




IMMIGRANTS ON THE THRESHOLD



Judith T. Shuval

*With a new preface by Alex Weingrod
and a new introduction by the author*

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Preface to the Transaction Edition

Israeli Ethnicity: Looking Back, Looking Ahead

Alex Weingrod

Thresholds are beginnings, or perhaps even prior to beginnings, and Judith Shuval's finely developed study of the attitudes and experiences of Jewish immigrants as they entered Israel takes us back (as she writes) "to another time and another place." This is part of the book's importance and appeal. Caught up by the perplexing events in the present, looking back to the threshold—more than a half century earlier—can lend a sense of perspective, a kind of accounting of where Israeli society was then and where it is today.

The Israel that Shuval describes in this book has changed enormously. In 1949-1950, the time when her study was undertaken, Israel was a small, poor, ambitious state and society seeking to establish itself, while at the same time straining to accommodate the tens of thousands of Jewish immigrants then arriving from dozens of different countries. The seemingly invisible Arab minority (invisible to the

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Jews, that is) was then sunk in defeat and despair, and the Jewish majority was busily building traditions and institutions that were pointedly secular and socialist. Now, a half-century after the threshold, practically everything looks different. The Israeli population has grown to well over six million persons, Tel Aviv has become the vortex for an urbanized country that is tightly linked into the global economy and technology, periodic wars and intifadas have seared the relationships between the Jewish majority and the increasingly militant Palestinian-Arab minority, and, culturally and politically, the society has become more stridently nationalist while also deeply divided between opposed ideological, religious, and other groups. With all of the chaos and tensions of the founding “threshold period,” the present appears no less filled with divisions and dangers.

The immigrants that Shuval writes about have also changed. It is fair to assume that some of her 1949-1950 informants are still alive and active, and among these many are the parents and grandparents of two new Israeli generations. Over time, members of these three generations have certainly become more “Israeli”: They speak and read Hebrew, the children and grandchildren attend a wide variety of different schools, most have or will serve in the army, they celebrate the yearly round of national and religious holidays, and they also are employed in various trades, vocations, and professions, vote in repeated elections, and so forth. At the same time, in many ways they also differ from one another: They live in different places, have significantly different incomes, some are ultra-Orthodox religious and others are secular, they have different political ideologies and practice different lifestyles, and much, much more.

Ethnicity is another real or potential dimension of difference among Israelis. How could this not be the case? The Jewish immigrants that Shuval studied came from more than twenty different countries, ranging around the globe from Libya and Morocco to Poland and Yugoslavia (Table 2, p. 31). Moreover, throughout her analysis Shuval emphasizes country-of-origin ethnicity: As she puts it, “One of the most striking impressions to emerge from the study is the generally high salience of the ethnic group during the period under discussion. There was hardly a problem in which differential ethnic patterns of attitude and behavior did not emerge...” (p.178). While

still on the threshold, as it were, the place or country that one came from made a great deal of difference.

This poses a tantalizing and important set of questions. To what extent, and in what ways, may “country-of-origin ethnicity” continue to be significant among second and third generation Israelis? Is ethnicity an important feature of their everyday life, or has its salience waned with time and a changing social system? Has Israeli society become “multicultural,” as is sometimes claimed, or is it still relatively closed and dominated by the same social strata? Exploring these issues helps to illuminate the broad social contexts of Israeli life, and in this brief preface I want to sketch ways in which ethnicity continues to be a meaningful marker and potent force.

***WHO IS ETHNIC, WHY, AND WHAT DIFFERENCE
DOES IT MAKE?***

Social categories of differentiation are, as we have come to know, social constructions that may shift and change over time. For example, how persons are classified in a national census, or the ways in which the media refer to individuals, are neither fixed nor “objective,” but rather categories constructed by the state, or by various groups of persons, in particular historical moments and social contexts. What terms or concepts have been used to categorize “country-of-origin ethnicity”?

Although the range of difference has not been very wide, there is no uniformity to the terms according to which immigrants to Israel have been categorized. The studies published in the 1950s and 1960s used a number of different terms. For example, the Israeli census sometimes listed immigrants by their specific country of origin, but census publications usually bunched them together into “European” on the one hand, and “Asia-Africa” on the other. This division is, of course, broad and arbitrary: “European” includes both Yugoslavia and Germany, and “Asia-Africa” ranges between India, Libya, and Iraq. Quite a range! Sociological and anthropological studies published during this period used somewhat different categories. In his 1954 *The Absorption of Immigrants*, Eisenstadt distinguishes between “European” and “Oriental” Jews, and he continued to use this classification in later publications. Eisenstadt’s categories seem appropri-

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ate in Hebrew, but they are less successful in English. Why “Oriental”? To my own American ear, the term “Oriental” conjures up images of persons who are Chinese or Japanese, entirely different from the Iraqi or Tunisian Jews then arriving in Israel. Some years later, when I wrote a short book on Israeli ethnicity, I choose to categorize immigrants as “Europeans” and “Middle Easterners.” This too was problematic since the term “Middle Eastern” did not quite stretch to include North Africans or the Jews of India, yet it seemed more appropriate than “Orientals.”

In this book Shual takes a different course: She categorizes the immigrants as either “European” or “non-European.” This would seem to be a neutral division, and it has the added advantage of simplicity. Nevertheless, it too is problematic. As she recognizes, these two are broad social categories, each of which lumps together persons from very different countries. In addition, the terms are uneven: Why should European origin be the basis of comparison? One might just as well have categorized the immigrants into “Middle Easterners” and “non-Middle Easterners,” or “Orientals” and “non-Orientals.” The reasons why this latter categorization was not chosen may be obvious, and I will consider it shortly.

Continuing this brief review, some years later (probably during the 1970s) these social categories changed once again: “Europeans” then came to be designated as “Ashkenazim,” a Hebrew term referring to the Jews of the West. Their European origins could be once-removed—for example, South African or American Jews whose ancestors were European were also labeled “Ashkenazim.” The opposite or contrasting category to Ashkenazim might be “Sephardim,” another older Hebrew term referring to Jews whose historic origins were in Spain. Curiously, however, not only were the terms not quite accurate (the Jews of Yemen, Iraq, and India are not the descendants of the Jews of Spain), they also were not broadly accepted by either sociologists or the general public. The term “Ashkenazim” has become widely accepted, both in everyday conversation and social science research, but instead of “Sephardim,” “Mizrachim” was generally used when referring to Israelis whose origins are in the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond. To complicate matters (the process by which social categories are constructed is always complicated), Shas, the

Israeli political party whose leadership and wide following is outspokenly “Mizrachi,” describes itself as “Sephardic.” And, to complete this review, some politically-savvy sociologists and social activists have lately recommended replacing “Mizrachim” with the term “Arab Jews,” thereby lending a quite different slant to how Israeli Jews can be categorized with regard to “country-of-origin ethnicity.”

What do these shifts in terms indicate? What conclusions can be drawn from tracing ethnic categories from the “threshold period” until the present?

It is clear that there is nothing immanent or “objective” about these ethnic categories—they are constructed and redesigned as social realities themselves change. For example, in the second and third generations, the categories “Ashkenazi” and “Mizrachi” commonly replaced the more specific country-of-origin ethnic designation. This does not mean that there were not occasions during which persons continued to identify themselves and others in specific country-of-origin terms—yet the broader ethnic categories became widely understood and accepted.

Of course, the present-day situation is even more complicated. In the third generation, these ethnic differentiations are no longer meaningful or relevant for everyone: Many label themselves and others as “Israelis,” rather than identifying themselves with a specific ethnicity. But this is only part of the story, since these same “Israelis” may distinguish between themselves and “others” (mainly Mizrachim) by using various negative slang terms (such as “chach-chachim” and others). What is more, the recent waves of immigration have brought large numbers of immigrants—Russians and Ethiopian Jews—who are not incorporated within these broad ethnic categories. There are different reasons for this: Although it might be assumed that the million or so Russians will become “Ashkenazim,” the sheer size of this population, as well as the desire of many to continue to be “Russian,” has meant that “Russian” is a meaningful ethnic category. Ethiopian Jews also are a separate country-of-origin ethnic group, but in this instance racial features distinguish them from others. Thus, in brief, in the twenty-first century ethnicity continues to be an important social marker, while, at the same time, the categories of differentiation have changed.

Finally, as alluded to previously, there is a constant or structural feature to this changing array of ethnic categories. Over time, the contrasts have all been between “Europeans” or “Ashkenazim,” who are differentiated from a series of “others” (“non-Europeans,” “Asia-Africa,” “Mizrachim,” etc.). What this suggests is that these two populations are by no means equal in prestige and status, but that, to the contrary, Ashkenazim are and have been the “normative” Israeli group, while the “others,” however categorized, are, in effect, placed in the category of “ethnics.” To put it differently, this brief review of changing ethnic categories is also an indication or reflection of the ethnic inequalities that characterize Israeli society, the topic that I turn to next.

SUSTAINING ETHNICITY: ETHNIC GAPS AND IDENTITY POLITICS

As Judith Shuval makes clear, during the “threshold period” Israeli society was highly egalitarian. While there certainly were differences in income and status between the new immigrants and the veterans, the huge immigration, reigning socialist ideology, and absence of economic resources had the overall effect of limiting inequality. Have inequalities narrowed or widened over time, and to what extent are they linked with ethnicity?

Not surprisingly, ethnic stratification has been a major research focus for Israeli social scientists. There is an extensive, sophisticated literature that seeks to measure and explain the “gaps” between Ashkenazim and Mizrachim—more specifically, the differences between members of these groups with regard to occupation, income, education, political leadership, and, from a different perspective, the extent of cross-ethnic marriage. Briefly summarized, these studies show that many of the differences between groups that existed in the immigrant generation have become greatly diminished over time. For example, while in the “threshold period” there were wide differences between Ashkenazim and Mizrachim with regard to family size, age of marriage, and participation of women in the work force, in the third generation these differences have essentially disappeared. The data regarding occupation, income, and education are more complex. Ashkenazim are strongly represented in the highly-skilled,

higher paid occupations such as law, medicine, and, more recently, hi-tech, while Mizrachim tend to be concentrated among the self-employed, at lower levels of government and other bureaucracies, and in skilled and unskilled labor. The median income of members of the two groups narrowed between 1950 and 1975; interestingly, however, the income gaps grew substantially between 1975 and the early 2000s. For example, whereas in 1975 the income of Mizrachim was 79 percent of Ashkenazim, in 1982 it fell to 70 percent, and since then the gap has become even wider. The rich, who are mainly Ashkenazim, have grown much richer, while middle- and low-income groups, mainly Mizrachim, have had more modest gains.

With regard to education, a larger number of Ashkenazi men complete high school, while among women, the differences between groups have substantially diminished. Similarly, among university graduates, 37 percent of third-generation Ashkenazi males received degrees, in contrast to 32 percent among third-generation Mizrachi males, and the proportions change slightly with females (38 percent to 33 percent). Significantly, the percentage of third-generation Israelis from ethnically-mixed families who received university degrees is roughly equivalent to that of the Ashkenazim. Indeed, some researchers have argued that “family background” (meaning social class) rather than ethnicity has become the critical variable regarding university training: Irrespective of ethnic origins, youngsters whose parents have a university education are also likely to receive higher degrees.

To what extent do members of the different groups marry one another? Cross-ethnic marriage was often thought to be the ultimate key to “absorption,” and “intermarriage” among Jewish ethnic groups has consequently received considerable research attention. The studies show that, over time, the rate of marriage between Ashkenazim and Mizrachim has climbed steadily to slightly more than a quarter of all marriages. What this means, of course, is that while a majority of members of both groups marry one another, a substantial minority do marry across ethnic lines. Recent research also points to education as a critical variable—that is, in the second as well as third generations, persons with university training are likely to marry one another irrespective of their ethnic origins.

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To summarize, these studies show that while the “gaps” have narrowed, they have by no means disappeared: Inequalities between members of the two ethnic groups remain deep and pervasive. To be sure, in the third-generation Ashkenazim and Mizrachim have a great deal in common, and yet to a considerable extent they continue to be concentrated in different social strata. Inequalities often are a source of social tension, and in the past ethnic conflicts have periodically broken out (the Israeli Black Panthers of the 1970s is a case in point). On the other hand, not only have the ethnic gaps narrowed, over time the standard of living of the entire population has risen considerably, so that in the 1990s Israeli median incomes approximated the lower range of European countries. As in other industrialized states, income (and therefore also ethnic) inequalities are growing at a furious pace, and yet the overall economic growth, welfare-state provisions, as well as the salience of other national issues (the Israel-Palestinian crises, for example) seem to have taken an edge off of overt Ashkenazi-Mizrachi tensions.

This brings us to the question of ethnic politics. To what extent, and in what ways, has ethnicity been intertwined with Israeli politics? As Shuval makes clear, at the “threshold” political power was entirely monopolized by European-origin elites. The Mizrachim were allotted a token representation, and attempts to organize ethnic political parties (such as a Yemenite party) were unsuccessful. Nonetheless, as they grew in number to become practically half the Jewish population, a larger number of Mizrachim were elected to the Israeli Knesset, became mayors of towns that had a Mizrachi majority, and, in general, moved upwards in the political system. This was especially the case in the leadership ranks of the two dominant political parties, Labor and Likud, and also included some of the smaller parties. Thus, even though Ashkenazim continued to hold the most prestigious positions, by the 1990s the Israeli political arenas became ethnically “integrated,” with Mizrachim also in many high-level roles. The examples are well known and also significant: The Israeli president, leading government ministers, high ranking army officers, as well as many mayors and heads of government offices, are Mizrachim.

This is an important part of the story, but only one part. Along one dimension politics has become ethnically “integrated,” but along other dimensions vibrant ethnic-based political divisions have also

emerged. To be more specific, since the mid-1980s a series of specifically Mizrahi, Russian, and Ashkenazi political parties have been organized. Based upon a common sense of complaint, or the shared experience of being new immigrants in a strange land, “identity politics” has become an important feature of the Israeli political landscape.

Basing its appeal upon a mixture of ethnic grievance and Orthodox religious practice, in the mid-1980s the Shas political party burst upon the political scene. Basing its appeal upon “returning to the glories of the Sephardic heritage,” and led by a former Sephardi chief rabbi as well as a corps of talented younger leaders, the Shas party succeeded in gaining the electoral support of significant numbers of Mizrahi voters. Over the years it successfully built its own Orthodox school system as well as other party-linked institutions, and it regularly mobilizes its supporters with religiously-imbued messages of ethnic support. In addition, during the massive Russian immigration of the 1990s, new political parties composed specifically of Russian immigrants were also organized. These parties campaigned in the Russian language, and while they have recently lost support to broader-based parties, the massive numbers of Russian immigrants continue to be a critical element in the Israeli political scene. Finally, in the 2002 elections, a new political party, Shinui, based much of its electoral appeal on an anti-religious platform, with special criticism of Shas. Shinui sometimes appeared as the mirror-image of Shas—that is, a political party whose leadership and support appealed to and was drawn from among Ashkenazim.

Thus, in brief, while the gaps have narrowed, and other issues have become more salient, “identity politics” periodically mobilizes some Israelis in support of ethnic political parties and their platforms. At times quiescent (“We are all Jews!”), at other moments fiercely combative (“How could you do this to us!”), ethnic sentiments as well as ethnic mobilization continue to be powerful factors.

There is much more that might be said on the topic of ethnicity—indeed, Judith Shuval’s new Introduction also reviews important facets of ethnicity in Israel. I agree with her conclusions regarding Israel’s overall cultural design—although deep changes have taken place since the “threshold period,” present-day Israel is by no means a

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“multicultural society” in which minorities are encouraged to define themselves publically. This is certainly not the case with the Palestinian-Arab minority, nor with large Jewish ethnic groups such as the Mizrachim and the Russians. Cultural differences are more permissible now, and they are sometimes even praised, and yet the Ashkenazi minority continues to set the society’s cultural (and other) tones. As far as one can surmise, in the future ethnicity will remain a basic theme in Israeli society, and *Immigrants on the Threshold* provides the reader with an opportunity to better understand how ethnic and other social features began to shape the society.

Introduction to the Transaction Edition

Another Time...Another Place...

*Judith T. Shoval**

WHEN WE WERE VERY YOUNG

Rereading *Immigrants on the Threshold* carries me back to another time and another place. I was myself a new immigrant to Israel having arrived fresh from graduate school at Harvard one year after the establishment of the state. I wonder at my youth and naiveté—and at my chutzpa. How did I have the courage to undertake a research project of such a magnitude and complexity in a society that had barely emerged from a traumatic war for survival? There were no precedents in Israel for this type of large-scale sociological study. It was Louis Guttman, my mentor and the founder of the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, who initiated the research and recruited me to direct it. In the wisdom of time, I can't help wondering if I would advise a brand new Ph.D. to undertake such a challenge today!

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Like many others at that time, I was imbued with an exhilarating sense of the thrill and drama of “nation building.” We felt we were living through a turning point in history, surrounded by events that were larger than reality—newly attained independence of Israel after the Holocaust and a traumatic war; free immigration of hundreds of thousands, which doubled the Jewish population in a few years’ time; the establishment of a new government with its tremendous potentials and problems. We were imbued with ideals and hopes for the creation of a more just and equitable society. There was a sense of being present and recording a major rite de passage that would transform the society radically from what it had been: a series of “imprinting” events that would have repercussions long into the future. And in many ways this proved to be the case.

For the handful of social scientists in the country, there was a feeling that Israel offered a unique opportunity as a “laboratory” for social research because of its many innovative social experiments. The kibbutz and the moshav were then largely un-researched social phenomena—and mass immigration was another.

***DECONSTRUCTING MYTHOLOGY:
A CANDID CAMERA VIEW***

Looking back now on the early 1950s, when this research was undertaken, it is difficult to disentangle reality from mythology. Indeed, those early years are shrouded in the mystical aura of birthing a new society. For most people today, this period predates their conscious memory and they have learned about it in school, if at all. Because of its temporal and symbolic association with the founding of the state of Israel, it has assumed un-real, legendary qualities. Critical historians and sociologists have sought to deconstruct the mythology in order to anchor the meaning of the events of the period in historically based facts.

The enduring strength of the book lies in its candid-camera quality. It provides a real photograph in situ of a critical segment of social life of the time. The newly established government, motivated by an awareness that very little was known about the hundreds of thousands of newly arrived immigrants, reached an astounding decision given the many pressing problems it was confronting: to launch a compre-

hensive sociological study of this population in order to better plan for the immigrants' integration.

Thus it commissioned a broadly based study, which sought to answer such questions as: Who were the immigrants at this time? What were their hopes and aspirations? What were their feelings about the new society? How did they cope with the many stressors in their past and in their daily life? What were their expectations with regard to their new life in Israel?

In an effort to get at the answers to these questions, 1,866 interviews were carried out with a sample of newly arrived adult Jewish immigrants during their first year in Israel. The population consisted of people from some twenty countries of origin living in fourteen temporary camps made up of crowded tents and barracks left by the departed British military forces and located in various parts of the country. The study focuses on the "jumping off" point of integration rather than on its ongoing processes over time; the immigrants were barely inside the society—but on its "threshold" (thus the title of the book). It therefore is able to provide an empirical deconstruction of part of the mythology: What was the reality of the immigrants' experiences during the period of their first arrival in Israel?

For sociologists interested in developmental processes in a newly independent society, in integration of immigrants, in acculturation in a context of multiethnicity, in buffering mechanisms in situations of stress—the book provides an empirically based analysis of the starting point of these processes. The findings present the point of view of the people in situ at the time. With the present advantage of over fifty years' perspective, it is possible to evaluate the relevance of the earliest experiences of these immigrants to subsequent developments that have occurred.

***A RETROSPECTIVE VIEW AFTER A LIFETIME
OF RESEARCH ON IMMIGRATION***

Of course, the book is a child of its time, both theoretically and in terms of the analysis of the data. The text needs to be read in the historical context of the period. It was written in the heyday of structural functionalism and I came directly from the heartland of that school of thought. The Department of Social Relations at Harvard

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was an exciting and stimulating place where graduate students felt they were touching the frontiers of social science development, both theoretically and methodologically. The great names in the Department of Social Relations were Parsons, Kluckohn, Homans, Allport, Murray, and Stouffer (who was my thesis advisor). The attempt to integrate four of the social sciences (sociology, social anthropology, social and clinical psychology) in one department was seen as a pioneering effort and viewed at the time as highly innovative. The notion of “objective” social research was taken very seriously and I myself sought to be a “neutral” observer (Schmidt, 1978; Washington, 2004).

The rhetoric and vocabulary of the book are those of the early 1960s, while its categories and concepts grew out of the discourse of the period. It focuses on the viewpoint of the immigrants themselves and does not take into account the many other relevant actors who played crucial roles in the social context of the time.

Migration theory at the time was based on the widespread “individual relocation” approach that emphasized push-pull factors and focused on rational decision-making, transitions, and adaptation processes. These early theories were largely a-historical and referred to tendencies to move from densely to sparsely populated areas, from low- to high-income areas, or in response to fluctuations in the business cycle. Political and religious threats or overt persecution generated populations of “refugees” that were distinguished from the category of “migrant.” Early migration theory emphasized economic factors, social order, and equilibrium and focused on the inability of countries of origin to fulfill expectations. In considering the consequences of migration they tended to concentrate almost entirely on the countries of destination and assumed unilinear processes of acculturation and assimilation. Conflict was seen as a temporary expression of dislocation in the normal ordered state of host societies (Castles and Miller, 1992; Heisler, 1992; Zolberg, 1989).

At the time there was little awareness that conflict might be inherent in the context of these processes or that the struggle for stability and peace would continue for many years. Indeed, it is clear in retrospect that the seeds of social conflict and unrest were already present during this early period and were beginning to be felt.

The methodology of the research was rigorous. The sample was carefully drawn and substitute cases for unfound persons were carefully matched. The questionnaire was meticulously translated into nine languages and dialects and then retranslated to check for inaccuracies; it was pre-tested in a series of pilot studies; sixteen interviewers, most of them themselves new immigrants and conversant in those languages, were carefully trained in a two-week course and were carefully supervised during their work. Guttman scales for each attitudinal variable were defined: Several items presumed to define a universe of content were tested empirically for an hypothesized structure and an acceptable level of reproducibility; those that met the criteria of structure were combined to provide a continuum.

Most readers will find it hard to believe that the analysis was carried out before the time of the electronic computer. Cross tabulations were done on punch cards by an IBM counter-sorter. Significance tests were calculated by a research assistant. These technical conditions dictated the mode of analysis: Focusing on each dependant variable in turn, we examined two controlled variables at a time in order to tease out the relationship. Multiple regression analysis was impractical in that context.

In retrospect, after a long career with large data sets and computer assisted multiple regression analysis, I am struck by the sobering impression that simpler, more “primitive” analyses can provide useful and stimulating conclusions. Even if more sophisticated techniques make it possible to tease out the nuances of complex relationships, it is not always evident that they make that much of a contribution to theory.

My early training and experience—reflected in this first book—were strongly positivist, emphasizing the importance of sample populations, structured questionnaires in data collection, and analysis by means of statistical tools. While I tried to be an “objective” observer, in all likelihood I was not entirely successful—and in any case that positivist goal is not a realistic one.

Despite my good intentions, we were unable to add in-depth interviews at the time of this early research. One reason was the need to interview immigrants in their native languages because very few had yet learned Hebrew. There was a paucity of anthropologists and

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sociologists trained in the relevant professional skills and sufficiently competent in the necessary languages. I was highly sensitized to the problems of interviewing in a variety of languages and dialects by the late Professor Haim Blanc, the renowned linguist, who served as my language advisor and to whom I am deeply indebted (Blanc, 1956). The other reason was that then—even as now—the sponsors of the research had a strong preference for quantitatively based findings, which they believed—no doubt naively—were the only way to obtain valid and reliable findings.

Very soon after the data for this book were gathered, I began to utilize qualitative methods in my ongoing research and sought to integrate them with quantitative methods. In my most recent work, which concerns the interface of alternative and biomedicine, I have used principally qualitative methods. There is no inherent conflict between the different approaches to data collection and analysis; I have never felt a special commitment to one or the other—preferring to select the method in terms of the needs of specific research questions.

***THE ONGOING IMPACT OF ETHNICITY
IN ISRAELI SOCIETY***

One of the most striking and sociologically meaningful findings that pervades the book concerns the critical role of ethnicity in structuring virtually all of the attitudes and behavior of the immigrant population. (Since all of the immigrants were Jews, the terms “ethnic origin” or “ethnicity” are used in the book to denote their countries of origin.) In the course of the analysis of a multitude of attitudinal and behavioral variables, there is hardly one that is not differentiated by the ethnic origin of the respondents. This early picture makes clear the high salience of ethnicity at the very threshold of entry into the society.

Having been strongly influenced by Gordon Allport in the course of my graduate studies, I was especially sensitive to the problematic implications of these findings and almost immediately initiated additional research in the field of ethnic relations. All of these ongoing studies showed emerging tensions among ethnic groups, hierarchies of status and prestige, and alarming signs of growing inter-group preju-