V.M. Bekhterev

COLLECTIVE REFLEXOLOGY



The Complete Edition

Lloyd H. Strickland, editor

Eugenia Lockwood and Alisa Lockwood, translators

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Contents

Acknowledgments—1999: The Complete Edition

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Finally, I am most deeply appreciative of the dedication of Eugenia Lockwood, specifically for her sacrifice of many, many evenings and an entire summer vacation period to review and revise her translation of Part 1 so that it could be published alongside her daughter Alisa's sterling efforts with Part 2. She deserves more credit than anyone for the belated appearance of the writing of Vladimir M. Bekhterev in the history of social psychology.

Lloyd H. Strickland
Carleton University
December 1999

Acknowledgments—1992: Part 1

Thanks are due to many people for the appearance at long last of this book. Eugenia Lockwood obviously deserves primary credit for the translation (I must claim subsequent interpretive and editorial errors as my own), but it may not be otherwise apparent how much else I owe her for other help and support over the years of my work in the area of Russian and Soviet social psychology. The Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Grant # 410-87-1056) provided funds for Ms. Lockwood's salary during the two-year translation process, and Carleton University provided invaluable aid in a number of ways: first through "start-up" funds in the form of Faculty Research Grants, application for which was supported by the then Deans of Graduate Studies (Syd Wise and John ApSimon) and Social Science (Dennis Forcese); second, through the prompt replacement of our stolen Macintosh computer by the latter's successor, Dean Marilyn Marshall; and third, through the sustaining support of a number of colleagues who accepted my insistence, at a time when it was not politically stylish to do so, that a relatively unknown, long-dead Russian physiologist/physician was really as important a figure in the history of my field as I claimed he was. Chief among them are Will Webster and Bill Jones, successive Chairs of Psychology, Larry Black, former Director of Carleton's Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, and fellow social psychologists Warren Thorngate, Fran Cherry, Betty Bayer, and Miho Hotta. Finally, to scholars like Michael Cole, James Wertsch, Jaan Valsiner, and Vladimir Trusov, who did not need to take my word for Bekhterev's contribution and who offered the kind of support that only consistent interest can contribute, I am particularly grateful. Putting Bekhterev's thoughts in a form to which my many colleagues could relate has been a long pull, and I hope that for them the product has been worth the wait.

Clearly, if the reader construes the appearance of this book as the product of a collective effort, he/she will be entirely correct.

Lloyd H. Strickland
Carleton University
September 1992

A Note on Structure, Translation, and Transliteration

The editor and translators have faithfully preserved the original structure of the book. Thus, for example, we have retained Bekhterev's original Table of Contents, which recorded own detailed overviews of each chapter.

Every effort has been made to restore the spelling of all proper names (i.e., English, French, German, or Italian) cited by Bekhterev in their Russian transliteration. In a very few cases, when we were unable to verify problematic names in any sources available to us, we have had to rely on our linguistic expertise.

A brilliant and prolific scholar, Bekhterev was, unfortunately, not meticulous in referencing his extensively quoted material. We have made these references as accurate as possible, but have not furnished lengthy transliteration of titles in journals, etc., having instead chosen to present here only their English translations.

Except for some proper names with long-established English transliteration, such as Nevsky and Kerensky, we have adopted Shaw's System II (Shaw, 1979. p.4) in every instance, assuming that readers of *Collective Reflexology* can be fairly designated "Scholars in the natural and social sciences who are concerned with Russian Studies."

Lloyd Strickland
Eugenia Lockwood
Alisa Lockwood

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From Energy to Collectivity: A Commentary on the Development of Bekhterev's Theoretical Views

Jaan Valsiner

The publication of Vladimir Bekhterev's classic work *Collective Reflexology in* English translation is a second important milestone for North American psychology in its possibility of access to the thought of that seminal personality of the turn of the twentieth century. Bekhterev's work was certainly known in North America in the first decades of the twentieth century (see Valsiner, 1988, p. 52), but later fell into oblivion together with the extensive proliferation of America's own varieties of behaviorism. Although Bekhterev's *magnum opus* (*General Principles of Human Reflexology*) was published in English translation in 1932 (Bekhterev, 1932), the ideas it contained must have by that time fit poorly into the American social discourse about psychology as the behaviorists had agreed to view it. It is clear from reading Bekhterev that his ideas, even if close to the behaviorist credo in many ways, were actually far more sophisticated than mere reduction of all psychological complexity to associative reflexes might imply (see Bekhterev's own comparison of his ideas with American behaviorism—Bekhterev, 1932, p. 173).

The present publication of *Collective Reflexology* constitutes an effort to overcome a certain historical myopia, which has taken hold worldwide, of contemporary empiricistic psychology. In the case of contemporary psychology, the focus on collecting increasingly vast masses of data and analyzing those by methods accepted by social conventions leads psychologists away from the disconcerting understanding that, in the conceptual domain, advancements over the recent decades might be less than profound. Of course, the expo-

nential information explosion may make it objectively complicated to maintain a comprehensive overview of the discipline (see Thorngate, 1990). Nevertheless, the conceptualizations of person/society relationships in the social psychology of the 1990s have not led to many noteworthy generalizations. Instead, we continue to dispute many particularistic issues of exceedingly narrowly focused theories—and call for more or better data in the hope that by empirical accumulation we might arrive at general understanding.

From this overly empiricistic standpoint of contemporary psychology, careful attention to classic psychological works of the past can bring us to the conceptual issues that our predecessors tried to address. Bekhterev's *Collective Reflexology* is clearly one of those classics that may help us to overcome some of our present problems. However, we will essentially have to transcend the culture boundary between ourselves and Bekhterev's era. We need to jump not only from the English-speaking world of today to that of the Russia of 1900, but also from our socialized view on the focus of theoretical search as a narrowly data-driven enterprise to that of vast generalizations that satisfy our quest for understanding of the social and personal world in general.

Reading Bekhterev may turn out to be an intellectual nightmare for some present-day readers. His prolific writing is filled with redundancies, polemic assertions of the truthfulness of his ideas, criticisms of his opponents and other contemporaries, and vast sweeping generalizations. All this requires intellectual stamina from the reader, paired with a readiness to play with ideas (rather than merely refusing to understand a particular nuance of Bekhterev's expression, or being bored by his insistence upon a polemic point *contra* some long-forgotten thinker). Our collective culture in a society filled with computers, nuclear electric stations, aggressive 30-second advertisements, and cults of TV stars, provides us with a remarkably poor basis for understanding a "Renaissance humanist" (see Kozulin, 1984, p. 51) who simultaneously was an administrator of numerous institutes, an opponent both to his famous contemporary, Ivan Pavlov (see Joravsky, 1989, chapters 5 and 6), and to the totalitarian tsarist regime. Finally—in the 1920s—Bekhterev became a proponent and (at least intellectually) a victim of a "new society." All this (and more) was characteristic of Bekhterev—and this makes his role in psychology rather complicated to comprehend. The present commen-

tary is aimed at providing an (admittedly limited) angle upon the development of Bekhterev's ideas of the relations between personality and society.

Formative Years of Bekhterev's Ideas

Bekhterev's life was filled with activities in many parallel areas (see Gerver, 1932; Kozulin, 1984, chapter 2; Nikiforov, 1986; Protopopov, 1928; Valsiner, 1988). Born in 1857, he graduated from the St. Petersburg Military-Medical Academy in 1878. He received his medical doctorate at the same Academy in 1881. After a couple of years as a *Privatdozent in* St. Petersburg and a trip abroad (in 1884) to work with Flechsig in Leipzig (where he also became acquainted with Wundt's psychology on its home ground) and Charcot in Paris, Bekhterev was appointed to the Chair of Psychiatry at Kazan University. His stay in Kazan lasted eight years—in 1894 he became the Chair of Nervous and Mental Diseases at the Military-Medical Academy. From that time, until his death in 1927, Bekhterev's work took place primarily in St. Petersburg—the historic capital of Russia that later had the fate of being re-named at first Petrograd, then Leningrad, and which has by now been restored to bear the very non-Russian name it had carried since its beginning.

Bekhterev's activities in St. Petersburg were extensive in both the scientific/clinical and administrative domains (see Nikiforov, 1986). The administrative event that is of greatest relevance for the present commentary is his organization of the Psychoneurological Institute (a semiprivate institution of research and higher education). The idea for such an institute for psychological and neurological investigations led to organizational activities by Bekhterev and some of his close co-workers (among them were A.P. Nechaev and A.F. Lazurskii) as early as 1903. The founding of the Institute was approved on July 9, 1907, by the Russian Minister of Public Instruction, after which the faculty of the Institute became established. The lectures at the Institute were planned to start in spring, 1908 (see Psikho-Nevrologicheskii Institut, 1908).

The Psycho-Neurological Institute immediately became a highly progressive academic institution in Russia, drawing on the cooperation of many major scientists in different fields as its faculty. A number of these faculty members are referred to by Bekhterev on the

pages of *Collective Reflexology*. Thus, the zoopsychologist Vladimir A. Vagner (or Wagner—as his name has been usually transliterated in German publications) was listed as a faculty member from November 1, 1907. He later even served as its director. The personality psychologist whose method of "naturalistic experiment" was essential for Bekhterev—Alexander F. Lazurskii—was among the core organizers of the Institute. The sociologist Evgenii V. de Roberti was listed as starting on the faculty of the Institute also on November, 1, 1907 (see Gerver, 1912). Another sociologist, Maksim M. Kovalevskii (also mentioned in *Collective Reflexology*) joined the faculty in 1910. The Institute also drew to its faculty a number of major Russian philosophers (Nikolai Losskii and Semyon Frank—both from October 1907 onwards), linguists (Lev Shcherba and I.A. Boudoin-de-Courteney—both from 1910), and lawyers (Mikhail Reisner—later an important figure in the Socialist Academy and Moscow Institute of Psychology—see Van der Veer and Valsiner, 1991).

The faculty of the Psycho-Neurological Institute was the basis for Bekhterev's ambitious goal of building an institution that would succeed in the interdisciplinary study of human beings. It is that ambitious goal that can be detected in the text of *Collective Reflexology*. I want to claim that the intellectual roots of *Collective Reflexology* are embedded in the intellectual environs of the Psycho-Neurological Institute from its beginning to the time of publication of the book (see also Bekhterev & Lange, 1924; Bekhterev & Lange, 1976). In terms of its wider context, *Collective Reflexology* is based on ideas that were widespread in the European traditions of the biological and social sciences of the latter half of the nineteenth and first decades of the twentieth centuries.

Bekhterev and Mind/Body Dualism

Perhaps the most general dilemma that nineteenth-century science and philosophy left for us is the issue of mind/body dualism. There are basically two possible strategies for overcoming that dualism. First, it can be eliminated by denying one of the two parts of the whole (e.g., reducing the mind to bodily processes, or ascribing the latter to the invention or creation by the mind). The second strategy entails some conceptual construction of the unity of these opposing parts. The notion of such unity is to be elaborated, and a number of different forms of such elaboration are possible.

Bekhterev was actually facing two dilemmas at the same time: aside from the mind/body opposition, he had to address the conceptual contrast between living organisms and physical objects. That contrast was a dilemma that emerged from the biology/classical physics comparisons at the time, and that has posed formidable conceptual problems in our present-day psychology. Bekhterev's solution to these two dilemmas was to insist upon one (the clear separation of living organisms and their basic principles of existence from those of physical systems—Bekhterev, 1904, p. 178) and solve the other by way of a unifying idea—that of *energy*. Of course, the notion of energy itself was borrowed from the nineteenth-century physical sciences, and it fitted with living systems in ways that could seem rather contemporary to present-day readers.

The "Hidden Energy," its Accumulation, and Constant Transformation

Bekhterev's emphasis on energy was based on the neurophysiologist's worldview—that of observing electrical activity in the different structural parts of the nervous system. The "nervous energy" (the energetics of biochemical processes in the cells in the nervous system) that the active organism carries with itself as "hidden" was viewed as unified across its different external manifestations—those of mind (psyche) and body (Bekhterev, 1904, p. 35). In this way, Bekhterev avoided the dualism between the intrapsychological world and the immediate world of organism-environment interaction. At the level of *phenomena*, Bekhterev accepted the difference (parallel existence) of the mind and the body. However, that parallelism was explained through both those phenomena being the result of the same cause—"hidden energy" (Bekhterev, 1904, p. 39). The nerve processes and the psyche do not differ qualitatively from each other, but constitute a different form of expression of the same hidden energy. Likewise, unconscious and conscious phenomena are merely different expressions of that energy. This energy was not construed as being hidden in a static state in some internal reservoir of the organism, but instead as being constantly changed from one form to another in the course of the organism's active relationships with the environment. The environment is the source of energy, which becomes transformed into its hidden form within the organism (building up an "energy reserve"—the basis for all subjective psychologi-

cal phenomena), and through movement of the organism the hidden energy becomes again transformed into other forms of energy (e.g., by way of mechanical work). This general-biological view constitutes an open-systemic perspective on the nature of the living systems.

Bekhterev's use of the notion of energy as the unifying concept of all biological phenomena can also be seen as the theoretical foundation for his endeavors to study human beings in ways that we presently would consider "interdisciplinary." Indeed, he expected psychology as a separate discipline to vanish and be replaced by "general psychobiology" (Bekhterev, 1904, p. 44) or "reflexology," as he ended up calling that discipline later (in *Collective Reflexology*; see also Bechterev, 1932, p. 81, on his account of the history of the use of that term). In fact, Bekhterev's discussion of nerve conductivity anticipated the 1990s fad of demonstrating the effectiveness of neural networks in the learning process (e.g., Bekhterev, 1904, p. 169). Indeed, much of present-day cognitive neuroscience seems very busy teaching computer systems' rather special, particular skills in accordance with notions that are very similar to Bekhterev's associative reflex ("neural networks" in our contemporary cognitive neuroscience).

From Evolutionary Ideas to a Theory of Activity

Bekhterev went along with the progressive Russian evolutionary biologists of the late nineteenth century who refused to appropriate Darwin's ideas without modifications (see Valsiner, 1988, pp. 30-38). Two major modifications were in order. First, the notion of inter-individual *competition* was supplemented by the primacy of the idea of *cooperation* (see Kline, 1955, for overview; for an original version, see Kropotkin, 1908). Secondly, the behaving organism was viewed *not merely as a target* of the natural selection process, but an *active agent* in the process of organism-environment adaptation.

Bekhterev's emphasis on the relevance of the organism's active role in interaction with the environment was expressed by him in opposition to the ideas of Herbert Spencer (e.g., Bekhterev, 1904, p. 97), distinct from Darwin's mechanistic elaborations of the idea of natural selection. In contrast, Bekhterev emphasized the relevance of activity on behalf of the adapting organism, tracing the roots of that notion to the philosophy of zoology of J.B. Lamarck. It is there-

fore not surprising that, in the different versions of Russian/Soviet activity theories that have been discussed in English-language psychology literature, the "Lamarckian" and "Bekhterevian" traces of ideas surface in different forms. Bekhterev synthesized his view of the processes involved in evolution with his energy-notion:

> It is obvious that the agentive role of natural selection starts only from that time when certain changes that are useful to the organism under given conditions have already emerged. In this the role of natural selection is rather more negative than positive. While it does not produce any positive novelty in the organism, it merely kills the non-adapting organisms, which opens a wide field for the experiences of more adapted ones. Natural selection is in no way responsible for the adaptation processes. Its role in the evolution of organisms is rather supplementary and not relevant. It is obvious that the relevant role (that is— the role of adaptor of the given organization to the surrounding environment) in the evolution of organisms is played by the internal forces of the organism. In other terms, [that role is played] by that very same hidden energy that is characteristic of any organism, and which is at the foundation of the exchange and alimentation of tissues and which also serves as the cause for the psyche in the wide sense. (Bekhterev, 1904, p. 100)

Organisms are thus active and constructive participants in their own adaptation to the environment, and, through that, also in the future of their species. Bekhterev's emphasis on the relevance of "internal forces" allowed him to concentrate on the active role of the organism in any setting based on the organism's history of past relationships with the environment. The phenomenon of the psyche is thus viewed as a means to the end of adaptation (Bekhterev, 1904, p. 198), and its emergence in phylogeny is explained by the notion of accumulation of energy by the organism. Hence his later emphasis on the role of personality and its socially mediated "education" in psychological development (see Bekhterev, 1912, 1914, 1916). This focus on intrapsychic energy had likewise given a relevant head-start for the work of Bekhterev's colleague at the Psycho-Neurological Institute, Alexander Lazurskii (1906, 1916), and for Mikhail Basov (1931; see also Valsiner, 1988, ch. 5) who, as a former student of Lazurskii, later became one of the major originators of Activity Theory in the Soviet Union.

The acceptance of both intrapersonal and extrapersonal (conduct, social relations) spheres of energy accumulation and transformation is crucial for understanding Bekhterev's theoretical credo. By explaining the subjective domain of the human psyche through considering it a form of transformed energy, Bekhterev overcame the dualism between mind and body through positing a general unify-

ing basis for both. It is another matter that he did not elaborate (beyond occasional comments) how the different unique forms of transformed energy become established, indeed forcing that explanation to the domain of formation of associative reflexes and their complexes. His polemic argument with the introspection-oriented psychology of his time surely led him to overlook the variety of specific forms of psychological phenomena and their mutual interdependence within the whole. In part, that neglect may be due to Bekhterev's style in writing (and, probably, thinking). The reader of *Collective Reflexology* has many opportunities to experience that herself/ himself: Bekhterev's sudden leaps from detailed experimental or everyday descriptions to sweeping statements about the inevitable truth of his point of view (or falsehood of that of his opponents) can leave an inquisitive reader flabbergasted.

Bekhterev's Interest in Hypnosis, and the Foundations of Social Life

Psychology of the twentieth century has had very few empirical phenomena of persisting theoretical relevance at its foundation. One of those few is the phenomenon of hypnosis, and especially that of posthypnotic suggestion. It is well known that these phenomena gave rise to the psychoanalytic belief system and its methodology. The issue of the effects of hypnosis (and its use in therapy) was a major topic that puzzled psychiatrists and psychologists in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Bekhterev, as a psychiatrist and a practitioner with practical hypnotic skills, was on target in trying to understand the phenomena of social suggestion that are involved in hypnosis as well as in the social life in general.

Social suggestion in that context was viewed by Bekhterev using an analogy with infectious diseases (*contagium vivum*) as a special kind of "psychological infection" (*contagium psychicum*). Analogously to infection-carrying biological microorganisms, that psychological infection is carried by words, gestures, and other phenomena in social interaction—hence human beings are constantly available to social suggestions (Bekhterev, 1903, p. 5). Bekhterev's emphasis on the organism-environment interaction as the framework in which the hidden reserve of energy is being accumulated fits with the notion of psychological infection: through social suggestion, each personality accumulates the particular suggested material (energy)

in a way that later starts to look (from the perspective of others) as if it were the person's *own* willful act.

However, Bekhterev's view on the mechanisms of social suggestion (in both everyday life and under hypnosis) transcended the traditional opposition of the "self *versus* others suggestion" dilemma. Bekhterev's notion of the active person led him to emphasize that, in any case of social suggestion, the socially suggested material interacts with the person's already existing core personality. The latter, of course, was seen as a result of previous encounters with the world by the given person. Bekhterev viewed the implicit (we could call it clandestine) process of everyday social suggestion as the normative context for development of personality:

> In essence, involuntary suggestion and intersuggestion (*vzaimovnushenie*), as general phenomena, act everywhere in our everyday life. Without noticing it ourselves, we appropriate to some extent the feelings, superstitions, convictions, tendencies, ideas and even personality characteristics from the persons around us with whom we interact most frequently. That kind of inoculation of psychological states takes place mutually between people who live together; in other words, every personality to some or another degree inoculates others with the peculiarities of his own psychological nature, and, in return, takes from them one or another kind of psychological trait. (Bekhterev, 1903, p. 41)

The clinical phenomena of *folie à deux* that have been well known to psychiatrists constitute a good example of these processes of mutual psychological contagion. However, even if the main route of mutual social suggestion was understood by Bekhterev to take place with minimal resistance from the person, he did recognize the active role of the personality in the process of interpersonal psychological suggestion. From his own experience with posthypnotic suggestion, Bekhterev could draw a number of instances where the suggestion becomes transformed on the basis of internal contradiction between the preexisting personality and the particular suggestion:

> The resistance to suggestion, if it occurs, is based on a critique, on a discovery of an internal contradiction between that suggested and the convictions of the person.... From here it becomes obvious that suggestion in certain cases does not exclude even criticism [of the suggested material by the person], while it still does not cease to be suggestion. This can be observed during hypnosis of mild levels when the personality, or "I" that is not fully removed, still relates critically to all of the surroundings, including the suggestion.
>
> I suggested to a person in hypnosis that when he wakes up he must take a postcard from the table. When he woke up, he almost immediately looked around on the table and his gaze became fixated on a certain spot. "Do you see something?" I asked. "I see a postcard." I said good-bye to him and prepared to leave, but he still keeps staring at the

> table. "Don't you need to do anything?" I ask. "I would like to take that card, but I do not need it!" answers the man, and leaves—not having fulfilled the suggestion and obviously fighting with it. (Bekhterev, 1903, p. 14)

The social world of Russia, Europe, and North America provided Bekhterev with a multitude of real-life phenomena that could be explained by social suggestions that have become fixated into persons' strong beliefs. Cases of religious sects of extreme kinds, recovery from hysterically based somatic symptoms under personal religious revelations, and so on, were all present in the Russian society of Bekhterev's time, as in any other society at any time. The strong beliefs that social groups develop among their members—by way of escalation of the belief through mutual social suggestion—constitute the basis of social hysterias that have been described widely in world history. For Bekhterev, the energy-based worldview that recognized the development of intrapersonal psychological phenomena on the basis of social (self- and other) suggestions constituted the foundations on which the ideas expressed in *Collective Reflexology* were built two decades later.

Bekhterev's Methodological Imperatives: The "Objective" Study of Developing Phenomena

All through his long academic career, Bekhterev was actively promoting objectivity of investigation, largely arguing against the acceptance of introspectively available psychological phenomena at the level of their immediate symptoms. Strong anti-introspectionist statements can be found in Bekhterev's work *Collective Reflexology*. However, in parallel with these statements one can find recurrent disclaimers that Bekhterev over many decades (e.g., Bekhterev, 1888; Bekhterev, 1903; and in the present effort) did *not* want to eliminate the phenomena of subjective nature from the focus of scientists' attention. Instead, the issue at stake was methodological—how to gain access to the *development* of subjective-psychological phenomena, rather than start from their established form (which could be accessed only by introspection). This methodological problem was relevant for other Russian psychologists of this century, despite their accentuated differences from Bekhterev's reflexology (e.g., Vygotsky, Kornilov, Basov—see Valsiner, 1988; Valsiner & Van der Veer, 1991; Van der Veer & Valsiner, 1991). In most of our Western retrospections on Russian psychology we have failed to detect the

consistent emphasis on developmental methodology in the thinking of various authors whose work happens to trigger our interest.

Bekhterev's notion of objective methodology deserves careful analysis. It has become almost a legend of what was only recently called "Soviet Psychology" to consider Bekhterev an active fighter for objectivistic methodology in the sciences that study human beings. What often has been overlooked is his recognition of the complexity of human psychological phenomena, and his acceptance of a highly heterogeneous set of methods for its study. However, the main explanatory principle—the associative reflex—and its philosophical underpinnings (the worldview of associationism) remain prominent in all of Bekhterev's vast-ranging claims, and in the empirical work of his co-workers.

Nevertheless, it would be a gross simplification to consider Bekhterev a leader of the worldview of the physiological reductionism that is easily accepted by many empiricistic psychologists. Any reader of *Collective Reflexology* will get a glimpse of his gargantuan effort to paint the big picture of human sociality by way of an (ill-defined, but popular) energy-concept on the one hand, and different complex formations of associative reflexes on the other. It is perhaps exactly that wide scope of knowledge and readiness to approach fundamental issues of human psychology that keeps fascinating us. *Collective Reflexology* in all its complexity, persuasive efforts, and striving for generality can thus lead us to more fundamental questions in our contemporary social psychology and beyond.

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Part 1

Editor's Foreword—1992

Work on the first translation of Part 1 of *Collective Reflexology* has been a rewarding sojourn during my fifteen-year voyage in and around Russian and Soviet social psychology. Preparation for the journey really began in the late 1960s, when I was trying to reconcile my own mainstream-American version of what Berry (1979, p.23) would later call a social-psychological "blueprint" with the discrepant social reality based on my new home, Canada. In 1971, I spent a sabbatical leave with Henri Tajfel's unit at the University of Bristol. There, I was witness to the competition between European versions of the field and became apprised even more vividly of the cultural relativity of what constitutes social psychology.

Articulate spokespersons for the multiple and oft-conflicting American and West European variations on the main themes of social psychology were subsequently brought into confrontation in a NATO Conference at Carleton University (see Strickland, Aboud, Gergen, Jahoda & Tajfel, 1976; Strickland, Aboud, Gergen, Tajfel & Jahoda, 1976), one presented before a group of Canadian social psychologist-discussants, mostly recent Ph.Ds and graduate students; many of the papers subsequently appeared in a book (Strickland, Aboud, & Gergen, 1976).

While editing the contributions to this book, I was, one day, asked by a harried official of the Canada Council if I would supervise a Russian post-doctoral student for a year. I agreed, and this young social psychologist, Vladimir P. Trusov, of Leningrad University, and I considered at length the possibility of including Russian/Soviet ideas in the broadening focus of my work on contrasting social psychologies. After a year, we organized another Canada Council/ Carleton University conference. It had the same title as the first, "Paradigms and Priorities for Social Psychology," but it was constituted differently. Whereas the former had brought major American and West European views of social psychology into an arena with

young and/or new Canadians, the Strickland-Trusov meetings in May 1977, introduced a number of by-then-established Canadian social psychologists to an equal number of quite senior Soviet counterparts, this time with several "participant observers" from the USA and Western Europe. Inevitably, another book followed (Strickland, 1979), and this, in its turn, was succeeded by edited collections focused first on Russian and Soviet social psychological theory (Strickland, 1984) and second on empirical research (Strickland, Trusov, and Lockwood,1986). A summary of my other efforts in this particular "context of social psychology" has been published recently (Strickland, 1991). I ended that article with a post-glasnost quotation by a young psychologist at the USSR Academy of Sciences about how ignorant Russian scholars have been forced to remain over the decades by their political circumstances:

> We know neither the names, the achievements, nor the real mistakes of our predecessors. This applies not only to pedology, but also, for example, to the work of the first Soviet psychoanalysts, to the social psychology of the 1920s, to such varied figures as Bakhtin, Bekhterev and Berdyaev. (Etkind, 1990; quoted in Strickland, 1991, p. 589)

It was rewarding to see Etkind's statement in print at long last. Over the duration of my efforts to more fully comprehend Soviet social psychology, my most difficult problems were in establishing the source of certain ideas that seemed on their own merits to hold so much promise. Veiled spoken references were often made by Soviet scholars to the work of V.M. Bekhterev, but written citations were rare and nonspecific. Bekhterev's picture might hang prominently in a lecture hall, but students and young teachers, conversant with his many contributions in physiological psychology, had not read (or did not admit that they had read) his social psychological writings. At the conversational level, there were dark rumors to be heard about Bekhterev's fate (see Moroz, 1989), but of *Collective Reflexology* (Bekhterev, 1921), a book often mentioned and then left unexamined in North American histories of psychology, no details were forthcoming. The research of the late Boris Lomov and his associates at the former USSR Academy of Sciences on such topics as "joint memory," "joint psychophysics," "joint visual search" (Lomov, 1978, 1979; Lomov & Kol'tsova, 1984), taken in conjunction with the pervasive importance of a major "principle of analysis" (see Strickland, 1987) in official Soviet psychology, "communication" (*obshchenie*), rarely failed to instigate excitement when discussed with Western audiences. Indeed, such investigations seem

to have anticipated those of a number of enthusiasts in the West (Middleton & Edwards, 1990; Wegner, 1986; Zajonc & Adelmann, 1987). Yet of Russian/Soviet antecedents, there was no clear record. This led to a request to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for funds to permit translation of Part 1 of Bekhterev's *Collective Reflexology*.

During preparation of this translation, it became apparent that Bekhterev's work is much more than an early extension of a physiologist's reflexological views to the person/group relationship, although even as such it proves to be a remarkable statement of insights about the nature of groups and collectives, plus prescriptions of certain research methodologies for their scientific study. An historian of science may construe the book as another product of one of the greatest scientific minds of the century (Bekhterev authored 600 or more research articles and a half-dozen books and founded several journals). A psychological theorist might see Bekhterev's efforts as the first complete "systems" view of the social organism. His view of "reflex" was not restricted to the world of glandular secretions or muscle twitches—it was an energic view of the entire organism (whether made up of one or of multiple units). In this volume, the translation is preceded by a commentary by one of the major authorities on Russian psychology, Jaan Valsiner of the University of North Carolina, who expands knowledgeably on this aspect, among others, of Bekhterev's thought.

Collective Reflexology has proved equally exciting as an early statement of political psychology, wherein the author outlined the views which probably helped cost him his life (see Moroz, 1991) on the interrelations between the person and society and the strengths and limitations of each of these social units. Reading his psychological assessments of events in early Soviet parliaments, about military morale problems, about food riots, anti-Semitic violence, etc., in the context of current news from Russia gives this historical document a new life. Finally, since the book was published in 1921 without ever a second edition, this translation testifies to what the world of social psychology, along with other spheres of psychological and social science, had lost through the totalitarian machinations of Stalin and his successors. In addition to the "progressive" ideas first voiced and then silenced, references to hitherto unknown social research and researchers will help investigators complete the slowly emerging history of Russian social science in the years after the Revolution.

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In Place of a Foreword

I demonstrated in my *General Principles of Human Reflexology* (Petrograd, Rikker, 1918) that manifestations of the individual personality are at present investigated with a strictly objective research method. The latter should definitely be applied to the manifestations of collective, or composite, personality, for to speak of "public consciousness," "public soul," or—which is the same—of "collective soul" means no more than to use a figurative expression. The truth is that while a human individual can accomplish self-analysis by means of self-observation, the same can never be done with respect to a collective, or composite, individual.

However, sociologists as well as representatives of other humanities still operate with subjective and even metaphysical concepts. They keep talking about collective emotions, conceptions and perceptions, about the collective soul, collective consciousness, collective will, etc., whereas it is clear to everyone that in reality this is merely a generalization of the subjective state of one's own self, which should never be extrapolated to a crowd or any society in general.

Even the neopositivist sociologists generously sprinkle their treatises with subjective terminology borrowed from psychology. Let us take, for instance, E. de Roberti's interpretation of collective experience, a phenomenon undoubtedly real and objective:

> It is "sociality"—that constant source of the "*spirit*" or "supra-organic phenomena" in nature—that neopositivists see as lasting, indissoluble and versatile interaction, which is necessarily established in any permanent, rather than random, "community" of cerebrally endowed living beings between such characteristic psycho-physical and already *conscious* phenomena and processes as *sensations*, *perceptions*, *conceptions*, particular *images* and particular *judgements*, as well as *emotions*, elementary *feelings* and *volitional* impulses. It is this interaction that makes up the entire inner content of collective, or communal, experience that relates, verifies, supplements, unifies and objectifies the discordant and always highly subjective data of bio-individual experience (but not of the personal one, which represents the highest state and the ripest fruit of the communal experience).[1]

This quotation gives a clear idea of the peculiar manner in which neopositivism coexists with individual subjectivism.

All this subjectivism borrowed from psychology is in essence a remnant of the anthropomorphism that is being radically eliminated from the biological sciences. It should also be expelled from sociology, history and other humanities. Collective reflexology represents an attempt to found one of the most important branches of sociology, which is also often referred to as public or social psychology, on a strictly objective basis of experience and observation without venturing into the realm of subjectivism.

As we know, sociology has until now been based on two scientific disciplines: biology and psychology. Biology provided this science with a stable objective basis, while psychology as a subjective science weakened its position. From our point of view, sociology should not contain any psychological doctrines of a subjective nature. To become a strictly objective discipline, sociology should be based mainly on two sciences: biology and the reflexology that I am currently developing. The latter should replace psychology whenever we study the individual human personality and the individual members of a collective in particular.[2]

We shall not touch upon the question of whether this new discipline of reflexology is an abstract or a concrete science. The issue is not in the theoretical interpretation of this science but in the value of its method, which excludes subjectivism in the study of human personality. That is why reflexology rather than psychology should underlie the study of the social world.

Let us now discuss the issue of reflexology's relationship with biology and sociology. There can be no doubt that the human personality is a product of socialization, since without society human beings would not be human. In this connection one can cite certain observations that have the validity of an experiment, regarding some abandoned individuals deprived of any upbringing (e.g., Hasper Hans who lived in a barn until he was fourteen), who were unable to talk or walk. It is also known that shipwreck survivors stranded for many years on a desert island show clear signs of mental decline. The same is observed among individuals subjected to long-term solitary confinement. We also know that village children who have had few contacts with outsiders seem backward in comparison with city children. And it is common knowledge that those who grow up in contact with a greater

variety of people are more advanced than those who spend their lives shunning society.

It is obvious from the above that socialization is extremely important for the formation of the human personality: it is the principal factor of its development. In a word, personality (as such) is in its highest manifestations the product of society, which is, in turn, determined by its component members, i.e., personalities.

As we know, the neopositivist school reduces to their social origins even such categories as reason, color, space, species, number, causes, substances, etc., which places it in between empiricism and classical apriority:

> In reality they (i.e., categories) represent the most general relations between objects. While surpassing all other concepts in their comprehensiveness, they satisfy all aspects of our intellectual life. Therefore, if during the same historical period people did not share homogeneous notions of time, space, cause, number, etc., any accord between individual minds would be impossible and consequently, any kind of communal life would become unfeasible. For this reason society cannot abolish these categories in favor of arbitrary personal opinions without abolishing itself. In order to be able to exist, it needs not only moral consensus but also a certain minimum of logical unanimity, the limits of which are not to be crossed arbitrarily.[3]

All of this is unquestionably true, but the real issue is whether these categories are also biological facts, as has previously been believed, or purely social ones, as the neopositivists claim, or—which is our contention—whether we are dealing with facts of biosocial nature. The question thus posed is in reality far more complicated than it may initially appear. In any case, it requires a comprehensive discussion and cannot be resolved in so many words. That is why we prefer to keep it out of this discourse altogether, particularly since it is outside the limits of our present task. We can only point out that individual experience must have definitely played a role in the evolution of the above categories. Apparently, collective experience acquires a special significance here, leading through socialization to the equalization and softening of individual differences in the subsumed phenomena.

As for the evolution of the human personality, some believe that it created society. There can be no doubt that a better-developed human personality produces better social structures and that personality does, indeed, influence society. But if we ask whether society is the result of personality development, the answer can be only negative.

The first proof of this is the phenomenon of imitation. It is common knowledge that personality development is to a great extent a

product of imitation, which plays an enormous role in upbringing as well as in all aspects of social life in general. One can unequivocally state that without imitation there would be no personality as a social form, inasmuch as the main source of imitation is communication with one's own kind, among whom mutual induction and suggestion are developed through cooperation.

Another proof is language, which owes its origins to imitation on the one hand and to the instinctual need for communication on the other. Language is, therefore, an undisputable product of socialization, since without preliminary contact between individuals the emergence of human language is inconceivable. On the other hand, we know that human thought evolved mostly due to the word, and in such close and immediate association with it that abstract thinking would seem impossible without the participation of inner speech. And there is, indeed, evidence that savage prehistoric man was to a significant extent ignorant of both thought and words, in place of which there were only gestures, shrieks, exclamations and sound imitations.

Writing is another proof that the human personality evolves under the influence of society. It allows the results of individual experience to be widely circulated in the collective as well as to be recorded for the future and preserved for posterity. It will be no exaggeration to state that writing transformed man into an historical being.

The transition from pictorial (ideographic) to phonetic writing also marked an enormous advance in the evolution of human personality, hardly less significant than the transformation of gestures and exclamations into articulate speech consisting of words. Indisputably, it was phonetic writing in conjunction with oral speech that gave rise to the civilization of developed nations, since it became possible for each generation of humanity to pass on the totality of its achievement to all the generations to come.

Is, however, the evolution of the human personality exclusively due to society? Heredity and what we relegate to the manifestations of instincts undoubtedly represent a biological phenomenon, but is it possible to conceive of personality development unaffected by heredity and instincts? The initial stage of personality evolution may have been determined by the role of the hand, which provided the primal language of gestures (from which human speech developed), just as the later stage was determined by verbal language. However,

the evolution of the hand was the result of biological causes rather than the social conditions. The hand developed mostly due to the fact that, through natural selection or constant exercise, human beings stood up on their feet and transformed themselves from four-legged, or rather four-handed, creatures into two-legged ones.

Also, articulate speech as such could evolve only when the animal snout became the facial part of the head, which may have resulted partly from changes in nutrition and partly from the more sophisticated preparation of food, which are again biological rather than social factors. As for the family—that primal model of social relations—is it not a result of sexual attraction? Even the social aspect of human life may be a consequence of natural selection in the sense of the better survival of socially oriented beings, and natural selection is again a biological rather than a social factor. We also know from reflexology that higher, or associative, reflexes develop on the basis of common reflexes which are purely biological phenomena. Furthermore, what we define as "inborn inclinations" are determined by heredity, which is yet another purely biological factor. And finally, extraordinary giftedness, or genius, is to a significant degree produced by fortunate hereditary circumstances; education and erudition can only provide this inborn gift with the means and motivation to apply natural abilities. One can state with confidence that, no matter how substantial the social preparation for a certain discovery or invention might be, it is beyond the shadow of doubt that a poorly endowed person is not suited for making great discoveries, just as a retarded child is incapable of complex mathematical computations.

This leads us to the conclusion that the early evolution of personality was affected both by biological and social factors, while at the later stages it was influenced predominantly, though not exclusively, by social factors, which is why personality should be recognized as a phenomenon of biosocial origins.

This important thesis has been established only in recent times. It was proposed as early as 1860 by Courneau (*A Treatise on the Interrelations between Seminal Ideas in Science and History*) and the German sociologist Lazarus (*The Life of the Soul*); somewhat later this view found its way into English scientific literature in Lewis's *Problems of Life and Spirit*, 1874, and *The Physiological Foundations of the Spirit*, 1877. But it is our compatriot Professor of the Psycho-neurological Institute in Petrograd, the well-known sociolo-

gist Evgenii de Roberti, who has undoubtedly been the great champion of this proposition. He called it the "biosocial hypothesis" and used it as a foundation for his sociological research.

According to this hypothesis, or theory, the human mind is a product of the close union between the organic nature studied by biology and the supraorganic nature, or social environment, which is the subject matter of sociology. For that reason, de Roberti regarded psychology as a concrete science (when this theory was elaborated reflexology had not yet come into existence), as *biosociology* based both on biology and sociology. Therefore, it cannot be an abstract science, nor can it be recognized as a major science in the scientific hierarchy. However, we should not go as far as do some neopositivists, who claim that human individuality, i.e., personality, has no other root but the social one. Nor can we agree with Worms (*The Philosophy of Social Sciences*, 1903-1907), who does not see a satisfactory resolution of this problem and relegates its solution to the future. According to him, "No one has proved these issues insoluble and no one can claim that advances in knowledge will not shed a bright light on them with time" (vol. III, p. 95).

From our point of view, associative reflex theory also permits us to establish that personality is not after all the exclusive product of social interaction. In order to protect oneself from an attack by a wild animal it was enough to form an associative reflex between the animal's roar and appearance on the one hand, and the possibility of its attack on the other. The only escape was based on individual experience—the reflex of defense. Neither of those owe their existence to social interaction, although interaction does disseminate, through imitation, useful individual experience. In order to satisfy his hunger with shellfish or bananas, a savage did not have to possess previous collective experience: all that was needed was an associative reflex—born of the frequent search for food necessitated by hunger—between the outward appearance of the shell or the fruit and the satisfaction of hunger. In this and similar cases we deal with individual experience that subsequently becomes universal and by itself cultivates personality—the more so since the latter is manifest among uncivilized peoples far more strongly than is generally supposed. Besides the conditions that influence personality formation through individual experience from the very first days of its existence, there also emerge conditions for cultivating the human personality via games, cooperation, etc., through collective experience

in which imitation plays a special role as a reflex of exclusively social variety.

One should also bear in mind that a collective can act and express itself as a whole, as a *composite personality*, which will be discussed below and which is, in fact, the main subject of the present work.

As we know, there have already been attempts at creating so-called folk psychology as well as social, or collective, psychology (Steinthal, Lazarus, Wundt, McDougall, Kopel'man, and others), but these attempts, being based on the subjective interpretation of facts, have not met with success.

As has been mentioned earlier, the aim of the present work is to exclude subjectivism altogether from the issues of collective actions and reactions, as it has been excluded from my concept of reflexology as the objective science of the human personality.

While not permitting subjective interpretation of issues concerning the study of the evolution of social or collective phenomena, and understanding all such phenomena as collective or social reflexes, we recognize the necessity to apply to their study the same strictly objective method that we use when studying the individual personality. For this reason, the title chosen for this work is "Collective Reflexology" rather than the commonly used social, or collective, psychology.

It is hardly necessary to elaborate here on the fact that tackling the issues related to the evolution of social phenomena, or social, i.e., collective, reflexes, demanded from the author a new approach to the subject and its new interpretation, since what has until now been called social psychology could not yield much useful material in this respect because of its subjective method. One should also mention that although psychologists and subjectivist sociologists (since sociology still remains largely a subjective science, which should not be the case) could stretch their subjective method to philosophize about the crowd as an entity with a "single soul," it was far more difficult to apply the subjective method to all the other forms of the collective. That is why the crowd became the favorite object of study among psychologists and subjectivist sociologists. We shall expose in due course the one-sidedness apparent in the works of a number of authors when they describe the crowd from a subjective point of view. Here we would like to point out a more serious mistake made by psychologists and subjectivist sociologists

in their studies of the masses and their movements: some of them try to explain the latter by a single common principle.

Thus, Tarde, for instance, sees this common principle in imitation, whereas W. McDougall finds it in the instincts of human nature.

The obvious deficiency of these views proceeds from the lack of strict objectivity in research that tolerates preconceived notions.

Tarde—that talented sociologist—proceeded from a preconceived notion of the significance of imitation in social life and exaggerated its role in his "laws of imitation," paying hardly any attention to individual initiative and social creativity. When he does mention them, he, like other authors, considerably limits their importance and plays down their role in social life. At the same time, when he inevitably comes across some phenomena of social life that have nothing to do with imitation, he is forced by virtue of the preconceived nature of his theory, to incorporate them into his theory by using an ingenious term, "counter-imitation."

On the other hand, Professor W. McDougall (*The Main Problems of Social Psychology*), while emphasizing the nature of instincts in individual life, transposes the entire concept of sociopsychological phenomena: "If it is true," he says, "that human nature everywhere has always had the same natural foundation, this point of view will serve as the much-needed basis for human societies and institutions."

He then discusses the issue of instincts, unresolved by psychologists, some of whom pay it too little attention, while others, for example, Schneider and William James, maintain that humans have the same number of instincts as animals and attribute to them a corresponding role in determining human behavior. The latter view is supported by McDougall without sufficient grounds. At the same time, he admits that instinct is "of hereditary and inborn psychophysical predisposition, which enables its owner to perceive certain objects, to pay attention to them, to experience particular sensory excitement when perceiving such an object and to perform the corresponding special actions or at least feel the urge to perform them." It is on these instincts that the author builds his social psychology, by analyzing in sequence the role of the instincts of procreation, parenting, belligerence, of the herd instinct, and the instincts through which religious conceptions influence social life, the acquisitive instinct and of the creative instinct; as for the other factors that regu-

late interpersonal relations in social life, the author discusses imitation, play, and habit.

It is clear that, in developing his social psychology, W. McDougall was inevitably forced to stretch his concept of instincts out of all proportion. Suffice it to say that in addition to the above instincts, the author distinguishes, among the primary inclinations of the human soul that influence social life, the instincts of escape, repulsion, curiosity, self-effacement, self-confidence and a number of other instincts manifested as fear, submissiveness, etc. It is obvious that the recognition of all instincts is, in this case, derived from a preconceived social psychological theory of the "instinctual foundation" of all social phenomena. In a word, this is a case of the artificial construction of a particular system, since the author begins his study with a preconceived idea born of the subjective method instead of objectively analyzing phenomena in question and constructing his system on the basis of the facts thus revealed.

The application of a strictly objective method to the study of social phenomena avoids such strained interpretations that lead to wrong conclusions. Therefore, the same strictly objective viewpoint should also be applied to various manifestations of the collective, or composite, personality. Only this point of view can extricate this important realm of knowledge from its infant state.

As we shall see later, a strictly objective examination of the subject leads inevitably to the conclusion that manifestations of the composite personality revealed through the analysis of social life are ruled by the same law that is revealed through a strictly objective reflexological study of manifestations of the individual personality. The very forms of this law turn out to be the same for both the individual personality and the composite one; this should certainly be recognized as an advance in knowledge, since the theory of opposition between the personality and the crowd accepted by many authors who write about the crowd is greatly exaggerated.

As will be shown below, one encounters among the manifestations of social life essentially the same reflexes, in the form of universal, eternal movements following the same path and evolution, as one finds in individual activity. This is understandable if we bear in mind that a collective is nothing other than a group of individuals interconnected through their various interests and representing a single entity in the form of a collective, or composite, personality.

That is why the laws that govern the manifestation of collective activity are the same as those that rule the expression of individual activity. It cannot be otherwise, for a collective that represents a composite personality acts as a united group of individuals.

It follows from the above that a reflexology of the individual personality should shed light on collective reflexology just as the latter should shed light on the former, since both sciences are closely interrelated.

In conclusion, I would like to mention that the present work was begun as long ago as 1910-11 when I mapped out its basic concepts. The first chapters appeared partially in 1911 in my work *The Subject Matter and the Goals of Social Psychology as an Objective Science*. That is why the text of this work with the appropriate corrections has been incorporated into the corresponding parts of this book.

V. Bekhterev

Notes

1. E. de Roberti, *New Ideas in Sociology* (in Russian), 2nd Collection, p. 6.
2. V. Bekhterev, *General Principles of Human Reflexology* (in Russian), chapter 2.
3. E. Durkheim, "Sociology and Theory of Cognition" (in Russian), in *New Ideas in Sociology*, 2nd Collection, 1914, p. 40.

1

Introduction

Social events are molded by human hands, so whatever the other determining influences are, the human factor as the agent of social events should in no instance be ignored.

Here, however, the agent is not a single person but the whole society, a crowd, a gathering or a collective—which is not the same. Consequently, individual psychology is not suitable for understanding social movements and the evolution of social events, since an individual personality cannot personify a whole society or nation. These are the grounds for the attempts to create a special so-called "social psychology."

As early as the 1860s, Steinthal and Lazarus made such an attempt to create "folk psychology." They proceeded from the premise that the national spirit is distinct from the individual soul. In their view, the existence of folk art provided evidence, as it were, in favor of the existence of a unique, suprapersonal consciousness, or a composite national spirit. Therefore, the differences between the cultures of various peoples could be attributed to the peculiarities of their national, or folk, spirit.

But this attempt failed to strike a sympathetic chord, since one can speak of supra-individual consciousness or national spirit only as a figurative comparison and not as a reality.

The fact is that if we understand consciousness as the inner content of the self—which is universally accepted—it is then impossible to divide human consciousness into an individual and a public, or national, consciousness when the latter is understood as something special, as a single supra-individual consciousness, rather than a composite consciousness of the individual persons who make up the population of a nation and its representatives. It is, therefore,

natural that the attempt to build a social psychology on such a foundation could not succeed and that it was met with opposition from various quarters.

Further development of the same concept, but in a different way, occurred in W. Wundt's work on "folk psychology." The object of his research included language, myth, and tradition as products of the collective activity of the national mind, and his purpose was to study the psychological laws they reflected.

It is obvious that here we no longer deal with suprapersonal, or folk, consciousness but with the study of collective creativity, and in this direction W. Wundt undoubtedly made a big step forward, even though he failed to produce a social, or public, psychology in the full sense of the term.

According to W. Wundt,[1] the common products of creative activity are determined by the fact that "creativity of one person can be acknowledged by another as an adequate expression of the latter's concepts and feelings, which is why large numbers of different persons can be creators of the same concept to an unequal degree." The matter is thereby reduced to the following: in social organizations there are individual mental[2] processes which, inasmuch as they correspond to similar processes in other individuals, are the collective products of the mental activity of a certain number of people. But in such a case there can be no social psychology, since under these circumstances it will have no new goals except those in the province of individual psychology.

The Romanic nations have made a very considerable contribution to the study of the characteristic manifestations of the crowd; one may only mention the works of such authors as Tarde, LeBon, Sighele, and others.

In Russia, crowd psychology was studied by Mikhailovskii and subsequently by a host of other authors. The crowd, however, represents only one type of social form, and the most elementary one at that, with all the features of the herd. Thus, the crowd is only one of the objects of study pursued by a science focused on the social manifestations of human activity.

Issues of a social nature were also addressed in *Suggestion and its Role in Social Life*,[3] a work by the present author first published in 1898. It discussed the significance of suggestion as an important factor in the manifestation of social processes. Since then and until very recently there have been no attempts by Russian scientists to

comprehend so-called "psychic" manifestations of the masses in their totality except a few pamphlets by various authors. Abroad, a number of works were published during that period by such authors as LeBon, Tarde, Baldwin, De la Grasserie, Ross, Wundt, and others. Their common shortcoming is the subjective method used in their approach to the issue.

Somewhat later, A. Kopel'man published a work[4] in which he attempted to establish a general point of view on this subject. His analysis led to the total exclusion of folk spirit or supra-individual consciousness. According to the author, "social spiritual products are based exclusively on individual mental processes"; therefore the root of social phenomena is to be sought "nowhere else except in individual consciousness–in an exclusively individual one-which has no social aspects."

The author admits that, as creations of individual persons, social products share the nature of the individual products they contain, but he does not think it possible to use this fact as a proof of "the unity of consciousnesses of the producers, the people."

He allows for social unity or—in civilized nations—numerous individual unities under the general term "collective," construed by the author as "any group united through the ongoing process of establishing mental unity" (p. 37). It is this kind of collective that Kopel'man recognizes as the subject matter of collective psychology. Therefore, the latter, according to the author, examines not a particular mental process but its relationship with processes that occur in other members of the collective; it tries to define the essence of this relationship, the interaction between these individual processes as well as the regularity they manifest.

This point of view is undoubtedly more correct than the one postulated by other writers. Unfortunately, the author did not go beyond the general statement of the problem and was unable to renounce the subjective standpoint in this field.

Besides, the author proceeds to discuss yet again "the unity of individual consciousnesses" and the "soul of the collective" in addition to the individual soul (p. 42), the "fusion of minds" that "form a single collective soul," etc.

We believe that in societies and gatherings one can talk about the interaction or, to a certain degree, the standardization of the products of individual associative (neuro-psychological) activity, but not about their unity in the form of a "single collective soul," which is

not very different from the views of Steinthal and Lazarus opposed by Kopel'man himself.

The following quotations seem to provide the most complete representation of Kopel'man's ideas (pp. 4 and 43): "We must conceive of an individual psyche as converging to a greater or lesser degree with the psyche of other individuals....The content of other consciousnesses is added to the individual mental content, to the material which is related to, and developed in, the individual brain."

Thus occurs to a greater or lesser extent the fusion of minds, all of which form a single collective soul. It is in this single soul, in this amalgamated though initially divers mental content, that a number of processes occur which result in the erosion of diversity and its replacement by unity: it is here that united collective creativity takes place.

In contrast to the above author, we believe that it is more correct to say that in social groups we have gatherings of individuals, their interaction and equalization which lead to an amalgamation of their creative output, rather than a "single collective psyche" or a "single collective soul," which does not exist in reality. In a word, the apparatus of association—the brain and its *associative activity*[5]—of individual members of groups and gatherings generates, as a result of interpersonal contact, the products of social creativity without relinquishing its individuality or merging with others into a single mind or a "single soul."

Furthermore, we are decisively against any subjectivism in the assessment of social activity; this subjectivism is inevitable when "unity of consciousness" is believed to be the basis of a collective.

Although consciousness has its place in individual psychology, we are dealing here with studies conducted on oneself through self-observation and, unfortunately, transferred by analogy to other persons without sufficient justification; in our opinion, we cannot apply the method of self-observation based on the analogy with one's own consciousness to a multitude of individuals in social groups while accepting a hypothetical "unity of souls" or "unity of consciousnesses" and simultaneously presupposing the unity of their content, i.e., perceptions, conceptions, etc.

We believe that in all cases that involve the manifestation of mass correlative activity we should completely renounce the subjective point of view, since only in the figurative sense can we speak of a national soul, national feeling, or conception, while what we actu-

ally mean is the feelings or conceptions of many individuals, especially those from the ruling class of the population, and not a monolithic feeling or conception shared by the majority.

It follows from the above that in "collective reflexology"—as we shall call this new discipline—we can speak of the manifestations of associative activity of a whole group of people and their external responses under certain conditions, but not of the subjective side of their psyches, which will remain outside our field of study. In other words, collective reflexology should be an exclusively objective science in the strict sense of the word and not a subjective one.

Any social activity, irrespective of the circumstances that generated it, has an element of the highest order, or, to be more precise, a reflexological element.

The role this element plays in combat and war is common knowledge. The experts are absolutely positive that success in combat depends on the "spirit" of the troops rather than on their physical might.

According to Meillard, it is not the supremacy of weapons of destruction that wins a war. There is a force as old as the world and yet eternally young, a force more terrible than cannons and guns, which is capable of all kinds of surprises, for it can instantly produce the most unexpected means for actions both extremely divers and perfectly suited to the situation. It is moral force. This force saturates, excites and inspires the masses, making them capable of enormous sacrifices for the sake of victory. Moral force tips the scales of victory in its favor. It was Napoleon who said that in a war the moral element is three times more important than the physical one, and he was right.

This view is shared by the military historian S. Gershel'man.[6] According to him, the Napoleonic formula regarding the role of the moral element in a war has not changed at all; on the contrary, this element has acquired even greater significance.

The same opinion is held by Korf, [7]Golovin[8] and other authors. A detailed discussion of this issue can be found in Dr. Shumkov's work.[9]

We would like to remark here that the role of combatant enthusiasm, which often prevails over might, has been recognized since time immemorial. In this connection, we would like to quote the German authority Bernhardi, an advocate of a large army for Germany, who, according to Sheredam, said: