, this book is an extended essay about policy-making – an attempt to discover how

[1] F.C. Lane, *Venice and History: The Collected Papers of Frederic C. Lane*, pp. 383–9; also, C.G. Reed, 'Transactions Costs and Differential Growth: Seventeenth Century Western Europe', *Journal of Economic History*, XXXIII, pp. 182–90, and N. Steensgaard, *The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century, the East India Companies, and the Decline of the Caravan Trade.*

[2] BL, Add. MS. 1580, f.108.

information was acquired by the central government and used to formulate policy. It also serves as a case study of how local, national, and international political interests shaped government policy, and how, in turn, they were influenced by the policies of the Stuart government. In the course of research for this book, it quickly became apparent that piracy was more than a naval problem and, consequently, I have tried to put it in a wider and truer context. Also, as I began to research the responses of the English government to the problem of piracy, I became aware of how much policy was determined by political events on the Continent and England's relations with the continental powers. In my narrative and analysis of events, I have, therefore, attempted to place the problem of piracy in the diplomatic context in which English policy was made and executed.

Part 1
JAMES I AND THE PIRATE SCOURGE

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1
JAMES I AND THE SUPPRESSION OF PIRACY

On 20 March 1617, James I, whilst on his way to Scotland, sent the Privy Council the following message:

> One thing there is, which we again seriously recommend unto your diligence, which is a matter of a high nature, wherein both the advancement of our honour and the welfare of our loving subjects are deeply interested: for what can be more honourable to the propagation of our name and glory, to all ensuing posterity; then when we have not only governed our own kingdoms in peace and tranquility, but established by the enterprise of our authority a settled repose in all our neighbour countries, to draw our sword against the enemies of God, and man, that is the pirates, which at this time infest the seas, to the detriment of intercourse, and commerce of all trade: or wherein can we more clearly demonstrate our affectionate care to our good subjects, then by our protection to endeavour to enable them, that they may enjoy themselves, and the continuance of their wonted trades in peace and security.[1]

This passage of the king's letter has a double significance: first of all, the king's recommendation marks the first definite step in setting out an expedition against the pirates of Algiers; but, just as importantly, it provides an indication that the expedition was, in James's words, 'a matter of a high nature' and one which interested the monarch personally.

In part, James was motivated by a desire to secure the welfare of

[1] PRO, SP 14/90/136.

his subjects and their commerce; but also, as he makes plain, the expedition was being undertaken to advance his honour. Although it is a letter of instruction, the tone is very personal; it expresses James's sentiments as well as offering guidance to his government in London. This passage also reveals the king's intense dislike of pirates. They were more than an irritation; they were enemies, not only of man but of God as well; they were deserving of the sword. In writing this piece, James also cast himself in a familiar role – that of a peacemaker of the highest order. By a stroke of the pen, the king in this letter grandly proclaimed his intention to bring order and tranquility to the seas.

From the beginning of his reign, James I termed himself *Rex Pacificus*, and gloried in this title.[1] He told his first parliament that of the many blessings he was bringing, peace was foremost and a consequence of his person: 'I have ever, I praise God, kept peace and amity with all, which hath been so far tied to my person.[2] Later he claimed that he knew 'not by what fortune the diction of *Pacificus* was added to my title at my coming to England, that of the lion, expressing true fortitude, having been my diction before. But I am not ashamed of this addition. For King Solomon was a figure of Christ in that he was a king of peace.'[3] He delighted in being portrayed as a modern Solomon. He wished to be the peacemaker of Europe, settling the quarrels that divided the peoples and princes. In the first years of his reign, James sought to bring an end to the conflict in the Low Countries, and in the last half-dozen he laboured to prevent, limit, and end the Thirty Years War.[4] Though a self-proclaimed peacemaker, he was not a pacifist and on several occasions in his reign resorted to the use of military force, as he was to do against the pirates of Algiers.

James's formative years in Scotland caused him to develop an unusually strong hatred of men of force. Separated from his mother soon after birth, he grew up a pawn in a world of power politics. The future king was at the mercy of older, stronger, ruthless men who manoeuvred to use him for their own ends.[5]

[1] *Journal of the House of Lords* hereafter *Lords Journals*, III, p. 250b; D.H. Willson, *King James VI and I*, pp. 271–2.
[2] Willson, *King James*, p. 271.
[3] Ibid., p. 272.
[4] Ibid., pp. 271–87; also S.R. Gardiner, *History of England: From the Accession of James I to the Outbreak of the Civil War, 1603–1642*, III, p. 361.
[5] Willson, *King James*, pp. 13–57; J.M. Brown, 'Scottish Politics 1567–1625', in *The Reign of James VI and I*, ed. A.G.R. Smith, pp. 22–7.

Advisers and friends were banished and killed as factions fought for control of the boy.[1] He was bullied, threatened, and even kidnapped before he was old enough and sufficiently skilful to gain ascendancy over the lords and ministers of state and kirk.[2]

Given such a background, it is not surprising that timidity marked James's character, so much so, that some thought him a coward.[3] As king, he showed little respect for violent forceful men, like soldiers, and he also displayed a positive loathing of pirates for they, above all others, epitomized a violent disregard for the settled, peaceful order of society.[4] 'If ever a king hated pirates it was James', observed D.H. Willson, the king's foremost biographer.[5] Pirates harmed and intimidated the king's subjects, carried them off into slavery, disrupted commerce, and damaged amicable relations between states. These were practical reasons for disliking pirates, but the king's animosity rested on fundamental, philosophical reasons as well. While objectionable in many ways, military men and privateers at least acted within the framework of a society based on state order: pirates, on the other hand, were patently contemptuous of all rulers and state authority.

From the beginning of the reign, James's hatred of pirates was very pronounced. In 1603, when the Venetian ambassador complained about some English pirates and accused the Lord High Admiral of aiding them, the king could hardly control his anger. As the ambassador spoke, James began to show 'extreme impatience, twisting his body, striking his hands together, and tapping with his feet'. Unable to contain himself any longer, he cried out at last, ' "By God I'll hang the pirates with my own hands, and my Lord Admiral as well" '.[6] Though the Lord Admiral was not hung, many pirates were. Admiralty court records attest to the activity of the government in these years.[7] On 22 December 1608, for example, 19 pirates were hung in a row from Wapping pier,[8] the traditional place of execution for pirates.[9]

[1] G. Donaldson, *Scotland: James V to James VII*, pp. 171–5, 178–80.
[2] J.M. Brown, 'Scottish Politics', pp. 22–39.
[3] Willson, *King James*, p. 274. Sir John Oglander thought James the 'most cowardly man that ever I knew': *A Royalist's Notebook: The Commonplace Book of Sir John Oglander, Kt., of Nunwell*, ed. F. Bamford, p. 193.
[4] Willson, *King James*, pp. 273–4.
[5] Ibid., p. 274.
[6] *CSPV*, 1603–1607, p. 100.
[7] PRO, HCA 1/5/39 to 1/6/187. Oyer and Terminer Records show that out of 260 criminal actions, 240 were for piracy or receiving or abetting pirates.
[8] PRO, SP 14/90/136.
[9] C.M. Senior, *A Nation of Pirates: English Piracy in its Heyday*, p. 121.

Years later, James liked to boast to the Spanish ambassador how great an enemy of pirates he was and that in the few years since his coming to the throne of England more pirates had been hanged than in the previous hundred years.[1]

In the early years, the efforts of the Crown were aimed at a reduction of piracy in English waters or by Englishmen since this was the main source of trouble.[2] The king's prerogative powers were employed to suppress piracy. Royal commissions were established and proclamations issued to enforce the law or extend its effectiveness.[3] Royal pronouncements against pirates came almost yearly in the first decade of Stuart rule: in 1603, 'A Proclamation concerning Warlike ships at Sea' was issued, and three months later general instructions were given in 'A Proclamation to represse all Piracies and Depredations upon the Sea'; in 1604 came 'A Proclamation for the search and apprehension of certaine Pirats'; on 1 March 1605, 'A Proclamation for revocation of Mariners from forreine Services' struck at English pirates serving abroad, while a second on 8 July, 'A Proclamation with certaine Ordinances to be observed by his Majesties subjects toward the King of Spaine' further restricted English pirates; on 13 June 1606, 'A Proclamation for the search and apprehension of certaine Pirates' was published; and on 8 January 1609, 'A Proclamation against Pirats' was promulgated.[4]

In these early years, most of the Crown's measures were directed toward English pirates or those that supported them, but in the second decade of his rule a new threat emerged: pirates from North Africa began to prey upon English ships. Being 'Turks', i.e., heretics, as well as pirates, they were doubly damned in the king's eyes. Long before, when still a very young man in Scotland, James had expressed hatred of the Turks in an epic poem. Entitled *Lepanto*, it celebrated the Christian naval victory of 1571.[5] It provides an insight into the royal mind and a partial

[1] *Documentos Inéditos para la Historia de España*, IV, pp. 52–8.
[2] Ibid., pp. 124, 135–6, 147–8.
[3] PRO, HCA 14/39/ff.217–218.
[4] *Stuart Royal Proclamations*, vol. I, *Royal Proclamations of King James, 1603–25*, ed. J.F. Larkin and P.L. Hughes, nos 15, 28, 46, 50, 53, 67, 93, contain the proclamations referred to above. This list is only a partial indication of royal interest and the use of royal instruments to strike at piracy. Other proclamations, such as that of 27 November 1609, which prohibited English merchants from trading in ports frequented by pirates, dealt with the matter indirectly. See for example, PRO, SP 14/37/96.
[5] *New Poems of James I of England*, ed. Allen W. Westcott; *Lusus Regius, being Poems and other Pieces by King James I*, ed. R.S. Rait.

explanation of the king's motives in supporting the proposal of an expedition against the 'Turks' of Algiers. The poem begins with a confrontation between God and Satan, in which God portrays the Turks as agents of Satan who incites their attacks on Christians. God then declares that Christendom will resist the Turks and sends the Angel Gabriel to inspire the Venetians to take up arms. But Venice is too dispirited and unable to act alone. Victory comes only after the Christian states unite. Under the command of the princely hero, Don John of Austria, the united fleet sets forth to crush the Turks.

Although James's account of the defeat of the Turks was romanticized, the battle of Lepanto, of course, was very real and marked a turning point in the struggle for naval supremacy in the western Mediterranean.[1] No more great naval battles in the Mediterranean took place, but the conflict between Moslems and Christians continued for centuries with piracy becoming 'a substitute for declared war'.[2] Though referred to as 'Turks', these pirates were of several nationalities and operated not from Turkish bases but from the Barbary ports of Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, and Sallee.[3] By the second decade of the 17th century, none of these pirate capitals was under Turkish control.[4] Sallee was often in rebellion against the Emperor of Morocco, and had long since ignored Ottoman.[5] The three North African regencies had thrown off much of the authority of the Sultan, even though they still owed allegiance to Constantinople.[6]

Nominally, the Barbary regencies were governed by a Bashaw (or Pasha), the Sultan's representative, but the real power in the Barbary states rested in the military order of janissaries. Through their governing council, the Divan, made up of senior officers, they elected their leaders, the Beys or Deys, who *de facto* ruled the

[1] A.C. Hess, 'The Battle of Lepanto and its Place in Mediterranean History', *Past and Present*, no. 57 (1972), pp. 53–73. Hess downgrades the long-term significance of the Turkish defeat.

[2] F. Braudel, *The Mediterranean: And the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, vol. II, p. 865.

[3] P. Earle, *Corsairs of Malta and Barbary*, pp. 29–30, 35; J. Pignon, 'La Milice des janissaires de Tunis au Temps des Deys, 1590–1630', *Les Cahiers de Tunisie*, IV (1956), p. 307; Pierre Dan, *Histoire de Barbarie et de ses corsaires*, p. 110.

[4] E.G. Friedman, *Spanish Captives in North Africa in the Early Modern Age*, pp. 9–10, indicates that Constantinople started to lose control in the early 1590s.

[5] R. Coindreau, *Les Corsaires de Salé*; see also, Friedman, op. cit., pp. 10, 12, 24–5.

[6] R. Mantran, 'L'Evolution des relations entre la Tunisie et l'Empire Ottoman du XVIe au XIXe siècle', *Les Cahiers de Tunisie*, VII (1959).

states.[1] The janissaries initially provided the Ottoman emperors with a military force to conquer and subdue the native Moorish population of the region. But as the 16th century developed, their composition changed; increasingly their recruits were drawn from the islands of the Aegean, Cyprus, and the Levant. The functions of the 'Turkish' rulers also changed over time. They still served to control the peoples of the Barbary hinterland and in times of declared war supported the Sultan, but increasingly they became integrated in the economic and piratical activities of the port towns.[2]

By the 17th century the Barbary regencies had in fact become pirate states;[3] in the words of a distinguished 17th-century jurist, Charles Molloy, they were 'pirates that have reduced themselves into a Government or State, as those of Algiers, Sally, Tunis, and the like'[4] and therefore not entitled to the rights and privileges due to privateers of civilized states. Molloy's judgement accurately reflects a political reality. They may have been highly organized and supported by a nominal, local authority, and therefore they were different from simple freebooters, but in a legal sense they were, nevertheless, pirates.[5] Their activity was never authorized by the Sultan, and, at times, it was carried out against his express wishes.[6]

The rise of Algiers, Sallee, and to a lesser extent Tunis and

[1] Earle, *Corsairs*, pp. 24–5; J.B. Wolf, *The Barbary Coast: Algiers under the Turks, 1500–1830*, pp. 77–8. Originally the Beys had been nominated by Constantinople: Friedman, *Spanish Captives*, p. 9.

[2] Earle, *Corsairs*, pp. 24–5.

[3] J.E.G. de Montmorency, 'Piracy and the Barbary Corsairs', *Law Quarterly Review*, XXXV (1919), pp. 133–42. The piratical nature of the Barbary states has been the subject of historical dispute. Nineteenth-century historians such as R.L. Playfair, *The Scourge of Christendom: Annals of British Relations with Algiers prior to the French Conquest* and S. Lane-Poole, *The Barbary Corsairs*, portrayed the corsairs as villainous pirates. Sir Godfrey Fisher, *The Barbary Legend: Trade and Piracy in North Africa, 1415–1830*, set out, as his title indicates, to correct the earlier view. Though useful, this work goes too far in exculpating the Barbary corsairs. This is especially true for the early 17th century, and may be a consequence of the author's reliance on calendars rather than manuscripts. It must be observed that contemporaries always referred to them as pirates and treated them so at law, an unambiguous test of their status.

[4] C. Molloy, *De jure maritimo et navali: or, a treatise of affairs maritime and of commerce*, p. 61. Molloy's judgment is certainly accurate in a legal sense but it does not take into account the contribution made to the growth of piracy in the Barbary states by nominal Christians; see Earle, *Corsairs*, pp. 97–123.

[5] This was the opinion of Henry Martin, Chief Judge, High Court of Admiralty: PRO, SP 16/40/24.

[6] PRO, SP 105/110/f.87v, contains a realization by Council that the Sultan was unable to control pirates.

Tripoli, as centres of piracy can only be understood when considered in the context of the Moslem-Christian conflict.[1] Their growth owes much to the struggles that took place in the late 16th and early 17th centuries Christian world, and especially in Spain. Although conquered in the 14th and 15th centuries, the Moorish elements were never assimilated. Instead, many Moriscos retained the language and cultural traits of their Islamic heritage, until measures were taken in the mid-16th century to enforce adoption of Christian belief and Castilian customs.[2] This brought rebellion by the Moriscos in 1568–70 in Granada and the eventual destruction of the Moorish community in that province with thousands killed or forced to flee.[3] Many of the embittered survivors reached the North African ports where they found scope to take revenge on Spanish or Christian ships.[4] The final expulsion of the Moriscos occurred in the years between 1609 and 1614 when tens of thousands more were massacred or expelled.[5] In all, about 275 000 Moriscos were driven out, many fleeing to the Barbary ports, bringing with them grievances which they took out on Spanish subjects or Christian ships who fell within their grasp.[6]

The arrival of northern Europeans also contributed to the growth of the Barbary ports as pirate bases. Some came first, as merchants, to trade cloth or fish.[7] Others sought a safe port from which to continue the trade they had learned during the long wars with Spain. With peace, privateering became illegal and piracy was virtually eliminated from British waters as bases in the west country and Ireland were eliminated. Some former privateers and pirates came to Algiers or Tunis or the other havens of North Africa.[8] From these ports they could obtain supplies, refit their ships, rest, and sell their booty. Most of the famous pirates of these years – Gifford, Verney, Ward, Dansker – operated from

[1] Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, II, pp. 865, 872–91; Earle, *Corsairs*, pp. 3–22.
[2] J.H. Elliott, *Imperial Spain, 1469–1716*, pp. 50–1, 232–5; A.D. Ortiz, *The Golden Age of Spain, 1516–1659*, pp. 166–76.
[3] Elliott, *Imperial Spain*, pp. 235–7; Ortiz, op. cit., p. 37.
[4] Ortiz, op. cit., pp. 170–2. This point is skilfully developed by Friedman, *Spanish Captives*, pp. 12, 24–5.
[5] Ortiz, op. cit., p. 172. In 1610 the entire community (1200) of Hornachos in the Extremadura was expelled; they settled in Sallee.
[6] Elliott, *Imperial Spain*, pp. 301–3; Ortiz, op. cit., pp. 170–2.
[7] English merchants were trading with Barbary ports from the late 16th century. John Tipton was appointed consul to Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers in 1585: A.C. Wood, *A History of the Levant Company*, p. 15; and was residing there in the 1580s: Playfair, *Scourge of Christendom*, p. 26.
[8] Senior, *Nation of Pirates*, p. 87.

the Barbary ports.[1] Though they may have come out of necessity, some of these old sea-dogs found the cities of Barbary positively attractive, not only for professional reasons but also for the degree of personal freedom that they found.[2]

These northerners were credited with making significant contributions to the growth of 'Turkish' piracy. It was claimed that they introduced local mariners and pirates to the use of northern-type sailing ships and taught the Moslems to navigate the Straits of Gibraltar.[3] Until the early 17th century the Barbary pirates relied on large, heavily-manned, oar-driven galleys to sink or capture their victims, but from the second decade of the 17th century, they began to employ not only lateen but square-rigged sailing ships in their piracy.[4] It is certainly possible that the 'Turks' adopted northern-type ships as a result of the presence of renegade Christian pirates, but it seems just as likely that the inspiration came from other sources.[5] Merchant ships from Northern Europe traded with the Barbary ports decades before the Christian pirates arrived. As a consequence, there were many opportunities for the 'Turks' to become familiar with northern-type sailing ships. The eventual adoption of northern-type ships may have come independently. It may have come as a response to the same stimuli: the heavy weather and wind system of the Atlantic made strong ships and sail power attractive, and the increasing effectiveness of heavy guns may have influenced the evolution of ship design. In a similar manner, it is possible that the 'Turks' acquired

[1] For an account of the famous Captain Dansker's activities by the English consul in Algiers, *c.* 1608/1609, see PRO, SP 71/1/f.17. Dansker was '. . . a ffleming borne . . .' and sailed in a great ship built in Lubeck; his crew consisted of about 20 Christians including some Englishmen, but the rest were mainly 'Turks'. Between 17 November and 8 December 1608, Dansker took three ships, a great argosy from Sicily with a viceroy aboard and two small English ships from Dartmouth. In the fight with the argosy, 25 Turks were killed and about 50 wounded; on the argosy between 50 to 70 were killed and 100 wounded. Both English captains surrendered without a fight; their ships returned to Algiers but not the goods.

[2] Ibid., pp. 20, 22, 25, 27, 29, 36, 38–40, 66, 89–101; *CSPV*, 1607–1610, pp. 140–1.

[3] Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, I, p. 119; J. Pignon, 'Un Document inédit sur la Tunisie au debut du XVIIe', *Les Cahiers de Tunisie*, IX (1961), pp. 141–209.

[4] Fleets at Lepanto were made up entirely of galleys; Earle, *Corsairs*, pp. 48–53; Cottington to Buckingham in, *Cabala, Sive Scrinia Sacra: Mysteries of State and Government, in Letters of Illustrious Persons and Great Ministers of State, As well Foreign as Domestick, In the Reigns of King Henry the Eighth, Queen Elizabeth, King James, and King Charles*, part I, pp. 201–2; PRO, SP 14/90/24. For more details on the fleets of the Barbary pirates, see A. Devoulx, 'La marine de la Regence d'Alger', *Revue Africaine*, XIII (1869), pp. 384–420.

[5] J.F. Guilmartin, jr, *Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth Century*, pp. 253–73.

navigational information and skills from renegade Christian pirates, as some claim,[1] but it seems just as likely that they gained their ability to sail the Straits and Atlantic by trial and error or from other sources, such as the refugee Moriscos, most of whom came from Granada and Andalusia, the part of Spain nearest to the Straits and the centre of the Spanish Indies trade.[2] From Seville alone, 7000 men, many of whom worked in the dockyard and port, were expelled in the great purge of the early 17th century.[3]

It is impossible to prove or disprove whether design innovations were transferred or developed independently. What is certain, however, is that by the early 17th century the character of the operations of the Barbary pirates had changed dramatically.[4] Increasingly, 'tall ships'[5] were used by Barbary pirates. With such ships, the pirates ranged the western Mediterranean and took, on average, 70 to 80 Christian vessels a year between 1592 and 1609, and in the decades that followed, at least that many ships were seized.[6] Initially, operations were confined to the Mediterranean, but then the pirates began to operate in the Atlantic, going as far as the Canaries and Azores and making their presence felt on the Spanish coast, as English diplomatic reports of the period testify.[7]

Levant Company ships fell to the pirates, as the records of the company attest, and as early as 1608 the company petitioned Salisbury for relief. In response, a government commission was set up to examine ways to bring about a reduction of piracy.[8] As the

[1] J. Denucé, *L'Afrique au XVIe siècle et la commerce anversois* (1937), (*Collection de documents pour l'histoire du commerce*, vol. II), p. 12.
[2] Ortiz, *Golden Age of Spain*, p. 172.
[3] Elliott, *Imperial Spain*, p. 303.
[4] Friedman's analysis, *Spanish Captives*, pp. 3–4, 13, of redeemed Spaniards gives statistical validity to this observation.
[5] See letter of Cottington, in *Cabala*, part I, p. 201.
[6] A. Tenenti, *Naufrages, corsaires et assurances maritimes à Venise (1592–1609)*, p. 27, and by the same author, *Piracy and the Decline of Venice 1580–1615*, pp. 16–32; Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, II, pp. 886–7; Senior, *Nation of Pirates*, p. 108.
[7] H.D. Grammont, 'La Course, l'esclavage et la rédemption à Alger', *Revue Historique*, XXV–XXVI (1884–5), pp. 28–9; S. Bono, *I Corsari barbareschi* (Turin, 1964), p. 178; Denucé, *L'Afrique* p. 20. For contemporary English reports of these developments, see the letters of Carew, in *Letters from George Lord Carew to Sir Thomas Roe, ambassador to the court of the Great Mogul, 1615–1617*, ed. J. Maclean (Camden Society, LXXVI, 1860), pp. 61, 67, 111, 125, 130.
[8] PRO, SP 14/37/91; HCA 14/39/ff.217–18; *APC*, 1613–1614, pp. 145–6. For a proposal to destroy the fleet of Algiers in 1610, see H[istorical] M[anuscripts] C[ommission] 9, *MSS of Marquess of Salisbury*, part XXI (1970), p. 250.