Psychic Structures, Functions, and Processes

Bridges

Rosemary Gordon

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Rosemary Gordon

WITH A FOREWORD BY MARIO JACOBY AND
A PREFACE BY MICHAEL FORDHAM

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FOREWORD

Mario Jacoby

It is a pleasure and an honour to have been asked to write some introductory remarks to this highly important work by Rosemary Gordon, fittingly entitled *Bridges*. I would venture to say that, like myself, the reader of this volume will soon come to appreciate the author's deep concern and special skill in building bridges—bridges in a great many directions.

Generally speaking, bridge-building seems an apt metaphor for the main task of any analyst or analytical psychotherapist, whose job it is to find or build connections to the inner world of patients and thus to help them overcome unhealthy gaps and splits in the psyche. Bridging the different parts and tendencies within not only leads to greater integration of the personality but may enable patients to find more solid bridges to the people around them and thus to experience satisfying relationships. After all, as Sigmund Freud proclaimed, one of the goals of psychoanalytic treatment is to increase one's capacity for love.

At the same time we have to acknowledge that the field of depth psychology, since its beginnings nearly one hundred years ago, has been rent by disagreements, quarrels, and subsequent schisms—in short, by bridge-burning. It seems his most creative heirs—namely Adler and Jung—felt a pressing need to free themselves from Freud's all-too-embracing 'psychoanalytic

movement'. At that time it was obviously not possible for them to go their own ways peacefully, developing original ideas that then could have fertilized mainstream psychoanalytic theories and practice. The bridges first had to be burned. For example, it seems that for Freud, Jung ceased to exist after their break. For Jung, the break was very traumatic also, and in the course of his later writings he repeatedly compared his ideas with and set them up against Freud's ideas—indeed, his whole psychological attitude. Yet we must add that the Freudian world Jung refers to in these arguments is the one he had known before his break with Freud in 1913. He simply took no notice of developments in Freudian analysis after that. The bridge had been burned—perhaps it had to be, so that Jung could develop his work.

Inside the Freudian school, schisms of various kinds continued to appear. There were movements that sought to burn all bridges to the mainstream, and others that tried to gloss over or 'overbridge' any discrepancies between themselves and the psychoanalytic community in general. Jung, whose main reproach against Freud concerned the latter's rigidity and dogmatism, wanted to avoid falling into the same trap. Although surrounded by enthusiastic followers, he seemed to resist the idea of forming a specific 'Jungian school' based on his teachings. Yet in spite of his ambivalence, Jungian analytical psychology grew into a multifaceted discipline of its own, with a set of shared beliefs, organized professional bodies, and training centres in many parts of the world.

Obviously, disagreements also cropped up within the Jungian school. These arose especially during the course of its further development, and concerned the question of how best to fill certain gaps and omissions in the rich and broad corpus of Jung's work. In particular, such questions as the development of the ego beginning in early infancy and the transference of childhood conflicts in the analytic encounter had not received much attention from Jung. In London, a group of analytical psychologists, led by Michael Fordham, began to make important and creative contributions by focusing on just those issues. They thereby rebuilt a bridge to Freudian psychoanalysis, though their interest centred more on the contemporary psychoanalytic ideas of Klein, Winnicott, and others than on those of Freud himself.

It is here that Rosemary Gordon comes in. An influential member of this so-called 'London School' of analytical psychol-

ogy, she has earned a special place within and beyond it thanks to her own creative mind and extraordinary capacity for bridge-building. The present volume, which encompasses a wide range of her diverse explorations, will provide readers with rich food for thought—whether their interest is in clinical or cultural issues of the psyche. The 'classical' Jungian reader, well versed experientially as well as intellectually in Jung's approach to the psyche, will encounter herein challenging new questions. Such questions are the result of the author's acute awareness of the need for greater differentiation in the theory and practice of analytical psychology. They also spring from her desire to build bridges between some of Jung's seminal ideas and contemporary developments both in analytical psychology and Freudian psychoanalysis. Thus she puts the concept of the archetypes 'on the couch', reflects on 'curing and healing', re-examines the idea of the self, and explores the distinction between symbols and symbolic experience. She makes a convincing attempt at clarifying much that is obscure, redundant, or contradictory, while never losing sight of the living experience behind the theoretical abstraction. This is not to say that a reader who follows Gordon's stimulating discussions will not have to think quite hard at times. But the effort will always be rewarded, as he or she will be led to discover a widened scope of psychic connections. Also, there are plenty of sensitive vignettes from the consulting room, which ground her ideas in immediate experience. What is most rare is the author's respect and tolerance for a plethora of differing views and her keen sense of what belongs organically together in matters of the psyche.

The author particularly favours one realm of the living psyche, and she visits it again and again. This is the 'location of archetypal experience'—a realm whose 'feel' she beautifully conveys to the reader, likening it to what Winnicott calls the 'transitional space' or the 'area of illusion'. This area becomes a base from which to build bridges in many directions. These bridges provide a new vantage point from which to re-examine clinical themes such as the psychodynamics of narcissism and the meaning of masochism and other perversions. Such re-examinations touch upon anthropological findings like the creation myth of the Ashanti tribe and their psychological interpretation and pay tribute as well to Gordon's special love, the creative processes in art and literature. Yet the link always remains to the

'location of archetypal experience', the 'transitional space' where things are paradoxical: at once fluid and firm, real and imaginary, metaphorical, symbolical, 'as if'. This is not at all a disengaged, arbitrary playground. We always are helped by the author to connect to this particular 'place', where we find and may experience the authentic 'dance of the soul'.

I sincerely hope this book will meet the large and receptive readership it deserves.

PREFACE

Michael Fordham

When Jung finished writing *The Psychology of the Unconscious*, where he had assembled the myths of the world, he reflected on what it means to live with a myth and what without one: what of his own myth? He realized that the man without a myth 'is like one, uprooted, having no true link either with the past, or with the ancestral life which continues within him, or yet with contemporary human society'. Again, 'how could I, when treating my patients make due allowance for the personal factor, for my personal equation, which is yet so necessary for knowledge of the other person'? He embarked on a 'confrontation with the unconscious', which occupied him intensely for many years and probably never ceased doing so. With these basic ideas in mind, Jung presented us with a massive opus to which the twenty volumes of his *Collective Works* bear witness. But there is a quandary in that much of what he uncovered was highly irrational and did not lend itself to scientific reductionism. How, therefore, could he describe his findings with the method of a science which he aimed to construct? His method became comparative, and with its help he defined regular patterns in the unconscious, which he termed archetypes, whose major form of expression is symbolic imagery.

Rosemary Gordon's book is faithful to Jung's pioneering work. She starts by defining the personal equation in her studies and by telling us how she became fascinated by the idea of a bridge and bridges, which lead her into a study of the significance of the bridge in many parts of the world and in antiquity—it is a rich harvest that she assembles. The bridge in antiquity was considered a violation of nature, an *opus contra naturam*, as the old alchemists put it, and consequently the gods located in the rivers or ravines took umbrage and had to be placated by various means, to extract one feature from Rosemary Gordon's extensive list of examples. That fascinating example illustrates in a metaphorical fashion a general phenomenon: that any important advance in consciousness or scientific achievement tends to carry with it a backlash—even the introduction of new drugs in medicine are liable to have side-effects, which have to be carefully studied lest they produce a disease worse than the one that the drug aims to cure.

So much for the symbolic study of bridging, which Rosemary Gordon explicates at length and in various fields. There is one of these in which I have a special interest: the bridging between schools of analytical psychotherapy. Like myself, she has found that many of the findings of Kleinian psychoanalysts can clarify and develop fruitfully some aspects of Jung's thesis.

Finally, there is the interesting way in which Rosemary Gordon presents her researches. It is not, as is usual, done by giving a theoretical introduction to her thesis; instead, she presents a symbolic field as the integrating element. That is refreshing, for the symbol is an integrator just as much as a theoretical statement. The book is a combination of this dual significance, so I hope it will receive the recognition it deserves.

INTRODUCTION

I have always been fascinated and intrigued by bridges. The way they give one access from one's own side to the other side, across an abyss or a watery boundary, strikes me as magical.

Then when I examined my own intellectual development, my pursuits and activities, I realized that I am really something of a compulsive bridge-builder.

It is certainly extraordinary how often I find myself driven to use the image of the bridge. And it is indeed extraordinary how often the image of the bridge has presented itself to me as the most natural and appropriate metaphor to describe a particular function or a particular state of relationship. This may refer to the inner, psychic world and the presence there of the different mental structures and functions; or it may refer to a person's intercourse and interaction with the 'other'—be it an object or a person or persons; or it may refer to groups of people or schools of thought and theory or even to the different fields of study.

The tenacity and persistence of this image in me, as well as in others, suggests that the bridge is an evocative symbol that has an almost universal appeal and meaning. This seems indeed to be the case, for myths and rituals in relation to the bridge appear all over the world. Nearly everywhere and in nearly all cultures there

is the story of the bridge that at the beginning of time linked earth to heaven and thus functioned as the passageway between the human and the supra-human—that is, between the mortal, the transitory, and the immortal, and between the sensory and the supra-sensory worlds. This linking of earth and heaven, of 'down-here' and 'up there', has led to the frequent identification of the bridge with the rainbow. Jung clearly recognized this link and the potential dangers to both sides it might entail. Thus, speaking of the rainbow, Jung (1944) stresses again and again that if it is to be used by mankind as a bridge giving access to heaven, then people 'must go under it and not over it. Whoever goes over it will fall and be killed . . . for . . . only the gods can walk rainbow bridges in safety' (paras. 69–70).

It is interesting that the making and erecting of a bridge has been regarded everywhere as a potentially risky and hazardous undertaking and hence is usually accompanied by many rituals and sacrifices. It has been thought of as a daring if not actually sacrilegious act, often as an act against a river god who is experienced as an obstacle and a barrier to man's curiosity. There is a great deal of evidence from all over the world that the sacrifice demanded was a human sacrifice, which later was often replaced by the sacrifice of a mere effigy of a human person. For instance, in an annual rite carried out in Rome in relation to the Pons Sublicius, which spans the Tiber, such human effigies were until quite recently flung into the river. In the Christian centuries the pagan idea of a river god was re-moulded into the idea that it was the devil who assumed guardianship over the rivers, and he had to be placated if a bridge was to be made and secured against collapse. There are indeed many stories of bridges being built, which collapsed again and again until the devil had been given his due. But at times men managed to outwit the devil by, for instance, the bridge-engineer making a bargain with the devil, which guaranteed him the life of the first three individuals to cross the bridge. Then, when the bridge was ready, the engineer would entice across it three chickens or three dogs and so cheat the devil of his human victims.

It is fascinating that it is particularly in children's games that we find relics of the tribute paid to the river god or the devil. There is, for instance, the famous song: 'London Bridge is burning down . . . my fair Lady.' The game that is played with it enacts and so represents the difficulty encountered in building a bridge by ordinary means only, for the song asks many questions of how the

structure may be secured. At last the children seize a 'poor prisoner' to whom they say: 'here is the chopper to chop off your head'.

Variations of children's bridge games are reported from America, Swabia, Germany, France, Italy, and Greece. In all of them there are two keepers, one at each end of the bridge, who are generally called 'angel' and 'devil', though this may here and there be varied to 'king' and 'emperor', or 'sun' and 'moon', or 'St Peter' and 'St Paul'. In an Irish version of the game, little girls dress as angels, but one impersonates the devil. A bridge is constructed of sticks and boards, and it is made to fall repeatedly; this is ascribed to the devil. When at last a victim is caught, he is made to undergo a test to decide whether or not he is to be the devil's captive: he must walk a straight line drawn on the ground.

There is a legend that in order to render secure the structure of London Bridge, the stones were sprinkled with the blood of little children. Children's heads are supposed to have been built into the foundation stones of the Hooghly Bridge in Calcutta; in China the heads of unwary travellers were much sought after to secure the foundations of newly built bridges. In Greece the bridge of Arta kept collapsing until the master builder had enticed his wife to the site and walled her in.

The demand for a sacrifice in order to placate the river god and so render secure the bridge confirms the view that a bridge construction between earth and heaven, between a 'here' and a 'there', is indeed experienced as dangerous; but it is also thought of as potentially a way of initiation, as is, for instance, the move from one social, cultural, or age group to another. Indeed, in many ways these bridge-building sites resemble, parallel, and mirror the many adolescent initiation rites, with their demand for submission, pain, and sacrifice.

On the other hand, once a bridge has been rendered secure by a sacrifice, it itself can take on an air of sanctity. Thus the Romano-Christian title of *'pontifex'* refers to the priestly bridge builder, for it was thought that to build a bridge not only was the skill of the engineer necessary, but also the knowledge of how to deal with and how to placate the gods. Even in Christian times bridges were constructed and maintained by special priest-engineers. Bridges were in the sacred keeping of the church, and bridge-building was esteemed a pious work. Most bridges had chapels attached or built upon them as part of the structure, as, for instance, at Wakefield and Monmouth and Bath. In Japan

there is an interesting 'bridge divination'. A person who wants to consult his fate or the gods will sit behind one of the end-posts of a bridge. These end-posts are made in the form of a phallus. Behind this phallus the inquirer sits and tries to overhear stray words or snatches of sentences that carry over to him from the conversation of the people who pass over the bridge. It is this chance talk that the inquirer then interprets and receives as an answer from the gods to the questions he has put. Here, too, then, the bridge clearly connects the profane with the sacred.

As it is the most vivid symbol of something that connects the 'this' with the 'that', and the 'here' with the 'there', it is not surprising that rivers and bridges should figure so importantly in the pictography of the world after death. Thus there is a widespread notion of a bridge in the unseen world over which the soul must pass at death—a bridge that is usually narrow, sharp, and dangerous. The Iroquois American Indians tell of travelling dreams in which they come to the river of the dead; there they find a snake bridge, the far end of which is the Great Dog who has to be passed before one may reach the villages of the dead in the far distance.

The existence of such world-wide myths, rites, rituals, and sacrifices in relation to the bridge suggests that it evokes in man experiences of a real sense of danger, probably because bridging is felt as a venturing-out of that which is known and familiar into that which is strange and unfamiliar, which is the 'other'; this transition, this crossing over, is really quintessential to the form and the function of the bridge. For a bridge presupposes the presence of the 'other', of a 'here' and a 'there', a 'now' and a 'then', a 'this side' and an 'other side'. Whether what is being bridged is water, a river, a ravine, or anything else, it separates and divides and acts as a boundary. When used as a metaphor, a bridge may describe the relationship between two or more persons or between two or more different intrapsychic functions. In other words, it is basic to the idea of the bridge that it allows and presupposes separateness and uniqueness, but without isolation or rupture. Rather, bridge and bridging symbolizes contact and communication between that which remains separate, distinct, and apart. For where there is bridging, there is no merging, no fusion, no all-out identification; but neither is there splitting, nor insulation. And there can be no regression towards the simpler, the less complex, the more unitary. The presence of a bridge

favours and facilitates diversity but without exclusion or disjunction; there are boundaries but no barriers.

Where there are bridges and hence diversity as well as communication, then there will also be situations of choice as well as of conflict, of dialogue, and of misunderstanding as well as of reconciliation. Consequently such situations are far from fixed and static; rather, there is always change, movement, and progress, and above all there is uncertainty.

Where there is bridging, there we find the condition of tension and dialectics; this implies that there are two or more entities, parts, factions, or forces and that there is a third, the bridge itself, which links and connects the two and forces them to take account of one another; it prevents them from remaining isolated, unaffected and untouched by each other. The presence of the two potentially causes the making of the third, just as with the actual bridge the tension created by the two opposing sides holds up the arc that is the apex of the bridge. Thus the desire for each other of a man and a woman can temporarily transform the penis into such a third, a bridge; and their coming together can then create a more permanent third, the child.

The universality of the metaphor of the bridge suggests that humankind has always been aware that all that exists is the result of ever-present dialectical processes. Our awareness of this fact may account for our attraction to bridges and for the way we resonate to the image and the thought of the bridge. Our desire for and attraction to the bridge reflects, I think, our experience of the opposition inside us, that is, of our need for uniqueness and thence diversity on the one hand, and of togetherness, communication, and even communion on the other. Only the dialectics, represented and symbolized by the bridging process, can hold together and reconcile this inner opposition.

The presence of bridging processes in an individual denotes that a certain amount of psychic differentiation exists and has already developed, which means that there are here conditions that make for movement, change, dialogue, but also conflict. In fact the states of the psyche in the presence of conflict on the one hand and of the functioning of the bridging processes on the other are remarkably similar, since they all depend on the achievement of separations and specializations in the psyche.

In fact Jung (1917) has argued again and again that conflict is part of man's destiny, that it is a universal experience that no one

can escape, avoid, or do without. For, 'disunity with oneself is the hallmark of civilized man. The neurotic is only a special instance of the disunited man who ought to harmonize nature and culture within himself' (para. 16). The awareness of the universality of the experience of conflict inevitably deeply affects the relationship between analyst and patient, for it leads both of them to recognize that they share some of these basic experiences and so are capable of mutual empathy.

What differentiates the mentally sick from those who are less ill is the reaction to conflict and to bridging. I have observed that the neurotic and the disturbed try to avoid conflictual situations; they try to protect themselves against them. They experience conflict as an unwarranted attack, as persecution, and they react to it with anger, resentment, and the conviction that they are personally disadvantaged and victimized. They feel totally ambivalent about bridges and bridging. Distrusting their capacity to hold up, to bring together and to relate the different factions, processes and communities in a benevolent and enriching manner, they fear instead that this, the bridge, will actually increase conflict and discord.

And yet while he is alive, curious, and flexible, man needs the experience both of diversity and of unity. Thus on the one hand we all search for continuity, uniformity, conformity, and order, but we also long for and celebrate what is different, separate, distinct, and special, both in ourselves—each one of us—but also in the objects and persons outside and apart from us. Indeed, we delight in the miraculous and infinite diversity of nature and the world; it excites, stimulates, and rouses our admiration—but only if, and on condition that, there is also communication and intercourse across the divides, and that means bridges.

I am of course using the bridge both as an actual object, but also as a metaphor that carries important and powerful symbolic meanings. I think of the bridge and the bridging functions as the third factor, the third force in the dialectical processes that govern the inter- and intra-personal relationships. For either there are the static states of fusion or merger, or, if and when differentiation has begun to happen, specialization and also separateness can come into existence. This itself can become a new kind of stasis, which could lead to regression back to oneness. Or the two can facilitate the emergence of the third, and this can then forge links between them, enriching both of them, but without threatening the separateness and uniqueness of each of

them. Instead, it can aid in the creation of something new. Jung has expressed this in *Mysterium Coniunctionis* (1955) where he writes: 'But if a union is to take place between opposites like Spirit and Matter, Conscious and Unconscious, bright and dark and so on, it will happen in a third thing, which represents not a compromise but something new' (para. 765).

I think of communication, of language, and of metaphor also as a bridge. And just as the actual bridge-building has always been regarded as ingenious and also hazardous, so, it seems, is communication. For even God, so it has been thought, felt threatened when men could use and enjoy making a bridge to Him. This is clearly expressed in the Tower of Babel story. It is recounted there that God decided to confuse men's language so 'that they may not understand one another's speech' (*Genesis* 11:7).

This reinforces my idea about the symbolism of communication and language as bridges and the projection of men's ambivalent feelings about it. For it was the building of the tower 'whose top may reach unto heaven' (*Genesis* 11:4) that called forth God's hostile action; for that tower is remarkably close to a bridge, and to the world-wide myth of the original bridge that linked earth to heaven and so acted as a passageway between earth and heaven. The fact that God chose to attack language rather than, for instance, the actual structure of the tower implies that men have been unconsciously aware that the bridge also symbolizes speech and communication.

Of course, the bridging function of communication is not confined to speech or to the concourse of different persons. Rather, bridging functions exist also intra-psychically. For instance, the 'area of experience' or 'of illusion' as described by Winnicott acts as a bridge between the external, the 'real', the 'objective' world on the one hand, and the individual's personal, private, or unconscious world of wishes, hopes, fears, and phantasies on the other. In other words, the area of illusion acts as a bridge where the outer and the inner worlds can meet and 'play' together.

Again Jung's description of 'psychic reality' shows it to be also a bridge, a bridge between matter and spirit and between reality and phantasy. And so is imagination; and so is the symbol, because it functions as a link between disparate and distinct entities and enables man to concern himself with universal as well as with individual and separate objects—that is to say, it enables humankind to be concerned with facts as well as with

meanings. Indeed, to symbolize involves the simultaneous experience of both the known and the unknown, of the concrete and of the abstract.

A work of art is also a bridge, a bridge between an artist's feelings, imagination, and inspiration on the one hand and on the other his respect for and attention to the real, the concrete world, such as the qualities and characteristics of paints, canvas, stone, rules of language or of music, or even of the human body if it is to serve the choreographer or the theatre director. So art is also a bridge in as much as it serves as communication between the artist and his public.

It must be clear by now that the bridge has come to be for me one of the most appropriate and telling of symbols and metaphors, representing both separateness, diversity, and uniqueness on the one hand and relationship, contact, and communication on the other. The fact that the rites and rituals in relation to the bridge and bridge building are so universal and similar suggest that it is indeed a deeply embedded image, an archetypal image, carrying for us much affect and meaning; it is thus part of our natural psychic equipment and endowment.

In this book I try to look at a number of psychodynamic concepts, processes, symptoms, and also achievements in terms of the bridge and the bridging functions.

Apart from the introductory chapters—the Prologue, which I offer as a sort of metapsychological backdrop to my general approach and as a way of introducing myself—I have divided the book into three parts:

PART ONE: *Bridges: Intrapsychic Structures and Functions.* Here I explore, review and re-assess some basic Jungian concepts in terms of the bridge and the bridging processes.

PART TWO: *Bridges Broken.* I deal there with clinical experience, clinical practice, and some of the mental disorders.

PART THREE: *Bridges Built* contains chapters that deal with questions of psychological growth, creativity, and the arts—in other words, with the achievements of men and women in their search for communication, for self-development, for individuation, and for meaning. Such achievements, I believe, depend and are founded on making and maintaining links—that is, bridges—intra-psychically as well as inter-personally, between the divided, the differentiated, the separate, and the distinct.

PROLOGUE

CHAPTER ONE

Jung: rebel son or prophet?

As I began to find material for my theme amongst the wealth of Jung's ideas about the unconscious, it felt like yet another validation of my original decision to become a Jungian rather than a Freudian analyst.

I remember that I was anxious to find an analytic discipline in which the characteristics of each person would be respected, and addressed according to their needs rather than those of the analytic dogma.

I wanted to find a school of thought that would be relatively free from dogma and premature theses.

I was looking for a group of like-minded colleagues, and my interests were broad: creativity, the meaning of life and death, myths, religions, literature, and the arts. I did not want any of these to be analysed in a way that would reduce their richness to mere categories such as instincts or drives. Perhaps making the right choice today would not be so easy, because there have been enormous developments in both Jungian and Freudian schools of thought, resulting in considerable overlap.

The gap between the two schools at the time of my decision was an echo of the split between the two founders of the Jungian and Freudian schools.

In order to understand Jung and his split from Freud, one has to take into account not only the differences in their personalities and their cultural origins, but also that, unlike Freud, when Jung started out as a psychiatrist in a large mental hospital he had to deal with and observe a great many psychotic patients who were often of a lower social class than were Freud's. As is well known, Freud's patients belonged to an urban bourgeoisie in Vienna, where a great number of doctors were very busy venereologists. Thus sexuality, it seems, was a very real problem for the Viennese.

This difference in milieu and clinical experience was obviously a major obstacle between the two men, and it threatened their collaboration. The other source of their conflict erupted as a result of their transference relationship; neither of them knew at that time of the elemental powers loosed by transference.

It is quite clear that the concept of the unconscious, which Jung, originally inspired by Freud, had formulated and developed, was a result of his work with psychotic patients, and even of his failure with them when he treated them according to a purely Freudian psychoanalysis. He was forced to become aware of the fact that the affective relationship to the mother is much more important than Freud had been able to discover by working only with neurotic patients. The suppression of the reality principle in dementia praecox could not be due only to the repression of the libido, which Freud had conceived and defined as sexual hunger. Furthermore, in dementia praecox there is a remarkable parallelism between the phantasies of patients and some of the themes of mythology.

Thus the most important difference between Freud and Jung is their concept of the unconscious. Freud thought of the unconscious as the reservoir of those experiences which the individual had in fact felt to be painful, shameful, or guilt-making. Consequently, its origin was ontogenetic and different and special for each person. The Freudian unconscious thus resembles an attic full of dirty and rejected objects, covered over with cobwebs. As it is painful to penetrate there, it is obviously avoided as much as possible, because all one would come away with would be old rubbish. Given this concept of the unconscious, Freud must have puzzled over the origin in the psyche of the drives, the instincts, and the id.

As for Jung, he contended that Freud's concept of the unconscious could not encompass even his own theories, and certainly

could not explain the phantasies and the phenomena of psychosis. He was thus led to suggest that the unconscious contains two parts: the personal unconscious that Freud had explored, and the collective unconscious, the personal unconscious being only a small part of the whole unconscious. He thought of the collective unconscious as consisting of instincts, drives, and phantasy images, which have never been conscious and which are of phylogenetic origin. But they are also present in myths and legends. Thus the collective unconscious contains all the potential qualities that men and woman share by virtue of the fact that we all belong to the same species—homo sapiens.

At the beginning of their collaboration, Freud looked as if he might recognize the implications of Jung's thesis, and in a letter to Jung (Freud & Jung, 1975) in 1910 he wrote:

> Your deepened view of symbolism has all my sympathy. True, what you write now is only a hint, but in a direction where I too am searching, namely archaic regression, which I hope to master through mythology and the development of language. [p. 291]

In 1911 Freud restated his position:

> If there is such a thing as phylogenetic memory in the individual, which unfortunately will soon be undeniable . . . I have been working in a field where you will be surprised to meet me. I have unearthed strange and uncanny things and will almost feel obliged not to discuss them with you. But you are too shrewd not to guess what I am up to when I add that I am dying to read your 'Transformation and Symbolism of the Libido'. [p. 449]

Again, in 1912 Freud (1912e) declared that Jung's ideas of an unconscious heredity in symbolism was in fact a demonstration of 'innate ideas' and one of the most important contributions he had made to psychoanalysis. Even thirty years later, in *Moses and Monotheism* (1939a [1937–39]), as Dehing has also pointed out, Freud formulated very clearly the hypothesis of a phylogenetic heredity consisting of 'certain predispositions possessed by all living beings, a faculty or tendency to adopt a certain kind of development and to react in a particular way to certain emotions, impressions or stimuli'. Do we not recognize here, implicitly—long after the break with Jung—a concept of the collective unconscious and the archetypes?'

Jung's hypothesis of the collective unconscious enables us to take into account the fact that the members of each species, including man himself, react in a characteristic manner, which ensures that they survive, procreate, and maintain the continuity of the species. In this way they remain attached to the history of their evolution, this history being preserved and conserved by the collective unconscious.

And here we come to the word 'archetype', so closely connected with the name of Jung. The archetypes are in fact intimately linked to the idea of the collective unconscious—although their character and their precise functions are still the subject of controversy, disagreement, and research.

Jung considered that the archetypes constitute the basis of the collective unconscious, which counters the hypothesis that man is born with the mind a *tabula rasa.* Already in 1919 Jung wrote that the archetypes determine a priori our drives, our perceptions, our sensibilities, and our knowledge of the objects around us. They force them to take the forms typical for the species; and so they allow us to orientate ourselves, to adapt ourselves and make use of the objects that exist in the world, both external to us and within us.

Jung, with the right proper to the seeker and explorer, changed his ideas about the archetypes several times. Initially, he was seduced by the idea that the archetype is innate, is inherited from our ancestors and hence fairly immutable. But he abandoned this concept quite quickly, and in his introduction (1935/1953) to *The Tibetan Book of the Dead,* he wrote:

> So far as I know, there is no inheritance of individual prenatal or pre-uterine memories; but there are undoubtedly inherited archetypes, which are, however, devoid of content because to begin with they contain no personal experiences. They only emerge into consciousness when personal experiences have rendered them visible. [para. 846]

I understand by this that the archetype, being at first devoid of content, participates in man's psychic life only if conscious experience has set it in motion. From this viewpoint the archetype can be defined as a psychic factor, which serves to organize and to 'programme' our actions, reactions, and behaviour. And this, it seems to me, relates it to the ethologist's 'innate release mechanism' (IRM)—that psychic structure whose existence we must postulate in order to explain why a particular and limited sensory

configuration is able to trigger off a specific reaction that ensures the survival of an individual.

Also, as ethologists have demonstrated in relation to 'innate release mechanisms', archetypes succeed each other in an ordered and logical manner, in a more or less regular and stable sequence. It is thus quite natural and normal that first the archetypal image of the maternal breast, then that of the appearance of the whole mother, should come into view before those of the father or the anima and animus. Here a psychic defect can develop, if the world that surrounds the baby or the infant does not provide at the right moment that which the emergence of a new archetypal image leads him to expect. Fortunately, man seems to possess a far more rich and varied range of archetypes than do other creatures, which means that he has more possibilities to compensate. What is more, each archetype is by nature bivalent, so that every archetypal experience is dominated by two opposing poles like the positive or negative, the good or evil, the benevolent or malevolent moods, feelings, and reactions.

When we speak of archetypes, we tend to speak mainly of the archetypal images of personages such as the witch or the hero. We discuss rather more rarely the archetypes of processes, such as birth or death, or the passage from one stage of life to another. And yet there are everywhere in the world, in nearly all cultures, collective rites that mark the passage from one stage of life to another, from one social role to another, and they display extraordinarily similar characteristics. Even less attention is paid to those archetypes that are imprinted on forms and structures such as the circle, the triangle, the *mandala*, the harmonies of sounds, and so on. And yet it would be extremely useful to take these into account and so contribute to the study of aesthetics, and to the criticism and history of art.

Jung arrived at the concept of the archetype not only through his work with psychotics, but also because he was fascinated by the study of myths and legends. What struck him in these two fields of research—psychopathology and mythology—was the repetition and universality of certain themes and certain images that occur throughout the world, in all periods of time, and in diverse cultures.

It is important to remain aware that the concept of the archetype is a metapsychological conception; it is not a sensed fact. In order to become an experience in the psyche, it must be embodied in an image, an emotion, or a phantasy; and such experiences are

always marked by an extraordinary emotional intensity, force, and power. 'Jung' so wrote Mircea Eliade,

> discovered the collective unconscious and its structures, the archetypes. With this thesis, this discovery, he has brought new light to the interpretation of myths, visions and dreams. . . . He did not reduce culture and spiritual life to the epiphenomena of infantile sexual complexes. [Tacou, 1982]

No description of the unconscious as conceived by Jung can avoid speaking about his concept of the 'psychoid', a hypothesis by means of which he tried to formulate a theory about the relationship of body and mind. The psychoid, he suggested, constitutes the origin, the basic substance, which then, in the course of personal and collective development, differentiates into matter or spirit or body and soul. Body and soul, therefore, are secondary products resulting from this process of differentiation of the primary material. Such a hypothesis can help us to understand and make more sense of the phenomena of psychosomatic illness. Sometimes Jung seems even to suggest that the demands of language and our intellectual functions (such as observation, investigation, reflection, and thought) compel us to postulate the existence of such a state. In a way Jung approached here the principle of complementarity as proposed by Niels Bohr. For Bohr also it was the limitations of human intelligence that made it appear inevitable that man can only understand the world, and the experiences it provides, through ambiguous and self-contradictory descriptions. Reality, according to Jung, is thus like a coin with two sides, and the essence of reality cannot be grasped, understood, or felt by us except with the help of differentiation and a constellation of the opposites. The hypothesis of a primary, or psychoid state, leads thus, in the last analysis, to a fundamental monism.

Jung's study of the unconscious has left us with what I call the 'anatomy' of the unconscious. But he has passed on to those who survived him the task to research and explore further its 'physiology and embryology', if I may use these metaphors. This is how I understand and appreciate the work of, for example, Michael Fordham. Being a child analyst, Fordham has quite naturally been interested in uncovering the forms of development and the stages through which the baby moves in its passage towards childhood and then to adulthood, taking of course into account

the various concepts already formulated by Jung. Thus he took Jung's concept of the self—the self being conceived as the source of images that symbolize union, unity, plenitude, itself being represented by them—and he sought for what might be their original form, the form one might find at the beginning of life. This led him to propose the existence of a 'primary self', or 'original self'. This would also be a state of psychic unity, having a simple structure, with little differentiation. Also, this is where not union—the process that dominates the self—but fusion and a drive towards fusion prevails. This is where the primary self reigns, says Fordham, and psychic experience is mainly unconscious. Further, this is the stage of autism as described by Margaret Mahler and Frances Tustin, among others.

Quite quickly, however, this dominance by the primary self is overturned and succeeded by the process Fordham has called 'deintegration', which then sets in motion the process of differentiation. Instincts, drives, and archetypal images, which Fordham called 'deintegrates' and recognized as identical with Jung's archetypes, now appear in psychic experience. The term 'deintegrates' reminds us that they have their origin in the primary self; hence they are always accompanied by experience of something special or sacred, something that is beyond the banal.

The validity and usefulness of these Jungian conceptions seemed to me to be reinforced when I discovered in my study of the religions of black Africa what appeared to be remarkable parallels, which, in fact, Mircea Eliade has also found in almost all religions. I gathered from these studies that there exists in all these diverse cosmologies a triad: the supreme god, who is beyond the comprehension and language of men and is not associated with any worship. He has no altar, no priest, and no rite is devoted to him. This supreme god, it is said, sends to earth and to mankind his sons, his messengers, or, according to the Ashanti of Ghana, his 'pieces', which contain a part of his essence. In this way the Supreme God, whose existence far surpasses man's intelligence, makes himself more accessible to his creatures by presenting himself in more concrete and corporeal forms. It is these forms that then serve as intermediaries between God and men—the third member of the triad being evidently man himself.

This triad, in my view, corresponds to the psychic triad as conceived by Jung: 'the self,' the deintegrates or archetypes, and the ego, the ego representing the centre of consciousness. The

self, as Fordham says, is the totality. Consequently, the self cannot be apprehended, since there is no one there, no subject that could see and know it.

The defraction of God, the splitting Him into His components, just like the deintegration of the primary self, is at the origin of the process of differentiation, both in the religions and in the psyche. I have no proof that this parallelism between the cosmic and the psychic triads rests on direct causality; but the fact that both exist increases their psychological significance and, what is more, confirms further the schema of the psyche as proposed by Jung and Fordham. Moreover it shows that myths, on the one hand, and psychic experience on the other, are not mutually reducible to limited and banal elements. On the contrary, they are obviously imbued with so much richness and subtlety that only the poetic form can communicate what is essential about them.

Having extended Freudian theory by adding to the personal unconscious the idea of the collective one, Jung created the basis on which our conception of the relationship between conscious and unconscious can be developed, which allows us to explore any new aspects or features. If there were only the personal unconscious, ontogenetic in origin and filled with repressed experiences, one could, at least in principle, exhaust it with the help of psychoanalysis. This was, in fact, one of the hopes of the early pioneers, a hope that was soon revealed as illusory.

What is more, an unconscious that is made up only of disagreeable and dismal experiences could offer nothing to enrich a person; indeed, such a notion expresses a dark and profound pessimism. And yet the study of artists, of art works, of dreams and of visions, all imply that the relationships between the conscious and the unconscious, and between what is felt as 'I' and what is perceived as being 'not-I', are extremely complex, subtle, and delicate.

In fact the unconscious would remain uncivilized, unserviceable, savage, and dangerous without the existence and the collaboration of consciousness. But, in its turn, consciousness without its relations with the unconscious would be colourless, anaemic, limited, and bereft of all imagination. Certainly Freud himself had suspected this when he said that the poets have always known it.

The collaboration between the conscious and the unconscious reveals itself vividly to those who study closely the process of

creativity—artists, scientists, philosophers, and psychologists. These studies show a remarkable agreement in relation to the stages of the creative processes, the nature of these processes, and the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious.

Jung paid much attention to the study of the positive effects of the relationship between the conscious and the unconscious. For him—and Neumann worked further on this idea—there are two fundamental tendencies in man. The first is the tendency towards separation and differentiation, which produces fragments of the unconscious to the process of consciousness. This always involves the sacrifice of original unity and leads to the experience of opposition and conflict. The other tendency is to unite all that has been separated and differentiated. Neumann called this tendency 'centroversion'. Centroversion is regressive, when through fusion it tends to re-establish a less complex totality. If these two tendencies—differentiation and centroversion—are in a state of equilibrium, we have what Jung has called 'individuation', which he studied almost throughout his life. This was well put by Eliade (Tacou, 1982) when he wrote:

> Jung was obsessed by the integration of the opposites and, in fact, this integration of opposites, the *coincidentia oppositorum*, is the key to Jung's system. . . . Jung discovered the collective unconscious, that is to say, all that is prior to the personal history of the human being, and he applied himself to deciphering the structure and 'dialectic' with a view to facilitating the relationship to the unconscious which then leads towards the integration of the personality.

Eliade adds to this his hope that Jung's disciples are going to continue and develop further his attempts to clarify the relationship between the conscious experience of the individual and his 'history' as conserved by the collective unconscious. I think his disciples have already begun this task.

I wrote at the beginning of this chapter that today I would find it more difficult to choose between the Jungian and Freudian schools, because the two schools have developed enormously since then, which is very encouraging because to stop developing brings fossilization and rigor mortis.

In the Jungian school the work of Neumann, of Henderson, and, above all, that of Fordham have advanced both theory and clinical practice by filling in the gaps that Jung had left.

Neumann made a special contribution by studying the order in which archetypal themes emerge, both in the phylogenetic evolution of the human species and in the ontogenetic evolution of each individual. He has thus enriched our knowledge of the archetypal themes by making us aware of their special significance, their function, and the task of each one of them.

Henderson has more recently added a further, very important dimension, with his concept of a 'cultural unconscious' being intermediate between the personal and collective unconscious. Through this extension he can explore and interpret three types of images, dreams, and fantasies: the personal, the cultural, and the archetypal, 'an arrangement that features all three, or, at times, one of them in tandem with the other two' (Henderson, 1991).

I have already mentioned Fordham's contribution, but I want to return to him for a moment in order to assess the importance to the development of Jungian theories of his concept of deintegration. This concept helps us to understand how consciousness and the ego evolve, detach themselves, differentiate themselves from the collective unconscious and how the deintegrates (archetypes) serve the organism to select from among the multiplicity of objects that surround it, and are useful for physical survival and psychological development. This concept enables us to understand that the archetypes represent only psychological possibilities—that is 'programmes', which are then personalized and incarnated in behaviour and in a more or less conscious experience.

The developments that have taken place in the Freudian school seem to me even more radical and more dramatic.

In her work with infants and adult psychotics, Melanie Klein was led to explore the pre-genital experiences and drives. Jung, it may be recalled, as early as 1912, in his book, *Symbols of Transformation*, spoke of an instinct of nutrition, or an alimentary instinct. Having researched and produced evidence of the existence of such an instinct, it is logical that from then onwards both Jung and Klein recognized and stressed much more than Freud had done the importance of the mother in an individual's development, and in the production of the collective myths. Furthermore, Klein put forward the hypothesis that there are 'unconscious phantasies', which she described as the 'mental expression of the instinct', that they existed from the very beginning of life, and that each instinct is associated with a specific unconscious phantasy which represents the goal of that instinct (cf. Segal, 1964). The

parallel between this description of unconscious phantasies and the definition of Jung's archetypes is striking. Finally, Klein belonged to that minority of psychoanalysts who actually accepted the hypothesis of a death instinct put forward by Freud in 1920, but which he did not pursue and study further, nor defend strongly. Although Klein only interpreted the systems of defence against the direct experience of this instinct, at least she recognized the problem of death.

Much influenced by Klein, Fairbairn also rejected the thesis that the psyche is primarily and predominantly a field of energy. Instead, he explored a person's object relationships. He believed that the relationship to the unconscious phantasies furnishes the inner world and affects and influences experience and behaviour just as much as do the relations to objects and persons external to the individual. Unconscious phantasies—and this must, of course, include archetypal phantasies—deserve, so Fairbairn argued, as much of our study and attention as do the energies of the drives.

Balint's clinical experience led him to propose the existence of three different psychic zones: the Oedipal zone, where there is a relationship between three people; the relational zone involving only two persons, the infant and the mother; and a third zone, the zone of creativity, where all is centred on a single person, the individual himself and his capacities to produce, to make, and to create.

As for Winnicott, he was interested above all in the psychological origin of man's capacity to play, to be in a relationship with the imaginary and with the world of symbols, and to create a culture that is religion and art. As early as 1929 Jung wrote in 'Commentary on "The Secret of the Golden Flower"': 'The creative activity of the imagination . . . raises man to the stature of someone who plays. As Schiller said, man is only truly human when he begins to play.' Winnicott was convinced that man does not want merely to exist; he wants to live, and this inevitably implies the need to find a meaning for his life, and for life in general. Thus he wrote in 'The Location of Cultural Experience' (1967): 'One can cure a sick person without knowing what impels him to continue to live. . . . The absence of a mental illness might be called health, but it is not life.'

Respect for the psyche of the patient really imbued and permeated Winnicott's clinical practice. He was, for instance, anxious and very concerned that he should not overwhelm his

patient by dazzling him with the impression that he, the doctor, knows all about what is going on in the depth of his, the patient's, psyche. As a result he was never in a hurry to proffer interpretations; and in any case he believed that interpretations should not be too far beyond or ahead of what was very near to becoming conscious to the patient.

Actually, Winnicott came very close to the idea of the archetypes when he suggested that images exist prior to and before an actual experience. He believed, for instance, that the baby, the new-born, tends to hallucinate the maternal breast, and that this is in fact the first sign of human creativity.

Marion Milner, following up the researches of the pre-genital and pre-verbal, was able to enrich our understanding of the psyche through her powerful and delicate poetic sensitivity. As Harold Searles (1970) has put it in his review of her book *The Hands of the Living God*, 'her poetic sensibility adds to the scientific value of this book. I am convinced that the phenomena of the development of the ego, which are founded on the pre-verbal stage can only be communicated by a writer sensitive to poetry' (p. 194)

Finally, the work of Bion, expressed in an extremely concise and condensed form, hence difficult to study, is really remarkable and displays an unusual understanding and sense of mystery. Like Jung, Bion had been much influenced by the theories of Kant. In the short biography devoted to Bion, Grotstein (1981) explained that Bion believed that man's unconscious is far older than man himself and that it is 'the mysterious source of creativity, imagination, evolution and development' p. 9).

Bion used the term 'alpha function' to indicate the existence and the experience of innate archetypal 'preconceptions', which, being the reservoir of ideas, wait to incarnate themselves in our sensory, cognitive, affective, and intuitive experience and function to facilitate communication between the conscious and the unconscious, just like Fordham's deintegrates. Bion also recognized that Freud had ignored the importance of the 'religious passion' in man. He thought of intuition as a psychological function superior to logical reflection. Moreover, with his idea of 'O' (pure thought, thought without the thinker), Bion hinted at his belief in the existence of God as the Holy Spirit. And he admitted that he had for a long time been struggling with religious experience, that he was seeking for absolute truth, and that he was

haunted by the image of God. For him, so Grotstein (1981) wrote, 'Truth is as necessary for the mind as is food for the body' (p. 33).

At the beginning of this chapter I tried to show some of the reasons that had impelled me at the time to choose the Jungian school. They could now be amplified and restated as:

1. respect for the person;
2. lack of dogmatism and closed systems;
3. concern for the relationship of man to death, to creativity, and to the need to find a meaning in life;
4. the need to find colleagues who are interested in the study of the great mythologies, the religions, literature, and art—in fact, I would include all the cultural forms created by man, for they are evidence that there are in man potentialities which, if they emerge from the darkness within him into the light of consciousness, can then nourish and enrich him.

This resumé, although absurdly brief, may nevertheless serve to give a glimpse of what according to my perception has happened in the two major psychoanalytic schools and the direction in which they have evolved and developed. This situation, far from distressing me, encourages me; it gives me confidence that we are on the right path, for, though starting from different places, we have reached similar questions and similar answers.

Looking at the developments that have taken place in the Freudian and Jungian schools brings to mind a quotation from Freud picked up by Eliade: that Jung started out as a brilliant scholar, and finished up as a prophet. I think that Freud was right to speak about Jung in this way. However, far from being a condemnation, as was his intention and feeling, I take this comment as one of the best descriptions and assessments of Jung's intuitive gifts. It is thanks to this gift that Jung was able to discover and bequeath to us hypotheses that analytic experience, accumulated for more than fifty years, has in fact proved seminal. Their efficacy has been proved, they have helped the development and evolution of our clinical technique, and they have been fruitful in the psychotherapy of our patients.

CHAPTER TWO

Conflict: combat or dance of the soul?

'It is the sacrifice of the merely natural man', Jung wrote, 'of the unconscious, ingenuous being whose tragic career began with the eating of the apple of Paradise. The biblical fall of man presents the dawn of consciousness as a curse' (1930, para. 751). And in the same article, 'The Stages of Life', he suggests that it is due to the development of consciousness that problems exist; they are in fact the doubtful gift of civilization and yet every problem brings with it the chance of a further extension of consciousness (para. 750).

Jung spoke about conflict in the same way. He said, for example, that civilized man, by separating himself from his instincts and from nature, has plunged inevitably into conflict, the conflict between consciousness and the unconscious, between spirit and nature, between knowledge and faith. These two terms—conflict and problem—signify, if not quite the same thing, at least similar experiences, being linked to one another by a close relationship and reciprocal action.

Conflict lies at the centre of all dynamic concepts about the psychology of man and, in consequence, lies at the centre of the theories of all schools of analytical psychology.

Moreover, the primordial act that brought about man's expulsion from Paradise was itself a consequence of conflict, a conflict

between curiosity and obedience or, in more modern terms, between adventure and dependence. It is of some interest that an African people, the Efiks, have the same myth but inverted. The Efiks recount how God had forbidden the first couple not only to make love and have children, but also to work and seek for food. The couple ate with God, and a bell called them for their meal times. But, according to the Efiks, they revolted against this kind of dependence and sought to free themselves, even if it cost them the loss of Paradise, the benevolence of God, and immortality. The Efiks were expressing the psychological fact noted by the American Jungian analyst, Edward Edinger (1963), when he wrote that when one dwells too long in Paradise it becomes a prison. Thus expulsion from Paradise could be felt not as punishment, but as liberation.

Conflict always presumes the existence of a schism and the absence of unity. The state of union can only be temporal and temporary, from which nothing can ensue except another schism. Even Paradise, which constitutes one of the symbols of an eternal state of unity, has never been present in man's imagination without invoking the image and idea of hell at the same time. Conflict, therefore, is fundamental to all that lives and even to all that exists, because all that owes its existence to conflict. Thus conflict implies meeting, collision, intercourse, and confrontation between two or several particles, whether physical or psychic.

By agreeing with the idea that conflict is the basis for all psychic development, the analyst ranks himself with dialecticians for whom contradiction constitutes fertile clashes, which lead to higher stages of development, to realizations, and to a superior reality.

But although analysts agree about the importance and the purpose of psychic conflict, and though they agree that conflict is unquestionably a major factor in psychic experience, they still produce among themselves a considerable number of splits and factions; in other words, they themselves show all the characteristics of the protagonists of those conflicts which they consider as primary.

When considering the standpoint taken by the various analytic schools, it becomes apparent that some emphasize the conflict between the individual on the one hand and the circumstances and people that surround him on the other. In contrast, others emphasize more the intra-psychic conflicts. In my view, Jung and Klein fall naturally into the second groups.

In this way we find the differences of opinion and theory between individuals and contemporary analytic schools. There are also differences between the various generations of analysts, and this is what we want; for it is our right to hope that our knowledge of man deepens progressively. Moreover, people who seek analysis are likely to differ in terms of the epoch and the culture into which they were born. Thus the women who were in analysis with Freud came largely from the Viennese middle class, among whom, at the end of the nineteenth century, puritanism and hypocrisy prevailed, especially in the domain of sexuality; they certainly provided him with subject matter and with problems that could have little in common with those brought by patients in the latter part of the twentieth century, our own century, an epoch distinguished by its re-evaluation of male and female relationships and by the contradiction between freedom and personal development on the one hand, and, on the other, socialization to the point of drowning in the crowd, the mob, or a totalitarian government.

Freud, as is well known, explained the basis of conflict in terms of three different principles: the pleasure principle against the reality principle; the impulses of self-preservation against the sexual impulses; and the impulse to live against the impulse to die. At the time conflict was seen in terms of the opposition between two instincts, two impulses. As a consequence of the development of a psychology of the ego our knowledge of the basis of conflict has become more complex. As before, analysts have continued to seek for the roots of conflict in the opposition between the instincts. But they have had to include the possibility that there is a conflict between the three structures of the psyche, either between the id—reservoir of the instincts and repressed experiences—and the ego (in this case it concerns the opposition between what one desires and what is possible) or between the id and the superego—and in this case there is a clash between desire and morality.

The development and emergence of the theory of internal object relationships has given us a vision of a psychic world well furnished with objects and people who are either of personal historical origin or else created by the imagination.

Furthermore, the development of Jung's researches has revealed to us that in the human unconscious there are depths only vaguely suspected by Freud, where themes, shapes, forms, and

super-real personages, evolved from and through the archetypal processes, abound and enrich our inner world.

The exploration of pre-Oedipal development, as well as the discovery of the mechanisms of perception and defence that characterize the early years, such as projection, introjection, and projective identification, has helped us to recognize just how complex is mental activity and how difficult it is to differentiate clearly that which is extra-personal from that which is intra-personal. Thus our paths towards knowledge have become very much more complex. Suppose, for example, that in our consulting room we are confronted with the conflict between a patient and his mother. Several questions arise: which person is in conflict; the person of today, the adult, or the person of the past, much younger? And the mother: is it she of today? Has she ever existed as she has been described? Or is it a phantasy figure resulting from projections and traits of either personal or archetypal origin?

There is little doubt—and there is hardly any disagreement—that a basic conflict exists between the demands of consciousness and those of the hidden desires that are typical of unconscious processes.

Jung, however, has added another dimension to our ideas about conflict when he proposed that the mind functions in a complementary manner, that archetypes are bivalent, and that opposites are always involved: they can be either non-differentiated or in contradiction, in union or in conjunction. Thus conflict is unavoidable; it is at the very heart of health.

It is here that a divergence took place from the original theories of psychoanalysis. In its beginnings psychoanalysts presumed that evidence of a conflict was both an indication and a cause of a psychopathology that had to be cured. Thus they considered it important to spare the child as much as possible from finding itself in a state of conflict, so as to prevent a subsequent mental illness, or neurosis. It is true that conflict is a rather disagreeable experience. The idea that conflict is a sign of illness goes well with the attitude and the illusion that was common during the earlier years of the present century: that life can be and should be completely without suffering. It seems that Jung very speedily dispensed with this utopian idea. Instead, he restored to man tasks that could not but increase his sense of dignity, of responsibility, and of his own significance. Furthermore, Jung suggested that man's tasks, problems, and conflicts

differ, depending on whether he is living in the first or second part of his life. During the first part a man has to make his way in life; in the second part he has to learn to let go of life, which means that he has to reconcile himself to death.

Some time ago, Erik Erikson (1966) made a careful analysis of the different stages in the life of man. He proposed eight stages, each of which is identified with a particular pre-eminent conflict. The first stage, for instance, is distinguished by the conflict between trust and mistrust. This is followed by self-determination, which is in opposition to self-doubt; then initiative, as opposed to the possibility of guilt; zeal and diligence, as opposed to feelings of inferiority; the search for identity, as opposed to role confusion; at the stage of early manhood we have intimacy, as opposed to isolation; and reproduction, as opposed to stagnation. During the second part of life despair arises, opposed to acceptance of one's own life, such as it is; and, finally, acceptance of one's own character and personality and the development of a sense of the spiritual.

Erikson's eight stages may or may not be accepted, but what matters is the serious view he takes of the existence of conflict.

As I have already mentioned in my Introduction, I believe that what distinguishes the neurotic are his attempts to avoid conflict, and, when he cannot, he feels angry and disadvantaged. Consequently, for him conflict is a fight and not a dance.

For instance, the patient, Paul, discussed in chapter five, demonstrated clearly his problem with conflict due to the contradiction of two opposing wishes: to fuse and remain dependent on his mother, or to be autonomous, a separate and distinct being. He seemed to feel that independence demanded that he suffer and make heroic efforts.

A second patient, discussed in chapter eighteen, showed in and through his psychosomatic symptoms his conflict between his need to assert himself and give vent to aggressions as against his longing to be loveable and to submit to a strict moral law.

Yet another patient was in conflict between his desire for undifferentiation and immortality as against his need as an artist to be available to feelings and to the sensuous quality of objects, which of course involves the recognition of general transitoriness.

As Jung has said, 'each conflict, even the neurotic's, is part of man's destiny' (1912, para. 252).