EMOTIONAL BUREAUCRACY

Rupert Hodder

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Preface

This book started out as an enquiry into the weakness of the Philippine civil service, but it quickly became an illustrative study of the importance of emotion in effective bureaucracy. Discussions with civil servants and politicians had begun to cast doubt on the Weberian distinction between emotion and a modern bureaucracy's impersonal and rational qualities, and led to quite another argument: that deepening emotion, a strengthened sense of the importance of social relationships, and informality are vital to the emergence of professional and stable organizations. Around this argument (which could not be particular to the Philippines) a still broader theme developed: that it is possible to account for social features with reference to actors' representations and practices.

Viewed through this perspective, actors' and scholars' representations (including notions of structure and culture) are necessarily of equal status, and interest is focused on the social world's "surface" features rather than on its putative deep or overarching structures (though the possibility that such phenomena exist is not ruled out). Implicit in this thinking is that the general is but a mental device—a way of arranging the particular; and that the world 'out there' must be extraordinarily fuzzy. Strings of representation and practice do form tangible opportunities and constraints; and there are ordered assemblies of strings. Shades of pattern and predictability arise from constant readjustments and compromise as actors seek a working fit with each other, aided by commonalities rooted in the human condition. These commonalities include, most fundamentally, an acute sense of self; a realization of the importance of interactions, relationships and community (upon which representations of self ultimately depend); and an understanding of the need to treat relationships, self, and others *as if* important in their own right. Yet these patterns of strings are poorly defined and are unable to reproduce themselves. They are better understood as congregations of everyday practicalities and commonalities rather than as closely integrated, large-scale, well-defined, and self-replicating arrangements in thought and behavior; and because they are dimensional, their subsequent influence (especially as constraints and opportunities) is ordinarily both uncertain and unpredictable.

Cast from this substance, bureaucracy is indefinite and ambiguous. Its weaknesses are as much about excessive formality as they are about personal-

istic behaviour, corruption, and political interference; and enmeshed around these features are other qualities—professionalism, technical competence, imagination, creativity, realistic compromise, commitment, and a willingness to take risks and suffer the consequences. Usually left unrecognised and undeveloped, these qualities—rooted in deepening emotion—keep the civil service and the organs of government working.

While these ideas are discussed in the context of the Philippines, they have much wider relevance to other states—especially, but not only, those whose bureaucracies are characterised as weak and personalistic. They suggest that these characteristics, and possible remedies, may need to be reconsidered: that it is through informality and emotion that more effective and stable organizations are built; and that excessive formalism may create the very problems that governments are trying to solve. The kernels—the means and qualities—around which bureaucracies might be strengthened are already "in-country" and need only be identified and encouraged.

Introduction

This study began with the simple, if ambitious, intention of understanding the weaknesses of Philippine bureaucracy. As it progressed, the study acquired two further levels of discussion. The first explores a model of bureaucracy—a model which, it is suggested, is peculiar neither to the Philippines nor to bureaucratic organizations. The second concerns ways of thinking about social features—ways that are more able to accommodate their dimensionality, less dependent upon the problem of structure, and less prone to their continuous bifurcation into classes (such as structure and agency, culture and structure, the political and economic, the formal and informal, the Western and non-Western, or even real and imagined). What emerges is an attempt to account for the social world and its attributes with reference to dimensional strings of representations (or understandings) and practices.

These discussions may be introduced through the matter of informality or, in other words, social relationships, emotion, and the unwritten norms and conventions that regulate them. Informality, it is often suggested, has an important place even in the most complex and formalized societies. It brings continuity despite alterations in the formal rules, processes, roles, and hierarchies of a society, and produces variation among societies with the same or very similar formal arrangements (North, 2004). And yet, as society becomes more sophisticated, formality is essential if predictability and stability are to be brought to organizations. Without it, organizations become weaker, interactions less efficient, and corruption more extensive. Informality and formality may lie along a continuum, but the two are quite distinct.

This distinction is sharpened by the suggestion that formality reflects a Weberian and, more generally, a Western cultural category. What is regarded as "informal" is, in fact, complex and different; and at the heart of this difference—and this is often thought to be especially true of Asia—is the primacy given to social relationships. Even corruption should not be seen in the narrow English sense of the word—with all its restrictive, provincial and puritan connotations—but rather as something more subtle, layered, and complex, like a "conversation, a ritual" (Haller and Shore, 2005: p. 3). In this respect, corruption is a form of exchange: a polysemus and multi-stranded relationship and part of the way in which individuals connect with the state (Haller and Shore: p. 7) Indeed, it is the ideal of formality and, more specifically, the rule

of law and a legal-rational bureaucracy, which "gives rise to the concept of corruption in the first place" (ibid.).

This dichotomy between the formal (the legal-rational and the impersonal) and informal (the social and emotional) is questioned in this study on Philippine bureaucracy. Deepening emotion[1] or an "affective"[2] state—it is argued—is indispensable to the emergence of effective organizations. These terms describe the treatment of both emotion (as a general quality) and the understandings or representations[3] which actors form about (and in relation to) one another *as if* these matters are of importance in their own right. This requires the synchronous treatment of rules, processes, roles and hierarchies (and the organization itself)—the representations which inform the reconfiguration of emotion and relationships into a functioning corporation—*as if* significant in themselves. Synchronicity is necessary because without the treatment of these representations *as if* absolute, their mystique is lost, the true social nature of the corporation becomes evident, and the use of emotions and relationships for particular ends is laid bare. It also happens that, as a consequence, the corporation may become more unpredictable and unstable. It is in this way and for these reasons that emotion and social relationships (informal social practice) are translated everyday into official practice (formality).

Further, though more technical, qualities which may help to explain the efficacy of bureaucratic organizations are: the extent to which actors' understandings of their role within the organization, and of the organization's role within wider government and society, are aligned and integrated; and the circumstances or conditions (the prior matrix of understandings and practices) which account for the nature and alignment (or nonalignment) of current representations and practice. A matter that has a particular bearing on the case of the Philippines is the adoption of an American-style government with its heavy emphasis on the division of authority. Informed by these practices and representations, bureaucracy shatters and, within its shards, partial and partisan understandings of government evolve; authority is widely perceived to be misallocated; and, in an attempt to remedy the apparent situation, rules and process are circumvented.

This emotional perspective confronts a tendency to conflate emotion with either irrationality or personalism (the use of relationships to secure personal ends); and to equate the impersonal with the proper state of affairs, with following the rules, and with impartial, effective and clean government. In fact, this perspective goes further and suggests that a fetish with being impersonal and with absolute rules, roles, and processes (and so, with correct behavior, strict propriety and the repression of any sign of instrumentalism) may both encourage and shroud a return to strongly personalistic behavior. It is where Puritanism and orthopraxy are strongest (as in those countries described as Western) that corruption, well hidden at first, is likely to proliferate. Emo-

tion, then, is placed at the core of an effective bureaucracy not because the Philippine civil service is "Asian" but because emotion and everyday social relationships are crucial to effective operation of any bureaucracy, East and West, North and South.

Strands of these arguments have appeared in the *Asian Journal of Social Science*, *Asian Studies Review*, *Environment and Planning C (Government and Policy)*, and *Geography Compass*, and in still earlier work (most especially on overseas Chinese and Filipino businesses). These publications are mentioned only because it helps to emphasize that this study was approached with various ideas in mind but with no framework intact. Indeed, as the work began in the field in Manila in 2007 it was clear that the application of any particular theoretical device would be rendered problematic by the comparative thinness of empirical and theoretical material on the civil service (whose analysis has been dominated by public administration perspective) and the wider political economy (in whose analysis patronage figures very strongly). Such a narrow base would only make it easier to accept, and more difficult to contradict, the motives and behavior assigned to politicians and civil servants through the application of one or another theoretical framework. For this reason, attention and energies were directed at gathering as many detailed (and triangulated) accounts and explanations of practice as possible from civil servants and politicians. As this material accumulated, however, it became clear that many possible and often contradictory frameworks (including many of those which have not been explored in the case of the Philippines) were capable of yielding intriguing and useful explanations for certain aspects of behavior but could not cope with others. The problem, then, is how to handle these dimensions?

The solution chosen is to accommodate civil servants' and politicians' accounts and explanations rather than to reject or re-interpret them in line with a preferred theoretical position. For these accounts, it is argued, trace interactions between "dimensional" practices and representations. That is to say, a given practice (such as the decision to rotate staff, or the influence exerted by a politician on an appointment in the civil service) or representation (such as the perceived misallocation of authority over the national budget) lies at the intersection—and simultaneously forms part—of several different strings of representations and practices. It is these strings of meaning and events that together constitute, say, "division," "office," "rule," "process," "hierarchy," "agency," "legislature," or "government," each of which (in so far as their constituent strings interconnect) is fused with one another.

An important element of this argument is that "self," "others," "social structure," or "culture"—whether formed by scholar or bureaucrat—are also representations, and have a bearing on the social world only to the extent that they inform practice. In this sense they are no different from "government," "office," "process," or "rule." This point is of some importance because

it refocuses attention on what might be called the surface features of the social world rather than on the "deep" structures of mind or society. There is, therefore, no compulsion to disentangle actors: either from the rules and principles which they create (and which, it is believed, are probably embedded at least partly in their genetic material and brain structures); or from those "external" regularized patterns of behavior which it is believed shape actors and which are, in turn, embodied and reproduced by them. In other words, it is assumed (*provisionally*) that understanding and explanation do not lie ultimately with something else (some kinds of biological or social structures) beyond practice and representation. Certainly, practice may impose very real limits and open up possibilities, so actors' representations of the social world may constitute what are, to them, tangible obstacles or incentives: together these strings of representations and practice comprise powerful constraints and opportunities. However, practices and representations are complex and dimensional, as are their antecedents[4] and their sequents.[5] Were it possible to step outside this matrix, then the patterns formed by these strings would appear to be extraordinarily fuzzy and indistinct. Representations of a world comprising sharply defined patterns may have a functional value in that they enable actors to operate and get by from day to day; and these representations may—to a limited extent, and more locally than over distance—find temporary and partial expression through practice. But, in the main, actors necessarily achieve a working fit with one another (and, therefore, a reasonable and practical degree of order and stability) through the constant readjustment of their representations and practice. This fit is achieved "necessarily" because fixed and coherent patterns of any great scale would breakdown more easily, while localized and constant adjustments are more flexible and durable. To this end, actors' representations of the general and distant social world are more functional rather than accurate. Thus, the fuzziness of the social world is perpetuated.

As the accounts of civil servants and politicians accumulated, a number of qualities in addition to their dimensionality began to emerge. Three of these are particularly significant. One is the common perception that, across government, authority is misallocated: that some branches, agencies and offices have too much authority while others have too little to carry out their functions and fulfil their duties properly. As already noted, the adoption of American-style government is one important reason for the emergence of insular and fragmented perspectives. But a marked difference among representations and practice, rather than sameness, is probably the default quality in a nation that is young, fragmented physically and linguistically, and a colonial manufacture. The prominence given to the market, and the efforts directed at economic growth both before and since independence, are also likely to produce different understandings of wealth, status, and purpose.

A second, and closely related, quality is widespread differences among officials both in their understandings (or representations) of the nature, function and behavior of other parts of government and other officials, and in the level of detail of their understandings. For instance, at the lower levels of the civil service, though not only at these levels, it is not unusual to find that officials have little sense of what it is that other officials, offices, agencies or branches of government do, or of how they should be integrated.

The third quality is the presence of affective and instrumental behavior in the same or very similar circumstances. It is suggested that deepening emotion forms part of three interlocking (rather than mutually exclusive) cycles at whose heart lies representations of "self" and "others." These cycles do not constitute external "forces." They are intended only as a means of describing strings of practice and representations whose abstraction, conceptually, from a fuzzy and dimensional matrix helps to account for particular features of the bureaucracy. Instrumentalism (it is argued) emerges with representations of self—representations which derive in part from the experience of awareness and the erroneous conclusion that self is the source of that awareness. But with awareness and the acquisition of a public language also comes the realization that "self" is rooted in, and dependent upon, interactions with other people and the natural world. The protection of relationships is therefore a powerful compulsion and a basic principle of practice. The first cycle begins when self, repeatedly challenged, tries to reassert its presence and qualities; and, as a consequence, instrumentalism and a sense of alienation strengthen. This downward spiral of alienation and instrumentalism (aided by over-conformity and authoritarianism as attempts are made to bring stability) prompts deepening emotion and then, in order to protect emotion, synchronous behavior within organizations. As effective organizations become prevalent and routine, there is a risk that an appreciation of the significance of deepening emotion will be dulled: and gradually and imperceptibly the distinction between relationships, emotion, rules, processes and organizations treated *as if* absolute and *as* absolute is lost. At first, in this puritanical atmosphere, any symptom of instrumentalism is prohibited. Self is at once idolized and hemmed in by an increasingly tight and complex mesh of orthopraxy. And once again, as this sense of repression and the desire to reassert self builds, a spiral of alienation and instrumentalism gathers pace.

The fundamental interdependency and interaction of these cycles may help describe other features, too. The significance of informality is overlooked when its translation is so much a part of everyday life and it is has become commonplace to accept the treatment of rules and process *as if* absolute; but it does become more noticeable when its reconfiguration into official practice is disrupted. When, in the case of the Philippines, relationships are used to circumvent and undermine rules and processes (such as those

governing civil service appointments) for personal ends; when there are divergent representations of government, its functions and policies (and, therefore, sharp differences over which rules and processes are accepted and acceptable); when there is over-conformity (and, therefore, little or no possibility that rules and processes can evolve along with understandings about what civil servants believe to be important and needs to be done); and when authority is perceived to be misallocated such that divisions in authority conflict with the fulfilment of what are felt to be critical responsibilities and duties: under these circumstances, as existing sets of rules, processes and organizations lose psychological force, and as civil servants attempt to keep organizations functioning through their own devices, informality becomes increasingly obvious.

The features of Philippine bureaucracy, then, are multiple and dimensional, and blanket judgments are, more often than not, unhelpful. Rarely are organizations exclusively self-serving or corrupt, or professional and compassionate: they are, more usually, ambiguous.

Notes

1. Emotion is understood here to refer to a belief about, and a desire for (or in relation to), something.
2. Following Aron (1935), the term "affective" is used by Gerth and Wright Mills (1977, p.57) to describe a type of action that flows from emotion. In this present book, "affective" or "affect" are used as above: to describe the idealization of relationships (and emotion) or, in other words, their treatment *as if* important in their own right.
3. Understandings or representations are used to describe constructs or mental states about a thing that may exist or which may only imagined, but in either case may inform practice. Representations therefore encompass emotions as well as ideas, beliefs, and imaginings.
4. The strings of practice and representation that inform the current string.
5. The strings informed by current strings of representations and practices.

1

Toward a Model of Emotional Bureaucracy

Introduction

The Philippines' civil servants staff the country's executive agencies, the secretariats of the legislature, the five commissions, the judiciary, local government, the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and the corporations owned or controlled by the government. They aid politicians in the formulation of policy and they implement policies; they keep the legislature and its committees working and help legislators and their staff draw up laws; they gather, coordinate and transmit information; they collect revenue; and they provide direct to the citizenry services of one kind or another, from the administration of justice, to policing, education, and health. In spite of its faults, which are many, the civil service is essential to the life of the Philippines. Without it the organs of government, inefficient though they may often be, would cease to function.

The Civil Service Commission (CSC) provides the service with a rudimentary sense of identity. The commission is responsible for: establishing the policies, regulations, procedures, qualifications, standards, and codes of conduct that shape recruitment, discipline, and other personnel matters (such as training). It also rules on administrative—as distinct from criminal—cases; and it defends and fosters the service in such a way as to strengthen the overall administration of the Republic. The organization of the service into three levels—first (clerical), second (technical and professional), and third (managerial)—also works to bind the service by setting out a clear hierarchy of authority and a ladder for advancement.

Third-level staffs hold the rank of director or above, and it is at third level that the bulk of political appointments (in national government agencies) are made. Political appointees occupying the highest echelons are usually brought in from outside the civil service and are, by virtue of their appointment, classified as non-career civil servants. The terms "non-career" civil servants and "political appointees" are, therefore, widely and loosely used interchangeably by civil servants and politicians, and this convention is followed in these pages. However, this convention ignores two facts: not all non-career civil servants are political appointees (there are very large numbers of contractual and casual staff); and career civil servants may also serve as political appointees (especially, though not only, at director level).

The highest-ranking, civil servants (non-career and career) together with complements of other ranks are housed in an agency's or a department's "central office." Both these terms—department and agency—are used to refer to an entire organization, such as the Bureau of Customs or Department of Education or Civil Service Commission (CSC). In some cases these agencies, while discrete, comprise part of a much larger agency. Thus, the Bureau of Customs and the Bureau of Internal Revenue fall under the Department of Finance. "Office" (when it is not used in the official title of an agency, such as the Office of the President) refers to the main functional segments (such as budget or accounting or human resources) within an agency.

The terms given to the internal segments and hierarchies of an agency (led by a Secretary), vary from one agency to the next. For the sake of consistency, "group" (led by Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries) describes a set of offices (usually with related and mutually supporting roles); "offices" (led by various grades of Directors) are usually arranged into divisions (led by a Division Chief) which are split into sections (each led by a Section Chief). In the Commissions, Directors are subordinate to Assistant Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners and Commissioners. At the regional level, national-line agencies are usually organized as an Office and are led by a Director.

Basic statistics on the civil service (or bureaucracy) are unreliable. For instance, figures available for the numbers of civil servants are derived from a census conducted by the CSC every four or five years. At the time of writing, the most recent census, 2004, puts the total number of civil servants in central and local government (excluding contractual staffs) at 1.33 million (see table 1). This figure excludes contractual employees and elected officials who together bring the total number of government workers to 1.47 million (see appendix I). The majority (67 percent) of civil servants (career and non-career) work in agencies of the National Executive; a little over a fifth (21 percent) occupy the three layers of local governments (provincial, city and municipal) (see appendices II, III, IV); and some 6.6 percent work in corporations owned or controlled by the government. By far the largest agency—with nearly 498,000 civil servants—is the Department of Education (which excludes State Universities and Colleges). The vast majority (86.5 percent) of its civil servants are teachers. Similarly, within the second-largest agency (the Department of Interior and Local Government) most (91 percent) staffs are uniformed officers in the police, fire or penal services. Even so, DepEd remains the largest agency with some 66,000 non-teaching staffs.

Non-career civil servants (or political appointees) constitute only 1.4 percent of the total Service (see table 2). The proportion is a little higher in the Department of Public Works and Highways, the Department of Transport and Communications, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Department of Energy, local government (see appendices II, III), the Judiciary, and government corporations; and it is much higher (see appendices V and

Table 1
Civil Servants (Career and Non-Career)

Congress Of The Philippines	4826
National Executive Agencies	
Department Of Education	497767
Department Of Interior And Local Government	149234
State Universities And Colleges	54835
Department Of Health	26307
Department Of Environment And Natural Resources	20550
Department Of Finance	19075
Department Of Public Works And Highways	18140
Department Of Justice	16137
Other Executive Offices	15380
Department Of Agrarian Reform	13905
Department Of Transportation And Communications	12416
Department Of Agriculture	12043
Department Of National Defense	9082
Department Of Labor And Employment	7272
Department Of Science And Technology	4405
National Economic And Development Authority	4233
Department Of Trade And Industry	3191
Office Of The Press Secretary	2319
Department Of Social Welfare And Development	2263
Department Of Foreign Affairs	1881
Department Of Tourism	1322
Office Of The President	1084
Department Of Budget And Management	865
Department Of Energy	621
Office Of The Vice-President	89
Local Government Units	
Municipal Governments	114635
City Governments	88736
Provincial Governments	73622
Constitutional Offices	17255
The Judiciary	26878
Government Owned and Controlled Corporations	88923
Autonomous Regions In Muslim Mindanao	24961
TOTAL CAREER AND NON-CAREER	**1334252**

Source: compiled from materials provided by the CSC, 2007.

VI) in those agencies whose functions are essentially political—the Office of the President (26.5 percent), the Office of the Vice President (22.5 percent), and the legislature (the Senate [52 percent] and the House of Representatives or Lower House [54 percent]).

The agencies considered in this book include: DepEd; the Bureau of Customs (with nearly 5,000 staffs) and the Bureau of Internal Revenue (a little

Table 2
Political Appointees as a Percentage of the Civil Service

	PA	PA%
Congress Of The Philippines	2509	52.0
National Executive Agencies		
Department Of Education	973	0.2
Department Of Public Works And Highways	482	2.7
Other Executive Offices	348	2.3
Office Of The President	287	26.5
Department Of Transportation And Communications	265	2.1
Department Of Agriculture	176	1.5
State Universities And Colleges	171	0.3
Department Of Labor And Employment	116	1.6
Department Of Finance	114	0.6
Department Of Justice	100	0.6
Department Of Environment And Natural Resources	95	0.5
Department Of Trade And Industry	77	2.4
Department Of National Defense	67	0.7
Department Of Interior And Local Government	58	0.04
Department Of Agrarian Reform	40	0.3
Department Of Social Welfare And Development	32	1.4
Office Of The Vice-President	20	22.5
Department Of Energy	20	3.2
Department Of Science And Technology	20	0.5
Office Of The Press Secretary	17	0.7
Department Of Tourism	14	1.1
Department Of Foreign Affairs	13	0.7
National Economic And Development Authority	13	0.3
Department Of Health	10	0.04
Department Of Budget And Management	3	0.3
Local Government Units		
City Governments	2885	3.3
Municipal Governments	3694	3.2
Provincial Governments	1674	2.3
Constitutional Offices	251	1.5
The Judiciary	1144	4.3
Government-Owned And Government-Controlled Corporations	2254	2.5
Autonomous Regions In Muslim Mindanao	144	0.6
Total	**18086**	**1.4**

Explanatory note: These figures include personnel classified as 'non-career executives' and 'non-career service'. 'Non-career executive' refers to placements at the upper echelons of an agency (usually its head) made by the President with the agreement of the Commission on Appointments, or by another official body); and either they serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority, or their term in office is prescribed by law. 'Non-career service' refers to placements at lower ranks; and whose terms are, again, either coterminous with the President (or another appointing authority) or tied to the duration of a specific project for which purpose the appointment was made. These figures exclude personnel who are elected, or who are classed as contractual (employed for less than a year) or as casual or 'job orders' (employed for less than 6 months and usually paid by the hour).

Source: compiled from materials provided by the CSC, 2007.

over 11,000) both of which fall under the Department of Finance; the Civil Service Commission awith around 1,300 staffs; the Senate and the Lower House (with staffs of around 1,500 and nearly 3,000 respectivelya); Quezon City Government (or City Hall) with nearly 5,000 civil servants; and the Manila Metropolitan Development Authority (MMDA) with a little under 5,000 civil servants.

Finding Perspective

Although responsible for the day-to-day business of government—and despite its complexity and size—relatively little academic analysis has been directed at the Philippine civil service or bureaucracy. Empirical data and field studies are fragmented, poorly disseminated, and often remain unpublished. The conceptual basis of its study is also patchy. Very few models of the Philippine bureaucracy have been developed. Amongst the most notable contributions are those made by Varela (1990, 1995, 1996) and Cariño (1992). Varela directs attention at the distortion of a properly functioning bureaucracy by Filipino culture. De Guzman (2003), too, argues that what is formally prescribed by government may not in fact be practiced because of the administration's search for flexibility as external family, kinship, political and socioeconomic groups bring their influence to bear. Cariño, on the other hand, in her model of bureaucracy as "administrative development," argues that the Philippine bureaucracy is shaped: by a constant struggle with the executive (a struggle which reaches its peak during legitimate and illegitimate change of executives); and by the behavior of a range of other actors within and outside government.

There have also been only few attempts to explore the relevance and potential value of those theoretical approaches which—though formulated with reference to bureaucracies in other developing societies as well as in "the West"—appear to lend themselves to the study of the Philippine civil service. For the most part its study has been dominated by just one approach—public administration. This directs interest at the processes, content and implementation of policies and programs of government, and at the delivery of services to the people through "cooperative human action" (De Guzman, 2003, p. 4) whether in the public bureaucracy, in the private sector, in non-governmental organizations, or in society more generally. Thus, Philippine bureaucracy tends to be viewed as only one amongst many sets of activities and organizations (public, private, and voluntary) that are the proper subject of study.

These studies comprise a number of fields: the management, leadership, and re-engineering of political, economic, bureaucratic and voluntary organizations and their interactions; the participation of private and voluntary organizations in the public sector; the privatization of public organizations; the direct participation of citizens in planning, implementing, and delivering

public services to the people; fiscal and monetary policy; local government and finance; technology's contribution to effective government; administrative accountability; and the strengthening of values conducive to effective administration. Many of these studies necessarily touch upon the bureaucracy, but relatively few concentrate wholly or largely on the civil service. Those that do, tend cluster within three of these fields. In the first (reorganization, management, and leadership), efforts focus primarily on the bureaucracy's historical evolution,[1] on its infiltration by what are held to be cultural features (including patronage), on its technical adjustment (including adjustments to pay, incentives, grades, and performance management systems), and on the failure the draw a clear line between the civil service and the polity.[2] In the second and third fields—administrative accountability, and the propagation of correct values—interest is directed mainly at corruption's effects, causes, and solutions.[3]

Underlying many of these studies is Weber's notion of rational bureaucracy which, in its ideal form, is both technically superior to any other kind of organization (Gerth and Wright Mills [eds. and trans.] 1977 [hereafter referred to as "Weber"], p. 214), and the most highly developed means of power ("Weber," p. 232). These qualities, Weber believed, owe much to a type of rational action described as instrumental or end-rational. This refers to an interest in means, rather than in the given ends or wants to which those means are directed. In contrast, value-rational action refers to the primacy of an interest and belief in particular values for their own sake rather than in the means by which they may be lived out. Both these types of rational action are contrasted with less rational or irrational types of motivated action—"affectual" action (motivated by sentiment or emotion) and "traditional" action (motivated by unreflective habit). Understood in this way, rational bureaucracy possesses a number of other important and related features. First, it separates the bureaucrats' private life from their official life. Secondly, the bureaucracy, as it develops, becomes increasingly mechanistic and depersonalized. Business is discharged according to calculable rules and without regard to persons. And the more it is dehumanized—and the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business "love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation"—the closer it moves towards perfection ("Weber," p. 216). Thirdly, the bureaucracy is based upon the leveling of economic and social differences, and, once established, works to level those differences still further. Indeed, bureaucracy inevitably accompanies mass democracy. "This results from the characteristic principle of democracy: the abstract regularity of the execution of authority which is the result of the demand for 'equality before the law' in the personal and functional sense—hence, of the horror of 'privilege' and the principled rejection of doing business 'from case to case'" ("Weber," p. 224). Fourthly, the bureaucracy takes on a permanent character. It is "*the* means of carrying

'community action' over into rationally ordered 'societal action'"[4] which, if methodically ordered and led, "is superior to every resistance of 'mass' or even of 'communal action.' And once the bureaucratization of administration has been completely carried through, a form of power relation is established that is practically unshatterable" ("Weber," p. 228). Rational bureaucracy, then, destroys those structures of domination (such as patrimonialism and patriarchy) which have no rational characteristics ("Weber," p. 244). But its march is relentless: the individual bureaucrat "cannot squirm out of the apparatus in which he is harnessed....the professional bureaucrat is chained to his activity by his entire material and ideal existence. In the great majority of cases, he is only a single cog in an ever-moving mechanism which prescribes to him as essentially fixed route..." ("Weber," p. 228). As the bureaucracy expands, as the fate of the masses is made dependent upon it, and as all are ushered into the machine, creativity, honor, charisma, and the individual are eroded; and humanity is condemned to a dull, repetitive existence.

Weber's influence is not always made explicit in studies of the Philippine civil service,[5] even though the service either aspires to or exhibits (though by no means either consistently or perfectly) all of the specific characteristics possessed by a bureaucracy as understood by Weber: fixed and official jurisdictions; principles of office hierarchy and levels of graded authority; the creation and preservation of files; officials imbued with special technical learning of the organizations' rules and through training in the specific aspect of their job; officials who are appointed on merit (and who are not considered the personal servant of the ruler), who are tenured, who earn a fixed salary, who are presented with a clear career structure, and who are held in high esteem. However, Weber's work does appear to speak more easily to studies of the Philippine polity. And it is from these studies that some of the most influential commentaries on the Philippines have emerged over the last sixty years. Of particular significance has been the work of Carl Lande who, when he began his work in the Philippines in the 1950s, was struck by the fact that in every province it was members of the wealthier classes or their representatives who led the two major political parties, and who benefited from government policy and action. How did they manage to win the votes of the poor? An important part of the answer, Lande argued, was the system of patron-client relationships or political clientelism: "the upwards flow of votes from ordinary voters to wealthy candidates ... and in return, the downward distribution of public and private funds and other favors to individual leaders and their followers among voters. Hoping to share in this distribution of benefits, poor voters could not afford to vote their class interests by supporting candidates of the left" (Lande, 2002: 120). During the years of martial law under Marcos, the two-party system collapsed and was replaced by competing presidential candidates all of whom were heavily dependent on their home regions for support, and treated political parties

as transitory electoral vehicles. Philippine politics certainly changed over the years, but "personalism and clientelism remain an important element of electoral politics" in the rural areas at least (2002: 122).

In more recent years the conceptual base for analysis has broadened as variations on this theme or new models of polity have evolved (see, for instance, Landé, 1965, McCoy, A.W. (ed.) 1993, Hutchcroft, 1998; Putzel 1999; Sidel, 1999; Thompson, 1995; Wurfel, 1988). For while the patron-client framework is deservedly influential, there is a need, as Kerkvliet (1995) argued, to move beyond it and develop a more textured view of the Philippine polity. Yet Weber's influence remains strong as in Hutchcroft's patrimonial analysis. He argues that the Spanish failure to engage in state building provided room both for the emergence of strong British, American, and Chinese trading houses, and for the entrenchment of a Chinese-mestizo landed élite. This decentralization of power was reinforced by the Philippines' American rulers, who concerned themselves mainly with the construction of representative institutions while leaving outside those institutions oligarchs with their own strong economic and social bases. After independence, these oligarchs, both directly or through their proxies, moved in and out of those institutions at will and, as they did so, continued to maintain and build up their own external social and economic power bases. Local patrons in the provinces, through their personal relationships with the center, drew money, materials, and authority, towards themselves. Family businesses, faced with hostile and unpredictable circumstances, established complex and aggressive networks of relationships through which they could influence the political economy to their own advantage and to the disadvantage of their enemies and competitors. The center was rendered weak, and the state was left vulnerable to influence from powerful individuals and factionalized groups operating outside its institutions. Thus, the Philippines lies some distance from a strong, regularized, formal, impartial, legal-rational economy and polity of the kind described by Weber as a bureaucratic administration. In particular, argues Hutchcroft, the Philippines lacks calculation in the administrative and legal sphere; and family and business are not clearly separated. The essential question facing the Philippines is how it might transform itself from its present condition into a regularized, legal-rational, and bureaucratic state? Sidel, too, focuses in on broad historical and structural conditions. He argues that local bosses—in municipalities, congressional districts, and provinces—emerge and become entrenched under certain structural conditions. Widespread poverty and economic insecurity greatly accentuate the significance of state resources and provide those with control over those resources and state regulatory powers with the means to accumulate private capital. The actions of the Philippines' American rulers—who "subordinated a weakly insulated state to officials elected locally and under … restricted suffrage" (2002:133), and superimposed this system upon an economy at such an early stage of

capitalist development—was bound to produce "bossism." Since access to resources is the overriding priority, and since that access is controlled by locally elected politicians, then the provision of public goods and services is very likely to be dependent upon the discretion of those local politicians (2002: 136-37).

While often quite open—as in the case of, say, Hutchcroft's patrimonial analysis, Sidel's references to charismatic authority in his interpretation of bossism, or Thompson's exploration of sultanism[6] in his analysis of the anti-Marcos struggle—Weber's influence may also take on an amorphous quality and in this sense permeates a good deal more thought on the Philippine polity. For instance, the personalistic or particularistic behavior that is felt so often to characterize political and bureaucratic life in the Philippines, resonates with Weber's view that modern bureaucracies are more the exception than the rule: "even in large political structures such as those of the ancient Orient, the Germanic and Mongolian empires of conquest, or of many feudal structures of state. In all these cases, the ruler executes the most important measures through personal trustees, table-companions, or court-servants. Their commissions and authority are not precisely defined and are temporarily called into being for each case" ("Weber,"196-97).

This affinity between, on the one hand, Weber's rational bureaucracy and, on the other hand, studies of the Philippine polity (and the relative marginalization of the Philippine civil service in academic analysis) probably has much to do with the general and creeping bureaucratization of life in the West[7] and what is perceived to be the comparative weakness of that process in the Philippines today. It is, in other words, Weber's apparent foresight (see, for instance, Ritzer 2006, 2004), and the failure of the Philippines to bureaucratize as deeply and effectively as many Western societies, that charges Weber's work with analytical power: comparing "what should be" with "what is" provides a frame with which to construct possible explanations for the actual state of affairs in the Philippines today. Another, and perhaps more important, reason for the comparatively modest attention given to the Philippine civil service, and for the redirection of Weber's model to the study of the political economy, is the view that the bureaucracy is severely weakened, distorted, and corrupted by external political and business interests. It is with these interests that real power and influence lies, and on which it is more profitable to focus analysis. This is a view that also harmonizes with the public administration approach. Certainly, as Carino (1992) points out, a general conclusion of its study is that the bureaucracy is a tool for politicians as they pursue economic and political objectives either for their own benefit or on behalf of—and frequently in collusion with—particularistic and private interests rooted outside state agencies. To these ends, politicians will distribute the resources they control and the many favors that lie within their gift. In so far as it is ever made a focus for analysis, then, the Philippine

bureaucracy is treated as part and parcel of a political economy that is inefficient, ineffective, and corrupt.

It is, therefore, understandable why the Philippine political economy should have attracted so much more attention, and why its analysis should be framed so strongly in terms of its departure from the Weberian ideal. It is surprising, however, to note that analyses of the Philippine civil service tend to be somewhat insulated (though not exclusively so[8]) from an extensive range of other international and theoretical perspectives on government and bureaucracy (and especially on bad government and bureaucracy). Of these, five perspectives seem to be especially relevant to the Philippines. These intersect with each other and with the debate on the Philippine polity referred to above.

1. The first perspective is as much concerned with behavior within bureaucratic organizations as with the wider political, economic and social context in which those organizations sit. It includes a range of approaches from, say, Weber's rational bureaucracy to public choice and bureau-shaping models,[9] and other still more generic theories of organizations and society. These perspectives also vary in the extent to which the explanatory burden is shared by "structure" and "individuals." Of particular interest are: the concept of organizations as social—rather than as purely, economic, political, or technical—processes (a quality emphasized by role of informal social relationships in undermining the official); and the view that organizations are social systems which interact with other social systems. A society's economy and polity (and so the organizations from which it is constituted), Parsons argued, are synonymous with "adaptive" and goals attainment systems; and conformity to a "patterns" or a shared system of value-oriented structures (rooted in a cultural system) brought a degree of stability to society. A failure to socialize actors through education initiated methods of coordination and control or "integration." Differentiation in these systems produces a constant process of splitting and re-integration of society into more complex forms. Other writers, while acknowledging the constraints within which actors must operate, allow them a little more room. Indeed, many go further, taking the view that organizations comprise human beings who, as they interact and attempt to give meanings to the wider world and self (which is shaped by interactions with other people[10]) produce streams of activities in constant change. A more recent and highly influential "take" on organizations is new institutionalism. While this returns more emphasis to structure, it also recognized the complex (as opposed to the purely economic) understandings of human behavior, and is willing to accommodate actors' representations of their world and, again, the importance of informality. For North (2004), institutional change is the result of interactions amongst formal constraints (conventions, codes of behavior and other socially transmitted information)